Bugs and Bureaucracies: Institutions, Administrative Autonomy, and the Governance of Antibiotic Resistance

Abstract

This dissertation investigates how variations in civil service arrangements among European states impact concerted governance over antibiotic resistance. Through four standalone research papers, it demonstrates that different institutional setups and degrees of administrative autonomy result in different governance outcomes. Consequently, concerted governance is deeply rooted in the institutionalized structures of domestic politico-administrative arrangements. However, the findings also suggest that even modest administrative reforms have the potential to disrupt the prevailing order. Crucially, the dissertation reveals that granting extensive latitude for action to senior civil servants and experts, driven by epistemic and collaborative values, creates favorable conditions for cross-sectoral and sustained governance. This holds true at both domestic and international levels. The dissertation contributes to the longstanding debate on administrative autonomy and political control, offering new insights into how these crucial factors should be configured for effective governance of collective action issues.