Ghana’s ‘Two Publics’ and the Crisis of Impartiality in Customary Land Governance

Abstract

Why do reform efforts to create effective public institutions in Africa frequently fail? This article addresses this question through a case study of Ghana’s customary land governance reforms, which, despite extensive donor support, have failed to institutionalize chief accountability. Drawing on the theory of effective public institutions as those that produce impartiality, the study argues that the failure of Ghana’s Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) stems not merely from resource constraints but from entrenched cognitive, political, and structural inequalities. Using data from elite interviews, legislative debates, and household surveys, this article demonstrates how power asymmetries between chiefs and citizens, weak institutional designs, and fragmented cognitive frameworks undermine the emergence of impartial public institutions. The findings contribute to governance theory by showing that institutional reforms cannot succeed in the absence of cognitive, political, and structural equality across the primordial and civic publics. The study offers a cautionary perspective for reforming customary land governance in Africa.