PARTNERS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT?
EU-UN cooperation in the DRC and Chad

Giselaldina Duro
# Table of contents

**ABSTRACT** ................................. 3

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS** .................. 4

1. **INTRODUCTION** .......................... 5
   1.2. Research Questions .......................... 7
   1.2. Disposition of the Thesis ....................... 9

2. **BACKGROUND** ............................. 9
   2.1. The need for cooperation after the end of the Cold War ............... 9
   2.2. European Union as an international security actor ............ 10
   2.3. EU-UN cooperation in crisis management: A brief historical framework ............. 11
   2.4. Cooperation in peacekeeping operations ................................................ 13
   2.5. Key definitions and new trends ............................................................... 14
     2.5.1. Crisis management ................................................................. 14
     2.5.2. Comprehensive Approach ......................................................... 14
     2.5.3. The problem of “comprehensive approach” ......................... 15

3. **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK** ................. 16
   3.1. State of the literature ................................................................. 16
   3.2. Neoliberal institutionalism ............................................................ 20
   3.3. Organisational theory ................................................................. 22
   3.4. Inter-organisational theory ............................................................ 24
   3.5. Expectations derived from the theories ............................................. 26
   3.6. Contribution of the study to previous research ......................... 27

4. **METHODOLOGY** ............................ 28
   4.1. Comparative case study research ..................................................... 28
     4.1.1. Most similar and most different case study designs ......... 28
   4.2. Universe and unit of analysis ......................................................... 29
   4.3. Case selection .................................................................................... 30
   4.4. Analysis of the data .......................................................................... 31
   4.5. Data collection ................................................................................... 34
   4.6. Validity and generalisability ............................................................ 35

5. **ANALYSIS** ....................................... 36
   5.1. MONUC and Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003 ............................ 36
     5.1.1. Background .................................................................................. 36
5.1.2. UN INTERVENTION ____________________________________________ 37
5.1.3. THE EU AND OPERATION ARTEMIS ________________________________ 38
5.1.4. TRANSACTION COSTS AND EXCHANGE OF BEST PRACTICES ____________ 38
5.1.5. STRATEGIC INTERESTS __________________________________________ 39
5.1.6. IMPACT OF THE JOINT MANDATE ON THE CONFLICT __________________ 40
5.2. UN MISSION AND EUFOR CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR) ____________ 41
5.2.1. BACKGROUND ____________________________________________________ 41
5.2.2. EUFOR CHAD/CAR ________________________________________________ 41
5.2.3. TRANSACTION COSTS AND EXCHANGE OF BEST PRACTICES ____________ 41
5.2.4. STRATEGIC INTERESTS __________________________________________ 42
5.2.5. IMPACT OF THE JOINT MANDATE ON THE CONFLICT __________________ 43

6. DISCUSSION ________________________________________________________ 44

6.1. OFFICIAL PURPOSES OF THE MANDATE AND RATIONALES ____________________________ 44
6.2. INTERESTS BEHIND COOPERATION ________________________________________ 45
6.3. IMPACT OF THE JOINT MANDATE ON THE CONFLICT __________________________ 47
6.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH _________________________________________ 48

7. CONCLUSIONS ______________________________________________________ 49

8. FUTURE RESEARCH ________________________________________________ 51

REFERENCES ________________________________________________________ 52
Abstract

This thesis seeks to explain the reason why international and regional organisations have started to cooperate, especially after the Cold War. Cooperation amongst organisations has gained importance as a field of research in the last decade, but most of the scholars have rather given a descriptive contribution and recognised the legal implications on the matter. There has been in this sense a lack of an in-depth analysis that provides a theoretical explanation of cooperation linked to an empirical analysis. This research aims at filling this gap by focusing on the cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations in the field of crisis management. It derives expectations that are going to be analysed and discussed from three interconnected theories: neoliberal institutionalism, organisational and inter-organisational theory. The study has been conducted employing a qualitative Comparative Case Study analysis method. Two case studies have been analysed and compared: the EU-UN joint mandate in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, namely Operation Artemis, and the one at the border between Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 called EUFOR Chad/CAR. The findings show that organisations cooperate to exchange best practices, share information and lower transaction costs. However, most of the time their cooperation is driven by personal interests and there is still a lack of trust towards each other regarding military interventions. The impact on the conflict has positive effects only on the short term and it is narrowed to the scope of the joint mandate.
## List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ECSDP</td>
<td>European Common and Security Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>European Union Force in Chad and Central African Republic</td>
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<td>EUGS</td>
<td>European Union Global Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRVP</td>
<td>High Representative Vice President</td>
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<td>IEMF</td>
<td>Interim Emergency Multination Force</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
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<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MDSD</td>
<td>Most different system designs</td>
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<td>MSSD</td>
<td>Most similar system designs</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UNBPU</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit</td>
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<td>UNDPK</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
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1. Introduction

After the end of the Cold War (1989-1990) the role of international organisations has grown significantly. At the same time, with the ending of the East-West conflict, it became possible for the United Nations (UN) to work as it was initially intended and engaging in peacekeeping, crisis management operations and conflict resolution in different areas worldwide. Due to the unstable situation of many democracies in the world and the constant threat of new conflicts, there has been an increasing need for international action. This became possible in the multipolar environment post-Cold War and therefore, many international and regional organisation gained a remarkable importance and started to cooperate one another. Throughout the decades, conflicts have become more and more complex. Due to the realisation of the complexity of armed conflict, the urge to join forces and share knowledge has become a driving force for cooperation.

Classic International Relations’ (IR) theories such as liberalism and rationalism focus their analysis on governments’ interests when tackling the concept of cooperation amongst organisations and their behaviours in terms of security issues. IR theories are surely relevant when explaining the structural change that occurred after the end of the Cold War and why international organisations – such as the UN and the EU – increasingly cooperate. However, this study seeks to add further complementary theories that focus on inter- and intra- organisational dynamics. These are: neoliberal institutionalism, organisational theory and inter-organisational theory. These three theories present interconnected characteristics when explaining inter- and intra- organisational cooperation. While neoliberal institutionalism is comprised in a branch of IR theories and focuses on explaining cooperation as a phenomenon, organisational and inter-organisational theory provide a further solid and resonated explanation on why and how the cooperation takes place. The two latter theories have been used mostly to analyse private companies’ behaviours. However, I find them highly relevant and in line with the behaviour of public organisations. By not using classic IR theories to analyse this phenomenon, I expect to enrich and fill the gap of current research with a complementary perspective.
Nowadays, many are the international and regional organisations that have a role in the field of defence, peace and security and spreading democratic values. The role of the United Nations (UN) is pivotal in this sense, but several other have a big role in the field of security and peace - respectively, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Likewise, regional organisations have also started setting their agenda on security matters and not just on economic ties among members. This is the case of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). In addition to this, a more recent phenomenon has risen, seeing international and regional organisations starting to cooperate between one another in different levels. This cooperation might take place in an informal way and just occasionally, or in a more institutionalised way. The latter case is the one of the cooperation between the EU and the UN, which have formally established their cooperation with a joint declaration signed in 2003. This enhanced partnership has paved the way to joint actions that have taken place in the last twenty years and that saw the intervention of the EU also in other continents, mostly in the African one. Consequently, the research is going to be narrowed down to the cooperation between the EU and the UN, being the only case representing the most advanced form of international and regional peacekeeping and crisis management cooperation so far.

Present research regarding the cooperation between the EU and the UN has a descriptive nature. Researchers mainly focus on presenting and describing this new phenomenon linking it to the historical process, but they lack on a systematic assessment of it through case study analyses. By combining the abovementioned theoretical framework to an empirical analysis, I expect to fill the research gap and provide a complementary and alternative explanation within the dynamics of IOs cooperation.

With a Comparative case study analysis, this research is going to systematically analyse and compare two cases of joint cooperation in the African continent. The first one took place in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the deployment of EU operation Artemis, while the second joint operation was deployed in 2008 with the European Union Force in Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR).
1.2. **Research questions**

Digging into the role that cooperation has in such a globalised scenario, the three abovementioned theories provide a detailed explanation on the reasons why, generally, organisations cooperate and how they do so. However, narrowing it down to the dimension of the cooperation between the EU and the UN and being the interest of this research focussed on intra and inter-cooperation amongst organisations and its impact on crisis management operations, the following question is raised:

*In what way can we understand inter and intra organisational dimensions in terms of EU-UN cooperation and its impact on crisis management operations in Africa?*

From this overarching question, this Master thesis aims at focusing at more specific elements that build several expectations that lead to more questions upon the topic. These are going to be addressed, analysed and discussed systematically. The three theories employed are neoliberal institutionalism, organisational and inter-organisational theory. The sub-questions generated are the following:

1. **Which are the official and underlying rationales of this cooperation?**

The three theories identify several rationales of cooperation that are going to be systematically analysed and discussed according to the goal set in the official documents of the mandates’ deployment under analysis. The rationales I am looking for are:

- **transactions costs**: individuated in neoliberal institutionalism. It comprises information sharing, coordination of the organisations on the ground in order to fulfil the mandate;
- **exchange of best practices and learning**: these concepts are pinpointed in organisational and inter-organisational theory. Exchange of best practices can be identified in military learning, intelligence abilities, organisational learning, budget management or anything that can be transferred as better skills from one organisation to the other and the organisations’ resilience to act on the problematics on the ground. Sharing experience, consequently, leads to a stimulation of innovation, therefore this element becomes crucial in the analysis.
- **Level of trust between the organisations:** according to neoliberal institutionalism, creating a trusty environment amongst organisations is highly important for achieving the prefixed goals of the mandate and for keeping relationships, having a good spill-over effect on transaction costs. If the EU and the UN show trust on each other’s work by sharing information and coordinate their work on the ground, intra- and inter-organisational relations have positive impacts on the outcome of the operation.

2. **What strategic interests for the EU and the UN lie behind their cooperation?**

Usually, IOs cooperate to reach “personal” goals. This is widely expressed mostly from a rationalist point of view, a theory that focuses on countries’ domestic strategies. However, when understanding intra and inter-organisational dynamics, organisational and inter-organisational theories show their relevance by highlighting the importance that strategic interests play when settling a cooperation. The core explanation of cooperation is the interest to seek legitimacy from an already well-established organisation in the field – in this case, within peace and conflict field. Usually, an organisation decides to cooperate with another one that is already established in the system to enhance its legitimacy. The EU started to have a structured security policy in the last twenty years, while the UN is the main security provider. For this reason, political and strategic concerns might be a core characteristic and condition of such a cooperation, that gives as an outcome legitimacy.

3. **In what way can the EU-UN cooperation have an impact in the achievement of the objectives of the joint mission?**

When analysing conflict interventions, it is crucial to look at the outcome of the in-ground joint operation. By looking closer at the objectives of the joint mandate – hence, the UNSC resolutions that established it – one can expect to see if it was fulfilled according to the expected goals. In this sense, the theories employed for the research provide with expectations in relation to cooperation and fulfilment of the mandate.¹

¹ This study is delimited to this level of analysis and it excludes unintended consequences of the joint cooperation. This would go beyond the scope of the study.
In particular, neoliberal institutionalism claims that cooperation leads to a facilitation of interaction and more transparency, hence, to reach absolute gains. Iterated cooperation exposes organisations to interact and put efforts together to reach common goals, therefore they are less driven by competition on the ground. Within the scenario of conflict mitigation, the cooperation of two actors smoothens the process of conflict resolution and has a positive impact on the absolute gains. Evidence on this can be seen by looking as well at the short term and long terms effects of the joint intervention after the fulfilment of their mandates.

1.2. **Disposition of the thesis**

The thesis is structured as follows. The second part is going to give an overview of the background and the need for cooperation between organisation, focusing on the EU-UN cooperation which is the dyadic cooperation under investigation. Moreover, it is going to argue key concepts, useful for the better understanding of the functioning of crises operations and how this is perceived by the two organisations. In the third part, the theory is going to be framed. It will firstly describe neoliberal institutionalism, which sets the ground on the importance of cooperation among institutions. After that, organisational and inter-organisational theory are going to be widely discussed, followed by the methodology chapter. In the fifth part the two selected cases, respectively the Joint EU-UN intervention in the DRC and in Chad/CAR, are going to be systematically analysed. Consequently, the findings are going to be discussed in the sixth part. This part will end up with the limitations of the research. Lastly, I will answer to my research question in the conclusions and I will reflect on the future research.

2. **Background**

2.1. **The need for cooperation after the end of the Cold War**

The end of the Cold War surely signed a new chapter in history in general, but also one in inter-organisational relations. Right after the end of the Cold War, the EU was established as an entity and a political organisation also with the entrance into force of
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Graham 2004). The Treaty outlined ambitious criteria designing the EU as a new global player and laid out the first elements for the constitution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that would have been established in the years 2000. In the same year, its cooperation with other international organisations intensified, especially with the outbreak of the Bosnian War in 1992 (Biermann 2008; Koops 2013). The escalation of violence in Bosnia forced major European security institutions to coordinate and interact in a more proper manner (Koops 2009), but it mostly showed the inability and limitations of the EU in terms of security issues (Tardy 2018).

A new strategy of inter-organisational cooperation was stressed in the Agenda for Peace, drafted by the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and published in 1992. Here the Secretary General addressed to the importance of cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations in order to meet the increasing demand for peace operations (Boutros-Ghali 1992; Umezawa 2012).

The need for multilateral cooperation due to constant escalating conflicts and the more and more globalized world paved the way to a new regionalism period and to the adoption of new security strategies.

2.2. **European Union as an international security actor**

Over the years, the role of the European Union (EU) in world politics has increased constantly and its tasks have expanded. For this reason, the EU has been recently studied as an international actor by global governance scholars, underlining its importance in the realm of international relations and establishing its crucial role of global player. The EU is not just a big actor in trade, but it is also the main donor in humanitarian assistance, and it is very active in the support of peacekeeping operations across several regions in the planet (Lucarelli 2013).

The conflict in the early 1990s taking place in the former Yugoslavia was particularly traumatic for the European continent, mostly due to the EU’s inability to intervene in the region during the conflict. At that time, the EU did not possess a clear institutional capacity nor defence policies aiming at facing conflict situations in its territory’s
proximity. These events consequently demonstrated the need for a European common policy security framework, striving for the right directions and strategies to conduct military and civilian missions of peacekeeping, peace-making and conflict management (Umezawa 2012). As a reaction to that, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was finally established in 1999 and became operational in 2003. During that year, the European Security Strategy (ESS) tried to define the EU role as an international security actor and coined the concept of “effective multilateralism”. This was the guiding principle for the future strategy of the EU in security issues and it gave an emphasis on the enhancement and strengthening of the EU cooperation with other international organisations. Additionally, this concept set out the policy foundations for the EU’s role as an international security actor (Council of the European Union 2003; Biscop and Andersson 2008; Jørgensen 2009; Kissack 2010; Koops 2011 and 2013). Ever since, the EU has played a central role in Eastern Europe and Africa, where a several missions have been conducted.

New challenges over the years and the big contestations towards the EU led the High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini to launch an update document of the European Security Strategy of 2003, the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). This new strategy tackles the defence and security issues, migration, the cooperation between member states’ armed forces and the management of crises. The EU has furthermore put its effort in developing a “comprehensive approach” and improving its internal coordination around the field of security alongside with the EUGS. The concept of comprehensive approach and how the EU perceives it will be described later in this the chapter.

Moreover, in 2018, there has been a Joint Press Statement made by the EU and the UN with the aim of reinforcing the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management and where they jointly identify the priorities for the years 2019-2021 (EEAS 2018).

2.3. **EU-UN cooperation in crisis management: a brief historical framework**

The previously mentioned Agenda for Peace of 1992 endorsed cooperation among regional organisations and the UN for the contribution of a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs (Umezawa 2012).
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali saw a potential in regional organisations that could be used in many fields of action in which the UN was already operating, such as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. Moreover, it could enhance the legitimation of intervention of international organisation and deepen the sense of participation. To fulfil these tasks, the EU seemed to be an optimal partner as it finds its grounds on the same values – protection of human rights, peace, democracy – and it can provide the UN with the necessary tools to fulfil its more complex tasks, that can vary from financial tools to capability ones (Umezawa 2012). Inter-organisational cooperation was further endorsed by Secretary General Kofi Annan in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution. From a EU perspective, cooperation in the mentioned fields was seen positively. The ESS described the UN to be “a major partner with which to cooperate in global crisis management” (Novosseloff 2012). The ESS also stated that effective multilateralism would have seen the UN at the centre.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN was formalized in 2003 after the adoption of the ESS and the development of the ESDP calling for “effective multilateralism”. The war in Iraq 2003 put the EU in the condition of reconsidering the relations with the UN. This led the EU to formalize the cooperation with the Joint declaration happening the same year, defining their partnership in crisis management. The Declaration outlined four areas of action for further cooperation: planning, training, communication and best practice. This document represented a big step for the EU in the commitment with security issue and the formalisation of its possible contribution to UN peacekeeping missions, either in the form of a ‘stand-alone force’ or as a part of a larger UN mission (Pirrozzi 2012).

In 2006 at the high-level meeting between the Security Council (SC) and regional organisations and the SC president, the latter presented his report “A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities”. In this document, he proposed several recommendations for the further development of their partnership, including guidelines, general principles and formalization of the cooperation (Pirrozzi 2012; Umezawa 2012). The need for cooperation between the UN and the EU was repeatedly emphasized in various documents since then. It is however worth to mention that the cooperation between the EU and the UN has not been smooth and
always effective over the years, but it still represents the most advanced form of international and regional peacekeeping and crisis management cooperation (Pirrozzi 2012).

2.4. **Cooperation in peacekeeping operations**

In the field of security and most specifically in peacekeeping operations, there has been a natural need for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) views regional organisations as essential partners in burden-sharing and resource providers (Koops and Tardy 2015). The change of the international system required the UN to find new partnerships due to the increasing need of skills, comprehensive competences, funds and information sharing that the UN cannot face all by itself anymore.

The Joint declaration of 2003 does not provide any guideline on how joint peacekeeping operation are taking place, it is something that it is decided case by case. Tull (2012) outlines three types of cooperation between the UN and regional bodies:

1) *Follow-up missions*, which are operations conducted by regional organisations after an initial stabilisation success and that are handed over to a UN mission. This is the case of Chad, which I am going to use for my empirical analysis;

2) *Co-deployment of parallel missions*, where the UN and another regional organisation intervene at the same time. The UN sometimes request the support of a regional organisation and a further time-bound mission is deployed by the latter in order to help the ongoing UN mission. This is what happened in the case of the DRC with the EU operation Artemis in 2003 and EUFOR DRC in 2006, deployed alongside the already present MONUC. In other cases, the support of a regional actor is required to support peacebuilding efforts, as it happened in Kosovo.

3) *Hybrid operations*, that are the ones conducted jointly by the UN and another regional actor with a joint command. This model seems to be difficult to implement and it has not been put very much into practice.
2.5. **Key definitions and new trends**

2.5.1. **Crisis management**

Crisis management has become an important concept after the end of the Cold War, and it includes a wide range of activities. According to Reichard (2006: 241) the concept of crisis management post-Cold War “denotes all measures intended to prevent or defuse a humanitarian crisis or conflict, mitigate its effects on human populations once it has broken out, stabilise the region after a ceasefire has been reached, and prevent its recurrence in the long term”. Particularly in the last years, crisis management has seen the involvement of multiple actors and has differed in tasks and means of addressing to them. Moreover, there has been a change in the way crisis management is put into practice.

If beforehand peacekeeping operations had the aim to contain military escalation, now crisis management puts an effort in achieving a political, economic and social transformation in order to end up with a comprehensive and sustainable conflict resolution (Major and Mölling 2009). Crisis management operations have become over the years longer and they encompass now multiple actors on the ground. For all these reasons, crisis management is becoming a more and more complex reality.

2.5.2. **Comprehensive Approach**

One tool that has been further discussed is the doctrine of “comprehensive approach”. This term addresses to all the responses to a crisis that “promote the external and internal coordination of policy instruments and the coherence of objective between different actors” (Major and Mölling 2009). Comprehensive approach (CA) envisages the way crises responses should be planned and carried out in a transparent, legitimate and efficient manner, by harmonizing the interaction and interdependence of the involved actors (Major and Mölling 2009).

As the EU has become an important security actor, it has also put its efforts in creating its own doctrine in comprehensive approach. New threats and challenges in the last ten years have led the EU to make the improvement of external-crisises response as a
top priority. Initially and before the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s comprehensive approach had a broad framework and collected all the policy areas relevant for a successful external action (Rieker and Blockmans 2019). The EU struggled for many years in order to set up more precise points on comprehensive approach and finally reached the adoption of a comprehensive approach to crisis management in 2013. With this, they committed to a comprehensive approach that “covers all stages of the cycle of conflict or other external crisis; through early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peacebuilding in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable and long term development” (European Commission and HRVP 2013; Faria 2014).

The EU’s comprehensive approach aims mostly at developing a good culture of coordination, an element which was consistently lacking until that time. Moreover, it aims at defining a common European strategic vision, merging all areas of the EU external action. According to the previously mentioned communication, the EU comprehensive approach must be understood as a horizontal organizing principle with the aim of ensuring a coherent and integrated response from the EU institutions and instruments (European Commission and HRVP 2013). What the EU comprehensive approach outlines is further mentioned also in the EUGS declared in 2016, with a particular reference to the integrated approach to conflicts. Under this field, the EU stresses the need of a clear definition formal division of labour among the instruments and their policy- and decision-making, hence their responsibilities (Kempin and Scheler 2016; Rieker and Blockmans 2019).

2.5.3. The problem of “comprehensive approach”

One can notice that two different organisations cooperating in security issues have a different concept of comprehensive approach: this is the major problem of the definition of it and sometimes this leads also to a terminological confusion. There is not a single and homogeneous direction in which this doctrine goes, as it has not been formalised in just one way, but by more organisations in different ways (Major and Mölling 2009). This creates confusion on how comprehensive approach is perceived and what it really entails. Even though organisations have a common view on cooperation and
coordination they might have slightly different perceptions on how to put it into practice or on the way they prioritise tasks and means to contain crises, therefore having different definitions of CA creates more confusion. Consequently, there is a big need of clarification of terms and a single view on comprehensive approach in order to reach goals efficiently, coordinate tasks and consequently ensure peace and security in conflict zones.

3. Literature review and theoretical framework

This chapter of my thesis aims at developing the theoretical framework. First of all, I am going to outline the state of the current literature on EU-UN cooperation to clarify the research gap. Many are the scholars that have tried to contribute to the assessment of such cooperation, describing the various stages and trying to assess possible future outcomes. Part of the literature will refer also to the IR theories already used by scholars to explain this phenomenon; this is particularly devoted to the intervention of the EU under CSDP. After that, I am going to assess the theories, hence neoliberal institutionalism, organisational and inter-organisational theory. These three theories are inter-connected, and I find them to be complete one another by stressing on how organisations started to cooperate and the reasons why they do so. From these three theories I identified expectations that lead my research sub-questions in the analysis.

3.1. State of the literature

As multilateralism and cooperation among international and regional organisations is, instead, a quite recent topic, researchers have started to put more effort on its study in the last fifteen years from the moment of writing. The new role of the EU and its evolution as a security actor and its new-developed doctrine of “effective multilateralism” appealed the interest of many scholars. The need for a clarification of terms and the evaluation of organisations’ job has come right after the Joint declaration of 2003. For this reason, during the first years, scholars devoted their research prevalently on the description of this new phenomenon rather than on the analysis of cases and the combination with theories.
Consequently, research contribution on effective multilateralism and EU’s inter-organisational relations has been mostly characterised by think-tank reports, with the aim to identify the main challenges to effective cooperation and describing how the inter-organisational impact could be improved (Koops 2013).

The first researchers on the field focused on the new role of the EU and how this would have affected the functioning of other regional and international organisations. This stage of problem-driven research started with the study of EU-NATO relations during the Balkan war in the 1990s. In a second stage and in more recent years, scholars have tried to not just describe the phenomena but also to investigate on the EU’s inter-organizational relations and analyse it under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Recently, several scholars have sought to explain with different IR theories the EU military crisis management operations under the CSDP.

Pohl (2013) has analysed the logic underpinning EU crisis management operations under a liberal perspective. According to liberals, governmental interests prevail to national interests, and this happens also with CSDP operations. According to Pohl (2013), EU governments look at domestic opportunities and relative constraints when making decision on security-related policies. Hence, the deployment of EU military crisis management operations depends on EU governments interests. If they receive political benefits and a certain influence on the events rather than losses, they are more likely to be positive on a CSDP intervention. Pohl has conducted further research within this framework in the book “EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: Power, purpose and domestic politics” (2014). In this volume he refers to different CSDP related case studies – namely, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Chad - in order to understand and analyse the drivers behind the CSDP.

A realist explanation on the topic has been given by Gegout (2009). In her research, Gegout (2009) uses realism to explain why the EU intervenes in crisis management operations. She uses the case of EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA to argue that the main interest of these interventions has been the wish of France to increase the prestige of the EU as an international actor and to demonstrate a certain independence from other actors, particularly the US. She furthermore argues that the EU is very selective with crisis management operations because not all intervention can provide it with prestige; if an operation is very risky under this point of view, the EU is not intervening (Gegout, 2009: 412).
Dijkstra (2012) analysed this behavior under an institutionalist point of view, claiming that EU institutions and their officials are playing a decisive role in the deployment of CSDP operations. He particularly claims that the former High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and other officials have used the several CSDP intervention as a tool to establish CSDP as an EU policy competence. Such operations pushed for “the foreign policy turf battles” with the European Commission (Dijkstra, 2012). Constructivists rather argue that the deployment of such operations is driven by norms, values and culture. This has been analysed by Martin (2007) in relation to EUFOR RD Congo and by Riddevold (2011) with EU NAVFOR in Somalia.

Novaky (2015) gives a multi-level collective action approach for understanding the deployment of CSDP military operations. He based the model on three levels of analysis: the international level, the national level and the EU level. To put it into practice he uses the case studies of EUFOR Althea and EU NAVFOR Atalanta, which showed that the deployment processes of both operations were catalysed by events at the international level (Novaky 2012: 504).

None of the abovementioned studies, however, sought to explain why organisations do cooperate when deploying military crisis management operations and did not analyse the cooperation between the EU and the UN after the joint cooperation agreement. They rather have analysed and focused particularly on the EU behaviour under the CSDP. Since this thesis focuses on the organisational role, their cooperation and the relative outcomes, I am going to focus on the nature and the need of cooperation, using theories that dig further in this sense and that will be further explained in the following paragraphs.

As mentioned before, the literature related to the EU-UN cooperation has been mainly descriptive. Scholars that have provided with literature on this topic, have not just the EU-UN cooperation, but also a broader set of regional organisations cooperating with the EU, such as NATO, OSCE or the African Union. This has been largely done in Knud Erik Jørgensen’s volume “The European Union and International organizations”. The authors try to assess in a more conceptual and comparative way the cooperation between the EU and different international organisations. Another big research contribution on inter-organizational relations has been done by a consistent number of scholars, who worked together for the publication of Studia Diplomatica named “Military crisis management; the challenge of inter-organisationalism” (Koops 2009).
Here, scholars examine the state of play and core challenges of several partnerships in the field of peacekeeping, crisis management and capacity-building, including EU-UN relations. The part written by Tardy (2009) on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management particularly shed the light on the issue. Tardy has also written several working papers on the EU-UN cooperation for the European Institute of Security Studies, with the aim to evaluate the stages of cooperation and the relative shortcomings. In his newest publication for this think tank dated January 2018 he talks about the new challenges to security and how EU’s partnership is tackled by that. Moreover, Tardy has recently contributed with a chapter in the book edited by de Coning and Peter (2018) “United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order”. In his chapter he focuses on the role of the EU in crisis management and compares its operations with the ones of the UN by consequently shedding the light on the causes of this partnerships and further shortcomings. For the related analysis, he utilises the case of Mali (Tardy 2018).

In the specific dyadic case of the cooperation between the EU and the UN, another big contribution has been given by Katie Laatikainen and Karen Smith (2006) with the volume “The European Union and the United Nations: intersecting multilateralism”. This publication was the first one to deeply examine the relationship between the two organisations and to critically assess the EU’s contribution to effective multilateralism. This is the first book that deeply examined the relationship of the EU with the UN and criticise the contribution of the EU to ‘effective multilateralism’. The scholars here argue that the EU most often fails to make the UN as effective as it should be in addressing global challenges (Laatikainen and Smith 2006). Another important piece of literature on this cooperation has been provided by Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffsteimer and Tom Ruys (2006) with their publication "The United Nations and the European Union - An Ever-Stronger Partnership". This book provides an overview on the EU-UN cooperation and its influence in several policy fields, including security and crisis management.

In terms of peacekeeping, Pirozzi (2012) has researched on the role and impact of the EU in peacekeeping missions made by the UN. While Tull (2012) has contributed instead with an insight in the effectiveness of this partnership, providing an overview on the types of cooperation and comparing it with another organisations’ cooperation.
Still on peacekeeping and cooperation between the two actors, Alexandra Novosseloff (2012) has tried to assess the options for improving and strengthening this kind of cooperation.

Generally, one can say that at this stage of research there has been a largely descriptive nature of literature on this cooperation, focusing mainly in the post-Lisbon Treaty moment. Surely there have been also several studies on in-ground joint operations, but they lack on providing a systematic analysis for testing a specific theory related to cooperation.

The role of the EU in crisis management has been theoretically assessed by several scholars, however an approach to the analysis of the cooperation with other international organisations and its nature is still lacking.

Therefore, in the next paragraphs I would like to first introduce neoliberal institutionalism. This is the international relations (IR) theory that best fits with the explanation of cooperation among institutions. It outlines the importance of institutions within the security framework and gives a further understanding on multilateralism and cooperation.

3.2. Neoliberal institutionalism

Neoliberal institutionalism is that doctrine that focuses on the role of institutions in mitigating conflicts and their cooperative role (Badie et al. 2011; Navari 2012). According to neoliberal institutionalism, international institutions are self-interested creations of states. This mechanism is enabled by the fact that states find self-interest behaviour problematic, therefore they prefer to construct institutions in order to face sets of problems they might encounter (Stein 2008). States are central in this theory, as they create institutions and they accept joining them as a single entity. Neoliberal institutionalism belongs to the larger International Relations’ (IR) theory of liberalism, consequently of a core importance are the concept of rationality, information, iteration and institutional arrangements to cooperative outcomes in IR (Badie et al. 2011). The scholars that majorly contributed to the development of this theory are Robert Keohane (1984) and Robert Axelrod (1984). What the two authors want to address is the big ability that institutions have in redefining state roles and acting as arbitrators in state
disputes. Institutions are therefore a tool for changing the character of the international environment by influencing state preferences and behaviours, even though they are not completely able to transform anarchy (Navari 2012: 42).

They create a safer and trusty environment because they possess the potential to create long lasting relations among nations and reduce the so-called “transaction costs”. According to North (1990: 27) transaction costs include information gathering, the measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged, the protection of rights and policing and enforcing agreements. For this reason, institutions are likely desirable because they reduce transaction costs interconnected with rule-making, negotiating, implementing, enforcing, information gathering and conflict resolution (Navari 2012).

Institutions help also the achievement of absolute gains. In fact, they facilitate interactions and they diffuse information; they also heighten transparency among states and lessen the ability of actors to defect from institutional agreements. This leads the system to the achievement of common gains they would forgo otherwise, and it is beneficial for the achievement of international security. Moreover, institutions are important and powerful because they last over time. Axelrod highlights the benefit of having a good for good exchange among actors, because this enables a potential spiral of cooperative behaviour (Axelrod 1984, Navari 2012: 42).

Another important element for neoliberal institutionalists is long-term gains. Institutions provide an environment of repeated interaction among actors. These continuous interactions are consequently less likely to defect from cooperative arrangements. Alternatively, neoliberal institutionalists argue that once actors submit an institutional agreement, they become locked in and as a consequence actor's interactions comes more frequently and common (Badie et al. 2011). The more actors interact the more they trust and learn from each other. Thus, iterated interactions are seen as a positive spill over effect of institutional agreements; these interactions catalyse cooperation among multiple actors possessing also divergent characteristics. Consequently, actors are less likely to enter into conflict against each other because they know one another. This leads to a pattern of dependence amongst organisations: actors have lesser interests and desire to hit one another because they might be hurt too by their
misbehaviour. Consequently, defectors are left vulnerable because they can no longer depend on the actions of others to fill the institutional needs that had been previously met (Badie et al. 2011).

Neoliberal institutionalism had initially a focus on the cooperation on low politics – economics, society, environment – and did not deal with military cooperation or security. The aftermath of the Cold War and the importance of NATO led scholars to identify a pattern of cooperation also in the field of security. Wallander and Keohane (1999) theorized the concept of “security institution”, identifying NATO as one. NATO in fact persisted because it was not a simple alliance anymore, but it rather became a security institution. The same argument can be made also on the more recent tasks affiliated to other international and regional institutions - specifically the UN and the EU - in the field of security. After the end of the Cold War, both of these institutions have increased their tasks concerning security and they are seen as “security enhancer” actors. Nowadays institutions are thus viewed as mechanisms that create long-term and long-lasting benefits for states from a socio-economic point of view, but also in the security field or in the protection of human rights.

Neoliberal institutionalism, hence, sets the ground on the importance of cooperation. Other school of thought have focused on the importance of organisations and have then analysed organisations behaviours. In the following paragraphs these are going to be through organisational and inter-organisational theory.

3.3. Organisational theory

Organisational theory aims at defining the approaches to the analysis of organisations. An organisation is broadly defined as a structured social conglomerate of people with the aim of meeting needs and pursuing collective goals (Business dictionary 2019). Organisations can be public, private, business or non-profit. Krasner (1982) tried to give a broader definition of organisation with a focus on regimes: he defines them as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”.

Organisational theory sets out the ground for a better understanding of the organisational structure and it seeks to explain why cooperation amongst
Organisational theory in the broader sense has become object of study already during the Cold War. Thompson (1967) has studied organisations as private companies in combination with the notion of power. One way to acquire power according to him is interdependence, hence cooperation among organisations. Cooperation among organisations at all levels has been a phenomenon already studied in the 1980s by DiMaggio and Powell. In their article “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields” they underline how structural changes in organisation started to be less driven by competition, but they rather result in building up a similar structure among organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This harmonisation among organizational practices would lead, according to the authors, to a more homogenous structure. They argue that once different organisations emerge in the same field of work, what happens is that they consequently copy each other in order to become more similar to one another (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148). Even though these organisations change goals, develop new practises and they might see the emerging of new organisations, in the long run they constrain their ability to change further in later years; the ones wanting to adopt innovations are the one with a strong desire of improving performance (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148). As a consequence of homogenisation comes isomorphism. According to Hawley (1968) isomorphism is a “constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149). In the case of organisations this happens through three isomorphic processes outlined by the authors: coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive isomorphism happens when there is a similar environment amongst organisations; mimetic isomorphism takes place when there is uncertainty and ambiguity on the goals or in conditions of dependency and finally, normative isomorphism stems from professionalisation and similar professionals employed (DiMaggio and Powell: 150-152). What the authors want to point out is that there is a mutual awareness amongst organisations and that this leads to more interaction. This means that an organisation always takes into account other organisations.

Organisational theory and DiMaggio and Powell’s research contribution help understand the nature of inter-organisation relations. Organisations have different levels of interactions and they seek legitimacy and political power; therefore, they look
for other similar organisations already established in the environment in order to gain these elements. This theory also shows that overlapping of tasks often leads to homogenisation, and this element is always seen as a prerequisite for relations amongst organisations. In a multipolar world, task might often overlap, and states might be members of multiple organisations, so there is a need for cooperation and exchange of best practices amongst organisations in order to survive. According to DiMaggio and Powell’s theory this happens automatically through the process of isomorphism in different scales.

3.4. Inter-organisational theory

Inter-organisational theory gives a further insight on cooperation. First of all, inter-organisational theory aims at studying the relationship among organisations in the broad sense (Cropper et al. 2008: 4). The study of inter-organisation relations aims at understanding the character and patterns of cooperation, their origins, the rational and the consequences of this relationship.

What inter-organisational theorists focus on are not just the characteristics that organisation have but also and mainly the goals that organisations share. Having similar or same goals leads to the need of resources from another organisation and this might give as an outcome a mutual dependency or interdependency (Ojanen 2018). Knowledge is a very important element for inter-organisationalist theorists and the core reason why organisation cooperate. What they focus on is called “organisational learning”. According to Ingram (2002) inter-organisational learning “occurs when one organisation causes a change in the capacities of another, either through experience sharing, or by somehow stimulating innovation.” This process can be very beneficial as it does not create big costs for organisations taken separately. However, it might also be risky and lead to negative outcomes: the transferred knowledge can harm another organisation when it is not appropriately assessed. Moreover, the learning process does not always run out so smoothly because it depends also on the relationship between the receiver and the sender, as well as the quality of the receiver and the status of the sender. This last thing can be determining for the positive outcome of inter-organisational learning.
Another element that organisation seeks is legitimacy. According to the definition of Suchman (1995) legitimacy “is the assumption, or perception, that the actions of an entity are desirable, appropriate or proper in the context of the social system in question and also a collective rationale for what it does, and why”. It may come through performance, but also through the conformation to dominant conceptions of appropriate behaviour in response to actual or anticipated pressures (Mizruchi and Yoo 2002: 604). Legitimacy is therefore strongly interconnected with the survival of an organisation. In fact, losing legitimacy might be followed by a loss of resources, mandates and calls for reforms (Biermann 2017). It is hence strongly important for organisations to build up their legitimacy and maintain it over time. To do so, cooperating with another organisation might be essential for new organisations or similar ones.

Notwithstanding, organisations do not always cooperate, or they inefficiently cooperate. This happens because there is a lack of knowledge about each other’s work, miscommunication or misperceptions, but also the organisations’ tendency to protect their own authority, autonomy, visibility and relevance and, finally, their quest for primacy and control (Ojanen 2018). What triggered the intensification of research in the field of inter-organisationalism in the last years have been important episodes in the political realm: the multiplication of security providers in Europe; the not so positive outcomes of international peacebuilding operations and the several shocks bringing home the need for much closer inter-organizational cooperation, such as the 9/11 and the war in Iraq (Biermann 2017). These events perfectly coincide with the raising attention to multilateralism and the consequent European Security Strategy and EU-UN Joint declaration in 2003. Inter-organisationalism is taking place in UN peacekeeping operations. Most of the latest Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) involve more than one organisation, especially regional actors (Koops and Tardy 2015).

By cooperating, international organisations can accomplish their tasks more efficiently and make PKOs more successful (Koops and Tardy 2015). For a regional organisation as the EU, cooperating is a tool for achieving more legitimacy, vehicle task expansion and affirm their importance in the field of security and crisis management. The need for such a cooperation has come also because of the possible confusion that organisations might encounter on the ground: it is necessary to avoid duplication, rivalry and reticent impact in conflict zones.
3.5. **Expectations derived from the theories**

The theories described above are highly relevant to identify how organisations started
to cooperate and why they do so. The EU-UN cooperation is pivotal in this sense, since
it is the only organisation’s cooperation founded on a joint declaration.
As previously mentioned, the three theories outline a set of expectations that are going
to be employed for the analysis and discussion of the two cooperation cases, namely
Operation Artemis and EUFOR Chad/CAR. Reflecting now on the research questions
raised in the introduction, I am going to highlight these expectations.

Neoliberal institutionalism widely explains cooperation and considers transaction costs
to be the main reason of such a phenomenon. Transaction costs comprehend
information gathering, the protection of rights and enforcing agreements. Lowering
transaction costs would consequently mean smoothing conflict resolutions. According
to organisational and inter-organisational theory, cooperation is beneficial for
exchanging best practices and learning. These rationales of cooperation have an
effect on the enhancement of skills in every field, plus a shared budget and shared
troops. My first sub-question asks “Which are the official and underlying rationales of
this cooperation?”, hence it looks at the official reasons of cooperation and the
rationales of such, being identified in the theories as transaction costs, exchange of
bests practices and learning. In order to achieve the lowering of transaction costs and
the exchange of best practices and information, trust is the core element. If
organisations trust each other, they can achieve results in this sense. Trust is therefore
a necessary condition outlined by neoliberal institutionalism. By reflecting on the
identified rationales of this cooperation, I expect these to be characterizing aspects of
the two joint operations testing their capabilities on the ground when trying to
coordinate their practices. If they do not verify, it means that cooperation explained by
these three theories fail to provide a complementary explanation of this phenomenon.

In the case of my second sub-question, inter-organisational theory sets the ground on
a possible answer. The theory highlights the importance on the organisations’ final
goals. It stresses on a core element that organisations seek, namely legitimacy. This
seems to be the main reason that moves IOs to cooperate, but often – or never –
expressed amongst the official reasons of cooperation. By looking at political interests
and strategic concerns with the final goal of seeking legitimacy, I expect to find an answer to my second sub-question “What strategic interests for the EU and the UN lie behind their cooperation?”.

The final goal of IOs in general is to stabilise the situation in the intervening conflict area. Cooperation seems to be helpful within this process according to the set of theories described above. It should have a positive impact on absolute gains, and it smooths the process of conflict resolution thanks to the elements described in regard to the answer to the first sub-question. For these reason in order to answer to the third sub-question I am going to look at the effects on the conflict once the joint cooperation have fulfilled their mandate and look at the short and long-term gains. By looking closer at the objectives of the joint mandate one can see whether it was fulfilled according to the expected goals. Looking as well at short and long terms effects of the joint intervention shows evidence about the positive effects of cooperation in conflict intervention. Looking at these elements provides an answer to the sub-question “in what way can the EU-UN cooperation have an impact in the achievement of the objectives of the joint mission?”.

3.6. Contribution of the study to previous research

Leaning on previous IR theoretical explanations and previous discursive analysis done on the cooperation amongst organisations, this study aims at focusing on intra and inter-organisational study in regard to the EU-UN cooperation. These theories are complementary to the IR theories and deepen our understanding for why international organisations cooperate. Moreover, it seeks to give not just a doctrinal approach on the EU-UN cooperation, but rather a more theory-based one that is going to be investigated by employing two empirical cases and compare them. The aim is to identify whether the patterns of cooperation take place as the theories employed for this study state. It does so by focusing on cooperation dynamics and questioning the official and strategic dynamics behind the cooperation. By analysing core expectations from the theories, the cases are going to be systematically analysed and compared in order to answer to the research questions and see if organisational behaviours take place in the same way despite the different context. The thread used for the analysis follows the research questions that set the ground for this research.
4. **Methodology**

This chapter outlines the methodology and the material that is going to be used for the empirical analysis. Seen the explanatory nature and aim of this study, I decided to opt for a comparative case study method. To conduct the analysis, I selected two cases that I aim at comparing employing the comparative case study method. The steps taken will be further explained throughout this chapter.

4.1. **Comparative case study research**

A case study is an intensive study of a single case with the aim of shedding the light on a larger class of cases (Gerring 2007). It investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth, within the real-world context and it relies on multiple sources of evidence and benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 2014).

For the qualitative analysis I am going to conduct a comparative case study research. According to Ragin (1987) a comparative case study is a way to envisage theory and data. It aims at comparing within and across contexts and they are usually selected when there is a need to understand and explain how features within the context influence the success of a programme or of policy initiatives (Goodrick 2014).

This method involves the analysis and synthesis of the similarities, differences and pattern across multiple cases that share a common focus or goal (Goodrick 2014). To do so, the specific features of each case should be well described at the beginning of the study.

4.1.1. **Most similar and most different case study designs**

In comparative political research there is a distinction between the ‘Most Similar Systems Design’ (MSSD) and the ‘Most Different Systems Design’ (MDSD) (Anckar 2007).

In the case of this study, a MSSD is going to be employed. Its main goal is the one of testing theories, which is the main contribution that this study also wants to give. Furthermore, it has a strict nature of systemic evaluation of pre-selected criteria. In the
case of this research, these have been assessed as expectations derived from the theoretical framework.

In a MSSD the researcher chooses as objects of research systems that are as similar as possible, with regard to the phenomenon the effects of which we are interested in assessing – in this case, the effects of the joint EU-UN cooperation. By choosing similar systems, the researcher keeps constant as many extraneous variables (or in qualitative research “conditions”) as possible (Anckar 2007).

This method permits me to show how relevant the three theories in regard to the cases selected and the sub-questions. The relevance of the theories is intended to be confirmed or rejected for the three sub questions under investigation and the related expectations derived from the theories.

Three are the possible outcomes that this research can achieve according to the analysis of the expectations got from the theories:

1) Both cases give some empirical indications that the three theories are relevant for understanding intra- and inter-organisational cooperation;

2) One case does show relevance of the theory in this sense while the other one does not. In this case, although some support for the theory, one can expect that the theory employed is weak in explaining cooperation (which may depend on context specific circumstances);

3) Both cases do not show that the theory is relevant for understanding intra- and inter-organisational cooperation within the dimensions under analysis; therefore, the theory is rejected.

4.2. Universe and unit of analysis

Within the analysis it is firstly important to define the universe of analysis and unit of analysis. There are many kinds of international organisations’ cooperation nowadays. The UN or the NATO have been cooperating with other international organisations or regional organisations such as the EU, the AU or the OSCE. Seen this, with the conduction of this research I determine as the universe of analysis states that have experienced peacekeeping operations, or any kind of other crisis management operations provided by the UN. As unit of analysis I take into consideration countries that within this universe have seen a UN intervention happening in cooperation with the EU in order to contain security issues. Within this framework, I identify the
experiences in the African continent as the ones that best suit with the testing of the theory. This because most of the cases of joint cooperation have found place in the African continent. Moreover, Africa is still seen as the most fragile continent, where conflicts, crises, anarchy and disorder take place and therefore it attracts external intervention. As the EU seems to be driven by the desire of being legitimized as a security actor, Africa appears to be the most suitable place where to test its capacities. This happens also because the enhanced engagement in that continent is unlikely to cause troubles or concerns with other international actors (Tull 2012).

4.3. **Case selection**

The case selection constitutes a major task of far-reaching consequences for the study. First, because it influences the answers one might receive. Second, it plays a big role since the analysis of small-N is not based on a randomly chosen sample of cases. However, its strength is the qualitative investigation of a particular case, or cases. In the following paragraphs I am going to provide an explanation on my case selection. Few are the mandates of co-deployment that have taken place within this framework.

The focus of the research lies on security and crisis management in regions hit by a conflict in Africa. Therefore, I am going to firstly select the case of the co-deployment of the EU operation Artemis alongside with the UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUC), which took place in 2003. As second case, I am going to analyse the follow-up mission of the EU in Chad/Central African Republic, respectively named and known as EUFOR Chad/CAR. The mission took place between 2008 and 2009. These cases suit the best because they reflect two models of missions – co-deployment in the first case and follow-up mission in the second case – and the aim is in both cases the containment of the conflict and humanitarian aid. The selection of the cases is by itself restricted to three cases as military missions within the area of peace and conflict, since other cases of joint operations in Africa are happening in other fields of intervention. The only other security intervention happened with EUFOR RCA in 2014-2015. This case has been excluded because it is more recent and therefore harder to assess. Other joint missions that have been deployed in Africa have had more of a political character (EUFOR RD Congo, 2006, happened during the elections’ period)
or of a training and advice one (EUTM Somalia, 2010-present; EUTM Mali, 2013-present; EUCAP Sahel Mali, 2014-present; EUTM CAR, 2016-present).

Since the focus is on African mission, I have excluded the cases of the intervention in Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia.

It is important to underline also the fact that the two operations selected take place alongside two important events. The deployment of operation Artemis is of a fundamental importance for the EU-UN cooperation as it is the first autonomous military mission performed by the EU without NATO support and outside of the EU territory. It took place right after the signing of the Joint declaration of 2003. Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR takes place along the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty, that sets the ground for the ECSDP, hence a more important Security and Defence strategy adopted by the EU.

The two cases selected present similar aspects, but they differ in the way they have been established. As already mentioned, while operation Artemis is a case co-deployment, EUFOR Chad/CAR is a follow-up mission, handed over to the UN in a second moment.

4.4. **Analysis of the data**

Concentrating now on the actual methodology of how to carry out the planned research, I will explain how the data collected by the different documents are going to be systematically assessed.

According to the theory, cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management operations are highly preferred because of the reduction of transaction costs, namely the need of skills, comprehensive competences, funds and information sharing. If cooperation in these fields work, PKOs are more likely to be successful and hence better achieve absolute and long-term gains, that in the case of this type of operations re-stabilisation of the situation in the intervening conflict area according to the UNSC resolution that defined their scope. In order to look closer at these aspects and answer to my research questions I am going to structure my analysis as follows.
In the first place I am going to outline an historical background of the two cases that helps to understand the deterioration of the situation and the reasons of intervention. Within the intervention, I am giving information on the structure of the joint mandate. The core of the analysis is going to follow respectively the three sub-questions I am at answering with this research according to the expectations derived from the three theories employed, in order to show their relevance.

To answer to my first sub-question, I am going to analyse the documents stating the official purposes on the mandate. The rationales I am looking for are the exchange of best practices and expertise, the transaction costs and the level of trust between the two organisations on the ground, conditions that fulfil the purpose of the joint mandate. These conditions provide an answer to the relevance of intra- and inter- organisational cooperation in relation to the purpose of the mandate and the achievement of the goals. Therefore, I am going to look at the exchange of information and other expertise – troops, intelligence -, the coordination of the two organisations on the ground. This is connected to the level of trust between the organisation when exchanging information, intelligence and coordinate the two ways of operating on the ground. If organisations did trust each other when communicating, coordination did verify and the exchange of information sharing and other expertise took place, the theories I am testing would be supported. In the case these conditions did not verify and the cooperation between the two organisations led to big problematic on information sharing and other expertise, the theories are refuted.

In order to provide an answer to my second sub-question, I am going to look at the political interests and strategic concerns laying behind the cooperation and the reasons for intervention, that according to the theories is seeking legitimacy. A particular attention is going to be given also to the lead country of the operations from the EU side. If this behaviour does take place and the need of the EU to be legitimised as a security provider is the main reason leading to cooperation, the theory employed is supported.

As the third sub-question itself indicates, I am going to collect information on the impact of the joint mandate and whether the objectives established by the UNSC resolutions have been fulfilled. If that happens, the intra- and inter-organisational claims on the
benefits of cooperation would be supported. Moreover, I am going to look at the short term and long term effects of the joint intervention after the fulfilment of their mandates.

I am going to utilise primary and secondary sources in order to collect the data employed. The following table gives an overview on which kind of sources I am going to include in the analysis according to all the aspects under evaluation mentioned above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions under analysis</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official reason of cooperation and rationales</td>
<td>UNSC resolutions; press statements; EU official documents; research articles; UN reports; NGO reports.</td>
<td>Exchange of best practices (exchange of information on the ground, troops skills, intelligence skills); transaction costs (coordination of the two organisations on the ground); level of trust (trust of exchanging information, sharing intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons behind cooperation</td>
<td>Research articles; reports; newspaper articles.</td>
<td>Political interests (seek of legitimacy by showing capability in military operations); strategic concerns (EU confirming its security power outside of its territories).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of joint mandate on the conflict</td>
<td>EU and UN reports; research articles.</td>
<td>Effects on the conflict as an outcome of joint operations; short and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
long-term gains (effects of the joint cooperation on the conflict in the short and long term).

Yet, in the next paragraph I am going to better explain the data collection and the sources.

4.5. Data collection

According to researchers, combining different sources of information enhances the validity of the measurement and it is a strategy to minimize accuracy due to systematic error (Marks 2007: 3). For this reason, I am going to employ different primary and secondary sources when conducting the analysis. I plan to use different official documents published by the EU and the UN – such as Security Council Resolutions, press statement made by the organisations’ officials - as well as different academic papers that have deepen an analysis of the two cases. In fact, several are the academic articles that have given space to the research on the cases. Some of them have conducted interviews with organisations’ officials too. The academic article of Morsut (2007) on the case of the cooperation between the EU and the UN in the DRC gives, thanks to the interviews conducted, particular insights that could not have been retrieved otherwise.

Moreover, I am going to employ official reports published by the organisations, but also other ones think tanks in order to get a less partial picture of the facts. Furthermore, I am going to triangulate the abovementioned sources with possible interesting Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) reports and newspaper articles where possible. In the case of newspapers, I am going to gather information by official channels and highly relatable ones – such as the same UN official news portal – in order to avoid possible opinions and biases.

Since official documents sometimes (especially in the case of Congo dated 2003) are difficult to be retrieved, I am going to mostly rely on the reconstruction of facts done by previous researchers. The analysis of the case of operation Artemis in the DRC is,
hence, highly dependent on previous academic work and sees less triangulation of sources. At the other side, the analysis of EUFOR Chad/CAR has seen a smoother process of data gathering and a more variegated set of sources. However, also in this case many research articles have been analysed, as I find this source the most reliable one also in the view of possible biases. Notwithstanding, in both cases official documents and reports have been highly taken into consideration, as well as possible reports coming from other sources. This is the case of the information gathered by the UN Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit (2004), which were found in an academic article published by Koenig (2012). Moreover, a report conducted by Oxfam has been retrieved through another paper written by Dijskstra (2010).

For this reason, I consider academic sources to be very useful to have a more complete picture of the case and therefore to find strong evidences for my research. I find this channel the one that provides a better quality of the data that can be employed for my systematic analysis.

4.6. Validity and generalisability

It is important to bear in mind the question of validity, as it is one of the most important elements of a research design. Validity can be divided in internal validity, which refers to the validity of the research one is conducting, and external validity, which relates to the generalisability of the results of the research. Usually, case study designs are lacking on external validity in comparison to large-N studies, as small-N studies do not quantify the impact of limited cases taken into consideration. According to Slater and Ziblatt (2013) one can enhance external validity in small-N studies by crafting arguments with general variables or mechanisms, capture representative variation and select cases that maximise control over existing rival hypotheses. In the case of this research, external validity is enhanced due to the dyadic cooperation selected, hence EU-UN. Since the EU is an organisation sui generis, it cannot be generalisable outside of this dyad.

The aim of comparative case study research is the one to get a higher generalisability, given the fact that more studies are taken into consideration.
At the other hand, several are the limitations outlined by different researchers on this design. Some argue that there is a limited number of countries and therefore it will never be possible to keep constant all potential explanatory factors. Even though Lijphart (1975) suggests to carefully select a restricted number of cases to be compared, he has also highlighted a problematic on the “many variables, small number of cases selected”. Leaning on Lijphart’s words and seen the qualitative nature of this research, I have chosen two cases instead of more in order to identify some conditions that might be relevant for supporting the theories.

According to Collier (1997) comparing across small number of cases provides a weak basis for causal inference. However, when considering the internal role of these comparison, the “N” is substantially increased and therefore the level of causal analysis is strengthened.

In the case of this research, it is hard to properly find comparable cases because of a limited availability of empirical examples of EU-UN cooperation operations, hence, there is a limitation within the case selection that has been expressed already under paragraph 4.3.

5. Analysis

In the following chapter I am going to analyse the cases, following the mechanisms explained in the methodological part. First of all, I am going to briefly describe the background situation of the two countries. After that, I am going to analyse the missions itself and the related outcome.

5.1. MONUC and Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003

5.1.1. Background

After the genocide in Rwanda, the more recent history of the DRC has been defined by continuous political instability with the outbreak of two wars: the first one taking place between 1996 and 1997 and the second one between 1998 and 2003. They reflected the fundamental political crisis in the DRC and the massive regional instability and political competition in the wider Great Lakes Region. Different are the actors that
have engaged in the Congolese territory to seek power over land and natural resources. This has led to the escalation of one of the biggest conflicts in Central Africa in the recent history, with continuous atrocities hitting the civilian population.

The second war in the DRC broke out in August 1998, when the Congolese rebels, together with Ugandan and Rwandan forces attacked the President Laurent Kabila. The outbreak of the war engaged many other external responses, involving many countries in Africa and leading to a conflict of big proportions, with many victims of atrocities of any kind taking place in big parts of Central and Southern Africa (Hendrickson et al. 2007).

5.1.2. UN intervention


Since the beginning of its mandate, MONUC faced many challenges that included both internal as well as external problems, spacing from persistent political instability to lack of financial and human resources.

As the situation kept being unstable and violence did not cease from occurring, the UN started to set the ground for help from the international community. In May, the deteriorating situation led Secretary-General Kofi Annan to call for international help, hence all states in possess of capabilities to “make every effort to quickly address the situation in Bunia” (UN News Service 2003). The first country offering help was France. However, it would have not intervened alone and without a clear mandate (Hendrickson et al. 2007).

France started setting the ground for a possible European crisis management operation that ended up with the deployment of operation Artemis.
5.1.3. **The EU and Operation Artemis**

Following the request of the Secretary-General to help MONUC with an interim operation and the wish to help stressed by France, Kofi Annan asked for help also the European Union through the High Representative Javier Solana. The EU - mostly France⁵- seemed to be on the same line as the UN. It supported the Peace Process in the DRC by condemning the violence in the Ituri province and called for an implementation of the MONUC mandate (Hendrickson et al. 2007).

Operation Artemis was established through the adoption of resolution 1484 (2003) by the Security Council the 30th of May 2003. The resolution legitimised and outlined the agenda to be followed by operation Artemis. The Interim Emergency Multination Force (IEMF) deployed in Bunia should have worked in close coordination with MONUC and its aim was to grant the protection of civilians exposed to threat and physical violence and to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions in the district of Bunia. Moreover, it aimed at protecting the airport and establishing a weapon-free zone inside the town. The IEMF would have lasted until September 2003, when MONUC was supposed to be reinforced. Besides, the territory of intervention was limited: operation Artemis was deployed in the district of Bunia (UNDPK 2004; Koenig 2012). The EU was able to deploy 1,850³ troops on the ground, with most of them belonging to France.

5.1.4. **Transaction costs and exchange of best practices**

Transaction costs refer to all of the activities done by organisations to gather information, the ability to negotiate, to protect civil and human rights and to resolute conflicts. When organisations cooperate, these activities have to be coordinated. Coordination between the two organisations has not always been smooth, especially in the first stages of the deployment of operation Artemis. The amount of countries

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involved in the latter operation was claimed to be chaotic within the headquarters. Before the deployment of the troops, the communication between Paris and Kinshasa was scarce; MONUC was not informed about the first EU deployments and there was a fear from the UN side that there could be an overlap with the blue helmets (Morsut 2007). This because the leadership of the IEMF did not trust the security information of MONUC, since the latter was not well informed about the moves of guerrilla fighters close to the landing site. From its side, the UN did not rely on a liaison officer at the operational Headquarters of Artemis, who knew the UN Mission and the area of Bunia, providing the right information on the capabilities of the hostile forces (Koenig 2012).

After operation Artemis was deployed, the level of cooperation and coordination between IEMF, MONUC, the UN Mission in Bunia and the respective Headquarters highly improved. It was signalled a good cooperation between the peacekeepers and the EU troops deployed, by exchanging information, coordinating operations by exchanging radio networks and managing the usage of the airport in an efficient way (UNBPU 2004). Moreover, the forces deployed by the EU managed to have a good communication with the local population. This improved cooperation and provided a better intelligence, including the usage of sophisticated communication technology (UNBPU 2004). According to an interview held by Morsut (2006) with an EU official belonging to the Africa task force office, there was a constant and mutual exchange of information on an institutional level and on the ground, thanks to clear and simple procedural rules.

5.1.5. Strategic interests

In this occasion, the EU had the interest to promote itself as a capable security actor abroad (Sempijja 2008). Artemis was an occasion for the EU to test and improve its military capabilities in territories hit by conflicts, without the presence of NATO for the first time. The Council of the EU declared that with Artemis, the EU has gained a greater credibility on the international stage and has affirmed its role as a political and military actor in mitigating conflicts far away from its territory and accomplishing the task of crisis management. The EU in this occasion showed its ability to put into practice the European Security Strategy in order to promote regional stability and accomplish all the tasks assigned by the UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003) (Hendrickson et al. 2007; Koenig 2012).
5.1.6. Impact of the joint mandate on the conflict

Since the first days of the intervention, operation Artemis seemed to be capable of containing the conflict in the territory assigned. The European high-skilled troops week after week were able to end violence in Bunia by declaring it a “weapon-free town” after a month of the deployment of the mission (Goris et al. 2004). Besides, they had the ability to secure Bunia’s airport and to assist the displaced people of the surrounding area and the refugee camps.

Overall the EU was satisfied with the outcome of the operation. According to the EU special representative for Africa’s Great Lakes Region Aldo Ajello, operation Artemis has been a “big humanitarian, military and political success” and the operation commander of Artemis claimed the mission to have been fulfilled, by bringing back security, helping people to return home and restart an economic activity (Hendrickson 2007). According to a EU Council meeting held at the end of the operation, the EU concludes that the efforts put on Artemis resulted on a successful intervention (EU Commission 2003). This was mostly due to the high skills possessed by the troops deployed, the rapidity of the intervention and the narrow-defined scope of it (European Commission 2003, UNBPU 2004, Koenig 2012). Moreover, thanks to Artemis, many people forced to migrate from Bunia could come back and resettle. This operation surely helped MONUC to proceed in a smoother manner once the EU troops would have accomplished their mandate.

If many argue the success of the operation, there are however some weaknesses. Since it was an interim operation it had a limited time and scope. Artemis, in fact, lasted just three months, from June to September 2003, and it intervened in a very limited portion of the Congolese territory, respectively the district of Bunia, while elsewhere in the region of Ituri atrocities were committed on a daily basis (Morsut 2007). Additionally, few foot patrols were deployed, which could have been useful for a better monitoring of vehicles around the district; and the assertive behaviour of EU soldiers did sometimes not help building trust with the population (Morsut 2007).
5.2. **UN mission and EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic (CAR)**

5.2.1. **Background**

The deployment of the military bridging mission EUFOR Chad/CAR is a consequence of the Darfur crisis erupted in 2003 that failed to be addressed by the international community\(^4\) and led to migration flows to the neighbour countries Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). After some evaluations on the ground, the UN Security Council (UNSC) recommended to deploy instead a monitoring/protection mission in Chad/CAR in consultation with the local authorities. After France willingness to intervene, the UN Secretary-General decided to opt for a revised deployment of the operation. This was formed by three distinct elements: a multi-dimensional presence of the UN; a Chadian police component and an EU military force to be deployed on the ground (Churruca 2015). This was approved and established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007). An official UN Mission would have been established just after the follow up mission assigned to the European Union, that started operating in March 2008 and ended the year after, followed by the further intervention of the UN.

5.2.2. **EUFOR Chad/CAR**

The EUFOR Chad/CAR was initiated in March 2008 and it ended in March 2009. After that, it was officially handed over to the UN follow-on mission MINURCAT (Lanz 2009). The mission has seen the involvement of 23 EU members, being the most multilateral and multinational military operation in Africa so far (Council of the European Union 2008).

5.2.3. **Transaction costs and exchange of best practices**

Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR deployed overall 3700 troops, with France being the main military contributor. The mandate was very narrow; it was coordinated closely with the UN presence in the territory to provide and improve the security in the regions assigned. With EUFOR Chad/CAR the EU had the objective of protecting the civilians, especially the refugees, the displaced persons and the UN personnel. Moreover, it had to provide security in the areas where the operation was taking place to facilitate the

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\(^4\) There have been multiple attempts to address the severe problem on the region and ask for a humanitarian intervention (especially the EU and the US) to end violence and conflicts. Western attempts to mitigate the conflicts, however, have been limited.
delivery of humanitarian aid and free movement of humanitarian aid workers (Council of the EU 2009).

While the mission per se seems to have run smoothly and followed the coordination procedures, the handover to from EUFOR to the UN seemed to have encountered some complications. EU officials in Brussels defined the handover as “nightmare” (Dijkstra 2010). In the UNSC resolution 1778 nothing stated the conditions under which the handover had to take place after the completion of the EUFOR mandate, and MINURCAT did not seem ready to overtake the operation. At the end, this happened thanks to the EUFOR promptness to handover troops and infrastructures and to provide logistical support to MINURCAT at the beginning of the operation (Dijkstra 2010). Handing over the infrastructure created tensions between the EU and the UN. A Council Secretariat official in Brussels said that there was an informal gentlemen’s agreement between the EU and UN saying that MINURCAT should have paid back part of the costs that EUFOR used for the building of new infrastructures (Dijkstra 2010). Nonetheless, since nothing was stated in an official document at the end the UN payed this amount only partly – 20 per cent of the 70 million used by the EU common expenses. This affected mostly Germany, which did not want to be actively involved in the operation (Dijkstra 2010).

5.2.4. Strategic interests

France has been surely the main European and Security Council actor that wanted to get involved in Chad at that time. Notwithstanding, there were also EU strategic interests behind the choice of the European intervention. Following the frustration of being powerless in the region of Darfur, the High representative Xavier Solana identified in the Chad intervention a potential of redemption (Mattelaer 2008) and an occasion of public visibility (Hainzl and Feichtinger 2009). Generally, this was a desire to establish the EU as a global security provider as the European Security Strategy suggests (Churruca 2015). It was time to enter into a new military operation to promote the development of the ESDP as a conflict and crisis management tool (Mattelaer 2008; Churruca 2015).

France, not surprisingly, had particular interests in the territory of intervention. Since the beginning of the Darfur crisis in 2003, France provided military protection and
indirect military support to the Chadian President Idriss Déby, which is ruling the country since 1990 (Churruca 2015). Advocating for an EU intervention in Chad seems undoubtedly a move to seek legitimacy to its security policy in Africa (Churruca 2015). During the French presidency election held in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy and particularly Bernard Kouchner – elected afterwards Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs under Sarkozy’s government – made clear that the Darfur crisis was one of their top foreign policy priorities (Charbonneau 2009). Right after their election, they brought this priority on a higher stage of discussion, calling for a prompt intervention to stabilise the region. Amongst the EU and UN members, there was however a certain level of suspicion. For this reason, neutral countries insisted on a neutral mandate (Mattealter 2008). This argument created a wreckage between France on the one side and Germany and the UK on the other hand side. The two latter countries saw this intervention as another project in support of Françafrique (Dijkstra 2010). Nonetheless, they did not block EUFOR from occurring, they only stated they would not have contributed with their troops and would have kept the common costs to an absolute minimum (Dijkstra 2010).

5.2.5. Impact of the joint mandate on the conflict

Thanks to the presence of EUFOR on the ground, the number of rebel attacks decreased and the military threat against the president was reduced. Besides, EUFOR supported humanitarian organisations in multiple ways. Thanks to their protection, these kinds of organisations were able to become active in areas they could not enter before due to security and safety reasons (Hainzl and Feichtinger 2009). Overall, one can say that the objectives of the mandate have been fulfilled: aggression towards civilians decreased, refugees and displaced people were secured, and the work of humanitarian organisation was made possible (Hainzl and Feichtinger 2009). According to a report written by Oxfam, EUFOR “made many civilians feel safer through its activities, which include patrolling known dangerous routes, destroying unexploded ordnance, making contact with local leaders, and positioning itself defensively around civilians during rebel and government fighting” (Oxfam 2009; Dijkstra 2010).

However, EUFOR was not fully able to protect the refugees and displaced people as it is claimed officially (Berg 2008). During the deployment of the EU operation there was no local Chadian police force to provide help and security in the areas of the
refugee camps as it was supposed to be according to the UN resolution and multidimensional strategy. MINURCAT was supposed to train and deploy Chadian police on the ground but it faced already its own problems while recruiting stuff for the UN operation (Berg 2009).

6. Discussion

This part is dedicated to the discussion and the findings according to the analysis. This part is intended to be using a more comparative approach, underlying similarities and differences between the two cases.

6.1. Official purposes of the mandate and rationales

Operation Artemis and EUFOR Chad/CAR were both deployed for a short period of time in just a small portion of the territory. First of all, it is worth to mention again the main difference between the two operations. Operation Artemis has run parallelly with MONUC, which was already deployed four years before the EU intervention. In the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR, it was a follow-up mission deployed alongside with a UN mandate and then substituted by MINURCAT.

Even if the deployment looks different because of the different conflict dynamics, the motives calling for an intervention are similar. According to the adopted UNSC resolutions, the two EU intervention had the goal of protecting the civilians and stabilise the security conditions of the designed territory.

The three theories employed for this research indicate that information sharing, exchange of best practices and expertise and the reduction of transaction costs is what leads organisations to cooperate and what makes these joint mandates beneficial for peace and conflict interventions. The analysis conducted shows that both cases confirm what the theories say and in what way we can understand these rationales of cooperation and hence, reply to the first sub-question.

With the help of the EU, the UN could coordinate its mandate better thanks to the provision of funds and high skilled troops. During both joint mandates, there was an
exchange of best practices and expertise between the organisations in terms of intelligence and communication technology. The two organisations managed to coordinate their tasks on the ground thanks to a smooth sharing of information through different channels and a good joint management of the airport. They also built together a good communication with the local population. This has permitted to accomplish the tasks of the joint mandate promptly and in an efficient manner.

However, problems took place during the handover coordination at different stages of the operations. In the case of Artemis, coordination problems laid mostly on the deployment of the operation. Due to a lack of trust, the two organisations did not exchange information and barely started to coordinate before the deployment. In the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR the handover process was problematic during the handover to the UN Mission. This happened due to lack of indications on the official documents and created an environment of mistrust between the two organisations.

This aspect weakens the relevance of the theories. However, organisational theory also suggest that in intra- and inter-organisational dynamics, problems may arise due to the lack of knowledge about each other’s work and their miscommunication. The fact that these two organisations barely cooperate, lowers the possibilities to create the environment of trust needed in this kind of cooperation.

Looking forward, there is a need to setup a common comprehensive approach towards crisis management operations in order to have common goals. It is crucial to establish a clearer general structure of coordination on joint interventions, that can create iterated processes to enhance the level of trust amongst organisations, especially in the handover process. This would avoid possible misunderstandings and inconveniences.

6.2. Interests behind cooperation

Even though part of the theory employed for this study suggests that organisations tend to cooperate because they are less driven by competition, they find in cooperation new patterns of personal interests to achieve. Inter-organisational theory suggests that an organisation is cooperating with another in order to seek legitimacy. Even if the
cases show some differences within the strategies taken, they surely show similarities on the final purposes.

EU officials wanted to show their engagement in security issues by intervening in the DRC and be present in Darfur, they sought public visibility and they wanted the EU to establish as a security provider. This shows that the EU sought cooperation with the UN not just for the sake of humanitarian purposes, but also because this partnership would have given more legitimacy to the EU Security project and be recognised as an established and well-functioning security actor. Therefore, the three theories are relevant in terms of organisations’ interests in terms of legitimacy. Dijksta (2010) has also showed evidence with the institutionalist theory that EU interventions are moved by internal pressures within institutions. This can be confirmed and further explained by the theories utilised in this thesis; the seek for legitimacy seems to be the biggest friction of the cooperation between these two actors.

France followed its own political agenda to push for an EU intervention in the DRC and Chad. In the first case, they wanted to show the power of the Union after the failure in Iraq without the presence of NATO. In Chad, they wanted to prove that Darfur was on the top priorities of Sarkozy’s agenda. Gegout (2008) from a rationalist point of view has come to the same conclusion, identifying France as the main player in such operations. Rationalism focuses on power dynamics and national interests. For this reason, it is interesting that also with an analysis of the cooperation between two organisations, the outcomes look similar. Charbonneau (2009) emphasises on the fact that without France, this cooperation would most likely not have taken place.

Moreover, cooperation helps also in securing an achievement of the goals. In the case analysed the UN asked for an EU intervention due to its inability to fulfil the mandates on the ground. Both missions provided the UN with time to better enforce their mandates and capability, nonetheless, help with the containment of the escalation of the situation. This permitted the UN to not yet declare a failure of the mandate, but rather get more time and to improve the situation thanks to information sharing, exchange of best practices, highly skilled troops and more funds.
6.3. Impact of the joint mandate on the conflict

The two cases are similar in their outcome. Overall, the goals set by the UNSC resolutions have been fulfilled, permitting the re-stabilisation of the situation in the intervening area. In the case of Artemis, the district of Bunja – which is the one assigned by the mandate – was declared a “weapon free” zone and episode of violence ended. In both cases, civilian seem to have been protected, especially refugees and displaced people. The exchange of expertise and the presence of a higher skilled troop has had a positive impact on the fulfilment of the mandate. For this reason, one can claim that this analysis shows a relevance of the theory in terms of benefits of the cooperation also in relation with the first sub question under analysis.

However, the containment of the conflict has been secured only in the conflict regions assigned to the EU mandate and in the short term. In both cases, violence and conflict did not stop from occurring in the rest of the territories. In both cases, MONUC and MINURCAT kept on working over the territories, but without restabilising completely the situation and finally bringing peace on the long term.

The shortness of these mandates, their narrow scope and territory restrictions, raise some doubts on the absolute and long-term gains. Even though the mandate has been respected and the tasks fulfilled, the conflict has been contained just in the short term and in the small regions where the operation were deployed. As already claimed, this could be a way for organisations to maintain their autonomy and power; even though organisations tend to be homogenised and the process of cooperation seems a natural step forward, they are constrained by the wish to be autonomous and maintain their authority rather than aiming at long-term gains and common goals. Individual interests and power, therefore, seem to always play an important role within this research. This shows that even though the cooperation is beneficial an provides good tools to help restabilising the situation - at least on the short term -, organisations are still driven by competitiveness to a certain extend. As already suggested, by creating iterated processes to enhance the level of trust amongst organisations, competition would be substituted with a higher degree of cooperation and possibly help to achieve long-term goals. Trust is once again pivotal in the function and success of cooperation.
Short operations can secure the area for the duration of the operation, but once they are over the situation might escalate again and be as it was before. Generally speaking, this is claimed to be the main problem with third-party intervention according to many scholars that deal with post-conflict reconstruction and crisis management.

6.4. **Limitations of the research**

The analysis conducted let me provide a systematic analysis and obtain interesting findings. Many are the documents that helped me with the analysis of the cases. However, I encountered some limitations throughout the research. In the case of the DRC, many were the UN and EU official documents and reports difficult to retrieve. Therefore, I had to rely mostly on the analysis conducted by previous researchers, who used UN reports that were not available on UN official website anymore. Moreover, it was difficult to retrieve NGO reports, who could have provided me with less biased evaluations of the operations than official UN-EU documents. The lack of different kind of documents, hence, could not let me accurately triangulate the data, therefore the validity of the measurement has not been properly enhanced in order to minimize accuracy.

Comparative Case Study Analysis has helped to show the relevance of the theories employed for this study. However, being limited in the selection of the cases and given the fact that similarities and dissimilarities depend on the emphasis given by the researcher and the data evaluated, this methodology could only help partially to generalise the findings of this study. Moreover, data are mainly collected from existing literature and official documents. I acknowledge that interviews could have offered further insights and different perspectives and I would therefore suggest for further researchers to complement interviews.

Another natural limitation of this research is that EU-UN cooperation is a relatively recent phenomenon and it has developed mostly in the last fifteen years. Since the signing of the joint declaration, few have been the episodes of military joint missions in crisis management operations. This has not helped in the selection of the cases, which was limited to very few ones and could not create a deeper comparison and generate a more variegated discussion, with stronger generalisations. Moreover, this fact does
not help researchers to analyse data also in a quantitative way, hence quantify the impact of cooperation on a large-N scale rather than just by conducting small-N studies. A mixed method approach could help providing more accurate results and analysing more aspects within the joint operations, enhancing the validity of the results. Additionally, the EU-UN cooperation sometimes is difficult to be proper analysed as a two-player mandate, due to the fact that it is multi-layered and multi-faceted.

That said, this study has a limited ability to generalise beyond the context of this dyadic cooperation. Nevertheless, the aim of a qualitative case study analysis is to generate analytical generalisations rather than ones beyond the context (Yin 2014; Flick 2007). The findings of this study can therefore only be generalised to similar contexts, namely other cases where the EU and the UN have cooperated.

7. **Conclusions**

This thesis has explored cooperation amongst organisations, focusing particularly on the EU-UN ties and cooperation. The phenomenon under investigation has been recently an object of study by scholars, particularly in a descriptive way. The thesis focuses on intra and inter-organisational study in regard to the EU-UN cooperation. Neoliberal institutionalism, organisational and inter-organisational theory are intended to be complementary to the IR theories and deepen our understanding for why international organisations cooperate. This has been done through the qualitative method of Comparative Case Study Analysis using two similar cases, respectively Operation Artemis and EUFOR Chad/CAR. The study has been guided by the research questions that will be then answered accordingly.

The analysis shows the relevance of the theories in regard to the rationales under investigation. During the joint mandate, the two organisations cooperated in terms of exchanging best practices in terms of military force, intelligence and communication on the ground. They lowered transaction costs by smoothly sharing information and coordinate their tasks. However, trust – essential condition for cooperation according to the theory - lacked in the handover process. According to neoliberal institutionalism, iterated processes of cooperation should increase trust amongst organisation.
Therefore, if cooperation between the EU and the UN keeps on taking place, trust would increase and enhance cooperation patterns.

The theory is also relevant also when explaining strategic interests behind cooperation: legitimacy plays a big role in the settlement of a joint mandate. The EU achieved a higher legitimacy in the security framework and good public visibility. On the other hand, the UN got more time on the preparation of its missions and better equipment provided by the EU.

Given the results, one can say that the scope of the joint mandate was fulfilled, and the situation was stabilised, but only on the short term and in the district of intervention. Violence did not stop occur in the rest of the country.

The theories claim that cooperation smoothens the process of conflict resolution because organisations are less driven by competition and work on achieving common goals. However, this analysis shows that competitiveness still drives organisations to a certain extend. For this reason, cooperation does not happen systematically, and organisations prefer to use it as a “last choice” and keep their autonomy when intervening military in a conflict zone.

Cooperation in terms of training and advice happens more often and for a longer amount of time (EUTM Somalia, 2010-present; EUTM Mali, 2013-present; EUCAP Sahel Mali, 2014-present; EUTM CAR, 2016-present). In line with this study, this shows that the exchange of best practices and learning is seen by organisations as a positive tool. At the other hand side, a joint military intervention tackles some power dynamics that organisations are not ready to put aside in crises situations.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN has shown positive achievements in the African continent. However, the level of trust between them seems to not have increased after two joint military mandates. This happens because of their rare formalised cooperation in military joint missions. This research suggests that it is mainly strategic interests that lead to such a cooperation. In order to prove success, the two organisations should focus on joint strategies to alleviate conflicts in the intervening area and assess a more systematic approach to intervention, outlining a scheme of action to be adopted.
This study shows to be in line with previous study, but it adds complementary explanations on intra- and inter-organisational dynamics, and it does deepen the understanding on why organisations seek cooperation. It also shows that by putting efforts together missions appear to be more resilient.

8. **Future research**

Within this intervention, France is the main actor in action together with the EU institutions and their officials, driven by personal interests. These actors deserve a particular attention in the work of future researchers. Unluckily, the branch of organisational theory employed for this research has a limited explanation of this phenomenon. Realism and institutionalism might give a more detailed explanation when analysing the role of France and the role of the European institutions and the UN bodies. Even if similar studies have been conducted, scholars should use these theories within the cooperation dynamic and look at all actors on the ground.

The theories employed for this study could be useful to dig deeper into the other cases of intervention that have taken place in Africa in terms of training and advice and the ones in the Balkans.

Moreover, interviews should be taken into consideration by future researchers when taking into consideration similar studies. They would generate new data and give interesting insights tailored to this topic.

The scope of this thesis was to provide a generalisability just within the dyadic cooperation between the EU and the UN. Further research should also look at the cooperation between other international and regional organisations, looking at trilateral and multilateral cooperation. They could do so by taking into consideration other IR theories that could alternatively and/or complementary explain organisational behaviours. Further research in this sense can enhance the generalisability of the results given by this study and generate new data for possible comparative analysis and studies.
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