Why Is European Union Defence Integration Difficult To Achieve?

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Abstract

This thesis utilises the inter-governmentalism theory and the content analysis method to critically analyse the reasons why defence integration is difficult in the EU. The main primary empirical source for this thesis is the 2017 EU Council decision establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The research gap identified in this research is that PESCO is a new EU Council Decision passed in December 2017 and this PESCO has not been widely studied since it’s newer. As such most of the debate in this thesis is dominated by researching the positives and drawbacks of PESCO in relation to EU defence integration. However the PESCO document alone cannot answer the main research question of why EU defence integration is difficult to achieve. As such secondary sources like academic articles are used to answer the research question. The main research focus is mostly on current defence issues and not the history of defence. In endeavoring to find answers to the main question of why defence integration is difficult in the EU, I looked at sub-questions related to the pros-and-cons of PESCO; the pros-and-cons of NATO; the effect of European defence clusters on EU efforts at defence integration; institutional challenges in the EU; the sovereignty issue and examples of the strategic positions of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the CSDP. The new contribution I hoped to make was to try to link these arguments to the recent defence integration developments based on PESCO. The topic is complex and challenging but necessary for policymaking.
Abbreviations
CARD – Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CESDP – Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy
EDA – European Defence Agency
EDF – European Defence Fund
EEC - European Economic Community
ERRF – European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy
ESS – European Security Strategy
EU: European Union
EUCOM – European Union Commission
EUGS – European Union Global Strategy (Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy)
EUMS – European Union Military Staff
FGB- Franco-German Brigade
FNC – Framework Nations Concept
HRVP- High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission
MPCC – Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDPP- NATO Defence Planning Process
NIP - National Implementation Plans
PESCO- Permanent Structured Cooperation
TEU – Treaty of the European Union
TFEU – Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
USA – United States of America
US EUCOM- United States European Command
Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Theory, Research Question, Data and Methods .......................................................... 4
Chapter 3: Literature Review: Challenges in defence integration---------------------------------- 10
Chapter 4: PESCO: The opportunities and challenges for defence integration-------------------- 15
Chapter 5: Impact of NATO and USA on EU defence integration------------------------------- 26
Chapter 6: Sovereignty makes defence integration more difficult to achieve---------------------- 30
Chapter 7: Decision-making, infighting, fear of mission failure and disunity slows integration--- 33
Chapter 8: Germany, France, United Kingdom and Defence Clusters as examples------------------- 36
Chapter 9: Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 40
References------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 43
Chapter 1: Introduction

Aim of this study: analysing the problem of achieving EU defence integration.

Despite decades of efforts to develop security and defence cooperation in the EU, it remains clear that defence integration is an agonisingly difficult area for the EU. After all, one of the endogenous motivating factors for the EU when she thinks of security is that the fundamental objective of the European project “was to bind together the fates of Europe’s core nations in a way that would both render intra-European war unthinkable and maximize European influence in the outside world” (Howorth, 2017: 347). Defence integration is one of the steps that can quickly reduce the possibility of intra-European war. Nevertheless integration of the EU’s defences has lagged behind in comparison to areas like economic, monetary and legal integration. This research thesis wishes to find out the reasons why defence integration has been so difficult for the EU to realise.

From the 13th of November 2017 the EU announced the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) widely reported in the media as the EU defence pact. The PESCO notification was send by 23 Member State ministers to the High representative and to the Council for a decision to be made. “On 11 December 2017, the Council adopted a decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), less than a month after receiving a joint notification by member states of their intention to participate. The 25 member states participating in PESCO are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden” (European council press release, 11.12.2017). The List of Ambitions (LoA) outlined by HRVP Mogherini in PESCO clearly show that a full-fledged EU defence integration is a sensitive and challenging case (PESCO Notification, 2017). Using the inter-governmentalism theory we will see how PESCO confirms the inter-governmentalist argument that states are central deciders on how defence integration will progress.

It has to be emphasised from the start that this research focuses mainly on discussing defence integration rather than security integration. A brief distinction between defence and security is therefore warranted. It was not easy to find literature devoted only on EU defence without mentioning security and defence together. Since I realised that security and defence are almost always lumped together it becomes necessary to define these two terms so that understanding the difficulties of integration in EU defence can become more visible.

Defining of Security

Bendiek noted that ‘there is a clear legal separation between the defence Union and the security Union’- ‘the security Union is predominantly driven by the Commission and focuses mainly on new issues in internal and judicial policy, but also aims to interlink internal and external security’ (Bendiek, 2016: 16 SWP RP11) and the security Union is based on the concept of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ)’. For example the 2015 European
Agenda on security regards organised crime, terrorism, and cyber criminality as security challenges. Bendiek goes on to say that the main legal basis of the security Union is article 67 TFEU subject to article 4 paragraph 2 of the TEU and article 72 of the TFEU which create the AFSJ. Examples of Security issues outlined within the AFSJ framework are counter-terrorism, radicalisation, data banks, information exchanges, infrastructure protection, tightening gun laws, data protection, policing, border management, hate speech and illegal content (Bendiek, 2016: 16-17 SWP RP11). These security areas as defined by Bendiek are better integrated in the EU than areas that fall in the definition of defence.

**Meaning of Defence**

In contrast the defence Union is a political project proposed by foreign and defence ministers (Bendiek, 2016: 16 SWP RP11). This definition quickly reminds us the inter-governmentalist argument on state actors as central actors in defence policies. A November 2016 European Parliament report on future military cooperation within the EU called for any newly created defence Union to enable the interlocking of national armies and to transform battlegroups into standing units (European Parliament, 30.11.2016). Here we see that defence has more to do with soldiers, with armies, as opposed to security which has more to do with police and intelligence operatives. The European Parliament report also mentioned issues like cooperation in arms procurement. A 2016 EU Commission European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) called for sufficient capacity building for military operations (EDAP, 30.11.2016). The European Defence Agency (EDA) is expected to help in areas like for example in-flight refuelling, remote-controlled aviation systems, satellite communications and cyber defences (Bendiek, 2016: 18). The EU’s European Defence Fund (EDF) is intended to support joint research into defence technologies (Beckmann and Kempin, 2017). Other defence items mentioned in different EU documents include helicopter software, unmanned aviation systems, mobile reconnaissance robots for urban warfare and common industrial norms in defence (Bendiek, 2016: 18).

In summary the differences between security and defence issues as outlined by these authors is that security in more aligned to police duties whilst defence is more related to military items. This research’s focus is on the defence challenges inherent in EU integration. Since the core of this research pertains to “defence integration” it is necessary to briefly lay out the meaning of integration in the context of European integration studies.

**Meaning of integration**

Ernst Haas defined integration in the Uniting of Europe (1958) by saying that ‘integration equals the formation of a new political community. In the process of integration, national political actors were persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities for a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the national states’ (Haas, 1958, pp.4-5). Oxford dictionary states that ‘European integration is the formation of European states into the world’s closest regional association, which has assumed many of the characteristics of the statehood’ (in Ladic, 2018: 5). Based on the definition by Haas, defence
integration will mean that national armies have to shift their loyalties to a new EU center with jurisdiction over national armies. The reality is that this is not the case in the EU today. It shows that defence integration is difficult but Larrabee (2004:67) and de Wijk (2004) argue that the only way to increase European military capability is a greater degree of European defence integration (in Ojanen, 2006:73). Defence integration is therefore a vexing enterprise for the EU and the reasons for these difficulties are what this research attempted to answer using the inter-governmentalist theory and sub-research questions related to this theory. Let us talk about what inter-governmentalist theory is and how the thesis research questions are base intertwined to the theory. But first, I outline a brief on the organisation of the study and then a discussion of the theoretical framework follows.

**Organisation of the study**

The study is about finding out the reasons why defence integration in the EU is difficult. The paper started by outlining the research aim of the study and defining key concepts like defence, security and integration. The following chapter 2 will outline the theoretical framework and link it to the research questions since the theory will guide the data collection that will answer the research question. Chapter 2 will also briefly explains the research design, data and methods. Chapter 3 is a literature review discussing what previous literatures have said on the issue of defence integration. This chapter also use literature review to justify the need for doing more research in defence integration. Chapter 4 focuses on PESCO and analyses the potential opportunities and difficulties connected to the future of defence integration in the EU within the PESCO framework. Chapter 5 discusses how NATO and USA can be problems and opportunities in the quest for an EU defence Union. Chapter 6 discusses how sovereignty is an obstacle in efforts aimed at EU defence integration. Chapter 7 discusses causes of defence integration difficulties like decision-making challenges, disunity, fear of mission failures and lack of trust between Member States. Chapter 8 gives examples of how major decision-making powers like Germany, France and United Kingdom impact defence integration and discusses why defence clusters are mushrooming outside the EU framework. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by summarising the reasons that make EU defence integration difficult and by reshowing how the inter-governmentalist theory answers the research question of this study.
Chapter 2: Theory, research question, data and methods

This thesis is not about theory testing but rather about using the inter-governmentalist approach to explore an empirical problem. There are many theories of European integration but I will use inter-governmentalist theory to discuss the paper’s research question. Inter-governmentalist theory gives a glimpse of the complexity of why defence integration is a difficult enterprise for the EU.

Meaning of Inter-governmentalist theory

Inter-governmentalists argue that European integration is a standard process of inter-state bargaining with a view to furthering the national interests of member states (Howorth, 2017: 344). Stanley Hoffman (1966) argued 50 years ago that integration would not and could not be happen in the area of ‘high politics’ of which defence was the ultimate example. Another inter-governmentalist, Andrew Moravcsik (1998), argued that although other types of social actors can bargain at the international level for more policy coordination, ultimately, key decisions will always be taken by states and once again security and defence coordination is seen as unintegratable (in Howorth, 2017: 344). In 1993, Moravcsik wrote that the principle of inter-governmentalism suggests a process of rational bargaining in negotiations, where each Member State seeks to defend the ‘national interest’ and lays down ‘red lines’ which it will not be prepared to see crossed (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). Hatton and Sonny (2015) summarised their understanding of inter-governmentalist theory by writing that “Inter-governmentalism emphasises the role of the nation state in integration, and argues that the nation state is not becoming obsolete due to European integration” and Alan Milward, argued that the national governments of the Member States were the primary actors in the process of European integration, and rather than being weakened by it as some of their sovereignty was delegated to the EU, they become strengthened because in some policy areas it is in the Member State’s interest to pool sovereignty. Hatton and Sonny further stated that Inter-governmentalist also argue that periods of radical change in EU integration can be explained by convergence of Member State interest and periods of slow integration occurred when the government’s preferences diverge and they cannot agree (Hatton and Sonny: 2015 ). Based on these explanations of the meaning of inter-governmentalist theory, I think that the main reasons for the difficulties of integrating defence in the EU are because of EU Member States who are central drivers of NATO, of sovereignty, of defence clusters, of PESCO, of militaries and of decision making.

So, in line with the inter-governmentalist theory the main research question is “Why is European Union defence integration difficult for the EU to achieve?” To tackle this question the following sub-research questions which will help in categorising and analysing relevant data. These sub-research questions are as follows:

Sub research questions

1. What are the reasons behind the difficulties in defence integration in the EU?
2. In what ways, if any, can PESCO be considered a turning point in EU defence integration?
3. In what ways, if any, can PESCO be considered a drawback in EU defence integration?
4. Does the existence of NATO make EU defence integration less important and less pressing for EU Member States?
5. Why are defence-clusters emerging outside of the EU framework, and what are their implications for the EU defense integration?
6. How does sovereignty impact defence integration in the EU?
7. How do the roles played by Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the EU help us to understand the challenges in EU defence integration?

The inter-governmentalist approach attempts to answer these questions by raising issues to do with national interests of member states (Howorth, 2017: 344), integration difficulties in ‘high politics’ (Hoffman, 1966); states as key decisions makers with national interests (Moravcsik 1993 and 1998) and states as the primary actors in the process of European integration and pooling of sovereignty (Alan Milward quoted in Hatton and Sonny, 2015). Even though PESCO is approved by the EU council and reviewed by the HRVP together with others, it is clear that, in line with arguments in the inter-governmentalist theory, it is the EU Member States who are can make or break PESCO and ultimately it is these states who can make defence integration happen or sink.

It should also be born in mind that the liberal inter-governmentalist theory in this thesis is part of the larger inter-governmentalist theory framework that this research is based on. For the purpose of this study it was not necessary to split liberal inter-governmentalist theory from inter-governmentalist theory but instead both are taken under one umbrella. This is due to the fact that liberal inter-governmentalism is a development of the intergovernmental theory and was established by Andrew Moravcsik in his 1998 book called ‘The choice for Europe’. Like inter-governmentalism theory, liberal inter-governmentalism emphasises national governments as they key actors in the process of integration (Hatton & Sonny 2015). However, it also incorporates the liberal model of preference formation, whereby national governments have a strong idea of what their preferences are and pursue them in bargaining with other Member States. Liberal inter-governmentalists argue that the bargaining power of states is important in the pursuit of integration, and they see institutions as a means of creating credible commitments to make sure that other governments stick to their side of the bargaining. Liberal inter-governmentalists consider supranational institutions to be of limited importance, in contrast to neo-functionalists (ibid.). The liberal inter-governmentalist perspective can be utilised to explain the bargains made in the PESCO framework.

Another branch of the inter-governmentalist theory is the new inter-governmentalism theory which argues that traditional institutions of supra-nationalism have by and large accepted the dominance of intergovernmental policy shaping practices (Howorth, 2017: 345). Again for
the purposes of this research, the new inter-governmentalist theory is placed under the umbrella of the inter-governmentalist theory. The new inter-governmentalist argument still make states vital deciders on whether or not defence integration will be consolidated in the EU.

It should also be born in mind that the inter-governmentalist theory is not the only theory that can explain European integration. Neo-functionalism, post-functionalism and multi-level governance are some of the theories of European integration. Neofunctionalism focus on erosion of sovereignty by supranational actors (Hoffman: 1966) and argue that progress in one area give rise to calls for integration other areas (Hooghe and Marks: 314) and is concerned with day-day policy making (ibid. 314 &315) and says that economic gains lie behind calls for regional integration (ibid.315). Like postfunctionalism, neofunctionalism emphasise actors other than the states. Postfunctionalism says our understanding must go beyond economic interests of groups and elites (ibid.) but consider influence of communal identity (ibid. 311). Now, public opinion on integration affects states (ibid. 317). Maastricht brought referendums and politicians now fear election defeat if integration is not handled well (ibid.). Electoralization of integration has changed the process of decision making as a Eurosceptic, un-ignorable public has taken space from the elites (ibid.). Before, the elites ruled because the public was incapable (Haas: 1958). Hooghe and Marks note that political party debates are conducted in terms of identity (Hooghe and Marks 2008:327) with right wing parties aiming to get votes and oppose integration. The neofunctionalism years were under permissive consensus but the post 1991 period is under dissensus (ibid. 316). Now Identity has greater weight in public opinion and governments are now responsive to public pressures on European integration (ibid. 319). Hooghe and Marks seem to suggest that it is the electorate and mass politics which will affect the direction of integration and they will not beg the federal authority for help because EU issues are into national politics and national politics is into the EU now (ibid.321). Haas say the Left cries for a united Europe (Haas 1958:148) whilst Hooghe and Marks noted that right wing parties reject integration in favour of national sovereignty (Hooghe and Marks 2008:323). The writers agree that political parties play a role in the integration debate. They also agree that there is an element of advantage seeking. Haas point out that community formation is dominated by national groups who have specific interests and aims who turn to federal institution when profitable (Haas 1958 in Nelsen and Stubb 2014:148) whilst Hooghe and Marks noted that voter’s identity based decisions are also affected by consideration of advantages. The bottom line is that neo-functionalists and post-functionalists argue that there are factors beyond the national governments that affect the process of integration. Even the Multi-level governance theory clearly shows that numerous actors contribute to the European policy process, including but not solely, the state (Awesti, A. 2006:2).

The point here is that there are some perspectives who argue in contrast to inter-governmentalist theories. For example Howorth (2011:3) noted that “In virtually every case”, decisions on foreign and security policy “are shaped and taken by small groups of relatively
well-socialized officials in the key committees acting in a mode which is as close to supranational as is it to intergovernmental” (ibid.) He further noted that CSDP ‘decisions are actually shaped and formulated by a host of working groups and committees labouring away in the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the national capitals’ (ibid.:7). This is a position which argues for the role of institutions.

Despite these other alternative theories, that I will not dwell much on due to space constraints, I believe that the inter-governmentalist school offers us a better chance in understanding the reasons why defence integration is difficult in the EU. The other theories mentioned above are very useful when one wants to understand integration in socio-cultural-economic areas. But in the defence integration area, it is mostly the inter-governmentalist theory which proffers a better explanation and as such this theory guides the discussion in this research thesis. In addition to theory, research design and methods are critical components of any academic research.

**Research Design**
The case study is the European Union’s defence policy. I will focus mainly on the areas of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); NATO; Germany-France-United Kingdom; sovereignty and decision-making issues. The PESCO document and academic articles will help me to dig out why defence integration is a tricky item for the EU to achieve. My data gathering method is the content analysis method. I will analyse the language in the PESCO document and in relevant academic articles discussing EU defence in order to discuss why defence integration is difficult for the EU to achieve.

**Data, methodology and methods**
The analysis in this thesis is mainly based on the PESCO document and academic articles related to the study of EU defence. The text analysis method involves reading different texts, finding different arguments and then categorizing the data in order to sort the data in a way that can answer the research question. This is the approach adopted in this research.

I believe that a content analysis of PESCO decision, policy statements of Member States like the Germany white book on defence and secondary academic literature analysing PESCO and CSDP can, among others, assist with sufficient resources to answer the question of EU’s difficulties in defence integration. In this research, I don’t think interviews will provide me with data that will be significantly different from what I can find in relevant EU and Member State’s policy documents and different secondary publications. Content analysis is therefore the preferred method based on its advantages outline by scholars including Titscher.

In this research paper, I will, among others, analyse the EU PESCO decision and the impact of NATO and defence cluster on defence integration. I will analyse defence debates in related academic publications. Content analysis allows the sampling of cases (here the defence
integration case) and breaking down the case into units of analysis, categories and coding and analysis and evaluation (Titscher et al, 2000:58-61). The research thesis is made up of subheadings made through the process of coding and categorisation of themes based on readings of different academic articles on the case of EU defence integration.

I used the content analysis method but there are many other methods. It was possible to use other methods or combine different methods if the timeframe and space allowed it. Nevertheless methods like ethnography require that “all social research is based upon the human capacity for participant observation and the capability for reflecting upon it” (Titscher et al, 2000:90). The defence integration case I am analysing is not well suited for participant observation. Usually the EU issues policy documents and press statements which can also be best studied using the content analysis method. Ethnography is more suited when one is geared towards researching the cultural, anthropological and communication sectors. Content analysis method fit well with the European integration theories since it is possible to analyse the contents of EU policies like the PESCO decision and CSDP documents and academic articles and then compare the arguments and propositions in these papers. The European integration theories can thus be brought in to see how they match with the categorized data or how the theories can guide further data collection and analysis.

The EU defence policy is the case study. The thesis focused on debating the current EU defence integration challenges but not on defence policy progression. CSDP and PESCO are the drivers of the current EU defence policy and this is why the PESCO document is an important source. There is a complex relationship between PESCO and CSDP. CSDP has been studied a lot before and as such I will focus more on PESCO since it’s a new policy approved by the EU in 2018. The PESCO decision is new and not many secondary documents on the latest PESCO developments are available. However the 2018 EU PESCO decision has been a subject of interest in influential think tanks on EU (e.g. Politico, SWP Germany, Carnegie Europe, etc.). Think-tanks publications are a useful source of information on PESCO and defence integration.

The inter-governmentalist integration theory guided my data collection and analysis. In addition to theory and methods, issues of quality and validity are important in research.

**Issues of Quality, Validity and Ethics**

I tried to aim for quality arguments and discussions by attempting to use the content analysis method to categorize and sort my data in a tandem with the inter-governmentalist theory which I used as a data collection guide. This thesis is not about theory testing but rather about using the inter-governmentalism approach to explore the empirical problem of defence integration in the EU. Prior theories help to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 2009:18 and Godsater, 2013:24).
I tried to carry the aims and research questions of this paper throughout the discussion. I will not leave the research question and then go back to it after. Instead I attempted to walk together with research question through all stages of the writing process in order to make sure that I find answers to why defence integration is a challenge in the EU. This was an attempt to safeguards issues of validity and quality. The content analysis methods and the inter-governmentalist theories helps to answer what this research intend to answer and thereby hoping to take validity and quality into consideration.

Clearly citing my sources and references contribute with enhancing research validity as well as keeping in line with ethical and professional issues.
Chapter 3

Literature review: Challenges in defence integration

Most current and previous studies on the topic of defence integration in the EU have mainly been focused on combining security and defence into one bracket and these studies have been mainly on CSDP missions. In fact most studies have a focus on EU ‘security’ policy and less on ‘defence’ policy on its own right. But the political thinking of integrating defence in the EU is not knew in the EU even though there are less studies on defence than on security. For example Anderson noted that the idea of supranational European defence collaboration dates back to the very beginning of integration efforts in Europe after World War II when French Prime Minister Rene Pleven called for a European defence Community (EDC) and the creation of a European army under a supranational authority in October 1950, to be funded by a common European defence budget but this was never realised even though the ideas are arguably even more valid today (Andersson et al 2016:12). Thus the idea of defence integration has always been there but ‘more often than not, defence and military issues were the object of exceptions and derogation to the rules especially with regard to funding (no EU budget) and voting (no QMV) procedures (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:11). This ‘exceptionalism’ treatment of the defence area may have contributed to less focus on defence as compared to more focuses on security studies. However the Lisbon Treaty has changed the defence ‘exceptionalism’ from constraining to enabling provisions (ibid.). Here it can be seen that the area of defence is evolving. Building on these arguments, this thesis, shows the intergovernmentalist nature of problems curtailing faster defence integration in the EU. Even as recent as the 1990s the area of defence was considered sensitive. As Howorth noted, “any notion of an autonomous EU role in the field of security (let alone defence) remained virtually unthinkable for most of the 1990s” (Howorth, 2017: 343). Howorth goes on to say that there are tensions between Brussels and the national capitals in the area of security and defence policies (ibid.). Howorth is one of the established authors on EU who have started to shift more focus to defence integration and as such this paper developed further based on his different propositions. In this 2017 article Howorth briefly traces the stagnant developments in EU defence in the 1990s but he says that “beginning in 1999 after the ground breaking Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo, the EU progressively sought to develop an autonomous capacity in security and even – at least on paper- defence policy” (ibid.). Based on Howorth we see that security, as opposed to defence, received much earlier attention from the EU. However in recent times further steps in EU defence and security policy were necessitated by external factors like the prospect of the US military disengagement from Europe and the re-emergence of insecurity and instability on the EU’s periphery (ibid.347). Factors like these are spurring a move towards defence integration in the EU. But still the EU continues to face obstacles in terms of achieving Rene Pleven’s dream of a defence Union as he suggested in 1950.
Furthermore Zimmerman and Dur (2016) said that despite progress in the area of security and defence policy, there are huge questions to be answered. They point out the following concerns: they say that there are questions about the EU’s will and capacity to become a fully-fledged military actor. There are concerns related to the lack of credible capabilities given the shrinking defence spending in Europe, technological limitations, divergent strategic outlooks and cultures among member states, as well as the fear of decoupling from and duplication of NATO. Kagan (2003) said that Europe is essentially mired in a culture which prevents the development of real military capabilities and he further says that the EU made efforts at creating credible military capability structures through the CSDP- but this is facing challenges from many sceptics including member state governments which are hesitant to transfer decision-making power in defence matters to the EU (see Zimmerman and Dur, 2016:220). Concerning this CSDP, Menon (2016) postulated that the CSDP has failed in its ambitions and Ojanen (2016) argues that there are pros and cons of the CSDP. This research contributes to the arguments raised by these authors. Menon and Ojanen’s articles focused on the CSDP and this is typical of many studies which have studied EU defence by focusing on CSDP yet the CSDP cannot be deployed inside the EU. We see also that there are diverging views on outcomes of EU CSDP policies. This research joins this debate and tries to contribute by shading more light on challenges faced in EU defence integration.

Other attempts to study the defence field have been done through analysing EU foreign policy. For instance some have argued that the intergovernmental character of foreign policy co-operation is frequently made responsible for the failure of EU to produce collective decisions (cf., for example Nuttal 1997:19 & 2000:35; Pottering 1990:342; Rummel 1997:372 in Wagner, 2003:577). A Howorth (2011) article looks at decision making in security and defence in the CSDP framework. Although this article is useful, it is only limited to the aspect of decision making dilemmas in security and defence issues in the EU (Howorth, 2011). This thesis contributes to a more understanding of challenges in EU defence integration by building on these arguments from existing literature.

Previous and current literatures also help to justify why it is necessary to study the subject of defence integration in the European Union.

**Justification of the study based on Literature review**

The reason why the topic of defence integration in the EU is vital is because of the fact that defence matters. Different writers on European studies agree with this view and so do I. For example Wæver (1996:123-125) argued that Europe can perhaps exist only if it has a defence identity, and is a recognised actor in the international area (in Ojanen, 2006:71). On a similar note Anderson et al (2016:31) argued that ‘no single European country is able to manage the violent conflicts, hybrid warfare challenges and sophisticated cyberattacks now taking place in and around Europe on its own”. They further note that defence cooperation is needed if Europe is to be a global security actor in its own right (Ibid.37). In unison, Posen argued that the EU should prepare itself to manage autonomously security problems on Europe’s
periphery to have a voice in settlement of more distant security issues, should they prove of interest and the EU realise that military power is necessary to have such an option (Posen 2006:150-151; also Posen 2004 & Rynning, 2011:26). It is therefore important to understand why defence integration is difficult for the EU. Moreover it can also be pointed out that the lack of attention on EU defence integration studies justifies the necessity to do researches like this thesis as a way of shedding more light on the significance of this area.

There are few studies on defence integration and this thesis contributes with more analysis

Supporting the arguments on lack of studies on defence, Howorth wrote that “scholarship on European integration has traditionally focused on just about every policy area except defence and security policy” (Howorth, 2011:5). Similarly, Ojanen says that there was an absence of security and defence policy from the process of European integration (Ojanen, 2006:59) and that not even the Maastricht treaty of 1991 or the Amsterdam treaty of 1997 convinced anyone that there was a real intention to proceed in the field of defence integration- the CFSP existed merely on paper (Ibid. 60). On the defence aspect of CSDP, Andersson et al commented that while there is broad convergence inside the EU on the common security aspect of CSDP, there is much less convergence on the possible scope of common defence policy aspect of CSDP (Andersson et al 2016:5). It can therefore be seen than the defence aspect of EU integration is complicated. Due to the significance of defence, this area is now starting to receive attention from both academics and the EU itself. This thesis is motivated by the need to contribute to this area which is getting renewed attention from the EU.

Defence integration is becoming more important in its own right

The European Global Strategy on Security (EUGS) was born in 2016 and this “EUGS has injected unforeseen dynamism into security and defence policy, as a field hitherto largely unaffected by moves towards European integration and communitisation” (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 1). A year after launching the EUGS and in September 2017 EU commission President, Juncker forwarded a timetable setting 2025 as the deadline for creating a ‘fully fledged European defence Union’ (Juncker, 2017 SOU Address). Juncker has may be realised that ‘there is widespread concern over the current state of European defence and that the complexity of defence cooperation cannot trump the overarching benefits for collective action as Robert Axelrod put it (Andersson et al 2016:5). Based on these developments, it is clear that defence integration in now an important subject. After two decades of strategic timeout, ‘defence matters’ now as European leaders are once again pressed to focus on how to defend their territories, citizens and open societies (Ibid.9). As a result researchers need to understand the reasons why it is difficult for the EU to integrate in the area of defence.

Using the inter-governmentalist theory; data from EU PESCO policy document and academic literature, the analysis section below answers the research question of why defence integration is difficult for the EU to achieve. Using the content analysis method, I gathered and analysed different arguments (from literature and the PESCO documents) that support and or oppose some of the reasons that explain why EU defence integration is difficult. As such the
following section outlines the reasons why EU defence integration is a difficult and challenging agenda for the EU to achieve. The following analysis section provides therefore the answers to the thesis research questions.
Analysis: Reasons Why Defence Integration in the EU Is Difficult

This section answers the research question by outlining and critically analysing the reasons why defence integration is a difficult assignment for the EU to achieve. In summary the reasons why EU defence integration is difficult are connected to inter-governmentalist theory explanations related to defending national interests; defending national sovereignty by member states; the influence of NATO on EU defence; challenges of decision-making in EU defence issues; disunity amongst EU member states; EU’s fear of failure; the normative-ness of the EU; costs and lack of trust in the area of defence amongst EU Member States.

The PESCO decision was passed by the EU in December 2017 and was finalised in early 2018. As promised in the research questions, I will analyse how PESCO can hinder defence integration and how PESCO can spur defence integration. In analysing the role of NATO, I also looked at the pros and cons of NATO in EU defence integration. By so doing one will be analysing the difficulties in the area of defence integration.

To make the picture clearer, I have used the example of the positions of Germany, France and United Kingdom on defence issues to demonstrate the inter-governmentalist explanations related to national interests and sovereignty as well as to demonstrate how defence integration is possible if the influential EU Member States choose to cooperate. These are the issues that I will now discuss before the conclusions come at the end of the paper. I will start with discussing PESCO, then the NATO/USA impact, then the issue of sovereignty, followed by issues of decision-making, disunity, fear of deployment failure and lack of trust before giving the examples of Germany, France, United Kingdom and defence clusters. The final chapter is a conclusion summarising the thesis.
Chapter 4

PESCO: The opportunities and challenges for defence integration

Different writers have described the PESCO as a possible game changer for European defence cooperation (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:5) whilst others have said that PESCO can be seen ‘as a trailblazer for the defence Union’ (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 2) due to the various ambitions outlined in the PESCO document. On 11 December 2017 the Council adopted a decision establishing PESCO with 27 EU Member States participating (Council press release 765/2017). Since PESCO is a decision it is important to know what a decision means. According to Hartley “A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them” and a decision is different from a directive in that it can be addressed to an individual as well as a Member State. In the Grad Case (case 9/70) [1970], the Court of Justice of the EU decided that decisions can be directly effective (Hartley TC, 2014: 205). The significance of this is that if PESCO is a decision (of which it is) then it should be binding on those who are participating. This is probably why others have described PESCO as “a ‘sleeping beauty’ of EU defence” awakened by events the “Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, countless terror attacks in Europe, migration crisis, shift in USA foreign policy and the United Kingdom Brexit among others (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:7). Due to the sensitivities of defence issues it has been emphasised that PESCO is not about placing defence capabilities under the control of EU and is not about excluding non-PESCO members (Ibid.50). The contradictions of PESCO are that it is a ‘decision’ but not under the control of EU and PESCO is inclusive but also exclusive. It is therefore necessary to analyse ways in which PESCO can be a motivator and possibly an obstructer of EU defence integration.

What is PESCO?
The PESCO document and its annexes are long. Here will be a brief explanation of the main contents of PESCO. Quoting from Fiott et al, PESCO include two components: binding commitments and specific projects. ‘Commitment’ means that those joining PESCO commit to increase defence budgets, having deployable units, participate in joint equipment programmes within European Defence Agency (EDA) and participate in at least one specific project (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, and 2017:8). PESCO projects are aimed at reaching capability and operation dimensions assessed by Member States themselves and the HRVP, EDA and EEAS through reporting (Ibid.). The December 2017 Council Decision on PESCO lists 17 collaborative projects which are: European medical command; European secure software defined radio; network of logistics Hubs in Europe and support Operations; military mobility; EU training mission competence centre; European training certification centre for European armies; energy operational functions; deployable military disaster relief capability package; maritime autonomous systems for Mine countermeasures; harbour and maritime surveillance and protection; upgrade of maritime surveillance; cyber threats and incident
response information sharing platform; cyber rapid response teams and mutual assistance in
 cyber security; strategic command and control system for CSDP missions and operations;
 armoured infantry vehicle / amphibious assault vehicle / light armoured vehicle; indirect fire
 Mentioning all the 17 PESCO projects can help in availng a picture of what
 PESCO is really about. As can be noted from these projects, PESCO sounds like defence as
 opposed to just security issues. PESCO was introduced under article 42(6) of the Treaty of
 Lisbon. It allows for Member States ‘whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and
 which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the
 most demanding missions’ to cooperate more closely than the EU27 context permits (Kempin
 and Kunz, 2017:7; PESCO council decision 2017; and Beckmann and Kempin, 2017:1).
 PESCO may be initiated in the CFSP with a qualified majority and in this process PESCO can
 be linked to the EU framework through the HRVP and EDA (von Ondarza, 2013:9). Thus
 even if Member States voluntarily make commitments to another through joining PESCO, it
 is important to note that PESCO is linked to the EU framework as von Ondarza reminds us.
 ‘Under the Treaty of Lisbon the purpose of permanent structured cooperation is not solely to
 strengthen the operative capabilities of member states: it should be seen as the first step on the
 road to a European Defence Union’ (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 2). If this is to go by,
 it can be argued that PESCO can significantly change the future of EU defence if its
 intentions are successfully executed. At the same time, a reader of PESCO can see some
 aspects in PESCO which are positive and some aspects which sound possibly constraining in
 terms of aiming for defence integration. As such I will now turn to a discussion about the
 ways in which PESCO can spur and or hinder defence integration in the EU. In other words,
 the following paragraphs discuss the pros and cons of PESCO and by so doing; I will be
 answering the two sub-research questions, viz:

 1. In what ways, if any, can PESCO be considered a turning point in EU defence
 integration?

 2. In what ways, if any, can PESCO be considered a drawback in EU defence
 integration?

 These two questions help in digging out the reasons why defence integration is challenging
 for the EU, which is the main research question. PESCO allows for Member States ‘whose
 military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to
 one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’. This statement exposes
 the differentiation aspect in PESCO and this differentiation can have both enabling and sidelin-
ing effects in terms of achieving EU defence integration.

 **PESCO can spur defence integration through Differentiated integration**

 Differentiated integration is “the state in which the uniformity and simultaneity of integration
 of all Member States is more or less restricted by temporary or permanent exceptions” (von
 Ondarza, 2013:7) and in the EU “increasing differentiation presents an enormous challenge to
 the further development of the EU” (Ibid.5). But at the same time: “differentiation has proven
 to be an effective means of overcoming political impasses – but with the exception of the
European Social Charter, no differentiated integration project to date has succeeded in bringing all of the EU Member States together again” (Ibid.:7). Based on von Ondarza it can mean that PESCO is differentiating between those Member States ‘whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria” and those who do not fulfil the higher criteria. It is difficult to know if those members who fulfil the higher criteria will one day be reunited with those who are excluded. PESCO is a special form of differentiated integration which is concentrated on developing military capabilities, while decisions about CSDP operations remain subject to all EU countries (Ibid. 9). Von Ondarza says that no differentiated integration project to date has succeeded in bringing all of the EU Member States together again: So can PESCO run the risk of splitting EU Member States in the area of defence forever? This is possible but considering that more than 25 EU Member States have joined PESCO (except Denmark due to opt-out under article 5 of protocol nr.22 TEU and TFEU and United Kingdom which is leaving the EU), there is a better chance that, if followed correctly, the PESCO agreement can help to spur integration in the defence field in the EU.

I agree with the view that differentiated integration is one of the ways which can most likely produce positive movements towards defence integration. For instance Menon wrote that ‘PESCO is intended to enable the Union to tackle capability deficits head on by allowing smaller groups of states to go further and faster absent political will on the part of all governments’ (Menon, 2011:80). Lack of political will is precisely one of the reasons why defence integration has been relatively stagnant in comparison to other areas. Differentiated integration in the defence area under PESCO offers a better chance to address obstacles of the past. As an example we can see that Schengen started with few like-minded states before being embraced by more Member States and was incorporated into the treaty itself- the same logic can be applied to defence through PESCO by starting with Member States who share the same vision and objectives (Andersson et al 2016: 6). This sounds reasonable. Even many decades ago Robert Schuman explained that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity” (EU Commission, 2017:4 in Ladic, 2018: 5). Using historical lessons, it is now clearer that differentiation will be the primary method of European integration going forward especially considering the difficulties in enacting further EU treaty reforms (von Ondarza, 2013:7). These views are also shared by Fiott et al when they pointed out that PESCO amounted to the most flexible template to date for deeper cooperation among some Member States in a(ny) specific policy area- not just defence due to PESCO’s less prescriptiveness in terms of participating Member States and triggering procedures (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:18). I agree with these views. The differentiation aspect of PESCO can indeed promise to make a difference. In addition to differentiation issues another defining aspect of PESCO is its accountability framework and its aim for irreversibility and its permanence framework (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:8 & 43) and it being implemented along the ‘hub-and-spoke’ rather than ‘pioneer group’ model (Ibid. 21). These are the positive prospects of PESCO. However “the criterion for entering PESCO shows contrasting exclusive and inclusive tendencies of PESCO. There is an agenda oriented on ambitious exclusive
projects and an inclusive model to prevent the emergence of a multi-speed Europe in security and defence policy (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 2). Thus despite the positives associated with the differentiating dimensions of PESCO, one should also bear in mind that there are some aspects of PESCO that can hinder defence integration and these are part of the reasons why defence integration is difficult for the EU to achieve.

How PESCO can also derail defence integration

Differentiation and opt-outs dynamics in EU defence integration policies present difficulties in the quests to achieve defence integration in the Union. For instance with the Lisbon Treaty, the number of opt outs reserved by individual Member States has continued to rise – because the opt-outs are set down in protocols to the EU treaties, they can only be established or rescinded through treaty change (though a state can retreat from its opt-outs unilaterally as per primary law) (von Ondarza, 2013:10). This von Ondarza assertion is valid since opt-outs have the effect of dis-integrating instead of integrating all members. In the area of defence, Denmark is an example of permanent differentiation, which is a situation whereby the goal of unified integration is abandoned in some or all areas while only smaller groups of Member States move forward is a specific area - thus we see that the Danish non-participation in the CSDP is almost an example of permanent differentiation (Ibid.). Even if smaller groups succeed in moving forward, like in the euro monetary zone, the effect is still lack of full integration of all Member States. In the defence field it can be argued that PESCO is more closer to the Europe a la carte concept- which implies an EU that is defined by intergovernmental agreements in which states are key players and maintain control over their individual treaties ad are able to determine which substantive issues they will participate in based on their capabilities and political interests (Ibid. 8 & 9). In this scenario the success of PESCO is hinged on the willingness of Member States to implement defence integration. Willing states can move forward with PESCO but “any process of differentiated integration carries the risk of marginalising the ones that are not part of the avant garde’ and ‘non PESCO members will be confronted with this risk’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:35). So, despite the positives, differentiated integration is one of the reasons why defence integration is difficult in the EU. We have to remember that PESCO will not be legally binding and that defining things that are ‘necessary’ will be a question of interpretation and the general prudence of Member States vis-a-vis the use of force will not be easily overcome (Ibid. 38). Historically these are the same scenarios that have prevented the achievement of defence integration in the EU. It is hoped that in PESCO a ‘combination of commitments made and peer pressure will incentivise decision-makers to contribute to operations and simultaneously raise the cost of defection’ (Ibid.) but relying on peer pressure is not sufficient enough to achieve defence integration though it helps in conjunction with other measures. Moreover, in PESCO ‘no enforcement mechanism has been established: state’s sovereign decisions remain the norm’ (Ibid.39). Thus the inter-governmentalists are right when they say that the nation states remain the central decision makers in EU defence matters, not the EU institutions. To
add to the challenges presented by opt-outs and negative differentiation, the fitting of NATO into PESCO is not that very clear.

**Challenges in linking PESCO and NATO**

PESCO is about improving EU defence capabilities but we also know that NATO has always historically been the pillar of EU defence. It is also a fact that currently 22 states are members of both NATO and the EU (Helwig, 2018:1). EU and NATO have always been working on ways to work together though there have been uncertainties. For instance “while their joint declaration of July 2016 commits to deepening cooperation, the document contains no indication of how PESCO, CARD, and EDF should distribute defence functions between the EU and NATO without duplicating structures (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 3). Thus we see that some EU countries like the United Kingdom have been pro-NATO and not supportive of EU defence initiatives outside NATO in fear of duplication of roles, among other things. Yet some countries like Germany are of the view that “the EU could align PESCO more closely with the objectives of NATO” in line with the Germany idea of an inclusive EU defence policy’ (Helwig, 2018:1). In addition we see that “NATO allies that are participants of PESCO will also want to ensure coherence between what they develop under PESCO and what they have agreed to under the 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration and the related 42 action points (of which defence capabilities and industry and research are crucial)” (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:50). So there are diverging views inside the EU Member States themselves on how PESCO and NATO should work together. The United Kingdom will remain an important factor in EU defence even if it leaves the EU since she will be a strong voice in NATO in alliance with the USA. To calm these concerns on the PESCO-NATO uncertainties, “the EU emphasizes that PESCO does not compete with NATO’ and that the aim of PESCO is to develop national military capabilities that can be deployed under either the EU, NATO or UN flags (Helwig, 2018:3). What we learn here is that the EU has to deal with these complexities in order to make defence integration in the EU progress forward. For example agencies like the European Defence Agency are going to be used to link PESCO to the EU framework as part of the multifaceted efforts to connect PESCO to the EU.

**European Defence Agency (EDA) and PESCO**

According to PESCO council decision (2017) the HRVP, the EU military staff (EUMS) and the EDA shall jointly provide the necessary secretariat functions of PESCO and be a single point of contact. We see therefore that PESCO is linked to the EDA. EDA was created in 2004 to improve European defence capabilities via the promotion of research and technology, armaments cooperation and creation of a European arms market and is made up of 28 defence ministers and is thus prey to the whims of the national ministers who control it (and who for several months failed to appoint a chief executive) (Menon, 2011:81 & 85). It can be seen here that, in line with the inter-governmentalist theory governments control the defence playground. Howorth also notes that EDA is ring-fenced by intergovernmental constraints though its direction is clearly towards ever greater cooperation and even integration (Howorth, 2011:24). Hopefully EDA will achieve the defence integration ambitions of
PESCO though it should not be forgotten that “EDA’s executive arm does not have the sanctioning powers to enforce joint capability development – as an intergovernmental body, the Agency is dependent on the willingness of governments to voluntarily embark on joint capability projects” (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:46). Under PESCO there is what they call National Implementation Plans (NIP) which are needed from governments before they join PESCO and these serve as individual national binding commitments to PESCO and they are a mechanism through which the HRVP can hold EU governments to their word (Ibid.). Since EDA has developed experience since 2004 it is possible that this agency can help to further defence integration via PESCO. Nevertheless as the inter-governmentalist theory explains, the EU Member States are the key in making this progress happen. Thus the challenge in achieving defence integration also rests on the shoulders of the state’s failure to have the willingness to cause quicker progress in defence work. There is the CARD review mechanism within EDA which can however be used to consolidate defence cooperation between EU governments.

The PESCO Dimensions of Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)

CARD is meant to institutionalise a systemic exchange between Member States under the auspices of EDA and CARD will be used to identifying and closing gaps in Member State’s military and civilian resources (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 8). On a similar note Fiott et al noted that CARD, though technically separate from PESCO, is also complimentary to PESCO and “is designed to encourage EU governments to align their defence budgets and capability plans and to concomitantly jointly identify common capability needs over the medium to longer-term” (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:45). In this sense one can see the helping efforts provided to PESCO by CARD. PESCO is a step forward in the sense that it designed to move beyond the existing mode of voluntary commitment by saying firstly that before a government can be in PESCO they need to fulfil higher and more credible commitments to one another and secondly by regular review of common binding commitments made at the onset of PESCO (Ibid.). CARD is an opportunity to know gaps that need to be addressed. Nevertheless defence integration has failed in the past since, for example, the 1999 Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) and the 2001 European Capability Action Plan failed ‘because Member States balked at revealing gaps in their national defence capacities’ (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 9). There is no guarantee that this balking will not be repeated under PESCO. Another defence integration setback issue is that CARD will not ‘be a sanctioning tool nor will it take control of national defence investment plans’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:46). It means that there is no guarantee that states will implement their National Implementation Plan since there are no sanctions and things rely on peer pressure. To add further incentives, the EU has linked PESCO to the EDF as an attempt to increase chances of succeeding in defence integration this time around. The EU maybe knows the past challenges in the defence area and EU efforts around PESCO maybe designed to plug loopholes that have problematized defence integration in the past.

The PESCO dimensions of the European Defence Fund (EDF)
As Beckmann and Kempin remind us, the EU Member States and the European Commission established the EDF to incentivise cooperation on key defence capabilities acquisitions. The EDF will co-finance initiatives where at least three EU states join forces to develop and procure defence products (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 8; and Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 2). It is clear from this that the EU wants to promote defence integration by promising to co-finance defence capability acquisitions when at least three Member States do it together. This is a good incentive if the addressees are willing to do it. The EU itself wrote that the European Commission currently contribute 20% to joint EU capability projects under EDF and it said it is willing to increase this by an additional 10% if projects are placed within PESCO, with the hope of aiming for harmonisation for common defence programmes. The EU further noted that as of now 80% of procurement and 90% of research and technology happens at national level (EUCOM 2017; Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:47). Thus EDF co-financing is expected ‘to permit states and companies to operate more cost-effectively and such initiatives benefit especially strongly from the fund where their cooperation falls within the PESCO framework’ (Beckmann and Kempin, 2017: 2). These are helpful defence integration incentives since ‘the industrial dimension has long been another neglected child of European defence cooperation’ (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 24; Beckmann and Kempin, 2017: 2). In summary it can be seen that PESCO is being used to try to revitalise defence integration. The reasons why defence integration has been difficult are those that PESCO is trying to address through these various incentives under CARD, EDA, EDF and so forth. The awakening of PESCO defence efforts were also aided by the 216 EUGS.

**EUGS dimensions of PESCO**

The 2016 EU global strategy for foreign and security policy is a legally non-binding document that replaces the 2003 European Security Strategy (Bendiek, 2016: 14) and the EUGS’s key elements include ‘fostering peace and guaranteeing the security of the EU and its citizens, since internal security depends on peace outside of the EU’s external borders’ (EUGS 2016; Bendiek, 2016: 14). The EUGS promise of protecting EU citizens is one of the central planks of the EU’s legitimacy (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 1). The 2016 EUGS can be explained by the perceived necessity to create resilience in security and defence (Bendiek, 2016: 14). The ‘EUGS names resilience as the overarching goal of CFSP- in other words reinforcing the EU’s ability to defend against internal and external threats’ (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 3). Resilience is the ‘capacity to resist and regenerate’, as well as being ‘crisis-proof’ (Bendiek, 2016: 6). Fiott et al agreed with these view when they noted that the 2016 EUGS had a ‘strong emphasis on the need to make defence cooperation among EU countries the norm, even though EUGS talks of ‘enhanced’ instead of ‘permanent’ cooperation in defence (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017: 20). It can be further said that the 2016 EUGS gave way to a process that resulted in a raft of EU defence initiatives like CARD, Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and EDF (Ibid.7) which are all linked to PESCO. It can therefore be argued that defence is now a subject that has come to the forefront but achieving EU defence integration is constrained by different factors that include costs and lack of capabilities.
Costs as a major problem in EU defence politics

The EDF offers co-financing incentives for projects done under PESCO in recognition of the reality that ‘cost’ is one of the major reasons why defence integration has been difficult for the EU to achieve. Spending on security and defence is the key prerequisite for operational autonomy, i.e. the capacity to independently plan for and conduct civilian and or military operations (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 21 & 10). But the difficulty is that EU Member States are divided by the thorny issue of costs which renders some members even less anxious to see deployments occur (Menon, 2011:83) and thus hindering military integration in the EU. In addition, EU Member States are not likely to yield sovereignty over defence spending (Howorth, 2001: 766 &782; Ojanen, 2006:64). At the same time article 41(3) of the TEU prohibits charging operations with military or defence implications to the EU budget (Menon, 2011:83). It can thus be quickly seen that cost avoidance is a problem area in the quest for military integration in the EU. We see for example that the United Kingdom and France accounted for over 40 % of EU defence spending (Ibid.84). Scholars like Kempin and Kunz have therefore postulated that Europe is far from being the world’s second largest military power due to collective and individual inefficiency in defence spending which lead to lack of interoperability – e.g. 84 % of all equipment procurement took place at national level in 2013; defence research and development has fallen from 20 % benchmark in 2006 to 17,9% in 2014 and defence research and development expenditure has fallen to 1% of total defence expenditure in 2014 (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 16)- and as such, Europe suffers therefore from ‘non-deployable assets, lack of training and problems related to hardware maintenance (Ibid.). All these are challenges that help us to understand why EU defence integration is difficult and challenging. From an inter-governmental perspective can be supported here since we can see that costs related to defence are a domain of national governments, yet they avoid taking pro-defence integration steps in due to costs of assets and deployments. Lack of capabilities can lead to capability crises.

Lack of coherence and capabilities as a difficulty in EU defence integration

Problems in EU defence capabilities show that progress in EU defence cooperation and integration has not been going smoothly. The key security policy ambitions of the Lisbon treaty were coherence and capabilities (Menon, 2011:76). Yet European defence has lost over 20% of military capabilities between 2008 and 2014 with further losses likely due to inaction in the defence area (Andersson et al 2016:10 & 11). To illustrate this Anderson et al noted that between 1990 and 2015 there has seen a dramatic fall in in combat battalions: Western Germany had 215 battalions in 1990 but the unified Germany had 34 battalions in 2015. In the same period, Italy’s battalions decreased from 135 to 44; France from 106 to 43; United Kingdom from 94 to 50 and the US EUCOM from 99 to 14 battalions (Ibid.43). Based on this data, it is clear that the EU has faced reduced capabilities. For example the two most important constraints bedevilling the European security defence policy (ESDP) are the incoherence of many EU security policies, the turf battles that have characterised their design and implementation, and a chronic lack of the hardware required for effective military
intervention (Menon, 2011:76). In addition it can also be highlighted that the EU had half a million more personnel under arms than the USA but around 70% of them cannot operate outside their national territory (Ibid.79). This is a big challenge in EU defence integration since Member States are not willing to allow their 70% personnel to be deployed outside their national domains. In line Menon’s arguments, Hill (1993:306) argued that “the (European) Community is not an effective international actor, in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events” (Hill 1993 in Wagner, 2003:577). It’s not easy to produce effective collective decisions, since under the Lisbon treaty, Member States dominate EU military and CSDP policies and the success or failure of these policies depends crucially on national governments displaying the political will to turn rhetoric into reality (Menon, 2011:76). In recent times, faced with these defence challenges, the EU’s 2016 EUGS, the EDF and PESCO have focused on the importance of developing military capabilities and under article 42.6 of the TEU, PESCO calls for EU members to cooperate ‘with a view to the most demanding missions’ which clearly defines the operational objectives for PESCO (Fiott, Missirolı & Tardy, 2017:28). Since PESCO was born in December 2017, only time will tell if the EU will manage to overcome the capabilities challenges through financial and support incentives outlined in the 2017 PESCO decision. These challenges, from an inter-governmentalist viewpoint, are mostly caused by the lack of will by EU Member States to take decisive steps that promote defence integration through joint actions to enhance capabilities.

Using the inter-governmentalist theoretical inclination it is clear that “the idea of testing PESCO won the day only after a series of meetings by EU defence and foreign ministers in autumn 2016” and Germany was particularly proactive in contributing with PESCO especially when it released its white paper on defence (Ibid.20). The defence tasks of PESCO reminds us that defence is a high politics area as it can be seen that ‘PESCO is a Member State driven process, meaning that decisions and activities are the responsibilities of PESCO members’ even though there will be support from EU bodies like EDA, EEAS, and HRVP with aspects like regular annual assessments and incentives (Ibid.32). PESCO is a new endeavour and it is not easy to judge in this short space since December 2017. Most PESCO projects may not take off until at least 2025 depending on the type and scale of these projects’ (Ibid.50). But the language used in PESCO help us to see and learn what the EU is attempting to do in order to overcome the various challenges that are inhibiting quicker progress towards EU defence integration. The EU learnt a lot under the CSDP era and improvements and incentives in PESCO are aimed at addressing challenges experienced under CSDP.

**CSDP-PESCO link**

A lot has been written on CSDP but in the context of PESCO it is important to note that “CSDP is exclusively oriented towards external threats, not intended for territorial defence and legally precluded from being deployed inside the EU” (Bendiık, 2016: 19). In other words “in accordance with article 42.1 TEU, CSDP operations are to take place ‘outside the Union’” (Fiott, Missirolı & Tardy, 2017:35). Thus, from a legal viewpoint CSDP legally
belongs to CFSP and under article 42 paragraph 1 of the TEU, the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP (Bendiek, 2016: 5 &7). Some EU Member States are not eager to engage in actions ‘not intended for (EU) territorial defence’ and this derails defence integration since states will be reluctant to be involved in long wars outside the EU. Still CSDP is dependent on EU Member States. As an illustration, CSDP has been mainly operational with 35 operations and missions to date and EU Member States contribute military capabilities since unlike NATO, EU has no military capabilities (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:27). CSDP itself has faced many challenges.

“The biggest weakness of CSDP as a defence actor has been its failure to deliver on its promise of autonomy” as the EU has repeatedly turned to the USA and to NATO in serious destabilization threats on the EU’s borders and “collective defence remains, in all official discourse, the responsibility of NATO” (Howorth, 2017:351& 352). Critics of PESCO argue that the future with PESCO will be more of the same as CSDP (Valasek, 2017:1). To make matters even more complicated, “the EU has been attempting to fund 28 separate armies, 24 air forces, and 21 navies” and France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy contribute 70 % of the total EU defence expenditure whilst the 15 lowest-spending EU Member States have a combined total budget of $822 million which is less than that of Africa’s Ivory Coast (Howorth, 2017: 355). Even further, one sees that of the EU’s 1.9 million troops ‘in uniform’ only 50 000 could be used for high intensity conflict (Ibid.). This can be summed up by saying that the “CSDP remains a project that is seriously suboptimal” (Ibid.). Howorth finely came up with a good assessment of CSDP which help to expose the defence challenges that the EU is facing. The hope is that PESCO can improve CSDP since PESCO is an instrument in support of CSDP policy (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:33).

Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy highlighted the following scenarios under which a PESCO force or army can participate in an operation: 1. PESCO forces participate in CSDP mission together with non-PESCO members, 2. Participation in CSDP by PESCO members only, 3. CSDP missions with PESCO members only under article 44 of Lisbon Treaty, 4. A non-EU coalition with PESCO members only, 5. NATO led operation with PESCO members only or with other NATO members, 6. UN-led mission with PESCO members only and or together with other European states, and 7. an internal security (home defence) operation (2017:34). Here it can be seen that PESCO is dynamic and ambitious if these scenarios are to go by. It also shows that PESCO is about more than CSDP as it is also about industrial projects as well as protecting EU citizens- yet it is also less than CSDP which includes a substantial civilian component- and PESCO and CSDP are overlapping yet distinct (Ibid.53). In a nutshell the same challenges that faced CSDP can also befall PESCO and make the goal of defence integration a continuously difficult thing to achieve.

In this section we have seen that PESCO can promote defence integration through differentiated integration, i.e. willing Member States can move forward and the undecided crew can join later. PESCO can also spur defence integration if the support to be provided by
the HRVP, the EDA, EDF and CARD come into reality. This support is to deal with problems of costs and lack of capabilities in the EU defence apparatus. The upside-down of PESCO is that Member States excluded from participating and those given opt-outs can contribute to a long term failure to integrate the entire EU into a defence Union. Another potential downside is that the same lack of will problem faced under CSDP can also lead to the demise of PESCO. The knitting of PESCO and NATO is still work in progress and this clarity is needed in order to see if NATO will not be an obstacle to PESCO even though the EU insists that PESCO and NATO will work well together. From an inter-governmentalist theory perspective we saw that PESCO is a high politics area were most crucial decisions are state-based and thus leading to the sluggish pace of EU defence integration since NATO is available as a back-up. Let’s now turn to a discussion on how NATO makes EU defence integration a tricky issue.
Chapter 5

Impact of NATO and USA on EU Defence Integration

Does the existence of NATO make EU defence integration less important and less pressing for EU Member States? On the one hand it is clear that NATO makes some EU member states less enthusiastic about pursuing a compact EU defence integration agenda. On the other side, there are EU members like Germany who think that NATO is not an obstacle to EU defence integration. The EU Commission itself has been at pains to say that NATO can complement defence integration efforts through for example the PESCO pact.

NATO makes defence integration less pertinent
Based on EU’s legal instruments, it can be argued that NATO makes EU defence integration less important. We can see for example that article 42 of Lisbon treaty states that any obligation to mutual assistance ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states’ and that any obligations must also be ‘consistent with commitments under the NATO, which, for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’ (Menon, 2011:82; TEU). Based on this, it can be argued that it seem EU defence is reliant on NATO. In other words European defence will be firmly integrated with NATO and the transatlantic alliance with the USA is the undisputed core of European defence collaboration (Andersson et al 2016:12) and where the EU is heading in the field of security and defence hinges intriguingly on its relations with NATO (Ojanen, 2006:73). Even as recent as January 2017, the HRVP Mogherini called for the EU ‘to be built into a true defence Union that was not limited to the EU-27 because the EU’s security could only be improved, she argued, through external measures and close cooperation with NATO’ (Bendiek, 2016: 15). It is thus not a wonder to see that EU members of NATO still refer to NATO for their ‘common defence’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:16). These developments make EU defence integration difficult because it is easier for Member States to rely on NATO which is already established than to contemplate establishing an EU military Union with all the nationalism and costs associated with it.

Moreover recent events show that NATO is critical for EU defence. It is possible for EU to integrate its defence and still have NATO as a critical partner. But recent events point to a bigger role for NATO in EU defence than to efforts aimed at increasing EU defence integration. For example the NATO-EU Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 has been seen ‘as a way of tying EU and its action closely to NATO’ (Ojanen, 2006:69). Howorth (2001:783) talked of ‘the Natoization of the Union, or the US hegemony via the back door’ (in Ojanen, 2006:70). So the EU-NATO relationship is complex in terms of seeing how the EU Member States can achieve EU military integration because some of them want NATO to play the role of defence protector. In a 2006 article Ojanen concluded by noting that EU-NATO relations
have two options: to separate or to fuse. Separation means the EU can make independent policies whilst the fusing model will mean ‘NATO has supremacy over the EU in central questions of security and defence’ (Ojanen, 2006:72). At the moment it seems NATO has supremacy in defence issues. The recent birth of PESCO is probably an attempt by the EU to achieve ‘separation’ or strategic autonomy.

However, “the discussions about PESCO have revealed diverging strategic objectives among EU Member States” (Helwig, 2018:3). For example “France and Italy want the EU to be able to react independently to future crises in the southern neighbourhood. In contrast Poland and the Baltic countries are acutely aware of the possible threat from the east and support NATO’s objective of establishing a credible deterrent on the EU’s Eastern border. The successful implementation of PESCO is endangered by these different preferences’ (Ibid.). The divergences in the EU are being partly caused by views on NATO and this makes EU defence integration difficult to achieve. NATO’s collective defence is key for Baltic and Central European countries who are not so eager about Western Europe’s view which is increasingly looking at the EU’s goal of achieving ‘strategic autonomy’ in crisis management’ (Ibid.:1). This is a challenge to the idea of EU defence integration since the EU Member States do not yet share a common understanding of the role of the EU and NATO in European defence (Ibid.). There are views which perceive the EU as a threat to NATO, where a harmonious state of affairs would now seem to require a division of labour and role specialisation between the two organisations (Ojanen, 2006:58). These problems can be explained through the inter-governmentalist theory because states are not willing to support defence integration. They prefer NATO because “the logic of EU integration means an eventual supra-nationalisation of defence, while NATO logic keeps it traditionally intergovernmental’” (Ibid.69) and thus cementing continued state control of defence matters. It seems therefore that some Member States see an EU-NATO dichotomy when it comes to defence because ‘on important issues – from the fight against terrorism to the strategic orientation of EU defence policy- the positions within the EU and NATO continue to differ (Helwig, 2018:4). This weakens and makes EU defence integration difficult. But Member States know that they alone cannot defend their territories individually. Some favour the idea of EU defence and others favour NATO to act in defence issues because states need international organisations to provide cover for the legitimacy of military interventions - if NATO is not interested or not appropriate, the EU is an obvious alternative (Menon, 2011:88). In addition to these challenges, there is “a serious inability among the EU’s Member States to agree on sending soldiers into combat missions (Henrion 2010 in Howorth, 2017: 356) and NATO under USA leadership hesitate less than the EU in deployment matters. Despite the challenging side of the NATO-EU defence dimension, the other side of the coin shows that NATO can complement EU defence efforts if there is a positive will to do it that way.

**NATO can however also complement EU defence integration**
One of the positive aspects of the EU-NATO Berlin agreement is that under the agreement, the EU is authorised to draw on NATO assets and capabilities for its own military operations (Berlin+, 2003 in Bendiek, 2016: 18). If the EU achieves defence/military integration it can therefore continue to work well with NATO by using NATO assets and maybe save money. Thus instead of seeing an EU-NATO dichotomy, one can also support the view that an EU “security and defence Union will rest on three pillars: the Security Union, the Defence Union and EU-NATO cooperation” (Ibid.6). The Berlin plus agreement points out that ‘the EU’s territory can only be effectively defended if the EU and NATO cooperate closely’ and this is a message repeated in the 2016 EUGS (EU-NATO statement, 2016 and Bendiek, 2016:18). The risk is that such pronouncements can embolden EU Member States who prefer NATO at the expense of promoting an EU defence Union and thus further derail the quest for EU military integration. It is not possible to talk of NATO without mentioning the USA since it is the backbone of NATO. What can be noted is that from the late 1990s NATO, under the USA started to develop a profile more focused towards operations like anti-terror actions outside Europe (Ojanen, 2006:62) and this tendency has continued up to now. The USA’s gradual shift of focus from the EU on defence operations can help the EU to seriously think about in the direction of a defence Union.

USA dis-engagement can lead to EU unity on defence issues though USA remains the key
I agree with Gordon’s (1997/1998) argument that it is only if the USA disengages from Europe and the EU experiences a kind of ‘shock’ that EU unity will occur (also Rynning, 2011:25). For example we can see now that the election of Donald Trump has accelerated the Franco-German security and defence cooperation because President Trump has been inconsistent and at times sceptical of NATO leading to strategic uncertainty about the future and credibility of USA engagement in Europe – and because of this, EU members need to be more autonomous in security and defence (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 7). This does not mean that the USA will become less important for the EU. In fact the EU is motivated by regional security needs and the desire to influence American policy (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Lieber and Alexander:2005; Rynning, 2011:27) and as Calleo (2009) argued, ‘a Europe locked in opposition to America is unlikely to succeed in uniting itself” (Calleo 2009) because ‘the role of the USA is destined to remain important, both as a reference point for Europe’s ambition and also because Europeans are more likely than not to remain partially dependent on capabilities and leadership from across the Atlantic’ (Andersson et al 2016:37). And it is a fact that securing good relations with the USA is a top foreign policy objective for many European governments (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 24). In short, a sceptical USA view of NATO can galvanise EU Member States to further their defence integration efforts as seen with PESCO which was adopted in December 2017 when Trump was the President of USA who raised critical questions about NATO’s role in defending Europe. Nevertheless USA will continue to be vital in EU defence as it was during World War I and II.
In summary we have seen that the NATO argument fits better with the inter-governmentalist explanation which places nation states and national interests at the heart of decisions on defence politics. Building on leading scholars in this area, it has been argued that NATO contributes in causing EU defence integration to be difficult because EU Member States are divided on the role of NATO in defending the EU. For example Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom favour a bigger NATO role whilst Western Europe is eager for strategic autonomy. These are divergences that can slow the pace of EU defence integration. However if the USA begin to show less interest in defending Europe, then this can help to push things in favour of EU military integration even though we should not underestimate the significance of the USA as a pillar of EU defence. Part of the reasons why some Member States favour NATO is that NATO is an inter-governmental organisation which means that national sovereignty is better protected in a NATO set-up than transferring defence issues to a supranational EU Defence Union.
Chapter 6:

Sovereignty makes defence integration more difficult to achieve

How does sovereignty impact defence integration in the EU? An inter-governmentalist oriented argument is that EU Member States do not want to hand over decisions on defence matters because this is one of the highest areas of sovereignty. As Stanley Hoffman argued 50 years ago, integration would not and could not be happen in the area of ‘high politics’ of which defence was the ultimate example (Hoffmann 1966 in Howorth, 2017: 344). EU defence integration is therefore difficult to achieve because defence is seen as a sovereign area which cannot be put under a supra-national EU organ. First I will briefly define what sovereignty is and then building on scholarly literature it is argued that on the one side sovereignty makes defence integration difficult and on the other side there are positives of sovereignty.

Definition of sovereignty:

Ondrej wrote that ‘Westphalian sovereignty is defined as an imminent characteristic of a state, and no other unit, higher or lower, can become a sovereign but a state. When a state ceases to exist, its sovereignty also ends. And, contrarily, it emerges when a new state comes into a being. The existence of a plurality of sovereign structures on one territory is in this approach unthinkable’ (Ondrej: 2016:55 & see Ladic, 2018: 4). If this definition is to go by, then it means that there is no state without sovereignty and the only thing that guarantees state sovereignty is the means to defend it, i.e. control of the army. However, in other non-defence areas, sovereignty can be pooled in line with what Moravcsik (1998:67) stated by saying that “sovereignty is pooled when governments agree to decide future matters by voting procedures other than unanimity… Sovereignty is delegated when supranational actors are permitted to take certain autonomous decisions, without intervening vote or unilateral veto”(in Wagner, 2003:581). The Multi-level governance theory (MLG) argues that European governance was now dominated by a complex web of interconnected institutions at the supranational, national and sub-national levels of government (Hooghe and Marks 2014:263) and that “state sovereignty has been diminished by restrictions on the ability of individual governments to veto EU decisions and by the erosion of collective government control through the council of ministers” (Ibid.). The multi-level governance theory is more correct in socio-economic areas and less so in defence matters. The defence integration area is still dominated by inter-governmentalist based actors.

State sovereignty as a reason for slow defence integration

PESCO notification to the Council and the HRVP (2017) clearly states that “participation in PESCO is voluntary and leaves national sovereignty untouched”. This sentence is arguably a confirmation of the continued obstacles caused by sovereignty in EU’s efforts designed to achieve defence integration.
In addition to the PESCO notification, article 3a of the TEU states that the Union ‘shall respect (member state’s) essential state functions, including enshrining the territorial integrity of the state, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security’ and that ‘national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State (Menon, 2011:82; TEU). I agree with Beckmann and Kempin when they argued that sovereignty has always been a red flag in the entire field of security and defence – exploiting the full potential of European integration will require the taboo on sovereignty to be lifted and a realistic dialogue to be open up (2017: 3). For example, because of the sensitivity of sovereignty, most EU governments, largely for internal political reasons, vigorously denied that the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) amounted to a ‘European army’, stressing that it is not a standing force, that each national government retains sovereign control over the deployment of its own troops, and that there is no European uniform (Howorth, 2001:768). From this we learn that states do not accept the idea of ceding their armies to EU control. On the same path, Gordon (1997:100) argued that at the heart of the problem lies the Member State’s reluctance to permit delegation of sovereignty to centralised institutions (also Wagner, 2003:577). As such sovereignty has been constantly present and sometimes jeopardizing further integration (Ladic, 2018: 3). Wagner also argued that “the incentives to delegate sovereignty to supranational institutions hardly apply to the realm of the CFSP” (Wagner, 2003:578-579). And for example in a French understanding, the defence industry is partly state owned and is a key aspect of the nation’s strategic autonomy whilst in Germany defence industry is private and family-run (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 25). The France case shows that some EU member states “remain determined to exercise their sovereignty rights over foreign and security policy” (Howorth, 2017: 343). Way back in the 1990s, Van Staden (1994:153) argued that ‘for the foreseeable future none of the EC members can be expected to commit itself to majority decision-making or to accept the authority of a supranational body in questions of life and death’ and Ojanen notes that the argument in the 1960s was that the process of integration would not come to include security and defence since these areas formed the core of national sovereignty (Ojanen, 2006:60). This is still the same today even though there are signs of progressive movements under PESCO. But PESCO is to be reviewed through the EEAS/HRVP under CARD. At the same time Menon reminds us that national governments have tried to shape the EEAS to suit their own preferences (Menon, 2011:79 Survival) and Fiott et al highlight that ‘capabilities developed in PESCO will remain national and not put under any kind of permanent and common (EU) command’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:34). The end result of these arguments is that defence integration in the EU is made difficult by state’s wish to keep sovereign control in the area of defence. There is however a constructive side of sovereignty though it’s limited.

**Sovereignty has positive sides**

Despite the obstructive aspects of sovereignty, some inter-governmentalists see the terms of international co-operation as ‘reflecting the relative bargaining power of different governments, who, while never abnegating their sovereignty, may be willing to ‘pool’ or ‘delegate’ it as efficiency and effectiveness require’ (Puchala, 1999:319). Sovereignty can
thus be delegated but only in bargains that help to achieve national interests as opposed to achieving defence integration. Sometimes states that form the inner core of the EU power structure have to forfeit the most official sovereignty (to make things work) (Bendiek, 2016: 10). Wæver (1996:116) argued that the content of sovereignty changes over time but Ojanen says this can imply that divergences in understanding sovereignty may widen (in Ojanen, 2006:72) and consequently divide decisions on military integration. A positive use of sovereignty by the EU has been that EU countries have embraced pooling of sovereignty as a resource which can be used to act within international regimes (Keohane, 2002 -in Ojanen, 2006:72). But in short, the EU is struggling in the area of defence integration and collective military operations.

In summary, the argument here is that sovereignty is still a high politics area dominated by governments who are not consistently and collectively supportive of EU defence integration because for them, controlling defence is a life and death subject. Sovereignty can be pooled to bargain in order to achieve national and common interests but the sluggish pace of EU defence integration shows that, for the most part, sovereignty is part of the obstacles hindering faster defence integration. In addition to sovereignty, defence integration is impacted by aspects like disagreements in decision-making, fear of mission failures and lack of trust between member states in defence intelligence issues.
Chapter 7

Decision making procedures, infighting, fear of military failure and disunity slows defence integration

Some of the reasons causing difficulties in the work to integrate EU defences are challenges related to decision making procedures, institutional infighting, the EU’s fear of mission failures and lack of unity amongst EU Member States. For example a recent literature by Webber (2014) and Bendiek (2016) states that “academic debate is dominated by the theory that the CFSP structures are dysfunctional. Some warn of disintegration, since key decisions continue to require unanimity and since essential differences persist among Member States on an appropriate role for the USA in Europe, on Russia policy, and on migration policy” (Webber, D 2014:341-365 & Bendiek, 2016: 6). In this sense one can argue that the consensus principle in CFSP and CSDP is integration inhibiting (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 3) because, for example, as recent as 2011 Menon wrote that all 27 EU Member States must approve CSDP operations which do not fall under the purview of permanent structured cooperation (Menon, 2011:83). It means that the unanimity/consensus policy is a contributor to making it difficult to integrate the defence sectors in the EU. It means that Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is an alternative which can help to promote defence integration together with other actions. For instance Schulz & Kooning (2000) and Golub (1999) argued that QMV significantly increases the speed of decision making and Wagner (2003:578) argued that QMV “is extremely helpful to make the CFSP more effective”. In a nutshell QMV can address that challenges caused by unanimity requirements in the defence integration area. Even if defence decisions are dominated by inter-governmentalist settings, some EU institutions provide administrative support to national governments. However there is a problem of institutional infighting which contributes to slowing work on defence integration.

As an example of problems caused by institutional infighting, it has been said that in February 2010 USA’s president Obama cancelled a USA-EU meeting allegedly because of institutional infighting within the EU (Rynning, 2011:24). In support of the institutional problem issue Menon wrote that the EU’s deployment of distinct policy instruments lead to use of different decision making procedures which can in turn lead to friction and incoherence and that rivalries between the European Council and the Commission have become somewhat a cliché (Menon, 2011:77). On a similar note Rynning (2011:24 & 29) noted that the EU’s complex institutional system pitches agents of Council, Commission and Member States against one another and the CSDP is structurally weakened by the nature of EU bargaining. Because of these institutional challenges, member states blame European level institutional structures for their own failings (Menon, 2011:77). I support the institutional problem as part of the causes leading to difficulties in EU defence integration. Even under PESCO it is the
EEAS/HRVP who should provide support with the CARD review of National Implementation Plans made as PESCO commitments by Member States. It is important that EEAS institutions must function well if moves towards more defence integration under PESCO are to go well.

**EU Fear of mission failure - normative and soft EU**

Another problem associated with the reasons why EU defence integration is difficult is the EU’s fear of embarking on missions that fail. Moreover the EU is said to prefer soft power than hard power. This means that strengthening military power through more defence integration can compromise the normative soft power thinking inside the EU. According to Manners, normative power describes an actor’s ability ‘to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics and this is the greatest power of all since it sets standards for the actions of all actors (Manners 2002:253 in Bendiek, 2016: 8). The EU’s military problem is that the EU ‘has no tradition of power politics or energetic political action (Andreani et al., 2001:39; Howorth, 2001:773). The EU thus fears to use military power since they don’t have a power tradition. As Howorth noted, the most important challenge with CESDP is the EU’s fear of the price of failure- failure would also place a heavy question mark over the other political dimensions of EU integration (Howorth, 2001:773). On a similar note Ehrhart (2002: 19-24) sees the EU as a ‘co-operative security provider’ that bases its actions on normativism, prevention, inclusiveness, multilevel orientation, integration of non-state actors, multilateralism and co-operation with other organisations (in Ojanen, 2006:66). And Smith (2003) noted that the EU’s five foreign policy objectives are promotions of regional cooperation, human rights, democracy, good governance, prevention of conflicts and fighting international crime (in Ojanen, 2006:66). Similarly, Moravcsik (2003) noted that the EU is more competent in non-military questions whilst Menon (2003) noted that the EU can take care of crisis prevention and reconstruction after crises, whilst NATO can take care of military crisis management proper (in Ojanen, 2006:68 JMCS vol44). On the same path Andrean et al (2001:74-76) say that the EU’s aim is to address the root causes of conflicts rather than using power against their symptoms, generosity in development assistance and willingness to share the benefits of multilateralism (in Ojanen, 2006:66). It can thus be argued that the EU’s self-perceptions as a soft and normative power contribute to her hesitance in increasing military strength through defence integration. Manners (2002) and Kalypso and Withmann (2013) posited the EU is a ‘normative power’ that is exceptionally attractive to other states (Manners 2002: 235-258; Kalypso & Withmann, 2013) and Bendiek (2016:8) noted that EU policies are tied to the EU’s self-conception as a soft power. Despite the good aspects of soft power and normativism, these aspects are also a factor in hindering defence integration in the EU in addition to the disunity in Union.

As an example of disunity in the EU related to the Libyan war, le Monde newspaper (31.3.2011, translated by Menon, 2011:76) stated that the EU has failed miserably and is incapable of agreeing on how to act, on whether to recognise the Libyan opposition and most of all, on the legitimacy of the use of force. In addition, Germany was reluctant to do military intervention in Libya in contrast to United Kingdom and France and this is a public
illustration of a division that has haunted the ESDP since its inception (Ibid.:83). Besides the Libyan crisis, one can also say that there has been a traditional and unproductive opposition between southern and Eastern Europe on threat perceptions and different defence priorities and these differences will remain (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 7). These differences are not new but they are still alive today. Way back in 1966 Hoffmann wrote that European political projects are tied down by sovereign nations with ‘domestic differences and diverging worldviews’ which result in ‘diverging foreign policies’, and ‘any international system based on fragmentation’ tends to reproduce diversity (Hoffmann, 1966: 864; Rynning, 2011:29). These differences are present in deployment of forces and in how far defence integration should go. These differences are also based on lack of trust and all this contribute to making it difficult to achieve defence integration.

An example of trust issues can be that closer Franco-Germany cooperation on defence is faced with a number of obstacles including fear of unwanted technology transfers and distrust between companies in different countries (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 25). In addition we see that member states of EU and NATO lack the willingness to share sensitive information (Helwig, 2018:2). For instance member states are reluctant to share findings from their intelligence services within the multilateral framework of the NATO alliance; instead they prefer bilateral agreements (Ibid.). This also helps to show that Member States pursue national interests at the expense of common EU defence interests and thereby slowing down defence integration.

In summary it can be argued that using unanimity in voting makes is difficult to move faster with EU defence integration. On top of that institutional infighting in the EU and the EU’s fear of failing in missions contribute to making it harder to take decisions that increase EU military power through defence integration. In addition we see that diverging defence and foreign policies and lack of trust in sensitive defence areas all make defence integration in the EU difficult. This is in line with the inter-governmentalist theory which argues that defence integration will be difficult to realise because of the sensitivity of this area. Actions by Germany, France and United Kingdom in the defence area can help in showing the brighter sides of defence cooperation and the drawback of non-cooperation.
Chapter 8

Germany, France, United Kingdom and Defence Clusters outside the EU framework – as illustrations

How do the roles played by Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the EU help us to understand the challenges in EU defence integration? Giving brief examples of EU power brokers, viz, Germany, France and the United Kingdom help to illustrate the challenges and opportunities in EU defence integration since these nations are leaders in this area. For example, Puchala, (1999:319 jcmsvol37) noted that for inter-governmentalists, “the initiators, promoters, mediators, legislators and promulgators of deepening and broadening European integration are the national governments in general, the governments of the major EU countries in particular, and heads of governments and powerful ministers most specifically”. Things move in a better direction when France and Germany work together than when they don’t. Defence integration was slowed by the consistent vetoes led by the United Kingdom. Lack of movement in defence integration has led to formation of defence clusters outside the EU frameworks. This is a testimony to the difficulties faced by the EU in defence integration.

In terms of the impact made by differences between the more powerful EU countries, it can be highlighted that France’s and Germany’s ideas on the role of the military and the use of force differ, their defence priorities, threat perceptions and regional priorities differ (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 12). Furthermore Kempin and Kunz observed that differences in force employment between France and Germany have prevented real operational deployments of the Franco-German Brigade (FGB), with the exception of its deployment in Mali (Ibid. 19). They further noted that France defines strategic autonomy as her own ability to decide and act freely in an interdependent world, thus preserving French independence and sovereignty, whilst on the other hand, Germany carefully avoids to use the term ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘prefers recurring to civilian approaches over the deployment of military forces’ (Ibid.12 & 20). Using this data from Kempin and Kunz it can be argued that diverging views between France and Germany are not helpful in promoting defence integration. When these two major EU countries work together chances of deeper defence integration become enhanced.

For example Kempin and Kunz postulate that they are ‘convinced that the Franco-Germany relationship has to be the nucleus of any European defence integration’ – ‘a truly Franco-Germany approach in the area of security and defence policy can be the starting point of a European project’ (Ibid.9). They give an example of the positives of Germany-France collaboration by noting that Paris and Berlin’s revitalised relationship in the area of security and defence led to the EU’s action to implement the ‘Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ in which the EU’s strategic autonomy is the leitmotiv.
Bendiek agrees, and so do I, that France and Germany are the key by noting that at the center of the power structure are Germany and France whereas members like Greece and the Baltic states are more of norm takers in the EU (Bendiek, 2016: 10). As recent as 13 July 2017 Germany and France used their bilateral Ministerial Council to propose a list of steps intended to satisfy the exclusive and inclusive project models of PESCO (Beckmann and Kempin, 2017: 2). Due to Germany and France support PESCO was adopted by the Council of the EU in December 2017. It can be argued that the input of France and Germany is vital if the EU is going to achieve a defence Union. This argument is pro inter-governmentalist theory since it sees powerful states like France and Germany as more influential than EU institutions in terms of moving the defence integration agenda forward.

Taking a closer look at Germany defence policy, it can be seen that the Germany army white book of 2016 declares Germany’s favour of the long term objective to create a European security and defence Union (Bendiek, 2016: 15). This is good for the future of EU defence integration if other bigger nations like France support the same goal. Glatz and Zapfe, (2017) commented extensively on the 2016 Germany white book. They noted that the Germany Bundeswehr (army) white paper of 2016 see Germany and NATO perspectives as inseparable and the aim for the current Bundeswehr planning is that Germany, British and French armed forces are to form the backbone of European defence within NATO (Glatz and Zapfe, 2017:1). I agree that Germany, France and the United Kingdom will always be keys in European defence. However what we see here is that NATO is a big factor in the future of EU defence integration. Helwig (2018:4) notes that Germany has both a military and political interest in closely linking the EU with NATO whilst Glatz and Zapfe (2017:3) think along the same line by stating that the Bundeswehr consistently subordinates itself under NATO guidance through near-complete integration into NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and participating in multinational force development. There is also a Germany-led Framework Nations Concept (FNC) which ‘is a systematic and structured approach to gradually build European forces within NATO, and to thereby indirectly facilitate the generation of forces for specific missions (Ibid.7) and this FNC focuses on the coordinated development of capabilities, developing large multinational formations and by September 2017, 19 nations had joined Germany-led FNC (Ibid.:4). We can note therefore that Germany is active in defence activities but within NATO. The future of defence integration must always take into consideration what role NATO will play. In contrast to a positive Germany long term objective to create a European security and defence Union (Bendiek, 2016: 15), the United Kingdom has been historically unenthusiastic about EU military integration.

**United Kingdom vetoes that hindered defence integration**

The United Kingdom has contributed significantly to the stagnant pace of EU defence integration. For instance Regelsberger and Wessels (1996:35) argued that the Maastricht Treaty introduced QMV to the CFSP but the British government blocked any attempt to use the possibility of majority voting (in (Wagner, 2003:588). Furthermore in 2003 France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Poland supported the creation of EU Operational
Headquarters (OHQ) but the United Kingdom refused (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 17). Even in 2011 the United Kingdom vetoed the case of an Operational Headquarters (Howorth, 2017: 361). Way back in June 1997 at the European Council in Amsterdam, the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Blair vetoed proposals to merge Western European Union into the EU itself though Britain signed the St Malo Declaration with France some 18 months later (Howorth, 2011:5). Also in 2002 France and Germany announced that ESDP was to be developed into a security and defence Union but this idea only gained momentum in 2016 after the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU(Bendiek, 2016:15). In short, EU defence integration has had its setbacks due to various oppositions by the United Kingdom.

Defence clusters happening outside CSDP

Why are defence-clusters emerging outside of the EU framework, and what are their implications for EU defense integration? According to Fiott et al, some European countries have defence cooperation clusters with one another outside the EU framework due to their desire to maintain national sovereignty in defence- meaning that states need to maintain security of supply for defence systems and components and need to protect jobs in the defence sector within national borders – for example in 2015 European defence turnover was 102 billion euros and 430 000 people were employed in the defence sector (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:47; EUCOM 7.6.2017). The cluster approach is cooperation among geographically close and like-minded Member States (Howorth, 2017: 357). For example the November 2010 Anglo-French summit in London resulted in agreement on bilateral defence collaboration, but did not place this in the wider context of the CSDP (Menon, 2011:88 Survival). Recently the Nordic Defence Cooperation was extended to include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (Bailes 2006 in Howorth, 2017: 357). There is also the Benelux cooperation; Visegrad cooperation (Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovakia); Central European Defence Cooperation (Austria, Croatia, Czech, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia); the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland) and the Portugal-Spain cooperation (Howorth, 2017: 357). Even more, Germany is ‘developing integrated structures with the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Romania and announcing a security partnership with the United Kingdom (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 19). There is the 19 member Germany FNC (Framework Nations Concept) aiming to close capability gaps identified by NATO but to be fixed by FNC-members coordinated by Germany (Glatz and Zapfe, 2017:4). Under the Germany-FNC all members retain fully sovereignty over their forces and their deployment and equipping and they can pull out their forces at any point (Ibid.5). What we learn from these clusters is that it seems as if EU states are attracted to groupings that make them to retain their sovereignty over defence forces outside the EU institutions. The impact of this is that defence integration inside the framework becomes difficult. The EU has decided to support PESCO projects by hoping that these defence clusters can do joint defence projects under PESCO and in the end help in bringing these different clusters within the EU framework. Some defence clusters outside the EU have worked whilst others have not. For example Fiott et al noted that ‘mini-lateral defence groupings such as the Nordic Defence Cooperation, the Weimar Triangle and the Visegrad
Group have generated political dialogue without necessarily resulting in joint capability programmes’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:47) whilst collective defence cooperations that have been success stories include the TIGER school where French and Germany and Spanish helicopter crews are trained and the activities of the European Air Transport Command (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 17). The hope is that Germany and France can help to take these clusters into the EU framework through PESCO. These two countries supported PESCO and they are playing a leading role though time will show how it will end up.

In this chapter I used the examples of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and different European defence clusters to show the difficulties faced in EU military integration. We saw that differences between France and Germany slows progress in defence integration whilst collaboration between the two move things forward like what happened with PESCO in December 2017. Defence clusters are happening outside the EU due to various reasons including the need by EU Member States not to put the sovereignty of their armies under EU institutions. However defence clusters can be made part of PESCO and be indirectly brought into the EU framework in the long term. The unsupportive stance by the United Kingdom over the years has been an obstacle to EU defence integration. When the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU in 2016 it became easier for PESCO to be born, though other factors like recent Russian aggressive behaviour, terror attacks in Europe, the migration crisis, Brexit and the USA criticism of NATO also motivated the birth of PESCO and the new focus on how EU should deal with defence issues.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

Summary of the reasons causing EU defence integration to be difficult: based on the inter-governmentalist theory.

In conclusion it can be said that the inter-governmentalist theory gives a plausible explanation of why EU defence integration is difficult because of its focus on the dominance of EU Member States on decisions related to defence politics. The main research question was “why is EU defence integration difficult?” The aim of the thesis was to find and analyse answers to this question based on data and theory. In short the main theory and data-based reasons why EU defence integration is difficult are related to the unwillingness of EU Member States to cede control of defence to EU supra-national institutions; constraints caused by Member State’s need to retain sovereignty over their armies; differences of opinions amongst Member States on the role of NATO in EU defence and divergences of views on military use between EU’s major powers like France, United Kingdom and Germany. The EU and her Member States faces problems related institutional infightings in the EU; lack of trust in sharing sensitive defence information; fear of mission failures if they deploy forces as well as differences in threat perceptions. All these factors contribute to making EU defence integration difficult for the EU to achieve.

Analysing the PESCO decision passed in December 2017, one can learn a lot about the opportunities and challenges in defence integration in the EU. On the one hand PESCO can move defence integration to the next level by allowing willing member states to make commitments to each other and progress with joint military capability projects. Unwilling or undecided Member States can join later when they fulfil ‘a higher criterion’. This differentiated integration dimension of PESCO is good in that it avoids being bogged down by sceptical Member States who do no support defence integration. The drafters of PESCO seem to have realised that part of the reasons for the failures to integrate EU defences are related to costs and lack of capabilities. To address these issues the PESCO decision endeavours to link PESCO projects to the EU framework through offering support and financial incentives via EDF, EDA, CARD and the EEAS/HRVP office. PESCO is clear that Member State’s sovereignty will remain untouched and again this is a realisation that sovereignty has been a major factor slowing down EU defence integration efforts. The incentives offered to PESCO participants via EDF, EDA and CARD are aimed at promoting EU defence integration within the EU framework. PESCO is relatively new and only time will tell whether this endeavour will succeed. I agree that “the success of PESCO will depend on participating Member States adhering to the common binding commitments made to each other’’ and that “PESCO will be judged a success if it leads to the creation of a more effective, capable and joined-up Union in security and defence” (Fiott, (Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:51-53). The EU’s intention is, after all, to achieve a defence Union as we can see that in the 2017 State of the Union Address, Juncker forwarded a timetable setting 2025 as the
deadline for creating a ‘fully fledged European defence Union’. This research therefore contributes to the debate by outlining reasons why it is difficult for the EU achieve this defence Union in the hope that current and future policies can be made knowing what need to be corrected.

Another challenge PESCO aims to address is the role of NATO in EU defence integration. Under the agreement, participating PESCO members commit themselves to ensure interoperability with NATO. The United Kingdom, Germany and most eastern European states want NATO to play a bigger role in EU defence. Countries like France want strategic autonomy to enable independent military operations without too many constraints. The drafters of PESCO tried to balance all these challenges that are making EU defence integration difficult. There is also a concern that PESCO’s differentiation aspects will sideline those who do not fulfil ‘a higher criterion’. Considering that more than 25 EU Member States have signed to PESCO, I think the exclusion argument is not a big concern at the moment.

Defence clusters which are sprouting outside the EU framework are a sign that it will be difficult to achieve EU defence integration. These clusters are simply giving a signal that all EU member states are failing to have one defence cluster made up of all 28 Member States. The architects of PESCO (the HRVP office) probably realised these challenges and they are trying to address this by proposing PESCO projects with the hope that the different European defence clusters will join PESCO projects. This is an indirect and long term effort to bring the different clusters into the EU fold and hopefully achieve a defence Union in the future.

Most, if not all, of these defence integration difficulties can be linked to the inter-governmentalist theoretical propositions. This is because nowhere is the role of individual Member States more pronounced than in defence policy and its Member State behaviour that has produced the most severe problems in defence areas (Menon, 2011:81) as seen through disunity, lack of trust and failure to make integrative decisions. Whatever the institutional fixes created by the Lisbon Treaty, it is unreasonable to expect them to alter the preferences of national governments in a policy sector as sensitive as defence (Ibid.87) with all these taboos linked to sovereignty. We see for example that the United Kingdom vetoed discussions on defence matters within the institutions of the EEC/European Community/EU for 50 years until the 1998 St Malo summit (Howorth, 2001:769) partly because the United Kingdom favours a reliance on NATO than on EU defence integration. In classical realist terms the CSDP “is a case of power politics” (Rynning, 2011:25) since, for instance the United Kingdom can enjoy more influence within NATO together with USA which is a close ally.

Moreover, the ESDP and CFSP were always characterised by relationships between governments with a highly limited role for community institutions (Menon, 2011:81) as we can still see with PESCO which gained momentum due to Germany and French support and due to Brexit. Wagner also argues that “the delegation of competencies to the EU’s
supranational institutions is unlikely to make European crisis management more effective”, instead EU’s security policy will remain inter-governmentalist (Wagner, 2003:576) as can be seen in the dominant power of states in various European defence clusters and PESCO projects.

It can be seen that even in the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties, CFSP and CSDP were under pillar two where inter-governmentalism is considered to be sacrosanct and all decisions are officially taken either at foreign minister or at Heads of State or government level (Howorth, 2011:5-6). In other words defence and security was an area in which states would not renounce their decision making rights and thus confirming the centrality of states (Ojanen, 2006:59). Even way back in defence history, the period from mid-1960s to 1980s is called the euroclerosis period due to the Member State’s refusal to further surrender their sovereignty and the inter-governmentalist theory is conventionally seen as the framework to explain this period of state self-interest (Awesti, A. 2006:2). Also long back in 1966, Hoffmann argued that integration takes place if there is a permanent excess of gains over losses and he said a defence community would weaken the state, as defence was a zero-sum nature (Ojanen, 2006:59). Some argue that EU institutions have a big role in defence integration but ‘inter-governmentalists attribute little influence to supranational agents or institutions’, ‘they see the movement toward, and the timing of, closer international co-operation as resulting from the converging national interests of states’ (Puchala, 1999:319). Currently PESCO seems to offer hope as a convergent zone for joint defence efforts in the EU. Factors like Brexit, Russia annexation of Crimea in 2014, waves of terrorist attacks in Europe, the 2015-2018 refugee movements to the EU and the current USA Trump directed scepticism towards NATO have all contributed to the birth of PESCO and the urgent need for the EU and EU governments to do something related to furthering defence integration in the EU.

Most major reasons for the sluggish pace of defence integration rest on the shoulders of EU Member States. To address these problems the EU Member States must work together with the EU institutions if the hope of achieving an integrated defence Union is to be realised. EU institutions have massive experience in already integrated areas like the four freedoms and the monetary and economic areas. These experiences can be transferred to the area of defence even though it will demand more willingness and commitment from EU Member States. After all the failure or success of EU defence integration will be determined by the ability of EU Member States to move forward with integration of their various European armies.
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