FUNDS FOR FAVOURS Leder sen absorbering av EU:s regionalstöd till ökade korruptionsrisker?

Abstract

This thesis explores whether late absorption of EU regional funds leads to increased corruption risks. While EU regional funds aim to promote economic growth and reduce inequality, the significant sums allocated – particularly to less developed regions – may create incentives for corrupt practices. The study focuses on the effect of the rule for automatic decommitment, which pressures member states to quickly absorb funds late in the budgetary process, as not to lose them. Previous research has mainly examined the impact of corruption on fund allocation, but few studies examine whether the absorption or budgetary processes themselves lead to increased corruption risks. Using data from Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) between 2007 and 2023, the thesis employs logistic regression to analyse the relationship between late absorption and corruption measured via the proxy "single bids" in public procurements. Results show that late absorption correlates with a higher likelihood of single bids, suggesting reduced competition and potential corruption. This relationship is especially strong in economically disadvantaged member states, where administrative capacity is lower. The findings contribute to previous research on how time pressure in absorption of EU funds may promote corruption and underscore the need for policies that emphasize long-term project quality over quick absorption of funds.