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Metaethical Relativism : Against the Single Analysis Assumption


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Title: Metaethical Relativism : Against the Single Analysis Assumption
Authors: Francén, Ragnar
Issue Date: 20-Dec-2007
University: Göteborg University. Faculty of Arts
Institution: Department of Philosophy
Date of Defence: 2008-01-19
Disputation: Lilla Hörsalen, Humanisten, Renströmsgatan 6 kl. 13.00
Publication type: Doctoral thesis
Publisher: Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothenburgensis
Series/Report no.: Acta Philosophica Gothoburgensia
24
Keywords: moral relativism
metaethical relativism
speaker relativism
appraiser relativism
absolutism
cognitivism
non-cognitivism
metaethics
pluralism
internalism
externalism
moral disagreement
motivation
conceptual analysis
methodology
Abstract: This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desirelike attitudes. Standard rela... more
ISBN: 978-91-7346-604-2
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/8505
Appears in Collections:Acta Philosophica Gothoburgensia
Doctoral Theses / Doktorsavhandlingar
Doctoral Theses from University of Gothenburg / Doktorsavhandlingar från Göteborgs universitet

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