On revising conceptual metaphors for argument

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1
Introduction

1.1 Premise

Since at least the 1980s, there has been a growing worry that large parts of philosophy throughout history has been biased towards certain masculine ideals. As we know, women have historically been regarded as morally deficient in various ways (e.g. irrational and sinful), even by philosophers (Rooney, 2010, p. 207). Today we know better. Regardless, women are still woefully underrepresented (at least in America) in academic philosophy, even as representation is evening out in other academic fields of study (Penaluna, 2009). One explanation of this disparity is that the aforementioned bias towards the masculine has left a fundamental mark on many areas of philosophy (Rooney, 2010, p. 208). One example of this is, we might argue, that argumentation is seen as a battle between two (or more) adversaries. When we argue, we set out to defeat our opponent. This is supposedly particularly the case in philosophical institutions.

The aim of this essay is to examine the way we argue, and whether we ought to change it. First, I attempt to explicate a framework for considering the normative dimension of the concepts we use. Then, I consider a particular concept—the conceptual metaphor argument is war—and develop an argument in favour of replacing the war metaphor. More specifically I shall use the conceptual metaphor theory of Johnson and Lakoff (2003) as a starting point. In other words, we currently argue by way of a certain conceptual metaphor, and there might be normative reasons to use a different one. In grounding this discussion in a conceptual framework, I am guided not only by Lakoff and Johnson, but also by Burgess’ and Plunkett’s (2013) idea of conceptual ethics. The argument is war metaphor is examined by way of Aikin (2011), who defends the use of such metaphors.

Perhaps the feminist concern outlined above can be solved by constructing a different metaphor to guide how we conduct and conceive of arguing. Although this essay speaks almost exclusively of argumentation, I hope the method employed can be used to solve a wide variety of concerns relating to the field of conceptual ethics.
1.2

Delimitations

The reader might find some considerations curiously omitted from discussion. I will here enumerate those that were intentionally left out because they were deemed to be outside the scope or beyond the ambition of this paper.

(1) For the purposes of this paper I assume the validity of conceptual metaphor theory, which is not entirely uncontroversial.

(2) I do not account for language variations. War metaphors are prevalent in both English and Swedish, as well as—I assume—in most other Western countries. It has been pointed out to me that not all cultures necessarily think of argument by metaphor to war. In light of this, my argument should be seen as applying to cultures where the war metaphor is in fact in place. I shall not endeavour to answer the empirical question of exactly for which cultures the war metaphor is active, but rather take for given that it is at least used at some place, under some conditions. As I understand it, this is not controversial.

(3) It might also be asked what sort of arguments I am talking about. Although I believe war metaphors permeate most varieties of argument, let us here limit the discussion to what Johnson and Lakoff (2003, pp. 62–63) call rational argument. By this they mean argument as conducted in, among other places, the academic world. Such argument is characterized by frowning on the use of unfair conversational strategies, such as intimidation, flattery and so on. Even when it lives up to these ambitions, they argue, it remains structured by metaphor to war.
2
Main discussion

2.1
Conceptual ethics

Conceptual ethics is a potential field of philosophical inquiry proposed by Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett (2013). The idea is essentially to apply the method of conceptual analysis to prescriptive questions rather than descriptive ones (2013, p. 1091). In other words, we are interested in the normative aspects of using the concepts that we do. One instance of talk about such aspects comes from Haslanger (2000). Although her project does not necessarily rely on conceptual ethics, I believe placing it within a conceptual ethics framework might illuminate her project as well as serve as an example of the utility of conceptual ethics. I shall try to do so here.

The objects of Haslanger’s (2000, p. 32) scrutiny are two somewhat contested terms: race and gender. She asks two questions about these: What are they? And what should they be? Admittedly she is careful to separate her project (which she calls analytical) from conceptual (Haslanger, 2000, p. 33) inquiries, which deal with the conceptual content of our terms as we use them, and from descriptive ones (although the “conceptual” category seems to me to also be descriptive in some sense). The analytical project is more pragmatic. It considers, among others, questions about what our purpose is with a certain concept, and whether a different concept might serve this purpose better (Haslanger, 2000, p. 33). This essay cannot claim to be taking a pragmatic approach, but like Haslanger’s project it is revisionary; that is, it considers if, and how, we should change some of our concepts.

Haslanger thinks that because of social inequality, there are useful concepts that the words race and gender could pick out (Burgess and Plunkett, 2013, pp. 1093–1094). If connecting these words to new concepts might help us deal with social inequality, then it seems we can claim that one ought to. Here we have an “ought”, some sort of normative force, which applies to a conceptual change. This alone gives conceptual ethics some raison d’être.
2.2
Conceptual metaphors

Conceptual metaphors, simply put, are metaphors that structure our thoughts in relation to the meaning and application of terms. The idea is that we understand some concepts by metaphor to others. Johnson and Lakoff (2003, p. 3) put it this way: “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.” As previously noted, I shall not offer a defense of conceptual metaphor theory here. Instead, I will assume it to be true and merely offer a brief account of it before attempting to apply it in a discussion of argument.

Abstractly speaking, to think of something by metaphor to something else is to think of one thing in terms of another. This is just to say that the way we think works sort of like metaphors from speech or literature. This is not as mysterious as it may seem. Rather, we speak metaphorically all the time. When we say that we are *madly in love*, we are not literally questioning our sanity, and if we skip breakfast because we are *out of time*, we do not mean to imply that time is the sort of thing you can literally possess. We are simply speaking *as if*.

A more detailed explanation is called for. We are necessarily aware of some concepts because of our senses (Johnson and Lakoff, 2003, pp. 14–15). Many of these relate to gravity—we have an idea of what “up” means, for instance, simply because we are constantly being pushed down. This means that we can conceive of certain things without the use of metaphor. This makes sense, because it seems like a metaphor (or a chain of metaphors) would eventually have to refer to something non-metaphorical.

One example of a conceptual metaphor is connecting the concept “up” (that is, using it as a metaphor for) with the concept “happy”. Johnson and Lakoff (2003, p. 59) remind us that this is not a matter of ordering experiences: Our *experience* of the concept “up” is not a more fundamental or basic experience than that of the concept “happy”. However, there is a sort of ordering insofar as we use a more sharply delineated concept to think of a more blurry one (2003, pp. 57–59). In our example, “up” would be conceptually prior to “happy”. We can also think of this as physical concepts being clearer than non-physical. Thus we use the physical to conceive of the non-physical (Johnson and Lakoff, 2003, p. 59).
The previous example was of a non-physical concept being conceived of by metaphor to a physical, non-metaphorical concept. However, conceptual metaphors can be much more complex. By using structural metaphors, we can superimpose the structure of one concept on another (2003, p. 61). To see what this means, let us look at how we think of time in terms of a resource, as described by Johnson and Lakoff (2003, pp. 65–67). To say that we think of time in terms of a resource is to say that our conception of time is metaphorically structured by the concept “resource”. Such a metaphor assumes that, or is only useful if, the concepts in question have something in common. In the case at hand, time has several properties in common with (material) resources. Both are quantifiable (e.g. we measure time in seconds, oil in gallons); both are substances (although time is an abstract substance); and both serve a purpose (and are used up in the process).

It should be clear that, at least in the Western world, our culture is pervaded by these metaphors. Each of these metaphors is complex—it consists of several other metaphors. For example, time is a resource consists partially of the simpler metaphor time is a substance (2003, p. 66). This works because we already think of resources as substances. Another feature of conceptual metaphors is that they inevitably highlight some aspects of a concept at the expense of other aspects, which become hidden. The aspects they have in common become highlighted, while aspects that are dissimilar or conflicting are hidden (2003, p. 10). For an example of this, consider another conceptual metaphor: labor is a resource. It is structured by the concept resource in much the same way as our previous example, time, was. As natural as it may seem to some of us, this metaphor hides certain aspects of labor by making assumptions. For one, it assumes that labor is a binary activity: either you labor, or you don’t (2003, p. 67). In reality humans are not always either 100 percent productive or 100 percent leisurely. It is clear that labor is a resource partly fails at characterizing what labor is. This is hardly surprising—it is not in the nature of metaphors to be exact descriptions. Still, we should strive to find out which metaphors hide or highlight aspects in an undesirable way.

It is safe to say that we are not usually aware that we think in this metaphorical way. The surest way to find evidence of it might be to do what Johnson and Lakoff (2003, pp. 3–4) suggest: Look at how we speak. If we truly think in terms of metaphors, then we should expect to find this reflected in our use of language. There are countless examples of this, some of which I outlined above in discussing the time is a
resource metaphor. Johnson and Lakoff (2003, pp. 4–5) make an interesting point regarding revisionary projects like Haslanger’s: We might certainly imagine a culture that uses an entirely different metaphor for arguing (dancing, they suggest), but it’s not clear that we would call what they do arguing at all. Of course, Haslanger’s revisions aren’t as radical. Regardless, it seems that what we do when we argue really is similar to warring, at least in some ways (2003, pp. 4–5). The question is, I think, this: When we revise a concept, to what degree are we allowed to do so? In part this will depend on our capacity to change the way we think. I will return to this question later.

2.3

Metaphor from an ethical perspective

Since almost all of our experiences are beholden to various conceptual metaphors, it stands to reason that our choice of metaphors can influence virtually anything that depends on our experiences. Things like feelings and actions, for example, surely do just that, and our feelings and (especially) actions are at the center of ethical inquiry. Thus, if Lakoff is right that we fundamentally think in terms of metaphors, there is need of a way to normatively assess not only what we do, but also the underlying conceptual metaphors. The importance of these metaphors would seem to have been neglected. I believe conceptual ethics is a way to accomplish such assessments. This is what I am referring to when I talk about using conceptual ethics as a framework for discussing the normative aspects of conceptual metaphors.

What sort of normative statements might we want to make about conceptual metaphors? Well, we might for instance want to cure ourselves of the ill effects resulting from certain metaphorical concepts we hold. That is, we might find that we are morally required to revise or replace one of our conceptual metaphors. Sneaking a peek at the upcoming discussion in this paper, perhaps thinking of arguing in terms of war is making us too hostile, resulting in a less productive and friendly environment. Or perhaps the focus on winning the argument makes us less intellectually honest.

Another conceptual metaphor we often seem to use is time is money (Johnson and Lakoff 2003, pp. 7–9). The meaning of this metaphor is, of course, that we tend to think of time in terms of money. It is likely motivated by certain cultural practices. The most prominent of these is that we (in the Western world, at least) are paid by the hour (2003, p. 8). This fact gives the metaphor, or so it seems to me, some legitimacy.
Much like our notion of arguing may have certain things intrinsically in common with war, time seems to have things in common with money, even though it’s relative to our culture. Nevertheless, there could be a better metaphor for time. If we find a contender, we might prefer it because *time is money* nudges us towards an unhealthy, stressed-out lifestyle. Of course, this is not to say that there are only negatives to the *time is money* metaphor—we would have to take its benefits (encouraging hard work, perhaps) into consideration as well.

Return to the question from the previous section: To what extent do we ought to change our concepts? I suggested that it depended on humans’ capacity to change the way we think. If the way we think is heavily influenced by metaphors, then it seems our capacity to change these metaphors is crucial. Let us assume we have normative reason to change the conceptual metaphor *argument is war* into something less combative, like dancing. Our ability to change ourselves in this regard seems to depend on two things: (1) whether we are capable of disassociating arguing from the adversarial attitudes it has in common with warring, and (2) whether the concepts that are intrinsically linked to dancing are compatible with arguing (or, rather, with the concept we want “arguing” to pick out).

Perhaps we are generally good or poor at changing in this way. To what extent we possess this ability to change our metaphorical concepts is still an open question, but I believe it is safe to assume we possess it to some degree. If correct, that should be enough to open the door for a union of conceptual ethics and conceptual metaphors. Even if we somehow lack the ability to change, we are definitely able to change our behavior in order to teach the next generations to think using normatively better concepts.

2.4

Argument is war

I pointed out earlier that we can find evidence of a certain metaphor being in place by looking at actual language, that is, how we speak and write. To see that we conceive of argument by metaphor to war, then, we should consider what sort of things we say in argument. For instance, if I put forward some absurd claim, you might say that such a position is *indefensible*. More commonly, talk of *attacking your opponent* and *defending* yourself is ubiquitous in arguments, not least in academic philosophy.
The prevalence of such speech suggests that there is an underlying war metaphor. It makes sense for us to say that an argument is weak, but it could just as well be ugly, small, or taste poorly, if we had some other conceptual metaphor. Since we speak as if argument were war but not as though it were cooking, it seems like there is a conceptual war metaphor active.

Linguistic evidence of this conceptual metaphor is perhaps most evident when we criticize an argument; and when we present our own arguments in text. Aikin (2011, p. 252) provides an overview of how war and sports metaphors for arguments are used. Different sorts of arguments, he suggests, correspond to different sorts of tactics in war. An argument may be an ambush, a surprise attack, or simply a full frontal assault.

It certainly looks like we think of argument in terms of war. This means that, since in a sense our reality is made out of the concepts we use (Johnson and Lakoff, 2003, p. 156), we are currently thinking of argument in one out of many ways. We could, at least theoretically, replace the metaphor by which we conceive of argument. If we do, the way we argue would change. Perhaps for the better.

2.5 The case against the war metaphor

Having argued that we do in fact think of argument as war, I will proceed to consider some potential issues with this conceptual metaphor, and attempt to construct an argument in favour of it being replaced. Given how my project is framed, it is issues that give us normative reasons to reject it that are most interesting. In this examination I am guided by Aikin’s (2011) defence of the argument is war metaphor. The rejection of the war metaphor, he says, partly rests on the war metaphor promoting “unacceptable argumentative performances” (2011, p. 251). He considers three different types of arguments for this, and I will follow him in doing so. First I'll consider the no-fallacies argument, then the equity argument and, finally, the blindness argument. If even one of these arguments pan out, we would seem to have a strong case for claiming that we ought to abandon the war metaphor.

However, even having shown that, we would also need to show that it is actually possible to abandon it. After all, ought implies can. There are two facets to this challenge. On the one hand, it was pointed out
earlier that conceptual metaphors are part of our most basic experiences. Perhaps that means they are nearly impossible to change; at least in persons immersed in a culture pervaded by the metaphor. If so, the normative force resulting from the previous arguments would be very weak. On the other hand, it might also be argued that there is something necessarily adversarial about argument, that argument without adversariality cannot be considered argument at all. Aikin (2011) offers an argument of this kind. After examining the three arguments for the war metaphor leading to unacceptable performances in argument, I will return to this matter of adversariality.

2.5.1

The no-fallacies argument

The no-fallacies argument is based on the assumption that in war, anything goes. Consider an arguer who uses a fallacious line of reasoning to win an argument. Argument-as-war, it seems, must allow such a strategy as long as it leads to victory. (Aikin, 2011, pp. 252) As long as the war metaphor reigns, nothing but winning matters—there are no fallacies in argument. This ruthless disposition is harmful because an argument that allows unfair methods of argumentation (e.g. lying) is less likely to end well (i.e. in the arguers finding the truth of the matter). This argument has some force.

However, the initial assumption requires further scrutiny. Is it true that anything goes in war? On reflection, that is surely false. War is, after all, regulated by laws and international agreements, such as the Hague Conventions. Aikin (2011, pp. 256–258) believes that just as there are just wars, there are just arguments. Not only are wars actually (with horrifying exceptions, certainly) bound by rules; we—I, at least—also think of them that way. Not just anything goes.

In other words, I think we should accept that war is not lawless. This means that there can be fallacies in argument-as-war. The no-fallacies argument fails. However, it has been pointed out to me that a very similar argument can be developed without relying on the assumption that war is lawless. To do so, we begin by noting that although war is indeed bound by rules, these rules are not necessarily satisfactory. We must argue, then, that argument-as-war causes unwanted behaviour and that although it follows certain rules, those rules are not successful in mitigating its ill effects. The point of contention here will, I suspect, be whether argument-as-war actually does cause this behaviour. It seems to make sense that it would, but
finding out for sure might be very difficult. Still, I believe we have managed to make something out of the no-fallacies argument.

2.5.2

The equity argument

Our second option is to appeal to equity. The idea here is that the confrontational nature of arguments (governed by argument is war) is exclusionary. One way to frame this argument is from a feminist perspective. The so-called Critical-Logical model that dominates contemporary argumentative discourse is biased against women, one might claim, because it excludes certain factors (e.g. social ones) that are typically associated with women (Gilbert, 1994, pp. 95–96). Of course, it remains to be shown that war metaphors of argument are responsible for this exclusion.

An argument along these lines can also be made in a more generalized way (Aikin 2011, p. 258). Rooney (2010, p. 205), although developing an explicitly feminist argument of her own, seems to agree that a similar point can be made without talking about men and women. Such an argument might start like this: Certain types of people (perhaps those afraid of conflict) are driven away from serious philosophical discourse because of how aggressive it is. This I believe to be uncontroversial. Secondly, it stands to reason that the loss of these people entails a loss in knowledge and competence. Next, we must show this unnecessary aggression to be caused by the war metaphor. This is where Aikin (2011, p. 265) disagrees. He argues that it is not the adversarial conception of argument that causes aggression; or, at least, that it does not necessarily do so. Thus, this argument seems to hinge on the claim that adversariality causes aggression. That specific point will remain an open question for now, but I address similar concerns about adversariality in the upcoming parts. In other words, it is difficult to judge the strength of the equity argument. However, I think the blindness argument (see section 2.5.3) can make a similar point without relying on adversariality causing aggression.

2.5.3

The blindness argument

Finally, there is the blindness argument: that as long as we think of argument as war, we lose sight of some non-adversarial goals (Aikin, 2011, p. 259). We end up competing rather than cooperating. Theories of
argument seem to agree that cooperation is a crucial part of argument, so if this is right it is a serious concern. Aikin, while giving this argument some credit, thinks that it essentially boils down to a worry about there being more to argument than war (2011, p. 259). To him adversariality, albeit essential, is merely one part of what argument is. Presumably we can recognize this without neglecting the other parts. Other ways to conceive of argument, Aikin (2011, p. 263) argues, should not be seen as true alternatives to war metaphors, but rather as ways of managing an inevitable adversariality. I address the idea that adversariality is necessary at more length in section 2.6.

Here I shall consider his refutation of the blindness argument—that adversarial metaphors do not make us neglect other goods, like cooperation. Aikin is right, naturally, that argument is not exclusively adversarial. However, that should not be the point of contention here. If we could isolate the adversarial aspects and only apply them where needed (that is, only use them for thinking at certain times or under specific circumstances), there would be no problem. No epistemic blindness would ensue.

I suggest that the point of the blindness argument is—or should be—that the mere presence in our minds of the war metaphor poisons our conception of argument with adversariality. If our language use suggests that we mostly conceive of argument using a conceptual metaphor to war, then we should expect the adversarial aspects to be highlighted and the cooperative aspects to be hidden (Johnson and Lakoff, 2003, p. 10). And that is, after all, almost exactly what the blindness argument claims. Out of the three arguments against the war metaphor that I have presented here, I believe this to be the strongest.

2.6 Is adversariality inescapable?

Say we accept that argument is war is negatively affecting argumentative discourse in some way. Then we ought to change, if we can. But can we? In the previous section I mentioned the idea that adversariality might be an intrinsic part of argument. Perhaps the war-like, adversarial parts of argument are so central to it, so much a part of what arguing is, that we cannot possibly remove them without being left with a quite alien concept. In other words: Without adversariality, we cannot be said to be arguing at all. Aikin (2011) develops an argument to this effect.
I think Aikin is right—argument does imply some sort of adversariality. At the very least, some tension arises from whether we should accept a given argument. This seems like a particular sort of conflict, namely one between opposing ideas. Some ideas (those that are true, for instance) should flourish; their opposites should not. Clearly our arguments should be conducted accordingly. I will call this light adversariality. As far as I can tell, it does not necessarily imply adversariality between the actual persons having the argument. So while Aikin (2011, p. 258) is right that there is what he calls an “essential adversariality” to argument, it is not necessarily one between the arguers.

This light adversariality does not, I argue, entail that war-like metaphors are necessary. Alternative metaphors for argument can, as we shall see (in section 2.7), account for this sort of adversariality. However, Aikin likely means to posit heavy adversariality; an opposition between the parties having the argument. On his view, the connection between adversariality and argumentation is inescapable (2011, p. 263). If arguers are necessarily opponents, it seems like the metaphor (or set of metaphors) we use must also contain heavy adversariality. I think we should resist drawing this conclusion. It is true that we often argue as opponents, but that is to be expected, considering the war metaphor is active. This does not show that heavy adversariality is necessary—only that it currently obtains.

There is a related, more general question that is worth considering: To what extent are we able to change our mental concepts (or our conceptual metaphors)? It seems quite possible that, regardless of whether adversariality is an essential part of arguing, we humans have a limited capacity to change the way we think. Ultimately the existence of such a capacity might prove to be a deciding factor. Aside from acknowledging the relevance of the question, I will not discuss it here.

2.7 Replacing the war metaphor

I have argued that there are serious problems with using war as a conceptual metaphor for argument. If my argument holds we should seriously consider revising our metaphor. Presumably the solution is to find a replacement metaphor that avoids the issues that the war metaphor encountered.
In looking for a new metaphor, let us begin with re-stating the flaws of the war metaphor. We found that it (a) discourages less confrontational people from participating and (b) causes a sort of blindness in that it makes the participants lose sight of the cooperative aspects. The metaphor we choose must not repeat these mistakes. To address these concerns, we would be well served by picking a metaphor which encourages cooperation rather than competition. Furthermore, the metaphor should aid us in accomplishing the primary goal of argument: arriving at the truth together (Aikin, 2011, p. 265). Testing one party’s idea against another’s in bloody war is certainly one way of doing this, but there might be other ways. Rather than finding the truth (and agreement) by attacking each other until one of us gives way, perhaps it is possible to cooperate towards finding the truth. Agreement would be assured, then, although it is an open question whether such a metaphor would be as good as the war metaphor at helping us find the truth. As far as I can see, a cooperative approach would still be able to account for the lighter type of adversariality. The heavier kind seems less likely to be compatible, as there is hardly room for the cooperators to also be adversaries.

As an example, we might think of argument as constructing a house together. We shall have to endure terrible winters in it, so we ought to insulate it properly. We would like it to stand for generations to come, so we should build it on a solid foundation. A poorly insulated argument might correspond to what we now call an argument with holes in it, and the idea of arguments needing a solid foundation is not at all foreign to us. House-building and argument are obviously not perfectly analogous, but that is not the point—neither are warring and argument. The idea is simply that we can use some aspects of it as a conceptual metaphor for argumentation, much in the same way we currently use war.

It is also not that drastic of a change from the way we currently think of arguing. We already talk of constructing arguments, for instance. Not only do we say that arguments have foundations, but we speak of shaky arguments, of them having a certain form or framework, and so on (Johnson and Lakoff, 2003, p. 46). Thus it seems that we already to some extent think of argument by metaphor to construction. Admittedly, we likely do not think of it as a collaborative project. There might even be some implied adversariality: Like fortresses, our houses should be tough in order to withstand attacks from our enemies. Regardless, retaining the construction metaphor and making it collaborative seems like a promising approach.
Naturally, there are many other potential metaphors for conceiving of argument. I will not develop any of them here, but a good approach would be to look at what other metaphors we already have. Much like the construction metaphor is already a small part of how we think, there are other conceptual metaphors that could perhaps be adapted to apply to argument. Ideas are closely related to arguments, for example, and we have several metaphors for them—they can be food, plants, people, products, commodities, resources and so on (Johnson and Lakoff, 2003, pp. 47–48).

3  
Concluding discussion

Part of the purpose of this essay was to establish a framework for normatively assessing concepts. I accomplished this by proxy of conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual ethics; the former saying that various metaphors shape the way we think (and therefore act), and the second providing some precedence for discussing concepts normatively. Admittedly much can (and should) be done to further develop the connection between these: While conceptual metaphor theory has been an invaluable tool that I have been able to employ to some success (in section 2.5.3, for instance), conceptual ethics has served mostly as a backdrop for the discussion.

I also set out to specifically assess the argument is war metaphor. Certainly the result is nothing like a knock-down argument for replacing it, but I believe that my arguments show that we have fairly strong reasons to seek a better metaphor for argument. I have come to the conclusion that the three arguments against argument is war all have some merit. The blindness argument, which claims that the dominance of adversarial metaphors entails a loss of focus on the cooperative aspects of argument, looks particularly promising.

Although I have not succeeded in providing a strong argument for any particular replacement metaphor, I have discussed a promising candidate, and briefly named some others. I also argued that we can still make sense of argument with a much weaker adversarial component than Aikin suggests. Taken together, this should make us interested in further exploring the issue. Still, there is some worry that we are simply (in
practice) incapable of thinking away the adversarial core of the war metaphor. In the same vein of thought, it is ironic that even this text, the point of which is to critically examine the war metaphor, is riddled with language that affirms it.
References


