ExecutiveAppointmentsunderLegislativeOversight
| Dahlström, Carl | ||
| Holmgren, Mikael | ||
| The Quality of Government Institute | en | |
| 2023-03-27T19:44:58Z | ||
| 2023-03-27T19:44:58Z | ||
| 2023-03 | ||
| A largeliteraturearguesthattheexecutive’sappointmentpowersmaybestowthem with asignificantpolicyadvantageagainstthelegislature.Inpractice,however,the legislature mayalsodeployavarietyofinstrumentstostrikebackatopportunistic executives.Inthispaper,weusefivedecades’worthofdatafromtheSwedishgovern- menttoinvestigatewhethertheexecutivemightadapttheirappointmentstrategies to legislativepressures.Wetakeadvantageofavastsystemof ad-hoc commissions that theSwedishministershavedevelopedovertimetotracktheirsensitivitytothe parliament’sideologicalcomposition.Wefindthat,whiletheministersgenerallyover- sample appointeesfromtheirownpartisanranks,theoveralldistributionofpolitical appointeesalsotendstoshiftalongwiththeparliament’sbalanceofpower.Inline with recenttheoriesofinterbranchrelations,ourresultshighlightboththeexecutive’s penchantforbureaucraticopportunismandthelegislature’sconstrainingreach. | en | |
| 1653-8919 | ||
| https://hdl.handle.net/2077/75729 | ||
| eng | en | |
| Working Papers | en | |
| 2023:4 | en | |
| https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2023-03/2023_4_Dahlstrom_Holmgren.pdf | en | |
| ExecutiveAppointmentsunderLegislativeOversight | en | |
| Text | en | |
| article, other scientific | en |