Expectations in the commons: On the dynamics of state-citizen cooperation contracts

Abstract

This thesis addresses the question of how citizens' expectations on state delivery matter for their willingness to cooperate with the state in delivering collective benefits. The argument made in the thesis is that citizens' positive expectations of the state may affect cooperation in both positive and negative directions. While expectations may let the state rely on forward-looking strategies to enhance cooperation, they may at the same time give rise to new citizen demands on the state. In this sense, citizens' expectations work both supporting and constraining for the cooperation contract, in which citizens cooperate reciprocally with the state in exchange for collective benefits. It is suggested that the dynamics of the cooperation contract is continuously updated along with citizen expectations and experiences with the contract. This implies that the contract dynamics regularly change not only in contracts that are about to stabilize or undergo larger transformations, but also in contracts that are considered stable and in well-functioning equilibria. By combining a contract perspective with a micro-level approach, the thesis sheds new empirical light on classical questions of citizen compliance, the social contract, and state-citizen dynamics more generally.