Frustration and Anger in Games: A First Empirical Test of the Theory
| Persson, Emil | ||
| Dept. of Economics, University of Gothenburg | sv | |
| 2016-02-15T14:01:07Z | ||
| 2016-02-15T14:01:07Z | ||
| 2016-02 | ||
| JEL: C72, C91, D03. | sv | |
| Anger can be a strong behavioral force, with important consequences for human interaction. For example, angry individuals may become hostile in their dealings with others, and this has strategic consequences. Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015; BDS) develop a formal framework where frustration and anger affect interaction and shape economic outcomes. This paper designs an experiment testing the predictions based on central concepts of their theory. The focus is on situations where other-responsibility is weak or nonexistent, and in this specific context I find only limited support for the theory: While unfulfilled expectations about material payoffs seem to generate negative emotions in subjects, which is in line with BDS' conceptualization of frustration, behavior is generally not affected by these emotions to the extent predicted by the theory. | sv | |
| 38 | sv | |
| 1403-2465 | ||
| http://hdl.handle.net/2077/41913 | ||
| eng | sv | |
| Working Papers in Economics | sv | |
| 647 | sv | |
| Emotion | sv | |
| Anger | sv | |
| Blame | sv | |
| Psychological games | sv | |
| Experiment | sv | |
| Frustration and Anger in Games: A First Empirical Test of the Theory | sv | |
| Text | sv | |
| report | sv |