INTERNATIONELLA POSITIONER OCH NATIONELL KORRUPTION En kvantitativ studie om icke-permanent medlemskap i FN:s säkerhetsråd och upplevd korruption

Abstract

Previous research has shown that non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council is associated with increased international influence, diplomatic leverage, and external resource flows. However, existing studies have primarily focused on the external consequences of membership, while its potential domestic effects remain largely unexplored. Drawing upon a principal-agent perspective, this study examines whether membership in the Security Council is associated with higher levels of perceived corruption. The study investigates whether Security Council membership may alter domestic incentive structures by increasing political actors´ access to resources and strategic opportunities. The theoretical framework suggests that the relationship between Security Council membership and corruption should be understood in relation to institutional context. In states with weaker institutional capacity and lower levels of accountability membership may create greater opportunities for opportunistic behaviour, whereas such effects are expected to be weaker in institutionally stronger states. Using panel data covering 173 countries between 2012-2024 and country fixed-effects regression models, the results show no general relationship between membership and corruption across states. However, the findings indicate that the relationship may vary across institutional contexts. Membership is associated with a weak negative relationship among non-OECD countries and a weak positive association among OECD countries when examined separately.