Browsing by Author "Holmgren, Mikael"

Now showing items 1-7 of 7

    • Agency Problems and the Politics of Administrative Reorganization 

      Holmgren, Mikael (2017-05)
      While scholars have long argued that political uncertainty leads governments to enact organizational structures that insulate agencies from future control by opposing groups, they have paid less attention to what governments ...

    • Endogenous Bureaucracy 

      Holmgren, Mikael (2015-02)
      By manipulating administrative institutions, political leaders can indirectly control the policy preferences that are carried out and enforced within a polity. In this paper, I suggest that precisely for this reason, ...

    • ExecutiveAppointmentsunderLegislativeOversight 

      Dahlström, Carl; Holmgren, Mikael (2023-03)
      A largeliteraturearguesthattheexecutive’sappointmentpowersmaybestowthem with asignificantpolicyadvantageagainstthelegislature.Inpractice,however,the legislature mayalsodeployavarietyofinstrumentstostrikebackatopportuni ...

    • Partisan Politics and Institutional Choice in Public Bureaucracies 

      Holmgren, Mikael (2016-12-20)
      Political leaders can indirectly control policy implementation by strategically manipulating administrative institutions. In this dissertation, Mikael Holmgren argues that, precisely because administrative institutions are ...

    • Standardsystem- Management av anskaffning, anpassning och användning 

      Holmgren, Mikael (1999)
      ABSTRACT Titel: Standardsystem ö Management av anskaffning, anpassning och användning. Författare: Mikael Holmgren Handledare: Thanos Magoulas (Institutionen för Informatik, GU) Mikael Rasmusson (Telia ProSoft AB) Institution: ...

    • The Link between Appointments and Appropriations in the Politics of Administrative Design. 

      Dahlström, Carl; Holmgren, Mikael (2017-04)
      In this paper, we analyze the relationship between political control of agency decision-making and the size of agency budgets. Scholars of bureaucratic and distributive politics have respectively highlighted how political ...

    • The Politics of Political Appointments 

      Dahlström, Carl; Holmgren, Mikael (2015-02)
      By manipulating the screening and selection of executive bureaucrats, political leaders can indirectly control the policy preferences that are carried out and enforced within a polity. In this article, we argue that ...