PREDICTING THE FUTURE: THE SWEDISH ARMED FORCES ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA

Abstract

This thesis examines why the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) failed to foresee Russia’s military actions, culminating in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This study shows that a combination of theories concerning cognitive bias and organisational problems can explain the continued failure. The cognitive bias theory, being the rational theory, helps explain how the SAF analysed Russia, assuming Russia would act rationally and avoid military actions because of high costs, such as economic consequences and damaged relations with the West. This belief persisted despite Russia’s actions in Georgia and Crimea, indicating a failure to recognise Russia’s willingness to accept significant costs for strategic goals. The theory concerning organisational problems, being the organisational theory, explains why this belief continued over time. There was a groupthink mentality in the SAF, leading analysts to not challenge the previous analysis. Because of this, reports often repeated earlier conclusions and alternative perspectives were not presented to political decision-makers. This groupthink, centred around the rational theory, made it difficult to question the thought that Russia would act rationally, even when evidence contradicted it. The thesis thereby concludes that the SAF’s failure to understand Russia was caused by both cognitive and organisational issues. The rational theory explains how the SAF viewed Russia and the organisational theory explains why this belief continued over time. Together, these two theories explain the repeated underestimation of Russia, acknowledging the importance of viewing both cognitive and organisational aspects to improve future intelligence work.