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Generalized trust and the collective action dilemma of immunization


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Title: Generalized trust and the collective action dilemma of immunization
Authors: Rönnerstrand, Björn
E-mail: bjorn.ronnerstrand@pol.gu.se
Issue Date: 11-Feb-2015
University: University of Gothenburg. Faculty of Social Sciences
Göteborgs universitet. Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten
Institution: Department of Political Science ; Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Parts of work: Rönnerstrand, B. (2013). ‘Social capital and immunisation against the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic in Sweden’. Scandinavian Journal of Public Health 41(8): 853-885. doi: 10.1177/1403494813494975

Rönnerstrand, B. (2014). ‘Social capital and immunization against the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic in the American States’. Public Health 128(8): 709-715. doi:10.1016/j.puhe.2014.05.015

Rönnerstrand, B. n.d. ‘Contextual generalized trust and immunization against the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic in the American states. A multilevel approach.’

Rönnerstrand, B. n.d. ‘Generalized trust moderates the demand for ‘ethical reciprocity’ in large-scale collective action. Evidence from a scenario experiment in Sweden.’
Date of Defence: 2015-03-20
Disputation: Fredagen den 20 mars 2015, kl. 13.15, Hörsal Dragonen, Sprängkullsgatan 19.
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Publication type: Doctoral thesis
Series/Report no.: Göteborgs Studies in Politics
139
Keywords: Collective action
immunization
pandemics
A(H1N1)
generalized trust
reciprocity
social capital
Sweden
United States
Abstract: Immunization is one of the most cost-efficient medical treatments available. But the potential for societies to secure the public health benefits generated by vaccinations can be reduced by the collective action dilemma of immunization. High immunization coverage in a society can provide an incentive for individuals to benefit from the herd immunity generated by others being vaccinated in their place, without having to expose themselves to potential vaccination side effects. However, the other-r... more
ISBN: 978-91-628-9289-0
ISSN: 0346-5942
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/38234
Appears in Collections:Doctoral Theses from University of Gothenburg / Doktorsavhandlingar från Göteborgs universitet
Doctoral Theses / Doktorsavhandlingar Statsvetenskapliga institutionen

 

 

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