The State in Democratic Breakdowns: Who, How, and Why

Abstract

It is often invoked that in modern times the state is a prerequisite for democracy to endure. How-ever, cross-national research typically applies this as a static assumption rather than a dynamic caus-al proposition. Therefore, we are largely left in the dark about who the relevant state actors are, how they contribute to democratic breakdowns, and why they do so. Specifying who, how, and why of the state in democratic breakdowns is a vital first step in developing a better understanding of whether the state stabilizes democracies, including whether a disaggregation of the state concept matters. In this paper, I present an overall theoretical framework and observable implications to answer these questions. At the general level, I propose that the state – defined by either a monopo-ly on violence, administrative effectiveness, or citizenship agreement – is relevant for containment of anti-systemic forces and management of security-related and socioeconomic conditions. I then specify seven oft-cited mechanisms which stem from weaknesses in one of the three aspects of state. Empirically, I examine the observable implications of these mechanisms in the 14 democratic breakdowns of the interwar period. This systematic examination provides a more detailed and dis-aggregated yet also coherent understanding of the state-democracy nexus. The results indicate the general importance of a strong and legitimate state for democratic stability. However, disaggrega-tion of the state is recommended to obtain more precise average and single-case inferences.