Negative Externalities in Day Care: Optimal Tax Policy Response

Ohlsson, Henryswe
Lundholm, Michaelswe
Department of Economicsswe
2006-12-08swe
2007-02-09T11:16:07Z
2007-02-09T11:16:07Z
2002swe
Systematic pediatric evidence shows that the morbidity rates for children in day care are increasing in the group size. Sick children are usually cared for at home by parents. This creates a negative externality of parents&#39 labor force participation. The social optimum implies lower group size than the non--intervention market equilibrium. We study the optimal tax policy. The cost of labor force participation should be increased. This can be done by either or both tax on day care services and a home car allowance. The cost of providing day care should be decreased by a subsidy to entrepreneurs running day care centers. This policy will decrease the group size. It is, however, not necessarily the case that this will decrease labor force participation.swe
22 pagesswe
280035 bytes
application/pdf
1967swe
Göteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawswe
1403-2465swe
http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2835
enswe
Working Papers in Economics, nr 68swe
negative externalities; infections; day care centers; optimal taxation; Pigouvian taxesswe
Economicsswe
Negative Externalities in Day Care: Optimal Tax Policy Responseswe
Reportswe

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
gunwpe0068.pdf
Size:
273.47 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

Collections