THE SWEDISH RIKSDAG AND THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

Abstract

This thesis examines whether the Swedish Riksdag functions as a Policy Shaper, an actor able to influence legislation, or a Marginal Player, with no influence, within the European Union’s Early Warning System (EWS). These terms are introduced and developed in the thesis as ideal types, derived from theories of deparliamentarization and parliamentarization. By defining these perspectives, the thesis builds a renewed analytical framework for assessing parliamentary influence. Using this framework, the study analyzes both legislative case documents and interviews with EU and Swedish officials, applying qualitative content analysis. This framework and these methods are used to evaluate the indirect influence of national parliaments through the EWS. The empirical findings show that the Riksdag predominantly occupies the role of a Marginal Player, where its Reasoned Opinions have no influence on final legislative outcomes. However, exceptions exist: in a minority of cases, the Riksdag contributes to substantive policy amendments aligning with the Riksdag’s concerns, illustrating that the Riksdag sometimes exerts influence. The findings also identify Marginal Player characteristics through key administrative, institutional, and interpretive constraints such as centralized processing, filtering mechanisms, and divergent understandings of subsidiarity — all of which may limit effective parliamentary input. However, the thesis also identifies potential ways to exert indirect influence through the Governments or the European Commission’s position. These findings challenge binary theoretical perspectives on deparliamentarization and parliamentarization, instead suggesting a dynamic, contextdependent landscape of parliamentary influence.