ExecutiveAppointmentsunderLegislativeOversight

Abstract

A largeliteraturearguesthattheexecutive’sappointmentpowersmaybestowthem with asignificantpolicyadvantageagainstthelegislature.Inpractice,however,the legislature mayalsodeployavarietyofinstrumentstostrikebackatopportunistic executives.Inthispaper,weusefivedecades’worthofdatafromtheSwedishgovern- menttoinvestigatewhethertheexecutivemightadapttheirappointmentstrategies to legislativepressures.Wetakeadvantageofavastsystemof ad-hoc commissions that theSwedishministershavedevelopedovertimetotracktheirsensitivitytothe parliament’sideologicalcomposition.Wefindthat,whiletheministersgenerallyover- sample appointeesfromtheirownpartisanranks,theoveralldistributionofpolitical appointeesalsotendstoshiftalongwiththeparliament’sbalanceofpower.Inline with recenttheoriesofinterbranchrelations,ourresultshighlightboththeexecutive’s penchantforbureaucraticopportunismandthelegislature’sconstrainingreach.