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Global Democracy for Europeans:  
A Demographic Story*

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Abstract

Insofar as democracy is a product of long-term diffusion, scholars generally focus on colonialism (especially English) or religion (especially Protestant). Here, we focus on a third pathway from Europe – *Europeans*. We show that there is a persistent relationship between the share of Europeans in a society and its regime type. We conjecture that this is because Europeans viewed democracy as a basic right – for themselves. It was a club that produced club goods (excludable goods such as property rights and civil liberties). Hence, where Europeans were in the majority they were democrats. Where they were the minority they were indifferent or hostile, or they embraced a restricted form of democracy that excluded non-Europeans. And where Europeans were entirely absent there was no one – at least initially – to carry the democratic torch. To test this argument we assemble an original dataset measuring the diffusion of Europeans across the world from 1600 to the present. This is employed to predict democracy in a series of analyses that focus on various indicators of democracy and a variety of samples, specifications, time-periods, and estimators, including fixed effects and instrumental variables. The evidence offers strong support for the thesis.
Introduction

Democracy is often viewed as a product of diffusion, understood loosely as the adoption of norms and institutions from other states. Studies of diffusion typically focus on proximal relationships, where an event at year $t$ affects another event at $t+1$ (e.g., Brinks, Coppedge 2006).

Long-term diffusion – taking place over decades or centuries – has received less attention, perhaps because it is harder to assess. One line of work focuses on colonialism, where studies indicate that a wide variety of factors associated with colonialism, and British rule in particular, made democratic outcomes more likely in years following independence (Bernhard et al. 2004; Hariri 2012; Lange, Mahoney, Vom Hau 2006; Olsson 2009). Another line of work focuses on Protestantism, where researchers find a positive association between the spread of Protestant sects and the rise of democracy in the contemporary era (Anderson 2004; Brown 1944; Bruce 2004; Tusalem 2009; Woodberry 2012). Both factors may be regarded as emanations of Europe.

In this study, we focus on a third pathway from Europe – Europeans. The presence of Europeans is a widely recognized factor in economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly, Levine 2016; Engerman, Sokoloff 2012; Glaeser et al. 2004; Mahoney 2010; Putterman, Weil 2010). However, its possible role in democratization has not been systematically assessed.

Beginning about 1500, with the advent of sailing vessels capable of circumnavigating the globe, Europeans began to populate the distant abroad. By 1900, they could be found virtually everywhere, in varying proportions. We argue that the resulting ratio of Europeans/non-Europeans structured the fate of democracy around the world. Where Europeans were numerous (relative to indigenes and migrants from elsewhere), they championed some form of popular sovereignty, though often with restrictions limiting suffrage or office-holding to those of European heritage. Where they were in the minority they were more reticent and often actively resisted democratization. And where Europeans were entirely absent there was no one – at least initially – to carry the democratic torch. We argue that this demographic mechanism was probably the most powerful pathway of democratic diffusion from Europe to the world and one of the more enduring causes of regime-type in the modern era.

Section I lays out the argument. Section II presents an original dataset measuring the spread of Europeans throughout the world from 1600 to the present. Section III offers a series of analyses that test the argument with qualitative historical data and also quantitative measures of democracy and European ancestry. Appendices (on-line) present sources (A), codings of European ancestry for each territory (B), maps of the world illustrating European ancestry at
various points in time (C), convergent validity tests for the key variable of theoretical interest (D), descriptions of each variable used on all analyses (E), robustness tests (F), and alternative accounts (G).

I. Argument

The outcome of theoretical interest is democracy, a term encapsulating a wide range of meanings in the modern era. At the most abstract level, democratic principles include representation, consent, accountability, political equality, individual liberty, and popular sovereignty. At a more disaggregated level, attributes associated with democracy include the sovereignty of elective bodies (vis-à-vis unelective bodies), competitive multi-party elections, universal suffrage, constitutional constraints on the exercise of power, civil liberties, and citizenship (for all those born within the boundaries claimed by a state who subsequently live out their lives subject to its laws). All of these attributes are implied by the concept of democracy, as we use the term here.

When we make statements about the democratic or autocratic nature of a polity at some point in history we invoke an implicit comparison-set of other societies existing at that time. We recognize that no societies were fully democratic (by today’s standards). Indeed, prior to the twentieth century “democracy” was not an especially popular term. (Preferred terms included freedom, liberty, self-government, representative government, responsible government, republican government, and political rights.) Even so, at any given point in time some societies were more democratic than others. It is this difference of degrees that we wish to explain.

Our argument builds upon three facts about the modern world that we take for granted and do not attempt to explain. First, Europe was the birthplace of democracy. Second, Europeans adopted a racialized view of society, defining their identity and interests separate from non-Europeans. Third, Europeans were globally dominant – militarily, politically, and to some extent culturally.

With this as background, democracy may be viewed as a method of governance whose feasibility and payoffs (to Europeans) depended upon the demographic balance of Europeans and non-Europeans within a society. Where Europeans composed a majority of the population, democracy offered a convenient system for monopolizing political power. Rule by the people meant rule by white people, and they had the infrastructure (education, wealth, etc.) to make it work. Where Europeans composed a substantial minority they could still achieve this result, but to do so they needed to prevent the majority from participating or to successfully coerce/coopt their political opponents, a precarious feat that (it turned out) could not be sustained indefinitely.
Where Europeans composed a tiny fraction of the population, establishing a democratic system of rule was neither practicable nor necessary, as European interests could be coordinated through informal channels within a small (and presumably tightly-knit) community. Regime types therefore evolved from the intersection of European ideas and interests with varying demographic realities. In the following sections, we elaborate on this thesis.

**Democracy for Europeans**

Europeans were the first to develop representative institutions, to hold elections for public office, and to constrain the use of political power by constitutional rules. Exactly why democracy arose in Europe and not elsewhere is a conundrum that we shall not attempt to unravel (for varying perspectives see Cartledge 2016; Schulz et al. 2018; Stasavage 2016). We know that it was a long, slow, and halting development, with many reversals and many shifts of course across the continent. Nonetheless, democracy has deep roots in Europe, which remains the most democratic region of the world today.

Europe also developed into the world’s first global hegemon, inaugurating an age of imperialism (Abernethy 2000). As Europeans conquered the world, they brought their ideas about political organization with them. Democracy in English colonies was viewed by colonists as an extension of the rights of Englishmen, a clear instance of intellectual diffusion (Greene 2010; Kammen 1969; Ward 1976). Representative institutions in Spanish and Portuguese America developed later and might be viewed as a reaction against the authoritarianism of the colonizer. However, constitutional thought and the Latin American constitutions that resulted were modeled on European exemplars – ancient Greece and Rome, Renaissance Italy, contemporary England, revolutionary France, the Netherlands, the short liberal episodes of Spain (1812, 1820-1823), the long history of local government (*cabildo*) in Spain, and the former English colony to the North, the United States (Demélas-Bohy, Guerra 1996; Graham 1994: 73; Guerra 1994; Rodríguez O. 1998; Sabato 2018: 5). Democracy in French colonies was directly linked to France insofar as *colonnes* participated in elections to the *Assemblee Nationale* and often viewed themselves as children of the French Revolution (Choi 2016; Johnson 1971; Southworth 1931). Wherever they happened to be situated, Europeans tended to view themselves as rights-bearers – inheritors of the legacy of the Classical age, the Enlightenment, and the age of Revolution (Armitage, Subrahmanyam 2009; Simon 2017).

Europeans also developed and carried with them other features that might be regarded as forming the *infrastructure* of democracy, e.g., written languages, educational systems, advanced transport and communication systems, urban patterns of settlement, nuclear family structures,
nation-states, property rights, capitalist economies, and wealth (comparatively speaking). We do not know which of these features (often associated with the process of modernization) is most important for democracy (Knutsen et al. 2018; Murtin, Wacziarg 2014; Schulz et al. 2018). But we do know that they developed in tandem and were closely interconnected.

Because democracy was valued by Europeans, and because they possessed the infrastructure required for sustaining democratic forms of government, it is not surprising that democracy arose first in areas inhabited by Europeans. In this respect, as in many others, colonies in the New World were a continuation of the Old – “Neo-Europes” (Crosby 1986).

However, democracy was not viewed by Europeans as a nostrum suitable for all peoples everywhere. Even within Europe, there were limitations on who could participate in politics (Goldstein 2013). Outside Europe, it was generally assumed that non-whites were incapable of self-government, or that they would need many years of apprenticeship before developing that capacity (Fieldhouse 1966; Fradera 2018; Huttenback 1976; Lynch 1973; Reinsch 1906: 197; Ross 1982; Ward 1976; Waterhouse 2010: 240-45; Wight 1946).

This belief had a number of underpinnings. It drew on a vision of democracy in which citizens must possess property (signaling their independence) and education (signaling their capacity for rational thought). It drew on a Euro-centric vision of the world in which non-Europeans were savage (uncivilized, ungodly) or servile (in thrall to despots or masters), and hence unable to govern themselves in a responsible manner. In a much-quoted passage, J.S. Mill (1862) articulates the enlightened opinion of the day...

It is now a fixed principle of the policy of Great Britain...that her colonies of European race, equally with the parent country, possess the fullest measure of internal self-government...But there are others which have not attained that state, and which, if held at all, must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by it. This mode of government is as legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement. There are, as we have already seen, conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization...The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs, guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure attendant on barbarous despotisms, and qualified by their genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the
more advanced nation. Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous
or semi-barbarous one.¹

Abstract considerations of political theory intermingled with overt racism in European thought.

We must also consider how defining democratic capacities in this exclusive fashion may have served the interests of Europeans. “Democracy” (along with associated ideals of equality, representation, and so forth) provided a convenient mechanism for binding together members of the European community, overcoming class antagonisms and monopolizing power in heterogeneous societies around the world. While the economic interests of a European worker and large landowner might differ, they were both granted civil and political rights and in this fashion differentiated themselves from those who fell on the wrong side of the color line (Morgan 1975). Insofar as the exercise of democratic rights was reserved for Europeans it also served as a mechanism of political control – useful for the passage of discriminatory property rights laws and measures of “self-defense” that displaced indigenous peoples and made room for European settlers (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 259; Lützelschwab 2013; Woollacott 2015: 99).

Thus did values and interests combine to make democracy (for Europeans) a popular ideal (among Europeans). Avid proselytizers of property rights and Christianity, Europeans were not keen to spread the gospel of democracy among indigenes, transplanted migrant workers, and slaves. Political freedom meant freedom for whites – more precisely, white men (Foner 1994; Greene 2010; Huttenback 1976; Lake 2012; Morgan 1975).

To be sure, Europeans sometimes extended civil and political rights to non-Europeans. However, emancipation, enfranchisement, and qualification for public office for indigenous people came about with greatest alacrity in places where Europeans predominated. Here, the extension of rights posed little threat to European hegemony. By contrast, where Europeans were in the minority, fear of popular uprisings or popular rule prompted Europeans to resist democratization, or to resist independence from the metropole wherever that seemed destined to inaugurate mass democracy (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 139, 332; Dippel, Carvalho 2015; Greene 2010: 76; Lynch 1973: 20, 51, 127, 158, 163, 190, 265, 325; Williams 1970: ch 22).

Democracy as a Club

From a longer perspective our narrative suggests a historical model in which democracy serves as a coordinating device for group interests.

Beginning in the medieval period, communes, guilds, parties, fraternities, companies, churches, and universities in Europe were formally incorporated based on models drawn from

¹ For a review of recent work on liberalism and empire see Sartori (2006).
Roman and/or canon law. They also developed methods of governance – consultative and decisionmaking bodies, judicial bodies, formal limits on the exercise of executive power, methods of leadership selection and de-selection, protected rights for all members, and so forth – that presage contemporary democratic institutions (Berman 1997; Bilder 2006; Black 1984; Ciepley 2017; Greif 2006; McLaughlin 1932: 50; Maitland 2003; Post 1943; Runciman 2000; Tierney 1982).

Over time, these corporations “acquired a legal personality and began to perform functions of a semi-public nature” (Najemy 1979: 49-50). However, they remained corporate bodies with strictly limited memberships whose purpose was focused primarily on advancing the interests of their members. It is not surprising, therefore, that when forming new political communities Europeans regarded themselves as owners of corporations that performed acts of governance, primarily for their own benefit. This legacy can be found in colonial charters (Lutz 1988) and in municipal charters (Weinbaum 2010). Indeed, municipalities continued to function as the property of their shareholders, i.e., ratepayers, into the twentieth century in cities like Chicago (Einhorn 2001).

Of course, the governance of a political community involved spillover effects to the rest of society since some policies are non-excludable. However, the distinction between members (citizens) and non-members generated an exclusivist polity in which only members (conventionally defined as those with suffrage rights) enjoyed full civil rights and property rights. These policies were (and are) strictly excludable.

From this perspective, democracy began as a club and its policies may be regarded as club goods. Since club membership was defined primarily by race (a marker of European origin), the extent to which this club was inclusive or exclusive (relative to the community in which it was situated) depended upon the demographic heritage of a society. Where the population was predominantly non-European, club membership was restrictive and democracy accordingly limited. Where the population was predominantly European, club membership was expansive and club goods were indistinguishable from public goods. In this fashion, demography structured regime outcomes.²

Summary and Implications

Our main thesis is that prospects for democracy in the modern era vary with the share of Europeans in a society. Of course, this does not imply that regime types are solely a product of the beliefs and actions of Europeans. Many other factors come into play – not the least of which are

² This schema bears resemblance to selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Note, however, that the latter intends to explain the quality of governance while our goal is to explain regime types.
the preferences and actions of non-Europeans. Nonetheless, there is good reason to imagine that Europeans had considerable influence on the course of regimes over the past two centuries.

We argue, second, that European influence flowed mostly through demographic channels. Other channels such as religion (e.g., Protestantism) and colonialism (formal control by a European hegemon) were less important.

We argue, third, that limitations on democratic development were manifested by the exclusion of non-Europeans from the franchise (suffrage) and from the privilege of holding public office. The racial line dividing Europeans and non-Europeans was reflected in the institutions Europeans created.

We argue, fourth, that non-Europeans were more likely to be included as full (or partial) members of the political community where they were few in number – and hence, less threatening to European hegemony.

We argue, finally, that the relationship between European demography and regime type changed over time. It follows from our previous arguments that this relationship was apt to be strongest at a point in history (a) when the ideal of democracy was widely embraced by Europeans but before it diffused widely among non-Europeans, (b) when racial distinctions between Europeans and non-Europeans were pervasive and invidious, and (c) when Europeans exercised greatest influence in the world. It seems plausible that these factors reached their apogee sometime in the twentieth century. By the end of that century, ideas and practices associated with democracy diffused to such an extent that it could no longer be regarded as a European patrimony. Additionally, ideas about national identity and race evolved such that the color line separating Europeans and non-Europeans blurred or become less consequential. Finally, the global hegemony of Europeans waned – including the termination of virtually all overseas colonies – such that Europeans could no longer impose their preferred political institutions on the rest of the world. These trends seem likely to continue. Thus, although the legacy of the European era persists, its effects seem likely to weaken as time goes on.

In summary, our arguments suggest one main hypothesis and several ancillary hypotheses:

\( H_1 \) European ancestry (the share of people in a territory whose ancestors hail from Europe) is a distal cause of democracy.

\( H_a \) Other pathways from Europe such as religion and colonial control are more weakly correlated with democracy.

\( H_b \) Civil and political rights are allocated so as to exclude non-Europeans, de jure or de facto.
The inclusion of non-Europeans is more likely where they are fewer in number.

The relationship between European demography and democracy peaked in the mid-twentieth century, declining thereafter.

These propositions will be explored in Section III. We do not intend to demonstrate the causal mechanisms at work in this explanatory sketch as these factors are hard to measure and difficult to distinguish.

II. The Diffusion of Europeans

European out-migration began with the age of exploration and continued on a sizeable scale through the early twentieth century. During this period, an estimated 60-65 million Europeans left the continent for points abroad (Etemad 2007: 18). After World War One, migration slowed to a trickle due to the demographic transition in Europe as well as improvements in European economies and the growth of welfare states, relieving pressure on potential emigrants. The following discussion therefore focuses on the era of mass European migration, circa 1500-1914, and especially on early waves of emigration (prior to 1850). Later migrants generally followed in the footsteps of their predecessors – typically, members of their family or village – and were responsive to economic and demographic realities that earlier settlers had established.

For European emigrants some destinations were preferred to others. Distance appears to have been a minor factor. To be sure, North America was closer to Europe than South America, and ocean passage was accordingly cheaper and less onerous. This may account for the higher rate of immigration to the US (especially among poor emigrants) relative to other destinations in the Americas. These are marginal differences, however. Central Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa, the areas closest to Western Europe, received very few emigrants, while New Zealand and Australia, at the other end of the world, became “Little Englands.” Instead of distance, European migration choices were structured primarily by geography and disease. Healthful climates were generally located away from the equatorial zone, where malaria and other dangers lurked. Of equal concern was the ready availability of land that was fertile and cheap.

Our concern, however, is not with European migration per se but rather with the resulting demographic balance between European and non-European populations. Regardless of how many

Europeans entered a society, where indigenous people were densely settled they were unlikely to lose their demographic predominance. This describes much of Asia, some parts of Africa (in the tropical regions), and the equatorial region of the Americas (from southern Mexico to Peru). Demography played an especially important role in the New World, where indigenes were susceptible to the scourge of European diseases (smallpox, influenza et al.). Where populations were densely settled, they tended to recover quickly as resistances built up; where populations were diffusely settled, they might never recover and were in any case easy to displace.

A second factor affecting demographic balance were the commodities encouraged by a region’s geography. Family farming was not as remunerative as labor-intensive cash crops (sugar, tobacco, cotton, coffee, tea, cocoa, sisal, oil seeds, oil palms, rubber, or fruit) or mining (e.g., for gold or silver). Thus, where soil and climate resources allowed, or where natural resources were discovered underground (alluvial deposits could be harvested by individual miners working for themselves on the model of the California and Alaska gold rushes), these industries proliferated. To be profitable in a low-technology environment, plantations and mines required a large labor force that would do hard and dangerous work under close supervision for little or no remuneration. Europeans would not abide by these conditions except under temporary arrangements of indentured servitude. Consequently, plantation and mining economies came to be dominated by non-European workers – indigenes, slaves imported from Africa, or migrant workers from Asia.

In summary, where climate and soil were suitable for European emigration and the establishment of family farms and where indigenous populations were diffuse, Europeans usually became a sizeable ethnic group. This describes the Americas (especially away from the equator), Australasia, and the southern tip of Africa. Where geographic and demographic conditions were not propitious, Europeans may have operated trading posts, mines, plantations, or missions; they might have also controlled the levers of political, military, and economic power; and they might have established colonies that endured for centuries. However, their demographic presence was slight.

**Europe**

We turn now to problems of conceptualization and measurement. The region known today as Europe is a cultural construction, open to varying interpretations that change over time (Pagden 2002). As a rough-and-ready definition, we shall say that a country is a part of the European cultural area if its principal or official language was Latinate or Germanic in the modern era. This decision-rule generates a list of contemporary states including Andorra, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. For present purposes, “Europeans” are those whose ancestors lived in this region in 1500.

Of course, Europe could be defined differently. One might mark its territory by the furthest extent of the Roman Empire or by the spread of Roman Catholicism (prior to the Reformation). One might extend its borders to include more of Central Europe or Southern Europe, or shrink its borders to exclude the Celtic fringe. One might include countries like the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia that are commonly regarded as European. However, these minor adjustments would have negligible impact on our analysis, as out-migration from different parts of Europe tended to follow in the footsteps of migrations from the core states of Western Europe.

**European Ancestry**

The variable of theoretical interest, *European ancestry*, is the share of people living in a society who are European by ancestry. It is an open question how to define a European, given the mixed ancestry of most people in the modern era. The same problem besets work on ethnicity and race (Lieberman, Singh 2012; Simon, Piché, Gagnon 2015). Lines were drawn differently at different times and places, and where populations inter-mixed over long periods these lines were especially blurry.

We adopt a constructivist definition of ancestry. A European is what people – specifically, surveyors and enumerators – understand to be European, an understanding that is likely to change over time and is especially elastic in places with high rates of intermarriage such as Latin America. Having said this, we expect that group categories are never constructed out of whole cloth. An individual classified by surveyors or enumerators as European is likely to have a substantial genetic tie to people living in Europe in 1500.

In treating Europeans as a corporate group we do not mean to suggest that all Europeans were the same. Differences in cultures and institutional practices across countries were considerable, and we assume that this mattered for economic development and the spread of democracy (Bernhard et al. 2004; Lange, Mahoney, Vom Hau 2006; Olsson 2009). Yet, there is reason to suppose that differences attenuated over time as settlers from different countries assimilated the ideals of the Enlightenment and began to think of themselves as inheriting a common European culture rather than a specifically British, Dutch, French, et al. culture.
Relatedly, we treat Europeans within each colony or country as a unitary group, overlooking cleavages based on country of origin, language, religion, and ideology. Of course, every European settlement generated its own intra-European conflicts, and these gradations of status and power were consequential. However, when it came to establishing basic rules and norms about who could vote, hold office, or enjoy civil rights, distinctions among Europeans were less relevant than distinctions between Europeans and non-Europeans. In constitutional matters, race trumped nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, and party (Fredrickson 2002: 68; Gann, Duignan 1962: 69; Giliomee, Elphick 1979: 359-60; Mills 1997). In this respect, we feel justified in treating Europeans as a category.

Precisely why race came to predominate over other identities is a question that we leave in abeyance, though we presume that the encounter between Europeans and the wider world that occurred during the age of imperialism was of critical importance. In an age before passports, distinctive skin pigmentation allowed Europeans to readily distinguish themselves from natives, migrant laborers, and slaves, facilitating the perpetuation of a hierarchical order (Allen 1994; Belich 2009: 5; Fanon 1970; Fradera 2018; Kennedy 1987; Mohanram 2007; Pagden 2009; Ross 1982).

**Counting Europeans**

Measuring the number of Europeans who were present in societies around the world across the past several centuries is not an easy matter, and not one that modern demographers have attended to. Consequently, there is no standard database that one might draw upon.

In some respects, historical data on Europeans is apt to be more accurate than data on non-Europeans. After all, Europeans were responsible for most surveys and censuses during the colonial period and one can be fairly confident that they counted themselves. The fact that they tended to have sedentary lifestyles and often lived in cities meant that they were easily accessible. By contrast, counting indigenous people in the bush was more difficult, and one might assume that enumerators were less motivated to do so. Thus, in many situations our numerator (number of Europeans) may be regarded as more accurate than our denominator (total population).

The numerator suffers from a serious problem of definition, however. It is never easy to distinguish those with European ancestry from everyone else, especially where inheritances are mixed. Surveys might classify respondents by country (e.g., “English”), by continent (e.g., “European”), or by race (e.g., “white”). Consistent with our constructivist approach, we assume that local practices governed how these categories were defined and operationalized, that there were differences across polities and across colonizers (McNamee 2018), and that definitions of who was “white” or “European” changed over time (Carvalho 2004; Loveman 2014). To deal with
cross-regional heterogeneity we include regional dummies and conduct sub-sample analyses focused on specific colonizers – British, Spanish, and French. To deal with cross-temporal heterogeneity we include year dummies and sub-sample analyses focused on particular eras.

Even so, the question of ancestry was not entirely fluid – especially during the pre-contemporary era. Prior to the twentieth century, the color line was strictly monitored and policed in most societies throughout the world. At any given time, most people had a clear sense of where they stood and could do little about it. The rigidity of race makes it a harder, more exogenous category than it is today. However noxious, race-consciousness undergirds our statistics. Indeed, a primary purpose for gathering demographic data in which people are classified by origin or pigmentation was presumably to reinforce these invidious distinctions (Loveman 2009; Nobles 2000). Thus, despite the weaknesses of census/survey methodology we have greater confidence in the numerator in historical eras – when it had a clear meaning – than in the contemporary era, when its meaning seems increasingly ambiguous and when the categories sometimes disappear entirely from censuses and surveys. Historians and social scientists – not to mention, contemporaries – discuss the presence of Europeans as if there was something real out there. Likewise, studies of ethnicity, religion, and other ascriptive categories assume that these culturally defined categories were, and are, meaningful. We shall do the same, with the usual caveats.

To maximize coverage, minimize stochastic error, and to get a sense of convergent validity, we collect data from as many sources as possible. We begin with the most recent global dataset compiled by Easterly, Levine (2016) from thirty-nine secondary sources. This is supplemented by our own collection, integrating data from over fifty secondary sources (a few of which overlap with Easterly, Levine). These secondary sources, listed in Appendix A, cull innumerable primary sources, i.e., censuses, surveys, and informal estimates.

Statistics of interest include (a) number of Europeans, (b) total population, and (c) European share of population. Where only one of these elements is missing it is calculated by the authors. Where total population is missing we draw upon Fariss et al. (2017), which aggregates a number of primary datasets. From these sources, we assemble 2,193 data points representing the demographic histories of 237 countries and colonies from 1600 to 2017. (Twenty-three percent of these data points are drawn from Easterly and Levine.)

Aggregation and Missingness

To aggregate estimates across multiple sources and to generate a continuous dataset with estimates for each territory-year (back to 1600) we take several additional steps. For territories outside Europe (as defined), we mark the date of the first recorded European settlement or (if the latter is
unknown) the first European contact. This is coded as zero (no Europeans), forming the first data point in the series. For territories within Europe, we record the number of Europeans as 100% in 1950. This estimate is extended back to 1600 under the assumption that the share of Europeans within a territory did not change greatly during a period when in-migration (from outside Europe) was limited.

For the remaining time-period (after the point of first European contact for non-European territories and after 1950 for European territories), we estimate yearly data points across available data using a loess smoother that regresses population on year with smoothing parameter $\alpha=0.85$. The quadratic function is appropriate for data patterns with a single curvature, as is the case for most territories under observation – where the share of Europeans increases to a peak and then decreases, forming an inverted-U shape. For European countries, the share of Europeans tends to decrease in a monotonic fashion after 1950, also nicely captured by the quadratic function.

To give readers a sense of the data, our sources, and our method of interpolating missing values, we produce graphs for each territory, shown in Appendix B. We also produce maps of the world at century-long intervals, shown in Appendix C. Reassuringly, our measure of European ancestry is highly correlated with other attempts to measure this concept, as shown in Table D.1.

A histogram of the European ancestry variable, in Figure 1, shows bimodal peaks located at each end of the scale. Most polities have little or no Europeans, a handful have lots of Europeans, and the rest fall somewhere in between. This suggests that most of the variation in our outcome may be driven by the polar extremes. Helpfully, measurement error at the extremes is less likely than measurement error in the middle. Yet, we do not regard European ancestry as a binary variable in disguise. Indeed, we show that the relationship of theoretical interest is robust even when each mode is excluded from the analysis (see Table 3).
III. Analysis

To test our main hypotheses along with various sub-hypotheses listed at the end of Section I, we begin by exploring the relationship between European ancestry and democracy in the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras, drawing on a vast library of historical work. Next, we conduct a series of wide-ranging tests in which an indicator of democracy is regressed against our measure of European ancestry. To probe robustness, we employ various indicators of democracy and a variety of samples, specifications, time-periods, and estimators, including fixed effects and instrumental variables.

The Colonial and post-Colonial Experience

If Europeans affected the rise of democracy around the world we ought to see this relationship manifested during the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras, when European power was at its apex. In this section, we focus on sets of colonies/countries that were under the control of a single colonizer. This allows us to hold constant important background features while focusing on factors of theoretical interest. We are also able to exploit within-unit (within-colony or within-country)
variation. Note, however, that due to space-constraints we are limited to a very schematic account of complex historical realities. Readers may refer to the cited literature for more depth and detail.

Across British colonies in the Americas, European settlers were often a substantial minority and sometimes an outright majority. In these settings, settlers usually won rights of self-government, thereby establishing some of the oldest legislatures and the earliest examples of contested elections in the world. Vibrant assemblies were founded throughout the region, e.g., in Virginia (1619), Bermuda (1620), Massachusetts Bay (1634), Maryland (1638), Connecticut (1637), Plymouth (1639), New Haven (1639), Barbados (1639), St Kitts (1642), Antigua (1644), Rhode Island (1647), Montserrat (1654), Nevis (1658), Jamaica (1664), North Carolina (1665), South Carolina (1671), East Jersey (1668), West Jersey (1681), New Hampshire (1680), Pennsylvania (1682), and New York (1683) (Kammen 1969: 11-12). These assemblies continued to thrive where the demographic balance tilted toward Europeans. But where the black population outstripped the European population, threatening revolt or majority rule, Europeans and their descendants generally resisted independence or relinquished rights to self-governance by transitioning to a Crown colony (Dippel, Carvalho 2015). The only case of persisting self-government and ongoing democratic institutions in a colony without a white majority occurred in Barbados, where European colonists and their descendants comprised a substantial minority of the population, sufficient to maintain political control until near the end of the colonial era (Beckles 1990).

Within the British colonies that became the United States the development of democracy was contingent upon solving the so-called race problem (Myrdal 1944). Marked differences could be found in the ratio of whites/blacks across regions, with African Americans constituting a substantial minority (and occasionally a majority) of the population in the South and in smaller numbers elsewhere. Consistent with our hypothesis, African Americans generally enjoyed greater civil and political rights in parts of the country (initially colonies, later states) where they were least numerous as a share of the general population (Acharya, Blackwell, Sen 2018; Klinkner, Smith 1999). Accordingly, subnational authoritarianism survived in regions where black Americans were persistently excluded – by slavery, Jim Crow, or other, more subtle maneuvers (Key 1949; Mickey 2015).

In the southern tip of Africa, European settlers never gained the demographic hegemony they enjoyed in North America. However, the demographic balance was quite different across the various British colonies. Europeans were a much higher share of the population in Cape Colony than in Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State (Curtin et al. 1995: 293). Consistent with the patterns found in the US, Cape Colony established the most liberal suffrage laws, a (formally) race-blind policy that was maintained for several decades after independence within the rubric of the
Union of South Africa (Curtin et al. 1995: 437-8; Edgecombe 1978; McCracken 1967). As in the US, blacks were allowed to play a role in politics only where their role was subordinate, and this, in turn, was a product of demography.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Jews – mostly Ashkenazi, originating in areas controlled by the Holy Roman Empire – settled in Palestine, forming the social base of what would become a British Mandate (1922-) and eventually a Jewish state (1948-). This small area of predominantly European settlers has been the most democratic region of the Middle East throughout the twentieth century, despite the exclusion of many of the original inhabitants. Here, as elsewhere, “Democracy is constituted and functions as ‘a defensive democracy,’ a political system designed to deter and to outlaw highly menacing groups” (Smooha 2002: 478).

The connection between race and responsible government was also apparent in British colonial policy throughout the era (Albertini, Wirz 1982; Ward 1976; Wight 1946). Fieldhouse (1966: 261-2) comments: “The greater part of the new British Empire has been excluded from ‘responsible government’ on the principle that non-Europeans could not run a parliamentary system, partly because they were uneducated, partly because they were not European.” That said, there was considerable variation across the colonies. If, based on the demography of a colony, London viewed it as “white man’s country” the colony was likely to be granted a legislature and a high degree of self-governance. If, however, there were few white settlers London was likely to maintain direct control. Southern Rhodesia, with a sizeable white settler community, followed the first route while Kenya, with a much smaller settler community, followed the second (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 454, 467). Likewise, rights of political participation for non-Europeans were extended quickly in societies with few non-Europeans (e.g., to the Maori in New Zealand), more slowly in societies with larger numbers of minorities (e.g., in the United States), and slowest of all in societies with majority non-European populations (e.g., Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Caribbean).

French colonialism featured direct rule, which prohibited self-government. However, those colonies with the highest concentrations of French settlers were integrated into the metropole as departments with full rights of suffrage and representation – at least, for those with French citizenship, which in practice was generally reserved for those with European heritage. This was the practice in Algeria (Choi 2016), Cochinchina (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 199), and in the four historic communes of Senegal (Johnson 1971). In the latter, whites did not compose a majority of the electorate but were nonetheless able to monopolize power through most of the colonial period with the assistance of Creole allies (Ibid.).

Portuguese imperial rule was also highly centralized, and colonists had even less power over their own affairs. However, whatever semblance of representation existed – often taking the
form of municipal councils (Boxer 1965) – existed primarily for whites (Newitt 1981: 171-74). Albertini, Wirz (1982: 422) report that “wherever there was a white colonial population of any size, it was organized as a council (concelho), having representative organs and some administrative autonomy.” The situation was similar within the small German Empire (Townsend 1966: 277). Again, the colony with the most settlers – Southwest Africa – enjoyed the greatest measure of self-governance (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 411-2).

Spanish colonies in the New World did not allow for extensive political rights until the waning years of the colonial era, though local governments (cabildos) gave representation to those who could claim Spanish heritage (Halperin 1981: 51-55, 84-92). Once the heavy hand of the Spanish crown was lifted, one finds a strong association between European-ness and early suffrage. Within Argentina, Buenos Aires, where European settlers were most heavily concentrated (Moya 1998), was the only province to recognize universal male suffrage in 1821 and to maintain that practice in subsequent decades (Alonso 1996: 182; Sabato 2001). Across nation-states, Argentina, the most European in demographic composition, was the first to adopt universal male suffrage (in 1856), preempting other Latin American countries by many decades (though Colombia briefly recognized the practice from 1853-1886). Likewise, throughout most of the past two centuries democracy has been more robust in the European-dominated Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) and in the one country in Central America with a large European inheritance (Costa Rica).

In summary, across the colonial and post-colonial eras, one finds few signs of democracy anywhere except in the presence of European colonists (Fieldhouse 1966; Reinsch 1906: chs 11-12; Ward 1976; Wight 1946). This was a product of directives from the metropole as well as pressure from the colonies. The latter, of course, became dominant once colonies gained independence, but played a role – often a dominant role – throughout the life of a colony. Although these two forces sometimes came into conflict with each other with respect to the appropriate treatment of non-whites, there was general agreement on the question of democracy. Whites (Europeans) were capable of it while non-whites were not. Consequently, the metropole’s perspective hinged upon demographic realities on the ground, just as it did for settlers. The logic of empire was not so different on this particular point from the logic of independence.

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4 We do not mean to suggest that Argentina in the nineteenth century was a model democracy. Restrictive naturalization procedures disqualified recent immigrants from suffrage and elections were by no means free and fair (James 1995).
Regression Analyses

The narrative analysis presented above indicates a strong relationship between European demography and democracy during the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods. In the following sections, we explore this relationship over a longer period of time and with larger samples.

Our principal measure of regime type is the Electoral democracy (“polyarchy”) index developed by Teorell et al. (2018) as part of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2018). Other measures are employed in subsequent tests to demonstrate robustness and to illuminate different dimensions of democracy. To facilitate comparisons, all indices are transformed to a 0-100 scale.

Specifications used in the following analyses vary in order to probe different assumptions about the data generating process. A few background variables are treated alternately as potential confounders and potential instruments. This follows from our ignorance about the data generating process, which so far as we can tell is open to different interpretations. While there is no obviously “correct” specification, we believe that there are a limited number of plausible specifications, most of which can be tested. To conserve space, detailed descriptions of each variable employed in the following analyses are placed in Table E.1 and descriptive statistics in Table E.2.

Time-periods extend from 1789 to the present. All models include year or decade dummies, a convenient way to control for time-effects of no theoretical interest. Standard errors are clustered by polity, an important feature given the high degree of temporal auto-correlation.

We include both colonies and independent countries, wherever possible. However, since measures of democracy usually focus on independent states these polities dominate most of our samples.

While most studies of European diffusion focus on the non-European world we include Europe in our benchmark sample, motivated by the assumption that whatever factors might be at work elsewhere ought to apply to Europe as well. Europe constitutes a small part of the sample so its impact on the analysis is not great. To make sure, we construct sub-sample tests focused exclusively on the non-European world.

Initial Analyses

Table 1 presents an initial set of tests. In Model 1, democracy is regressed against European ancestry along with year dummies. In Model 2, we add several geographic covariates that have been shown to be strong predictors of democracy and economic development: harbor distance (Gerring et al. 2018b) and latitude (La Porta et al. 1998). In Model 3, we add a measure of early
(pre-modern) democracy based on data gathered in the Ethnographic Atlas (Giuliano, Nunn 2013), measures of the share of the population that is Muslim and Protestant, and an index measuring the duration of English colonial rule (Olsson 2009). Model 4 includes all previous variables along with oil income per capita (Haber, Menaldo 2011), GDP per capita (Farris et al. 2017), and a vector of nine regional dummies.

Coefficient estimates for European ancestry are fairly stable across these specifications and t statistics are well above the usual thresholds for statistical significance. Granted, estimates attenuate somewhat as covariates are added to the model, and standard errors increase in Model 4, presumably because of the smaller sample (due to list-wise deletion of missing observations). We regard Model 2 as a “spare” benchmark and Model 3 as a “full” benchmark, to be replicated in subsequent tests. Model 4 is less satisfactory by virtue of missing data and probable endogeneity among the covariates. Note, in particular, that if the presence of Europeans contributes to economic development, as many researchers have argued (op. cit.), then per capita GDP must be treated as a downstream factor whose inclusion in the model runs the risk of post-treatment bias.

The variable of theoretical interest, European ancestry, changes slowly through time for most countries and is unlikely to be affected by the outcome (democracy). Nonetheless, it is important to establish that the findings are robust to different lags of the predictor. In Model 5, right-side variables are lagged 100 years behind the outcome. In Model 6, we maintain the 100-year lag while restricting the outcome to a single year (2000). Note that if European identity was more clearly defined and operationalized in historical eras (Section II), one may have more confidence in these estimates than in models where right- and left-sides of the model are measured contemporaneously.

In Model 7, we adopt a fixed-effect approach to estimation, which should help to overcome specification problems inherent in cross-sectional analyses. Here, democracy is regressed against European ancestry (lagged by two decades) along with country and year dummies. This model presents a similar estimate and is highly significant. We regard this as a robustness test, not a benchmark model, as changes in European ancestry are infrequent and heavily trended and thus less appropriate for a mode of analysis focused entirely upon within-country variation.

Model 8 returns to the “full” specification (Model 3), this time with standardized coefficients (and unclustered standard errors). The goal here is to compare, albeit in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, the impact of various factors on democracy. We are especially interested in alternate paths of long-term diffusion from Europe, namely Protestantism and English colonial rule – both of which have garnered a great deal of attention from scholars (op. cit.). It will be seen
that a one-standard deviation change in European ancestry has a much larger apparent impact on regime type than either of these alternate pathways. It should also be noted that neither pathway is robust (at standard thresholds of statistical significance) in previous tests shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Initial Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lag (years)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>20</th>
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<td>Model</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European ancestry (%)</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
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<tr>
<td>(11.99)</td>
<td>(6.92)</td>
<td>(5.00)</td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(3.73)</td>
<td>(3.40)</td>
<td>(2.00)</td>
<td>(45.00)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harbor distance</td>
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<td>-2.56e-3*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01**</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3.26)</td>
<td>(-2.52)</td>
<td>(-0.83)</td>
<td>(-1.93)</td>
<td>(-2.08)</td>
<td>(-14.97)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latitude</td>
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<td>6.53</td>
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<td>(3.05)</td>
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<td>(-0.29)</td>
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<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(19.06)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early democracy</td>
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<td>7.50**</td>
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<td>8.67</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
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<td>(2.15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant (%)</td>
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<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3.31)</td>
<td>(3.31)</td>
<td>(3.09)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td>(29.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim (%)</td>
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<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
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<tr>
<td>(-5.30)</td>
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<td>(-4.59)</td>
<td>(-4.07)</td>
<td>(-29.40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>English colonial duration</td>
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<td>2.36e-3</td>
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<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(7.41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil income per cap</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(5.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per cap (ln)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(6.70)</td>
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<td>√</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country dummies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>166</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>23,108</td>
<td>18,185</td>
<td>17,586</td>
<td>12,454</td>
<td>8,375</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>23,108</td>
<td>17,586</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.5524</td>
<td>.5588</td>
<td>.6233</td>
<td>.6291</td>
<td>.6017</td>
<td>.5482</td>
<td>.5166</td>
<td>.6233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. Ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors – except Model 8, which employs standardized coefficients and unclustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

To get a sense for what the coefficient estimates for European ancestry might mean in the real world, we estimate predicted values for democracy as the share of Europeans changes based on the spare benchmark specification. These estimates, surrounded by 95% confidence intervals, are shown in Figure 2. It will be seen that a country whose share of Europeans increases from 0 to 100 is estimated to gain about 35 points on our 100-point index of democracy.
Predicted values of democracy (measured by the Polyarchy index) as European ancestry changes, based on estimates from Model 2, Table 1, with covariates set at their sample means. The gray area surrounding the point estimate corresponds to the 95% confidence interval.

**Temporal Relationships**

To explore how the relationship between European ancestry and democracy might change over time we execute a series of rolling regressions. Here, the sample is restricted to a 30-year moving window starting in 1800 and continuing to the end of the period. As an outcome measure we employ the Lexical index of electoral democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015), whose coverage is superior to Polyarchy and thus more representative of the population of interest. We again adopt a spare specification, including only geographic covariates and annual dummies.

Figure 3 graphs the coefficients for European ancestry over time, showing that the relationship peaks, as hypothesized, in the twentieth century, with a dip in the interwar years (corresponding to the breakdown of democracy in continental Europe), a recovery in the postwar years, and a steep decline at the end of the century during the third wave of democratization.
**Figure 3: Rolling Regressions**

Rolling regressions in which the Lexical index of electoral democracy is regressed against European ancestry, geographic covariates (latitude and harbor distance), and annual dummies in a moving 30-year window. Coefficients for European ancestry, flanked by 95% confidence intervals, are graphed for each year (the end-point of each 30-year window).

**Alternate Measures of Democracy**

In Table 2, we test alternate measures of democracy. This includes a few composite indices along with measures intended to capture particular dimensions of democracy. A secondary objective is to expand the time-horizons of the analyses so as to include colonies and semi-sovereign countries, which we attempt to follow back to the late eighteenth century. For each outcome, we test two specifications (based on the spare and full models in Table 1).

Models 1-2 in Table 2 focus on male suffrage, the approximate percentage of enfranchised male adults older than the minimal voting age, as measured by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018) for the twentieth century and by Bilinski (2015) for the nineteenth century. These analyses are restricted to years prior to 1920, when there was considerable variation in suffrage laws.

Models 3-4 focus on the presence of elections based on the V-Dem electoral regime index, which measures whether regularly scheduled national elections are on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent (Coppedge et al. 2018). Where possible, we extend this variable to cover colonies in the nineteenth century.

Models 5-6 focus on electoral contestation as measured by a contestation index developed by Gerring et al. (2018a). For each year, a polity receives a score calculated as the incumbent share
of votes in national elections (parliamentary and/or presidential) minus the share received by the largest challenger, subtracted from 100. A score of zero is assigned if there are no elective offices at the national level or if elections are interrupted.

Models 7-8 utilize the Lexical index of electoral democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015). Models 9-10 focus on the wellknown Polity2 index from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers 2016).

Estimation is by ordinary least squares except Models 5-6, which utilize a tobit model appropriate for outcomes that are bounded at zero. Year dummies are included in all models except Models 5-6, where they are replaced by decade dummies.

These tests show a strong and robust relationship between European ancestry and democracy. Indeed, virtually all coefficient estimates are higher than those estimated with the Polyarchy index (Table 1). Again, we find non-robust results for alternate measures of European diffusion – Protestantism and English colonialism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Alternate Measures of Democracy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European ancestry (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor distance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant (%)</td>
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<td>Muslim (%)</td>
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<td>English colonial duration</td>
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<td>Decade Dummies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome: democracy, measured in various ways and transformed to a 0-100 scale (with the exception of Elections, which is binary). Estimators: as indicated, t statistics in parentheses, clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10
Sub-Sample Analyses

In Table 3 we explore various sample restrictions. Models 1-2 are limited to non-European cases. Here, the causal factor of interest can operate only by diffusion. Model 1 adopts the full specification while Model 2 adds several additional variables intended to measure stateness, which may serve as an impediment to European conquest – and also, perhaps, to democratization (Hariri 2012).

The next tests focus on the distribution of the data for European ancestry. Recall that this distribution is bimodal (Figure 1), so it is important to establish that our results are not contingent upon a set of extreme cases. Model 3 is restricted to cases where Europeans composed less than eighty percent of the population, eliminating Europe as well as neo-Europees in the New World from the sample. Model 4 is restricted to cases where Europeans composed greater than ten percent of the population, eliminating cases (many of them in Asia and Africa) where Europeans were a slight presence.

The final set of tests focus on colonizers with largest numbers of ex-colonies: Britain (Model 5), France (Model 6), and Spain (Model 7). These are important comparisons since they hold constant the colonizer – and also, to some extent, the period of colonization and the regions of the world that were colonized. (British colonization spanned the centuries and most parts of the world, while Spanish and French colonization was somewhat more focused.)

Estimates for European ancestry from all tests in Table 3 are robust and comparable to (indeed, somewhat stronger) than the corresponding benchmark models in Table 1. Although standard errors are reduced wherever there is a significant reduction in sample size, t statistics surpass usual thresholds of statistical significance.

In additional tests we remove each region of the world, seriatim. The relationship between European ancestry and democracy is remarkably stable in these sub-sample tests, as shown in Table F.1.
In Table 4, we take a different approach to the problem of causal identification, modeling assignment to treatment with exogenous instruments. These analyses are limited to non-European cases, as the instrument attempts to model the spread of Europeans beyond Europe.

As a principal instrument we rely on population density in 1500, which served as a barrier to European migration and – more importantly – to demographic dominance, as discussed in Section I. Model 1 offers a minimal specification with only the IV and decade dummies. Model 2 adds geographic covariates. Model 3 adds additional covariates, following the full specification in Table 1 with the addition of pre-colonial state history (drawn from Putterman, Weil 2010) and years since

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Non-European polities</th>
<th>Non-European polities</th>
<th>European ancestry &lt;80%</th>
<th>European ancestry &gt;10%</th>
<th>British hegemony</th>
<th>French hegemony</th>
<th>Spanish hegemony</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European ancestry (%)</td>
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<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.05)</td>
<td>(7.27)</td>
<td>(4.97)</td>
<td>(3.22)</td>
<td>(4.98)</td>
<td>(9.06)</td>
<td>(3.33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor distance</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.58e-3</td>
<td>2.08e-3</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-2.82)</td>
<td>(-2.69)</td>
<td>(-3.32)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(-0.60)</td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.42)</td>
<td>(-0.34)</td>
<td>(4.13)</td>
<td>(-0.74)</td>
<td>(-0.19)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td>(-1.51)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early democracy</td>
<td>6.77**</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>7.99***</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.57)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(2.98)</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(-0.40)</td>
<td>(-0.20)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant (%)</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.30***</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.62)</td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
<td>(4.04)</td>
<td>(3.02)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (%)</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.08*</td>
<td>-0.09****</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>2.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-4.08)</td>
<td>(-1.84)</td>
<td>(-3.98)</td>
<td>(-2.10)</td>
<td>(-2.40)</td>
<td>(-0.37)</td>
<td>(3.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English colonial Duration</td>
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<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>7.66e-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.58)</td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State history</td>
<td>10.97**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2.01)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State formation, years since (ln)</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(-0.58)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence, years since (ln)</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(-0.83)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year dummies</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. Ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

**Table 3: Sample Restrictions**

**Instrumental Variable Analysis**
*independence* (a proxy measure of stateness). Estimates for European ancestry are robust across all three models and consistent with the corresponding benchmark models in Table 1.

In common with all non-randomized instruments, it is impossible to verify the assumptions underlying our IV analysis. Nonetheless, it is plausible to suppose that the exclusion restriction has been satisfied conditional on observed covariates. Note that population density may proxy for state strength, which could also serve as a deterrent to European influence (Hariri 2012) and to democratization (Andersen et al. 2014). With this confounder in mind, we condition on two factors intended to measure state strength in Model 3.

Reassuringly, other possible instruments show similar results. In Appendix F, we replicate Model 2 with a variety of other geographic or pre-modern historical variables commonly viewed as influences on European settlement – distance from London (squared), settler mortality, malaria, years since agricultural transition, and state history. The relationship between European ancestry is robust with each of these alternate instruments, as shown in Table F.2. No matter what instrument is chosen, European ancestry predicts higher levels of democracy. While assumptions required for any single model may be questioned, the aggregate set of results seems to offer strong support for our thesis.
Table 4: Instrumental Variable Analysis

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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS 2SLS</td>
<td>OLS 2SLS</td>
<td>OLS 2SLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European ancestry (%)</td>
<td>0.32** (2.06)</td>
<td>0.37*** (2.95)</td>
<td>0.32** (2.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density, 1500 (ln)</td>
<td>-7.83*** (-4.02)</td>
<td>-8.76*** (-5.16)</td>
<td>-7.59*** (-4.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor distance</td>
<td>-0.02*** (-4.18)</td>
<td>-0.01** (-2.51)</td>
<td>-0.01** (-2.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latitude</td>
<td>31.05** (2.22)</td>
<td>17.03* (1.91)</td>
<td>47.41*** (3.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence, years since (ln)</td>
<td>2.96*** (3.28)</td>
<td>-0.20 (-0.31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State history</td>
<td>-15.30** (-2.18)</td>
<td>2.36 (0.32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early democracy</td>
<td>5.35 (0.93)</td>
<td>8.14 (1.71)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant (%)</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.21)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (%)</td>
<td>-0.10** (-2.15)</td>
<td>-0.11** (-2.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English colonial duration</td>
<td>2.97e-3 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.02 (1.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decade dummies</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>11,921</td>
<td>10,626</td>
<td>7,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.2468</td>
<td>.4661</td>
<td>.6534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.3851</td>
<td>.4926</td>
<td>.6216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcome**: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. **Samples**: non-European cases. **Estimator**: two-stage least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

IV. Conclusions

As a form of governance at the state level democracy was a European innovation. It spread to the rest of the world during the colonial era, leaving a legacy that persists (in attenuating form) to the present day. In that racialized era, we argue that political outcomes depended upon a numbers game. The greater the ratio of Europeans to non-Europeans, the greater the likelihood that the latter would be granted full (or at least partial) political rights and the greater the likelihood that a democratic system of rule would materialize. We have shown that similar patterns obtained across colonies, across regions within countries, across countries, and through time.

We conjecture that this is because Europeans viewed democracy as a basic right – for themselves. It was a club good. Hence, where Europeans were in the majority they were democrats.
Where they were not they were indifferent or hostile, or they embraced a restricted form of democracy that excluded non-Europeans.

We argue that this demographic relationship peaked in the twentieth century and declined thereafter as a result of waning European power and prestige, the global diffusion of the democratic ideal, and the blurring or obsolescence of racial identities. If current trends continue (see Figure 3), regime outcomes may have little to do with European demography in the coming century.

This argument is relevant to ongoing work on the long-term diffusion of European ideas and institutions. Specifically, our analyses suggest that demography may be a stronger, more robust predictor of democracy than other potential pathways from Europe such as religion and colonialism. (Alternative accounts and alternative measures are explored in greater detail in Appendix G.)

Our argument is also relevant to ongoing work on the intersection of race and liberalism (Centeno 2007; FitzGerald, Cook-Martin 2014; Horton 2005; Rana 2011; Smith 1997). We have shown that the spread of democratic norms coincided with, and to some extent presumed, the norm of racial exclusion.
References


Black, Antony. 1984. Guild and state: European political thought from the twelfth century to the present. Methuen.


of Chicago Press.


Wight, Martin. 1946. *The Development of the Legislative Council, 1606-1945*. Faber, Faber.


Appendix A: Additional Sources

Colonialism, Settler Societies, Race, European Migration, Democratization


Census Data, Racial Classifications


**Data Sources for European Ancestry Variable**


*Annuaire général.* 1927-. Paris: Larousse.


Data Sources for Easterly, Levine (2016)’s European Ancestry Variable

Castro, Rodolfo Baron. 1942. *La poblacion de El Salvador*. Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez De Oviedo


Appendix B: European Ancestry, Territory Graphs

This appendix includes data on European ancestry (as described in the text) for 237 territories that enjoyed some degree of self-rule (not necessarily formal independence) at some point from 1600 to the present. Note that these territories are excluded from analyses if there is no corresponding data for the outcome of interest, democracy. This means that data points for years prior to 1789 and for many non-sovereign territories and micro-states are excluded. Note also that territory names used in the following graphs are those currently attached to these entities. Many territories have historic names that we do not reproduce here.

Territories here are defined according to modern boundaries. Every effort was made to match historical definitions of countries and territories from the original sources to these modern definitions. In cases where multiple territories were combined into a single country, population estimates (both European and total) were also combined. In cases where a single territory was split into multiple countries, the calculated European ancestry (European population as a percentage of total population calculated prior to smoothing) was duplicated for each resulting territory. In a handful of cases where modern boundaries were not the result of either a join or split, it was necessary to both aggregate and split.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Ady &amp; Hazlewood (1965: 10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertini &amp; Wirz (1982: 153)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertini &amp; Wirz (1982: 202)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertini &amp; Wirz (1982: 299)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertini &amp; Wirz (1982: 409)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albertini &amp; Wirz (1982: 428)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alesina et al. (2003)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrews (2004: 155)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrews (2004: 207)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrews (2004: 41)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belich (2009: 26)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belich (2009: 28)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bender (1978: 20-21)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosma (2007: 526), data received from the author via personal communication</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA World Factbook</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark (1936: 34-5)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coglan (1902: 530)</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Curtin et al (1995: 293)</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 234;</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 254;</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 273;</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 453; the author does not trust these numbers, which were constructed by John Galindo for the Royal Geographical Society and which were used by Squier. Both authors agreed that the percentage of whites was too high.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 527; one has to be careful here, since white could be born in SLV and not europeans</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Cáceres (2000) -- p. 3;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Census -- web</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Constantino (1975) -- p.122; &quot;&quot;&quot;&quot;by the middle of the 19 century&quot;&quot;&quot;&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Cook and Borah (1974) -- p. 197;</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Cook and Borah (1974) -- p. 208-209; excludes West region; totals taken from table A, others from column 5 in B,C,D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Cook and Borah (1974) -- p. 214-215; Totals constructed from data in A column 2 and B column 4;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Dawson (1925) -- p.27</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Dunn (1973) -- p. 155;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Dunn (1973) -- p.88; from census 1680</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Engerman (2000) -- p.499; includes indians</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly &amp; Levine: Gann and Duignan (1962) -- p.160; Appendix</td>
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</table>
Easterly & Levine: Gann and Duignan (1962) -- p.165; Appendix
Easterly & Levine: Gootenberg (1991) -- p. 111; database uses total pop from p. 11, which is slightly different; euroshare in that case 0.126565812
Easterly & Levine: Jones (1994) -- p. 166-167; Estimated by author; Whites is really Spaniards and Ladinos
Easterly & Levine: Jones (1994) -- p. 166-167; Estimated by author; Whites is really Spaniards, blacks and mulattos
Easterly & Levine: Mamalakis (1980) -- p. 8;
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 300; African component 100%
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301 (African Component, 80%)
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301; African component 33%
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301; African component 66%
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301; African component 75%
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301; African component 90%
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (78) -- p.337; Population from Maddison
Easterly & Levine: Merrick (1979) -- p. 29;
Easterly & Levine: Ominde (1968) -- p.85
Easterly & Levine: Ominde (1975) -- p. 41, table 3.1
Easterly & Levine: Ominde (1975) -- p. 48, table 3.7; this figures are only for citizens
Easterly & Levine: Ominde (1975) -- p.4, total; p.45, europeans
Easterly & Levine: Rivarola and Heiseke (1969) -- p. 13; the year is not determined with 100% assurance
Easterly & Levine: Rogers (1962) -- p. 12; Table 1; total populations are estimates, although European shares are given by author.
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p. 186
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p. 186;
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p. 87;
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.3;201;
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.112; only Antigua
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.117
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.120; only Trinidad
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.163;
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.186;
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.68
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 20; Total and non-white population given; whites assumed to be others not reported
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 20; Total and non-white population given; whites assumed to be others not reported; use reported values of panama plus canal area
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 36; the author gives a total of 400000, but this is not equal to the sum of the values he gives for the decomposition
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 36; the author gives a total of 800000, but this is not equal to the sum of the values he gives for the decomposition
Easterly & Levine: Sanchez-Albornoz (1973) -- p. 135; Quito only
Easterly & Levine: Time (1942) -- web
Easterly & Levine: Toussaint (1977) -- p. 96
Easterly & Levine: UN Bulletin (1965) -- p. 48-49
Easterly & Levine: UN Bulletin (1965) -- p. 48-49; Whites and Mixed
Easterly & Levine: UN Bulletin (1965) -- p. 48-49
Easterly & Levine: UN Bulletin (1965) -- p. 48-49; Whites, Mixed and Asian
Easterly & Levine: Vazquez Rial (1999) -- p. 59; Only population of Buenos Aires
Easterly & Levine: Vazquez Rial (1999) -- p. 60; Number of foreigner per each 100 natives during the era of immigration
Easterly & Levine: Vergara Velasco (1892) -- p. DCLXII-DCLXIII
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 173; total population and % white and blacks from census
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 173; total population and % white and blacks from census, In database used for 1769,
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 183; total population and % white and blacks
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 196;
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 212; only Antigua
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 253; Only percentages given
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 238 (all male between 20-30 years)
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 253; only Tobago
Encyclopedia Britannica
Etemad (2015: 41)
Gann & Duignan (1962: Appendix)
Giliomee, Elphick (1979: 360)
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 178)
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 188)
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 3)
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 328)
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 8)
Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 235)
Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 240)
Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 245)
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http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/united-states-virgin-islands-population/ 126
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https://www.worldstatesmen.org 129
Kateb (1998: 92) 130
Knight (1978: 238-39) 131
Krujitzer (2008: 132) 132
Krujitzer (2008: 137) 133
Kuczynski (1937: 13) 134
Kuczynski (1937: 17-21) 135
Kuczynski (1937: 22-23) 136
Kuczynski (1948, 1949, 1953) 137
Last Observation Carried Forward 138
League of Nations (1941: 24) 139
Lützelschhab (2013: 149) 140
Maddison (2001: 235) 141
Maddison (2001: 87) 142
Maddison (2003: 71) 143
Maddison (2003: 76) 144
Martin (2013: Appendix III) 145
McCacken (1967: 1) 146
Nobles (2000: 105) 147
Penvenne (2005: 86) 148
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Robinson, Glenn (Personal communication with authors dated October 9, 2018) 150
See Section II in text 151
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US Census 153
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Watts (1987: 313) 155
Watts (1987: 316) 156
Watts (1987: 318) 157
Watts (1987: 320) 158
Watts (1987: 321) 159
Wikipedia 160
Appendix C: European Ancestry, Maps
Appendix D: European Ancestry, Convergent Validity Tests
**Table D.1: Correlations among Indices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternate index</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Pearson's r correlation</th>
<th>Included in European Ancestry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly, Levine 2016</td>
<td>1600-1800</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly, Levine 2016</td>
<td>1800-1900</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3232</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puttermann, Weil 2010</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s $r$ correlation of European ancestry (authors) with alternate indices, focusing on the year(s) in which the alternate index is measured.
Appendix E: Data Description
### Table E.1: Variable Descriptions

**Agricultural Transition.** Estimated years in thousands since the transition to an agricultural society. *Source:* Woodberry (2012), agritrans


**Contestation.** Incumbent-challenger formula of electoral contestation, calculated as the incumbent (the party with the largest share of votes in the previous election) share of votes in a national legislative or presidential election minus the share of the largest challenger, subtracted from 100. *Source:* Gerring et al. (2018a). *Scale:* interval. inc_chall_combined

**Distance to London.** Distance in kilometers (logged) from country capital to London. *Source:* Gleditsch (2002). dist_to_london_km

**Early democracy.** A measure of early democratic characteristics in societies prior to the arrival of Europeans. The variable is calculated by the authors as the sum of the values of two variables: “election or other formal consensus” and “informal consensus.” *Source:* Giuliano, Nunn (2013) drawing on Murdock (1967). *Scale:* interval. murdock_dem

**Elections.** The electoral regime index (v2x_elereg) is coded 1 from when there was a presidential or parliamentary election, if it was not aborted, until there was an interruption through the executive or legislature. An electoral interruption is i) an event that dissolves, replaces, or otherwise terminates an elected body executive or parliament or ii) an event that implies that the elected body, while still intact, will not be subject to election in the future. Typically, an interruption is the product of a coup, declared state of emergency, or military defeat. After an interruption, a coding of 0 continues until another election occurs. An executive and a legislative electoral regime cannot be separated since they form an integral part, where an aborted legislature is interpreted as a signal that also the executive is not standing for election any longer, and vice versa. *Source:* V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016), supplemented by the authors. *Scale:* binary. v2x_elereg_jg

**English colonial duration.** Number of years of English colonial rule. *Source:* Olsson (2009), supplemented by the authors. *Scale:* interval. durbritain_new

**European ancestry.** European share of the population as calculated by the authors based on multiple sources. For territories outside continental Europe, we mark the date of the first recorded European settlement or (if the latter is unknown) the first European contact (discovery). This is coded as zero (no Europeans), forming the first data point in the series. For territories within continental Europe, we record the number of Europeans as 100% in 1950. This estimate is extended back to 1789. For the remaining time-period (after the point of first European contact for non-European territories and after 1950 for European territories), we use a quadratic function to estimate yearly data points across available data points. *Source:* see Appendix A. *Scale:* interval. eur_pct_est_smooth


**European colonial duration.** Number of years of European colonial rule. *Source:* Olsson (2009). *Scale:* interval. duration_global

**Early state history (pre-1500).** State antiquities index up to 1500. *Source:* Brockstette and Putterman (2007) provided in dataset from Hariri (2012). statehist_pre1500


**GDP per cap.** Gross domestic product per capita in constant 1990 dollars, based on data from the Maddison Project (Bolt, van Zanden 2014), supplemented by estimates from Bairoch (1976), Broadberry (2015), Broadberry/Klein (2012), Gleditsch (2002), and the WDI (World Bank 2016), which are combined.

Harbor distance. Mean distance in kilometers within a territory to the nearest natural harbor. Natural harbors are considered one of four types (coastal natural, river natural, river basin, or lake/canal) as defined by the World Ports Index (NGIA 2017). Source: Gerring et al. (2018b). Scale: interval. portidst_natural_km


Inequality. Distribution of income expressed as a Gini coefficient (aka Gini index, Gini ratio). Missing data is imputed, as follows, using linear models (a reasonable imputation procedure in this instance given the stickiness of the variable of interest). Step 1: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated. Step 2: Missing data from the last recorded data point to 2012 (less than a decade in all cases) is filled by repeating the last observation. Measure is based on data from UNU-WIDER (2017). Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016). Scale: interval. e_gini

Latitude. The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1). Source: La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997). Scale: interval. lp_lat_dabit

Lexical index of electoral democracy. An ordinal index measuring the electoral components of democracy in a cumulative fashion. That is, to qualify for a given level (0-6) all previous conditions must be satisfied. 0 = No elections. (Elections are not held for any policymaking offices. This includes situations in which elections are postponed indefinitely or the constitutional timing of elections is violated in a more than marginal fashion.) 1 = Elections with no parties or only one party. (There are regular elections but they are non-partisan or only a single party or party grouping is allowed to participate.) 2 = Multi-party elections for legislature. (Opposition parties are allowed to participate in legislative elections and to take office.) 3 = Multi-party elections for executive. (The executive is chosen directly or indirectly – by an elected legislature – through elections.) 4 = Minimally competitive elections for both executive and legislature. (The chief executive offices and the seats in the effective legislative body are – directly or indirectly – filled by elections characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to win government power.) 5 = Male or female suffrage. (Virtually all adult male or female citizens are allowed to vote in elections.) 6 = Universal suffrage. (Virtually all adult citizens are allowed to vote in elections.) Source: Skaaning et al. (2015) and extended by the authors. Scale: ordinal. lexical_index


Male suffrage. A measure that covers de facto enfranchised adults and not de jure. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted, male suffrage may still be 100. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) and extended by the authors with data from Bilinski (2015). Scale: interval. v2msuffrage_I

Muslim. Share of population that is muslim by heritage (%). Source: authors. Scale: interval. Muslim

Neolithic transition. Years prior to 2000 in which Neolithic transition is estimated to have occurred. Source: Putterman and Trainor (2006) as provided by Hariri (2012). agri_transition

Oil income per capita. The aggregated real value of a country’s petroleum production, as a share of total population. Source: Haber, Menaldo (2011). Scale: interval. e_Total_Oil_Income_PC


Protestant. Percentage of population belonging to a Protestant Christian denomination. To complete the time series, countries were assigned a value of 0 in the year prior to the arrival of the first Christian missionaries and then filled using linear interpolation. Observed data points come from the Correlates of War Project (Maoz 2013) and Woodberry (2012). Source: Calculated by authors. Scale: interval. chrstprotpct

Regions. A vector of dummies: Europe (Western and Eastern), America, Caribbean, MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, Pacific. Source: Authors. Scale: nominal. e_regionpol


State history. History of stateness calculated at 100-intervals from 0 AD to the present with one percent depreciation rate. Source: Bockstette, Chanda, Putterman (2002). Statehistn01

Year. Calendar year.

Years since independence. Number of years since independence (de facto or de jure) or 1000 (whichever comes later). Source: Calculated by authors. Scale: logarithmic. indep_yrs_since

Years since state formation. Number of years since state formation. Source: authors. Scale: logarithmic. state_early_yrs_since
### Table E.2: Descriptive Statistics

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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Appendix F: Robustness Tests
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<th>MENA</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
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<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
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<td>0.31***</td>
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<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.01**</td>
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<td>19.72**</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>21.71***</td>
<td>21.50***</td>
<td>22.90***</td>
<td>21.95***</td>
<td>23.20***</td>
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<td>(2.33)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
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<td>(3.02)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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</table>

| Countries | 152 | 153 | 126 | 125 | 168 | 163 | 166 | 170 | 169 |
| N         | 14,596 | 15,996 | 13,908 | 13,494 | 17,477 | 17,127 | 17,348 | 17,780 | 17,754 |
| R2        | .5599 | .5806 | .5406 | .5144 | .5646 | .5581 | .5652 | .5598 | .5651 |

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. Ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10
### Table F.2: Alternate Instruments

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<th>4</th>
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<td>2SLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>2SLS</td>
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**Outcome:** democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. **Samples:** non-European cases. **Estimator:** two-stage least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10
Appendix G: Alternative Accounts
Having set forth a European-ancestry account of democratization it is time to consider several alternatives.

In attempts to explain long-run economic development political institutions often play an intermediary role. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (“AJR” 2001, 2002) argue that the contribution of Europeans to economic development operates through “good institutions,” operationalized with an indicator of property rights measured in the late-twentieth century. This argument runs parallel to our own, but is conceptually (and empirically) distinct.

A second argument hinges upon labor supply. Engerman, Sokoff (2012: ch 4) distinguish between labor-poor and labor-rich societies, arguing that in the former political institutions are apt to be more inclusive so as to attract migrants. It seems evident that in some settings governments grant suffrage and other political and civil rights and landowners offer enhanced wages in order to encourage immigration. However, in other settings labor scarcity is dealt with by restricting labor mobility (serfdom) or forced migration (slavery). Divergent experiences may be found in Europe after the Black Death (where Western Europe followed the a liberalizing strategy and Eastern Europe a coercive strategy [Engerman 2014: 37]) and in the Americas during the 17th–19th centuries (where labor-poor areas away from the equator followed a liberalizing strategy and labor-poor areas near the equator followed a coercive strategy). This seems to be a case of extreme causal heterogeneity, where – due to some unidentified moderator – a single causal factor has contrary effects. In any case, we find no discernible relationship between population density and democracy when tested in a crossnational sample (results available upon request).

A third issue concerns the role of geography in conditioning global migration and mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly, Levine 2016; Engerman, Sokoloff 2012; Glaeser et al. 2004; Mahoney 2010; Putterman, Weil 2010). These factors are featured in our theoretical account (Section I) and represented in our empirical models by latitude, harbor distance, and a vector of regional dummies (Table 1). However, “geography” is a complex of causes and there are many ways it might affect the variables of theoretical interest, perhaps serving as a confounder.

To mitigate this concern we include a battery of additional factors in tests shown in Table G.1. These include settler mortality, malaria ecology, indigenous mortality, soil suitability, precious metals, and biogeography. We also test inequality (proxied by the gini coefficient of income inequality), which appears as a key intermediary variable in many accounts of long-term development (e.g., Engerman, Sokoloff 2012). Results demonstrate that few of these factors has an appreciable impact on the outcome of interest in the full specification. More important, for present purposes, these covariates do not attenuate the estimated effect of European ancestry on
democracy. Thus, although we cannot discount the possibility that some unmeasured geographic factor might serve as a confounder, we cannot readily identify what this factor might be.
Importantly, the differential performance of these factors

A final issue to consider are the many and various alternate pathways from Europe to the world that might have served to diffuse concepts and practices of democracy. We argue that the demographic pathway was more potent than other potential pathways including those based on religion (Protestantism) or colonial control (British). We choose British colonial duration because this variable out-performs other measures of colonialism in tests conducted by Olsson (2009). We choose Protestants as share of the population because this variable, unlike others provided by Woodberry (2012), is measurable across the period of observation and across the world (not merely outside Europe), and hence is congruent with our research design. We supplement coding of both of these variables so as to be testable across a global sample that extends back to 1789 (see variable descriptions in Table E.1).

### Table G.1: Geography and Inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European ancestry (%)</td>
<td>0.43***</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor distance</td>
<td>-5.18e-3*</td>
<td>-4.66e-3</td>
<td>-3.15e-3</td>
<td>-2.93e-3</td>
<td>-4.43e-3</td>
<td>-5.30e-3**</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-2.12)</td>
<td>(-1.73)</td>
<td>(-1.30)</td>
<td>(-1.08)</td>
<td>(-1.80)</td>
<td>(-1.98)</td>
<td>(-3.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latitude</td>
<td>-10.19</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>22.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-1.31)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early democracy</td>
<td>-1.86</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>5.41*</td>
<td>5.19*</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>9.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.71)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
<td>(1.66)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant (%)</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.89)</td>
<td>(2.75)</td>
<td>(2.69)</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
<td>(3.15)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
<td>(2.60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (%)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.37)</td>
<td>(-2.10)</td>
<td>(-1.63)</td>
<td>(-0.98)</td>
<td>(-2.13)</td>
<td>(-1.10)</td>
<td>(-3.28)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>English colonial duration</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler mortality</td>
<td>-1.51</td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria ecology</td>
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<td>(0.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous mortality</td>
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<td>(2.48)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil suitability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precious metals</td>
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<td>(2.79)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Biogeography</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>Countries</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>8,978</td>
<td>12,210</td>
<td>12,504</td>
<td>11,744</td>
<td>12,504</td>
<td>9,451</td>
<td>5,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.6955</td>
<td>.6157</td>
<td>.6224</td>
<td>.6156</td>
<td>.6266</td>
<td>.6674</td>
<td>.5558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcome:** democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to 0-100 scale. **Estimator:** ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10
remains in narrower tests, e.g., when the sample is restricted to the non-European world (Table 3) or when the outcome is measured only in the contemporary era (Model 6, Table 1).

Granted, these complex causal factors might be operationalized differently. To further probe alternate pathways from Europe we conduct additional tests focused on other variables drawn from recent work on these subjects. This includes an indicator of colonial rule that measures the duration of colonial control for all European powers, not just England (Olsson 2009), and a measure of indirect rule constructed by Lange (2004) and extended by Hariri (2012).

For each variable, we adopt two specifications – one based on Model 2, Table 1, and the other based on Model 4, Table 1 (excluding Protestantism and British colonial rule so as to avoid problems of collinearity). All tests are restricted to non-European cases, in conformance with conventional formats.

These tests show that alternate pathways from Europe carry the expected signs – colonial rule is positively associated with democracy and indirect rule negative associated with democracy. However, neither relationship is especially strong judging from t statistics. By contrast, the relationship between European ancestry and democracy retains strength in all tests and estimates are comparable to corresponding models in Table 1.

To be clear, we are not arguing that other pathways of European influence are irrelevant to the fate of democracy. However, the crossnational evidence suggests that demography is probably a more important – or at any rate, a more consistent and long-lived – factor in conditioning regimes in the modern era.
Table G.2: Alternate Measures of European Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European ancestry (%)</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.14)</td>
<td>(3.09)</td>
<td>(4.22)</td>
<td>(2.95)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonial rule</td>
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<td>0.03**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect rule</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.71</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.56)</td>
<td>(-0.80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor distance</td>
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<td>-3.22e-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.21)</td>
<td>(-0.69)</td>
<td>(-0.81)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latitude</td>
<td>16.92**</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.86</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.53)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early democracy</td>
<td>10.11***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.37)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.85)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource income</td>
<td>-8.37e-4***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-4.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (ln)</td>
<td>6.73***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.36)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year dummies</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region dummies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
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<td>86</td>
</tr>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>9,900</td>
<td>6,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
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<td>.5510</td>
<td>.5743</td>
<td>.5921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. Ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10
Appendix H: References


Engerman, Stanley L. 2014. “Slavery, serfdom and other forms of coerced labour: Similarities and


