dc.contributor.author | Broms, Rasmus | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-08-09T10:51:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-08-09T10:51:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-12 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1653-8919 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/61440 | |
dc.description.abstract | Electoral accountability is widely considered an essential element for ascertaining institutional quality. Nevertheless, and contrary to this notion, a growing body of empirical research finds weak or limited support for the notion that voters actually punish political corruption, a central but partial aspect of institutional quality. Instead, I introduce the concept of institutional performance voting, capturing institutional quality as a whole. Using a novel dataset on performance audit reports in Swedish municipalities, I find that voters punish mayoral parties responsible for institutional dysfunction. | sv |
dc.language.iso | eng | sv |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers | sv |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2018:11 | sv |
dc.relation.uri | https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1709/1709807_2018_11_broms.pdf | sv |
dc.title | The electoral consequences of institutional failure: A comparative study of audits, rulers, and voters in Swedish municipalities | sv |
dc.type | Text | sv |
dc.type.svep | article, other scientific | sv |
dc.contributor.organization | QoG Institute | sv |