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Nudges and Threats: Soft vs Hard Incentives for Tax Compliance

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Title: Nudges and Threats: Soft vs Hard Incentives for Tax Compliance
Authors: Andersson, Henrik
Engström, Per
Nordblom, Katarina
Wanander, Susanna
Issue Date: Feb-2021
Extent: 57
Publication type: report
Organization: Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg
Series/Report no.: Working Papers in Economics
Keywords: tax compliance
regression discontinuity
Abstract: We study what induces delinquent taxpayers to pay their taxes due. We use high quality administrative data from the Swedish Tax Agency. We find a strong effect of the standard enforcement regime: a threat of having the debt handed over to the Enforcement Agency increases payments by roughly 10 percentage points. When including actual enforcement, payment increases by around 20 percentage points compared to those who do not risk enforcement. In a field experiment, we compare these effects of sta... more
ISSN: 1403-2465
Description: JEL Codes: C21, D03, D91, H24, H26
Appears in Collections:Working papers



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