MORE MONEY, DECREASED DISCONTENT? Hur EU:s regionalpolitik påverkar väljarstöd för euroskeptiska partier

Abstract

This thesis investigates the relationship between European Union’s regional policy and voter support for Eurosceptic parties in the 2024 European Parliament elections. It examines whether higher levels of disbursed funds may decrease incentives for Eurosceptic voting, a connection rarely tested in the context of European elections. Previous research has been inconclusive; while some authors claim that this relationship exists, others even argue that higher levels of regional funding may, in fact, increase Eurosceptic voting. Beyond the main hypothesis, the thesis distinguishes between hard and soft Eurosceptic parties, arguing that the relationship is primarily driven by the former. Furthermore, I also assume that greater voter awareness of the policy may strengthen the relationship between regional funding and reduced Eurosceptic voting. Using quantitative methods, this study conducts regression analysis on NUTS2-level data, combining information on regional funds per capita, electoral results, and aggregated levels of voter awareness of EU-funded initiatives. The results reveal a significant negative correlation between regional funding and support for Eurosceptic parties, especially hard Eurosceptics. This relationship is further strengthened in regions where awareness of EU-funded initiatives is higher. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how redistributive policies at the supranational level may influence political preferences toward European integration among the European electorate.