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A decisive intelligence failure? British intelligence on Soviet war potential and the 1939 Anglo-French-Soviet alliance that never was


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Title: A decisive intelligence failure? British intelligence on Soviet war potential and the 1939 Anglo-French-Soviet alliance that never was
Authors: Kahn, Martin
Issue Date: 6-Mar-2008
University: Göteborg University, School of Business, Economics and Law
Institution: Department of Economic History
Publication type: report
Series/Report no.: Göteborg Papers in Economic History
12
Keywords: Economic History
Soviet Union
British Intelligence
Soviet war potential
Second World War
Soviet economy
Soviet military strength
Appeasement policy
Intelligence failures
Abstract: In 1939 the British Government tried to assess Soviet war potential in order to know more about their potential ally, as part of the negotiations concerning an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. British assessments of Soviet economic and military strength (and the internal stability of the Stalin regime) in this context have partly been neglected in earlier research, and it seems both that British estimates were much more off the mark than earlier supposed, and that the gross underestimation of ... more
ISSN: 1653-1000
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/9633
Appears in Collections:Working papers

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