| dc.contributor.author | Dahlström, Carl | |
| dc.contributor.author | Holmgren, Mikael | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-27T19:44:58Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-27T19:44:58Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-03 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1653-8919 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2077/75729 | |
| dc.description.abstract | A largeliteraturearguesthattheexecutive’sappointmentpowersmaybestowthem
with asignificantpolicyadvantageagainstthelegislature.Inpractice,however,the
legislature mayalsodeployavarietyofinstrumentstostrikebackatopportunistic
executives.Inthispaper,weusefivedecades’worthofdatafromtheSwedishgovern-
menttoinvestigatewhethertheexecutivemightadapttheirappointmentstrategies
to legislativepressures.Wetakeadvantageofavastsystemof ad-hoc commissions
that theSwedishministershavedevelopedovertimetotracktheirsensitivitytothe
parliament’sideologicalcomposition.Wefindthat,whiletheministersgenerallyover-
sample appointeesfromtheirownpartisanranks,theoveralldistributionofpolitical
appointeesalsotendstoshiftalongwiththeparliament’sbalanceofpower.Inline
with recenttheoriesofinterbranchrelations,ourresultshighlightboththeexecutive’s
penchantforbureaucraticopportunismandthelegislature’sconstrainingreach. | en |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2023:4 | en |
| dc.relation.uri | https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2023-03/2023_4_Dahlstrom_Holmgren.pdf | en |
| dc.title | ExecutiveAppointmentsunderLegislativeOversight | en |
| dc.type | Text | en |
| dc.type.svep | article, other scientific | en |
| dc.contributor.organization | The Quality of Government Institute | en |
