Legal Systems and Democratic Stability in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Civil Law Frameworks in Shaping Electoral Democracy

Abstract

The legal traditions inherited from colonial rule continue to shape democratic stability across African states. This study examines how common-law and civil-law legal systems influence electoral democracy, with a particular focus on judicial independence, executive power, and electoral fairness. Drawing on Afrobarometer survey data and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) indicators, this study finds that common-law African states exhibit stronger judicial independence, higher public confidence in courts, and greater perceptions of electoral fairness compared to their civil-law counterparts. In contrast, civil-law states, with their codified legal structures and centralized executive authority, tend to experience greater executive overreach, constitutional manipulations, and weaker institutional checks on power. The findings underscore how inherited legal systems create path-dependent trajectories that reinforce or undermine democratic stability. While common-law states demonstrate stronger democratic resilience through legal adaptability and independent judicial oversight, civil-law states often struggle with entrenched executive dominance. These insights highlight the critical need for legal reforms, particularly in civil-law African states, to strengthen judicial autonomy and safeguard democratic institutions.