CAN UNEVEN WELFARE FUNDING EXPLAIN THE RISE OF THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT?

A sub-national study of variations in welfare provisions and the change in vote share for the Sweden Democrats in Sweden between 2010 and 2014.

Anders Ziethén
Abstract
In the last few years, the party group defined as the radical right have risen in popularity across the nations of Europe. The research in this field is impressive yet many assume that these party simply represent a xenophobic view as a reaction to the recent waves of immigrants fleeing war or social injustice in Africa and middle east but what is xenophobia if not a lack of social, general, trust? The research in this field is limited with only a few studies that have taken it into consideration. This paper analyses the impact of uneven distribution in education and elderly care funding to assess the impact of partiality in welfare institutions on the vote share of the populist radical right. The study compares 276 municipalities in Sweden and assesses the average municipal expenditures on welfare relative to the national average. The result suggests that in municipalities where the expenditures are below the national average, support for the PRRWP have increased between 2010 and 2014.

Key words: General trust, Welfare state, Sweden, Radical right, Welfare expenditure, Partiality in welfare, Partial trust, PRRWP
Acknowledgments
I would like to send a special thanks to my friends and family for their help and support in the writing process. I would in particular thank my supervisor Marina Nistotskaya for her continuous warm words and great feedback. I’m certain that the quality of this paper would be significantly lower without your guidance. I would also like to take the chance to thank Hans Abrahamsson for his support in the phase where the idea was first hatched. Without your positive reaction and feedback, I’m not certain that I would have continued down the path that lead me here. Finally, I would like to thank the graders whose feedback allowed me to rework the paper and improve both myself and the paper in the process.

Introduction
Over the last few years, immigration have given birth to a heated debate in Europe. We can see how it have sown a split between the countries of the EU and was an often mentioned argument for the realization of the Brexit before the referendum in the United Kingdoms. The past few years have also seen the rise of the radical right, a group of political parties that now exists in most countries and many hold sets in national parliaments. These have been connected to at least two issues of significant for the international community, anti-EU sentiments and a strong nativist position that speaks out against immigration and argues in favour of the universal welfare system. (Eger & Valdez, 2015) The link between the radical right and welfare is a phenomenon that, while studied, have been given less attention than many other areas. Most often, the research on the radical right have looked at demand side variables that measure factors that make people more likely to vote for the radical right, such as immigration, crime rates, unemployment and varying sociodemographic factors. Alternatively, researchers have focused on supply side variables that look at the potential effect of election systems, political factors and the ideologies and strategies of the radical right parties themselves. Few have looked at the implications of the welfare state, and those that have has mostly done so from a theoretical perspective of welfare chauvinism. (Kitschelt, 1995) Only a handful have targeted the other side of welfare which have been linked to the generation of social capital and generalized social trust. (Rothstein, 1998) Those that have made the connection between the mitigating factor of security generated by universal welfare systems and decreased support for the radical right. (Swank & Betz, 2003) Others have particularly studied the mitigating effect of social capital and while some have found that it decreases support for the radical right(Coffé et al., 2007), others have found that it have no effect. (Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler, 2009) This paper will add to the literature by combining the research of universal welfare and trust by measuring the impact of unequal welfare state expenditures on the sub-national level. Sweden in particular is known both for its universal welfare system and generally above average general trust, yet even here have we seen the rapid rise in popularity of the radical right. The main force of the radical right in Sweden consists of one political party, the Sweden Democrats(SD). They have risen rapidly in popularity from 2.9 % in 2006 to 12.9% in 2014. (Loxbo, 2015; Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall, 2012) Currently, national poles place them at 17.3%. (PSU, 2016) The party combines left/right authoritarianism with a focus on nativist policies that I refer to as populist radical right wing. (Loxbo, 2015: 180) In particular, the party have been argued to stand for a ethno-
nationalistic welfare system which corresponds with a general trend among the radical right. (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015) The fact that welfare is central for the Swedish case, both in practise and in nationalist rhetoric, can be explained by the strong connection between Swedish identity and the universal welfare state with the founding of the “people’s home” (folkhemmet) in the 1920’s. An ideological position that have been argued for almost a century. (Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012: 194-197) Thus making a good case for testing a welfare state based hypothesis.

In the paper, I strive to answer the question “What the impact of the welfare state is on the electoral support of the PRRWP?” In particular, I aim to investigate whether the difference in the amount of welfare provisions (partial welfare) is linked with the varying degrees of electoral support received by PRRWPs?

By asking this question, I aim to add to the research on the relationship between PRRWP and public welfare. In particular, I aim to add the idea of partiality in public institutions to the field. A topic which I have been unable to find any previous research about. The outcome of the paper could potentially offer a wider understanding as to what effects the shifting role of the state have had on the rise of the PRRWP. A topic which today is primarily dominated by a population diversity paradigm where immigration is the main focus, yet few ask themselves why the immigration issue have been given so much room in the debate. I believe that uneven distribution may offer an explanation to this particular issue.

The results show a strong and promising correlation between variations in welfare provisions and the support for the PRRWP which open up for further studies. The rest of the paper will begin by identifying the characteristics of the PRRWP. That is followed by the literature review of research on the PRRWP in general and the welfare state and generalized trust in particular. In chapter 2 I construct the theoretical arguments for why welfare and PRRWP should correlate with each other based on theories on general and particularized trust. Chapter 3 contains both case selection and methodology. Chapter 4 contains the analysis followed by a short discussion and conclusions in chapter 5.

1 Previous research
The following chapter defines and conceptualizes the main theoretical concepts, and then provides the literature review and formulates the three hypotheses.

1.1 What is the radical right?
The research in the field of extreme right research is simply massive. A significant boost in popularity with the rise of French Front National in the 80’s led to a massive rise in the field.
However, as pointed out by several authors, there is dissonance in how this party group is conceptualised. (Mudde, 2007: 11. 12; Boomgaard & Vliegenthart, 2007: 405) A few examples of the plethora of concepts used to describe the parties categorized as far right are anti-immigrant (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005; Dinas & Van Spanje, 2011; Bolin et al. 2014), populist radical right (Pauwels, 2010), extreme right-wing (Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers, 2002; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2002; Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler, 2009; Giugni & Koopmans, 2007), extreme right parties(Golder, 2003.A; Arzheimer, 2009) radical right parties (Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2009), radical right-wing populist(Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009; Swank & Betz, 2003; Rydgren, 2007), right wing populists (Oesch, 2008; Muller et al. 2014; Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2014), new radical right(Kitschelt, 1995; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005), Neo-nationalist (Eger & Valdez, 2015), Right-wing extremism (Knigge, 1998), far right-wing (Lacassen & Lubbers, 2012), neo-fascist (Fenner & Weitz 2004; Karapin 1998) and racist (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014). As has been pointed out previously by Pauwels, (2010: 270) this issue is not aided by that some authors apply different terms interchangeably throughout their work (see Boomgaard & Vliegenthart, 2007: 407, 412, 415; Müller et al, 2014: 42) As is, it seems necessary to first identify a reasonable point of departure, how should we conceptualise the radical right?

To identify a point of entry to the extreme right, we should first differentiate them from other forms of political parties. The clearest differentiation is between those of mainstream and populist parties. The concept of mainstream parties applies to a form of political party that is normalized within the political system. As such, a mainstream party may offer up populist policies, but they are still the representation of the established political elite and thus remain mainstream. (Golder, 2003. A.: 447). What is important when using the concept populism, is that there are two forms, either ideology or strategy. (Mudde, 2007: 23) When we refer to populist radical right parties, we refer to them on the basis of ideology. As mentioned previous, any party can have a populist strategy, but not as an ideology. The basis of which stands an inherent position that argues to be a representative of “the true people”. Standing against a corrupt political elite. (Rydgren, 2005: 12; Swank & Betz, 2003: 218) Of the two, the parties defined to belong on the extreme right seems to be adequately positioned among the populist parties. However, if used carelessly, such a conceptualisation alone may affect the way we can, and will, approach the object of inquiry. If stuck on the implication of populism alone. Too much explanatory power may be attributed to the impact of “protest voting” and attractive charismatic leaders. Both critique and empirical evidence have been presented in recent studies that go against such presumptions however. (Arzheimer, 2009; Betz, 1994; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2009; Van der Brug & Mughan, 2007) Others have found support for it (Cutts, Ford & Goodwin, 2011). A few authors have argued that while labelled populism, the correct way to consider the impact of protest voting may in reality be an established ideological position which in turn explains the extreme right vote. But as an ideological standpoint it is no different than any other position and as such, rational choice based on political preference and thus, not an example of populist behaviour (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2009.A; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 482). As such we can conclude that only relying on the term populist right-wing may potentially be misleading.
The next step of importance is the difference between neo-fascism and the radical right. Ignazi argues that the extreme right and fascism split paths in the 1980’s, the extreme right took the form of right-wing conservatism that took up the idea of cultural differentiations between the national and the foreign based on cultural differences. (Ignazi, 2003: 19-26) Authors have shown that their voters hold significantly different values (Golder.2003. A.; Carter, 2005) and it have been shown that inherited relations to neo-fascist movements may impede on the success of the radical right. (Widfeldt, 2008; Cutts, Ford & Goodwin, 2011: 436) Many authors argue that an important barrier between the radical right and the neo-fascist camp where the radical right is considered democratic, to a relative degree, while the latter is considered to represent anti-democratic ideals more often connected to violence or the disregard for the sovereignty of the people. (Mudde, 2007: 31; Kitschelt, 1995: 30; Golder, 2003.A.:446, 47) The reasons to separate these seem quite clear, however it’s still common that authors miss, or ignore the separation of the two. For example, in Eger & Valdez, 2015, they identify the Greek political party Golden Dawn in a new group of radical right parties they identify as neo-nationalist based on three shared political positions. 1. Anti-EU, 2. anti-immigration and 3. pro-social welfare spending on the in-group. (Edger & Valdez, 2015: 117) However similar, an in-depth study of the party suggests clear neo-fascist positions similar to other neo-fascist movements in the UK and the U.S. (Dinas et al. 2016)

One of the terms most commonly used when describing this group of parties is anti-immigrant. Proponents of this categorization argues that although there potentially are other issues that these parties approach, the anti-immigration policy represents the most significant (Boomgaard & Vliegenthart, 2007: 407; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 474). Others have criticised this position in particular, but also the conceptualisation of niche, or one-issue parties in general (Formisano, 2005: 249, 250; Pauwels, 2010: 270; Giugni & Koopmans, 2007: 488). The principle of one-issue parties, or niche parties, have long been discussed and criticized in the field (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005: 148). Meguid (2008) in her book identified the radical right as another in a line of niche party groups, following the same line as the greens in the 70’s and the ethno-nationalist parties in the 60’s. Essential for the niche parties is that they gain influence by focusing on a particular issue which is in the periphery of the political agenda. But in return the party will, essentially, stay focused on a small set of issues and will always be perceived to always represent the one issue by its voters (Ibid: 4, 5). The niche party will serve as a third point of political positioning outside of the spatial left-right scale. To adopt, the mainstream parties may either adopt an accommodative or adversarial tactic (Ibid: 26-29). At this point, critique has been lodged at the theory on niche parties on the basis that the actions of the mainstream parties should position the niche party on the left-right scale based on what position each side have, thus preserving the importance of the scale, also for niche parties. However, the same authors also acknowledge that this is not stated by Meguid herself (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2009). Unfortunately, the authors, in their critique, forget to calculate for the possibility that both sides may choose adversarial tactics, at which case the left-right scale should become
indifferent to the voters that still support it, thus making their findings to go in line with expected outcomes (Ibid: 603). The materialization of such a situation could be conceived from the cases of Austria (Fallend & Heinisch, 2016) and Sweden (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011) where all mainstream parties originally took a dismissive (adversarial) position. However, many other studies have found grounds to reject the niche party principle. Everything based on that voters for the extreme right, opposite to the theoretical argument by Meguid, does value other sides of the agenda and not necessarily relate to the anti-immigrant position in first hand (Mudde, 1999; Eger & Valdez, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2001). The final argument against the use of one-issue party identifications is the impact it can have on the prospective outcome of our studies. If we perceive anti-immigration as the main proponent of these parties, then we may potentially bias our results with variables that directly link to immigration sentiments. I agree with Formisano in his argument that the concept needs to be deconstructed to understand it. Although it implies a negative attitude against immigration, it does not necessarily need to be due to intolerance or hate, but also from fear of or uncertainty to that which is foreign (Formisano, 2005: 249, 250).

So far, we know that the radical right is defined as populist, however it is not neo-fascist, so it is anti-establishment, but not anti-democratic. It is not a niche party. And so, the increase in support for the radical right may potentially be observed due to other effects than xenophobia or anti-immigrant sentiment. However, one question remains, “Is it right?” Kitschelt (1995) argued in his influential theory, that the “new” radical right could be conceptualized in a “master case”. The master case was to combine authoritarian-paternalistic policies and market capitalism. Thus, by adding a cultural dimension to party politics, separating the libertarian and culturally authoritarian parties apart. Further, he suggests that economically, on the spatial left-right scale. The radical right places at the far right (Kitschelt, 1995: 19, 20). But 7 years later the theory was changed slightly as Kitschelt admitted that his previous argument no longer held true (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). Now, the radical right was moving left. Theoretically, he argued that his previous model had been correct, but bound to the relative spatial limitation of time. Furthermore, an internal evolutionary process had occurred which had moved the party left on the scale so as to position itself close to the centre, but without going so far as to cause small business owners to feel that they let go of their right-wing economical position. But still far enough to encompass leftist welfare policies that attracted the working class (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). The “shift to the left” argument found further empirical support (Arzheimer, 2008: 176; Muis & Scholte, 2013; Oskarson & Demker, 2015: 641, 642). The link between the radical right and the welfare state is one that is highly debated and acknowledged in contemporary studies. Nordensvard & Ketola (2015) suggest that the combination ethnocentric welfare policies and nationalism have given birth to a new phenomenon they call the welfare nation state. A form of policy where the radical right parties interlink the nation building process and an ethnocentric vie won the access to welfare services that argues that only the citizens of the ruling majority should have access to these civic institutions. Eger & Valdez (2015) and their concept of neo-nationalism have already been brought up previously. But it to represent a recent study that categorizes the radical right to hold integral welfare-expansionist policies.
The prospect of conceptualising the radical right as a racist party is raised by Mulinari & Neergaard (2014). I consider this point to be of both methodological and ethical significance and thus believe that it is a point that should be raised. Firstly, methodologically, it falls under the same category as anti-immigration party in that it conforms to a one-issue conceptualisation. Thus raising the issue of limiting the understanding of the radical right supporters once again. Secondly, the researchers claim that the position of the people in their study is racist, opposite of the expressed view of the people themselves. This raises a question of research ethics. By this I mean that if we as researchers should ascribe negatively, or positively, charged subject positions to people involved in our research while they themselves have expressed their position to be radically different to that which the researchers claim. To what level can we as researchers interpret our results and what conclusions can, and should, we draw from it. Particularly if the interpretation may have negative effects for the concerned in the future. There is research that link right-wing authoritarianism to different kinds of “new” or subtle, or “old” or blatant, racism (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005; McFarland, 2010). However, this link does not represent a causal relationship that explains every case of social, or general, prejudice. As such, if combined with the argument by Formisano (2005), simply using the term racism to describe the electorate and its members may lead to highly charged yet inaccurate description of individual positions. Thirdly, it raises the question if racism as a term should be used at al. Mulinari & Neergaard argues that the growing body of research have gone to great lengths to avoid using the term racism to categorize the radical right parties where as they would identify them as cultural racists. (53) The message is simple enough however I question the need to include the use of racism in academic papers. Not because it may be incorrect. Clearly, there are cases in which it can be applied. However, the word itself reflect and reproduce a perverse construction of societal norms and ideologies without any form of empirical substance. As such, although we may possible claim that radical right parties, such as the Swedish Democrats, act in a way that attempts to “race-ify” culture. However, we should ask ourselves if the inclusion of racism in academic papers will work against it, or if it will work to concretize and legitimize the concept into common use. Due to these arguments, I consider that the use of the term racist would be counterintuitive to my ideological position and the goal of the research conducted in this paper.

To recap and summarize the previous section, we can now conclude that the identity of a radical right party is identified by an anti-establishment, or populist, ideology. It has an authoritarian position on culture and have shifted its economical position from far right to centre right due to an, over time, change in the attitude to welfare expenditures. As is, I will therefore not use the concepts of populist or extreme right, nor racist or anti-immigration party. I will instead, from here on out use the term populist radical right-wing party (PRRWP). This term is the same as in the definition used by Mudde (2007). However, it is important to note that these definitions are different from each other. While I borrow many of the main theoretical positions from his theoretical construction, Mudde’s construct is much more complex and offer more subtle differences in the construction, and differentiation, of the concept. Initially however, Mudde uses a good categorization of what the term “radical” should be defined as which I to will concede
to. Mudde argues that opposite to the radical as the extreme end, we should consider the radical position to represent the anti-establishment and pro-authoritarianism position of the radical right as an opposite to central liberal values, more specifically political pluralism and the protection of minorities. (Mudde, 2007: 24, 25) In the following section, I will first define a common set of categories to categorize previous research in the field of right wing populism in combination with other theories in order to conceptualize a framework.

1.2 Literature review

The width of research in the field of the radical right does not necessarily mean that all areas are equally well understood. Bolin et al. (2014) argues that more research should focus on the effects PRRWP’s have once they enter the government as the reasons for their rise and success by now is relatively well understood. (:336) Others, like Mudde (2007) argues that too much focus is aimed at demand-side variables. Instead, more focus should be aimed at the supply side and in particular, the impact the PRRWP’s have on their own success. This section will continue as follows. First, I will explain the difference between support and demand side variables. The second part will cover many of the topics of PRRWP research that have been studied before in order to make a weighted selection in chapter three where the list of control variables will be identified.

The separation between demand and supply side variables is a methodologically advantageous categorization which separate the radical right research into three section. Demand-side variables cover micro, meso and macro level studies. These variables explain in which groups, or under which circumstances, there is a demand for PRRWP’s, and thus explain their increased support. Supply-side variables separate between the external and internal variables. The supply side, in general, covers the variables which links together available space in the political sphere and the rise of the PRRWP. The external variables cover such areas as issue salience, election system and political centralisation/convergence and others. The internal category of supply side variables focusses on the impact and influence of the PRRWP itself. These variables cover aspects of the parties’ internal structure, strategy and history. (Mudde, 2007)

1.2.1 Demand-side research

There are many demand side variables which have been included in PRRWP research. The spread of variables covers cultural, economic, socio-demographic and development factors. In the following chapter, I have attempted to separate and sort them into relevant categories. The cultural values relate to ethno-nationalism and identity. In this section, I will relate this to the impact of immigration¹. Welfare and social capital are separated from other variables due to the significance of this factors in the paper. Socio-demographic factors, as well as economic factors are sorted under the label “other values” due to their interconnected nature.

¹ To read more on the impact of cultural threats, see chapter 2.1: What is the radical right?
1.2.1.1 Welfare

Welfare first appeared in Swank & Betz (2003). Their paper analysed the impact of the universal welfare state in mitigating the impact of globalisation and market-liberalisation by measuring the increased support of PRRWP. This is done by comparing 16 countries with either a universalistic welfare system, categorized by comprehensive coverage of citizens, within risk categories, a generous social wage and well developed active labour market programs. Or a corporatist, conservative (and liberal) welfare system which is categorized either by generous occupationally based social coverage and insurance while having minimal social service provisions. Alternatively, they can be recognized by a disproportional reliance on means-tested or private insurance and moderate to low levels of income replacements. (Ibid: 224) Their findings suggested that a universalistic welfare system decreased support for PRRWPs in west European countries and that, while support for PRRWPs still increased with immigration, universal welfare lowered the increase from 2.34 to 1.60 at an immigration level of 0.18 of the population. (Ibid: 235) Hypothetically, this is due to the nullification of the competition hypothesis when a strong welfare state can nullify the threat to social and economic security via social services and income redistribution. This relative to the threat that may be perceived by groups in a corporatist welfare state system where some are better off than others. (Ibid: 233) The mitigating impact have been found in other studies as well. Arzheimer (2009) found a curvilinear relationship between PRRWP support and unemployment benefits. When benefits were high enough, unemployment no longer increased PRRWP support. An argument that have been used in micro level studies, to explain higher support for PRRWPs among young and old voters is that they more commonly rely on welfare functions such as elderly care or unemployment benefits. The influx of immigrants and asylum seeker thus become a perceived threat to their continuous wellbeing when they compete for the same resources. This have been called the “losers of modernity”2 explanation. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, Arzheimer, 2008) Rydgren & Ruth (2013) found that in election districts in Sweden, where the number of inhabitants that were depending on welfare benefits due to illness, PRRWP support were higher. (Ibid: 723) An alternative explanation is the “welfare chauvinism” concept which was developed by Kitschelt (1995: 22) This alternative explanation moves the focus from competition to selfishness and argues that people don’t mind income redistribution but argues that they do so from an ethnocentric point of view. Meaning that those already present matters more than those with tries to get in. Coffé, Hayndels & Vermeir (2007) found in their study of the Vlams Block in Belgium, that more prosperous areas where correlated with higher support, thus supporting the welfare chauvinism concept. This theoretical concept gains further support from Schmidt & Spies (2014) who found that support for the welfare system dropped when migration was part of the political discourse. Based on the discursive perspective, we may consider that the medial and political discourse effects could be similar in their effect on welfare and PRRWP support. Authors like Boomgaard & Vliegenthart (2007) have found that media coverage have a significant relationship with PRRWP support. The effect has been seen in how media coverage creates issue salience in areas such as crime or immigration which have increased PRRWP support as they both keep an issue alive and pushes mainstream parties to take a position on the issue, which in turn have

2 A concept that imply that some have lost out due to the effect of globalization. These people are known as the “losers of modernity” and are supposedly disgruntled and highly likely to vote for the radical right.
been correlated with increased PRRWP support, particularly on the issue of immigration. (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011, Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012, Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001). If we combine these findings with the writings of Nordensvard & Ketola (2015) that argue for that the PRRWP’s in Sweden and Finland have moved away from traditional forms of welfare state discourse to form a third, the “welfare nation state” which argue for a nativist welfare state which should prioritize natives only, while only offering limited support to non-natives. (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015; Kpessa et al. 2011; Blyth 2002) This could be considered to attract those voters who believe that the welfare system is insufficient. This could in part explain the rise in PRRWP support in Sweden where Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz (2012) found that the Sweden Democrats have linked reduced welfare quality to immigration. (ibid: 194-197)

In the context of welfare expenditure, not all authors agree with Swank & Betz (2003). In their study, Veugeles & Magnan (2005) suggest that a large welfare state is equated with PRRWP support. However, compared with Swank & Betz. The measurements used by Veugeles & Magnan to cover the welfare state, public expenditure on social protection, is simple and covers only part of the welfare state. (Veugeles & Magnan, 2005: 840) Other areas which is included in Swank & Betz (2003) such as education and public health expenditures are seemingly excluded. Leaving a significant part of the variation outside of the model which could potentially affect the results of the study. Other studies have had mixed results when it comes to the impact of welfare states. Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler (2009) found that fiscal redistribution had a negative impact on PRRWP support when immigration was high, however their results were limited to two out of 144 regions, 8 out of 144 when including social capital as a moderator. Their conclusion is that while fiscal redistribution is effective at negating PRRWP support, it has to be at an adequate level. Further, unless social capital is high enough, welfare chauvinistic tendencies will make voters very of immigrants and increase their belief that they are misusing the welfare system. Thus increasing PRRWP support if social capital is low (ibid: 288). Over all, Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler in their findings ties the effect of the welfare state with the presence of social capital and social/interpersonal trust.

In total, this offers us three explanations to the relationship between PRRWPs and welfare. Either it decreases support due to that it nullifies threats if it is sufficiently high and shares the burden evenly. Alternatively, it increases PRRWP support if services are insufficient or risk being insufficient due to a perceived competitiveness between locals and immigrants. Either from a “losers of modernity” perspective or from a “welfare chauvinistic” perspective. The luck of consensus on the relationship between the welfare state and PRRWPs constitutes a clear gap in the literature and largely informed the research aim of this thesis.

1.2.1.2 Generalized trust
The concept of generalized trust merit that in general, person A can be trusted. The theory contains a cognitive and a moral component. Based on our surroundings, we gather information to aid in our decision if we can trust person A. But we also rely on a normative morality in our judgement of another individual’s trustworthiness. (Rothstein, 2005: 58, 65) We can divide
generalized trust into two categories, social and political. While political distrust has been a reoccurring topic\(^3\) in PRRWP research. For social trust, there are only two avenues where it has been pursued. The first is in connection to Swank and Betz where it accounted to a plausible outcome of universal welfare. The second is in two papers which analyse the impact of social capital. The two concepts are not the same, however, like many have pointed out, though through different explanations, they are closely connected. (Rothstein, 2011: 168, Rothstein & Stolle, 2008: 441, Nannestad et al. 2014: 544, 545) The concept of social capital conceptualizes the idea that social interaction and social networks increases the populations wealth through the solution of common action problems and by assuring that agreements are upheld by both parts. The prospect corresponds highly with the ideology of the PRRWP as in that their ideology is based on the lack of trust towards out-groups (non-natives) in society. As such it may be believed that it could potentially be a common variable in PRRWP analysis. Yet the pickings of papers which refer to this concept is slim at best. Coffé, Hayndels & Vermeir (2007) found that social capital decreased the support for PRRWP’s. However, Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler (2009) found support for a link between PRRWP support and the level of social capital, where it gained significance as a moderator, but not by individual direct effect. It significantly reduced the impact of immigration and unemployment on PRRWP support in 8 European countries on the regional level. There is a modelling difference in these papers that could help explain the variation in the results however. Jesuit et al. model their social capital variable on the previous work of Uslaner, which have hypothesized that one of the effects of high trust is support for income redistribution and thus reduced income inequality. (Uslaner, 2008: 22, Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler, 2009: 281) Therefore, Jesuit et al. assumes that if we measure income inequality, we also gain the significance of social capital on PRRWP support. Coffé et al. (2007) show that the level of income inequality show less impact on PRRWP support than that of social capital, which, in this paper, is measured by the number of socio-cultural organizations per capita. (Coffé et al. 2007: 145, 150) It should be mentioned that Jesuit et al. acknowledges the issue and explains their modelling as the effect of limited material in their data. Of the two, Coffé et al. can be considered to most accurately capture the concept of social capital relative to the underlying theories. The size of once social capital, or a person’s number of, and composition of, social connections also correlate to generation of generalized social trust. Bram Vanhoutte & Marc Hooghe find a correlation between small social networks and the likelihood to vote for a PRRWP. (Vanhoutte & Hooghe, 2013) On the other hand, Jens Rydgren & Patrick Ruth (2013) find evidence that socialization may potentially reduce the support of PRRWP’s in neighbourhoods where a significant minority of the population belong to the out-group. Moreover, they find that unemployed living in homogenous, or close to homogenous areas are more likely to vote for a PRRWP.

The fact is that the literature on generalized trust is minimal. This leaves a gigantic gap which feeds further into my theoretical assumption that trust, or mechanisms to generate trust, could aid the research on the success of the PRRWP. In a paper in the journal *Political Psychology*, Sam McFarland analysed right wing authoritarianism from a point of generalized prejudice. Among other things, he found that empathy and principled moral reasoning were directly negatively correlated to prejudice. Additionally, he found that empathy in particular was strongly

---

\(^3\) See external supply side variables.
correlated with fair treatments of newly formed minority groups while authoritarians were significantly more likely to take a nativist position. (McFarland, 2010) What I aim to say with this is that normative moral values are strongly connected to generalized trust. Trust in turn is connected to impartial institutions that generate positive moral values. The lack of attention to generalized trust in PRRWP research form another big gap in the literature that further supports the aim of this study.

1.2.1.3 Immigration

Immigration is probably one of the most commonly included variables in the PRRWP research. It has been included in survey data studies, regional studies, cross-country studies and as a moderating factor for other variables. The results are varied but most commonly, the result show that immigration seldom lead to higher support for the PRRWP. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Kitschelt, 1995; Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2007) But others found a significant, positive effect on PRRWP support. (Golder, 2003. A; Swank & Betz, 2003). Knigge (1998) found a positive correlation with PRRWP support, however he concludes that while his study reflects the results on the macro level, the impact may look different on the micro-level. (ibid: 268) Lubbers & Scheepers (2002) made a study on the individual and contextual level in France. Their findings on the topic were twofold. First, they found that people’s individual views on ethnic minorities did not correlated clearly to PRRWP support. However, secondly, they found that on the contextual level. Manual workers were more likely to vote for the PRRWP in employment sectors where the number of active immigrants where higher. They accredited this to the impact of economic threats and competition by doing an interaction where unemployment is included to account for sector based pressure. As such they found that in sectors where unemployment and the number of immigrants were higher, manual workers were more likely to support a PRRWP. (ibid: 135, 139) The opposite results have been found by Oesch (2008), while he too finds support for that manual workers are a larger share of the PRRWP vote, his findings suggest that cultural factors, people’s perceptions, matters more than economic grievances. In particular, this points to an inherent fear in the PRRWP voter that the substantiate a threat to the national identity and culture. However, others have found that anti-immigration sentiment among PRRWP voters are bigger in groups that perceive an economic threat from immigration. Thus in a particular vulnerable groups in society such as the elderly, the young and the unemployed. (Arzheimer, 2008) Rydgren & Ruth (2013) made a study on the level of election circles in Sweden. Their findings give support to the socio-economic explanation, and the halo effect. The halo effect theorizes that some areas tend to gather more immigrants than others, thus creating areas with high immigrant density as many non-immigrants move away. Thus leaving the native population living in a circle around the area, manifesting halo. The findings can be divided into two, within the area and in the relative halo area. They found that PRRWP support were negatively correlated to immigrant density. Secondly, they found that areas bordering high density areas with high unemployment and a low number of immigrants were positively correlated with PRRWP support. The perception of the economic threat feeds into the theoretical argument that supports the link between welfare and PRRWP support. If there is a reliance on welfare for security, changes in the level of welfare finding could cause an increased perception of threat to those which regularly rely on it in everyday life.
As an issue, immigration have been seen to increase PRRWP support if it gains attention, saliency, in the political and medial debate. (Arzheimer, 2009; Dahlström & Sundell, 2012; Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Rydgren, 2007) Others have downplayed the role of the medial discourse and instead argue that it’s the politicians that create issue salience and thereby open up for the PRRWP. (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008) A final position suggest that the relationship between media and politics is. Muis & Scholte (2013) suggest that the medial discourse works in convergence with the political positions of the parties to creates issue salience. Their findings suggest that when the media focused on socio-economic issues, socio-economic party positions mattered more and when media focused on socio-cultural issues, socio-cultural party positions gained salience. (ibid: 41) As an interaction term, immigration have most often been combined with unemployment. The link between the two have been mentioned above, however the results of the interaction between unemployment and immigration have seen varying results. Arzheimer (2009) argues that the two does not support each other and that the interaction reaches a ceiling-point at which the interaction loses significance for the PRRWP vote. Golder (2003. A) found that the term did increase PRRWP support and Knigge (1998) argued that the interaction is insignificant. Dinas & Van Spanje (2011) included an alternative interaction where they look for a link in voter preference for the PRRWP in the Netherlands, List Pim Fortuyn in relation to immigration and crime. Their findings show that when voters where tough on crime, they were more likely to vote PRRWP IF the two categories had been linked together by media or by political actors. (Ibid: 669. 670) Their findings gain support by Sheets, Bos & Boomgaarden (2015) that found similar relationships in an experiment where they used cues to affect a reader’s opinion in a newspaper. They found that when an anti-immigration cue was combined with a PRRWP cue, the average score of anti-immigrant sentiment increased. The relationship has been observed outside of the Netherlands as well. Coffé at al. (2007) found a positive relationship between areas with high crime and high levels of immigrants and positive PRRWP support in Belgium. A similar bottom line correlation is found by Golder (2003. A.) That found that the interaction of election district*immigration were positively correlated with PRRWP support, but only when the district magnitude reached a certain size. While the use of immigration as an interaction term have granted many new findings in the field over the last decade it will not be included in this paper. As the current theoretical argument feeds on the presence of immigrants, there is no reason to control for an interaction at this stage. The literature on issue salience carries over to supply side variables and the idea of issue salience as a whole for PRRWP success. The perception the link between welfare and immigration can be made if we perceive that immigration and welfare quality is linked by PRRWPs. As the concept of ethno-centric welfare policies have already been brought up, we can conclude that this most likely is the case. Additionally, the argument will be included as a control variable for the issue salience of immigration in the political sphere.

Another area that have been discussed in regards to immigration is the origin of the “immigrant”. Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall (2012) analysed Sweden on a municipal level and found
that immigration from outside the Nordic countries increased support for the PRRWP. Arzheimer & Carter (2009) have made the argument that immigration as an issue can only attract voters that are non-immigrants. (ibid: 336) However results by others suggest that this is not the case. (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007) We can find documented examples of this from both France. (Formisano, 2005) and Sweden (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014) The implication becomes a near idealistic view on people that suggest that immigrants themselves would never be against other immigrants. Yet we may theorise, for example, that immigrants to perceive the economic threat that further tension to welfare systems. Rydgren & Ruth have shown in two studies that immigrant composition affects the PRRWP vote. In their analysis, they separated between immigrants from within the EU/EFTA and others. Their findings suggest that areas where the majority of immigrants were from the EU/EFTA group, PRRWP gained more votes, but areas with high concentration of immigrants from outside the EU/EFTA were negatively correlated with PRRWP support which equals less votes. (Rydgren & Ruth, 2011; Rydgren & Ruth, 2013) Coffé et al. (2007) found that immigrants of Turkish and Maghreb decent increased PRRWP support in Belgium while immigrants of other ethnicities had no significant effect. Bowyer (2008) found that in the United Kingdoms, he presence of large Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations in a neighbourhood positively affected the support of the British National Party (BNP) But this form of result has been questioned, both for its accuracy and for its usefulness. Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw (2011) analysed previous data from Flanders-Belgium in the time period 1987-2007. In their paper. they criticise the current practises of the PRRWP research. They found that various groups of immigrants had been more significant based on the contextual situation of the time. They found that the findings of Coffé et al. (2007) were accurate up until 1991, after this point, the significance of the variable dropped off. Later, in the elections of 1999 and 2003, immigrants from Europe where more strongly correlated with PRRWP support. The authors theorize that this is a lagged effect of the fall of the iron curtain and the war in the Balkans. (ibid: 681) Their conclusion is that no specific group of immigrants is particularly different from another. What increases support for the PRRWP is more likely connected to the way in which a wave of refugees and asylum seekers are depicted in the medial and political discourse. (ibid: 685) The literature of the immigrants’ origin is a factor which could influence the results. This factor will therefore be included as a control variable in the analysis.

1.2.1.4 Other factors
Within the sociodemographic field we can see that age, gender, education, religion and employment have all been continuously included. Among the results, it has become an accepted fact that the once most common to support the PRRWP are men below the age of 25. More inconclusively is the support among the elderly. While Arzheimer & Carter (2006) argues that elderly is positively correlated with PRRWP support. Both claims correlate with the results from a recent opinion poll in Sweden. (Sannerstedt, 2014) Meanwhile, Dülmer & Klein (2005) found that people age 65 and up where negatively correlated with support for the German PRRWP “Republikaner”.
The impact of religion can be divided to two sides. One show that being active in a church is negatively correlated to PRRWP support. Something that can, in part, be explained by the encompassing values preached in the religious community. (Dülmer & Klein, 2005; Haugen, 2015) Lubbers & Scheepers (2002) found that a subgroup, marginal Christians, were more likely to vote for a PRRWP in France, while the non-religious were significantly less likely to do so. As such, we may potentially conclude that there is a dilemma where those who perceive the threat of other religions are those who does not visit, or actively partake in religious institutions on a regular basis. As such they lose out on the trust-generating function that have been attributed to religious groups and instead hold a particularized view on Christian values. As such, an important factor in variable construction for future studies is to separate those who actively visits church and those that believe but do so on the margin. Secondly, Muslim population have been studied with various results. Some have argued that it has no effect. (Lacassen & Lubbers, 2012) While others have found that anti-Muslim sentiment have a strong correlation to PRRWP support. (Muller et al. 2014) In connection to this finding, others have also found that Muslims vote significantly less for the PRRWP. (Vanhouotte & Hooghe, 2013)

The impact of education is commonly considered to be significant, with increased educational attainment reducing PRRWP support. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Dülmer & Klein, 2005) This have been attributed both to increased knowledge, understanding and a higher development of critical thinking. Tying this together with the results of age, Schmuk & Matthes (2014) found that young people with less education where more susceptible to advertisement with pro-PRRWP messages.

The impact of unemployment has been analysed in at least three separate ways. The level of unemployment (Golder, 2003. A), being unemployed (Knigge, 1998) and the change in unemployment over time (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Dülmer & Klein, 2005). The results are inconclusive. Some argues that the unemployment levels are negatively correlated to PRRWP support. (Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall, 2012) The effect is perhaps contradictory to the image of the angry protest voter. However, studies suggest that the unemployed are more likely to vote for a socio democratic party that focus more on creating jobs and worker rights. ((Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler, 2009: 288) Some authors have found a positive correlation between unemployment and PRRWP support. (Arzheimer, 2009, Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2007) Others argue that there is a link, but the effect is only significant if the level of immigration is high. (Golder, 2003. A.) Yet others have found that unemployment is insignificant. (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001) An alternative to the interaction between immigration and unemployment is suggested by Rydgren & Ruth (2013) that found unemployment to be a relative variable, where unemployment was positively correlated to PRRWP support if the unemployed lived in an area bordering an area with a high population of immigrants.
Crime has been given little attention in PRRWP research, but still enough to show a varied outcome. Often, it’s been suggested to be a relative factor dependent on others such as immigration or people’s perceptions of the quality of law and order institutions. Or when it is linked with immigration through a discursive process, either by media or by politicians. (Dinas & Van Spanje, 2011) Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw (2011) further finds that crime had a temporal effect on PRRWP support and suggest that it could be correlated with such contextual factors as trust in the police and the capability of the state to maintain law and order. (ibid: 674) Further, this may be aided by the findings of Rydgren & Ruth ((2011) that discovered a strong, positive, correlation between the number of reported crimes and PRRWP support. The positive effect on PRRWP support have also been suggested by Lewis-Beck & Mitchell (1998) However, yet again, evidence is inconclusive and other authors found no significant link between PRRWP support and crime rates. (Bowyer, 2008: 647; (Coffé, Hayndels & Vermeir, 2007)

Wealth have had two significantly different functions in the PRRWP research. One have been connected to welfare chauvinism, the theory that suggests that the rise of the PRRWP is not only due to a disgruntled lower class but to a worried (upper)middle class that sees how the welfare system they built up is drained by immigrants and thus make them and their families lose out on what they have worked for. (Kitschelt, 1995) In its operationalisation, this have been studied in factors of average income to show how PRRWP support have been correlated with higher income areas. (Coffé et al., 2007: 153; Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw, 2011) Other studies have found a different relationship when the average income level was higher in a neighbourhood if a bordering area had a higher concentration of immigrant inhabitants. (Rydgren & Ruth, 2013) The impact of relative income have also been shown to have an effect on the cross-national level. PRRWP support have been shown to relate to anti-EU sentiment. A study by Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie (2005) found that a country with average less GDP growth than their neighbouring EU countries were more likely to have higher PRRWP support rates. This can also be connected to the field of generalized trust where Erik Uslaner have argued that while the individual income level matters little for trust, the economy of the country does. If the economy of the country falls, economic inequality increases and trust decreases. As such, your trust is not dependent on you alone, but on the world around you. (Uslaner, 2008: 22) To support this argument, it should be noted that when inflation have been included in PRRPW analysis, it has been found to be insignificant. This effect puts further emphasis on that the national economic development matters less than that of how good the country is doing relative to others. (Knigge, 1998; Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005) The benefit of this literature is three fold. First, it informs us of the link between age and PRRWP support. It may therefore be wise to include the number of people directly correlated with the relevant welfare institutions in the model. It further informs us of the impact of education to an individual’s prospects of voting for the PRRWP. As such, there is merit to first and foremost focus on lower level institutions when analysing education. Secondly, the effect of religion helps to inform the argument of generalized trust. There is merit in believing that organizations that are all-encompassing, either cultural or religious, could aid in the generation of generalized, opposite to partial, trust. Thirdly, the remaining topics is intended to both inform the reader of other areas of PRRWP
research and to similarly inform the construction of the model with the intent to run the model with all alternative demand side variables as control variables.

1.2.2 External supply-side research

The research on external supply-side variables can be divided into three areas. Political trust, political party positions and electoral system composition. Political trust may also be connected to political dissatisfaction. While the PRRWP have been positioned ideological position as anti-establishment (Rydgren, 2005), studies have attempted to find out if their voters reflect this position. The concept of political trust can take three forms. Trust in the government, trust in political parties or trust in all or individual public institutions. Oskarson & Demker (2015) found that low trust in the established political parties among the working class, combined with the PRRWP positioning on authoritarian policy positions, together explain the increased support of the PRRWP, by the working class, in Sweden. Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund (2009) found that supporters of the PRRWP in Norway on average were less trusting of the mainstream political parties, the political institutions and of others in general. Additionally, they found that the level of mistrust increased dependent on how strongly they related to the party. (ibid: 174, 175) Other examples of papers which have included political dissatisfaction, have studied dissatisfaction with political parties (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2002), the process of democracy (Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers, 2002) and in political institutions and the political regime (Knigge, 1998) also found support for the PRRWP. Swyngedouw (2001) found that political dissatisfaction due to weaker ideological differences between the mainstream parties and/or political scandals turned into political dissatisfaction pushed voters towards the PRRWP vote.

The weakened distinction between the left and the right is an issue that carries us over to the research on party positions. It has been found when party positions converge, they open up for PRRWP to declare themselves as the sole opposite party. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Loxbo, 2015) This have put into question the aforementioned practise of adversarial positions in relation to PRRWP parties. It has been shown that while everyone takes an adversarial stance, most commonly by cross-ideological cooperation, it keeps the PRRWP out of politics. However once the coalition breaks by one or more parties. The breakoff often leads to accommodative attitudes from the break of parties to PRRWP issues which in turn increases the legitimacy of the PRRWP. (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011) Cross-national adversarial positions, such as were used towards Austria when the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) came into power in the year 2000. When foreign powers impeded sanctions on Austria the support for the PRRWP government increased to where only 15% of the population wanted them out of government. (Fallend & Heinisch, 2016) Dahlström & Sundell (2012) made a study of all Swedish municipalities where they compared local mainstream politicians position on immigration with the popularity of the Sweden Democrats and found that there where a positive effect on PRRWP support when local politicians had a tougher stance. They further found that when separated to left and right, the impact of immigration toughness had a greater impact when the left changed their positions then the impact of the right-wing position. This could be correlated with the findings of other researchers that connect the ideological position of the working class to that of the PRRWP.
The legitimizing power of the mainstream issue accommodation and the ideological position of the working class should sufficiently cause a move of the left-wing to be tougher on immigration to also affect the support for the PRRWP. It is important to consider that any such move does not only mean the legitimization of the PRRWP. It can also include an increased dissatisfaction and de-legitimizing effect on the mainstream parties that seem to turn the coat for the wind as they try to accommodate popular issues to take back voters from the PRRWP, causing an opposite effect.

The link between political systems and PRRWP support have been studied from a few angels. It has been shown that the election district magnitude may affect the vote outcome of PRRWP’s which may strategically target such areas. However, the results are inconclusive as both statistically significant (positive) (Golder, 2003. A) and insignificant associations (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2007) were found. Although earlier research attributed the electoral susses of the PRRWP parties with the electoral system (Jackman and Volpert, 1996), the soundness of this finding has later been questioned. (Golder 2003. B; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005) Another inconclusive factor is election thresholds. Earlier studies found that higher thresholds meant less PRRWP votes as voters perceived that their vote might be vested if the PRRWP didn’t get in. (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998: 262) But a recent study found no such correlation. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006: 432) Hypothetically, this could be due to that PRRWPs in parliament are becoming increasingly common through Europe. Thus granting increased legitimacy to the party family.

The final category of external-supply side variables historical context. The reason that this variable is considered a supply and not demand side variable is that it considers the previous support for authoritarian as a source of possible support, but not necessarily due to a demand for, the radical right. Studies have analysed the impact of history through the concept of path dependency. That previous neo-fascist, extreme-right wing or PRRWP parties may have constituted a base of supporters. (Bowyer, 2008: 618; Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005: 566) However studied through a Large-N analysis, this factor seems to be insignificant in the case of PRRWP support in Sweden. (Dahlström & Sundell, 2012) An alternative form of historical heritage is when a PRRWP grows out of an extreme right party directly. Even though the party have evolved, these parties commonly get their legitimacy as a democratic party questioned. Some authors have expressed that such a heritage may negatively affect their potential vote share. (Cutts, Ford & Goodwin, 2011; Widfeldt, 2008; Loxbo, 2015; 178)

1.2.3 Internal supply-side variables
In the search to understand PRRWP support, the PRRWP themselves have often been forgotten in favour of demand side variables. (Mudde, 2010; Muis & Scholte, 2013) The finings can be divided between three areas: party strategy, party presence and the importance of a political leader. This does not mean that they are not interlinked, like indeed, a majority of this literature review show. For example, Widfeldt (2008) argue that the political strategy of the PRRWP in
Sweden was to establish a network of local faculties to connect with local areas. (ibid: 273) Meanwhile, Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall (2012) show that local representation is positively correlated with PRRWP success in these areas. The important difference is that the actual presence does not always reflect a strategy. The same study found no conclusive evidence that PRRWP’s targeted areas where they may gain more votes due to demand-side circumstances. (ibid: 832) The strategical decision to increase their local presence can be explained by two factors. Evidence suggest that people are more likely to perceive a small party as unserious and thus not a valid option. A party that presents itself on the local level may instead seem large and thus offer valid alternatives to other major parties. (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2009) The second reason is to normalize the party’s values. A party with an active local presence can interact as a respectable face for the party. Thus attract voters who might not only be looking for a national but a sensible local representative, even if the main party’s values seems radical. Loxbo (2015) argues that this may be the reason for the increased support of the Sweden Democrats They both increased their local presence and vote share between the 2006 and 2010 elections. In particular, he argues that this move switched their electorate from mainly working class to also include a health amount of middle, and upper, class voters. This have in turn been suggested to be a necessary step to become a legitimate political actor. (Art, 2011)

The political strategy has been connected to the acclimatisation to an advantageous situation. Often connected to issue ownership. Many studies have shown how PRRWPs gain support if they can claim ownership of a specific issue such as immigration, corruption or security. (Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012; Mudde, 2010: 1080; Muis & Scholte, 2013: 41 Oskarson & Demker (2015) argues that ownership of the entire authoritarian sector of the liberal/authoritarian scale allows the PPRWP’s to gain followers from the group, particularly working class, that holds authoritarian values additional to the classic left/right cleavage. Thus “owning” the authoritarian issue is another form of issue ownership beyond a single issue. These findings are also supported by Spies (2013)

As a political actor, the political leaders have often been attributed an extraordinary influence on the PRRWP vote. Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund (2014) found that for PRRWPs, the character of the party leader had an abnormal influence of the party’s popularity relative too other political parties. (ibid: 657) This effect was also present when compared to other local leaders of the same political party. Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers (2002) found that in combination with well-organized members and a strong, active party core had enough influence in their model to offset the influence of both education and anti-immigrant sentiment in most of their cases. Additionally, party leaders have been argued to fill a role when creating issue salience for PRRWP-beneficial topics. (Dinas & Van Spanje, 2011) But not all authors agree, some have attempted to downplayed the effect. (Green-Pedersen & Krogsstrup, 2008) Van der Brug & Mughan (2007) even make the argument that the PRRWP leader is no different in significance to any other political party leader. (ibid: 45).
1.2.4 Research question
The literature of the electoral success of PRRWPs examined a plethora of factors on both the supply and demand side. Specifically, the literature points to the importance of political or general trust for the outcome in question and the role of the welfare state. But it fell short in linking changes in the welfare state with changes in generalized and political trust and then the PRRWPs electoral success. Therefore, the research question that this thesis engages with is what the impact of the welfare state is on the electoral support of the PRRWP? In particular, I aim to investigate whether the difference in the amount of welfare provisions (partial welfare) is linked with the varying degrees of electoral support received by PRRWPs?

By asking this question, I aim to add to the research on the relationship between PRRWP and public welfare. In particular, I aim to add the idea of partiality in public institutions to the field. A topic which I have been unable to find any previous research about. The outcome of the paper could potentially offer a wider understanding as to what effects the shifting role of the state have had on the rise of the PRRWP. A topic which today is primarily dominated by a population diversity paradigm where immigration is the main focus, yet few ask themselves why the immigration issue have been given so much room in the debate. I believe that uneven distribution may offer an explanation to this particular issue.

2 Theory
In this section I am going to show how variance in the welfare provision may affect the amount of support people offer to PRRWPs.

2.1 Partial welfare
The welfare state has many forms. Swank & Betz refer to 3 variations. Universal, conservative and liberal. The universalistic welfare system, categorized by comprehensive coverage of citizens, within risk categories, a generous social wage and well developed active labour market programs differs to a corporatist, conservative (and liberal) welfare system which is categorized either by generous, occupationally based, social coverage and insurance while having minimal social service provisions. Alternatively, they can be recognized by a disproportional reliance on means-tested or private insurance and moderate to low levels of income replacements. (Swank & Betz, 2003: 224) From a theoretical perspective, the latter two are inherently partial. By partial I mean a welfare system that caters to, or treats certain groups, different from others within the same system. My argument is that while it is common to compare partial or universal institutions on the national level, sub national level variation is often forgotten or ignored. This is problematic as we can see significant variation in how good welfare services functions within, as well as between, countries. There is considerable local autonomy in many countries on the level of funding the welfare institutions receive. For example, both in Sweden and in the UK, the budget for education, elderly care and part of the healthcare institutions rely on municipal funding. Yet there are no national guidelines to decide the exact sum for welfare expenditures and there are room for local variation, sometimes due to arbitrary reasons such as local budget prioritization. In a paper from the UK, three prestige projects, which aimed to increase the notability of the municipality and further local development, were evaluated. Among the findings,
the paper showed that in two out of the three projects. Funding were cut from the local welfare budget to make room for the additional expenses of the projects. (Loftman & Nevin, 1996) The economic argument runs even deeper in the welfare sector. Especially in the Nordic countries, the state had a significant role as welfare provider. But with the rise of capitalism in the 1990’s. The view on welfare services became more and more economized. The continuous focus on economic efficiency have negatively affected the quality of welfare services in general. (Ros-skam, 2006; Lynch, 2006; Beach, 2009) In particular, the vulnerability to this change in quality differs between the upper and lower social class. Members of the upper class have, even before the change in the 90’s, been capable of ensuring their own quality of health and education services through private enterprises, or means based assurance. The true dependents on welfare is, and have always been, the lower classes. Those which lack the financial means to assure their own social and economic security. These are also considered to be the once to suffer the brunt of the change in welfare quality. (Beach, 2009) An anthological study at an elementary school in the UK offer some support to the argument. Diane Reay (2012) wrote about the issues of education in Great Britain from a class perspective. She shows that funding is one of the elements that will create variation in the quality of the education, together with other factors such as school choice and reputation. In particular, she describes how the students expressed that they perceived it unfair that their school seems underfunded and run-down relative to other schools with more resources (Reay, 2012: 45-47). The role of the universal welfare state was to assure equal access to the fulfilment of once capacity without discrimination against individual citizens on the basis of their individual circumstances. This would synthesize with the generation of positive normative values that would increase both political and generalized trust in the population. (Rothstein, 1998: 52-55) On the basis of the previous examples as well as the theoretical assumption by Rothstein, I conclude that partial welfare has two forms.

1) **A welfare system that intentionally caters to one specific part of the population.**

2) **A welfare system where an individual is limited in the fulfilment of his/her full capacity.**

Of the two functions of partial welfare, a means based systems such as the conservative or liberal welfare system described by Swank & Betz (2003) heavily dependent on private insurances with weak social services represents the first form of partial welfare. On the other hand, the example from the UK would fit in under the second form. While the system does not intentionally favour specific groups, the children that were interviewed perceived themselves to be treated unfairly perceived their school to be underfunded relative to others. This in turn reinforced their scepticism to authorities and in turn, less trusting in other groups of society. Of the two functions, I believe the second to be particularly prevalent in the Nordic countries where the universal welfare state has a long and strong tradition.

2.2 Variance in welfare provisions and the PRRWP

While there are no specific findings that support the link between funding and quality, the argument that the economization of welfare institutions that focused on economic efficiency, school choice and privatization have negatively affected institutional quality. (Bleach, 2009) I believe that the argument can be taken further however. As I concluded in the overview on economic factors of PRRWP, relative wealth mattered more in understanding PRRWP than absolute wealth. I believe that this function carries over in a similar pattern to welfare provisions. To hear how much a municipality spends on education in absolute terms say little about how they prioritize it. However, if it is presented in relative terms, then there is something to compare with. This is why I believe that relative welfare funding is a better measurement then
absolute welfare funding, but it also relates to the previous argument made on partial welfare. If a municipality spends less than the average on education, then it could be perceived as neglecting the welfare function relative to other municipalities in general, and relative to other municipal projects in particular. The argument is further informed by the literature on issue salience. Looking at the medial discourse, it is not uncommon to find articles which points out the difference in welfare expenditures, or in this case, education funding, between the top and bottom municipalities (Tideman, September 24th, 2014) or relative to the national average (Fjellman, September 20th, 2016) Both brings the issue to the public’s attention. In turn, we can expect this to affect the way in which they perceive the current municipal welfare provision to be unfair, or fair, depending on where in the scale from top to bottom, above or below average, that they rank. In line with the findings of Muis & Scholte (2013), we can expect that this in turn creates a heightened attention to issue specific policies from the political parties and thus granting higher salience to welfare as an issue. As the PRRWP have taken positions to improve welfare, make it ethnocentrically, this could aid in increasing their support. Additionally, if the PRRWP argues that the variation is in part due to immigration, the party could draw additional support from the distrust to government caused by the partial welfare provision. Further, I believe that this argument draws strength the link between right wing authoritarianism and ethnic intolerance (McFarland, 2010) and ethnic intolerance and increased care for the elderly relative to immigrants. (Van Oorschot & Uunk, 2007: 79, 80)

2.3 Mechanisms of partial welfare
I argue that the association between variance in the welfare provision and electoral support for PRRWPs runs through two mechanisms.

a) Insecurity generated by partial welfare provision may leads to lower trust in the state and in its institutions which may be beneficial to PRRWPs which are populist at their core. The reduced political trust would then feed into the group of voters that support the PRRWP due to their mistrust in the democratic system in general, and the current mainstream political parties in particular.

b) Insecurity generated by partial welfare provision may lead to lower generalized trust through the lack of reinforced positive norms by the perception of partiality in the system which in turn is reinforcing negative trust in authority, i.e. the establishment. Thereby both creating a perception of relative deprivation that enforces the idea that one social group gains, or takes, more than they deserve which may then be exploited by the PRRWP by pushing for ethnocentric welfare. This mechanism feeds both into the welfare chauvinist argument and the “losers of modernity” argument,

Together, both mechanisms account for the main characteristics of the PRRWP, mechanism a) supports the anti-establishment agenda. Mechanism b) captures both their authoritarian position and their centre right position which contains both support for welfare and the right wing ideological position of entitlement to services you help pay for. By this last argument, I point to the welfare chauvinist argument and the perception that you and your family are entitled to what you pay taxes for, relative to others which might not add as much to the pool of resources that are redistributed through the welfare function. Further, function b) also feeds into the perception of an economic threat. If there is a link between immigration and reduced welfare quality, then a plausible train of though is that further immigration could further reduce welfare quality. Thus
offering a plausible connection between lower class voters and welfare provisions. As I described above, this is the group which perceive the unevenness of the welfare system the most, while upper class voters have enough individual capital to circumvent the issue.

2.4 Hypothesis
In light of the discussion above, I formulate the following hypotheses.

H: If welfare provisions for welfare institution X is below average, the vote share of the PRRWP increases.

In order to account for national context. The hypothesis will be further deconstructed to testable hypotheses based on a selection of welfare intuitions which correlate to the municipal level of the Sweden.

3 Methodology
This chapter includes the definition of empirical setting and the level of study, data operationalization and method selection.

3.1 Empirical setting
I opted for the sub-national politic as the empirical setting to test the hypothesis. There are several reasons for this. The first reason is that the case of welfare expenditures is limited to a national setting. While we may compare average welfare expenditure levels between countries, we cannot compare the relative cost of welfare relative to a national average. Therefore, the way that the variables are operationalized determines the level of analysis. The second reason is that the use of subnational data enables a greater number of observations, which means that we can account for more variation than in cross-national studies. Additionally, it allows us to keep the broader political system and institutional variables constant. Thus enabling higher focus on comparing relevant demand and supply side variables without taking differences of national differences into account (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2007: 363). The choice of sub-national politics adds this paper to the growing line of work that looks at subnational variation. This is in part a reaction to the call by other authors to analyse data on the subnational level more as it previously mostly revolved around cross-national studies of West-European countries. Thus practically analysing the same data with slightly different combinations of variables each time (Mudde, 2007; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw, 2011; Arzheimer & Carter, 2009). The number of publications that uses such data has increased over the last few years. However the field is still highly dominated by cross-national analyses.

---

4 See for example Dahlström & Sundell, 2012; Loxbo, 2015; Dülmer & Klein, 2005; Bowyer, 2008 Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2007
3.1.1 Sweden
I have selected to use Sweden as a case for this study. The reasoning behind this is threefold. Firstly, the standing of welfare institutions within the cultural context of Sweden is of paramount importance. The welfare state has been connected to the Swedish national identity since the 1920's until today when it is often referred to as “the Swedish model”. This imply almost 100 years of universal welfare connected to the core values of the Swedish identity. (Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012: 194-197) While this does not mean that all Swedes value welfare equally but it suggests that most Swedes do, particularly those with ethno-nationalist values. Secondly, the decentralized nature of the political system in Sweden allow for a considerable subnational variation in terms of municipal finances. Swedish municipalities are responsible for allocating funds for basic public goods. This includes education and elderly care. However, this does not relate to healthcare which is divided between municipal and regional authorities. Furthermore, similarly to the United Kingdom, where budget prioritization has already been proved to exist (Loftman & Nevin, 1996), the Swedish municipalities have also been active in municipal brand making. (Brorström, 2010; Brorström & Parment. 2014) Thirdly, it reflects a choice of convenience where a large amount of easily accessible and accurate data exists. Currently, data coverage in all variables exist for all 290 municipalities. It is important to notice that while the results of the study may not be generalizable beyond the Swedish case before more research is done, it may suggest further alleyways for analysis which have previously been unexplored.

3.1.2 Sweden Democrats
Over the last two decades, Sweden has had two parties in the PRRWP family. Ny Demokrati (New Democracy) between 1991 and 2000. It held seats in parliament between 1991-1994 (Rydgren, 2005) The second party, Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats(SD)) ). They have risen rapidly in popularity from 2.9 % in 2006 to 12.9% in 2014. (Loxbo, 2015; Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall, 2012) Currently, national poles place them at 17.3%. (PSU, 2016) Their support base correlates with the same basic characteristics of other PRRWPs. Males between 18 and 25, individuals 65+ (Sannerstedt, 2014) with a strong connection to the working class. (Oskarson & Demker, 2015: 635) The party is considered to be centre/authoritarian on the left/right/liberal/authoritarian scale (Loxbo, 2015: 180) and are in the group of parties identified as sympathizers for an ethno-nationalistic welfare system. (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015) The party fits well into the authoritarian position. When referring to their webpage and political program it offers itself as a party that represents “change for real”. The party also present itself to represent all of Sweden. (Sverigedemokraterna, n.d. A) Of particular interest for the strength of issue salience is the section on immigration in the party program. Here, SD expresses the need to limit immigration so that the level and character of immigration won’t be a threat to the national identity, the national welfare or security. (SD, n.d. B). All points to that SD fulfil all characteristics of the PRRWP identified previously. It is centre-right win authoritarian with an

---

5 “förändring på riktigt” - All translations are done by the author. The webpage itself offers no alternative language setting
6 “hela Sveriges parti”
7 “Sverigedemokraterna motsätter sig inte invandring, men menar att invandringen måste hållas på en sådan nivå och vara av en sådan karaktär att den inte utgör ett hot mot vår nationella identitet eller mot vårt lands väl-färd och trygghet.”
emphasis in nativist policies and with a soft spot for the welfare state. In particular. The party connects the two issues of welfare quality to immigration which correspond to the theoretical argument made in the previous section.

3.1.3 Adjusted Hypothesis

To account for the empirical setting described above, I have constructed two adjusted hypotheses.

**H1**: If municipal expenditure on education is below average, the vote shares of the PRRWP increase.

**H2**: If municipal expenditure in elderly care is below average, the vote shares of the PRRWP increase.

3.2 Data

This section will detail the selection and operationalisation of the dependent, independent and control variables and summarize them in a table with descriptive statistics.

In order to find an effective relationship between municipal expenditures on elderly care and education on the one hand and the support for the PRRWP, I opted to use change rather than levels approach to calculate my dependent variable. Consequently, to account for the support for the Sweden Democrats, I constructed a measure by calculating the change in the electoral support for the Sweden Democrats between the 2010 and 2014 elections. The variable appears normally distributed and does not suffer from skew or kurtosis. It is thus not necessary to transform the data.

3.2.1 Operationalization, Education expenditures (H1)

The concept of education expenditure is measured with three variables. Three individual variables, education expenditure, external expenditures and children enrolled in education. The first variable is calculated as the sum of difference between the national average and local expenditures over the period of 2010 to 2013. This is in order to account for yearly fluctuations. The reason that the scope is limited to 2013 is to account for lag and secondly to avoid any effects that may be caused by partisan politics from municipal governments that attempts to appease upset voters. The variable will be calculated in line with the following equation. X is the variable we want to construct, the difference between municipal and average national spending on
education. N is the national average, M is the municipal average and Y is the number of years which we are averaging.

\[ X_1 = \frac{(M_1 - N_1) + (M_2 - N_2) + (M_3 - N_3) + (M_4 - N_4))}{Y} \]

As the years we calculate for span between 2010 and 2013, Y = 4, thus giving the width of the equation that ranges from \( N_1 \) to \( N_4 \). The variable will be based on education spending on the level of primary education, grade 1 through 9 for the average student. The logic behind this selection is two-fold. Firstly, above the level of primary education, the Swedish students are free to select a direction in their studies. This ranges from practical to theoretical subjects and on a variety of institutions, many with an acceptance area beyond the municipal range. The freedom of choice should level the impact of the average expenditures show less when we contrast different educational structures, subjects and individual interest. The effect also turns the institutional variation on its head and would no longer allow us to keep the institutional form somewhat similar. University level would not make sense either, as there is no link between university/college level finances and the municipality. Secondly, to choose the average student rather than all students or students with special needs is that we are interested in measuring the impact of budget prioritization on the many, not the few. The theoretical foundation for the argument state that the PRRWP gain support when general trust decreases. It decreases, in this case, due to that the children don’t have the same support in their education as students where the municipality spend more. It is therefore important to note that the data used does not average in costs for those with special needs, including immigrants which need extra resources to catch up to the same level as their peers and at the same time also learn the language.

The second variable, school building expenditures relate to other costs which relate to education beyond those which directly affect the child. These are connected to internal and external costs to keep and maintain the internal and external areas of the school grounds and building. This variable has been included because there is an argument that have been made that some municipalities have had to choose between higher external costs due to local housing rents or a higher number of smaller schools in order to have better school coverage (Österman, October 21, 2013). The variable will be calculated through the same equation as education expenditures. The third variable measures the average number of students enrolled in primary education within the municipality over the same period of 4 years.

3.2.2 Operationalization, Elderly care (H2)

To test H2, I used two variables to measure the concept of elderly care expenditures. Elderly care expenditures and people above the age of 65. The variables will be calculated by the same equation as in IV set 1. Elderly care is measured by the aggregated cost of all three sections of
the Swedish elderly care system. This include day care, care in special homes and care at home. The data is calculated as the total cost over 1 year and divided by the number of inhabitants of age 65 and above on the 31st of December for each year. The reason behind this selection is that while data existed that divided the sum over all inhabitants, it would, in first hand, be those of age 65+ that are actually affected and connected to the expenses. Further, in correlation with the second variable, the percentage of inhabitants above age 65, it will offer an insight into the growing issue of de-population and rising elderly care costs in the rural parts of Sweden.

When computing the variable elderly expenditures. It was found that no value existed for the year 2012 for Nykvarn municipality. To account for this missing value, the sum of the other observations between 2010 and 2014 were summed up and divided by 4 to calculate the mean. The missing value was then replaced by the municipal mean. This to fill in the missing value while not affecting the overall result of the municipality or the national average for that year. This is in line with the method used by Dahlström & Sundell to fill in missing values in the few cases where no responses were received. (Dahlström & Sundell, 2012: 357) The mean value was calculated to 33292.75 and rounded up to 33293.

3.2.3 Control variables

Many authors have made the argument that when we construct a model to measure the way in which PRRWP gain support, a mix of both demand and supply variables should be included. (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 482; Pauwels, 2010: 271; Mudde, 2010: 1181) As such, I will draw upon the variables which was covered in the literature review to comprise a mixed set of variables from both sides.

The basic set of variables which is included on the demand side is immigration, education, crime and unemployment. As the findings remain inconclusive, I will include these as well. Immigration will be operationalised as two variables in line with the findings of Rydgren & Ruth (2013) and so I will separate between immigrants from the EU/EFTA and immigrants from outside the EU. Unemployment will be measured by the percentage of unemployed in the municipality. (Golder, 2003. A) Education will be broken down into two variables measuring % of population with higher and lower education. This is a simplified version of Arzheimer & Carter (2006) which included larger variation. However, in line with the findings of Schmuk & Matthes (2014), I believe that the most important breaking point is between primary and secondary education. Income inequality will be included in order to contrast the findings of this paper with the previous research that have utilized it as a proxy-variable to measure social capital. To make sure that I contrast appropriately, I will use the gene-coefficient of income inequality which is in line with the model used by Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler (2009)

---

8 For an in-depth walkthrough of the Swedish elderly care system and its functions, visit www.swedish-healthcare.com
To further measure the effect of the economic factors, I will control for the relative wealth argument that I discussed in the literature review, inspired by Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie (2005), on the municipal level as well as individual wealth. To control for the relative wealth, I will control for the change in municipal Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita relative to the national average. In order to account for the difference, I will utilize the same equation as for education and elderly care expenditures with the difference that we are limited to data from two years. The Swedish bureau of statistics only collected data for the years 2012 and 2013. While it would have been preferable to have data for all four years, the result will be similar. We will still be able to account for the average change relative to the national average, but with the limitation that we cannot account for random effects. In order to account for the welfare chauvinist hypothesis, a control will also be added for disposable income, measured by its mean value per inhabitant, age 20+. (Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw, 2011, Kitschelt, 1995) Crime will be measured by the number of crimes reported for every 100 000 citizens. This goes in line with previous modelling (Rydgren & Ruth, 2011), however the research overview show that the effect of crime might more likely be based on people’s perception of the quality of the crime fighting institutions. An alternative variable which were considered for this paper was to utilize satisfaction statistics that measured people’s perception of security in line with the suggestion by Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw (2011) This took into account the fear of various crimes being committed. The issue with this data were that it turned out to be incomplete and non-consecutive. There several cases with missing values and no single year existed where all municipalities had made the survey, as such I controlled for data between 2010 and 2014 and still found missing values. It may be possible to go back further however at that point the variable would no longer fill any function as it did no longer reflect the citizen’s views connected to any period close to the election. Neither would it reflect possible changes applied by the law and order institutions in order to counteract growing insecurity. The variable was therefore discarded and replaced by the current variable. To account for the local Swedish context, a variable was retrieved to measure the percentage of the municipal population that lives outside of the city centre. Together with men under the age of 25 and the elderly, people from the rural areas are considered to be more supportive of the Sweden Democrats. (Sannersted, 2014)

In order to account for support side variables. This paper will utilize five variables. Issue salience, presence, party organization, historic precondition and election participation. In order to measure issue salience, I will include the data from Dahlström & Sundell (2012) which measure the mainstream party’s toughness on immigration\(^9\). The data comes with an adverse effect which must be taken into account. Unfortunately, the data was retrieved in 2008 and no similar data exists from a later date. As such, this should be kept in mind when interpreting the results as it affects the conclusions that we may draw from the outcome. To measure historic preconditions, it makes little sense to measure extremist roots of the Sweden Democrats, as might be sensible in a cross-national study. The benefit of the sub-national level is that this variable is

\(^9\) For a full description, see Dahlström & Sundell, 2012: 356, 357
constant. Instead, I will again borrow from Dahlström & Sundell (2012) and include a measurement for the vote share of New Democracy in 1994. This is the only other PRRWP that have had a set in the Swedish parliament between 1991 and 1994. (Dahlström & Sundell, 2012; 358) Opposite to Dahlström & Sundell however, I will not include the vote share of the nationalist party from 1936. The reasoning behind this decision is based on the position that the PRRWP differs from the fascist party family which had its high in the middle of the 20th century. Additionally, in depth studies of the neo-fascist movements in Sweden suggest that families connected to this group of parties are less likely to end up with the Sweden Democrats and more likely to connect with the modern neo-fascist movements such as “Svenska motståndsrörelsen”. (Lööw, 2015) The variable has two missing values. In the regression, these are replaced by the value of the mean after the assurance of normal distribution.

Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall (2012) found that local organizations of SD aided in facilitating their success. Unfortunately, there are no list of local SD organizations from 2014. The aforementioned authors utilized formal ballots to account for SD presence. However, as the SD entered the parliament the same year. The election centres are now obligated to assure the presence of SD ballots at all facilities. It would thus be unreliable to use the same approach now. However, their findings suggested that presence correlated with a higher number of chairs in the municipal council. Therefore, I will utilize this measurement as an approximation of party presence by including the number of chairs gained by SD in the 2010 elections. Thus accounting for possible lag. Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers (2002) argued that a well-organized party posed a significant effect on PRRWP support, however this is an area that is difficult to quantify. I’ve decided to control for the number of vacant seats that were held, but not filled, by the Sweden Democrats. The reason behind this is that if the party got a set but did not have candidates to fill the post, it would affect the party’s’ local credibility and thereby should negatively affect the support it gained in 2014. Finally, I’ve decided to include a measurement for participation which measure the change in voter participation between 2010 and 2014 in order to see if the outcome could be explained by that more people turned out to vote. As have been seen in the literature, the issues connected to the PRRWP also corresponded to make people more engaged to vote. But not automatically correlate with an increased vote share for the PRRWP. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006)

3.2.4 Transformation

The variables for education expenditure, local expenditure, number of students, elderly care expenditure, crime rate and disposable income were transformed to a standardized variable through SPSS. This were done in order to avoid the issue of absolute, high numbers which negatively affects the interpretability of the model. Due to the high values, the result ended with b= 0 with p<.001. The standardization was also done in order to attempt to reduce the number of omitted values, the variables which had high absolute numbers were standardized to reduce the size of the measurements. Unfortunately, this did not affect the leverage of the omitted values. The interpretation of a standardized variable is based on the formula 1-unit change =
one-unit change in standard deviation (sd) (see table of descriptive statistics for sd values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable name</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SD_change, %</td>
<td>5.12(.13)</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>12.31</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_exp, t/kr</td>
<td>237.77(307.45)</td>
<td>5107.85</td>
<td>-9300</td>
<td>27300</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local_exp, t/kr</td>
<td>-14.85(211.19)</td>
<td>3508.70</td>
<td>-7650</td>
<td>12375</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>student_average</td>
<td>2574.85(195.06)</td>
<td>3240.73</td>
<td>165.5</td>
<td>33555.5</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elderly_exp, t/kr</td>
<td>128.52(531.55)</td>
<td>8830.83</td>
<td>-23768</td>
<td>35999.5</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elders_average, %</td>
<td>21.99(.23)</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>12.43</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immi_EU</td>
<td>2.66(.08)</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immi_non_EU</td>
<td>7.07(.24)</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_high, %</td>
<td>32.49(.58)</td>
<td>9.67</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_low, %</td>
<td>15.13(.23)</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemp_2013, %</td>
<td>6.70(.12)</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime_2013, c/100 000 inhabitants</td>
<td>9226.29(161.40)</td>
<td>2681.42</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>19231</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disposable_income, t/kr inhabitants</td>
<td>206717.09(1386.72)</td>
<td>23038.00</td>
<td>171428</td>
<td>324903</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_rural, %</td>
<td>.2563373</td>
<td>.14609198</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.68961</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_inequality, 1 - 100 Gene, coefficient</td>
<td>.38(.0021)</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRP_dev t/kr inhabitants</td>
<td>-92.08(7.46)</td>
<td>124.02</td>
<td>-265</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND_1994, %</td>
<td>1.01(.06)</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean_toughness, scale, 0.0 - 1.0</td>
<td>.35(.0045)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec_P_change_2014, %</td>
<td>1.62(.066)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD_empty_chair</td>
<td>.25(.039)</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD_chair</td>
<td>2.11(.11)</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Method

This paper is a quantitative study that will apply a multiple regression Ordinary least square (OLS) model. The benefit of this particular method is that it enables the measurement of relative significance between several variables in order to test a hypothesis. This is in line with the goal of this study as it attempts to test a new, previously untested hypothesis, and compare it to previous findings within the PRRWP field. Further, I will apply a forced input multiple regression method, incorporating several variables sorted only through categorical means. Thus differentiating from Hierarchical or stepwise multiple regressions which follows a specific order (Fields, 2013: 322). As the topic of interest is the change between elections that is interesting, it is deemed plausible that calculating the change by differentiating the years 2010 and 2014 in most variables. I believe this to be a better method for this purpose then time series analysis which might be an alternative as the timeframe for the SD as a political party only goes back to 2006, meaning that a time series analysis would have few observations. This due to that even if we observe cases between election years, it makes no sense since party support data only is 100% reliable at elections as these are manifestations and expressions of support while pole, as an alternative between elections, become subjective to sample selection and subjective whims in opinion. Significance will be measured by the two-tailed p-test. The paper applies the conservative measurement of p < 0.05. The analysis will be divided into 5 models. Model one
will include the three main variables, education and elderly care expenditures. The second will include the sociodemographic variables % of population above age 65 and the number of enrolled kids in education. The third model will add the demand-side variables to control for alternative demand side explanation. The fourth model will include the supply-side variables to compare the two groups and their influence on the PRRWP vote share. The fifth model contains all variables at a perfect sample. Thus holding N at 290.

4 Analysis
This chapter covers, in order, pre-regression analyses to assure that the models fulfil the basic assumptions of multiple regression. The second half of the chapter contains the regression results and the main analysis.

4.1 Pre-regression analysis.
This section will measure the data in order to make sure that it fulfils the basic assumptions of the linear regression. This is done in order to strengthen the result and guarantee the quality of the findings as well as transparency between the writer and the reader to communicate the conscious decisions taken by the writer when sorting and managing the data.

4.1.1 Normal distribution
When we do a linear regression, it is useful to make sure that our sample is representative in the distribution of observations. The reason that we test this is to make sure that no observation has an abnormal influence on the regression. The impact of an interaction variable becomes more severe when we include cantered interaction terms. In the process of cantering a variable we deduct the variable from its mean but when we have outliers in the model, the mean will be different. Tus potentially inflating the effect of the interaction term. affected, But the process of omitting cases is not unproblematic. The opinions on if it is right to remove influential cases is hotly debated due to the question of the scientific community, in the hunt for generalizable results, inevitably also create bias. The form of our target group changes by the removal of our cases, which is important to keep in mind. By omitting cases, it is questionable to claim that we measure the entire population, yet neither is it correct to claim that we measure a sample. Instead, the result of omitting variable is that we now measure a normally distributed sample of the total population. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009: 343-345)

---

10 The discussion between the two sides can be seen in the exchange between Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, (2007). Arzheimer & Carter (2009) and Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund (2009, b) In their critique, Arzheimer & Carter criticise Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund in their decision to omit some cases.
When accounting for outliers, there are two forms of value measurement that becomes relevant. The first is the leverage of individual cases on the overall model. For this purpose, four sets of values have been collected through analysing the data. First, to assess the overall impact on the regression, cantered leverage \( \frac{2 + k + 2}{n} \) Cook’s distance \( 4 \div n \), and studentized deleted residual \( SDR. > \pm 2 \). Additionally, in order to assess the impact of an observation on the regression coefficient. For this purpose, DFBeta values was taking into consideration \( \frac{2}{\sqrt{n}} \).\(^{11}\) (Chen et al., 2003)

The second is to assure that the residual values of the model are normally distributed. The second step is significantly more valuable as it is only when the residuals are normally distributed that we can get reliable P-values\(^{12}\) from the model. To measure this, we take into account the skew and kurtosis values of the unstandardized residuals. Additionally, we take into account the Shapiro-Wilk value to test for normality. To fulfil the assumption of normal distribution, we want skew and kurtosis to be as close to zero as possible while having the Shapiro-Wilk be insignificant (p>.05. (Chen et al., 2003) The result of these tests have shown that we have several outliers, both in the observations and among the observations.

As can be seen by table 1 in Appendix 2, the municipalities of Stockholm, Bjuv & Ljusnarsberg all show values that significantly alter the results of the model. These three have above the tolerated values in two of the three influence measures and DFBeta values above .8. This imply that the effect of these cases alone affect the regression coefficient 8 times as much as they in theory should (DFBeta= 0.1174). Initially, these cases are therefore omitted. Next we look at the residual statistics. In table 2, Appendix 2 we can see a summary of omitted variables, skew, kurtosis and the Shapiro-Wilk coefficient. In order to keep omitted variables to a minimum and avoid omitting unnecessarily, the process of selecting cases were done carefully picking only the highest or lowest values at a time, then recounting the unstandardized residual values to analyse the impact. The final value of N is 276. In the last round of controls for residual distribution, the values suggested a worse fit, with Shapiro-Wilk dropping from .330 to .185. The final omitted value was therefore remitted.

\(^{11}\) For table of values, see table 1 in appendix 1.1.  
\(^{12}\) The P-value indicates the significant of the coefficient in the regression. In this case, a two- tailed significance test is used which means that a coefficient is significant when the p-value is smaller then, 0.05, or within the 95% confidence interval.
4.1.2 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity

When controlling for heteroscedasticity, the predicted values were mapped against the residuals in a simple scatterplot. The graph shows a fairly heteroscedastic picture of the full model. On the individual level, the number of students as well as the vote share of new Democracy in 1994 have homoscedasticity tendencies. Therefore, the variables were log transformed. However, this had no effect on the distribution. It was therefore concluded that the two variables, as controls, had little effect on the findings or the overall model and were kept in its original form.\textsuperscript{13}

Normally, multicollinearity is only an issue when we include time series analysis or multiple variables that risk covariance. As the model contains two pairs of measurements (education and immigration) that measure different parts of the same population, it is good to make sure there is no multicollinearity. To do this, we check the tolerance and VIF values of each predictor.\textsuperscript{14} The highest observed VIF value is 7.778. The rule of thumb is that VIF-values above 10 should be a case for worry. Tolerance measures the amount of variance a predictor can explain independently of others. As such, it also gives an indication to if a variable is redundant within the scope of the model. If the tolerance value is below .1 it has little impact on the dependent variable and may merit further investigation. The tolerance scores of the predictors range from .129 to .898. We can therefore conclude that the variables in the model independently explain enough of the variance to remain while no issues with collinearity were observed.

4.1.3 Non-Linearity and independence of errors

To ensure that there are no issues with inflating errors and assure that the assumption of independent errors is affirmed. A Durbin-Watson test were made. The value for the full model is 1.898. The ideal score is 2 but the value can range from 0 to 4. As our score is close to 2, there should be no issues with dependent errors.

All predictors in the model is numeric and follows either a scale or a set of nominal values with a linear function. To ensure that all variables fulfil the linear assumption all variables was mapped in partial plots against the change in vote share for the Sweden Democrats. The plots show the linear relationship with 95% confidence intervals.\textsuperscript{15} The plots suggest no issues with linearity.

4.2 Results

The regression-table is set as a summary of the results of the 5 models identified above. The numbers represent the unstandardized($b$) beta coefficient. As previously defined, model 5 includes the regression at full sample.

\textsuperscript{13} Individual scatterplots are available in appendix 2.
\textsuperscript{14} For a full table of Tolerance and VIF values, see appendix 2
\textsuperscript{15} For the full set of partial plots, see appendix 2.
Table 3: Regression table, DV - Difference in SD vote, 2010/2014, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable name</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>edu_exp, t/kr</td>
<td>-.541***(.141)</td>
<td>-.683***(.139)</td>
<td>-.547***(.129)</td>
<td>-.401***(.121)</td>
<td>-.592***(.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local_exp, t/kr</td>
<td>-.021 (.138)</td>
<td>-.039 (.133)</td>
<td>-.096 (.124)</td>
<td>-.055 (.115)</td>
<td>.047 (.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elderly_exp, t/kr</td>
<td>-.349***(.143)</td>
<td>-.514***(.143)</td>
<td>-.390***(.154)</td>
<td>-.328***(.143)</td>
<td>-.294 (.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>student_average</td>
<td>-.482*(.201)</td>
<td>.112**(.043)</td>
<td>-.078 (.057)</td>
<td>-.033 (.053)</td>
<td>.078 (.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elders_average, %</td>
<td>.112**(.043)</td>
<td>.078 (.111)</td>
<td>.074 (.147)</td>
<td>.040 (.071)</td>
<td>.074 (.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immi_EU</td>
<td>.189 (.113)</td>
<td>.210 (.111)</td>
<td>.074 (.147)</td>
<td>.040 (.071)</td>
<td>.074 (.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immi_non_EU</td>
<td>-.120*.057)</td>
<td>-.030 (.054)</td>
<td>.040 (.071)</td>
<td>.074 (.147)</td>
<td>.040 (.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_high, %</td>
<td>-.028 (.032)</td>
<td>-.032 (.029)</td>
<td>-.030 (.039)</td>
<td>-.030 (.039)</td>
<td>-.030 (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_low, %</td>
<td>.183***(.059)</td>
<td>.156**(.055)</td>
<td>.160***(.072)</td>
<td>.160***(.072)</td>
<td>.160***(.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemp_2013*, %</td>
<td>.157 (.098)</td>
<td>.085 (.095)</td>
<td>.160 (.127)</td>
<td>.160 (.127)</td>
<td>.160 (.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime_2013, c/100 000 inhabitants</td>
<td>-.139 (.278)</td>
<td>.044 (.182)</td>
<td>.335 (.237)</td>
<td>.335 (.237)</td>
<td>.335 (.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposable_income, t/kr inhabitants</td>
<td>.898(.525)</td>
<td>.504 (4.891)</td>
<td>.195 (.659)</td>
<td>.195 (.659)</td>
<td>.195 (.659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime_2013, c/100 000 inhabitants</td>
<td>-.139 (.278)</td>
<td>.044 (.182)</td>
<td>.335 (.237)</td>
<td>.335 (.237)</td>
<td>.335 (.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income_inequality, 1 - 100 Gene, coefficient</td>
<td>.898(.525)</td>
<td>.504 (4.891)</td>
<td>.195 (.659)</td>
<td>.195 (.659)</td>
<td>.195 (.659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_rural, %</td>
<td>.690 (1.307)</td>
<td>.217 (1.204)</td>
<td>-.055 (.162)</td>
<td>-.055 (.162)</td>
<td>-.055 (.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRP_dev t/kr inhabitants</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>-.949 (.001)</td>
<td>-.002 (.001)</td>
<td>-.002 (.001)</td>
<td>-.002 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND_1994, %</td>
<td>-.049 (.096)</td>
<td>-.149 (.130)</td>
<td>-.102 (2.182)</td>
<td>-.102 (2.182)</td>
<td>-.102 (2.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean_toughness, scale,0.0 - 1.0</td>
<td>.417(1.642)</td>
<td>.643***(.114)</td>
<td>.789***(.151)</td>
<td>.789***(.151)</td>
<td>.789***(.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec_P_change_2014, %</td>
<td>.347*.167)</td>
<td>-.014 (.217)</td>
<td>-.014 (.217)</td>
<td>-.014 (.217)</td>
<td>-.014 (.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD_empty_chair</td>
<td>.208**(.080)</td>
<td>.034 (.104)</td>
<td>.034 (.104)</td>
<td>.034 (.104)</td>
<td>.034 (.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD_chair</td>
<td>.208**(.080)</td>
<td>.034 (.104)</td>
<td>.034 (.104)</td>
<td>.034 (.104)</td>
<td>.034 (.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.125***(.130)</td>
<td>2.638***(.959)</td>
<td>3.735(2.269)</td>
<td>1.673(2.157)</td>
<td>1.673(2.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.380</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In model 1, which only contains the welfare expenditure variables. Of the three, education have the strongest effect at b -.541 at p<.001. The cost of locals does not show any significant. Elderly care funding is significant with b-.349 at p<.05. Both of the significant variables have a negative connotation, suggesting that the relationship follows the prediction of H1 and H2. For every .541 standard deviation decrease in municipal funding for education, SD increases their support by 1 percentile in the municipality. Elderly care shows the same relationship. But then at a .349 standard deviation decrease in municipal funding increases SD support by 1 percentile.

Looking at model 2. The inclusion of the socio-demographic variables did not change the effect of education expenditure which remains at p<.001. The student variable itself were significant at p<.05. The inclusion of students and elders increased the significant of elderly care to p<.001. This could be explained by the inclusion of the percentile of the population in the municipality that were above the age of 65 which were significant at p<.01. A plausible explanation for this change in sig. value for elderly care is that for municipalities with higher average population of
In model 3, education expenditure remains at p<.001 but drops from $b = .683$ to -.547. Local expenditure remains insignificant. Relative to the inclusion of other demand side variables, both students and elders drop below the level of significant. Elderly care remains significant but drops to p<.05. Of the predicted effects of the other factors that have been found to sometime support the PRRWP. Only two pass the threshold of significands. In line with Rydgren & Ruth (2011/2013) the percentage of the population that is from outside the EU/EFTA is negatively correlated to PRRWP support. It shows a $b$ of -.120 at p<.05. This is against most of the research on the PRRWP but is in line with the findings of Vanhoutte & Hooghe (2013). The second demand side control to be significant is the % of inhabitants with primary education or lower. It has a $b$ of.183 at p<.01. The data thus suggest that the higher the number of inhabitants with up to primary education, the higher the support is for the PRRWP. This is in line both with previous research that suggest this group to be more likely to support the PRRWP (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006), but also the research that suggest that this group is particularly vulnerable to perceived threats and to the ideological campaigns of advertisement in particular, and the PRRWP in particular (Schmuk & Matthes, 2014). However, due to the nature of this study, the causality of each particular explanation cannot be concluded and as such, the exact reason as to why this variable is significant is only speculative, not definite.

Relative to other factors, expected predictors such as rural population, crime rate and unemployment were insignificant. The percentile of population from within the EU/EFTA had the predicted positive relationship to PRRWP support predicted by Rydgren & Ruth (2013) but ended up with at $p = .095$. Above the threshold for significands. None of the three variables that measured economic factors showed significands either. While disappointing, the data suggests that the “pure” welfare chauvinist argument that PRRWP support could be explained by the fear of the wealthy to lose out on what they have (Kitschelt, 1995). Nor does the perception that income inequality can explain the function of why PRRWPs rise in popularity in some areas. It should however be noted that over all, Sweden score fairly well on the gene coefficients. This
is particularly prevalent if we refer to figure 4 which show a simple scatter on the observations of gene-coefficient set against SD_change. As we can see, almost all observations are clustered between .35 and .4. It is possible to assume that an analysis in country with a bigger variation in income inequality may show different results. We should thus not exclude the plausibility that this, or any of the other findings, are due to the influence of the empirical setting.

The result of the GRP variable is unfortunately suffering from a miscalculated absolute number effect. As such, it is difficult to interpret the results or draw any conclusions from the findings. The significands of this variable is however, far from the threshold at the moment which may suggest that even if transformed, the variable would not reach significands.

In model 4, we add the supply side variables to compare the influence between supply and demand side factors on the main IV. Of the two IV’s, only education expenditure remains significant at p<.001 but drops to \( b = -.401 \) from -.547. Elderly care remains at p<.05 with \( b \) changing from -.390 to -.328. A significant factor to consider when we analyse the main IVs are that they both are standardized variables. A 1 unit change therefore mean one change in the IV. As the stepwise change in each model have shown, the \( b \) for both variables have decreased with the inclusion of other demand and supply side factors. This would normally mean that the effect drops slightly relative to others. However, in this case, a drop in the value of the standardized variable means that one percentile increase in SD support is gained from a smaller decrease in welfare funding. As such, with the inclusion of each new model, the welfare variable becomes more sensitive to the funding received by the government. In model two, one increase in SD equated to education expenditure at -3488.66\(^{16} \) from the national average. In model 4, the same relationship corresponded to -2048.25 from the national average. The only other demand side variable that remained significant were primary education at p<.01.

On the supply side, the vote shares of New Democracy and the mainstream party position on immigration both lack significands. The result of ND is in line with the findings of Dahlström & Sundell (2012) which also failed to find any significant relationship. On the other hand, mainstream party position is against what they found. It is however highly plausible that the effect of their data is offset by the distance between when the data were collected before the election 2010 and the results of the change between 2010 and 2014. As such, the findings, while informed by part positions in 2010, cannot be considered as evidence of their position between 2010 and 2014.

The internal supply side variables both held up in the regression. Party presence, or the number of chairs gained by SD in 2010, were positively correlated with increased SD support at p<.01. However, opposite to the theoretical argument. The variable that measured party reliability, or the number of seats that remained empty during the period, were also positively correlated to increased SD support at p<.05. Why the relationship is positive is difficult to explain, however if we compare it with model 5, we see that while insignificant, the direction turns from positive to negative. We might therefore consider that the effect of party reliance is affected by the selection of omitted variables in a way which may have affected the coefficient.

Finally, we note that the effect of election participation is highly significant at p.<001 with a positive correlation to PRRWP support. Based on the findings of Arzheimer & Carter (2006) we could potentially connect the change to a growing popularity of the PRRWP which make a

\(^{16} \) This relationship was calculated by multiplying the SD of edu_exp, 5107.85 times the \( b \) of edu-exp in model two, .683.
vote for them more likely to count over all. It is also plausible to assume that the issues identified by Arzheimer & Carter as PRRWP issues, make people more likely to vote. Another possible explanation is that immigration has gained increasing issue salience over the last few years. If both politicians and the media draws connections between the two, the voters that perceive immigration as a threat could increase which in turn would increase the PRRWP vote as well.

If we refer to model 5, the perfect sample model. We can see education expenditure remains at p<.001. All other variables, except for election participation(p<.001) and primary education(p<.05), feel below the threshold in this model. We can also see that the direction of the relationship changes for some of the insignificant variables. However, if we turn to the R², we can see that between model 4 and 5, we lose 13.6% of the explained variance, thus suggesting that the model fit of the perfect sample is weaker than the normally distributed sample.

In the other models, R² successively increases from 10.9% in model 1 to 18.7% when including students and elders in model 2. With the inclusion of demand side variables in model 3, the total variance explained were 38%, thus an increase of 19.3%. The supply side variable in model 4 added another 10.8% to a total of 48.8% of the total variance explained.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

The aim of this paper were to better understand how the welfare state affected the electoral support for the populist radical right-wing parties (PRRWP). In order to do this, I identified two mechanisms through which uneven welfare provision could increase the potential support for the PRRWP, and how the PRRWP in turn could potentially utilize these potentialities to form a strategy that would increase their support. As such, I identified partial welfare as welfare where not everyone is catered to equality. To test the hypothesis, I selected Sweden as a case. I argued that the Sweden Democrats were a part of the PRRWP group, both through the use of academic literature and by referring to the party’s political manifesto. I argue that specifically because the link between national identity and the welfare state is strong in Sweden in correlation to that everyone should be treated equally, Sweden makes a good case to test the hypothesis. If there is no variation in the welfare system, then there would be no correlation between the welfare provisions and the PRRWP. To account for the empirical setting, and the role of the municipality, I constructed two operationalization’s of the main hypothesis. H1 suggest that when educational funding is below the national average, the support for the PRRWP increases. H2 state that when elderly care funding is below the national average, the support for the PRRWP increases.

In the regression, support was found for both H1 and H2, where the results of H1 in particular remained at p<.001 through all 5 models. These findings support the theory that partial welfare may correlate to increased support for the PRRWP. I believe that future studies should incorporate the variance in welfare expenditures. Particularly on the subnational level where the variance may be greater and where the impact on the individual is greater than in cross-country comparison. It is important to note that I consider partial welfare to be a mechanism for changes in trust and for creating potential beneficial contexts where the PRRWP can gain increased support. As such, while it might be possible to conclude that I argue that partial welfare causes changes in policy preference, this is not the case. As such, while I might be criticised for not including, for example, the vote shares of the mainstream parties, this would have little meaning. That said, future studies could potentially look into the link between partial welfare and policy positions. But in order to do so, individual level survey data should be used. To draw a conclusion related to policy positions based on this study would potentially be contra intuitive, but foremost, it would be to commit an ecological fallacy to draw individual level conclusions based on aggregated
structure level data. Other avenues for future studies could be to analyse other forms of welfare institutions. Healthcare services, if entangled into a function separated between the regional and the municipal level, could add further insight into the impact of public welfare. Another avenue would be to dig deeper into welfare provisions to find out at what point people perceive welfare to be partial. Most of my arguments could be criticised for being highly theoretical. Future studies could aid in analysing how partiality is perceived, if it is perceived at all. Is it based on interaction or is the explanation closer to the issue salience argument where it becomes an issue once it reaches the political and/or media debate.

Most other findings in the regression were expected, except for the effect of party reliability which results, opposite to expectation, were positively correlated to PRRWP support. It is possible that the effect of the variable would be different depending on which outliers were deleted. As were shown in model 5, the variable there had the expected correlation but below the threshold for significands. Overall, better measurements could potentially have affected the number of removed outliers. Even if an effort were made to replace the absolute values in the model with standardized variables, the same outliers still remained. It could also be argued that there are some issues of homoscedasticity in two of the variables, however, even after attempting to a log transformation to assure normal distribution, the observations still clustered in almost the same way. As the variables were controls only, they were kept without changes.

Another limitation of this paper is the assumption of trust as an inherent variable. While it is not included in the regression I’ve continuously referred to it through the theory and literature review. An inclusion of social trust relative to the PRRWP would be interesting and have not been able to find a paper where it is done. However, it is not entirely unproblematic. Most social trust studies are done by social surveys and carried out by universities or other institutions. This is fine, however, one of the core mechanics that I identified is the anti-establishment position and a lack of trust in public institutions. The question is if the survey will be able to capture this group of people, as it, at least in my mind, would be logical for these individuals with low trust in institutions not to be willing to take part in such a survey. This would then, even before the analysis, mean that the data is biased. This is not completely unfounded speculation, if we refer to the SOM election participation survey on the values of SD voters, we can see that the number of respondents continuously drops for each year. (Sannersted, 2014)

Over all, I believe that this thesis has aided in improving the understanding of how partiality in the welfare system can create increased support for the PRRWP. Considering the significands of both IVs, the data definitely suggested that they are interlinked. I hope that future studies can incorporate these findings and continue to incorporate generalized trust into the field of PRRWP research.
## Appendix 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>code</th>
<th>measurement</th>
<th>variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SD_change</td>
<td>% change in vote share</td>
<td>The change in vote share for the Sweden democrats between 2010 and 2014</td>
<td>the Swedish Election Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_exp</td>
<td>thousand crowns per student</td>
<td>the mean difference in primary education funding between 2010 and 2014</td>
<td>The Swedish National Agency for Education/SIRIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local_exp</td>
<td>thousand crowns per student</td>
<td>the mean expenditures on school building expenses between 2010 and 2013</td>
<td>The Swedish National Agency for Education/SIRIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>student_average</td>
<td>number of students</td>
<td>The average number of students enrolled in primary education between 2010 and 2014</td>
<td>The Swedish National Agency for Education/SIRIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elderly_exp</td>
<td>thousand crowns per inhabitant, 65+</td>
<td>The mean elderly care expenditures between 2010 and 2013 relative to the national average</td>
<td>Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions/Kolada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elders_average</td>
<td>% of inhabitants 65+</td>
<td>The % of the population above 65</td>
<td>Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions/Kolada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immi_EU</td>
<td>% of population</td>
<td>The number of immigrants from within the EU/EFTA that lives in a municipality</td>
<td>Statistics Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immi_non_EU</td>
<td>% of population</td>
<td>The number of immigrants from outside the EU/EFTA that lives in a municipality</td>
<td>Statistics Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_high</td>
<td>% of population</td>
<td>The % of population with higher education</td>
<td>Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions/Kolada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_low</td>
<td>% of population</td>
<td>The % of population with primary education</td>
<td>Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions/Kolada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemp_2013</td>
<td>% of population &amp; of population</td>
<td>The % of population in open unemployment or in active unemployment programmes</td>
<td>Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions/Kolada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime_2013</td>
<td>crime per 100 000 inhabitants</td>
<td>The local crime rate</td>
<td>The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention/Brå</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disposable_income</td>
<td>thousand crowns per inhabitant</td>
<td>The average income level in an area</td>
<td>Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions/Kolada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_inequality</td>
<td>1 - 100 Gene, co-efficient</td>
<td>Income inequality within the municipality</td>
<td>Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions/Kolada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop_rural</td>
<td>Percentage of population</td>
<td>The percentage of the population that lives outside of the city centre</td>
<td>Statistics Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRP_dev</td>
<td>thousand crowns per inhabitants</td>
<td>Gross Regional Product or the economic development of the municipal economy</td>
<td>Swedish Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND_1994</td>
<td>% vote share</td>
<td>The vote share for the New Democracy party in 1994</td>
<td>Dahlström &amp; Sundell(2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean_toughness</td>
<td>scale, 0.0 - 1.0</td>
<td>Mean toughness on immigrants in the mainstream parties</td>
<td>Dahlström &amp; Sundell(2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec_P_change_2014</td>
<td>% change in voter turnout</td>
<td>Change in election participation between 2010 and 2014</td>
<td>Statistics Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD_empty_chair</td>
<td>number of empty chairs</td>
<td>The amount of seats without someone to occupy them in the municipal council</td>
<td>the Swedish Election Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD_chair</td>
<td>number of owned seat in city council</td>
<td>The number of seats won by the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 elections</td>
<td>Statistics Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2:

Normal distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>428</td>
<td>2.620</td>
<td>.05542</td>
<td>.38214</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2582</td>
<td>2.424</td>
<td>-.16823</td>
<td>-.24571</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499</td>
<td>2.302</td>
<td>-.12279</td>
<td>.26447</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260</td>
<td>-6.711</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>-.28132</td>
<td>.88730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>3.785</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>-.54006</td>
<td>.92433</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>561</td>
<td>3.536</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.11975</td>
<td>-.37822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>834</td>
<td>3.241</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.10845</td>
<td>.31136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>3.026</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>-.09009</td>
<td>.40690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2560</td>
<td>2.852</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>-.18868</td>
<td>--44880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>604</td>
<td>-2.649</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.17155</td>
<td>.42046</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.649</td>
<td>.03122</td>
<td>.87687</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2425</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>-.61115</td>
<td>-.53316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>.12541</td>
<td>.47642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>484</td>
<td>.334</td>
<td>.03181</td>
<td>.23214</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>.01480</td>
<td>.09832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td>.07187</td>
<td>--30667</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1281</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.00111</td>
<td>-.22820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1480</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.00039</td>
<td>-.01679</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2084</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.01063</td>
<td>.14899</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>.02003</td>
<td>-.43501</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| bench-mark | >±2 | 0.1379 | 0.1517 | 0.1174 | 0.1174 |

Residuals
### Residual statistics

#### Case selection by residuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>n/missing/total</th>
<th>skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
<th>Shapiro-Wilk sig.</th>
<th>removed cases</th>
<th>Municipal ID, residual value in parenthesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>284(3)287</td>
<td>.648(.144)</td>
<td>1.647(287)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>561(7.9), 834(7.1), 604(-6.0),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>281(3)284</td>
<td>.507(.145)</td>
<td>.953(288)</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1782(6.9), 428(6.1), 2560(6.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>277(4)281</td>
<td>.303(.145)</td>
<td>.436(290)</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2582(5.6), 682(5.5), 2361(-4.8), 1491(-4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>276(1)277</td>
<td>.269(146)</td>
<td>.017(296)</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1499(5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>275(1)276</td>
<td>.215(147)</td>
<td>-.121(292)</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1430(4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>276(+1)275</td>
<td>.182(147)</td>
<td>-.194(293)</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>added 1430 again</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Heteroscedasticity

Figure 6 Immigrants from EU/EFTA

Figure 5 % of population above 65

Figure 8 Number of students

Figure 7 Elderly_exp

Figure 6 Edu_exp

Figure 5 Local_exp

Figure 6 Immigrants from EU/EFTA
Figure 7 Immigrants from outside EU/EFTA

Figure 8 % of population with higher education

Figure 9 % of population with primary education or lower

Figure 10 % of population unemployed

Figure 11 Reported crime

Figure 12 Disposable income
Figure 13 Gene coefficient of income inequality

Figure 14 Rural population

Figure 15 GRP

Figure 16 New Democracy, 1994

Figure 17 Toughness on immigration

Figure 18 election participation change, 2010-2014
Multicollinearity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable name</th>
<th>Collinearity Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z_edu_exp</td>
<td>.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z_local_exp</td>
<td>.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z_student_average</td>
<td>.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z_elderly_exp</td>
<td>.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elders_average</td>
<td>.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immi_EU</td>
<td>.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immi_non_EU</td>
<td>.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_high</td>
<td>.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edu_low</td>
<td>.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemp_2013</td>
<td>.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z_crime_2013</td>
<td>.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z_disposable_income</td>
<td>.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_inequality</td>
<td>.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop_rural</td>
<td>.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRP_dev</td>
<td>.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND_1994</td>
<td>.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean_toughness</td>
<td>.687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec_P_change_2014</td>
<td>.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD_empty_chair</td>
<td>.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD_chair</td>
<td>.483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19 SD, empty chairs

Figure 20 SD municipal council chairs, 2010
Linearity plots.
Bibliography


Dahlström, Carl & Esaisssson, Peter, 2013. ”The immigration issue and anti-immigrant


Sverigedemokraterna (n.d.B) invandringspolitik, retrieved October 9th, 2016 from
Sverigedemokraterna, https://sd.se/var-politik/invandringspolitik/


