Do You Believe Me? Public Sector Incentive Systems in Japan, Korea, Spain, and Sweden
Sammanfattning
This paper presents a theoretical hypothesis for understanding the success of
performance-related incentives in the public sector, based on insights developed in the
private sector. The paper argues that incentives are more likely to be implemented in
administrations in which there is a relative separation between those who benefit from
the incentive system (e.g. politicians) and those who manage it (e.g. senior civil
servants). Where the interests of both groups overlap (e.g. the careers of senior
officials and politicians are intertwined), incentives will be less credible and thus less
likely. Narratives from four OECD countries – Sweden, Korea, Spain and Japan –
show that performance-related pay is used significantly more in contexts with clearer
separation of interests between politicians and senior civil servants (Sweden and
Korean) than in countries with a historical integration of careers and activities at the
top of the administration (Spain and Japan).
Länk till verkets webbplats
http://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1350/1350676_2008_25_dahlstrom_lapuente.pdf
Fil(er)
Datum
2008-12Författare
Dahlström, Carl
Lapuente, Victor
ISSN
1653-8919
Serie/rapportnr.
Working Papers
2008:25
Språk
eng