CONSIDERING TWO THEORIES EXPLAINING CORRUPTION Collective Action And Principal-Agent Recapitulated Through Experimental Research in Sweden

Abstract

Considering adebateontheoretical explanations of corruption, I test two theories outside commonly studied systematically corrupt countries. The study highlights a problem with the current understanding of theories explaining corruption in an experimental design. Although I argue that theory should be used to explain corruption, it is a complex issue, and therefore, concurring with Ostrom, multiple theories should be used to describe the phenomenon. In the survey experiment, first, considering that people are motivated by the net benefit of a corrupt opportunity according to principal-agent theory, I find that Swedes are less likely to pay a bribe by increasing the cost. Second, contrary to recommendation and implementation based on collective action theory, a treatment aimed to affect the descriptive norm and change the perceptions of what others would do in a similar scenario do not affect participants. This research has implications for current Swedish policy recommendations and some theoretical assumptions on corruption. The evidence questions collective action as a general solution to corruption mainly applied in systemic corrupt countries, and supports those applying principal-agent theory in Sweden. I argue that the factors explained through Principal-agent theory, shown as anti-corruption failures, could further be elaborated to efficiently combat corruption in Sweden. The experimental design develops a newwaytocapture the multidimensional information structure in which the corruption problem occurs. Developing conjoint experiments to incorporate two theoretical explanations in one design on corruption.