Regulatory Compliance in Lake Victoria Fisheries
Sammanfattning
This paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance using traditional deterrence
variables and potential moral and social variables. We use self-reported data from Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicate that fishers adjust their violation rates with respect to changes in the probability of detection and punishment, but they also react to legitimacy and social variables. A small group of persistent violators react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables, but systematically
violate the regulation and use bribes to avoid punishment.
Universitet
Göteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Law
Samlingar
Fil(er)
Datum
2005Författare
Lokina, Razack B
Eggert, Håkan
Nyckelord
compliance; fishery; Lake Victoria; legitimacy; normative; deterrence
Publikationstyp
Report
ISSN
1403-2465
Serie/rapportnr.
Working Papers in Economics, nr 175
Språk
en