En känsla av verkligheten En neurofilosofisk analys av relationen mellan kropp och känsla

Abstract

Emotions are very important in creating a sense of reality. But what are emotions? In this thesis I will argue that emotions (and feelings) are a form of perception based on somatic experiences. The arguments are based around some cases of alternative states of consciousness: Depersonalization and Cotards delusion. These states of consciousness are analyzed neurologically to see where in the neural network there is alternative activity. People that suffer from these anormal states of mind have decresead activity in brain areas that are important in creating a body image (which explains why they feel as if they don’t have a body and as if they don’t exist etc.). This form of delusions are not irrational, but the only logical deduction from their neuroanatomical activation. The conslusions in this thesis is that (1) to feel an emotion (or feeling) a person must be able to feel the body in some way. If this ability disappears one has lost the ability to feel any form of feelings. All emotions are somatic in nature. (2) Delusions are not a form of faulty rationalization, but rather rationalization based on anormal experience, which is caused by on alternative neuronal activity that alters the sense of reality.