Anti-immigration Parties
Impact on Immigration Policies. Fact or Fiction?
-A Study on the Sweden Democrats effect on immigration policies in the Swedish Municipalities

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Words: 12975
Abstract

The electoral success of Anti-Immigration parties in Europe raises many questions. Even if the research on whether Anti-Immigration Parties has an impact on policy has been sparse, it is a questions that researchers have been unable to give a unanimous answer to. The most important issue for the Anti-immigration Parties in Europe is restrictive immigration-policies. This thesis will answer the question if Anti-immigration Parties do effect refugee-policies. Earlier researchers have used cross-country comparisons or single case studies to answer this question. These methods are problematic because of the differences between Anti-Immigration Parties in different European countries. In order to avoid these methodological problem this thesis will study the Sweden Democrats impact on refugee-reception in the 290 Swedish municipalities. This method helps to address the “small-n” problems of many other studies as it keeps important institutional and cultural factors constant. The analysis in this thesis show that, contrary to what most of the earlier research find, that the Anti-Immigration Party in Sweden effects refugee-reception in a negative way. The results show that effect of the Sweden Democrats does not depend on left-wing or right-wing political majority and when the Sweden Democrats are in balance of power they have an even stronger negative effect on refugee-reception.
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Carl Dahlström, Associate Professor at the Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, for his help, support and interesting discussions. Further on, I would also like to thank PhD Karl Loxbo at the Linneaus University and Research Assistant Richard Svensson at the Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg for providing me with data.
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Introduction

Since the 80’s when the first anti-immigrant parties (AIP) gained electoral success in Europe, until today when they are present in the majority of the West-European country governments, the studies undertake of researchers has focused mainly on reasons of their rise and the nature of such parties. There is hardly any research done on AIP’s impact on policy-making (Minkenberg 2002 p.2) and the few researchers that did study policy-impact of AIP’s often come to different conclusions on whether AIP’s have the power to influence policy or not. There is no coherent terminology to describe AIP’s. Different researchers use different concepts when writing, fascist, radical right wing, populist or xenophobic parties are used, but in this thesis they will be called Anti-Immigration Parties (AIP). Although the AIP’s are not single issue parties they all have one thing in common in the European context, and that is the will to restrict immigration (Fennema 1997 p.473). AIP’s assert that immigration increases crime, threatens security, erodes the cultural identity, removes jobs from locals and overstrains the welfare system (Zaslove 2004 p.99).

Sweden was for a long time used as a deviant case as no AIP was able to win seats at the government level. New Democracy (ND), which was considered to be an AIP by some and more of a populist party by others, did enter the Swedish Riksdag in 1991 but the party imploded and was not able to get re-elected in the next election (Dahlström & Essisasson 2013). Even if AIP’s do not endure, their impact on the policy-agenda and political system is important (Schain 2006 p.272). This impact is described in an article by Folke (2010). Folke showed that New Democracy influenced the immigration policies in the Swedish municipalities in the short time they existed. Since the election in 2010 the AIP, Sweden Democrats (SD) is represented in the Swedish Riksdag and in most of the municipalities. In cross-country studies of AIP’s there is difficulties because of the significant differences between these parties in Europe. The different context’s in different countries is troubling when making comparisons. Folke’s method of using Swedish municipalities is a way of getting past these difficulties with cross-country comparisons.

Some small parties with anti-immigration on their agenda has managed to win seats at the local-level in Sweden but it was not until 2002 that an AIP, The Sweden Democrats (SD), succeeded to win seats in several municipalities in Sweden. In 2006 they were even more successful and after the election in 2010 they were represented in 245 of the 290 municipalities. In the national election in 2010 they got 5.7% of the votes and managed to get legislative seats in the Swedish Riksdag for the first time. Sweden is one of the most generous countries in the world regarding immigration and hosting asylum-seekers. The only industrialized country which hosts more asylum-seekers than Sweden is Malta, based on the number of asylum-seekers per 1,000 inhabitants according to UNHCR (UNHCR 2014). The immigration issue divides the Swedish citizens in two. In 2011 41% of the Swedes thought that it would be a good idea to accept fewer refugees in Sweden (Demker 2012 p.95). SD has tried to attract the voters with anti-immigration sentiments and has succeeded in many cases.
This thesis will answer whether or not SD has any policy-impact on the issue that they are most engaged in namely the restriction of immigration to Sweden. There are several ways to influence policy but this thesis will focus on direct and indirect influence. **Direct policy-impact** normally comes from winning legislative seats in the national or regional election. The influence of anti-immigration parties is most direct when the party is in control of the government or in coalition with others but in countries with a high degree policy-making decentralisation, as in Sweden, electoral success in the local elections can result in influence over policy-making both in coalition and as a minority force (Schain 2006 p.272ff).

Even in countries where electoral laws limit the ability for anti-immigration parties from gaining strategic advantages in national elections, such as France and Britain, electoral success in local elections can put pressure on the leaders of the mainstream parties (Schain 2006 p.286). As most of the earlier research has shown it is not enough with parliamentary presence of the anti-immigration parties alone, to result in policy effects. The real effects on policy occur as a result of the interaction between the AIP and the established parties (Minkenberg 2002 p.1). Throughout Western Europe the anti-immigration parties have been more successful in indirectly influencing the political agenda than in gaining direct participation in policy-making (Schain 2006 p.287). This **indirect policy-impact**, which occurs through pressures on the mainstream parties from the AIP, will also be investigated. Indirect effects of AIP’s in Europe, where mainstream parties move in to attract the voters of the AIP’s or take over the issues that AIP’s are winning voters on, such as the immigration issue, is well-documented in earlier research, this is often called the contagion effect (van Spanje 2010 p.563). What researchers argue over and discuss is if this contagion effect is most likely to affect the right-wing parties, the left-wing parties or the entire party system.

**Aim**

The aim is to answer if and when SD is most likely to affect the policies on immigration direct and indirect. If SD affects policy in an indirect way, this thesis will show if it is under right-wing majorities or left-wing majorities that immigration policies are most affected. By investigating if there is a combined effect of the change in support for SD and political majority in the municipalities and between change in support for SD and SD occupying the balance of power (so called interaction effects), interesting answers to questions that is relevant in many research fields and to people outside of the scientific field, could be found. There are great challenges in working out solutions to the methodological problems of estimating the influence of small parties on policy outcome (Folke 2011). The difference between the AIP’s in different countries makes it hard to use cross-country studies. In order to avoid these methodological problem this thesis will be using the 290 Swedish municipalities as a case. This method helps to address the “small-n” problems of many other studies as it keeps important institutional and cultural factors constant. The Swedish Municipalities also shows a lot of variation in both the support for SD and refugee-reception.
Disposition

In the first part of this thesis the theoretical foundations will be presented. This foundation will be used to explain how SD could have an impact on immigration both in a direct and an indirect way. In the second part the research strategy, data and the method used will be presented. In the third section of this thesis the results will be presented and discussed and at last there will be a conclusion that summarizes the thesis and discusses future study-fields.
Theoretical Foundations

In Sweden, and in many other European countries, the electoral success of parties which are anti-immigrant, xenophobic or outright racist have caused a strong reaction both politically and in the public. In some countries, for example Germany, the fear of these parties and their effect on society caused government to have them banned (Folke 2010 p.3). At the national level in Sweden, the Swedish AIP SD are treated almost like pariah by the mainstream parties. None of the other parties say that they are willing to cooperate with SD (Dahlström & Essiasson 2013 p.359). Hence it seems that there is a small likelihood for SD to have any direct influence over policy in the Swedish Riksdag or in the municipalities in Sweden. The first hypothesis of this thesis answers whether SD has any impact on policy both direct and indirect. Direct in the way that because of increased electoral support leads to more seats in the MC and indirect because SD is in the most cases treated as pariah when they try to cooperate with the mainstream parties. The second hypothesis answers if SD has any indirect policy impact and which parties that are most affected. One of the few instances when it is reasonable to believe that SD can assert direct impact on policy is when they are in balance of power in the Municipal Council (MC). The third hypothesis answers how SD effects policy when in balance of power and not in balance of power. Despite the difficulties to affect policies, described above, that the AIP’s face, there is research that shows that AIP’s do affect policy. Folke (2011) found that an AIP did have policy-impact in Sweden during the 90’s. He studied New Democracy’s effect on refugee reception in the Swedish municipalities in the 1990’s. Bolin et al (2013) also find that AIP’s (SD) do affect policy, but the impact is conditioned on SD holding the balance of power in the municipalities in Sweden.

It has been shown by several researchers that the impact of the AIP’s does not occur in a linear way. The impact can be observed in various degrees and on various levels. The levels of interaction are both the agenda-setting levels meaning how other parties react to the AIP, and the policy-making levels meaning how other parties react when AIP’s participates in government. (Minkenberg 2002 p.5). The mainstream parties in Europe has used different methods to face the threat of success for the AIP’s. Co-option with the AIP’s was shown to be successful in the British case in the 70’s but not so successful in Germany in the 80’s and not at all so in France in the 90’s. Isolation has been tried in Germany, Belgium and France without success. (Schain 2006 p.272).

Indirect impact on policy

The other way, except for direct impact, that AIP’s could influence the immigration policies such as the refugee-reception in the Swedish municipalities are in an indirect way. Earlier research shows that there are several different hypotheses on how anti-immigration parties could influence policy in an indirect way. The most classical theory is that of Downs (1957). Downs claim that when a new party enters the political arena it indicates that something has changed among the voters and that the other parties in response move closer to take over the issue. In the initial phase,
the success of the new party hurts the mainstream parties by loss of voters to the new party. The mainstream party that loses voters to the new party react by trying to prevent further electoral erosion and to recapture the lost voters by adjusting their issue agenda and their strategies to reduce the new party’s influence on policy-making (Schain 2006 p.271). Recently researchers, such as Meguid (2005), has developed and modified Down’s theory in several ways.

Meguid claims that there is three ways that the established parties can react (Meguid 2005 p.349). The first way is to move closer to the new party and try to take over the questions of the new party. Downs suggest that it is easier for parties that are closer on the political left-right scale to move in and take over the issues of the new party. If what Downs suggest is true then this would mean that in the case of Sweden, which this thesis focuses on, the established right-wing parties would be most likely to develop a more restrictive refugee-reception which is the main issue of SD. The literature presents two rival hypotheses on the effect of mainstream parties taking over the immigration-issue. Some studies show that the electoral support for anti-immigration parties declines because when the mainstream parties move in and take over the issue there is no need for the new party any longer (Meguid 2005; van der Brug et al. 2005). One explanation of the decline of the new party is that mainstream parties often have a higher credibility than new unknown parties. The other hypothesis is that when mainstream parties take over the question it gives a signal to the voters that the issue is relevant and the result will be that the new party will gain electoral success (Arzheimer 2009). This two hypotheses both show that if the mainstream parties move in on the issue it would lead to policy impact in the form of stricter refugee-reception.

The second way for the mainstream parties to react is to move away from the issue to show the voters that the new party is wrong and actively try to convince the voters that the issue of the new party is framed in an untruthful way. There are reasons to believe that this has been the way that the Swedish mainstream parties has reacted towards SD, at least on the national level.

The third way, according to Meguid, is to ignore the issue. By ignoring the issue mainstream parties send signals to the voters that the issue is irrelevant and of low salience. The method of ignoring the refugee-reception issue was used by the mainstream parties in Sweden during the 80’s. The disagreement on the issue of refugee-reception between politicians and citizens was then several times bigger than on any other issue. Although this disagreement between the politicians in government and citizens none of the established parties moved in on the issue and thereby legitimized the issue (Dahlström & Essiasson 2013).

Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup (2008) compared why Sweden and Denmark differed so much in success for AIP’s. Their conclusion was that if the mainstream right parties focus on the immigration issue, then conflict is inevitable. In Denmark, where the social-liberals ruled along with the social-democrats in the 90’s, it was attractive for other mainstream right-wing parties then the social-liberals to move in
on the immigration issue in order to take over office together with the AIP (the Progress Party). In Sweden the right wing were more afraid of conflict within the block that would destroy their efforts to take over from the left-wing parties that governed at that time (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008 p.610). According to their article, party competition is a fight where the different parties tries to emphasize different issues. This issue-competition, alongside with Down’s spatial competition over party position, is taking place simultaneously (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008 p.612). The issue of immigration and refugees are traditionally owned by the mainstream right-wing parties, so it is more natural for them to take over the issue than it is for the left-wing (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008 p.613). Dahlström & Essiasson (2011) find that the established parties on the right-wing are more willing to have restrictive immigration policies than the left-wing parties. van Spanje (2010) argues that it may be relatively easy for right-wing parties to adopt more restrictive policies on immigration, because the right-wing parties usually ”own” the issues of cultural unity and national pride. For these reasons, parties on the right-wing are expected to yield more to electoral pressures from anti-immigration parties than parties of the left-wing (van Spanje 2010 p.567). There are two mechanisms, described in an article by Vernby and Finneraas (2010), which explains how the right-wing could take over voters from the left-wing by becoming more restrictive in the immigration-issue. The first mechanism is called the “policy-bundling effect”. The “policy-bundling effect” explains that because the right-wing parties usually ”own” issues that can be called multi-cultural, such as race, ethnicity and immigration, they could win over voters from the left-wing by becoming more restrictive on immigration issues. Voters that normally would have voted on the left-wing if the political competition was all about traditional economic policies now defect to the right because of the fact that they make a trade-off in their preferences on redistribution-issues to the preferences they have regarding multi-culturalism and immigration-issues.

Bolin et al. (2013) shows that the right-wing parties has the strictest policies on immigration in the Swedish context (Bolin et al. 2013 p.1). In a Swedish survey examining the attitudes of local and regional politicians Gilljam et al. (2010) find that Swedish politicians representing the Left party (Vänsterpartiet) are most positive toward immigration, while politicians representing the Sweden Democrats and the Moderate Party are most skeptical. The second mechanism described by Vernby and Finneraas is the “anti-solidarity effect”. Citizens with xenophobic or immigration-critical attitudes which formerly supported the left-wing parties change their mind and votes on the right-wing because they believe that the welfare state is exploited by immigrants. This welfare chauvinism or “anti-solidarity effect” reduces the support for the left-wing parties which traditionally “own” the issue on welfare arrangements (Vernby & Finnneraas, 2010 p.491).

AIP’s are not only sensitive to the policy position of the party closest to the AIP but also to the position of all other parties (Dahlström & Sundell, 2012 p.355). Hinnfors et al. (2011) finds that the left-wing parties has supported and initiated stricter immigration policies. They study the case of Sweden and the Swedish Social
Democrats. Kitschelt (1995) describes how many of the blue-collar workers, that historically supported and voted on left-wing parties because of new divisions in society in the postindustrial era, nowadays are more attracted to vote on AIP’s (Kitschelt 1995 p.8-9). This could lead to left-wing parties being more willing to use the immigration-issue to try to win the blue-collars back from the AIP. It is also possible that the AIP’s do not affect the policy-making in a significant way. Ackerman (2011) find that the direct impact of radical right parties on policy output has been severely limited by the difficulties these parties face in adapting to public office. As shown previous research is disagreeing on almost every question.

**Swedish research**

There is a plethora of cross-national studies of AIP’s and sub-national studies of AIP’s are also rather common. Studies that focus on AIP’s in the Swedish municipalities, as this thesis, are however harder to find. Rydgren and Ruth (2011) explains why the support for SD varies in the Swedish municipalities. Dahlström and Sundell (2012) studies the Sweden Democrats and uses the Swedish municipalities as a case, but their focus is on how politicians attitudes (a tougher stance on immigration) legitimizes the immigration-issue and causes increased electoral support for SD (Dahlström & Sundell 2012 p.353). Folke (2011) studied New Democracy’s effect on immigration-policies in the Swedish municipalities. In his paper, Folke uses a new methodological framework, in which identification of causal effects is based on being close to a threshold for a shift in the seat allocation instead of the threshold for a majority change (Folke 2011 p.4-5). The conclusion of Folke’s article is that New Democracy had a negative effect on immigration in the Swedish municipalities. This suggests that there is a possibility that SD also could have an impact on the immigration policies in the Swedish municipalities. Bolin et al. (2013) tests an almost identical hypotheses as hypothesis 3 in this thesis and finds that the only situation that SD influences immigration-policies is when they hold the power of balance in the municipalities (Bolin et al. 2013 p.1). In their study they use the number of seats in the municipal council as a measurement of electoral support for SD. This could be argued to be the best way to measure the direct policy-influence but does not capture the indirect policy-influence.

**Research on Swedish municipalities**

Research has shown that the municipalities and local political institutions in Europe have increased their impact on the immigration-issue. Today most of the work regarding migration is handled at the local level (Lidén & Nyhlén 2013 p.1). Sweden is characterized as a decentralized unitary state where the municipalities have a high degree of autonomy (Lidén & Nyhlén 2013 p.4). The municipal councils in Sweden has vast competencies compared to other nations. They decide the local taxation and are responsible for most of the welfare in the municipality. The local government are often one of the biggest employers in the Swedish municipalities (Dahlström & Sundell 2012 p.356). Even if the role of politics is crucial it has often been neglected in research on migration and so has the role of politics on migration at the local level (Lidén & Nyhlén 2013 p.2).
Other explanations

There are many other variables that could affect both the change in electoral support for SD (the independent variable) and the change in refugee-reception in the Swedish municipalities (the dependent variable). In order to test the hypotheses of this thesis, these variables must be identified, considered and included in my model. Lubbers et al. (2002) uses three categories of explanations of why citizens vote for the anti-immigration parties in Europe. The three categories are sociological, economic and political explanations. These three categories could be used to group variables that affect both the dependent and the independent variable in this thesis. The sociological explanations are divided between the composition of the population and the public opinion. The composition of the population is an important factor in the Swedish municipalities. Research has shown that immigrants and refugees tend to locate in the proximity of other immigrants and refugees (Cronholm, 2013). The ethnic competition theory predicts that AIP’s have the strongest support where there are many immigrants located (Rydgren & Ruth 2011 p.204). How the size of the population in municipalities affects the refugee-reception is discussed by Lidén & Nyhlén (2013). Their hypothesis is that smaller municipalities with smaller population density are more willing to accept refugees (Lidén & Nyhlén 2013 p.11). Municipalities that suffers from depopulation should be more welcoming towards new inhabitants settling in the municipalities. Another important factor is the education level of the citizens in the municipalities. If one municipality harbors more low-educated citizens it is more likely that the support for AIP’s is higher than in municipalities that have higher educated citizen’s (Lubbers et al, 2002). The other sociological factor, public opinion regarding refugee-reception of the citizens in the municipalities is also used as a control variable in this report. Anti-immigration attitudes among the citizens could affect both the electoral support for SD and the refugee-reception.

The economical explanations that are interesting for this thesis are such that could affect both the support for restrictive policies on immigration and support for AIP’s. One of these economical explanations is unemployment. Municipalities with high levels of unemployment could be less willing to host immigrants and refugees, because there is small likelihood for the municipalities to be able to offer the newcomers any chance for employment. Research are not conclusive on whether there is a connection between unemployment and support for AIP’s. Arzheimer (2009) shows complicated interaction patterns between immigration and un-employment. If there is competition between the citizen’s already living in the country and the newly arrived regarding for example job opportunities then the support for anti-immigration parties could rise (Jackman & Volpert 1996; Werts et al. 2012), although Arzheimer and Carter (2006) comes to the direct opposite conclusion.

The last theory on AIP’s and immigration policies presented in this section is Mudde’s. According to Mudde (2013) restrictive immigration policies came long before the success for AIP’s in Europe. If his arguments is true then this poses a
serious implication to all of the research on AIP’s impact on immigration policies including this thesis.

**Research question**

The research question of this thesis is based on the theoretical foundation that was presented in this section. The question is if, and under what circumstances, AIP’s affect policies. The policy that the AIP’s are most likely to have an impact on is the refugee-reception since it is one of the main issues for these parties. The research on this area is ambiguous and it is of importance both inside and outside of the field of science to find an answer to this question.

**Hypothesis**

The first hypotheses (Figure 1) of this thesis derives from the question on whether AIP’s have policy-impact or not. The first hypotheses is that there is a negative relationship between the electoral support for SD in the Swedish municipalities and the willingness to accept refugees. This hypothesis is thought to give an answer to the question if SD has any policy impact (direct and indirect) at all.

![Figure 1 Hypothesis 1](image1.png)

The second hypotheses (Figure 2) is that the refugee-reception is effected differently when there is a left-wing majority than when there is a right-wing majority in majority in the municipal council.

![Figure 2 Hypothesis 2](image2.png)

The third hypotheses (Figure 3) is; In the municipalities where SD holds the balance of power in the municipal council the number of refugees accepted should be considerably lower than in the municipalities where SD do not hold the balance of power. This hypothesis helps answering if SD has any direct policy impact or not.
Figure 3 Hypothesis 3
Research Strategy

Dependent variable

To find out if the three hypothesis of this thesis could be answered, a well suited method and the right variables has to be used. The choices made are essential for the accuracy and relevance of the answers given. The dependent variable is the mean of the change in the number of accepted refugees per thousand inhabitants in the municipalities. The number of accepted refugees, according to the agreements between the state and the municipalities, in each municipality is thought to capture the willingness of a municipality to accept refugees, hence it is a way to measure policy outcome. The data on the refugee-reception in Sweden have been collected from the Swedish Migration Boards website. The Migration Board is the Swedish authority that handles applications of those refugees that seeks protection from persecution etc. The Migration board handles the care-taking of refugees from their arrival in Sweden until their asylum application is handled and they are granted a residence permit. The Migration Board is in charge of the economic compensation to the municipalities where the refugees settles (www.migrationsverket.se).

The refugee-policy of today has its roots in the 1980’s. In the 80’s the refugee-reception was so unequal between the Swedish municipalities that the government decided that something was needed to be done. The Immigration Board (later the Swedish Migration board) started to make agreements with the municipalities on how many refugees they would accept. The costs of the increased refugee-reception for the municipalities was financed by the Swedish government (Lidén & Nyhlén 2013 p.4). It was up to the municipality whether they wanted to make an agreement with the Swedish Migration Board or not. In 2010 92% of the municipalities had made an agreement (Lidén & Nyhlén 2013 p.5). Using the number of refugees per 1000 inhabitants gives a more accurate picture of the refugee-reception in the municipalities then an absolute number. Different sizes and different number of inhabitants in the municipalities makes it hard to compare the refugee-reception in absolute terms. A small municipality, like Ljusnarsberg, with only about 5000 inhabitants that had an average refugee-reception in the period 2009-2012 of 7 refugees per year should not weigh equal as if one big municipality in a major Swedish city accepted 7 refugees. The average number of inhabitants in a Swedish municipality was 33000 in 2013. Between 2003 and 2013 Sweden has accepted approximately 202.000 refugees nation-wide and each municipality has accepted 63 refugees per year. The average number of refugees accepted per 1000 inhabitants in the period 2003-2012 was 2.15 refugees.

The refugee-reception statistics is divided into different groups. The first group contains refugees that lives in accommodations offered by the Migration Board (ABO). The second group are refugees that choose to find an accommodation of their own, often at friends, relatives or family (EBO). The last and smallest group are refugees located in hospitals and children that are placed in new families etc. It could have made sense to divide the data according to this groups. Even though the
refugee-categories are different, the decision was made to include all categories in the analysis. One reason for this decision to use the total number of refugees accepted was the fact that categorized data from the years 2003 and 2004 was no longer available. Another reason for treating the different categories as one group was that earlier researchers such as Folke (2011); Bolin, Lidén and Nyhlén (2013) also use the total number of refugees as dependent variable in their articles.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics period 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Error of Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Expected effect on dependent variable</th>
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<td>Change mean refugee-</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0.757</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>1.413</td>
<td>-3.004</td>
<td>7.951</td>
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<td>reception/1000 2003-2006</td>
<td></td>
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<td>and 2007-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002-2006 Change SD%</td>
<td>290</td>
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<td>0.115</td>
<td>1.954</td>
<td>-2.340</td>
<td>14.790</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreignborn% of population</td>
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<td>5.316</td>
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<td>Population change/1000</td>
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<td>Population/1000 2008</td>
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<td>31.918</td>
<td>3.669</td>
<td>62.478</td>
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<td>Percentage with high</td>
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<td>0.340</td>
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<td>9.574</td>
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</table>
Table 2 Descriptive statistics period 2

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<td>.116</td>
<td>1.971</td>
<td>-6.44</td>
<td>16.62</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

To capture the electoral support for SD, a choice had to be made on whether to use the number of legislative seats or the support for SD in percentage of the votes. Choosing the number of legislative seats would be better for answering if SD has any direct impact on policy since it rules out those municipalities where SD has no legislative seats. The choice in this thesis was to use the support for SD in percentage of the votes. The percentage of votes captures both the indirect and direct impact SD could have on policy. Increased support for SD is a threat to mainstream parties both when SD has legislative seats in the municipalities and when they do not. Therefore the main independent variable used is the electoral support (percentage) for SD in the municipal elections. The data was collected from the Electoral Authority’s website (www.val.se).

The case: Swedish municipalities

There are 290 municipals in Sweden. These municipals are governed by a municipal council. The members are elected from multimember electoral districts. The Municipal councils are the local parliaments in Sweden and they are elected every fourth year. The local elections takes place at the same day as the national elections and the turnout is usually almost the same in both elections (Dahlström & Sundell 2012 p.356). Two thirds of the municipalities have one electoral district, but the large municipalities have more districts. Within each district the modified Sainte-Lagué method is used to distribute the seats. The number of seats per district is legally bound between 15 and 49. There is no electoral threshold for gaining representation in the municipal council (Folke 2013 p.12). Sweden was for a long time used as a deviant case when it came to AIP success in Western-Europe. Except for some occasional success of small AIP’s in the municipalities, like the Sjöbo Party which succeeded in Sjöbo, and the Skåne Party, which had some success in the south of Sweden, it was not until 1991 that an AIP got representation in the Swedish Riksdag. New Democracy obtained 6.7% of the votes, but in the next election in 1994 they only managed to obtain 1.2% and the party disappeared shortly thereafter (Rydgren & Ruth 2011...
The Sweden Democrats was formed in the late 90’s as a merge between the organization Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish) and the Swedish Progress Party. SD clearly has its roots in anti-democratic, Nazi and fascist ideologies. It was not until 1996 that SD banned uniforms at party meetings and in 1999 they openly denounced Nazism. Since the mid-nineties SD has tried to polish their facade and is aiming at making the party resemble successful AIP’s elsewhere in Europe (Rydgren & Ruth 2011 p.204). The re-polishing of the party obviously had some effect. In the local-level elections of 2002 and 2006 they gained electoral success and had their breakthrough at national-level in the election 2010 with 5.7% of the votes (Dahlström & Sundell 2012 p.356). At the municipal level SD managed to get 612 mandates in the municipal councils (Rydgren & Ruth 2011 p.205). The average change in support for SD between the two municipal elections 2002 and 2006 was 2.1% and between the elections in 2006 and 2010 the average change was 2.15%.

Causation

Change between two elections (2002-2006 and 2006-2010) is used in the analysis because this could help to get to terms with the causation problem (what influences what). It is possible that electoral support for SD could influence refugee-reception, but it could be that refugee-reception influences electoral support for SD as well. A positive relationship between electoral success and stricter refugee policies does not mean that electoral success for SD has a causal effect on policy-outcome. It might depend on inhabitants in municipalities which accept high numbers of refugees becoming less tolerant towards immigrants and refugees, and votes for SD, and as a reaction all parties become more restrictive on refugee policies to catch these voters. The problem of reverse causation is reduced by using change between two periods. If it is reversed causation that is the cause of the correlation in this thesis, then the electorate in the municipalities must anticipate the refugee-reception in the future and base their support on SD on this assumption which is highly unlikely.

Independent variables

The other independent variables used is political and socio-economic factors that earlier researchers has pointed out as important for the support for AIP’s and policy-outcome regarding immigrants and refugees. The political variables are first; If SD occupies the balance of power in the municipality. This variable is a dummy variable where 1 means that SD is in balance of power and 0 means they are not. SD were in balance of power in 32 municipalities after the election in 2006 and in 33 municipalities after the election in 2010 (Loxbo 2010). The second political variable is also a political dummy variable where 1 means that the right-wing parties have the majorit in the municipal councils and 0 means they are not. Before the national election of 2006 the right-wing parties decided to cooperate under the name “the Alliance” (Alliansen in Swedish). The Alliance consists of four parties; the Conservative Party (Moderaterna), the Center/Agrarian Party (Centern), the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) and the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna). The Alliance was in majority in 131 municipal councils in 2006 and in the elections 2010 they were in majority in 138 municipal councils (Dahlström et. al 2014). The dummy variable showing if there is a right-wing majority and the dummy variable showing if SD held the balance of power was transformed to multiplicative interaction variables. It is often a good idea to use multiplicative interaction variables when answering hypothesis such as the second and third in this thesis which are conditional rather than unconditional (Brambor et al. 2005 p.64).
The demographic variables used as control variables are the percentage of inhabitants in the municipality which were foreign born. The data on the percentage of foreign born inhabitants in 2008 was collected at Statistics Sweden’s website (www.scb.se). The data on the percentage of foreign born in 2011 was collected from the Quality of Governments (QoG) dataset on the Swedish municipalities (Dahlström et al. 2014). As mentioned in the section theoretical foundations, earlier researchers such as Rydgren & Ruth (2011) and Cronholm (2013) finds that it is common that immigrants and refugees settle in cities and municipalities where the numbers of foreign born inhabitants are already high. The population growth of the municipalities is often used by other researchers as a measurement on the economic success and the ability of the municipality to attract new citizens. The population growth is divided with 1000. The data on population growth 2008 was collected at Statistics Sweden and the data on population growth 2011 was collected from the Quality of Governments (QoG) dataset on the Swedish municipalities (Dahlström et. al 2014). The size of the population is used as a control variable because some researchers claim that less populated municipalities should be inclined to accept more refugees (Lidén & Nyhlén 2013 p.11). The size of the population is divided with 1000. The data on the size of the population in the municipalities is collected at Statistics Sweden (2008) and from the QoG dataset (2011).

The economic factors that decide which municipalities that are willing to accept refugees are measured in this thesis by the level of unemployment in percentage in the municipalities. It was calculated by using the total number of employable between 16-64 years of age that is unemployed in the municipality in percentage. The median income of the inhabitants in the municipalities was also used as a complement to the unemployment level to capture how well the municipality is doing economically. There are a lot of other economic factors, like for example Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that captures the economic situation in the municipality, but these data were harder to find on a regional level, so the decision was made to use unemployment and median income as a determinant of the economic well-being of the municipality. The median income is divided with 1000 and the data was collected from Statistics Sweden and the QoG database.

The level of education in the municipality is used as it is often said to affect the support for AIP’s and the attitude towards immigrants and refugees (Lubbers et al, 2002). The percentage of inhabitants that have an education above the Swedish gymnasium was used. The data on education level was collected at Statistics Sweden. The data to capture attitudes in the municipalities on immigration were gathered from the Super-Riks-SOM survey. This survey is unique as it gathers surveys from 1986 to 2011. The SOM-survey is a cooperation between three faculties at the University of Gothenburg, including the faculty of Political Science. SOM is short for Society, Opinion and Media. The survey covers 1200 unique questions and the participants are between the ages of 15-85. This data was ordered from (SND) the Swedish National Data Service. The data on the opinion of the inhabitants towards immigration and refugees is an average value from the Super-SOM survey. The question that is used from the SOM-survey in this thesis is; what do you think of the suggestion that Sweden should accept fewer refugees? A lower value means that the respondent is more positive to the suggestion.
Method and reliability

There is no reason to doubt the reliability of the data. The data was gathered from websites that are used frequently by other researchers. It is hard to imagine any ethical dilemmas in connection with this thesis. The method used in this thesis is an ordinary least square (OLS) multiple regression model. The (OLS) multiple regression model is by many seen as the most flexible and powerful way to analyse data (Essiasson et al. 2007 p.429). The reason to use this method is that it could be argued to be the most appropriate statistical tool to use for answering the hypothesis of this thesis as it shows the unique influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Another method that could have been appropriate to use is the Time-Series-Cross-Section (TSCS) method. TSCS data typically have the structure of a relatively small number of units that are observed for some reasonable length of time (Beck, 2008 p.475). As the data in this thesis is a large number of units that are observed for a short time the decision to use a regular OLS multiple regression model instead of a TSCS-model was made. What is important to remember when working with regression models is that regressions does not show the causation but only the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. It is by looking at the theoretical model, and in this report the operationalization that is change between two periods in the dependent variable that happens after the change in the independent variable, that the reverse causation problem is addressed.

Both the change between the elections 2002-2006 and the elections in 2006-2010 is used. There are two main reasons for using the same models for two separate elections. First, it constitutes a reliability check, and second and more importantly it introduces some dynamic factors into the analyses. It could be argued that there would be more systematic differences between the municipalities in support for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 election than in the 2010 election simply because the party was smaller in 2006. It is not farfetched to assume that municipalities characterised by social marginalisation and ethnic competition over scarce resources would be among the “early adopters”, hence substantial electoral support in 2006 would be expected. The municipalities with a more “average” level of social marginalization would be among the “late adopters”. If this is true, we would expect the effects of the key variables in the models to be generally smaller when looking specifically at the change in voter support for the Sweden Democrats between 2006 and 2010 compared to the change in voter support between 2002 and 2006 (Rydgren & Ruth 2001 p.211). There are several ways to introduce the control variables into the regression, such as stepwise and hierarchical introduction. The method that is chosen in this thesis is a so called “forced entry” where all the variables are forced into the models simultaneously. This method is used because the results of this thesis should be easy to retest and if another method was chosen the data would have been likely to be influenced of random variation (Fields 2013 p.322).
Results

Results hypothesis 1

The first hypotheses is; that there is a negative relationship between the electoral support for SD in the Swedish municipalities and the number of refugees accepted in the municipality. If this hypothesis is true then it would be a sign of SD having an impact on refugee-policies. This hypothesis is tested in two separate bivariate models (model 1). In Table 3 the dependent variable is the change in the mean refugee-reception between 2003-2006 and 2007-2010 and the independent variable in this model is the change in the electoral support (percentage) for SD between the election in 2002 and the election in 2006. In Table 4 it is the change in the mean of the refugee-reception between 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 that is used as independent variable and the independent variable is the change in electoral support for SD (percentage) between the election 2006 and 2010. The results of the first bivariate regressions in Table 3, model 1 and Table 4, model 1 indicates that the first hypothesis is supported. In the regression where the change between the elections in 2002 and 2006 is used, it seems that for every percentage increase in electoral support for SD the change in the mean refugee-reception decreases with 0.14 per 1000/inhabitants in the municipalities. In Table 4 (model 1), where the change between the elections in 2006 and 2010 is used, for every percentage increase SD gets the change in the mean refugee-reception decreases with 0.09 refugees per 1000/inhabitants. But the low adjusted R² value (4% in Table 3 and 2.2% in Table 4) gives an indication that the bivariate regressions seems to lack some important explanatory variables.

The next step is to introduce the control variables. The control variables were discussed in the research strategy section and the variables chosen are those that is most likely to influence the dependent variable. The method in which the variables is introduced is a so called forced entry where all the variables are forced into the models simultaneously. Some researchers believes that forced entry is the only good way for theory testing because the other methods (stepwise or hierarchical introduction) seldom gives replicable results if the model is to be retested because the data is influenced by random variation (Fields 2013 p.322). Table 3 (Model 2) shows the results of the multiple regression where the elections 2002 and 2006 was used. After introducing the control variables the decrease in the mean of the refugee-reception when SD gains electoral success is even bigger than in the bivariate regression and still significant at the 99% level. In Table 4 where the elections 2006 and 2010 is used, the introduction of the control variables shows that some of the effect of electoral success of SD on the refugee-reception decreases (from 0,088 to 0,082), but the remaining effect it is still significant at the 95% level. The adjusted R² values in the models increases to around 10%. These results strengthens the claim (hypothesis 1) that SD has real policy impact on the refugee-reception in the Swedish municipalities.

The first control variables used is the percentage of the population that is foreign born. According to some researchers (Rydgren & Ruth 2011) AIP’s have the strongest support where there is already a lot of refugees located. This because of the ethnic competition theory described in the theoretical foundation section earlier. Cronholm (2013) finds that refugees are more likely to settle in the proximity of other refugees. Table 3 (model 2) shows that the mean of the change in refugee-reception is somewhat lower in municipalities where the percentage of the population that is foreign born are higher. This is interesting because it contradicts what earlier
researchers has found, but the effect is not at a significant level in Table 3 (model 2). In Table 4 (model 2) although the effect is at a significant level (95%) and this shows that the effect is stronger in Table 4. The results indicate that in municipalities with higher percentage of foreign born, the change correlates negatively with the change in the mean refugee-reception. This is opposite to the conclusions of Cronholm (2013). Cronholm’s results shows that refugees often choose to live where other refugees already live.

The second control variable used is the population increase in the municipalities per thousand inhabitants. As explained earlier this is supposed to show the success of the municipality in attracting new inhabitants, which could be a sign of economic success. But the variable is also correlated to the number of refugees accepted. If a municipality accepts many refugees then it is also probable that the number of inhabitants grow. This is perhaps what the results show. If the increase in population grows, then the difference in the mean of the refugees accepted is higher. It seems that, in contrast to what was expected from previous research, municipalities with a population increase accept more refugees. Lidén & Nyhlén (2013) claims that it is the municipalities which suffers from depopulation that is most likely to accept more refugees but this is not what the results of the regression (model 2) of this thesis shows. Population increase per thousand inhabitants significantly affect the change in the mean of the refugee-reception in a positive way in both Table 3 and Table 4. The size of the population of the municipality in thousands of inhabitants is the next variable used in the regressions. Lidén & Nyhlén (2013) theorizes that it is more likely for small municipalities to accept more refugees. The media picture is the opposite, according to their picture it is the municipalities with big cities that harbours the big majority of the refugees. According to the results of this thesis it seems like Lidén & Nyhlén was right in their hypothesis. Bigger municipalities accept fewer refugees/1000 inhabitants than municipalities with smaller populations.

Unemployment are one of the most used variables in research regarding AIP’s. Economic crisis and unemployment is often described as the growing ground for anti-immigration sentiments and electoral success for AIP’s. Jackman & Volpert (1996) and Werts et al. (2012) discusses this connection between unemployment and electoral success for AIP’s. Arzheimer is more sceptical to the connection between un-employment and electoral success for AIP’s. First in an article from 2006, he finds that there is no connection, and later in another 2009 in another article he instead claims that it is an intricate interaction pattern between unemployment and immigration that causes electoral success for AIP’s. Municipalities which suffers from high levels of un-employment is possibly more reluctant to accept refugees because the prospect of offering them job opportunities, so that they can support themselves, seems hard to achieve. The result of the regressions in Table 3 and Table 4 shows that the unemployment level is positively correlated with the change in the number of refugees accepted. Municipalities with higher percentage of unemployed accept more refugees. In Table 3, where the elections 2002 and 2006 was used, this correlation is significant at the 99% level. In Table 4 the effect of un-employment is much weaker than in Table 3, and only shows to be significant in the model where other political interaction variables was used. The results of the un-employment variable indicates that Arzheimer may have been right in his claim that un-employment is a tricky variable, and that it only has an effect under certain circumstances. The median income in the municipalities per thousand Swedish crowns is another variable that shows the economic situation in the municipality. If there is a high median income it could be expected that there is higher possibilities to collect tax revenues, to support
newly arrived refugees or to build new accommodations to house refugees, if this is needed. What the results show is that municipalities with higher median income accepts less refugees, although the effect is only significant in Table 4 where the elections 2006 and 2010 was used. The education level of the population in the municipality is often discussed in the literature concerning AIP support. Low-educated people are more likely to support AIP’s according to Lubbers et al. (2002). The variable used is the percentage of the population with higher education than “gymnasium”. Higher levels of high educated in the municipality could also be a sign of the economic situation in the municipalities as higher educated often have higher income which the municipality can benefit from. In Table 3 the result is that municipalities with a higher percentage of the population that is high educated correlates negative with the change in refugee-reception but at a non-significant level. In Table 4 the percentage of high educated amongst the population is positively correlated with the change in refugee-reception, the higher educated, the more refugees accepted. The results of the education variable in Table 4 is only significant at the 90% level. The last of the control variables used was the public opinion regarding immigration in the municipalities from the SOM-survey. This variable was used as it could affect both the support for SD and the willingness to accept refugees in the municipalities. The results indicate that this variable is non-significant in both tables.

To summarize the results of the regression model with the control variables shows that the effect of the change in support for SD on the mean of the refugee-reception did not vanish when the control variables was introduced. In Table 3 (model 2) the effect of electoral success on the change in refugee-reception is stronger after the control variables was introduced than before. In Table 4 (model 2) some of the effect of electoral support on the change in refugee-reception disappears, but the change between before and after the introduction of the control variables is minor. The significance of the effect of electoral support on change in the mean refugee-reception does not change after the introduction of the control variables and is at the 99% level in Table 3 and at the 95% level in Table 4. The control variables indicates that municipalities with higher percentage of foreign born accepts fewer refugees (only significant in Table 4). Population increase in the municipality is correlated with more refugees accepted. The size of the population is negatively correlated with the change in refugee-reception. Municipalities with bigger population accepts fewer refugees. Municipalities with higher unemployment accept more refugees (only significant in Table 3). Municipalities with higher median income accepts fewer refugees (only significant in Table 4). The results of the percentage of the population with higher education shows that the effect goes in opposite directions in the two periods. In Table 3 the effect is positive but not significant and in Table 4 the effect is negative and only significant at the 90% level. The public opinion of the population regarding refugee-reception is non-significant in both models.

In Table 3 the effect of electoral success for SD on the mean of refugee-reception grows stronger when the control variables was introduced. Bigger municipalities (population wise) accept less refugees whilst municipalities with higher percentage of the population that is un-employed and has an increase in people moving in to the municipality accept more refugees.

The result from Table 3 will now be explained in absolute numbers by using a calculation example (see Example 1) where a mean municipality in Sweden
is used. The population in the mean municipality is approximated to 30,000 inhabitants. The mean number of refugees accepted in the period 2003-2006 was 50 refugees. The mean change in refugee-reception between 2003-2006 and 2007-2010 was +23 refugees which would mean that the municipality would accept 73 refugees if the effect of SD was not considered. According to the findings in this thesis on how SD impacts the refugee-reception negatively, instead of 73 refugees only 63 refugees would be accepted in this mean municipality. This would mean that instead of a 46% increase in refugee-reception without impact of SD, SD’s impact causes that the increase is only 26%. This effect that SD has on the refugee-reception could be considered relatively large as many earlier researchers did not find any effect of SD on policy.

Example 1

Mean number of refugees accepted in a Swedish municipality during 2003-2006: 50

Mean population in a Swedish municipality: ~30,000

Mean change in refugee reception/1000 inhabitants between 2003-2006 and 2007-2010 (see Table 1): 0.757

Number of refugees accepted/1000 inhabitants without SD:

\[ \frac{0.757 \times 30,000}{1,000} = 23 \]

Change in refugees accepted between period 1 (2003-2006) and period 2 (2007-2010): 50 + 23 = 73

Average increase in SD between the election 2002 and 2006 (see Table 1): 2,115 percentage points

Effect of one percentage unit change in electoral support for SD (see Table 3, model 2): -0.155

Effect of average increase of SD between 2002 and 2006 on refugee reception/1000 inhabitants: 

\[ (2,115 \times (-0.155)) \times \frac{30,000}{1,000} = -10 \]

Number of refugees accepted/1000 inhabitants with effect of average electoral increase for SD: 73 + (-10) = 63

The change in refugee reception without SD is \[ \frac{73}{50} \times 100 \approx +46\% \]

The change in refugee reception with SD is \[ \frac{63}{50} \times 100 \approx +26\% \]

In Table 4 the effect of electoral support for SD on the mean of the refugee-reception is somewhat smaller after the control variables was introduced. The results of the control variables indicate that it is municipalities with bigger percentage of the population that is foreign born, bigger population and higher median income of the population that accepts fewer refugees. Municipalities with population increase and higher percentage of high-educated accept more refugees. Just as before, an example with a mean municipality with the size of 30,000 inhabitants will be used to show the effect of SD on refugee-reception. The result from Table 4 is presented in calculation Example 2, which has been performed in analogue to Example 1. The mean
municipality with 30,000 inhabitants accepted 58 refugees in the period 2009-2010. The mean increase in refugee-reception between the period 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 was +4 refugees meaning that this municipality would accept 62 refugees in 2010-2011. When the average increase in support for SD between the election 2006 and 2010 and the effect of SD is included instead of 62 only 57 refugees would be accepted. This is a decrease with -2% in refugee-reception in the period 2010-2011 in comparison with the period 2009-2010 instead of the increase with 7% when the effect of SD was not considered. In both table 3 and 4 the results of SD’s impact on refugee-reception are very interesting.

**Example 2**

Mean number of refugees accepted in a Swedish municipality during 2009-2010: 58

Mean population in a Swedish municipality: ~30 000

Mean change in refugee reception/1000 inhabitants between 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 (see Table 2): 0.130

Number of refugee accepted/1000 inhabitants without SD:

\[(0.130 \times 30 000)/1 000 = \sim 4\]

Change in refugees accepted between period 1 (2009-2010) and period 2 (2011-2012): 58 + 4 = 62

Average increase in SD between the election 2006 and 2010 (see Table 2): 2.148 percentage points

Effect of one percentage unit change in electoral support for SD (see Table 4, model 2): -0.082

Effect of average increase of SD between 2009 and 2010 on refugee reception/1000 inhabitants: \( (2.148 \times (-0.082)) \times (30 000/1000) \approx -5 \)

Number of refugee accepted/1000 inhabitants with effect of average electoral increase for SD: 62 + (-5) = 57

The change in refugee reception without SD is \( \frac{62}{58} \times 100 \approx +7 \% \)

The change in refugee reception with SD is \( \frac{57}{58} \times 100 \approx -2 \% \)

It seems that hypothesis number 1 is confirmed. Electoral success for SD has a negative impact on the refugee-reception. The next step was to introduce the political multiplicative interaction variables to try to answer if it is indirect or direct effect at play.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
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<td>Change in support for SD %</td>
<td>-1.14***</td>
<td>-1.15***</td>
<td>-1.13***</td>
<td>-1.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2002-2006</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Population foreign born %</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population increase/1000 2008</td>
<td>0.629**</td>
<td>0.575**</td>
<td>0.627**</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>(.276)</td>
<td>(.279)</td>
<td>(.277)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population/1000 2008</td>
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<td>-0.010**</td>
<td>-0.011**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment % 2008</td>
<td>0.199***</td>
<td>0.220***</td>
<td>0.199***</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.077)</td>
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<td>Median income/1000 2008</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
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<td>High educated % of population</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
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<td>Public Opinion</td>
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<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Right-wing majority 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>.332</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.268)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD balance of power 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Change in support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD and right-wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.095)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Change in support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD and SD balance of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.112)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.061***</td>
<td>3.085**</td>
<td>2.970**</td>
<td>3.090**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2 Adjusted</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p=<0.1; *p=<0.05; **p=<0.01; ***
Table 4 The effect of the independent variables on change between 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 in refugee-reception per 1000 inhabitants in the Swedish municipalities. Unstandardized b-coefficients and standard Errors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in support for SD % Between 2006-2010</td>
<td>-0.088**</td>
<td>-0.082**</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population foreign born % 2011</td>
<td>-0.027**</td>
<td>-0.028**</td>
<td>-0.027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population increase/1000 2011</td>
<td>0.621***</td>
<td>0.652***</td>
<td>0.695***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population/1000 2011</td>
<td>-0.012***</td>
<td>-0.012***</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment % 2011</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median income/1000 2011</td>
<td>-0.010**</td>
<td>-0.011**</td>
<td>-0.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-educated percent of population 2011</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing majority 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD Balance of power 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Change in support SD and right-wing majority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Change in support for SD and SD balance of power</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.319***</td>
<td>2.479**</td>
<td>2.785**</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.130</td>
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<tr>
<td>R² Adjusted</td>
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<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.099</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results hypothesis 2

There are two different interaction variables used in this thesis. The first of those are an interaction between change in support for SD and the municipality having a right-wing majority. The reason to create an interaction model is to find out if the effect of one variable varies between different groups. The second hypothesis of this thesis is that it is important for the refugee-reception whether there is a right-wing or left-wing majority in the municipality. To answer this hypothesis a dummy variable was created where all the municipalities with a right-wing majority after the election in 2006 in Table 3 and after the election 2010 in Table 4 where coded as 1 and all the municipalities with a left-wing majority was coded as 0. Hinnfors et al. (2012) and
Kitchelt (1995) argued that the left-wing parties are most likely to be affected by electoral success of AIP’s while Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup (2008) and Dahlström & Essiason (2011) found that the parties on the right-wing was most likely to be affected by AIP’s. The results of the regression with an interaction between change in support for SD and right-wing majority are shown in model 3. Neither of the tables displays any significant results from this regression. Hypothesis 2 must be rejected as there is no effect found when the interaction variable of right-wing majority is used. A left or right-wing majority in the municipalities has no real impact on the refugee-reception according to these results. The quest for an answer to the question if left-wing or right-wing politics have different impact on immigration policies must be continued in future research.

**Results hypothesis 3**

The second political interaction variable was created to answer the third hypothesis of this thesis; if municipalities where SD are in balance of power in the municipal council accepts fewer refugees than those where SD do not. The variable SD balance of power was coded with 1 if SD was in balance of power and 0 if they were not. In Table 3 the dummy variable is whether they were in balance of power after the election in 2006 and in Table 4 it is if they were in balance of power after the election in 2010. The results of the regressions with the SD interaction variable is rather ambiguous. In Table 3 there is no sign of any significant effect of the multiplicative interaction variable. Although the results of the regression with the multiplicative interaction variable in Table 4 are somewhat more interesting. The results of the multiplicative interaction variable in model 4 (Table 4) are significant at the 90% level (this is often not accepted as significant in social sciences). These results might be a hint that something is happening when SD is in balance of power. To interpret model 4 (Table 4), where a regression with a multiplicative interaction variable was used, it is important to remember that the interpretation is not the same as when a control variable is used in a regression. That means that the coefficient -0.067 is the effect when SD are not in balance of power (under control for the control variables) in a municipality. The effect of SD being in balance of power (1 on the dummy variable) is the coefficient change in the support for SD 2006-2010, -0.067 plus the coefficient of the multiplicative interaction variable (SD change and SD in balance of power) - 0.206. This means that the effect of the variable change in support for SD between the elections 2006 and 2010 on the dependent variable, change in the mean refugee-reception/1000 inhabitants is -0.273 when SD are in balance of power and -0.067 when SD are not in balance of power. When SD is in balance of power after both elections and the change in support for SD is 0 the mean of the refugee-reception is 0.532. The result showing that the refugee-reception is higher when SD is in balance of power after both elections when the electoral support is 0 is interesting. One explanation to the result that the refugee-reception increases is that the SD representatives is more cautious when the electoral support is not increasing because they are used to rising electoral support.

The effects shown in table 4 (model4) indicates that Hypothesis 3 is true under certain circumstances. Just as Bolin et al. (2013) finds that municipalities where SD
are in balance of power accept fewer refugees than municipalities where they are not
the results of this thesis points in the same direction but are only significant at the
90%. Bolin et al. uses the election 2006 and 2010 in a time series cross sectional
(TSCS) method. In this thesis another method, multiple (OLS) regression was used.
Which method that is most appropriate to use on the data is up for discussion. Another
thing that differs between this thesis and Bolin et al. (2013) article is the fact that they
decided to use seat shares for SD instead of electoral support for SD. It could be argued
that seat shares is a better measurement on the direct influence of SD and electoral
support a measurement for indirect support. The results of this thesis indicates that
there is traces of both direct effect of SD on immigration policies (Table 4, model 4)
as well as indirect and/or direct effect of SD on immigration policies (Table 3, model
2 and Table 4, model 2). To state that the results of this thesis proves that SD has a
direct or indirect impact on immigration policies in the Swedish municipalities is a bit
premature.
Conclusion

Research and studies on who votes for Anti-immigration parties (AIP’s) and the electoral success of these parties are numerous. Research that covers the area of what this thesis studies, policy impact of AIP’s, are scarcer. The aim of this thesis was to find out if AIP’s do in fact have any impact on policies. The choice to use immigration policy was natural since most (if not all) AIP’s share the view that immigration is a big problem for the nation-states in Europe. To address the methodological problem that comparative cross-country studies suffer from, Sweden and the Swedish municipalities was used as a case. Research on Sweden and the Swedish municipalities helps to solve the problems in comparative studies, because of the differences between AIP’s in different countries, as it is the same party that is studied and this helps to keep institutional factors, such as electoral systems, constant. Both the history of the AIP’s and the institutional factors has proven to be important in studies of AIP’s in earlier research. To tackle the problem of proving in what direction the causation arrow points between the independent and dependent variable, a method which calculates change between two periods was used.

The first hypothesis of this thesis was the question of whether there was a negative correlation between support for SD and the refugee-reception in the Swedish municipalities. This hypothesis was partly confirmed. The results indicates that there are traces of direct and/or indirect effects of the Swedish AIP the Sweden Democrats (SD) on the immigration policies in the Swedish municipalities in both of the time periods that was studied. When the electoral support for SD increases between the periods the mean of the change in refugee-reception decreases. How SD impacts the immigration policies can only be speculated about. It is perhaps in the way that Downs (1957) spatial theories predicts party movement on the left-right scale, where the established parties move towards the voters of the AIP’s to win over their votes. Another theory is that something changes in the municipal councils when SD gains electoral support.

Hypothesis number two was that right-wing and left-wing political majorities will effect refugee-reception differently in the Swedish municipalities. Earlier research came to different conclusions on whether right-wing or left-wing politics is most negative towards immigration and which that are strictest when it comes to refugee-reception. It seems logical that different political majorities produce different immigration policies. In this thesis no such results was however shown so hypothesis 2 must be rejected. The difference between refugee-reception in municipalities with left-wing and right-wing political majorities was not found. Previous researchers has written about the contagion of the right and some other have claimed that it is the left who are most affected by AIP’s. Further research on this area is needed to find out if there is a difference and describe the eventual differences between immigration policies of the left and right-wing parties.

The third and final hypothesis of this thesis was that municipalities where SD are in balance of power should have lower refugee-reception than those where they are
not. This hypothesis is supposed to answer the question whether SD have any direct influence over immigration policies and especially refugee-reception. As mentioned earlier in this thesis SD are often treated as pariah by the other established parties. Because SD is treated as pariah they seldom get to the point where they are able to join coalitions with other established parties, therefore the possibility for influencing policy is small. Although in the situation where they are in balance of power it is more likely that SD are able to assert influence over policy. The results indicates that they have some impact over refugee-reception in the second period but the significance of the results are only at the 90% level. So it is a bit premature to reject or confirm hypothesis 3 that SD impacts the refugee-reception when they are in balance of power in the municipal council.

The method where it is change between two periods that is used was an attempt to get to grip with the problem of causation. But this method may not be enough to solve the problem. If Mudde (2013) is right when he argues that restrictive immigration policies came long before the success for AIP’s in Europe, then this is a serious implication to this thesis. Using the public opinion’s view on the immigration issue as a control variable was an attempt to tackle this problem with Mudde’s (2013) arguments. Future research on this area must always fight the methodological problem of controlling for an immigration sceptical culture which was already there. Using Sweden and Swedish municipalities as a case just as Bolin et al. (2013), Folke (2011) and Dahlström & Sundell (2012) helps to keep important contextual factors, such as institutional settings, party differences and electoral laws, constant which troubles comparative studies.

Despite the problems mentioned, there are many interesting results found in this thesis. Folke (2011) found that New Democracy, which was a party that had nowhere near as tough attitude towards refugees as SD has nowadays, were able to have some impact on immigration policies. This thesis finds traces of SD having the same indirect impact. Bolin et al. did not find any indirect effect of electoral support for SD on refugee-reception, but instead found a direct effect when SD were occupying the balance of power in the municipal councils. This thesis finds no such direct effect of SD occupying the balance of power between 2002 and 2006 but only finds an effect in the period of the 2006 and 2010 election. This findings serves as a reminder that future research, that applies new and different methods, is needed so that one day the answer on AIP’s impact on politics may be answered.
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