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dc.contributor.authorTiozzo, Marco
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-07T08:58:39Z
dc.date.available2018-12-07T08:58:39Z
dc.date.issued2018-12-07
dc.identifier.isbn978-91-7346-991-3
dc.identifier.issn0283-2380
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/57974
dc.description.abstractRecent years have seen an increasing interest in the philosophy of disagreement, especially in epistemology where there is an intense debate over the epistemic significance of disagreement and higher-order evidence more generally. Considerations about disagreement also play an important role in metaethics – most prominently in various arguments that purport to establish moral skepticism. This thesis presents five papers that address moral disagreement and the significance of higher-order evidence. The first two papers develop a view about higher-order defeat that is used in the dissertation. The other three papers consider specific arguments from disagreement. The third paper argues that the Argument from Peer Disagreement fails to make a case for widespread moral skepticism; mainly because higher-order evidence only contingently leads to defeat. The fourth paper examines a recent attempt to epistemically account for faultless moral disagreement without giving up on moral realism. The paper argues that this attempt to accommodate faultless disagreement is unsatisfactory. The fifth paper develops a new argument against cognitivism: the Argument from Dogmatism. The argument holds that the conceivability of moral dogmatists, i.e., agents who stubbornly stick to their moral judgments in the face of putative counterevidence, gives us reason to think that moral judgments are not evidence-sensitive in the way beliefs are.sv
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesActa Philosophica Gothoburgensiasv
dc.relation.ispartofseries34sv
dc.subjectMoral Disagreementsv
dc.subjectHigher-Order Evidencesv
dc.subjectMoral Skepticismsv
dc.subjectPeer Disagreementsv
dc.subjectFaultless Disagreementsv
dc.subjectMoral Intransigencesv
dc.subjectEpistemic Rationalitysv
dc.titleMoral Disagreement and the Significance of Higher-Order Evidencesv
dc.typeText
dc.type.svepDoctoral thesiseng
dc.gup.mailmarco.tiozzo@gu.sesv
dc.type.degreeDoctor of Philosophysv
dc.gup.originGöteborgs universitet. Humanistiska fakultetenswe
dc.gup.originUniversity of Gothenburg. Faculty of Artseng
dc.gup.departmentDepartment of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science ; Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteorisv
dc.gup.defenceplaceFredagen den 11 januari 2019, kl. 14.15, T302, Olof Wijksgatan 6sv
dc.gup.defencedate2019-01-11
dc.gup.dissdb-fakultetHF
art.description.project189


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