DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
- in context, in theory and in empirical research

Axel Rödström

Master’s thesis: 30 credits
Programme/course: L2EUR (IMER) PDA184
Level: Second cycle
Term/year: Spring 2020
Supervisor: Susanne Dodillet
Examiner: Elisabet Öhrn
Abstract

This master's thesis problematizes the deliberative citizenship education model from three different perspectives. It contains three substudies, which all investigate how deliberative democracy has been modelled on deliberative criteria for discussions. Firstly, the impact of deliberative democracy as a discourse for the democratic mission in Swedish educational policy is analyzed through a critical discourse analysis. Deliberative discussions were promoted as a work form by the National Agency of Education governing through a participatory management by objectives around year 2000. This work form was intended by NAE to fill a function in schools of participatory instruction planning while fostering students' communicative competences. NAE gradually replaced participatory management with juridical management and changed the context for the democratic mission and deliberative democracy. As I will show, this leads to two discourses of equal treatment and equivalent assessment making control and measurement into issues for the democratic mission. However, the deliberative democratic fostering aspects of communicative competences across subjects impacts the democratic mission in policy from NAE still today.

Secondly, the philosophical origins of the deliberative citizenship education model are investigated in the roots of the three deliberative criteria of 1) rational argumentation, 2) moral listening and 3) consensus in Habermas's theory of communicative rationality. The exclusionary effects of the rational and moral requirements of the deliberative citizenship education model are highlighted. This is done through contrasting the deliberative model with agonistic pluralism in philosophy and citizenship education.

Lastly a systematic literature review discusses the research on the empirical effects of deliberative discussion in mini-publics and teaching. By surveying participants before and after the discussions research has found an effect particularly in preference change and conversation skills. This finding has prompted further normative research (such as whether discussions can decrease self-interest) with mixed results.
# Table of contents

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1  
   1.1 Aim and research questions ...................................................................................................... 2  
   1.2 Motivation ................................................................................................................................ 2  
2. First substudy: Discourse analysis of Deliberative Democracy in a Swedish context ............. 3  
   2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis ....................................................................................................... 3  
   2.1.1 School’s democratic mission as social practice ................................................................. 4  
   2.1.2 Deliberative democracy as discursive practice ................................................................. 6  
   2.2 History of Deliberative Democracy in the Swedish School System ......................................... 8  
   2.2.1 The democratic mission takes shape in policy (1946-1980’s) ......................................... 8  
   2.2.2 Democratic value base and participatory management by objectives (1992-1998) .......... 11  
   2.3 Deliberative discussions as value base work (1999-2002) .................................................... 14  
   2.4 Juridical management – equal treatment plans and equivalent knowledge requirements (2003-2010) .................................................................................................................. 18  
   2.4.1 New Curriculum – new possibilities? (2011-today) ............................................................ 21  
   2.5 Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 25  
   2.5.1 The democratic mission before deliberative democracy .................................................... 25  
   2.5.2 Introducing the deliberative democratic discourse into policy .......................................... 26  
   2.5.3 The democratic mission after deliberative democracy ....................................................... 26  
   2.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 27  
3. Second substudy: Deliberation vs. Agonism debate .................................................................... 29  
   3.1 Method and previous research ................................................................................................ 29  
   3.2 Deliberative Democratic Theory ............................................................................................... 32  
   3.2.1 Communicative rationality – reason-giving ...................................................................... 33  
   3.2.2 Moral respect – listening to the other ............................................................................... 35  
   3.3 Agonistic Pluralistic Theory ...................................................................................................... 37  
   3.4 Deliberation and Agonism in Citizenship Education ............................................................... 42  
   3.5 Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 45  
4. Third substudy: Systematic literature review of the effects of deliberation ............................... 47  
   4.1 Evidence against deliberation? ................................................................................................. 47  
   4.2 Deliberative polling – effects on preference change ............................................................... 48  
   4.3 Single-peakedness ................................................................................................................... 50  
   4.4 Deliberative teaching ............................................................................................................... 51  
   4.5 Empirical research with normative standards ......................................................................... 53  
5. Discussion ...................................................................................................................................... 56  
6. References ..................................................................................................................................... 59

1. Introduction
When the Swedish government in 2000 reported on the state of democracy in the country, they inquired into how to make citizens further involved than only going to the voting booth every four years (SOU 2000:1). In the report a whole host of theories were taken up with different perspectives on what democratic approaches or methods could be used as a complement to the institution of free elections. They settled on deliberative democratic theory which is argued for because it puts participation through the "many discussions of the inter-election period (...) as the democratically truly central." (ibid. p.34) This is a strong claim coming from an executive branch of government for the by then established model of deliberative discussion and so logically would have consequences in other institutions. It was contemporaneous with a project by the National Agency of Education called "the value base year" which also used deliberative democratic theory (Skolverket 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). As part of pedagogical and curricular supervision deliberative discussions were promoted as a work form for instruction and citizenship fostering.

All these factors give a picture of a certain "zeitgeist" in the politics of that period and assessing deliberative democracy in a comparison with this in mind makes for an interesting research topic today. It also creates a lot of questions when the ambition and co-ordination between institutions back then seem absent today and contrasts in political climates stark, although it was not that long ago and most institutions are still in place. This especially puts the theory in the center of all these politics in a new light and calls it into question.

Fair elections where each citizen has one vote is in deliberative democracy supplemented, or preceded, by the procedure of fair discussions where each citizen is given equal time and space to speak. When a vote is preceded by a discussion where every participant has their say voting would be administered in a more legitimate way, so the deliberative hypothesis goes (Samuelsson, 2016). To be able to temporarily stand in for elections as procedure and have the same regulating effects of decision-making, the deliberative model designs speaking and listening towards agreement. Can deliberative democracy really supplement and have an impact on the institution of elections which has constituted the political identities of citizens for over a century? Were the problems that the deliberative democratic project back then confronted of disaffection and underparticipation in the democratic process overpowering and are they perhaps exacerbated today?
1.1 Aim and research questions

The aim of this master's thesis is to problematize the deliberative citizenship education model by investigating deliberative democracy as deliberative discussions through three different perspectives. This leads to my three-fold research question: How has deliberative democracy been interpreted in the context of Swedish educational policy, in theory and in empirical research?

1.2 Motivation

In a certain sense this thesis is intended as a contribution to the scholarly trend of deliberative democracy that can be said to belong in a particular way to Sweden. Deliberative democracy has had a larger influence here both on institutions and academic debate than most other countries (SOU 2000:1, Skolverket 2000b, Englund 2009, Morawski 2010). When reviewing literature on the topic a big part of it is Swedish research. Moreover, educational research is one of the fields where the debate has been the most active. Branching into areas of the field, which however fall outside of the scope of this thesis such as cosmopolitan education (Englund, 2012), the deliberative model is also designed to have an international appeal.

Alvesson and Sandberg (2013) distinguish between gap spotting research and problematizing research. Taking this into consideration one strong motivation has been to take into account the status of deliberative democratic research field internationally and its most prominent criticisms. The motivation has not been to only spot the gaps in deliberative democratic research, although it is an important beginning for criticism, but also for example to account for how agonistic pluralism challenges it with new democratic solutions in some educational contexts. The purpose of problematization is to construct innovative and interesting research questions (ibid.). Methods such as critical discourse analysis and philosophy has been used to construct questions that would investigate the fundamental assumptions of deliberative democracy.

2. First substudy: Discourse analysis of Deliberative Democracy in a Swedish context

This first substudy will analyze deliberative democracy in the context of policy documents governing the Swedish school system. The National Agency of Education (Skolverket 2000, 2000, 2013) has used deliberative democracy with the ambition to govern education more
democratically and preparing students for a democratic citizenship. I will investigate what factors led up to deliberative democracy, how it was introduced and whether it had any long-lasting impact.

The aim of this substudy is to analyze what impact deliberative democracy has had on the democratic mission in Swedish educational policy documents. These questions will be answered:

- How was the democratic mission formulated before deliberative democracy?
- How was deliberative democracy introduced in policy documents?
- How has the formulation of the democratic mission changed after that introduction?

Before the main section presenting the results I will explain how discourse analysis has been used as a method, and what earlier research has been important to this research design.

### 2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

As a method I will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as popularized by Norman Fairclough. Discourse analysis is in general interested in analyzing language in use but has in its existence gone through a few generation shifts. Bergström and Boréus (2017) divides this development into three generations, for each generation the definition of "discourse" is understood in a wider sense. It is the difference between the first two generations that is important to explain CDA. In the first generation the interest lies primarily in models of linguistic analysis focused on samples of spoken or written language. Discourse is here understood in the linguistic content of these samples without any connection to the context it occurs in (Bergström & Boréus 2017). CDA and Fairclough is the main example of the second generation of discourse analysis, and it is in this generation where I would situate this substudy methodologically.

In contrast to the first generation Fairclough wants to broaden the understanding of discourse as context dependent. CDA is an attempt to merge linguistic and social analysis (Sjölander, Payne et.al., 2011), which means to focus both on how texts are linguistically structured and how they reproduce and change social and historical norms. Texts and their social contexts are described and explained in analysis with a goal to give practical recommendations to problems. Deliberative democracy will be analyzed as a discourse in the context of the Swedish school system. With CDA deliberative democracy can be contextualized in relation to curricula and other legislation, and connected to the problems in that context it was intended to solve.
2.1.1 School's democratic mission as social practice

According to Fairclough's (1992) three-dimensional model, the policy texts of deliberative democratic discourse has to be contextualized by their social practices. Jörgensen & Phillips (2002) describe social practice as the institutional and economic conditions to which the discursive practice is subject. "It is in the analysis of the relationship between discursive practice and the broader social practice that the study arrives at its final conclusions. It is here that questions relating to change and ideological consequences are addressed.” (ibid.) Social practice is the historical and institutional context where a discourse is situated. In the result section, the historical and institutional factors are identified by periods where democracy in education has been governed by particular management forms. After presenting the results of the discourse analysis, the discussion section will conclude what changes had been found and what consequences, ideologically or other, deliberative democracy has had on managing democratic education.

Fairclough (2001) relates social practices to social orders on a global level such as neoliberalism but also more locally to social orders of education in a particular society at a particular time: "Social practices networked in a particular way constitute a social order - for instance, the emergent neo-liberal global order referred to above, or at more local level, the social order of education in a particular society at a particular time.” (Fairclough, 2001) Deliberative democracy will be analyzed as a discourse conditioned by two different social logics, participatory management from the educational sphere and juridical management from the legal sphere. A constellation of these two logics make up the current system of management by objectives and results. As the analysis will show social order has shifted from a participatory management by objectives to a juridical management of results.
Important earlier research for the analysis of the democratic mission are works within curriculum theory. These take up Swedish curriculum history institutional management and law. The social practices of participatory management and juridical management are two different governing logics Arneback & Bergh (2019) call management of placement and management of expectation. These forms of management govern both how schools should work with values and knowledge, what curriculum theorists have labeled the democratic mission and knowledge mission. Management of placement means giving the local school arena the freedom and decentralized responsibility of developing work forms and content of instruction. Management of expectation implies a stricter juridical regulation of control in the form of abuse prevention and measurement in the form of equivalent assessment.

Dahlstedt (2007) and Torper (1999) describe participatory management as continuous evaluation and transformation of goals through a “public discussion”: “Goals should be developed in different levels of the school system, one should establish how these goals are achieved and suggest changes of goals and methods to reach a better goal achievement – all this in a public discussion.” (Dahlstedt, 2007, Torper, 1999 p.153)

Novak (2018) discusses the differences in management between the period in the 1990’s and early 2000’s and the later period of late 2000’s and today with sweeping juridical regulation, or what is called juridification:

"In the area of schooling, this means that the pedagogical domains of action are opened up to bureaucratic intervention and judicial control. By implication, instructional procedures and school measures must be given in forms that are accessible to judicial review. Hence, what I call the juridification of educational spheres does not refer to increasing density in an already existing network of formal regulations, but rather to legally supplementing a communicative context of action through the superimposition of legal norms. (ibid. p.69)

What I will call participatory management relied on local responsibility, deliberative communication and minimal juridical regulation while the period afterwards would compensate with a stronger juridification of the educational system:

Though the basic facets of the central–local relationship in Sweden in the last decades of the twentieth century may rightly be understood as processes of decentralization, I argue that this decentralization was not accompanied by a sweeping juridification of the educational system. (…) The absence of this particular role of law in the case of Sweden is notable in that, despite major changes in Sweden’s education policy toward the end of the previous century, the Education Act of 1985 continued to provide the basic statutory foundation for the Swedish system well into the 2000s. (ibid. p.47)
This describes the context of participatory management and the curriculum in 1994 where deliberative democracy was introduced into. Instead of formulating the democratic mission through new laws, which would later characterize juridical management, the National Agency of Education was at this time more concerned with democracy as qualities of discussion on the local level. Previously mentioned earlier research will be combined in the following analysis to characterize social practice. As in management of placement, social practice in participatory management is characterized by work forms of public discussion on a local level. In juridical management as in management of expectation, social practice is characterized by control and measurement on a national level.

Texts for analysis of social practice have been selected from national texts (SOU-investigations and curricula) and legislation important for the history of Swedish comprehensive school system since 1946 (SOU 1948:27, Prop. 1978/79:180, Lgr 80, SOU 1992:94, Lpo 94, SOU 2007:28, Lgr 11). The most important texts are especially education legislation, curricula and government bills and pre-investigations leading up to new curricula.

2.1.2 Deliberative democracy as discursive practice

Deliberative democracy emerged as a discourse in participatory management as part of the "value base year-project" where a series of reports were published about the need for more organized democratic work forms in school (Morawski 2010). These reports will be the center of the result section (chapter 2.3). Aspirational objectives formulated central values for every subject in the curriculum Lpo 94 which started participatory management, and hence were crucial for the curriculum design. NAE noticed that these objectives were not used in schools as it was planned and therefore presented deliberative discussions as a form of "value base work" (Skolverket 2000c). Lpo 94 was replaced by Lgr 11 which removed the formulation of aspirational objectives, but nonetheless kept the central value base. Deliberative democracy has also re-emerged in reports after Lgr 11 and is arguably still today a discourse through which the democratic mission and value base is understood. Other discourses later emerging under juridical management will also be discussed in the analysis, such as equal treatment and equivalent assessment. These discourses have challenged and partly replaced deliberative democracy. The analysis of the discourses of equal treatment and equivalent assessment as part of the democratic mission today is influenced by Cooper's (2019) two nodal points for the democratic mission, prevention of abuse and the right to equivalent education.

Jörgensen & Phillips (2002) asks regarding the relationship between discursive and social practice: "Does the discursive practice conceal and strengthen unequal power relations in society, or does it challenge power positions by representing reality and social relations in a
"new way?" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) As I interpret these methodological guidelines, the relation between deliberative democracy and the social practices will have to be central in the analysis. Is it reproducing or challenging participatory and juridical management as social orders? What other potentially reproducing or challenging discourses have emerged under these social orders?

The most important texts for the deliberative discourse are published by NAE promoting deliberative discussions as a "value base work" for all schools in the country. Examples of emphatic formulations of a deliberative perspective on democracy are in the text "Deliberative discussions as value base" (Skolverket 2000c) and in 2001: "Schools that use deliberative discussions that are characterized by respect, reciprocity and a will to understand, largely fulfill society's demands that the organization should be run in democratic work forms.” (Skolverket 2001 p.4)

Cooper (2019) conducts a discourse analysis on the articulation of the democratic mission in Swedish educational policy texts from 2008 to 2018 with a focus on how the teacher is articulated as a subject position. She identifies deliberative communication as an expectation of the teacher's democratic application and as a democratic role model."The teacher as a democratic role model is organised around the master signifier democratic application. (...) One important aspect of applying democratic values and processes is being able to communicate in line with deliberative criteria in as many situations as possible.” (ibid. p.189-190) Deliberative communication is presented as part of fostering for democracy as a third nodal point in the democratic mission next to prevention of abuse and right to equivalent education.

Dahlstedt & Olson (2014) mention discussion as a main form of citizenship fostering in the first decade of 2000's in their book on the history of Swedish citizenship education. This form of deliberative discussion fosters citizens to a certain degree of reflective introspection, as a presupposition for mutual communication in society:

For one's own reflecting to be able to take a direction outwards, towards others and beyond towards society there is a presupposition of a looking inwards (...) One's own reflecting becomes a necessary presupposition for a democratic and desirable citizenship in a democratic citizenship fostering of a deliberative character. (Dahlstedt & Olson, 2014 p. 14)

In a curriculum theoretical approach, Morawski (2010) argues that deliberative discussions were a part of the implementation of the 1994 curriculum (Lpo 94). The school system had recently been decentralized by municipalization and privatization and the curriculum had to answer to concerns about segregation and equity. Participatory management by objectives, the
democratic value base stated as aspirational objectives in curriculum and syllabuses, local autonomy and teacher professionalism made up the context that deliberative discussions were introduced into.

2.2 History of Deliberative Democracy in the Swedish School System

To describe the historical background of deliberative democracy in the context of the Swedish school system the analysis will explain the emergence of the democratic value base and participatory management in policy documents on school's democratic mission. These policy documents make up the most important aspects of the democratic mission as a discourse leading up to the deliberative democratic discourse coming into place in 1999/2000. They are not exhaustive of the democratic mission during this long period but read through the deliberative democratic discourse they can be said to be earliest traces of this discourse. This is at least how the deliberative NAE report (Skolverket 2000c), part of chapter 2.3, takes up most of the documents in 2.2.1. The chapter 2.2.2 will describe the curriculum reform of Lpo 94 and the governing system of participatory management making up the social context of deliberative democratic discourse.

2.2.1 The democratic mission takes shape in policy (1946-1980's)

As a starting point of this discourse analysis, this chapter describes the consistency and discrepancies during the 45 years span between mid 1940's and 1990 in the demand from Swedish society on its school system to foster democratic citizens and to have a democratic management.

What is important for the emergence of the democratic value base is that the citizen of democratic fostering went from someone being neutral towards democratic values to someone who actively promotes respect for them. The fostering for neutrality and critical thinking was meant to counteract any potentially authoritarian “established idea of society” in instruction but this also meant that democratic values could not be promoted as a superior alternative (SOU 1946:31). It would take until the 1970's to formulate an explicit fostering for democracy in a curriculum and this is mainly the reason why the democratic mission changes during this 45 year span.

In the publication by the school committe (SOU 1948:27) the democratic mission is stated clearly as school's main task, however with the important caveat of a neutral scientific basis. Teachers and students were explicitly prevented from proclaiming any doctrine, even a democratic one:
School's main task becomes to foster democratic human beings. The claim cannot be misunderstood. It does not imply, that school should proclaim democratic-political doctrines. Instruction cannot be authoritarian, which it would be, if it served a political doctrine, would this doctrine be even democracy's own. Democratic instruction must on the contrary rest on objective scientific basis (SOU 1948:27 p.3, author's translation).

Fostering for neutrality is an example of the relation between the democratic mission and what can be called the knowledge mission, the task of assessment and supplying students with subject knowledge. Democracy as a mission for education is already here integrated with a mission for objective knowledge instruction, where the latter as a basis, is supposed to ensure the former. A compromise between the democratic mission and the knowledge mission is established, mainly in curricula between the overarching objectives and syllabuses, which will continue in different constellations until today. The compromise consists in designing a school system which provides the students with both the subject-specific knowledge to pursue a career/higher education and with the character a citizen in a democratic society should have. Democratic instruction was at this time not a democratic work form but rather focused on traditional scientific subject knowledge and assessment. The dependence of democratic instruction and fostering on an objective scientific basis can be interpreted as the knowledge mission being prioritized over the democratic mission from the moment the democratic mission first was formulated.

If the knowledge mission had been prioritized over the democratic mission in policy documents up until this point, the democratic mission would be formulated in a more prominent way in the late 70's. The democratic mission for education was now to be decided on after an inclusive "wide societal debate" about controversial scientific issues most relevant to society. Criticism grew of a too centralized expertise deciding what knowledge content subjects in curricula should contain. According to the pre-investigation to 1980's curriculum Lgr 80 scientific questions cannot be:

- left to specialists within limited fields or is decided within an elite group of experts.
- Scientific questions have during the last decades been and needs to be politicized in the sense that the direction has to be decided after a wide societal debate. (…) A strong democratic argument speaks therefore for school to give everyone the insight into the problems’ dimensions, a conception of which problems are relevant, their context, their dependency on human priorities and the price in form of other neglected upsides that either the one or the other solution can bring (Prop. 1978/79:180, p.75, author's translation).

According to the same proposition, it should also be investigated how the democratic mission and values could be integrated into the different school subjects and syllabuses. (ibid.) In Lgr
80, this meant a conflict perspective across all school subjects: “Discussion about conflicts and conflict resolution should be a natural aspect in many contexts in instruction in school. (...) It is pertinent in all subjects, in classroom assembly and other contexts.” (Lgr 80, p.36)

The syllabuses in Lgr 80 were determined by new formulations of the democratic mission as overarching objectives. These objectives also entailed a more active local arena, schools received new responsibilities to practice democratic work forms, for students to learn democracy through participation and experience. Concerning fostering for democracy, in the chapter "fostering and development” the following quote foreshadows the democratic value base in Lpo 94:

Respect for intrinsic human value and esteem for others should likewise be the ethical foundation for the school's work concerning questions in which people in our country have differing values (...) School should be open to divergent values and opinions presented and claim the importance of a personal engagement. At the same time, school should claim our democracy's essential values and clearly dissociate from everything that run counter to these. School can accordingly never position itself as neutral or passive in the case of democratic society's foundational values (Lgr 1980, p. 20).

The formulation in a curriculum that school could not be neutral, that democratic values are foundational and openness to differing values meant that a democratic value base had to permeate all schools and scientific subjects. This was the biggest indicator that the democratic mission had changed to a no longer neutral fostering for democracy.

In the late 80's/early 90's, the Swedish government instituted a series of reforms which still shapes today's school system. A decentralization by municipalization and privatization was started. The main shift was that the legal responsibility changed from the state to municipalities for public schools and to independent actors for private schools. The main remaining responsibilities for the state was to ensure equivalent education, quality and legal security between public and private schools (Prop. 1990/91:18).

2.2.2 Democratic value base and participatory management by objectives (1992-1998)

In the midst of the municipalization and privatization reforms a new curriculum, Lpo 94, was written. Grasping the systematic implications of the curriculum reform where deliberative democracy was introduced into demands a deeper analysis than the preceding curricula have received so far. Municipalization and privatization meant a new system which was a management by objectives and results, according to the pre-investigation to Lpo 94 (SOU 1992:94). This reform introduced several new concepts, but this analysis will be limited to explaining the democratic value base, participatory management by objectives and the parallel
objectives categorization of "aspirational objectives" and "objectives to achieve".

The democratic value base was first formulated in Lpo 94, a cluster of values and objectives similar to the quote on democratic fostering from Lgr 80 but here it is given a more central position. The curriculum begins with the first chapter "School's value base and mission" thus: "The public school system rests on the foundation of democracy. The education act (1985:1100) claims that the organisation in school should be formed in accordance with basic democratic values.” It goes on to name the main values included: "The human life's unviolation, the individual's freedom and integrity, the equal worth of all human beings, equality between men and women and solidarity with the weak and vulnerable are the values that school should shape and convey." (Lpo 94, p.3) Later in the same chapter it is proclaimed that it is not enough for instruction to transmit knowledge about democratic values but should also use democratic work forms and prepare students to actively participate in society (ibid. p.5). This objective makes clear that subject knowledge in for example social sciences about democracy as a political system is not enough for democratic fostering. Students become more democratic if they also get to practice that knowledge by deciding on instructional objectives, to adjust them to their different needs and learning processes. This is how the democratic value base and participatory management are related. The curriculum requires student participation and all schools to continually develop instruction methods with student imput in a participatory management by objectives.

Participatory management by objectives is the form of local responsibility for schools to create their own work plans and objectives for organisation and instruction (SOU 1992:94). These local work plans allowed every school to continually transform the national objectives (including the value base) to instructional objectives. This planning of instruction was explicitly to center around discussions between teachers and students about the value base and national objectives. Therein the intended participatory norm to involve students more than earlier curricular reforms. Organisation of schools in accordance with democratic work forms stated in the value base hence was to be realized locally by the participatory management form:

The national goals as they are expressed in curricula and syllabuses provide the base for the construction of specific instructional objectives in the individual school unit. It is the teachers together with the students that do this work. It means a form of participatory management of objectives insofar as those who will work with achieving the objectives also are those who will reconstruct the national objectives to instructional objectives. (ibid.,
author's translation)

The purpose first described in the pre-investigation letting students participate in choosing content and objectives for the organisation was further explained in Lpo 94. The curriculum stated that for the daily pedagogical quality to develop the instructional objectives, new methods and their results had to be constantly evaluated through the participatory management (Lpo 94). As a chain of steering from the national to the local level, the steering would go stepwise from values, to national educational objectives, to instructional objectives, to results and to evaluation (SOU 1992:94).

Both the national curricula and syllabuses are categorized into ”objectives to strive for” or ”aspirational” objectives and ”objectives to achieve”. The balance between the democratic mission and knowledge mission was represented in each goal categorization respectively. In the curricula the aspirational objectives are defined as starting points for instruction, giving the direction for the quality of schools and all subjects while formulated widely enough not to be achieved completely. Aspirational objectives should be the basis from which teachers and students select content for instruction and: "formulate what school should aspire to and work towards in a manner so that there locally can be designed specific instructional objectives.” (ibid.) They were especially important for the democratic mission since many of the values in the value base were formulated as aspirational objectives in the second chapter in Lpo 94, called ”norms and values”. Examples of these are that school should aspire to that every student ”respects other peoples' intrinsic values” and ”empathizes with others' situations” (Lpo 94 p.8). These objectives were also a connection between the value base and specific subjects since the objectives from ”norms and values” were concretized as both aspirational and objectives to achieve in syllabuses. Objectives to achieve should express what the students at least should have achieved at the end of 5th and 9th grade (SOU 1992:94). This was related to measuring equity in national evaluations as described in Prop. 1990/91:18.

Lpo 94 demanded that new methods be developed and evaluated and in the mid to late 90's the evaluation process intensified. NAE found schools focusing on objectives to achieve rather than the aspirational objectives and the value base (Skolverket 2000a). This skewed balance between the participatory democratic mission and a results based knowledge mission motivated NAE to work more explicitly with the management of the value base (Regeringens skrivelse 2000/01:59). NAE would promote deliberative discussions as a method for discussing the
aspirational objectives and the democratic mission and value base therein.

This historical background has described how the democratic mission has developed from a fostering for neutrality to a fostering for democracy, to a democratic value base and participatory management. At the same equivalent assessment grew out of the knowledge mission and the decentralization reform. The system of management by objectives and results in Lpo 94 combined the democratic mission formulated as aspirational objectives with the knowledge mission formulated as objectives to achieve. This laid the social context for the introduction of deliberative discussions as a form of value base work. The democratic mission now was at a crossroads where it had to be administered in system of management by objectives and results formulated in a curriculum through parallel objectives.

2.3 Deliberative discussions as value base work (1999-2002)

At the end of the 20th century, NAE would partly introduce new solutions to contemporary issues of the newly established curriculum Lpo 94 and partly learn from older policy texts and social factors during the 50 year period shaping the democratic mission. As we will see later in this chapter (Skolverket 2000c), more or less the same historical background described in the last chapter was used as a motivation for a new discourse centered around a new democratic work form. The formulation of the value base in the curriculum Lpo 94 as a different type of objective separate from the more measurable objectives to achieve made implementation difficult at a local level. In 1999 Swedish National Agency for Education declared the project "the value base year" to balance organisation of both subject knowledge and values in schools (Government note 2000/01:59). This year (1 February 1999-31 March 2000) actually meant several years of publishing new long-term perspectives through NAE evaluating Lpo 94 and the participatory management reform. Deliberative discussions in classrooms were presented by NAE as a method or procedure of value base work with criteria to evaluate its results by the participants themselves.

Perhaps the central text for the value base year "The value base book" (Skolverket 2000a) re-states the the motivation behind the value base year which is to re-emphazise the aspirational objectives in the syllabuses and value base aspects in every subject as steering and binding. The problem they see is that when aspirational objectives do not structure instruction in the participatory manner it was intended, democratic competencies in the value base are not fostered. Objectives to achieve, which were strictly meant to be used for assessing students' subject knowledge were also used for planning instruction, which was the intended purpose of
the aspirational objectives. NAE saw this way of reading steering documents “from below and up” as a common local misconceived implementation of Lpo 94. The syllabuses did not require participation from students, nor teachers to open up for discussions about the value base. This was to some extent what had happened according to NAE. Management by objectives and results made possible two different interpretations, one manner in which objectives were steering and another in which results were. The design of the syllabuses with their problematic balance of content between the two different goal definitions became an important reason for the value base year-project.

In the following quote, NAE explain how a one-sided focus on objectives to achieve marginalizes aspirational objectives and the value base in the curriculum. The reason for this marginalization is that objectives to achieve are easier to evaluate and are associated with assessment and subject knowledge. NAE sees the marginalization of aspirational objectives as symptomatic for a marginalization of discussions about value-base issues:

If the value base in the curricula in general is not perceived as steering, this is especially relevant for the curricula's aspirational objectives about the value base. These aspirational objectives are often marginalized instead of objectives to achieve in syllabuses and assessment criteria. The aspirational objectives are society's mission for the schools and a tool for teachers' planning work. The aspirational objectives should be the very starting point in the schools' work, while objectives to achieve should be the starting point in evaluating the students' knowledge. In contrast to objectives to achieve a discussion about aspirational objectives can be about the whole school's activity and approach, what value base one has, school's organisation, work forms, student's participation etc. To work with value base issues and other aspirational goals in the curricula offers (...) a big possibility to engage children and youth in school's work as a whole (...) Objectives to achieve, especially in syllabuses, have been in focus because they are easier to work with since they are relatively concrete and measurable, compared with the aspirational objectives. By starting with the objectives to achieve focus has thereby been put on traditional subject knowledge. Assessment criteria and syllabuses steer the concrete everyday work, at the cost of curricula. (Skolverket 2000a. p.79-80, author's translation)

The main function of aspirational objectives in Lpo 94, to structure the planning of instruction, did not occur as intended when they were ”out-steered” by objectives to achieve. This was the main concern of the value base-year project and why the other texts in the project would have a deliberative direction.
The text goes on to promote "a communicative democracy" where society's democratic mission for schools is striving for respecting differences between human beings as a starting point and discussing these differences. These discussions are seen as value base work fostering broad democratic competences which are mostly not to be found in assessment criteria (Skolverket 2000a). This way of interpreting curricula meant the perspective on learning as a never-ending process rather than outcomes. Aspirational objectives are aspirational because they were not meant to be fulfilled completely but rather work as a starting point for collective discussions. Because of these objectives' open character and in contrast to result achievement, they are harder to evaluate than objectives to achieve.

In another text (Skolverket 2000b) NAE takes a clearer deliberative democratic approach which was implicit in promoting a communicative democracy as value base work. Deliberative discussions therefore come into focus as a model for democratic work forms which could develop citizens communicative competences. The characteristic consensus-striving of the deliberative approach is recommended to have students participating in the democratic process and come to some sort of agreement. NAE presents their deliberative approach on value base questions in this way:

"The national agency in this study about the value base takes it's approach in what newer democratic research calls deliberative democracy or discourse democracy. This view of democracy puts the discussion and dialogue between people at center as the pillar of democracy. The approach has emerged during the latest decades within democratic research with Habermas as the main proponent. (…) The curricula contain clear traits of deliberative democracy. School is seen as a collective civic right on deliberative grounds. The communication in the activities, and the mission to develop citizens who can communicate, can be seen as a belief in a collective will-formation and as means for citizens to be able to participate in the democratic process. The deliberative model sees the discussion, the mutual communication concerning different problems and different ways to view values, as a fundamental link in a collective will-formation which aims to reach consensus.”
(Skolverket, 2000b p.9)

There is a similar concern as in the Value base book (Skolverket 2000a) that national objectives are not "translated” in the local arena since syllabuses are focused on at the cost of curricula. The report mentions that there has been a common separation between schools democratic mission and knowledge mission both on central and local level. This has made it difficult for the value base to permeate all organisation. It sees the value base as largely formulated as aspirational objectives and these objectives as collective starting points for discussions to plan
instruction. In contrast objectives to achieve should strictly be used to evaluate students knowledge. (ibid.)

A more in depth text about deliberative discussions as a "core in value base work" (Skolverket 2000c) was written also for NAE in 2000 by Tomas Englund, where criteria are given for deliberative discussion in classrooms. Englund puts the deliberative approach into a historical context of policy documents about school's democratic mission to foster democratic citizens:

"to what extent can the deliberative discussion be said to be an expression of a historically grounded continuity as an idea and how should we view the status of the deliberative discussion as a proposed central work form against the background of earlier Swedish educational-political ambition to via school foster for democracy?" (ibid. p.6)

Englund argues that the whole after-war period can be seen as a wave motion between school's democratic mission and knowledge mission. He points to SOU 1978/79:180 and Lgr 80 as peaks for developing school's democratic mission up until then and the closest to deliberative democratic discourse. Fostering for neutrality in the 1940's, although the starting point for the democratic mission, hindered having democratic values as principles in instruction. According to Englund, discussions for fostering should be able to hold different views and perspectives as superior, not only the truths of the scientific community. The text is critical of how Lpo 94 had technologized the knowledge mission into "indexes" and quotes NAE (Skolverket 2000b) to express the main concern of the value base-project that the value base and the overarching objectives are being obscured. The deliberative approach to the value base should for him (and arguably for NAE at this time) be seen as ambitions to realize the democratic mission and the knowledge mission as one and the same overarching mission for all schools. Deliberative discussions are argued for being able to contribute to students' construction of meaning and knowledge in most school subjects when using three criteria to be locally evaluated by the discussants themselves:

"a) discussions where differing viewpoints are contrasted and different arguments are given space,

b) that deliberative discussions always contain tolerance and respect for the concrete other, it is for example about learning to listen to the others' argument

c) the trait of collective will-formation, that is the aspiration to come to an agreement or at least come to temporary agreements

What is proposed can be seen as guidelines for evaluation if discussions have been deliberative or not (…) I believe one can say that discussions with deliberative qualities (a-
Although not mentioning participatory management or whether the deliberative criteria should be seen as aspirational objectives or objectives to achieve, designing a work form meant to be evaluated by the participants themselves is a main characteristic of participatory management. The open-endedness and small-scale of such evaluations would make them suitable for having an aspirational objective as a topic in any subject. On the other hand, the criteria of aspiring to a temporary agreement itself also could be seen as an aspirational objective. This formulation tones down the aspect of consensus from the earlier text (Skolverket 2000b) which would have authoritarian resonances were it to be formulated as an objective to achieve. Other examples of topics given in the text are discussions which can start from differing viewpoints on democratic values in relation to expressions which violate said values, such as bullying, racism or sexual harassment. Such a discussion could hypothesize violations (even though no such views may be present) while promoting democratic values, showing the difference between abuse and a legitimate counter-argument.

Finally in 2001 NAE in the report “Strategy for National Agency of Education's work with the democratic values” laid down the strategy for the democratic mission and deliberative discussions in the school system for the future ahead. The report claims that the aspect of the democratic mission formulated in the value base chapter in Lpo 94 about the demand for democratic work forms can be achieved by deliberative discussions: “Schools that use deliberative discussions that are characterized by respect, reciprocity and a will to understand, largely fulfill society's demands that the organization should be run in democratic work forms.” (Skolverket, 2001 p.4)

Deliberative democracy is introduced as a discourse in a context of participatory management of objectives where the democratic mission is mainly formulated in the Lpo 94 curriculum as a value base through aspirational objectives. Participatory management was dependent on the aspirational objectives being discussed in democratic work forms, but NAE found that schools did not engage students in planning instruction and instead focused on assessment. NAE suggests deliberative discussions as a particular democratic work form or value base work which could engage students further and develop their communicative competences across subjects.

2.4 Juridical management – equal treatment plans and equivalent
**knowledge requirements (2003-2010)**

From the central documents published by Skolverket during 1999-2002, deliberative democracy might indeed be seen as a dominant discourse for the participatory management of the democratic mission. Introducing deliberative discussions as value base work was a consequence of the participatory management having its last peak with the value base year-project. During juridical management, changes in the democratic mission can be seen both when formulations of equal treatment as well as of equivalent assessment become more common in policy texts. Following 2003 trends show a decline of deliberative discussions as a main discourse for NAE; the implementation of programs such as bullying prevention and regulation of legally enforced equal treatment plans. Objectives to achieve would also be re-named knowledge requirements to make equivalent assessment a democratic mission.

The equal treatment discourse can be said to challenge deliberative democratic discourse since they both are value base work forms, but imply different manners of promoting the values formulated in the curriculum. Equal treatment is formulated alongside a more common usage of legal concepts and counteracting of negative values in policy texts. Schools became juridically mandated to a larger extent than before to control students' rights not to be abused. The equal treatment discourse began when anti-bullying programmes replace deliberative discussions as value base work and is therefore the starting point of the last period in this analysis.

The organisation of value base work changed in 2003 when the new department for school development was tasked by the government to evaluate prevention of discrimination in schools. In the department's first report from 2003 this new direction was presented along with a whole group of programmes (Department of School Development, 2003). Programmes were presented by the department as "value base-strengthening" but none of which mentioning deliberative discussions nor any other texts from the value base year. Most programmes were instead manual-based with behavioristic methods which aim at counteracting bullying and discriminatory behavior in different ways. When discussions were promoted they were also manual-based. (ibid.)

The period of NAE recommending anti-bullying programmes as value base work soon went into a period of legally regulated equal treatment plans, and here the equal treatment discourse establishes itself as we know it today. Bullying was replaced by legal concepts of discrimination and abuse when the child and student protection (2006:67) was passed in 2006 which holds
schools responsible to implement local equal treatment plans against abusive behavior. Another law for the participation of children and students in establishing and following-up of equal treatment plans was introduced the same year (2006:1083). This is an interesting aspect of the transition from participatory to juridical management, although no guidelines were given of how schools should engage students in equal treatment. Equal treatment has a slightly less negative connotation than anti-bullying for purposes of promoting citizenship fostering and the values of equality. However, evidence that the anti-bullying direction remained important for the democratic mission is a press release in 2009 from the Ministry of Education on value base work. They write under the heading "Better value base work in school":

NAE has been tasked by the government to promote, strengthen and spread knowledge about school's value base. Together with the government's earlier projects about bullying and advice about clearer disciplinary authorities for teachers can security and studying environment improve. (U2009/2848/S)

Assessment also came more into focus for the democratic mission during juridical management, as the discourse of equivalent assessment. Whereas during participatory management the risk of syllabuses and assessment criteria "steering-out" broader democratic competencies had been counteracted through the value base year-project, now the argument was different. In 2007 a pre-investigation for a new curriculum was initiated. It was called "Distinct objectives and knowledge requirements" (SOU 2007:28) and would lead up to the 2011 curriculum Lgr 11. According to this text the new curriculum and syllabuses should contain only one type of objective called "knowledge requirement" which would be distinct for every subject. The text criticizes the management by objectives of Lpo 94 for making the objectives in the syllabuses too abstract and argues for removing the categorization of aspirational objectives and objectives to achieve. A "clearer" and more equivalent steering system in Lgr 11 than in Lpo 94 is what is argued for in general.

The introductory chapters in Lpo 94 were to be kept however, only removing the aspirational objectives and introducing an emphasis on human rights and on counteracting several grounds for discrimination into the value base chapter. Formulations in this chapter would still be as abstract and still had the function of overarching objectives, making a stricter separation from the detailed knowledge requirements in the syllabuses. SOU 2007:28 states that broader competences from the "norms and values" chapter should not be repeated in the objectives in the syllabuses. Broader competences should be strictly separated from subject specific
competences: "this type of general competence objectives should be avoided to make subject knowledge clearer in the syllabuses." (ibid. p.117) The connection between the curriculum and the syllabuses, which was the function of the aspirational objectives to formulate, thus became less clear.

To supplement the new curriculum a newly legislated education act would be introduced in 2010. This was important since the whole participatory management reform had left the old education act from 1985 intact. The pre-investigation ”A new education act – for knowledge, freedom of choice and safety” (Prop. 2009/10:165) argued for removing local work plans, distinctive of participatory management, since they in some aspects overlap with and could be confused with equal treatment plans. Instead value base work will be evaluated more from a national level through juridical sanctions to exercise for NAE and the School Inspection (SSI). The pre-investigation also argued for extended juridical management to protect individual rights emphasizing human rights in the value base in the curriculum:

School's value base, such as it is expressed in the current steering documents, is built inter alia on the international agreements but it needs to be made clearer that school's value base is based on human rights. The decisions and principles in the international agreements has to permeate the whole education. (Prop. 2009/10:165 p.207)

In summary of the period following the value base year-project where deliberative discussions were prominent, the system of management by objectives and results went through a series of juridical reforms. Participatory management was gradually replaced for neither being able to prevent abuse nor achieve equivalent result achievement.

2.4.1 New Curriculum – new possibilities? (2011-today)

Some trends towards a renaissance of the deliberative democratic discourse in the democratic mission can be seen in a few texts from agencies during this period (SSI 2012, NAE 2013). However, it is challenged by the equal treatment and equivalent assessment discourses and is in some cases changed when used in combination with these. The democratic mission today in the era of the current curriculum Lgr 11 can be analyzed in the relation of deliberative democratic discourse to the emerging discourses of equal treatment and equivalent assessment. Its formulations can be analyzed in the relation of deliberative democracy to the juridical management of control and measurement these new discourses introduce. It could be said that
only equal treatment answers to the democratic mission and equivalent assessment to the knowledge mission. But since the knowledge mission during this period is so closely connected to equity in policy (Cooper, 2018) it will rather be analyzed as part of the democratic mission.

A long line of reports mentions equal treatment and how it as a work form should look like in schools (Skolverket 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). As was previously said, the value base in Lgr 11 is kept relatively intact from Lpo 94 but updated with the task for schools promote respect for human rights and to counteract discrimination, instead of bullying in Lpo 94. Grounds for discrimination in Lgr 11 concern gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and disabilities. The psychological concept of bullying is therefore replaced by the juridical concept of discrimination and makes the perpetrator a criminal. The proactive promoting part of equal treatment work is mostly formulated shortly and in conjunction with the preventing and counteracting aspects. These aspects' constant presence in the equal treatment discourse can be explained by referring back to its emergence in anti-bullying programmes. Formulations of school as a safe environment for development and learning are arguably the furthest promoting equal treatment and/or human rights are explained in the equal treatment discourse. Teachers are expected to critically study the grounds for discrimination, plan ahead and calculate the risks for what types of situations and norms in which students might consider themselves discriminated against. When the democratic mission is mentioned is when the equal treatment discourse becomes the most participatory. A report describes the core of the democratic mission to be the cooperation between school staff and students in this planning. (Skolverket 2014a)

Juridical management leads to deliberative discussion and other forms of citizenship fostering to become less important to the democratic mission. Evaluating the democratic mission in schools SSI (2012) finds value base work to be focused on equal treatment at the cost of citizenship fostering:

It is apparent in the evaluation that schools' work during the latest decade mainly have consisted of preventive and reactive, more instrumental and manual-based measures against what in relation to the value base have been perceived as deviating behavior, rather than proactive promotion of students' will and capacity to both now and in the future take an independent and active responsibility for democracy. (…) One can distinguish in the inspected schools' organization a relatively independent value base work, which mainly seems to be about promoting equal treatment and preventing and handling incidents which violate the value base, there amongst abusive behavior. Often the awareness about the latter
seems bigger than the awareness about the citizenship fostering part of the mission. (SSI 2012, p.18)

The problem for SSI seems to be that it is difficult to integrate citizenship fostering and the democratic mission into instruction when equal treatment is the main value base work. Equal treatment plans have re-inforced the focus on anti-bullying and a reactive type of value base work in schools. Deliberative discussions are promoted to schools and teachers as value base work integrating the democratic mission both in instruction and in collegial and other informal situations.

Deliberative discussions can according to SSI's evaluation be seen as fruitful in a double sense in schools' democratic work through beginning with differing viewpoints. They can be a starting point for collegial discussions, that anchors and reevaluates the mission in relation to steering documents and schools' student compositions. They can also be used in classrooms, as a way to integrate the democratic mission in instruction in the form of allowing and testing discussions, where also uncomfortable opinions surface and can be met. (ibid., p.8)

SSI points out that deliberative discussions are very rare in schools because they demand time, character and courage. Pushing the disciplinary authority over schools as far as they can promoting deliberative discussions, SSI put the responsibility on principal organizers, principals and teachers: "According to SSI's evaluation the responsibility rests on principal organizers as well as on principals and teachers, as pedagogic leaders to stage and lead such discussions as a part of schools' continuous quality work as well as in instruction.” (ibid., p.8)

A juridically managed democratic mission makes room for deliberative communication as democratic competence in distinct subjects among other subject objectives. In a report paper from 2013, the National Agency adapts deliberative discussions to the Lgr 11 curriculum and to the assessment of particular subjects such as mathematics, visual arts, social science, Swedish and physics (Skolverket, 2013). Deliberative discussions are suggested in mathematics where one objective of teaching is to: "make the students develop knowledge to formulate and solve problems and to reflect over and evaluate chosen strategies, methods, models and results. Teaching should also contribute to the students developing the capacity to argue logically and reason mathematically” (Lgr 11, p.54). Also in Swedish, students in grades 4-6 should "develop the capacity to argue in different contexts of discussion and decision processes.” (ibid., p.260)
These subject specific objectives correlate to deliberative criteria, although here formulated as 9 instead of 3 (as in Skolverket 2000c), the report highlights in cursive font should be *aspired to*. (Skolverket 2013)

This points to deliberative democratic discourse still being used as a main connection between the democratic value base in the curriculum and the syllabus objectives in subjects. It is unclear to what extent Lgr 11 initially was written with the deliberative discourse and its broader democratic competences in mind. The report is also unclear to what extent teachers need to show students that the broader democratic competences inherent in the objectives are part of the democratic mission and can be achieved in different ways, and not measureable as knowledge requirements. Related closely to knowledge requirements and the equivalent assessment discourse, the expectation on teachers and students to assess subject objectives is considerable under juridical management. However, for the purposes of this analysis it is important to point out that deliberative democratic discourse seems to facilitate integrating the democratic mission into instruction. The deliberative criteria thus today fill out the function that aspirational objectives had in participatory management, in some sense reproducing juridical management but also challenging it.

Another example of how juridical management and an equivalent assessment discourse use deliberative and participatory elements is how teachers are expected to discuss and reach consensus on how to measure the quality of students knowledge in relation to the knowledge requirements.

To get a reliable picture of all students' knowledge their performances need to be measured in relation to the knowledge requirements several times and with different methods. The variation is important from an equity perspective since a student can more or less come into her own depending on what type of measurement situation she is confronted with. (Skolverket 2011, p.36-37)

Here the deliberative elements mainly reproduce juridical management by consensus functioning as a way to settle on a "legally secure" measurement of knowledge requirements on the assessment scale. Teachers are expected to reduce errors and subjective interpretations that can affect measurement situations by discussing students performances among themselves in relation to knowledge requirements. (ibid.) Equivalent assessment is related to the democratic mission in that these discussions promote equity: "There can probably never be
formulated knowledge requirements which are so precise that they single-handedly can guarantee equity. Teachers' consensus is therefore of great importance for the work with fair and equivalent assessment.” (Skolverket 2018 p.21)

The deliberative democratic discourse has changed along with juridical management focusing the democratic mission on discourses of equal treatment and equivalent assessment. As value base work today the fostering of the broader deliberative democratic competences in most subjects is challenged by a more controlling and risk calculating equal treatment discourse. Deliberative democracy is also challenged from another direction since the knowledge requirements in the current curriculum have made equivalent assessment into a central issue for the democratic mission.
Participatory management and the category of aspirational objectives in the previous curriculum had too unclear results to be sustainable and juridically equivalent.

2.5 Discussion

2.5.1 The democratic mission before deliberative democracy

The democratic mission before deliberative democracy started already in the 1940's and leads up to the curriculum in 1994 (Lpo 94) and its governing logic of participatory mangagement by objectives which was the context in which deliberative democracy was introduced. It is a long period with many aspects but the curriculum in 1980 (Lgr 80) constituted an important milestone. This chapter traces the evolution of the democratic mission with its forms of citizenship fostering shifting from scientific neutrality to promoting democratic values in different subjects.

Whereas earlier the democratic mission had been marginalized by a focus on traditional subject knowledge and assessment, overarching objectives for fostering such as student participation and promoting respect for democratic values became more central in Lgr 80. Democratic work forms and values in Lgr 80 would lead to the participatory management by objectives and democratic value base in Lpo 94 and later deliberative democracy. However Lpo 94 was also preceded by a municipalization and privatization of schools which brought back the issue of equivalence as assessment in the curriculum.
2.5.2 Introducing the deliberative democratic discourse into policy
The educational system in the 90's comprised a context for the democratic mission with a participatory management formulated in a curriculum by aspirational objectives and objectives to achieve ensuring equivalent assessment. Deliberative discussion as a democratic work form was introduced as a part of a ”value base year”-project. This project aimed to concretize the aspirational objectives characterizing participatory management, which according to NAE had been underdeveloped in schools. The deliberative discussion criteria (a-c) argumentation, listening and consensus were introduced as communicative competences for citizenship fostering. In this context these could be interpreted both as aspirational or as objectives to achieve in evaluation. They were to be evaluated by the participants themselves and could, although not presented as such, be used for discussing the aspirational objectives to plan instruction. Thus establishing a method for fostering that could be practiced and developed making sure students could influence instruction and the work forms.

2.5.3 The democratic mission after deliberative democracy
Around 2003 juridical management would gradually replace participatory management of objectives in which the deliberative democratic discourse had emerged. Deliberative discussions would rather abruptly disappear from policy texts while the new curriculum Lgr 11 was developed until re-appearing a decade later. By then Lgr 11 and juridical management had changed the context for the democratic mission. This transition meant more focus on control and measurement and had mainly two implications for the democratic mission. Juridical management would put equal treatment and equivalent assessment in center as discourses for the democratic mission during the first decade of the 2000's. The grounds for discrimination and knowledge requirements have the same central function in these discourses as the deliberative criteria have in deliberative discourse. What can be called the equal treatment discourse has introduced several grounds for discrimination into the value base which mandates every school to counteract abuse according to these grounds. Equal treatment would gradually overtake deliberative democracy as an alternative value base work form as anti-bullying programmes became legally mandatory for schools. Policy in this period showed some promise of integrating deliberative discussions in both equal treatment planning and in collegial assessment where cooperation and discussion is promoted.

Lgr 11 removed aspirational objectives and broader competences across subjects in order to ensure equivalence by assessing students strictly according to their knowledge in separate
subjects. This made assessment and the traditional knowledge mission more into a democratic issue. In that way the deliberative democratic discourse with its communicative competences across subjects is more fragmented today. However, the value base and the objective to organise instruction in democratic work forms have remained in Lgr 11. One of the main enabling conditions for the deliberative democratic discourse was participatory management's centering on aspirational objectives allowing for participation and longer-term learning processes. Organising instruction in democratic work forms is a transformation that needs to permeate all subjects and is supposed to take time.

Without the aspirational objectives category in the curriculum as a way to interpret its criteria the impact of deliberative democracy on the democratic mission has to be said to be weakened. How to organise instruction according to the grounds for discrimination if the aspirational aspect of objectives is not emphasized? How to interpret the deliberative criteria as objectives under juridical management, particularly aspiring towards consensus in conflictual situations? The consensus criteria then might make the deliberative democratic discourse in a juridical management seem unrealistic and be dismissed altogether. This can be at the cost of democratic competences which also corresponds to the value base, such as having different arguments be weighed against each other during an extended period.

2.6 Conclusion
Deliberative democracy has affected the democratic mission in schools through a discourse which encourages the communicative competences belonging to deliberative discussions: argumentation, listening and seeking ways to come to agreements together. These discussions have been a new way for policy to formulate school's democratic mission and democratic values as objectives across subject disciplines in a curriculum. The democratic value base has a central position in the current curricula Lgr 11 and in the previous curriculum Lpo 94 as norms and values formulated as objectives for schools' democratic fostering.

Deliberative discussions were the first type of citizenship fostering formulated as value base work. As a discourse deliberative democracy emerged under participatory management by objectives and as a part of the value base year-project in 1999. Participatory management by objectives depended on aspirational objectives which had formulated the democratic value base as objectives in specific subjects and syllabuses. These objectives, both across and specific to subjects, were in participatory management also supposed to be used by teachers and students to organize instruction in democratic work forms as the starting point of discussions. To help
assist these discussions taking place and giving them criteria for evaluation NAE suggested deliberative discussions in the reports of the value base year-project

The impact of the deliberative democratic discourse on the democratic mission today can be seen through analyzing how the discourse has been gradually challenged by juridical management which changed the formulation of the democratic mission since 2003. Juridical management of the democratic mission brought with it an equal treatment discourse and an equivalent assessment discourse. The equal treatment discourse first emerged through anti-bullying programmes replacing deliberative discussions as value base work. Today this value base work is centered around every school's own equal treatment plans and the grounds for discrimination that Lgr 11 introduced into the value base which these plans are supposed to counteract.

Traces of the equivalent assessment discourse goes back further to the decentralization reform where the main remaining responsibility for the state was to ensure equivalent quality between public and private schools. The equivalent assessment discourse was given a more central position in the democratic mission through the juridical management of Lgr 11. Aspirational objectives were removed in Lgr 11 since they were deemed to abstract and could not be used to compare students' knowledge in specific subjects nationally. Instead objectives in syllabuses are only formulated as knowledge requirements which are assessable and focuses instruction more on specific subject knowledge but without a clear connection to the democratic value base.

Deliberative discussions have re-appeared in reports from NAE since Lgr 11, although not for over 5 years. Especially the communicative competences across subjects fill a function since the aspirational objectives were removed and with it how specific subjects relate to the democratic value base. These reports do not take up whether the context of juridical management has new implications for deliberative democracy than when it first was formulated. Nevertheless this substudy has suggested possible ways it relates to the democratic mission as formulated in equal treatment and equivalent assessment.

3. Second substudy: Deliberation vs. Agonism debate

As the concept of deliberative democracy has influenced the idea of citizenship education in Swedish education policy without any greater objections, it is worth to investigate its status in international research. When it comes to a theoretical discussion on citizenship education today, democracy becomes the main concept to analyze. The procedure of fair elections where each citizen has one vote is in deliberative democracy supplemented, or preceded, by the procedure of fair discussions where each citizen is given equal time and space to speak. When a vote is
preceded by a discussion where every participant has their say voting would be administered in a more legitimate way, so the deliberative hypothesis goes (Samuelsson, 2016). To be able to temporarily stand in for elections as procedure and have the same regulating effects of decision-making, the deliberative model designs speaking and listening towards agreement.

Deliberative democracy is anchored in a cross-disciplinary international context, where it has been scrutinized in relation to other democratic theories. Introducing this substudy will require presenting the research questions as well as short sections on methodology and earlier research informing this methodological approach. As shown in the first substudy, deliberative democracy has theoretical roots in both philosophy and political science. In the present substudy I will take a critical look at these theories and lift arguably the most influential critique, agonistic pluralism.

The research questions I will answer here are:

- What are the philosophical origins of the deliberative democratic model in citizenship education?
- How is the agonistic critique of deliberative democracy formulated?

To answer these questions I firstly present the theory that is at the core of the deliberative democratic model, then present the theory of agonistic pluralism in order to later identify the differences between the theories in citizenship education.

### 3.1 Method and previous research

The German philosopher and sociologist Jurgen Habermas is one of the foremost inspirers to deliberative democracy. According to him the ideal for democracy is a conversation including understanding for each other's arguments and the absence of power and self-interest. Basic issues for him is how both speaking and listening can lead to agreement, theoretically formulated as linguistic processes of reaching understanding. Habermas (1996) describes this agreement as unanimity or consensus: "Whereas parties can agree to a negotiated compromise for different reasons, the consensus brought about through argument must rest on identical reasons able to convince the parties in the same way." (Habermas, 1996 p.339) In this strong version of consensus, the agreement should be unanimous based on an uncoerced and impartial argument. Not only does the group have to unite on one argument, every participant has to give the same reason for why the argument is better. If any of the participants disagrees or has a different reason for agreeing to an argument, the argument in question would be considered coercive and illegitimate.
The deliberative model in citizenship education is the most important earlier research to be presented for structuring this substudy. Since deliberative democracy focuses on the discussion form, it envisages democratic citizens in a certain way. It favors citizens who can communicate their opinions in a rational way and who want to act according to dominant social norms of morality.

Englund (2007) defines a theoretical model of deliberative communication as three criteria: a) different views argued for, b) tolerance/respect for the concrete other and c) agreement. These three criteria were used by Samuelsson (2016) in an empirical study on classroom discussions and then reformulated as:

a) giving reasons,

b) willingness-to-listen

c) consensus

Having consensus as the last step of the model, the idea of unanimous agreement earlier described in Habermas's philosophy becomes the standard to judge whether discussions are successful or not. Consensus is not taken for granted but undoubtedly sets the norm for the way opinions should be given and received by listeners and conceptualizes citizenship as forms of argumentation and discussion. These are the origins in philosophy and political science which will inform the methodology in the first chapter on deliberative democratic theory. The chapter on deliberative theory will focus on the first two steps of the deliberative model, argumentation and listening, as "requirements" of rationality and universalizability. I will explain how these requirements make argumentation and listening oriented towards the third step of consensus. These two requirements are the base for any deliberation (Jezierska, 2011).

The debate on democratic citizenship in philosophy, political science and educational research is lively in Sweden as well as internationally. Part of the purpose of this substudy is to take a critical look at deliberative democratic theory and therefore the methodology entails reaching into other areas of philosophy and political science. These are fields which deliberative democracy shares with agonistic pluralism in which citizenship education also has origins and which is the second component in the methodology presented here.

Agonistic pluralism comes mainly from the field of political philosophy and is often formulated as a critique of the definition of democracy as consensus-oriented. Mouffe (1992, 2000, 2005) is working more clearly than Habermas in political philosophy and draws a clear distinction against moral philosophy, a distinction she thinks deliberative democracy is unclear about (Mouffe, 1992). Deliberative democracy lets everyone express their opinions but presupposes
no conflict and instead takes orientation towards consensus for granted. Setting consensus as a goal to constantly strive for can even endanger democratic pluralism and create disaffection and exclusion, therefore Mouffe rather wants to question this goal altogether:

It is for that reason that the ideal of a pluralist democracy cannot be to reach a rational consensus in the public sphere. Such a consensus cannot exist. We have to accept that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion. The ideas that power could be dissolved through a rational debate and that legitimacy could be based on pure rationality are illusions which can endanger democratic institutions. (Mouffe, 2000 p. 104)

Instead of the term consensus Mouffe uses the term hegemony which refers to underlying political conflicts (agonistic struggles) that no discussion could eliminate, no matter what the rational or moral models for deliberation are. Hegemony is for her all the antagonistic relations of ”us and them” in social life and human relations which particular politics seek to stabilize in different ways. Building her political philosophy around the concept of hegemony defines democracy as pluralistic and conflict-oriented. Democracy should for her be about transforming the antagonisms that pluralistic life exposes into less violent agonistic struggles.

Theorizing citizenship as ensembles of ”us and them”-practices instead of forms of argumentation in a moral framework, is a more general definition to be able to include political conflicts and collective passions (ibid.). Agonistic pluralistic theory explains the emergence of conflicts and emotions as different identities in unstable power relations with each other. Citizenship groups are identities among others such as ethnicity and gender although they are given a certain privilege since they concern conflicts on the interpretation of democratic values not on the values of a particular community. This explanatory model of why political conflicts emerge also explains how citizenship as an ”us” always emerges and changes in relation to a ”them”. Therefore agonistic pluralism has become a popular theory in citizenship education.

Agonistic scholars in educational research have criticized the deliberative model head on, such as Backer (2017) who deals skeptically with each step of Samuelsson's (2016) model for classroom discussions. Ruitenberg (2009) applies Mouffe's concept of citizenship, as well as the critique of deliberative democratic theory, to education and argues for the place of political emotions in classrooms and democratic life. She distinguishes political emotion as oriented towards conflicts over social inequalities from moral emotion oriented towards personal
conflict. Also following agonistic pluralistic theory, Biesta (2011) criticizes the implications the rational and moral requirements of the deliberative model have as entry conditions to citizenship education. Instead he argues for citizenship as a political identity without a stable or positive form, not based on particular knowledge of what a good citizen is. In the next chapter, the deliberative model will be argued to be based on such a knowledge of speaking and listening, or on the requirements of rationality and universalizability in deliberative democratic theory.

3.2 Deliberative Democratic Theory

The German philosopher and sociologist Jurgen Habermas is one of the foremost inspirers to deliberative democracy. As has been said, basic issues for him is how both speaking and listening can lead to agreement, theoretically formulated as consensus achieving linguistic processes of reaching understanding (Habermas, 1998). The deliberative model in citizenship education splits this process up into three steps, giving reasons, willingness-to-listen and consensus. In this chapter I will analyze these linguistic processes as on the one hand involving speaking, on the other involving listening and how each side orients themselves towards consensus in Habermas's philosophy. Breaking deliberative democratic theory down to the two main forms of communicative interaction seems to be a fruitful way of condensing the deliberative model in citizenship education.

This is an analysis inspired by the deliberative model in citizenship education (Samuelsson 2016) and by deliberative ”requirements” in political science (Jezierska, 2011, 2019). Jezierska talks about requirements of rationality and universalizability in the deliberative model as ”closing” tendencies which steer discussions towards consensus. Using consensus to exclude alternative ways of speaking and listening, requirements have the opposite effect the open deliberative process is supposed to have on society:

Habermas’s concern is that the rationality and universalizability requirements are the best guarantors of decisions that are good for all, indicating that alternatives to his “arguments” would compromise this goal. We need to take seriously the objection that excluding certain utterances and subjects, and allowing others to speak in the name of a universal interest has a paternalistic ring to it. (Jezierska, 2019 p. 15)

To widen the perspective of deliberative theory the next chapter will also present other deliberative theorists of relevance influenced by Habermas.
3.2.1 Communicative rationality – reason-giving

The deliberative democratic theories stem from Jurgen Habermas's model of communicative rationality where deliberation is the central procedure for taking democratic decisions. Since deliberation means discussing different viewpoints and weighing them against each other, speech and reason-giving are also the first step in the deliberative citizenship education model. Mastery of speech is perhaps the closest to a main skill deliberative proponents think a good citizen should possess. That is why deliberative research often comes from linguistics, theories of communicative action and speech-acts.

Habermas is aware of how aspects of modern society can prevent people from understanding each other, and in extension any form of argumentation under current conditions. Therefore he draws a distinction between instrumental/strategic and communicative rationality. Communication can become "colonized” or "distorted” by economic or egoistic factors, which he sees as the negative effects capitalism has had on today's society. These factors have also had a distorting effect in a common perception of democracy as "only” elections where strategically acting individuals use the political system as an instrument to acquire positions of power (Habermas, 1994).

In contrast to instrumental and strategic rationality, Habermas argues for democratic politics to take place in an all-inclusive public sphere and civil society, where argumentation can take place separate from what powerful positions persons might have in society. After making these qualifications, Habermas still thinks communication can be free from power relations if a procedural model helps guide the way. Participants can come to a consensus if they are free and equal under the same requirements. After a linguistic analysis of everyday speech, Habermas formulates a set of requirements which everyone already presuppose in communication and cannot argue against. Therefore participants will not have to be forced to accept the requirements if they want to give arguments, since Habermas sees our ideas of normative truth and rightness (unconditionality) as retrievable in the fact of being in a process of deliberation: "The ideal moment of unconditionality is deeply ingrained in factual processes of communication” (Habermas 1996 p. 20). To argue for consensus as a presupposition and a requirement for the deliberative model is therefore unproblematic and "unforced” for deliberative theorists and Habermas. He calls these requirements "communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play.” (ibid. p.278) The consensus intended in decisions is inclusive of all affected, such as in his principles for discourse (D), universalization (U) and democracy (ibid.). How the criteria are described however will turn out to be the crucial part which have drawn criticism to the deliberative model.
The way Habermas describes this "better" argument is as a sort of unity of voices where an argument's meaning and force is identical for all participants. This unanimity is what distinguishes the decision as a rational consensus from a regular agreement, and communicative rationality from instrumental/strategic rationality. Although he mentions both as possible outcomes of a deliberation the purpose is to make a normative point about the advantages of consensus over difference in opinion: "Whereas parties can agree to a negotiated compromise for different reasons, the consensus brought about through argument must rest on identical reasons able to convince the parties in the same way." (ibid. p.339)

An argument is never "best", which would be an end to communication, but only "better" so that deliberation can continue and stay open for new participants. However, even though Habermas doesn't expect a completely rational and consensual society, he still expects democracy to make social relations progressively more consensual (Jezierska, 2019). His negative view of compromise, difference and conflict goes hand in hand with his criticism of instrumental uses of the economy and election processes. Jezierska (2019) points to how Habermas's description of unanimity in consensus seems so distant from contemporary societies penetrated by instrumental/strategic rationality that it resembles norms closer than facts. She says this makes its realization highly improbable in real-life politics and clashes with other more pluralistic types of democratic politics. This criticism highlights how Habermas introduces a requirement of rationality to argumentation where someone will present a rational and moral example for the other participants to follow and transcend their differences.

Arguments can bring social cohesion in areas which the political decision making of elections and institutions has ignored or segregated, among those citizens that inhabit such areas like schools, workplaces, local councils etc. Unlike some liberal theory, deliberative democracy acknowledges such power relations as instrumental/strategic rationality and promotes communication as a critical skill to counter-act such tendencies. This is why an open argumentation from different points of view starts out the deliberative process as the first step in the citizenship model. However, how self-interested and conflictual are the arguments allowed to be in order to be considered as good or rational and not classified as instrumental/strategic rationality? An argument from a minority position might start a conflict or best case scenario degrade a nice consensus to a compromise. Deliberative theory recognizes such a possibility and is open towards it, but the inherent consensus-orientation does not affirm
it. It can be said that the deliberative model postpones the moment of decision with winners and losers to ensure that communication remains uncoercive. The better argument also wins a particular deliberation, and can be seen as either rational or antagonistic depending on perspective. Is such an antagonistic perspective necessarily unreasonable or irrational? It is clear that coupling argumentation with consensus, the rationality requirement, discourages some forms of expression less oriented towards consensus. That is why other deliberative scholars have introduced forms such as storytelling, testimony, rhetoric and greetings under the argumentation category (Jezierska, 2019). What relation does the second step in the citizenship education model, willingness to listen to the other, have with consensus?

3.2.2 Moral respect – listening to the other

As the necessary counterpart to giving reasons through rational forms of argumentation, the act of listening to other participants is the “receiving” end in the deliberation. In this section, the act of listening to the other in deliberation is discussed as a key element in the deliberative perception of morality.

To explain the requirement to listen to the other, it is important to analyze the deliberative expectations of the participant as a subject. As subjects, participants and their others are the same in some aspects of their development, specifically developing communicative competence. Presupposing the other as someone potentially agreeable, one can say deliberative democracy has a positive view of the other (Jezierska, 2011). Habermas's theory describes the subject as someone who is rational, coherent and transparent to others. The self develops an understanding of itself and the world in deliberation from the very start of its development. Since every ”ego” is socially constituted in language from the beginning, Habermas holds those communicative presuppositions to be intersubjective, equal conditions for every subject.

Intersubjectivity in fact becomes a more important concept for Habermas than subjects, since subjects might be rooted in different cultural and legal traditions. For him, morality can transcend every particular personal or cultural understanding in eliminating ungeneralizable arguments. His principle of universalizability “works like a rule that eliminates as nongeneralizable content all those concrete value orientations with which particular biographies or forms of life are permeated” (Habermas, 1990 p.121). This ”moral point of view” which functions as a principle to evaluate the better argument, echoes the Kantian categorical imperative ”act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1785 p.37). Even though intended for distinguishing moral discourse from contextual ethical and pragmatic discourses, Habermas sees all communication at least referring towards this context-transcendence (Jezierska, 2019). When
used as a procedure of whose arguments are worth listening to, this principle eliminates all arguments by the others that are too tainted by their historical and cultural life-histories since these are not universalizable into consensus. It presupposes the interests of the other to be symmetrical to the interests of the self. Like the reason-giving requirement excludes participants according to rationality, the requirement of universalizability can exclude participants' voices according to morality.

Seyla Benhabib is another important deliberative theorist. She qualifies universalizability through her reversibility principle which presupposes symmetrical reciprocity and moral respect between the self and the other. This means that both sides make an effort to understand each other's particular perspectives and are able to reach a moral consensus nonetheless. Based on moral respect, consensus does not have to rest on identical arguments as long as moral respect is reciprocated. She sees deliberation as always contingent on historical and cultural contexts which legitimize differing interests among participants (Young, 1994). Her critique of Habermas takes an important step towards settling respectful listening as a criteria on its own, making consensus more open to different interpretations and pluralism. However, deliberation is still dependent on participants being able to take each other's perspectives as a requirement notwithstanding obstacles for transparency of life-histories, religion or politics. If one subject has listened to the other's concerns and integrated them into a proposed compromise, one should expect to receive the same quality of treatment of one's own idiosyncrasies. If giving arguments as communicative action relies on rational consensus, listening to the other as another type of communicative action relies on moral consensus. Presenting deliberative democracy in a rational and moral theory sets universal standards which every subject has to adjust to in order to participate in democracy.

In conclusion, I have presented the philosophical origins of the deliberative model as two parts, what the model in citizenship education splits up into reason-giving and willingness-to-listen. Reason-giving as a requirement was shown to be constituted by Habermas's coercion-free communicative rationality and finding the better argument in a discussion. Willingness-to-listen was shown in the last instance to be limited upon the universalizability principle which can exclude personally contingent arguments. Both requirements were shown to have excluding potentials according to rationality and morality respectively, according to their origins in communicative rationality. These philosophical origins orient deliberation towards consensus and are an issue of contention in academic debate, as we will see in the next chapter. The deliberative model in citizenship education will be further explained in the last chapter.
3.3 Agonistic Pluralistic Theory

Agonism, or agonistic pluralism, is a political theory developed by the theorist Chantal Mouffe. Etymologically agonism comes from the greek word agon meaning struggle or contest and has been used by Hannah Arendt in similar ways. Mouffe formulates her theory as a critique of deliberative democracy and has become one of the main alternatives to it in different disciplines, also in educational research. First I will outline Mouffe's political theory and her concept of hegemony as an alternative to the deliberative concept of consensus, and in the last chapter outline how this critique has been used in educational research.

3.3.1 Hegemony as an alternative to consensus

For Mouffe, the concept of hegemony is a central one to understand her agonistic political theory. Hegemony means the temporary dominance of one position or ideology over others. Explaining the theory of hegemony can give an understanding of how agonistic pluralism views power relations and why consensus cannot eliminate these relations. Deliberative democratic thinkers tend to view power relations as something that can be transcended in a moral universality. Hegemony was conceptualized by the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci to mean a "historical bloc" of relatively stabilized power relations (Mouffe, 1992).

If deliberative democracy can be defined by symmetry and consensus between the self and the other then agonistic pluralism can be defined by asymmetry and confrontation. But democracy needs hegemonic relations in some form, as a certain definition of who is included as citizen and who is excluded. This resembles the reality of pluralist democracy with election cycles, ideological regime shifts and struggles for majority. The fact that citizenship still today is so connected to nation-states with sovereign borders and legal systems also makes the hegemonic relations of inclusion and exclusion even clearer. Therefore relations of "us" and "them" becomes central for agonistic pluralistic theory as the political aspect of society which cannot be eliminated. Mouffe highlights how the "them" is constitutive of the "us" as a positive identity.

The main criticism of deliberative democracy from agonistic pluralism is that the latter holds that rational and moral consensus among different democratic struggles as conceptually impossible. Relations between these struggling interpretations of democratic citizenship always have the potential of being antagonistic and violent. Contrasts to the deliberative moral philosophy are stark in Laclau & Mouffe (1985) who defines the "them" or "the other" in antagonism as: "the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself. The relation
arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution.” Antagonism is the relation to the other (or "them") that prevents the self (or "us") from ever completely being itself. This prevention is how power and exclusion is constitutive and irreducible of social relations. Dealing with this other can either be as an enemy to destroy or as an adversary with conflicting interpretations of liberty and equality. The other as an enemy implies, wrongly according to Mouffe, identity that could become itself after the enemy is defeated. It is the main aim of agonistic pluralism not to overcome but to transform these relations from antagonism to agonism, to a confrontational struggle over democratic values.

From this perspective, deliberative democracy tries to escape the problem of antagonisms in the public sphere when it prioritizes the rationality and morality of consensus over unresolved compromises, which look more like the political relations that Mouffe describes as hegemony. The public sphere in democratic societies have limits which were formed by specific hegemonic interpretations of liberty and equality. Her critique of the rational and moral requirements of deliberative democracy goes through pointing out how the requirements ignore the political character of their exclusions. Deliberative democracy justifies exclusions by either rationalizing a hegemony as the better argument or moralizing compromise as uncharitable to the common good:

Democratic theory should renounce those forms of escapism and face the challenge that the recognition of the pluralism of values entails. This does not mean accepting a total pluralism, and some limits need to be put to the kind of confrontation which is going to be seen as legitimate in the public sphere. But the political nature of the limits should be acknowledged instead of being presented as requirements of morality or rationality. (Mouffe, 2000 p. 93)

The rational and moral requirements are ways to avoid political conflicts by trying to resolve them, according to Mouffe. She goes on to point out the implications of these requirements in the public sphere under the specific conditions of liberal-democratic societies. Agonistic pluralism and deliberative democracy are both made for dealing with arguably the most important of these conditions, pluralism. However, they put different kinds of limits on pluralism, rational and moral consensus for the former and political hegemony for the latter:

Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is and will always be the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations. The frontier that it establishes between what is and what is not legitimate is a political one, and for that reason it should remain contestable. To deny the existence of such a moment of closure, or to present the frontier as dictated by rationality or morality, is to naturalize what should be perceived as a contingent
and temporary hegemonic articulation of 'the people' through a particular regime of inclusion-exclusion. (ibid. p. 49)

Since the differences in conflicts which should be transcended in consensus also are the reasons the particular voices in deliberation have a say in the first place, consensus-orientedness can be counter-productive to pluralism in discussions. This leads agonism to define democracy and the subject in democratic politics in a different way than deliberative democracy. What the "demos", or "the people", means in liberal democracy is for Mouffe (2000) always open for debate as is seen in the debates between more established parties and populist parties today. Mouffe objects to the narrow definitions of citizenship for the deliberative subject in forms of argumentation, "the only way is to envisage democratic citizenship from a different perspective. one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms of argumentation." (ibid. p.96) Basically, she wants to broaden citizenship practices to make room for collective emotions, which she calls passions, and more confrontational aspects of political debates. As we have seen, such forms of argumentation tends to exclude less universalizable arguments and require symmetrical reciprocity. Such a requirement of citizenship risks in the long run, according to Mouffe, to exclude citizens and discourage them from the political process.

How does Mouffe then aim to replace consensus with hegemony and what democratic politics does she suggest this will entail? She argues for a "conflictual consensus" which replaces rational argumentation towards consensus with persuasion through a passionate commitment to the democratic principles of liberty and equality. Persuasion on political issues should be based on a consensus on the importance of the democratic values but each side can only reflect a partial view of society. Mouffe sees the hegemonic struggle between the different liberal-democratic party affiliations, on the overlapping spectrum of liberty and equality, as a model to deal with more antagonistic identity based politics:

Ideally such a confrontation should be staged around the diverse conceptions of citizenship which correspond to the different interpretations of the ethico-political principles: liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, and so on. Each of them proposes its own interpretation of the 'common good', and tries to implement a different form of hegemony. (…) If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. (ibid. p.104)

If the political views within the party system will be able to persuade disaffected parts of the population, they should according to Mouffe distinguish their views in confronting ways,
making room for dissent and collective passions to identify with. Otherwise, one can expect to see: "the growth of other types of collective identities around religious, nationalist or ethnic forms of identification. In other words, when democratic confrontation disappears, the political in its antagonistic dimension manifests itself through other channels.” (ibid. p.114)

Recognizing collective passions in discussions which are not necessarily universalizable is an example of recognizing counter-hegemonic claims which deliberative consensus-oriented requirements would exclude. These more particularistic interests closer tied to present inequalities in society are nonetheless collective although only "half-way" to universality. They might be antagonistic interests susceptible to transformation to agonism in a discussion about their interpretations of liberty and equality the way Mouffe envisages. If a conflict emerges on white or male hegemony for example, I see agonistic pluralism as a preferable alternative to deliberative democracy. The fact that historical subordination of non-whites and women has happened is common sense for most today but only because of political struggles that have managed to renegotiate new hegemonies. Colonialism and patriarchy represent fundamentalist attempts to organize society according to race and gender identity. These are two examples of hegemonies that have had to been transformed through pointing out antagonisms of race and gender as an issue of citizenship and democratic values. These hegemonic relations are something that can always re-emerge in new situations and hence the on-going struggle against antagonism where citizenship can supercede identity politics.

Such political issues can be related to current debates in most countries on nationalism and ethno-centric political identities. Are there signs of such collective passions in a group? What is the current discourse around "the foreigner" and are there examples of such antagonisms in the experiences of the participants? These considerations have implications for citizenship as practice or as Mouffe puts it: "This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity” (ibid. p.95). They are often lacking in deliberative theory or seen as unsuitable topics since they highlight power division in society, whereas communicative rationality rather stay to topics closer to common concern where participants are symmetrical. When Mouffe says that every consensus is impossible and a result of hegemony and power she means that there will always be exclusions when a deliberating group identifies as an "us”. For her this is a political decision although it may be a subtle one and has an affective dimension less explicit than the consent through argumentation in deliberative theory. Focusing on exclusions can stir up passions and result in self-interested arguments but they should be emphasized as the hegemonic borders of the socio-political order.
that affects all citizens, as they are by agonistic pluralism. For education, rather than focusing on citizens' speaking and listening skills, learning how to channel hegemony and antagonisms in a democratic way is a way to contribute to the rest of society.

3.4 Deliberation and Agonism in Citizenship Education

With a deliberative approach to education, consensus has an important part to play also here. Diverse opinions and ethical differences are supposed to be argued for in a respectful way in deliberation through the criteria of giving reasons and willingness-to-listen (Samuelsson, 2016). Giving reasons as a rational element and listening as a moral element are important forms of argumentation taken from deliberative theory. Consensus, or at least a temporary agreement between all participants is then expected as a third criteria to emerge in a rational and moral/respectful way to reconcile the differences discussed. This model of rational and moral deliberation is presented as an alternative didactic model in various subjects, more democratic than traditional teacher-led didactics. The consensus-orientation has a transformative function for learning, teaching students the "art of conversation" while emphasizing whatever emerging new skills on the topic the students demonstrate as a group. As a model, the context-transcending morality and rationality in deliberation is seen to create fair and universal agreements in various subjects and cultural settings. How the criteria of giving reasons and willingness-to-listen are supposed to result in consensus can be seen in Englund (2007), who uses this as a core of his adaptation of deliberative communication to education:

Deliberative communication can be understood as an endeavour to ensure that each individual takes a stand by listening, deliberating, seeking arguments, and evaluating, while at the same time there is a collective effort to find values and norms on which everyone can agree. (Englund, 2007 p. 503)

Englund (2016) also uses the distinction between instrumental/strategic and communicative rationality to distinguish between agonistic pluralism and deliberative democracy. As the philosophical roots, communicative rationality presupposes rational and moral requirements in order to resolve conflicts on an issue the way the deliberative citizenship education model implies. He makes the distinction between focusing on personal identities and a rational deliberation on an issue:

deliberation brings into focus the conflict, the problem, and the different views on a particular substantive issue, while agonism focuses, rather, on the different (often ethnic) identities of the persons/adversaries involved, not on the problem (whatever it is) itself. I believe that focusing on personal identities is likely to lead to struggles between individuals,
and that views built into and deeply rooted in identities make rational deliberation over the problem itself, and a shared effort to define the problem, more difficult. (Englund, 2016 p.69)

For Englund, the focus on passion is an example of egoistic bias of strategic/instrumental conflicts, such as using one's ethnic or any other identity strategically in discussions to gain advantage. This should be kept out of deliberation and either be dealt with individually or kept in the background to keep deliberation free of power relations:

identity-based discussions, differing from where discussions are focused on a problem, also tend to bring passion to the discussion (which also is explicitly underlined in agonism saying that deliberative theorists underestimate emotions) – a passion that I think, from a deliberative and cosmopolitan perspective, would be hesitant to promote. I think, from a deliberative point of view rather, that passion in the classroom if possible has to be (self-)controlled and nuanced (or at least pursued in that direction) (Englund, 2016 p.69)

This critique from deliberative theorists misses the fact that passions in agonistic pluralism are political identities, collective and unavoidable for democratic politics and for any transformation on political issues. That is why Tryggvason (2018) for example, rejects that a focus on identity can be separated from a focus on the issue itself:

As I see it, the deliberative critique rests on two unfounded and erroneous claims about the agonistic conception of identities. First, the critique assumes that a focus on students’ identities substantially differs from a focus on the issue itself. Thus, the critique presupposes that a sharp distinction between identities and political issues can be maintained. Second, the critique assumes that the agonistic approach embraces essentialist identity-formations, such as ethnic identities. (Tryggvason, 2018 p.4)

However, when the socio-political function of education is in focus in citizenship education, the deliberative criteria comes into new light. The criteria have to be seen as presuppositions for citizenship and analyzed on a broader scale of democratic politics. Here is where the critique from agonistic pluralism can come into play.

Taking the agonistic perspective on citizenship to educational research, Ruitenberg (2009) especially makes use of Mouffe's conception of transformation from antagonism to agonism. Antagonistic conflicts putting into question the basic institutions of democracy demands according to her a more radical democratic pedagogy than a deliberative discussion can offer. The democratic status of a school and of civic identities of the participants are tested when such a conflict takes place and Ruitenberg sees this as a potential for learning and transformation. Her aim is to educate political adversaries and not moral enemies, where the conflict concerns hegemony and "the social order, with ways in which to organize a society in a
particular place and at a particular time.” (Ruitenberg, 2009 p. 4)

A particular socio-political order sets the requirements for what kind of students education should promote. Biesta (2011) uses Mouffe's critique of the deliberative rational and moral requirements develop their implications in citizenship education where these work as entry conditions to reproduce an existing political hegemony. Deliberative democratic citizenship education contributes to setting rational and moral limits to liberal democracy and answers to a need in liberal hegemony for citizens to value impartiality and consensus:

I have argued that at least some conceptions of liberal democracy would see the borders of the democratic order as circumscribing the domain of rationality and morality. Those who are on the inside, so the argument goes, are there because they are committed to act in a rational and moral way, while those on the outside of this order are there either because they are unable to act rationally and/or morally—and this inability can either be seen as structural or, as in the case of children, as temporal—or because they explicitly reject the standards of rationality and morality that characterise the political order. (Biesta, 2011 p. 146)

For Biesta it would be wrong to include students into a democratic order according to rationality and morality. It would mean to label the excluded students as simply not yet able to give arguments in a rational way or to respect a moral argument when he/she hears it and hence “join” a unanimous consensus.

she (Mouffe) has exposed the political nature of such entry conditions by emphasising that such conditions always do political ‘work’ in including some and excluding others. She has also argued that we should be explicit about these exclusions because it is only then that we can begin to understand that those who are excluded from the political community are not ‘outside’ because of a lack of rationality of morality—also because what counts as rational and moral is at least partly the ‘effect’ of the particular hegemonic construction of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’—but because their political values are different from those who are on the inside. (Biesta, 2011 p. 143)

What democratic orders should maintain from the inside is a confrontation over liberty and equality which can include many different interpretations some of which may be excluded temporarily due to what hegemonic interpretation is dominant at the time. Such a confrontation looks more like an ”exposure” to the state of democratic politics in a certain hegemony than a rational decision to become democratic. This also goes for learning in citizenship education where political identity is no longer based on rational or moral entry conditions, nor ethnicity or similar stable identities.
for Mouffe any redrawing of the existing political hegemony always needs to take place with reference to the principles of *liberty and equality*. The democratic project, in other words, is not without ‘reference points’ but the very ‘essence’ of democracy is that these reference points engender a process that is fundamentally open and undetermined. This is why there is a need for a different conception of civic learning and democratic education, one in which civic learning is an inherent dimension of the ongoing experiment of democratic politics. (...) Learning here is not about the acquisition of knowledge, skills, competencies or dispositions but has to do with an ‘exposure’ to and engagement with the experiment of democracy. (Biesta 2011 p.152)

Deliberative theory about how democratic discussions should be held in society in general has been advantageously applied into citizenship education models and classroom format. It has created new and participatory roles for both students and teachers and challenged conceptions of citizenship education modelled on traditional social roles and norms. Agonistic pluralistic theorists in citizenship education has pointed to how exclusions are inevitable in democracy and should be seen as political adversaries.

### 3.5 Discussion

When education in democratic societies is organized according to the principles of liberty and equality, conceptualizing these principles in citizenship education theories can be done in different philosophical ways. The aim of this substudy was to investigate the theoretical presuppositions of deliberative democracy by lifting the influential critique of agonistic pluralism of these presuppositions in the field of philosophy and citizenship education. Deliberative and agonistic theories share the ambition of developing democratic theories of citizenship more inclusive than nationality or ethnicity.

When taking the original philosophical approach to deliberative democracy, formulated by Habermas, democracy is a form of communication which requires participants to hold certain presuppositions. This is a model of communicative rationality for citizenship, which he prefers over the instrumental and strategic rationality. Habermas's theory of communicative rationality has lead to a reciprocal two-way model of discussion for citizenship education where every participant gives arguments and listen to others' arguments. These two steps are in communicative rationality seen as striving toward consensus, as a third step, by holding certain rational and moral requirements.

In the agonistic criticisms of deliberative democracy, one of the most common points of critique from agonistic pluralism are the concepts of rational consensus and moral consensus which get
used interchangeably. The agonistic pluralistic critique claims that deliberative theory with the consensus-striving in philosophy and citizenship education does not account enough for pluralism. Mouffe claims that every consensus is an expression of a hegemony since she theorizes citizenship as first and foremost political. The main contributions of this substudy have been to show how rational and moral criteria are coupled with consensus. Criteria of giving differing perspectives on an issue and willingness-to-listen in themselves do not necessarily result in a collective agreement on that issue. Integrating them into education might indeed contribute to a more rational and moral classroom environment and be an alternative for political discussions. However, together with consensus the perspective on rationality and morality is narrowed and a whole set of other implicit presuppositions also enter such as transparency and symmetry which can have excluding effects in discussions.

This substudy has made the case that it is a good idea to supplement democratic models like the reciprocal two-way discussions in the deliberative model to recognize the exclusions of rational and moral requirements to achieve consensus. As a contribution to the research field on democratic theory the agonistic pluralistic model can in my view supplement such a two-way model with an alternative two-way model of exposing the inside and outside of citizenship as hegemony. Such an analysis can be conducted through Mouffe's concept of ”us and them”-practices. For example, in order to keep citizenship democratic, which interpretations of liberty and equality should be endorsed and which should be opposed?

Limitations of the theoretical approach of this substudy are not taking into account enough empirical cases, especially in education, in order to further evaluate the strengths of the two theories under consideration. Further research can be suggested to go in this empirical direction. Practitioners can compare these theories separately to their experience and might not find use for one or the other, but can also see their practices, such as didactical discussions or democratic inclusion, in new light if not having considered the theories against each other before. Chances are their pedagogical contexts are already impacted by them, especially deliberative democracy which has had most impact generally, which makes these theoretical considerations even more relevant.

4. Third substudy: Systematic literature review of the effects of deliberation
This systematic/scoping literature review will focus on core literature about deliberative democracy and what empirical effects its implementation has had in mini-publics and classroom discussions. The results of these studies are meant to investigate the empirical reliability of deliberative democracy. Reviewing the empirical research done on deliberative
democracy has given an idea of what that core literature might be.

The systematic literature review method provides a strategy to find a group of key search words, for my review these have been among others, “deliberative democracy”, “deliberative polling”, “deliberative teaching”, “evidence” and “empirical”. Searching on databases such as Gothenburg University's library online database, CDD (Center for Deliberative Democracy) on Stanford University's website for the Department of Communication and Google Scholar, the results have given the relevant types of systematic evidence-based articles. From these key words I have used criteria of inclusion of literature which discuss evidence from deliberative research in a systematic way, surveying the field as comprehensively as possible. Theoretical articles about deliberation not discussing experimental evidence, which is another large branch of deliberative research, has also been excluded here.

Scoping reviews are preferable to systematic reviews when the purpose is to survey the scope of a specific “body of literature” (Munn et.al, 2018), which is in this case the international research field of deliberative democracy. With the strategy to survey a particular and relatively independent research field with its own body of evidence, the scope and limits of the deliberative field has continuously been a criteria of inclusion for my reading. Systematic reviews are better for a focus on evidence, while scoping reviews are better for a focus on a limited field (Munn et.al. 2018), therefore this review have used both systematic and scoping strategies of inclusion. I will try to respond to the question ”what empirical evidence is there for the effects of deliberation?” In particular, evidence from conducted experiments on mini-publics, deliberative polling in political science and on deliberative teaching in pedagogy will be covered.

4.1 Evidence against deliberation?
At a first glance, discussions of evidence in deliberative research are not entirely optimistic. Most discussions include criticisms of deliberative democracy as such and plea for further research as evidence is limited, even the most optimistic literature. This shows a critical strength in the literature reviewed and my hypothesis of finding evidence for deliberation has proved more challenging than it appeared at the outset. Since deliberative research has an important status on many universities it has garnered severe critics questioning the reliability of the methods and evidence of the whole field. Articles only discussing weaknesses of deliberative research has been excluded but more balanced literature weighing both flaws and strengths have been important for the review and will be discussed throughout.

As an example of constructive criticism, Mutz (2008) shows how the assumptions of deliberative theory goes against evidence in social psychology about group behavior. Tendencies towards majority conformity and polarization in opinion formation suggest that
participants might have non-deliberative starting points in a political discussion. Even further than that: “These are not theories merely suggesting that people do not measure up to deliberative standards when they engage in political discourse; rather, these theories call into question the likelihood of beneficial results even when people do achieve such lofty goals” (Mutz, 2008). For example, this questions the efficacy of the deliberative goal of non-partisanship among randomly selected participants, something which all deliberative researchers should ask themselves. So what evidence is most common in defense of deliberative democracy?

### 4.2 Deliberative polling – effects on preference change

Perhaps the most cited evidence on deliberation is from political science and James Fishkin in the format of deliberative polls. These polls are political discussions among randomly selected citizens, so called "mini-publics", which usually get together over a weekend at the polling projects expense (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2002). Information about topics and policies to discuss is sent out to the participants to read between the first selection and the weekend of deliberation. Random selection from many strata of society (stratified sampling) is one of the main preconditions for ensuring a plurality of opinions and to measure preference change objectively. The main effect that deliberative researchers often proclaim is from these polls, where around two-thirds of the participants have changed their preferences after deliberating on policy questions (Fishkin & Farrar, 2005). This particular piece of evidence is measured by surveying the participants opinions on the topics discussed before and after deliberation:

“A random sample is first given a survey of the conventional sort. Then, it is invited to come to a single place, at the expense of the project, to engage in a weekend of small group discussions and larger plenary sessions in which it is given extensive opportunities to get good information, exchange competing points of view and come to a considered judgment. At the end of the weekend, it is given the same questionnaire as on first contact. The resulting changes of opinion are often dramatic. They offer a glimpse of democratic possibilities the views people would have if they were effectively motivated to pay attention and get good information and discuss the issues together. The Deliberative Poll puts scientific random samples in a situation where they have incentives, in effect, to overcome rational ignorance” (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2002 p.134).

Polls have also been conducted to study contact between ethnic groups where sympathies towards historically-disadvantaged groups have been measured to increase, especially those with more negative attitudes to begin with (Pettigrew 1997, Kim, Fishkin & Luskin 2018).

“Given our experimental design, it provides strong evidence that these effects are indeed
causal: structured encounters with members of a historically-disadvantaged group causes attitudes to be more sympathetic towards this group. It is important to note that these effects occurred on top of any general attitudinal shifts following deliberation. (…) In other words, deliberative contact was equally effective for those with more or less contact with the outgroup before the deliberative event, and was marginally more effective for those who had more negative contact in the past.” (Kim, Fishkin & Luskin, 2018)

Other polls have compared the standard face-to-face deliberation with online deliberation (usually through Skype or similar video) and have demonstrated that online deliberation is almost as informative as face-to-face (Iyengar, Fishkin et.al. 2003). Gastil (1999, 2000) describes the effects of deliberative discussion on participants political opinions as increased political sophistication. Effects on coherence, integration and differentiation of political opinions are measured before and after deliberating. Significant effects were measured in at least integration and differentiation in knowledge about a specific political topic.

4.3 Single-peakedness

When the deliberating group cannot come to a consensus on decisions, an “attractive compromise” or meta-consensus called single-peakedness is the last resort in the deliberative experiment. Therefore single-peakedness will my last example of evidence from deliberative polls. It is a range of a limited amount of opinions where the participants can rank their preferred order among the options discussed (List, Luskin et.al 2012, Fishkin & Luskin 2005). Interestingly, the range usually ends up representing a classic political scale from left to right, or secular to religious, but does not necessarily have to:

“Deliberation may increase proximity to single-peakedness by increasing meta-agreement, that is, agreement on a common semantic issue dimension (like liberal/conservative or secular/religious) in terms of which to conceptualize the choice at hand, as distinct from substantive agreement on what choice to make. This involves a three-step process. The first step is for the participants to focus on a common semantic issue dimension. The second is for them to place the alternatives in the same left-right order on it (thereby relating a geometric ordering like \([x \ y \ z]\) to the semantic issue dimension). The third step is for each individual to identify a most preferred alternative and to adopt a decreasing preference for other alternatives as they get more distant in either direction from it relative to that common left-right ordering. This process may but need not be conscious.” (List, Luskin et.al 2012)

Proximity to single-peakedness is measured before and after deliberating, with deliberation having an increasing effect on single-peakedness in general. Preferences can be said to be single–peaked if the alternatives (a–e, image 1) can be lined up so that the graph of every voter’s
preferences has a single local maximum. This can be visualized by two graphs showing single-peaked and non-single-peaked preferences:

![Graphs showing single-peaked and non-single-peaked preferences](Image 2 (Porello, 2016))

If preferences are single-peaked and the alternatives have a valid range, the graph cannot have two peaks like in the second graph, alternatives a and d. Single-peakedness is not a tool used by every empirical deliberative researcher and has its flaws which connects to the debate about the criteria for and achievability of consensus, but is one solution.

Dryzek (2007) discusses issues from social choice theory where polarization between majority and minorities in politics are shown to be a recurring issue, such as the non-deliberative tendencies problematized by Mutz (2008). Single-peakedness as evidence for the efficacy of deliberation seems to be able to counter-act such issues:

"individuals may not agree on what is to be done, but they do agree on the dimension on which preferences are structured. Results from deliberative polls show that in general deliberation does increase the degree of preference meta-consensus, and so the problems that social choice theory presents to democracy are ameliorated" (Dryzek, 2007).

### 4.4 Deliberative teaching

Deliberative democracy has also been experimented with within educational research. Knowledge gains, preference change and civic engagement has been measured to increase in both teacher-led and student-led classroom deliberation (Bogaards & Deutsch 2015, Latimer & Hempson 2012). As far as Swedish educational research in deliberative democracy goes, the most important author is Tomas Englund, pedagogy professor at Örebro University. His influence is mainly because of the national policy paper he wrote appointed by Skolverket in 2000 called "Deliberativa samtal som värdegrund - historiska perspektiv och aktuella förutsättningar" ("Deliberative discussions as value base - historical perspectives and current conditions"). In this paper Englund presents the general characteristics of deliberative discussion, how it can be used and defined, and argues that it should be a central work form for teachers.
and students as a democratic value base.

Samuelsson (2016) gives empirical examples of Englund's three criteria of democratic deliberation in the classroom by distinguishing it from three other forms of classroom discussion; explorative, problem-solving and predetermined discussion. Deliberation contains reason-giving, willingness-to-listen and consensus while the other three discussions only contains one or two of the criteria.

"The conclusion is that by posing a question that gives students the possibility to disagree on the matter, while at the same time giving them the opportunity to reach a collective conclusion, it is possible to steer classroom discussions in the direction of democratic deliberation." (ibid. p.9)

Andersson (2012) investigates the empirical effects of deliberative teaching in contrast with non-deliberative teaching. His results show: “deliberative teaching is sometimes more but never less productive compared to the alternative non-deliberative teaching”. According to Andersson, the connection between deliberation and the knowledge effects in the participants in the studies by Englund and Fishkin can be further elaborated. He finds that deliberative teaching is more effective in vocational programs than in academic programs for further studies. These findings go contrary to other evidence that deliberation would be best for academic students. Four democratic competences seem to develop in particular:

“(M)y results show that only students on vocational programs in the upper secondary school seem to be favoured by deliberative teaching. Students in vocational programs that participated in deliberative teaching increased their knowledge, thoughtful opinions, political efficacy, readiness for political participation and conversation skills more than students that had non-deliberative teaching. No such effects are present among students in the program preparing for ensuing studies (Andersson, 2012 p.192).

One main expected democratic value of deliberation is decreased self-interest. Some evidence of deliberative teaching points to a decrease in self-interested forms of argumentation. Deliberation in classrooms seems to affect how the students argue for their case with less reference to themselves and their own group belongings, even if they do not change opinion during deliberation (Jodal 2005). Andersson's (2012) study finds that deliberative teaching is as effective as non-deliberative teaching for the purpose of decreasing self-interest. What these mixed results pointing out areas where deliberation is useful mean for a future evidence-based policy-making in education and governance remains to be seen. However, norms such as rational ignorance, self-interested argumentation and polarization will continue to be non-deliberative and deliberative experiments in the future will still be designed to counter-act such norms.
4.5 Empirical research with normative standards

In the end, empirical research about deliberation has to take into account both the evidence for and against a successful group discussion and researchers aware of the obstacles their experiments face need persistence that the consequences will be overall positive in a cost-benefit analysis. Potentially democratic norms as well as non-deliberative tendencies are inherent to society and the challenge to researchers is to design the discussions so as to overcome the obstacles, a challenge many researchers demonstrably have accepted:

“Insofar as people do lack the necessary abilities and deliberative groups do not conduct their discussions in the desired fashion, is it possible to structure deliberations so as to improve the quality of the discourse that occurs? This calls for research that looks at different ways of facilitating deliberation and the impact these facilitative efforts have on the quality of the discourse, the collective outcomes produced and the development of the basic cognitive and communicative competence of the individuals involved.” (Rosenberg, 2005)

Curato & Dryzek et.al (2017) claim three reasons why deliberation is the solution to a non-deliberative norm such as polarization. Most importantly, random selection ensures a plurality of views to prevent homogenization on controversial topics. Secondly, for oppressed groups polarization can lead to clarity and confidence when meeting other oppressed groups and in finding a voice in the public sphere. The last reason is the important role of the facilitator in discussions to keep them structured (on topic and equal participatory contribution) since structured discussions show evidence of much lower polarization than unstructured ones.

A question some deliberative researchers have asked themselves and their field, is whether their theory is falsifiable, in the sense of Popper's (1959) procedure of confirming empirical predictions. Mutz (2008, 2002) suggests a difficulty in measuring causal relationships between deliberative process requirements and outcomes of these processes and that research can be more precise in how they apply their theories in experiments. In image 2, the cloud symbolizes deliberation as a “black box” where complex factors interplay:
For Neblo (2005), deliberative democracy is firstly a normative project which wants to investigate democratic capacities in the public sphere to develop them, and where empirical evidence functions as indications of which political goals are realizable:

“Put somewhat crudely, deliberation is not about making empirical predictions, but rather about clarifying a normative standard — one by which we can judge the legitimacy of any particular empirical instance. (...) Deliberative democratic theory does make implicit empirical predictions. While it is open to a deliberative democrat to argue that he or she is merely elucidating the relationship between certain moral concepts and practices and that those normative relationships hold whether or not any particular set of social conditions obtains, doing so comes at great cost. It is true that one cannot ‘falsify’ a normative theory in the same way one might falsify a theory about fluid dynamics. (...) If many of its implicit empirical premises and causal claims prove false, there is a sense in which it could be rendered practically falsified. That is, if his theory’s ideal content were sufficiently incongruent with realizable political goals, striving to achieve its ideal could lead to perverse consequences.” (Neblo, 2005)

Surveying the evidence from deliberative research, Thompson (2008) judges the results as mixed and depending significantly on the context of deliberative discussion. Policy issues which are polarizing and controversial even in a controlled deliberative environment can be seen as flawed policies which are in extra need of legitimization from the public. The evidence of flawed deliberation do not apply to the method of deliberation but are contingent constraints of contexts deliberation is situated in:
“The general conclusion of surveys of the empirical research so far is that taken together the findings are mixed or inconclusive. The main reason for the mixed results is that the success or failure of deliberation depends so much on its context. The contingent character of these results may seem to give theorists hope. If only theorists can identify the right conditions, they can confidently continue to extol the virtues of deliberative democracy. They can use even the negative findings to point out defects in the system, and support reforms that would bring about conditions more favorable to deliberative democracy. When confronted with findings that seem to confute his theory, Habermas is unfazed. He reads the “contradicting data as indicators of contingent constraints that deserve serious inquiry and…as detectors for the discovery of specific causes for existing lacks of legitimacy”. His article is pointedly subtitled “the impact of normative theory on empirical research.” It implicitly relegates empirical research to the job of being merely a helping hand. In that role, it poses no risk of becoming a disruptive voice in the deliberative project.” (Thompson, 2008)

Seeing the obstacles for deliberation as contingent is how the least critical deliberative theorists reason concerning empirical evidence. Thompson (2008) suggests a little more cautious conclusions when he says: “The most promising approach for empirical research would therefore seem to be to continue trying to discover the conditions in which deliberative democracy does and does not work well, while paying more attention to the question of to what extent the unfavorable conditions could change.” It is important to stress along with Thompson (2008) that the evidence from deliberation is mixed and inconclusive, and that some obstacles such as self-interest and polarization are necessary rather than contingent. Group dynamics can not be fully controlled by random selection or by neutral facilitation from a moderator. However, as a form for individuals to interact with the public discourse deliberation has proven reliable for informative and democratic opinion formation. As far as alternative discourse theories go, other forms of understanding interaction with public discourse exist as well. They do not however have as reliable methods and evidence underlying their theorization, which is why deliberation has been a relevant focus for extensive review.

5. Discussion
In common for all these three substudies are results which show how deliberative discussions are arranged according to presuppositions of communicative rationality and how they run into problems of socio-political realities. Whether it is social inequality or political changes in institutional conditions deliberative democracy constantly encounters obstacles to communication free from power relations. As was seen in the last substudy, even in the most empirically oriented deliberative research theoretical presuppositions still have a normative
input. Even in the most controlled settings possible there is an aspiration to measure the presuppositions of communicative rationality as to whether communication can lead to unanimous decisions, decrease self-interest etc. Problematically for the deliberative model the results led to the conclusion that power dynamics such as self-interest and polarization as inevitable presuppositions for political discussions among citizens.

The debate between deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism in citizenship education over what requirements should be put on the fostering of citizens is another example where deliberative theory is put into practice. Relating communication with rationality and morality so closely as deliberative democracy does implies that language and democracy can be abstracted from social and power relations. As was seen in the second substudy this can lead to seeing emotion as self-interested and eliminate conflict in argumentation and listening. Agonistic pluralism reframes the debate towards how emotions also can be political and collective expressed as different interpretations of liberty and equality. They settle with articulating ”enemies to be destroyed” into political adversaries as the main task for democratic citizenship. These considerations of citizenship education in theory and practice could all inform deliberative democracy in the context of a school system. For example, recognizing the right of adversaries to defend their political ideas could be an interesting focus for citizenship education in a school system where juridical management tends to control and measure specific rights.

Since multiple methodologies have been used further research can only be suggested in an eclectic way. One limitation of this thesis is this eclecticism and that a fragmentary structure lacks an overarching contribution. The three perspectives used here can be developed into more uniform future research designs on the topic depending on what one is interested in. The historical curriculum-theoretical approach had to survey a long duration of time which had to be selective as to what had impacted the democratic mission. Critical discourse analysis as a method made it necessary to focus on recent history and hence the connection to older policy can seem arbitrary or be redrawn with a more purely historical methodology. The approach to philosophy and political citizenship questions needed to include the agonistic critique and could therefore appear unfair to deliberative presuppositions or could delve deeper into them. The empirical approach also used a systematic literature review and hence collected no data of its own.

There are tendencies which describe deliberative democracy itself as hegemonic excluding other possibilities. This description was even an initial hypothesis for this thesis as something avoided by deliberative researchers and worth investigating. Mouffe (2005) has related the
deliberative consensus-orientation in political philosophy to a larger "post-political" state of democracy where conflicts between left and right are dismissed or avoided. Cooper (2019) describes the deliberative criteria in educational policy to make hegemonic claims for rational discussions which eliminate conflicts in the Swedish school context. The inwardness of respectful communication in citizenship fostering has also been criticized for paving the way for an even more dominant outward fostering of entrepreneurship and marketization of interpersonal relationships (Dahlstedt & Olson, 2014). These are possible topics for further problematizing research.

On the other hand the output of deliberative research can be said to have declined gradually in tempo and political impact since the early 2000's. One contribution of this thesis is to contextualize the deliberative theoretical presuppositions and in turn highlighting their importance underlying the logic of deliberative democratic discourse and citizenship fostering. For example, the deliberative consensus-orientation seems less problematic emerging in the context of participatory management with processual aspirational objectives than deployed today in a juridical management. Furthermore, research in mini-publics and teaching are arguably closest to what deliberative democracy looks like in practice. They would be prime examples for further research between political science and education if one wants to pursue that combination and is of a practical or empirical persuasion. The overarching thrust for these three substudies is to "cross-pollinate" each other in intersections of deliberative democratic theory and practice.

Deliberative democracy has a history in national curricula, syllabuses and citizenship fostering work forms. It has extensive theoretical origins spreading across philosophy, political science and linguistics. It also has a reliability in the empirical field in deliberative mini-publics and teaching. The versatility of the deliberative democratic discourse is one main reason why it has had effects on geopolitical decision-making and may have a towering presence in research still today. All these factors interplay in open academic debates on the international stage when deliberative democracy gains supporters, detractors and inspires alternative democratic discourses. Today when democracy faces threats it is especially important to emphasize citizenship education and research in these fields.
6. References


Prop. 1978/79:180 (1979). *Om läroplan för grundskolan m. m*. Downloaded from [https://data.riksdagen.se/](https://data.riksdagen.se/)

Prop. 1990/91:18. *Regeringens proposition om ansvaret för skolan*. Downloaded from [https://www.riksdagen.se/](https://www.riksdagen.se/)


Regeringens skrivelse 2000/01:59. *En nationell handlingsplan mot rasism, främingsfi-entlighet, homofobi och diskriminering*. Downloaded from [https://data.riksdagen.se/](https://data.riksdagen.se/)

Regeringsbeslut U2009/2848/S. *Uppdrag om skolans värdegrund*. Downloaded from [https://www.regeringen.se/](https://www.regeringen.se/)


Skolverket. (2000a). *Värdegrundsboken - Om samtal för demokrati i skolan*, Gunilla Zackari, Fredrik Modigh. Downloaded from [https://www.skolverket.se/](https://www.skolverket.se/)

Skolverket. (2000b). *En fördjupad studie om värdegrunden - om möten, relationer och samtal som förutsättningar för arbetet med de grundläggande värdena*. Downloaded from [https://www.skolverket.se/](https://www.skolverket.se/)

Skolverket. (2000c). *Deliberativa samtal som värdegrund - historiska perspektiv och aktuella förutsättningar*, Tomas Englund. Downloaded from [https://www.skolverket.se/](https://www.skolverket.se/)

Skolverket. (2001). *Strategi för Skolverkets arbete med de demokratiska värdena – en sammanfattning*. Downloaded from [https://www.skolverket.se/](https://www.skolverket.se/)


Skolverket. (2012). *Arbetet mot diskriminering och kränkande behandling*. Downloaded from [https://www.skolverket.se/](https://www.skolverket.se/)

Skolverket. (2013). *Förskolans och skolans värdegrund - förhållningssätt, verktyg och metoder*. Downloaded from [https://www.skolverket.se/](https://www.skolverket.se/)


Skolverket. (2014b). *Arbetet mot diskriminering och kränkande behandling*. Downloaded from [https://kvutis.se](https://kvutis.se)

Skolverket. (2014c). *Sex- och samlevnadsundervisning i grundskolans tidigare år: Jämställdhet, sexualitet och relationer i ämnesundervisningen: Årskurserna 1-6*. Downloaded from [https://www.skolverket.se/](https://www.skolverket.se/)
Skolverket. (2018). *Betyg och betygsättning*. Downloaded from [https://www.skolverket.se/](https://www.skolverket.se/)


