Uncertainty and Persuasion. Essays on Behavioral Political Economy

Abstract

When voters form their political opinions and decide whom to vote for, they are confronted with at least two types of uncertainty. First, voters cannot be sure what reforms a political party will pursue once in office. Second, the outcomes of political reforms are never perfectly known. How can political actors exploit this uncertainty to persuade voters and to shape public opinion? And how can voters mitigate this uncertainty by making inferences about the likely outcomes of political reforms and the credibility of parties' promises? Across three papers, I show that parties can shape public opinion by influencing voter beliefs about the outcomes of political reforms. However, voters discount both outcome predictions that clash strongly with their prior beliefs and policy changes which they perceive to be motivated by vote-maximizing considerations in contrast to sincere policy considerations. This dissertation shows that changing voter beliefs is an important way to shape public opinion, but that voters' pre-existing beliefs also constrain what politicians can claim without losing their credibility.