dc.contributor.author | Tsakas, Elias | |
dc.contributor.author | Voorneveld, Mark | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-06-18T07:41:38Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-06-18T07:41:38Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-06-18T07:41:38Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1403-2465 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/4576 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian
agents. We show that, in contrast with claims to the contrary in the existing
literature, communication under a fair protocol may not lead to common knowledge
of signals. We prove that commonly known signals are achieved if the individuals
convey, in addition to their own message, the information about every individual’s
most recent signal they are aware of. If the signal is a posterior probability about
some event, common knowledge implies consensus. | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers in Economics | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 255 | eng |
dc.subject | Private information | eng |
dc.subject | communication | eng |
dc.subject | common knowledge | eng |
dc.subject | consensus | eng |
dc.subject | JEL: D82, D89 | eng |
dc.title | Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus | eng |
dc.type | Text | eng |
dc.type.svep | report | eng |
dc.gup.origin | Göteborg University, School of Buisness, Economics and Law | eng |
dc.gup.department | Department of Economics | eng |