Making Plans For Nigel
Explaining the success of the United Kingdom Independence Party in the 2013 local council elections, with a focus on Boston, Lincolnshire.

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Abstract

Eurosceptic parties across Europe are on the rise, and since the Eurocrisis their calls for reform of or even exit from the European Union have gained more prominence. One such party, The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), shocked political commentators in 2013 with their huge rise in the opinion polls and successes in local council elections across England. The aim of this thesis is to explain the success of UKIP in those elections, using Boston in Lincolnshire as a specific case study. This case study involves investigating the research problem from a number of different perspectives, analysing political factors, demographics and media. It then seeks to analyse whether pre-existing hypotheses to explain the success of UKIP and similar parties can be applied to the specific case of Boston.

The findings of the study are that the low turnout at the elections, especially of Conservative voters, gave UKIP the opportunity to win. This turnout can be explained by a number of factors, including a lack of political competition from other mainstream parties. The visit to the town of Nigel Farage also contributed to success of UKIP in the area, although this appeared to have still relied on the low turnout of Conservative voters. Finally, the large amount of low skilled immigration in the area may have also contributed to the spread of support for UKIP, although it is possible that this could also be down to deprivation levels in the area, as this appears to be apparent in the same geographic areas.

Key words – United Kingdom Independence Party, UKIP, Nigel Farage, local elections, euroscepticism, Boston, Lincolnshire, political, demographic, media, European Union, turnout, competition, low skilled, immigration.

Abbreviations:

APE – Anti-Political Establishment
BBI – Boston Bypass Independents
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BNP – British National Party
EDL – English Defence League
EU – European Union
FPÖ – Austrian Freedom Party
NOC – No Overall Control
Tories – Conservative Party
UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party
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1.0 - Introduction

A common remark about politics is that ‘all politics is local’. Despite having a number of Members of the European Parliament, the eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party are yet to gain election to the national parliament of the UK. Ford suggested that ‘UKIP may carry on rising in the national polls, but without local strongholds they will win nothing in a general election’ (Ford, 2013). In May 2013 however, they recorded significant victories in the local council elections. The UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system has always been seen as a significant hurdle to smaller parties, but on this occasion UKIP showed that they were becoming increasingly capable of jumping this hurdle.

Despite this, Duverger’s Law makes it difficult to break into the 2 or 2.5 party system of the UK, and it is hard to immediately identify areas where UKIP could be successful. Rowena Mason of The Telegraph stated that there are not many counties in the UK that are as ‘true blue’ as Lincolnshire ‘…or that is what the Tories thought, before Nigel Farage’s Ukip threw a splurge of purple across the rural heartland this week’ (Mason, 2013).

Mason asks the question why such a solidly Conservative voting area suddenly turned to UKIP in the local elections. 16 UKIP councillors were elected in Lincolnshire, the home county of Margaret Thatcher and dominated by the Conservatives for a century. Mason points out that UKIP’s leader, Nigel Farage had paid special attention to Lincolnshire and in particular the town of Boston, which has been nicknamed ‘Little Poland’ due to the large amount of Eastern Europeans now living there. It is Mason’s question that this thesis intends to explain, concentrating particularly on the town of Boston that was the focus of Farage’s attention.

Indeed, the political commentator Fraser Nelson described Boston as now being a ‘UKIP town’ (Nelson, 2013) following the shock election results. Lincolnshire was not the only place that UKIP had success in the local council elections, but it was the town of Boston that stood out nationally, mainly due to the scale of success that UKIP enjoyed there. In fact, if the local election results in Boston were to be replicated in a General Election, the UKIP would have seen their first Member of Parliament elected. This is why I have chosen Boston, to try and find out why this was the case.

UKIP, normally seen as more of party of the south, had made a breakthrough in a part of the country nobody expected, and seemingly from a very low starting point. As Mason mentioned earlier though, Boston is no ordinary town. Peter Hitchens (2011) of the Daily Mail referred to the town as ‘Boston Lincolngrad’ in an article that was widely criticised and accused of being inflammatory. There were numerous other pieces in the national media detailing the wide scale immigration from the new EU countries that this small Lincolnshire town had experienced in a short period of time. In January 2013 a local person appeared on the BBC’s flagship political debating show Question Time and told viewers that the town could no longer cope with the influx and was at breaking point.

Because of immigration clearly being an issue in the town, this thesis will explore research that has already been conducted on the impact of immigration on the support of populist parties in Europe. Ford (2012) and others have described UKIP as being ‘populist’ and their ideology and background will also be discussed to justify their inclusion in this category. This research on immigration varies from those who see it as a cultural conflict or integration...
issue (Goodwin 2011b, Oesch 2008, O’Connell 2005), a labour market issue (Docquier et al 2010, Sadka & Razin 1995, Hansen et al 2010), a phenomenon in itself (Golder 2003), a skill level oriented problem (Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller 2012) or a proximity and threat issue (Warmebol 2007). It is the last two that will later form the basis of my investigations in this area.

Because it is an election I am focusing on, I will also be trying to analyse political factors, to ascertain whether any of these reasons may have contributed towards the success of UKIP. The Huffington Post (2013) have suggested it is a split in the Conservative vote; Nelson (2013) their mutation from an EU protest party to a party of the working class; Ford, Goodwin & Cutts (2012) explained by core and strategic voting; Dunt (2013) taking votes from mainstream parties that the Liberal Democrats can no longer do; and finally Arzheimer & Carter (2003) who suggest that turnout is responsible and that voters use this to register their protest at mainstream parties during second order elections. Again, it is this last theory that I later focus on.

The vast media coverage surrounding the elections suggests that media based issues may also be worth investigating, especially considering the high profile of UKIP leader Nigel Farage. ‘As one put it, he is a politician they ‘could bear to have a pint with’. In short Farage (like Boris Johnson) has cultivated an unconventional image which helps him to get away with rather more than the average politician.’ (Hayton, 2013). I will investigate whether this is actually the case and whether the ‘Farage factor’ had any bearing on the election results. I analyse hypotheses put forward by Usherwood (2013) that coverage leads to better polling, which in turn leads to more coverage; Hopmann et al (2012) that tone an visibility have an effect on results; and Bos (2012) who suggests that the more successful populist leaders are the ones who can seem similar to established politicians.

Whilst I focus on three testable hypotheses under the immigration, political and media categories to try to explain the success of UKIP in Boston, I expect that some of the other theories discussed may also serve as further explanatory factors of various phenomena. However, whilst I expect there to be a number of micro factors that are responsible for UKIP’s success, especially in individual council wards, this thesis seeks to identify the most important factors. Before I begin with my theoretical framework, hypotheses and testing, I first introduce concepts such as euroscepticism and previous research relating to immigration in Europe, UKIP and the national picture in terms of election results.

1.1 - Disposition

This thesis will be structured as followed: I begin by introducing the concept of euroscepticism and its various forms across Europe. I then look at previous research concerning immigration in Europe and its relationship with support for populist parties. The history of the United Kingdom Independence Party, where their support comes from and what current academic theory says about them comes next. I also discuss survey data on their voters and profile their leader Nigel Farage. I then discuss the current electoral picture nationally, looking at some of UKIP’s most recent results and what we can understand from them and from the opinions of various experts.
Following this I then set out my theoretical framework and methodology, also giving details of any ethical issues or issues of bias that may arise in my research. The thesis then focuses on the three hypotheses that I intend to test and what data and material I will be analysing in order to do this. The three main sections of my research, looking at political, demographic and media related factors that could have influenced the results in Boston then follow. I conclude with a discussion of the results and whether my hypotheses have been confirmed, or whether new hypotheses have been created as a result of my research. I then suggest further research that could be carried out to continue studies in this area.

2.0 - Previous Research

2.1 - Euroscepticism

Before focusing on UKIP, it is important to grasp the idea of what euroscepticism actually is, why parties are Eurosceptic, and the reasons why they are becoming more relevant to the political world. Therefore we will look first at why different political parties within the European Union are either supportive or sceptical of integration. I will be comparing these parties not only with a traditional left/right analysis, but will also be looking at the GAL/TAN (green, alternative, libertarian & traditional, authoritarian, nationalism) dimension used by Hooghe, Marks & Wilson (2002). Added to this I will be looking at certain countries on an individual case basis, and whether there are also non-ideological factors that influence their attitudes to the EU.

To begin with it is important to look at historical attitudes towards ‘Europe’. In the past, we have seen those on the political left characterise the European Union in its various guises as being nothing more than a capitalist project. It is an organisation that is geared towards the free market and liberal economics. For others, it has been a way of uniting countries and avoiding further horrific conflicts, following two World Wars. We have then seen more recent criticism from the political right, citing the loss of national sovereignty and traditions, and also criticism about austerity measures that have been imposed as part of bailout conditions. Political attitudes towards the European Union have evolved as much as the Union itself.

The British Conservative Party is a particularly intriguing example. It was the Conservative Party that originally took the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community in 1973. Their Prime Minister at the time, Edward Heath, was seen as a moderate within the party and was enthusiastic about membership. He was defeated following the Labour Party’s election triumph in 1974 however, and they promised a referendum on continued membership of the EEC. The UK public voted to remain as EEC members in 1975, and to this day it is still the only referendum on Europe to be held in the UK.

How times change. In 2011 we saw a vote in the House of Commons where backbench Conservative MPs have tried to force a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU (in that they wanted a withdrawal/status quo/reform referendum to be put to the public).
All three main UK political parties whipped against this proposal however, and their leadership made clear their support for continued membership of the European Union, although to different extents (with the Labour Party now seen as a pro-EU party). Since then, Prime Minister David Cameron has himself called for a renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU and has then promised to hold a referendum on this renegotiated relationship if the Conservatives win the next General Election. Whilst making clear his preference to remain within a reformed EU, this has left the door open for a possible exit if the renegotiation (if there is a renegotiation) is not acceptable to the British public. This campaign has been named ‘Let Britain Decide’. So far they are the only party to have pledged a referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. Can we continue to look at the old left/right dimensions to explain this occurrence though?

This is what Hooghe et al (2002) decided to research, looking at not just the British situation, but that around the rest of the EU. ‘We find strong associations between party score on the GAL/TAN dimension, overall support for European integration, and support for particular aspects of European integration, including environmental policy, asylum policy, and strengthening the European Parliament. (Hooghe et al, 2002, p985). They were surprised that this research looking at the ‘new politics’ of GAL & TAN had such a correlation on issues surrounding European integration.

From a British perspective this is even more apparent. ‘Given the endemic conflict between neoliberalism, oriented on the Left/Right dimension, and nationalism, oriented on GAL/TAN dimension, we hypothesize that conservative parties are particularly prone to such fissures (Hooghe et al, p982). The Conservative Party, despite being firmly on the right from an economic perspective, were seen as taking a more TAN approach since the election of Margaret Thatcher as leader following Heath. The splits in the Conservative Party, such as backbench rebellions over the Maastricht Treaty still influence the attitudes of the party towards Europe. Kenneth Clarke, a ‘big hitter’, but firm supporter of the EU and at one point the Euro saw his chances of becoming leader dashed on numerous occasions because of his pro-European views.

Hix and Hoyland suggest that domestic politics also play a part in how political parties view the EU. They use the example of the British Conservatives, for whom EU policies were described as being ‘socialism through the back door’, with Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 Bruges speech famously stating that they ‘…have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level.’. Hix & Hoyland then contrast this with the French perspective, whereby the French Socialists see the liberalising effects of the single market, along with privatisation and state aids policies, being more of an ‘Anglo-Saxon plot’ to undermine French workers (Hix & Hoyland, 2011, p127).

So whilst ideological positions and preferences with policy are important, it is the domestic policy context that they are set within that helps us to understand why the ‘right’ in Britain are critical of the EU, whilst the French right are more supportive. This also helps to explain why the opposite could be said of the British and French ‘left’.

This is interesting when looking at the radical/populist right as the same kind of pattern emerges. The Danish Peoples Party, Vlaams Belang and The Austrian Freedom Party, whilst all being eurosceptic, all have very different outlooks to other radical parties, such as the French National Front or the Italian National Alliance (Hooghe et al, 2002, p979). They primarily see the benefits of free trade and the market. This would appear to have a lot in
common with what Hix & Hoyland said about Anglo-Saxon attitudes, and may explain why the French are more suspicious.

Euroscepticism in its various forms appears to have spread. ‘It is clear that Euroskepticism is not just another English vice. As a minimum, Europe is no longer part of consensus, non-partisan politics in many Member States, not least the new ones.’ (Weiler, 2005, p231). This raises another interesting area, in that we must now look at Eastern and Central European members. Where do their attitudes fit in with this Anglo-Saxon/French way of thinking? Does their past play a role?

Some parties obviously felt that the EU would help them to gain access to their own system and that it would improve democracy (through conditionality requirements in the build-up to membership). If they are in favour of free market economics then this could also have played a role and led to more enthusiasm. However, once a country becomes a member of the European Union they may not feel the same obligation to fit in with many of these conditional requirements.

Vachudova (2008, p866) believes different Eastern European states are at different stages with their political parties and systems. Romania and Bulgaria are more ‘left TAN’ and eurosceptic, whilst Poland and Hungary are less left TAN populated, with less euroscepticism. This is because they had already started democratic reforms in the 1980s. Czechs voted out communists in 1990 and followed a liberal trajectory, but are put forward as a strange example, with the ODS being ‘right’ TAN and the KSCM (communist) ‘left’ TAN. Both are also seen as eurosceptic, so it could be argued that there are comparisons that could be made here with the British Conservatives.

Of course, the Conservative Party are not the only eurosceptics in the UK. In the early 1990s we saw Sir James Goldsmith set up the Referendum Party in protest at the Maastricht Treaty. We now also see the United Kingdom Independence Party who have several MEPs and advocate complete withdrawal from the European Union, along with the ‘cross-party’ but effectively right leaning Better Off Out campaign, which is supported by several eurosceptic Conservatives. They go further than simply saying that Maastricht needs revisiting. Even looking back to the early 90s and before treaties like Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, Weiler points out that Goldsmith ‘...focussed his campaign on the alleged evils of the Maastricht Treaty and its potential sequel. But if you scrutinize his manifesto with care you will see that, like many avowed Euroskeptics, it is the constitutional framework, already in place long before Maastricht, which is at the source of his rage’ (Weiler, 2005, p223). It is this sovereignty issue that seems to stand out when analysing euroscepticism on the political right, and for them is an issue where the status quo is clearly not acceptable.

There are also some very interesting cases of euroscepticism from places you would not normally expect to find it. Look at the first referendum in Ireland over the Lisbon Treaty for example. The mainstream parties were all in favour of a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum, and only the Sinn Fein party (who I would argue are ‘left’ and TAN) and independent organisations were campaigning for a ‘No’ vote. Indeed, some of the posters displayed slogans such as ‘People Died For Your Freedom – Don’t Throw It Away’, with references to the Declaration of Irish Independence. The ‘No’ vote won, and a similar result also happened in France. Could this be a sign that public opinion was not necessarily in line with the views of the political elites? This was even more surprising in the Ireland had always been held up as an example of how the EU could benefit smaller nations.
It should be pointed out though, that for the most part national governments are broadly in favour of European Union membership for many reasons including: the prevention of further conflicts between states; the solving of the ‘German Question’; keeping Europe democratic; protecting small countries and finally for cooperation in economic areas etc. Many on the left have softened their attitudes to what was originally to them a ‘capitalist club’, and you will now see Greens, such as those in Germany, viewing the EU’s power to implement wide-ranging environmental policies as a good thing.

Even the political mainstream have run into arguments with the European Union hierarchy however. In France, President Sarkozy was criticised over the handling of Romanian gypsies and more recently there have been issues with Danish border controls, despite them being part of the Schengen area. Conflict with the EU has seemingly come from the political right, or from TAN parties, trying to protect what they see as their traditional values and national sovereignty. Since the recent recession there has also been controversy over one of the EU’s great principles, that of the free movement of labour, and of low skilled migrant workers from the East.

It could be argued that the EU is centrist in its approach. One major area of controversy surfaced in 2000 when there were problems forming a government in Austria. When neither the socialists nor the conservatives could find a compromise, the FPÖ (Freedom Party) and their controversial leader Jörg Haider came forward as a potential coalition partner. Many referred to the FPÖ at the time as a ‘far right’ party, and leaders of the EU’s member states were quick to announce that they would be imposing bi-lateral political sanctions on Austria were they to enter into a coalition agreement. This led to a threat from Austria to hold a referendum on effectively using their veto to stop the EU progressing in areas. For some, the threat from the leaders of EU states was an abuse of their powers, trying to influence what had been a democratically contested election in a member state. For others it was an example of the EU trying to protect its principles and stop any further potential problems. For many eurosceptics though, this could be used as an example of the EU interfering with national sovereignty, albeit only to a limited extent.

The move was seen to have backfired and instead turned some Austrians, many of whom would have never voted for the FPÖ, against the EU for what they saw as interference and unfair treatment of their country. Similar parties have also supported governments in both Denmark and the Netherlands since this incident, but have not been official coalition partners, which may be to avoid similar conflicts. The stand out example is Italy, where Berlusconi has been in coalition with both the National Alliance and the Northern League. Perhaps the unstable nature of Italian politics is what has allowed this to go through without great opposition however.

The gap between political elites and the general public must also be considered. In Finland, yet another country you would not associate with euroscepticism, the True Finns party shocked many with their results in recent national elections. This was seen as a reflection of Finnish anger towards various ‘bailouts’. In France, the Front National leader Marine Le Pen wants out of the Euro and Arnaud Montebourg, a left wing protectionist who opposes globalisation, came an impressive third in the French Socialist primary. Going back to Britain again, the debate over the nature of EU membership rages on, though has at times been seen as ‘off limits’ to those leading the mainstream parties. Grzymala-Busse and Innes (2003, p72) feel that this forced conformity across the EU has closed basic ideological debates on public policy. They suggest that because there is ‘no alternative’ to this there is a rise of anti-EU
politicians who substitute populism for debate over ideology or policy. According to Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2011), public support for EU membership has been dropping in the United Kingdom in recent years.

I would agree with Hooghe, Marks & Wilson about the importance of the GAL/TAN dimension, and that the old left/right analysis can no longer be used in isolation to understand attitudes towards European integration. Added to this it is also clear that historical factors, the nature of a country’s domestic policy and how political parties’ leadership connect with their parties and the wider public also play a pivotal role.

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**2.2 – Immigration and populist parties in the rest of Europe.**

As has been previously referred to, there are similarities between the success of UKIP and other populist parties in Europe. Much of the research conducted has focused on the factors that may have led to increased support for these parties. Whilst there is argument over whether you can generalise about parties that differ from country to country, there are in some cases clear similarities, and it is therefore worthwhile to see if the same factors can be seen to apply across national boundaries.
In Austria, Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller found that the FPÖ gained votes when the immigrant population in areas increased. However, the skill composition of immigrants was also an important factor, as the proximity of low and medium skilled immigrants caused voters to the FPÖ. Conversely, high skilled immigration had an insignificant or negative effect on FPÖ votes (Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller, 2012, p27). This is an interesting finding, as the case we will be focusing on (Boston) has a large number of unskilled workers in industries such as agriculture.

In Belgium, it has been suggested that areas surrounding high immigrant concentrated areas are susceptible to high levels of support for the Vlaams Belang. Tough inner city areas with high unemployment are not necessarily linked to support for populist radical right parties. In particular, Warmenbol discusses the ‘inkblot theory’, whereby districts that do not have, or have only recently had these problems, tend to be more vulnerable to increased Vlaams Belang support. Warmenbol also links this with the ‘threat hypothesis’, whereby they will vote for a radical populist party to ‘...keep distance and prevent their own area from becoming like the stereotypical inner-city neighbourhood, a phenomenon which is also called the ‘halo-effect’ (Warmenbol, 2007, p20).

Again, this is another factor that is worth investigating. Have UKIP been successful in the areas surrounding those with high concentrations of migrants? If so then we should not only look at Boston, but also any areas that are immediately surrounding it to see if there has been an effect on voting and whether this ‘threat hypothesis’ can be observed. Can evidence be found that this also links in with the Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller assertion that the skills composition of migrants also matters?

For O’Connell, the levels of poverty in an area are not necessarily linked to people supporting populist parties. Whilst those with greater wealth were less hostile in their attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, he states that many successes for right-wing populist parties have been in countries where they are generally better off. Although he does point out that in these countries immigrants are less likely to be perceived as an economic threat, an increase in their numbers can lead a conflict on issues surrounding integration (O’Connell, 2005, p74).

This could explain the success of populist parties in the Scandinavian countries, where the standard of living is very high in comparison to other countries (and some may argue in the United Kingdom also). This suggests that factors such as culture may play a more important role in the success of these parties.

Golder has produced some of the main work relating to the effect of migration on votes for populist parties. He emphasises that unemployment on its own doesn't help populist parties increase their vote share, and that this only increases when there are large numbers of foreigners in the country. Although he has also stated that ‘...higher levels of immigration always help populist parties, irrespective of the level of unemployment.’ (Golder, 2003, p460). The assertion that higher levels of immigration always help populist parties is a bold one, and is a variable that could also be tested as part of a study.

Going back to the non-economic concerns, Goodwin has suggested that whilst economics are a factor, it is the cultural element that is key. More culturally distinct groups, such as Muslims for example, can be seen as threatening national cultures, traditions and ways of life. He refers to previous work by Sniderman whereby these feelings are seen to trump those
relating to any economic threat. 'It is similarly reflected in the Transatlantic Trends survey...'
(Goodwin, 2011, p7). This appears to back up Golder in the sense that unemployment alone is not necessarily the major factor.

Goodwin's views echo those espoused by Oesch, who looked specifically at the levels of support that 'workers' had for the parties and the reasons why. Cultural identity is seen as more important than economic concerns. 'The formula for Blocher’s, Dewinter’s, Hagen’s, Haider’s, or Le Pen’s electoral success seems clear: “It’s the identity, stupid!”'(Oesch, 2008, p370).

Goodwin then further goes on to say that this is also related to their unhappiness with the policies of mainstream alternatives, and that far from being irrational, the people who vote for these parties have very clear goals. ‘... they want immigration reduced and rising diversity curtailed or halted altogether. They are deeply concerned about these issues, and profoundly dissatisfied with the current response offered by mainstream parties.' (Goodwin, 2011b, pxi). This unhappiness with the political mainstream appears to be a recurring theme with research into populist parties.

Whilst cultural threat appears to be one of the main themes, can it be argued that migrants are also causing lower wages and increased inequality however? Docquier et al produced an interesting study suggesting that countries are losing more of their highly skilled workers and it is a brain drain situation, rather than a case of being dragged down by migration. ‘...immigrants are generally imperfect substitutes for non-migrants bringing skills that only partially compensate the losses due to emigration.’(Docquier, Özden & Peri, 2010, p23)

Sadka and Razin have suggested in a study that if the labour market is not functioning properly then migration can make things worse. They also suggest that unskilled migration can also put pressure on the welfare state, and that there is an inability to exclude them from this. Immigration can be more of a benefit to the native born population therefore if the labour markets function better and if welfare programmes are less comprehensive (Sadka & Razin, 1995, p316). This is interesting, as we know that wages in Scandinavian countries are generally higher than in other countries, and that the welfare state is especially renowned for being fairly comprehensive, yet in recent years they have seen a huge rise in the success of the Sweden Democrats, a populist right party. Hansen, Wahlberg & Faisal (2010, p1) suggest that low wages of migrants is mainly a quality sorting exercise, and not to do with them lowering existing wages. This would back up the earlier point made by Docquier.

So, from the research that has already been conducted there appears to be a number of variables that are continually referred to as being responsible for increased support of populist and APE parties across Europe. These will be analysed during this study to see if they are still relevant and can be applied to the British case of the United Kingdom Independence Party and in particular in the Boston area.
2.3 - UKIP, their successes, policies and supporters

The United Kingdom Independence Party, or UKIP for short, was first formed in 1993 by Dr Alan Sked as a response to the controversial Maastricht Treaty. They were very much a minor party however, and were in the shadow of the Referendum Party, led by Sir James Goldsmith (BBC News, 2013). Goldsmith’s death and the subsequent winding-up of the Referendum Party in 1997 were to lead to later successes for UKIP however.

In the 1999 European Elections UKIP had their first MEPs elected, returning three members to the Parliament. The proportional electoral system used for the European Elections played a big part in this, as the first-past-the-post electoral system that the UK normally uses makes it very difficult for smaller parties to gain election. It was in the 2004 European Elections where UKIP made a real breakthrough however, overtaking the Liberal Democrats, and securing 3rd place with 12 MEPs. This year also represented a peak in UKIP’s membership figures, and the party boasted some celebrity supporters, such as the actress Joan Collins and the television presenter (and former Labour Member of Parliament) Robert Kilroy-Silk (widely known as just ‘Kilroy’). Kilroy-Silk was also one of their candidates, subsequently gaining election for the East Midlands constituency.

This added media presence was to cause problems however. Things appeared to be happening a little too fast for UKIP. Abedi & Lundberg cite the internal conflict when Kilroy-Silk wanted the party to focus on taking office, whereas many party members were more concerned with keeping their populist appeal and their status as an APE (Anti-Political Establishment party). For Abedi and Lundberg, a party’s organisational structure evolves over time, and important events can have implications on their abilities to handle them. For them, Kilroy arrived too early in UKIP’s life cycle (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009, p4).

Kilroy-Silk did not last long, and after a failed leadership bid left the party to form his own unsuccessful movement, Veritas. Despite repeating their successes of 2004 in the 2009 European Elections, until recently the party’s support seemed to have peaked and been limited to European elections because of the proportional system. However, they have seen a
recent unprecedented rise in their support, baffling many political commentators and giving them seats in both local government and respectable results in parliamentary byelections.

UKIP have been portrayed for many years as little more than a single issue party. Clements, Lynch and Whitaker (2013) point to the low salience of the European issue with only around 6% of people in a 2012 Ipsos/MORI poll saying that the EU or Europe was the biggest issue facing Britain. They suggest that the salience may be slightly higher as people link the EU to other issues, such as immigration and the economy. However, they believe that UKIP will need to do more to raise the profile of this connection, or instead find other issues if they are to be more successful (Clements, Lynch & Whitaker, 2013).

A recent YouGov poll showed that the economy is very much the most important issue to people in the UK, followed by the immigration issue. The Eurocrisis and increased immigration from new EU Member States, along with the prospect of further immigration from Bulgaria and Romania appear to have made it easier to argue for a link between these different issues.

YouGov Issues Tracker (past 12 months)

Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the country at this time?
Please tick up to three.

![Graph showing economy and immigration issues]

(Jordan, YouGov, 8th May 2013)

Where exactly are UKIP in ideological terms though? Some have suggested that whilst UKIP policies generally match up well between their candidates and their supporters, a broadening of policies brings with it new problems and new disagreements. Whilst there is agreement over issues like the EU, things such as the economy may not have the same uniform agreement. Lynch, Whitaker and Loomes did a study looking at actual candidates and conducted a survey of them.
They found that if UKIP are to persuade more eurosceptic Conservative supporters to ‘lend their votes’ then they must not only generate an increased salience of the Europe issue, but also to have a broader message. One such suggestion is the concept of ‘independence’, in the sense that they could focus not just on independence from the EU, but of citizens from excessive state intervention, and of UKIP being independent thinkers on issues such as Europe, immigration and climate change, being an alternative to what is described as an elite consensus. This can then be linked to national and local issues that are of higher importance to voters, for example ‘...the costs of membership, the impact of the Working Time Directive on the National Health Service and how EU regulations shape local issues from job losses in manufacturing to the building of wind farms. (Lynch, Whitaker & Loomes, 2011, p23).

UKIP have also pushed traditional lines on issues such as defence and education, arguing for increased spending and the return of grants rather than student loans. They have however criticised high spending on foreign aid. Despite the pledges to increase spending on certain areas, UKIP have also pledged to introduce a flat tax system and to make billions worth of tax and public expenditure cuts. One of the main criticisms of their policies has been ‘where will the money come from?’, to which the usual response will be to cut public spending, including the money that they claim the UK pays to the European Union (BBC, 2013c).

It is also interesting to compare and contrast support for the more populist UKIP with the more extreme British National Party and English Defence League. Ford (2012) looked in detail at this particular issue. He found that whilst many voters have concerns over certain political issues, such as Islam, immigration and cultural identity, they will distance themselves from organisations such as the BNP and EDL as they are seen as being violent, racist or having links to fascism. He points out that in fact, ‘The most successful radical right politicians are often, paradoxically, those who start by talking about something else’ (Ford, 2012).

The way UKIP are treated in the media is also an interesting area of study (and one that will be addressed in more detail later in this thesis). The British National Party, who had two members elected to the European Parliament in 2009, regularly receives negative publicity in the press. Their leader, Nick Griffin, made an infamous appearance on the BBC political debate show Question Time. There were violent protests outside the television studios over the decision to allow him on the programme, and during the programme he was the subject of constant criticism from members of the audience and the rest of the panel. This was in fact criticised, as this was not the normal way the debate show operated, and led to many complaints of unfair treatment. Ford followed up his previous remarks by suggesting why Griffin received this treatment, whereas UKIP leader Nigel Farage has appeared on the programme several times without any problems.

‘Nigel Farage, by contrast, has been able to raise similar contentious questions about immigration, Islam and identity in mainstream political forums such as Question Time without being attacked as a racist or a fascist thanks to his roots in a more legitimate tradition of Eurosceptic politics.’ (Ford, 2012)

Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2012) did an interesting study of the 2009 European Elections and managed to divide UKIP supporters up into two distinct categories - these being ‘strategic’ and ‘core’ supporters. They also found that these supporters very often appear to display different demographics.
One suggestion is that the strategic UKIP supporters tend to be more affluent members of the middle class who use second order elections, such as those for the European Parliament, in order to demonstrate their dislike of the EU. Their vote is therefore being used as a warning to their natural party to change their ways. They found evidence that some Conservatives have been making this tactical choice, and that more than half of UKIP’s support in 2009 came from these ‘strategic defectors’ (Ford, Goodwin & Cutts, 2012, p26).

One of the main assumptions of UKIP supporters is that they are simply disaffected Conservative voters, and therefore any votes for UKIP will take away from the Conservative vote. Whilst this may be the case to some extent, and is something that will be investigated further at a later point, it cannot be assumed that all UKIP voters are former Conservatives, or Conservatives who are ‘lending their vote’.

The same research from Ford, Goodwin & Cutts outlined how ‘core’ supporters are very much different from their strategic counterparts, both in terms of their views and their demographics. In fact, the core supporters that UKIP rely on for both first and second order elections tend to be more economically marginalised and politically disaffected. Once again, it is suggested that there is an overlap with their profile and that of the extreme right BNP, who are also seen to have mobilised ‘economically insecure working class men’. However, the BNP are seen as more northern and working class, whereas core supporters of UKIP still tend to be more moderate, older, likely to be in the more prosperous south and more likely to be women (Ford, Goodwin & Cutts, 2012, p26).

In later work, Ford believes that comparisons can be drawn between UKIP and other populist parties in Europe, and acknowledges that their success needs to be put down to more than just Conservatives who are angry about the EU. Examples such as the Dutch Party for Freedom, Danish People’s Party, Austrian Freedom Party and True Finns are used.

‘Like these parties, UKIP mobilises voters who are primarily concerned about immigration, but are also typically nationalist, Eurosceptic and deeply disaffected with the existing political elite. In many cases these parties, or their leaders, began on the mainstream right, before breaking away to focus on a more populist agenda. (Ford, 2013)

This would make sense, especially with UKIP moving away from simply discussing the EU in terms of economic and sovereignty issues, and linking it with other issues, such as immigration.

UKIP also struggle in terms of establishing a base of local activists to help them make a breakthrough. In this sense they will need more candidates used to what Ford describes as the ‘hard slog’ of local politics. The example of the Liberal Democrats is used, as they spent a number of years establishing local organisations to build their party from the ground up and to then translate this into success at a more national level.

Tip O’Neill once observed that “all politics is local”, and under first past the post this is the brutal truth: UKIP may carry on rising in the national polls, but without local strongholds they will win nothing in a general election. (Ford, 2013)

The well-known journalist Fraser Nelson suggests that UKIP must have adopted a wider range of issues because on their own the local elections don’t have anything to do with the
European Union. He also suggests they are fast ‘...mutating from an EU protest party into a broader party of the working class.’ (Nelson, 2013).

Why then, if the local elections have nothing to do with the European Union, would UKIP be so successful in them? Nelson believes that there would be no rational reason for one-in-four voters choosing UKIP unless they genuinely believed they had broadened their agenda. This is why he feels that the referendum pledge by David Cameron did not ‘shoot the UKIP fox’. He admits to believing that UKIP had reached their high water mark, but realises that this has since been continuing to rise (Nelson, 2013).

The broader agenda appears to include some of the issues mentioned earlier, and his ability to link them in to the UK’s membership of the European Union. Opinion poll ratings published in The Observer newspaper show UKIP having a huge surge in support, and this coinciding with the local elections in May 2013. This has tailed off in the months since the poll, as the economy has shown signs of improving (which has also led to an increase in support for the Conservative Party).

(Opinium/Observer, 1st June 2013)

2.4 - UKIP Voters

The success of UKIP has led many to question what kind of people support them. Kellner (2013) highlights the problem that the number of UKIP supporters in most polls is too small to provide what we could call a reliable set of data- as is the problem when studying the support of many similar populist style parties across Europe. By combining all of the data from voting intention surveys over the course of a month, they managed to gain a sample of 30,000, which included 2700 people who said they would vote for UKIP. This is helpful, as it allows us to draw some conclusions from the data without worrying about the sample being too small.
Kellner’s research suggests that UKIP voters tend to be ‘older and poorer than Tories – but LESS right-wing’ (Kellner, 2013). This is interesting, as UKIP as a party are commonly seen as being to the right of the Conservative Party. It is also interesting, as despite being normally Conservative, the eastern part of Lincolnshire is generally less affluent.

Kellner’s research shows 60% of UKIP’s supporters voted for the Conservative Party in the 2010 General Election and only 12% actually voted for UKIP. Kellner also states that there is nothing new about supporters of the Liberal Democrats, seen as pro-EU, switching to the anti-EU UKIP ‘... they are the kind of Lib Dem voters whose choice was driven by a dislike for the two big parties rather than enthusiasm for Brussels.’ (Kellner, 2013).

Other analysis from Kellner’s study reveals that 60% of Tories (Conservatives) place themselves on the right of the political spectrum, but only 46% of UKIP voter. He also states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How UKIP voters compare</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Current vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who...</td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>UKIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted Conservative in 2010</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted Labour in 2010</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted Lib Dem in 2010</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If forced to choose, would prefer...</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameron-led Conservative government</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miliband-led Labour government</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regard themselves as centre or left-of-centre</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regard themselves as right-of-centre</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read the Mail/Sun/Express</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are male</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are under 40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are over 50</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have no qualification of just GCSE</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a university degree</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have household income more than £40k per year</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*K asked on two surveys; number of UKIP supporters: 352; rest of data drawn on responses of 2,788 UKIP supporters*
that 25% of Tories class themselves as being in the centre of left of centre, whereas for UKIP the figure is 36%. UKIP supporters are more likely to read right-leaning tabloids, like The Mail, The Sun or The Express. 71% of UKIP voters are over 50, only 13% have university degrees, and their supporters are less likely than Conservatives to have an above average income.

2.5 - The Farage Factor

One important element in terms of UKIP’s success has been the presence of their charismatic leader Nigel Farage. Farage first became leader in 2006, and then after standing down for a short time during the 2010 General Election became leader again. He is the public face of the party and has received huge amounts of media attention, not least for his speeches in the European Parliament, where he has also been criticised for insulting various members, including the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. In an age where many politicians are seen as dull and lacking personality, Farage’s eccentricities and charismatic qualities have made him a point of interest in the political arena, and a key part of UKIP’s success according to Hayton.

‘As one put it, he is a politician they ‘could bear to have a pint with’. In short Farage (like Boris Johnson) has cultivated an unconventional image which helps him to get away with rather more than the average politician.’ (Hayton, 2013).

Farage, himself a former Conservative, has in the past described himself as being a Thatcherite. Some have suggested in the past that some of his views are similar to those of the Conservative Party in the 1980s. This led to YouGov conducting a poll for The Sun newspaper to see which politician people believed was the most similar to Tory (Conservative) grassroots activists. Boris Johnson, the Conservative Mayor of London, came second and along with Farage is also seen by the public as being an eccentric and colourful character.

![Bar chart showing percentage support for similarity to Tory grassroots activists](Wilson, The Sun, 21st May, 2013)
In a further YouGov poll for the Sunday Times, Nigel Farage was rated the best leader of the top four parties. It needs to be kept in mind however, that this survey was asking how good a job they felt they were doing with their party. This is easier for leaders of smaller parties if they are doing well in the polls than it is for larger parties, like Labour or the Conservatives, who have higher expectations placed on them by the public. Half felt he was doing well and only one in five thought he was doing badly. ‘When asked who would make a better Prime Minister than David Cameron however, Mr Farage fares rather worse: just 11% back the UKIP leader, the same number as who back Nick Clegg, while 27% say Ed Miliband would be better.’ (Dahlgreen, 2013).

Linda Bos researched the role of the media in terms of the public image that leaders of right-wing populist parties had. The study was focused on political parties in the Netherlands. She found that the public generally arrived at their party choices through the same ideological and pragmatic considerations as they would with other parties, but only if these parties were perceived as ‘normal’, in that they were democratic and effective (Bos, 2012, pp115-117). She also found that the more successful populist leaders were the ones that came across as more authoritative, in that what distinguished them was not what made them extraordinary, but what made them similar to established party leaders. Whilst the content of media coverage affected the public image of political leaders, there were only small differences between populist leaders and those who were more established, with the media being able to exert both positive and negative effects. Finally, she found that the idiosyncratic style used by some populist did not harm them, but did not help them either.

Hopmann et al (2012) studied the news coverage of the 2007 Danish elections to investigate whether visibility and tone influenced party choice. They found that the more visible a party is and the more positive the tone is towards the party, the more likely people are to vote for them. These are however effects of the ‘information environment’, rather than simply effects of direct exposure. This can also influence undecided voters (Hopmann et al, 2012, p389).
Dr. Simon Usherwood of the University of Surrey believes that more media coverage drives more interest and that eventually this means better polling, which again in turn drives more coverage. He suggests that parties of limited resources, like UKIP, need to use this as a central strategy. They then ‘piggy back’ on the existing agenda before moving on to create their own. Despite their wish to leave the EU, this is why UKIP contest elections to the European Parliament as it allows them to ‘frame the debate on Europe’ (Usherwood, 2013).

2.6 –The National Picture and Results

In the May 2013 Local Elections across England & Wales, UKIP made significant gains and were seen very much as the success story of the night. Most of the media coverage regarding the elections focused on their successes. The most notable of these was the result in Lincolnshire, where they won 16 seats, which resulted in the Conservative council losing overall control.

Lincolnshire was not the only place where they enjoyed success though, as they increased their number of councillors to 147. When the seats were last contested in 2009 they won no seats at all, but they picked up 10 in Hampshire, 9 in Essex, 3 in Gloucestershire, 3 in Somerset and 1 in Dorset (Huffington Post, 2013).

One of the main assertions was that UKIP were splitting the Conservative vote and causing them serious problems. Leading Conservative politician Ken Clarke described the party as “clowns”, to which UKIP leader Nigel Farage responded by saying it was time to "Send in the clowns." (Huffington Post, 2013)

This is again mentioned by Dunt (2013), who suggests that unhappy Conservative voters are their natural home, with three quarters of their gains coming at a cost to the Conservatives. Dunt cites examples such as Gloucestershire and Lincolnshire, where the Tories (Conservatives) lost their councils, which went to ‘no overall control’. The Conservatives lost 18 of their seats in Essex and in Hampshire they ‘...have held on by their fingernails’ (Dunt, 2013).

Whilst these seats may have been taken from Conservatives, it is necessary to investigate whether it is just Conservatives that have been switching their votes to UKIP. However, Dunt later acknowledges this and suggests they are also causing a growing problem for Labour and what would normally be considered their core supporters. This is linked to earlier points that have been made about UKIP, who whilst being respectable have started to prove attractive to more working class voters with their focus on issues such as immigration. ‘In wards won by the Tories in 2009, Ukip were up 21 at the time of writing. In wards won by Labour in 2009, they were up 15. The Ukip effect may be reduced, but it is notable’ (Dunt, 2013).

This ties in with the earlier points made by Ford and Fraser Nelson about UKIP increasingly become a party of the disaffected working class. On the same night of the local elections there was also a parliamentary byelection for the safe Labour seat of South Shields in the North East. UKIP finished in second place with 24.21% of the vote, with the Conservatives
coming third. Dunt suggests that UKIP are showing they can appeal to voters outside of their traditional strongholds, which he feels Labour leader Ed Miliband has failed to do.

UKIP also had success down south in the Eastleigh byelection in March. Again, whilst they didn’t win the seat, their candidate Diane James came second with 27.8% of the vote, behind the Liberal Democrats, who held on to the seat with 32%. The Conservatives, who were targeting this seat, came third with 25.4%. Labour meanwhile came a distant fourth, despite having a celebrity candidate. ‘Ukip saw a remarkable rise in support over just a few weeks of campaigning in Eastleigh. It only got four per cent of the Eastleigh vote at the last general election.’ (Kirkup & Mason, 2013)

Dunt puts the success of UKIP down to them benefitting from an ‘…anti-politics, anti-establishment mood, especially with the Liberal Democrats no longer able to hoover up those votes’. With the exception of Eastleigh, the decline of the Liberal Democrats is noticeable from opinion polls and recent election results since becoming part of the government. Whilst ideologically they are nowhere near UKIP, it does beg the question ‘where have their votes disappeared to?’.

Like Fraser Nelson, Dunt acknowledges that UKIP have managed to move beyond the focus on the EU and have successfully managed to link the Europe issue to immigration and the economy, which were seen as more important issues to the public, according the YouGov issues tracker that we analysed earlier. They have also been highly effective in capitalising on concerns about a potential influx of Bulgarians and Romanians when entrance restrictions are lifted in January 2014 (Dunt, 2013).

This could explain why the Conservatives moving to the right has not made a difference to their levels of success and why they have also performed well against Labour. Dunt suggests that the public rarely see things in terms of ‘right’ or ‘left’.

Finally, we need to consider when looking at the performance of UKIP and other parties within the UK system the issue of turnout at elections. A lack of interest in the political process or what the main parties have on offer can give smaller parties a better chance of success, as Thorpe-Apps points out. This was the case with the extreme British National Party in the 2009 European Elections when they gained two MEPs.

‘It is also arguable that UKIP (not extremist, but certainly to the right of the political spectrum) only performed as well as they did at the recent local elections due to the low turnout.’ (Thorpe-Apps, 2013)

The BNP have won a number of seats at local elections over the years, but have never been close to achieving success in a Parliamentary election. Local elections in the United Kingdom, as well as European elections, tend to have low turnouts compared to General Elections, so would appear to provide more of an opportunity in these cases.

Arzheimer & Carter researched what they called the ‘extreme right vote’ and also found that lower turnout rates benefited these parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003, pp24-25). These second order elections also help them to gain experience and to be seen as more legitimate players in the political arena. A key point that they also make though, is that these second order elections can also be used as a ‘security valve’ for the public to express their displeasure with mainstream parties without the need to disturb processes at national level. In
this sense they can also disadvantage smaller parties in the long run, as their vote will not hold up consistently. They also found that, in common with the observation made by Dunt, when the party of the mainstream right moves to the right it tends to legitimise the more extreme party than simply channel the demand for its policies.

In common with Thorpe-Apps, it should be pointed out that UKIP are not seen as ‘extremist’. What Arheimer & Carter refer to as ‘extreme right parties’ are now more likely to be termed populist or radical right. For example they discuss the Austrian Freedom Party, Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party, all of which would now most likely be referred to using different terms. The only example in their study which would still perhaps be termed ‘extremist’ would be the German NPD.

![Table of English Councils and Councilors](image)

(BBC, 3rd June, 2013)

**3.0- Theoretical framework & methodology**

It is clear from the previous research and wide scale of opinion, that pinpointing exact reasons for the success of populist parties, or indeed any political party is not a simple straightforward process. For the purpose of my study I am not looking at the success of UKIP across the whole of the country, but instead in a specific area and trying to find out why Boston has become a ‘UKIP town’ as Fraser Nelson has described it (Nelson, 2013). Can this be put down to coincidence, or are there specific reasons why Boston and Lincolnshire were stand out examples at the local elections?

Because I have chosen to look specifically at Boston, I have chosen the case study method for this piece of research. This involves research where the crucial elements are not the methods of research, but instead the case itself. The interest in the case is therefore the most important aspect. This is an approach that Robert Stake is best known for, as opposed to other researchers such as Robert Yin who ‘…place more emphasis on the method and the techniques that constitute a case study.’ (Johansson, 2003, p2).
I will be using a deductive approach using hypotheses gained from previous research that can be tested against the case of Boston, and whether or not this place appears to be an exception. Robert Stake describes case studies as featuring descriptions that are complex, holistic and containing a ‘...a myriad of not highly isolated variables; Data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration, and even allusion and metaphor’ (Stake, 1978, p7). Stake also suggests that an comparisons made are implicit rather than explicit, and that whilst themes and hypotheses are important, they are subordinate to the general understanding of the case.

I intend to use various different approaches and forms of data to investigate UKIP’s success in Boston, and will be using these different approaches to see whether or not they come to similar conclusions and validate each other’s findings. I am therefore hoping that triangulation will help to validate my findings by helping to analyse from multiple perspectives. This will involve the use of census data, opinions polls media reports, and interviews amongst other forms of relevant documentation for research. Guion, Diehl & McDonald (2011) have highlighted the work of Patton in using the triangulation method, whereby there is a common misconception that the goal of this method of research is to arrive at consistency across data and approaches. For them, the inconsistencies that are likely to be arrived at can actually uncover deeper meaning in the data, and therefore should not be seen as weakening any evidence.

Bearing this in mind, it may be that triangulation results in more questions than answers. This is not necessarily a bad thing however, if it leads to a deeper understanding of the area of study. In terms of actual methods, Guion, Diehl & McDonald describe triangulation also involving the use of multiple qualitative and/or quantitative methods of study. These can involve surveys, focus groups and interviews, which can then in turn be compared to see if
there are any similar results. If there are any similar conclusions from the results then this can establish some validity.

### 3.1 - Ethics and Bias

Methods are not the only consideration for my work however, and it will also be important to consider questions of ethics and of bias. Marshall & Rossman define ethical research as being grounded in moral principles, such as respect for people, beneficence and justice. We should not be using those participating in our studies as a means to an end (which may be our own), and we should also be respecting things such as their privacy, anonymity and their right to participate or not participate. We should therefore have their free consent (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p47).

This is especially relevant to me, as the work I am doing is likely to be politically sensitive. In the past I have been, and still am, highly active in local politics. Bearing this in mind it is therefore important to make sure I do not use my research in a way that would be detrimental to those that I have interviewed or gained information from. As part of my current political involvement, I am not purposefully allowed to be in contact with local Conservative Party members, and as a former elected member (in another authority) I am unlikely to be able to interview those from other parties without me being dishonest about who I am. There is also the prospect that even though I promise elected members anonymity and confidentiality, the fact I have gained an insight from them could benefit me in the future. With this in mind, I have decided that I will be relying on secondary sources and interviews or sound bites from politicians that have already been conducted by others, mainly the media. This removes some of the ethical obstacles. It should not prevent me from conducting interviews with experts or anonymous surveys with members of the public.

Marshall & Rossman suggest a guide for researchers to try to understand any use of bias that they may include in the research. This is to help with ‘...assumptions, any prior observations or associations that might influence the research, and any personal connections and histories that could be useful or, conversely, could be seen as harmful bias.’ (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p97). Whilst I am aiming not to be biased in my research, I am aware that my association with a political party and my own experiences will have an influence on the way I view information.

### 3.2 - Hypotheses and Testing

Having extensively discussed previous research and theories on both the success of UKIP and of other populist parties in Europe, there are a number of theories that have emerged that could be tested. However, there are three main areas that I have identified that I think would be appropriate for this study in the Boston area. These three areas are those of: election turnout; immigration; and UKIP’s media presence.

With turnouts being historically low for second order elections in the UK, especially local council elections, I would like to test the theory of Arzheimer & Carter (2003) that right-wing parties, such as UKIP have benefitted from a low turnout. To do this I will be looking at
election results from the local council elections, but also at those from the European and Parliamentary elections to test whether the turnout in Boston and surrounding areas may have been a factor. Thorpe-Apps (2013) suggested that a lack of interest in what the main parties have on offer may also help UKIP, and that this in turn also has an effect on turnout. Analysis of previous elections may also prove or disprove whether second order elections are the ‘security valve’ for the public to express their unhappiness with mainstream parties without affecting processes at a national level (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003). Simply identifying whether the turnout is low or not will not give us the full picture though, and a further analysis of reasons why the turnout may have been low would give further perspective. Were turnouts only affected for certain parties?

To test Arzheimer & Carter’s theory, I not only intend to analyse election results at various levels, but also to see what politicians felt were the main issues surrounding the election. I will look at their views both before and after the election, and hope that this will perhaps help to explain any issues surrounding turnout and the election in general. This may also result in other factors being identified. I will use interviews already conducted in the local media to obtain these views, mainly for the ethical and practical reasons outlined earlier. The hypothesis will be tested in the ‘political’ section of this thesis.

The second hypothesis that I wish to test concerns immigration. With immigration being an issue that has brought Boston to the attention of the national media, and having experienced a large amount of immigration in a relatively short period of time, it would make sense to test this considering the extensive research that has already been conducted on this variable across other countries in Europe. In particular I am interested in the work of Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller (2012) in Austria, where they found that when an immigrant population in an area increased, so did votes for the populist FPÖ. This is too simplistic on its own however, and it is their further assertion that the skills composition of migrants, especially those with low or medium skill levels, increased support for the party that interests me. This is particularly relevant for studying Boston, as there are a large number of unskilled workers in industries such as agriculture.

I would also like this hypothesis to be tested alongside the theory put forward by Warmenbol (2007), who studied support for the Vlaams Belang in Belgium. This theory suggested that areas surrounding those with high levels of immigration could also be susceptible to voting for populist parties. This ‘inkblot’ theory suggests that areas that do not have, or have only recently had, immigration are liable to vote this way as they seek to prevent their own area from having the same problems as those neighbouring them. This ‘threat hypothesis’ can easily be tested alongside Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller’s theory as I will be able to simply look at election results from Boston’s neighbouring areas. What I will be testing therefore, is whether the low skills composition of migrants has had an effect (Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller), and whether this has then had an inkblot effect on surrounding areas (Warmenbol).

To test this hypothesis I intend to use data from the 2011 Census, Lincolnshire Research Observatory (2011) and Boston Borough Council’s report on the Social Impact of Population Change (2012). Other research has highlighted issues such as poverty and unemployment (O’Connell 2005, Golder 2003) or cultural factors (Oesch 2008, Goodwin 2011) that may not influence, or in some cases may influence support for populist parties. However, these are not being explicitly tested in this study. The hypotheses will be tested in my ‘demographics’ section of the thesis.
The third and final hypothesis that I wish to test regards the media presence of UKIP. Usherwood (2013) has suggested that more media coverage leads to better polling, which in turn leads to more coverage. He has also suggested that UKIP therefore ‘piggy back’ on existing agendas so they can later push their own. In the Danish case, Hopmann et al (2012) has found that the more visible a party is during elections and the more positive the tone is towards them, the more likely people are to vote for them, including those voters who are undecided. This is due to the ‘information environment’, rather than direct exposure however. Linda Bos (2012) found that the more successful populist leaders were the ones that came across as more ‘authoritative’, in that they were distinguished not by being extraordinary, but by being similar to established party leaders.

Incorporating Hopmann’s work, the hypothesis that I wish to test then is whether or not the amount of media coverage received by UKIP and the tone of it has had a positive effect on their election results. This will also involve analysis of their leader, Nigel Farage, to see whether the theory of Linda Bos (2012) can also be applied. To test this hypothesis I will not be conducting an exhaustive scientific study of all press articles related to UKIP, as this is beyond the scale of this thesis. I will however be using various articles from the local and national media, including some of those highlighted in a section looking at the media representation of Boston as a town in Boston Borough Council’s report on the Social Impact of Population Change (2012). To further validate my testing of the hypothesis I have secured an interview with an expert on media politics from a local university. This will be the ‘media presence’ section of the thesis.

I will conclude my study by summarising whether or not each of the hypotheses can be supported or not in each of the sections and whether there appear to be any other explanatory factors that have emerged from the research. The aim will then be to try and explain why UKIP were successful in the local elections in Boston.

4.0 – Political section

This section will now look at whether any electoral factors could be responsible for the results gained by UKIP, and specifically whether the hypothesis of Arzheimer & Carter on low turnouts benefiting right-wing populist parties can be supported. Boston is controlled on several different levels politically, so I will detail these in this section.

The town of Boston is governed by Boston Borough Council, which is currently controlled by the Conservatives since it last held elections in 2011. The next tier of government that Boston is controlled by is Lincolnshire County Council, which includes the area controlled by Boston Borough Council and various other districts. It is the 2013 Lincolnshire County Council elections where UKIP have made the breakthrough, and that are the main focus of this thesis. The UK Parliamentary constituency within which Boston is included is that of Boston & Skegness, created in 1997 and represented by the Conservative Mark Simmonds MP since 2001. It is seen as a relatively ‘safe’ Conservative seat in electoral terms. The Skegness part of the constituency is in the neighbouring district of East Lindsey. Boston is included within the East Midlands region for European Elections, and currently the East Midlands has five MEPs (2 UKIP – after a defection from a Conservative MEP, 1 Conservative, 1 Labour, 1 Liberal Democrat).
4.1 – Lincolnshire County Council Results

Lincolnshire County Council has traditionally been a Conservative controlled council, apart from the odd occasion where no one party has had a majority and the Council has been under no overall control (NOC). Below is a history of the control of Lincolnshire County Council.

![Election history chart]

(BBC, 3rd June, 2013)

In May 2013, the whole of the Council was up for election. The leaders and main people from each of the parties in the Boston area gave their views to the local newspaper, The Boston Standard, on what they felt the issues in the election would be. Six of the seven council wards were controlled by Conservatives, with the remaining ward being held by an independent.

Conservative councillor Peter Bedford, who is also the leader of Boston Borough Council was hoping for a ‘clean sweep’ of seats in Boston. He believed that it was difficult to defeat a sitting councillor if they had done their work properly, and thought that his team had worked hard enough to win re-election, not just in Boston, but in Lincolnshire as a whole. He felt that the two key issues in the area were immigration and the poor state of the county’s roads. Despite UKIP fielding candidates in every seat, she said he felt voting for UKIP would be a wasted vote and that it would simply mean an increased chance of a Labour victory (Brookes, 2013).

Labour’s Paul Kenny, who was standing for the County Council, but is also a Borough councillor chose to focus on welfare. This appeared more of a criticism of national government, where he believed the Conservatives were penalising people, and that this was making people in Boston angry (Brookes, 2013).

UKIP’s Don Ransome, who was standing along with several other members of his family in Boston, where his party had a full slate of seven candidates said he hoped to win at least one of the contests there. He felt that there had been a positive swing for UKIP in terms of people’s moods towards them, and that they had never been as popular as they were at the current moment in time. He felt this showed that they are more than just a protest vote.

He added: “We have got an enormous range of policies. We are not talking about the EU at these elections, we are talking about wheelie bins, potholes and street lights because those are some of the critical issues for our county councillors.” (Brookes, 2013). This would echo the earlier points made by Nelson (2013) about UKIP broadening their agenda.
The Lincolnshire Echo, a paper with a circulation across the entire county gave their predictions for the result, following them conducting a poll. They predicted that UKIP would be the biggest gainers in the County Council elections.

(Williams, M., 2013)

Their predictions from the survey suggested that the Conservatives, led locally by Martin Hill, would still control the county with 32% of the vote. ‘That would be 16 per cent down on the party's share of the overall vote at the 2009 election’. (Williams, M., 2013). They did not suggest a reason for this however.

In fact, the Conservatives scored slightly higher than predicted, achieving 35.9%. However, UKIP also increased their share of the votes to 24.2%, again this is more than predicted. The biggest hit appears to have been taken by the Liberal Democrats and Independent candidates. However, simply looking at the share of votes does not give an accurate representation or explanation of results, especially not in a first-past-the-post system. Issues such as turnout are far more telling, which is what we are looking for. As we can see from the graphs, the share of votes does not automatically convert into the number of seats won. The graphs also show which party won in various wards in Lincolnshire, and has a breakdown of the town of Boston.

(Lincolnshire County Council, 2013)
Breakdown of the 77 seats in Lincolnshire (77 declared)

- Conservative: 36 Seats
- Labour: 12 Seats
- Liberal Democrat: 3 Seats
- UK Independence Party: 16 Seats
- Lincolnshire Independents: 8 Seats
- Independent: 2 Seats

(Lincolnshire County Council, 2013)
As we can see, the Conservatives are still considerably the biggest party in Lincolnshire, but there is a large concentration of purple (UKIP) in the east of the county. This is primarily in Boston, but also in the East Lindsey district, mostly in the area that includes the Boston & Skegness Parliamentary constituency. If the results were replicated at a General Election then UKIP would have their first Member of Parliament. However, this is unlikely due to the increased turnout for General Elections and the increased competition from other parties for votes, such as Labour and the Liberal Democrats (who were absent in the County Council elections in Boston). There is also the prospect of UKIP losing the ‘strategic voters’ that Ford, Goodwin & Cutts (2012) discussed earlier. What the electoral map of Lincolnshire also shows is that the areas immediately surrounding Boston also elected UKIP councillors. This would be consistent with Warmenbol’s ‘ink-blot’ theory where districts that do not have, or have only recently had immigration are prone to voting for populist parties when they see their area as being under threat (Warmenbol, 2007). This will be explored later in the demographics section.

The full results from Boston, including the candidates, the number of votes cast and the turnouts are included in Appendix (i) (Lincolnshire County Council, 2013). UKIP won five of the seven County Council wards in Boston, with the other two being won by a Conservative in Boston Rural (who gained from an independent) and an independent (who gained from a Conservative) in Boston South. The main thing that is noticeable from the results is the significant drop in what was already a low turnout from the previous election in 2009. The lowest drop was 1.4% (from 34.4% to 33%) in Boston South, with the highest drop being 7.6% in Boston Rural. There was a drop in turnout for every single ward, which would support Arzheimer & Carter’s hypothesis that a low turnout has benefitted the populist party, in this case UKIP. With the exception of Boston Rural, which the Conservatives won, they experienced a sharp drop in votes for every single ward. Aside from Boston Rural and the closely contested Boston South, UKIP won all five of the others seats, all with significantly reduced Conservative votes and low turnouts.

In 2009 there were candidates from the Boston Bypass Independents and the British National Party. These were both absent from the elections on this occasion, and despite them being a party of government there were no Liberal Democrat candidates in any of the wards. Dunt (2013) has already identified that the Liberal Democrats are no longer able to ‘hoover up’ the anti-establishment vote now because they are part of the government, and in the case of Boston their lack of presence begs the question ‘who did their votes go to?’. They certainly did not go to the Conservatives, so it appears that UKIP are the only possible beneficiaries. In this sense, the lack of political competition and choice appears to have contributed to UKIP’s success. The Conservatives’ main natural competitor, The Labour Party, appears to have a weak presence in the area, as we will also see in the next section. There also appears to have been a distinct lack of interest in the established parties, which Thorpe-Apps (2013) has suggested has a negative effect on turnout.
4.2 – Boston Borough Council

It is also worth looking at other elections in Boston to try and gain some extra perspective on the town. Elections for Boston Borough Council in 2011 also show that there is a general lack of competition in terms of mainstream political parties. There is also a strong independent streak. (Boston Borough Council, 2011). Out of the 18 different wards, Labour only managed to stand candidates in 8 of these, and the Liberal Democrats in only 3. With the exception of Frampton & Holme, where there was only an Independent, UKIP and BBI candidate, the Conservatives had candidates in every ward, although in some cases did not stand more than one candidate in a ward when there was more than one seat up for grabs. It can sometimes be difficult to find a full slate of candidates, but the lack of mainstream opposition to the Conservatives is unusual. There are also a number of candidates for the English nationalist group the English Democrats, including a former BNP councillor for the Fenside ward.

Between 2007-2011 the Borough Council was run by BBI, the Boston Bypass Independents, who campaigned on traffic issues and for a bypass to be built for Boston. They had a shock victory over what had previously been a joint administration between the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Labour. They were however dissolved in 2011, and the council returned to Conservative control, with the leader of the Conservatives dismissing the BBI and suggesting that they had ‘…subjected Boston to "four years of nonsense" and it was now "time for a change" pledging a "more democratic and transparent council."’ (Lincolnshire Echo, 2011).

Once again, the general apathy and low turnout of these elections, where in many cases parties have not had a full slate of candidates, could contribute to smaller parties having an opportunity for a breakthrough. The fact that the BNP, English Democrats and the Boston Bypass Independents now appear to have disappeared off the radar also suggests that Arzheimer & Carter’s point about second order elections being used by a ‘security valve’ appears to be apparent. Whilst allowing smaller parties to enjoy some success, it also prevents them from sustaining their vote it comes to national elections, making consistent performances difficult and therefore not allowing them to properly establish themselves.

The absence of mainstream opposition could explain why UKIP did better in Boston than they did in other parts of Lincolnshire in the county council elections. A look at the political map of Lincolnshire shows that most of UKIP’s successes were in the east of the county, and away from the towns of Lincoln, Grantham and Louth, where there is a stronger Labour Party presence.

4.3 -What the politicians said

We have seen what politicians thought before the elections, but how did local politicians explain the result of the Lincolnshire County Council elections of 2013 though? Rowena Mason from The Telegraph went to Boston after the election to interview various political leaders and to try and find out what happened and why. This is useful for me as I have not been able to conduct these interviews myself because of restrictions placed on me and for ethical reasons. Mason begins by discussing a supermarket worker who was shocked at his
election as a UKIP councillor. She then states that both sides agreed the cause of the shock results was not just unhappiness with Prime Minister David Cameron, but with the entire ‘political class’ and that they had ignored the concerns of a rural area that was struggling to cope with mass immigration (Mason, 2013).

Martin Hill, the Conservative Leader of the County Council said after the elections that people felt there was a political elite that were divorced from the realities faced by ordinary people. He felt that the party nationally had a lack of communicators that could connect with people the way Margaret Thatcher could. He felt that people on the doorstep felt disconnected, even if they agreed with local policies. This is why many Conservatives stayed at home. One of his main criticisms was of ministers repeating an earlier claim by the Prime Minister that UKIP were a party of ‘fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists’. He felt that this insulted UKIP voters, including some ex-Conservatives “That was really shooting ourselves in the foot.” (Mason, 2013)

Eddy Poll, the Conservative Deputy Leader of the Council (who lost his seat in Spalding East) said that the party had campaigned incredibly hard, but that the turnout was dismissively poor. “Last time, I got 1,600 votes, this time I got 800. Those people didn’t go to Ukip. I think there were a lot of disaffected Conservative voters who stayed at home and didn’t vote at all.” (Mason, 2013). He also felt that whilst immigration was causing social change, much of this happened under Tony Blair, and that it is unfair to blame the Conservatives for the situation they have inherited. Again, this backs up Arzheimer & Carter’s hypothesis.

Peter Bedford, the Conservative Leader of the Borough Council (who lost his County Council seat Boston Coastal) said: "It was a protest against central government's policies - it's disappointing but we'll bounce back." (BBC, 2013b)

A number of members of the same family, the Ransomes, were elected as councillors for UKIP in Boston. Sue Ransome admitted that she had not done a great deal of canvassing in her area. Two of Mrs Ransome’s daughters were also elected to the council. They had previously tried to stand as candidates, but had never been close to getting elected. Mrs Ransome was formerly a socialist and a liberal, whereas her husband was a former Conservative. It was hearing Nigel Farage on the radio that convinced her UKIP were the right party for her. She believes that Farage’s growing media profile and his visits to Lincolnshire, where he addressed issues such as immigration, fishing and wind turbines helped contribute to their success in the area. “He’s a great vote winner no doubt about that,” she said. “He was a sell-out in Boston, people couldn’t get in.” (Mason, 2013). Mr Farage’s ability to link these issues to the European Union has been very effective, as Lynch, Whitaker & Loomes (2011) have suggested. This would also suggest that Mr Farage has managed to come across as ‘authoritative’ on the issues as a mainstream politician would, therefore becoming more successful according to Linda Bos (2012), which we will again test later in the media section.

Conservative Councillor Mike Gilbert, the portfolio holder for community development at Boston Borough Council, who lost his seat in Boston East felt that the swing to UKIP was a result of the public "…expressing frustration to politicians at national level and beyond about the undue influence of the European Union." (Truslove, 2013)

UKIP’s Chris Pain, elected for the Wainfleet & Burgh ward in East Lindsey, which borders Boston and is part of the Boston & Skegness Parliamentary constituency, was unhappy at
suggestions that migrants in the area could now face persecution. He said that the only people
being persecuted were the people who have lived in Boston for years. "They've realised that
they have woken up and local society has changed beyond all recognition. They are saying
' Enough is enough'. They are not happy about it." (Truslove, 2013).

As Mason suggested at the start, there seemed almost uniform agreement between politicians
that the ‘political class’ and the public’s unhappiness with them was the reason for the shock
result. Eddy Poll’s remarks again illustrate how low turnout has been a major part of the
election results, once more in line with Arzheimer & Carter’s hypothesis. What the remarks
of local politicians could explain however, are the reasons why the Conservative vote
dropped so significantly.

5.0 – Demographic section

In this section the demographics of Lincolnshire and the Boston area will be examined, using
the 2011 Census as our main source of data. We then examine Boston Borough Council’s
report on the social impact of migration and take a look at the skill levels and types of work
that migrants have been involved with. This is in order to test the hypotheses from Halla,
Wagner & Zweimuller (2012) and Warmenbol (2007) to see whether increased immigration,
and in particular low or medium skilled immigration, could have contributed to increased
support for UKIP, and whether this has then had an ‘ink-blot’ effect on surrounding areas.

5.1 – Boston and Lincolnshire

Research Lincolnshire analysed the 2011 Census for which there were three main areas they
highlighted (Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2011). The first of which was that
Lincolnshire continued to have a lower skilled population, and despite large improvements
had a higher proportion of residents with no qualifications to the national average. There are
also a lower proportion of people employed in professional and technical occupations.

The second area was that there was significant population change, but Lincolnshire remained
less ‘diverse’ than other areas of the UK. In ethnicity terms, the non-white population went
up to 2.4%, compared to 1.4% in 2001. This is compared to a national non-white population
of 14%. Lincolnshire has a higher proportion of residents born in the EU than the rest of the
country, with most immigration coming from the within the European Union.

The third area highlighted by Research Lincolnshire has been that Lincolnshire continues to
show an older demographic. Single person households aged over 65 made up 14% of
households, whereas this was 12% nationally. The number of people having their day to day
activities limited by their health was 20% compared to 18% nationally.

This is interesting, as it suggests that the county could be fertile ground for UKIP with its
lower-skilled, less diverse and slightly older demographic, which was found by Kellner
(2013) in his earlier survey results. However, Lincolnshire is a huge county, and it would be
wrong to make assumptions for the whole area based on an average. From the previous
section we have also seen that UKIP votes have tended to be isolated to the east of the
county, so this is of more interest to us, as is the specific demographics of the town of Boston, as this is main case we are studying.

The Census’s demographic information about Boston’s population has shown a 15.9% increase in population between 2001 and 2011. This is 50% higher than the county and double the rate nationally. Those over 65 years of age have increased by 26,000 in the entire county (21%), but in Boston this has been around 1855 people (20%). It has also seen a large increase in population for people in their 20’s (Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2011).

Truslove outlines some basic facts about Boston related to migration:

- **Boston's population grew from 55,751 in 2001 to 64,637 in 2011**
- **In 2011, 54,847 people living in the town were born in the UK compared to 54,023 in 2001**
- **In 2001 there were 500 people from Western Europe and 134 from Eastern Europe**
- **By contrast, in 2011 there were 7,865 people from EU countries**
- **While the UK-born population of Boston dropped overall from 2001 to 2011, the number of English-born residents increased by 1,997** (Truslove, 2013)

One major issue has been the perception that the number of migrants in the area is actually far higher than those recorded in the 2011 Census. This was one of the issues raised with the task & finish panel at Boston Borough Council during their study of the impact of migration in the town. Those who have suggested the population figure is higher than has been stated have used patient registration data and national insurance number issues to support their claims. They have also suggested that some migrants may have been deterred from completing census forms by their landlords (Boston Borough Council, 2012, p1). The fact that so much of the immigration to Boston has been relatively recent could also support some of Warmenbol’s arguments.

Professor Gary Craig from the University of Hull was interviewed by the Task & Finish Panel and contributed many suggestions as to why the area had seen such a large increase of migrants in the area and why they occupied certain places within the employment market. He highlighted the need for labour leading to a higher concentration of gangmasters than the rest of the country. Eastern Europeans had been attracted to the area in search of better lives, but he believed for some it had turned into a nightmare and become a modern form of slavery. He did acknowledge that most gangmasters were legal and operated properly however. Whilst the rates of pay were better than Eastern Europe, in many cases they are below the minimum wage and the conditions are poor, Because of this, local people do not want these jobs. Therefore he asserts that the idea they are ‘taking our jobs’ is simply not true. Employers are impressed by migrants’ work ethic, and if they were to leave there would be nobody to do these jobs. For Professor Craig, the issue is surrounded by ‘myth and prejudice’ (Boston Borough Council, 2012, p38).

This perspective helps to explain why there has been such a recent influx of migrants to the area. It also gives us a good insight into the kind of jobs that migrants are doing, and the skill set that they are arriving with. The point about the jobs not being filled by local people could also suggest that far from ‘taking our jobs’ the conflict could be cultural rather than economic. However, regardless of whether the conflict is cultural or economic, this does support Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller’s hypothesis about a lower skilled set of migrants leading to an increase in the populist vote. Issues with the labour market earlier mentioned in the census have similarities to the work done by Sadka & Razin (1995), and whilst Docquier
et al (2010) and Hansen et al (2010) have suggested that migration does not lower wages, the fact that some have been working for less than minimum wage suggests this may be the case, despite the fact that locals may not want the work on offer anyway.

Of course, Boston was not the only area where UKIP enjoyed successes, as we saw in the previous section. Skegness in the East Lindsey area is also included as part of the Parliamentary constituency Boston & Skegness. This is mainly a holiday coastal area and also includes a large agricultural sector. The constituency is also listed as having a relatively low level of academic qualifications compared to the national average. Boston is recorded in the 2011 Census as having 32.70% of those aged 16 and above having no educational qualifications, as opposed to Lincolnshire having 26.10% and the average for England & Wales being 22.70% (Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2011). The amount of agricultural jobs could also explain why there is concern about Romania and Bulgarian workers coming in January 2014, as both countries have a large number of people employed in those sectors and it would be fair to assume that the Boston and East Lindsey area could therefore be likely to have an influx of workers. Dunt (2013) has argued that UKIP have been successful in capitalising on this issue. Once again, Warmenbol’s ink-blot theory appears relevant.

Pidd, from the left-leaning Guardian newspaper visited Boston, reporting that they had the most Eastern European migrants as recorded in the Census. Referring to Boston as a ‘farming town’, she interviewed residents who were unhappy at the change the town had seen since the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. Unlike other countries, the UK chose to remove the temporary restrictions on the movement of labour from these countries, leading to a significant number of people employed in those sectors and it would be fair to assume that the Boston and East Lindsey area could therefore be likely to have an influx of workers. Dunt (2013) has argued that UKIP have been successful in capitalising on this issue. Once again, Warmenbol’s ink-blot theory appears relevant.

Pidd also notes that the influx of workers has also had an effect on other local services in the area, giving the specific example of one of the local primary schools where 62% of the pupils are from migrant backgrounds. Despite being positive about the efforts of the school, its recent Ofsted report noted that almost all on arrival were at an early stage of learning English. The parking sign outside the school is also translated into five languages (Pidd, 2012).

Coastal towns in the UK have been known to be high on the list of deprived areas, and this is consistently the case with statistics, both from Census information and from other studies conducted by the Office for National Statistics. Looking at these statistics on a map shows a harsh contrast in the county of Lincolnshire, showing again that using county averages for statistical purposes are not necessarily the best way to proceed in our research. The western part of Lincolnshire is generally ranked as one of the least deprived areas in the country, whereas the east side is ranked as one of the most deprived. This appears to particularly affect the Boston area and the adjoining parts of East Lindsey. The map showing the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation appears to also show that the most deprived areas are very similar to the political map of Lincolnshire in terms of areas where UKIP enjoyed success.
Finally, an interesting piece of research from the IPPR think-tank, published in The Economist, showed the levels of White Britons who identified themselves as ‘English’, rather than ‘British’. They also found that people who consider themselves English rather than British usually tend to be more hostile to immigration and likely to vote for right-wing parties like UKIP. Conversely, ‘For some, the flag of St George is too closely associated with far-right groups such as the English Defence League. (The Economist, May 25th, 2013).

The intriguing thing about this research is that many of the areas where the largest proportion of people identified themselves as ‘English’ were in almost identical areas to some of the high indices of deprivation and also in areas where UKIP have enjoyed some success. In the case of Lincolnshire and Boston, the graphs appear to match up almost perfectly.

(Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2011b, p4)
From analysing the demographic data of Boston and Lincolnshire then, there has been a high level of low unskilled immigration, and from the graphs we have seen, both here and in the previous political section, we can see that the UKIP vote is also noticeable in the surrounding deprived areas. Therefore, there is evidence to support the hypotheses put forward by Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller and also Warmenbol.

### 6.0 – Media presence section

The final research section concerns the local and national media’s portrayals of UKIP and of Boston, including the visibility and tone of both (Hopmann et al., 2012). As has been discussed earlier, this is not an exhaustive study of all of the media coverage of the town, and is instead intended to give a general picture. It includes the thoughts of the task & finish panel that produced the report on the Social Impact of Population Change in Boston and also examples of some of the more well-known recent articles about the town. It also contains information on the visit of Nigel Farage, and begins with an interview of a leading local academic.

### 6.1 – Interview with Dr. Matthew Ashton

I was fortunate enough to obtain an interview with Dr. Matthew Ashton, an expert on media politics, from Nottingham Trent University. The purpose of this interview was to gain a better
understanding of the media’s role in the success of UKIP and the importance of Nigel Farage to their image. This is mainly related to the national picture rather than Boston specifically, although this is touched on towards the end. The full interview is included in the appendix (ii), but here I now produce a summary of his main points.

The first question I asked Dr. Ashton was what role does he feel the media had in the success of UKIP nationally. Ashton mentions Duverger’s Law and the difficulty of minor parties in making any sort of impact in Britain’s 2 or 2.5 party system. UKIP have managed to break this circle for a number of reasons. These being: 1) holding views that the owners of some large media companies agree with, such as euroscepticism; 2) having a charismatic front man in Farage, whom he likens to Boris Johnson; 3) the media thriving on novelty and UKIP offering something a bit new; 4) the media thriving on bad news and conflict, with UKIP causing some conflict within the Conservative Party; 5) UKIP having a lot of maverick politicians, increasing the chance of scandals or gaffes which may sell more newspapers.

In terms of Hopmann et al’s hypothesis on visibility and tone, the party has certainly managed to increase the first aspect and appear to be receiving more a positive tone from the media according to Dr. Ashton’s observations. Dr. Ashton also suggested that UKIP have received a hugely disproportionate amount of coverage. For example, the Green Party has a Member of Parliament, but doesn’t get anywhere near as much coverage. He doubts however that they will be able to keep their momentum up from the European Elections if they do not win any seats at the next General Election. Zoe Williams from The Guardian has also made this point about the Green Party, in that if you were to show people a picture of their leader Natalie Bennett and one of Nigel Farage then it is clear that Farage would be the one they recognise ‘...not because he has more support. It is because he is on telly more often’ (Williams, Z, 2013).

In terms of his views on Farage, Ashton feels that he tends to dominate UKIP stories. This is fine on single issues, but the party needs more big figures if it is to be seen as a serious party of government. The party did well in the Eastleigh by-election, but almost all of the publicity was focused on Farage rather than their candidate. As has been earlier mentioned, Ashton also points out Farage’s success in linking the issues of the economy and immigration to the EU. Like Usherwood (2013) has suggested, he has successfully ‘piggy backed’ on this issue, and as he is discussing a mainstream political issue, he has been able to appear more ‘authoritative’, as Linda Bos (2012) discussed. For Ashton, Farage has managed to highlight issues where mainstream politicians have used poor economic or immigration data and has seized on this effectively.

In terms of the immigration issue, Ashton believes that they have managed to frame the issue around the EU, so far avoiding any questions of race, although they will not be able to do this forever. Unlike the BNP, they have been able to approach this issue and appear on television programmes such as Question Time regularly due to being on the right side political perception. As Ford (2012) has suggested, this is due to their roots in more respectable eurosceptic politics, rather than the fascist roots of the BNP.

Finally, Dr. Ashton believes that the most important reasons for UKIP’s success in the local elections were the EU and the financial crisis. In local terms, he suggests that in some areas with high immigration the economic situation may be better, or the other main parties may have stronger roots. These later points are similar to some of the results from the ‘political’ section of this thesis, where UKIP were successful in the less affluent east of Lincolnshire.
6.2 - Boston in the Media

Focusing more specifically on the town of Boston, the local council’s report on population change pointed out that whilst the town regularly makes the news, the news is not always positive, and the editorial slant given to this influences how people think and behave. They stress that therefore the press have a social responsibility, especially when sensitive issues such as immigration are being discussed (Boston Borough Council, 2012).

Boston Borough Council invited members of the local press to contribute to the report by answering questions about the presentation of local news issues. The questioning involved asking why there are so many reports about foreigners committing crimes. The local press stressed that on issues such as crime, they only tend to attend the court on a certain day, and simply report the cases listed, rather than targeting foreign national related cases (Boston Borough Council, 2012).

This is something that the national press later picked up on however, with the Daily Mail writing an article that mentioned the cases listed in The Boston Standard ‘...two thirds have names such as Zumbrickij and Kazombiase. Most offences are for drink-driving and other motoring offences. British names, it should be noted, still lead the section for assaults’. (Hardman, 2013).

There was acknowledgement in the council report that there was a difference between the local and national press, and was specific reference to an article written by the Daily Mail. This is referring to a now infamous article where the town was referred to as ‘Boston Lincolngrad’ by the right-wing commentator Peter Hitchens. This article was highly critical of the mass immigration to the town in recent years.

*Note here that I use the word ‘immigration’, not ‘immigrants’. All the people who have been hurt, uprooted and upset by this rather cynical piece of social engineering are pretty much free of blame.* (Hitchens, 2011).

Whilst the article suggested that the immigrants that had come to Boston were decent and hardworking, and that most of the criticism should be pointed at the previous Labour government, it painted a very negative picture of the town and of its perceived problems. He put the problems of the ‘British louts’ in the town down to a soft education system and welfarism, whilst the newcomers who were described as being drunk, urinating in the street and driving uninsured and over the limit were arriving from ‘...70 years of miserable communism, deliberate demoralisation and a culture of desperation and drunken oblivion.’ (Hitchens, 2011).

The Hardman article followed up on the amount of Eastern Europeans in the town and further developed another story that the Daily Mail had published relating to a television appearance on the flagship BBC political programme Question Time in January 2013. Audience member Rachel Bull, a local from Boston, insisted that the town was at breaking point and couldn’t cope any longer because of the huge levels of migration, but was dismissed by panel member Mary Beard, an academic from Cambridge University, and told that the claims were simply myths. Following this an article was printed in the Daily Mail about the show ‘Our town’s like a foreign country and locals can’t cope with the immigrants, says mother after TV clash
with academic on Question Time’ (Stevens, 2013). Mary Beard was later subjected to a significant amount of online abuse following the show and the subsequent reaction to it.

The Labour MEP Mary Honeyball has criticised the amount of time that UKIP, and in particular Nigel Farage have been given on Question Time. Between December 4th 2008 and 22nd November 2012, Nigel Farage had appeared as a panel guest on the show more times than any other person (11 times), with the exception of the Business Secretary at the time Vince Cable (12 times). Farage’s deputy Paul Nuttall appeared twice. Honeyball points out that this is more than all of the trade union representatives combined and suggests that ‘…the individual and political party represented on Question Time gains credibility in a way it would be difficult to achieve otherwise.’ (Honeyball, 2012). This would support the theory put forward by Hopmann et al about visibility and tone, but also backs up Usherwood’s point about coverage leading to better polling and then subsequently more coverage, as well as Bos’s hypothesis giving Farage more ‘authoritativeness’ by putting him regularly on par with established politicians and government ministers.

In November 2012, Boston saw the staging of the ‘Boston Protest’. This protest had been organised by a group for a previous date, but had been postponed after the Borough Council agreed to look into the migration situation – which involved the production of the social impact report. There had been concern that the protest would be hijacked by the far-right, but in the end it was described as a ‘peaceful demonstration’ and the 300 strong event went off without incident (BBC News, 2012).

In September 2012 Boston again made national news, with The Sun and The Express running a story about a migrant in the town claiming a large amount in welfare. ‘BRITAIN’s soft touch benefits system was laid bare yesterday after it emerged a Latvian mother-of-10 rakes in £34,000 a year in state handouts – and is now demanding a bigger house.’ (Reynolds, 2012). The Express is first newspaper in recent history to actively call for UK withdrawal from the EU, so they would support some of UKIP’s aims, as Dr Ashton suggested.

The most recent high profile press before the local elections that should be focused on is the visit to Boston of UKIP leader Nigel Farage however. Farage received widespread local coverage of his visit, and a meeting he spoke at was said to have been ‘packed’. The Boston Standard gave this visit extensive coverage. During this meeting he once again managed to link local issues with the European Union. In the case of Boston he spoke of immigration, EU fishing rules and wind turbines being key election issues. He also called for work permits for immigration and said, as Professor Craig did in the ‘demographic’ section of this thesis, he could see why people were coming to Boston to work. Once again however, he managed to raise the issue of immigrant workers from Bulgaria and Romania being on their way to the area soon “If I was a young Bulgarian I would be packing my bags now.” He also urged ‘moderation’ when it comes to the language and actions of people in the town when it comes to the topic. (Brookes, 2013b). This last point shows how Farage is trying to behave in a manner similar to that of mainstream politicians, and once again how he is trying not to behave in an extraordinary manner (Bos, 2012). He still manages to mix this successfully with populist rhetoric however, going on to say that ‘...there is a feeling that we are not putting the needs of our own people first.’ (Brookes, 2013b).

What is most noticeable from this section of the thesis and the focus on Boston is actually the lack of media coverage of local politics and politicians generally. The vast majority of articles in the national media were related to the immigration situation in Boston and were
almost all of a negative editorial slant. Most of the local coverage of UKIP as a party has also been after the local elections, and before this was mainly limited to quotes alongside those from other parties. The main coverage appears to have created a climate whereby the visit of Nigel Farage a month before the election made major local news, and once again gave him a level of ‘authoritativeness’ (Bos, 2012). In a small town, the visit of a political leader is always likely to make the news, although in this case he was also addressing issues that were very much UKIP’s ‘territory’ in terms of the immigration situation specifically regarding those coming from the European Union. Newly elected UKIP councillor Sue Ransome suggested in the ‘political’ section of this thesis that Farage’s media profile and his visits to Lincolnshire contributed to their success in the area.

7.0 – Discussion and conclusions

This thesis set out to explain the success of the United Kingdom Independence Party in the 2013 local elections, with a focus on the Lincolnshire town of Boston. The thesis started by looking at previous research into: euroscepticism; immigration and its effect on votes for populist parties in the rest of Europe; UKIP’s history, its supporters and its leader Nigel Farage; and finally the national picture in the UK in terms of elections. Following this a theoretical framework was devised around the case study model, and three hypotheses were outlined that would be tested in the thesis under three macro headings.

The first hypothesis from Arzheimer & Carter suggested that low turnouts benefitted right-wing parties. To test this I analysed local election results for Lincolnshire County Council, not just from 2013, but also from previous years too. This also included results from the Boston Borough Council elections. I also analysed what politicians thought the key issues were before the election, and what they thought influenced the results after the election. This was done in order to establish why turnout may have been low, and to be able to help explain the data.

We found that there had been a drop in turnout for every council ward in the Boston area, and that the Conservative vote in particular had suffered, allowing UKIP to overtake them in most of the council wards. When compared with previous elections, it was also clear that there was an opportunity for smaller parties like UKIP to gain a foothold, although they could never sustain this in subsequent elections, for example the English Democrats, the British National Party and The Boston Bypass Independents. This also supports Arzheimer & Carter’s point about second order elections being a ‘security valve’ allowing voters to show their frustration with mainstream parties, but in effect giving smaller parties little chance of sustained success when national elections are held.

One of the main factors that appeared from the results was the lack of political competition, especially from some of the more mainstream parties, to the Conservatives. This appears to have been a contributory factor to the low turnouts, and also could explain UKIP sweeping up the independent vote. In the parts of Lincolnshire where the Labour Party had a stronger presence and there were Liberal Democrat candidates, UKIP enjoyed less success. Local politicians appeared to agree that the public had been turned off by national politicians and what they perceived as a ‘political elite’. This may also explain the low turnout. Arzheimer & Carter’s hypothesis can therefore be supported by the evidence in this section.
The second hypothesis focused on immigration and tested the theory of Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller that populist votes increased not just when there was an increase in the immigrant population, but also that the votes for populist parties increased when the immigrants were lower or medium skilled workers. I combined this with the theory of Warmenbol, that areas surrounding these districts were also more likely to support populist parties due to the ‘ink-blot’ theory. To test this I used data from the 2011 Census, as well as material from Research Lincolnshire and Boston Borough Council’s report on the Social Impact of Population Change.

The demographic data for Lincolnshire suggested that it fitted the profile for those who typically supported UKIP, according to the research from Kellner (2013). Much of the demographic change to Boston has been recent, which could support some of Warmenbol’s arguments, and many of the jobs in the area tend to be lower skilled work, such as agriculture. As Professor Craig pointed out, many of these jobs are undesirable and some even pay less than minimum wage, deterring locals from taking them. The skills set of the immigrant population therefore tends to be made up of lower skilled workers, supporting the hypothesis of Halla, Wagner & Zweimuller. A look at the political map of Lincolnshire in our previous section also shows UKIP successes in the bordering areas, suggesting that Warmenbol’s ‘ink-blot’ theory and assertion that these areas see themselves as being under threat may also be apparent.

Interestingly, UKIP’s successes in Lincolnshire is almost identical to the map showing the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation. The areas seen as being the most deprived were the ones that UKIP were the most successful in. Equally interesting was The Economist’s map of England that showed the areas that considered themselves as English rather than British, as this once again had a striking resemblance. These people tend to be more hostile to immigration and likely to vote for right-wing parties such as UKIP.

The third hypothesis set out to test the effect of UKIP’s media presence. Usherwood stated that more media coverage leads to better polling and in turn to more coverage. Hopmann et al found that the more visible a party was during elections and the more positive the tone towards them, the more likely people are to vote for them, not because of direct exposure but instead because of the ‘information environment’. Bos found that the more successful populist leaders were the ones that came across as being more authoritative, and similar to established party leaders. Incorporating Hopmann et al’s work then, I set out to test whether UKIP’s coverage and the tone of it had a positive effect on their election results. I then included Nigel Farage within this analysis, using the theory of Linda Bos. To test this I interviewed a leading local academic expert on media politics, once again analysed Boston Borough Council’s report, and also used various articles from the local and national media.

Dr. Ashton suggested in his interview that UKIP were disproportionally represented and were currently more visible and experiencing a more favourable tone from the media. This backs up Hopmann et al’s theory. Others have also suggested UKIP have been over represented, comparing their coverage with other parties, such as the Greens. Like Usherwood, he felt that UKIP had successfully ‘piggy backed’ on issues such as the economy and immigration, becoming more ‘authoritative’ as a result, in line with Linda Bos’s hypothesis.

Analysis of the media reports on Boston suggested that many of the articles about the town in the national press were focused on immigration and were of a generally negative nature. Programmes such as Question Time had also led to negative publicity for the town because of
its immigration levels, and this was also highlighted as a show where Nigel Farage had made an excessive number of personal appearances, once again adding to his ‘authoritativeness’. Farage’s visit to Boston made major local news barely a month before the local elections, and a UKIP councillor believed that it was his media profile and his visits to the area that contributed to their success. Again, it could therefore be argued that Hopmann et al’s hypotheses on visibility and tone, combined with that of Bos in the case of Farage, have also been demonstrated.

From our testing it is clear that there is evidence to support all three hypotheses in one form or another. However, do some matter more than others and if so, which? The testing of the first hypothesis showed a low turnout for the local elections, and that the Conservatives in particular suffered from a lack of turnout from their own supporters. The increased UKIP vote clearly did not just come from disaffected Conservatives. The lack of political competition therefore appears to have helped UKIP, who sucked up the independent vote. If we look at our second hypothesis it is also clear that there has been significant UKIP support in areas with high levels of low skilled immigration, and that this has spread to surrounding areas. However, these areas also have a lack of political competition in comparison to other areas of Lincolnshire, and this could once again serve as an explanation for the low turnout and the success of UKIP. As Dr. Ashton has suggested, it could also be that the economic situation in some of these areas could be a more important factor than immigration. The Index of Deprivation from 2010 could also support this theory. What of the media coverage received by UKIP though? There has been acknowledgement that this has helped the party in Boston, especially from its own councillors. It is clear that when people think of UKIP, they think of Nigel Farage, and it may be that Farage’s presence made all the difference in giving the UKIP vote the extra lift it needed. However, even with this lift, if the Conservative vote had not failed to turnout then they would have more than likely held on, despite the surge in support for UKIP.

8.0 - Further Research

To gain a further insight into the reasons why UKIP were successful in Boston I would like to conduct a micro-analysis of each of the different council wards to see if circumstances varied and they could each be explained by different or common factors. This would be difficult for me at this moment in time however, for the ethical reasons outlined in my methodological section.

Whilst I have conducted a general analysis of issues in the town, an interview section with members of the public would be useful. This could involve me conducting a basic set of semi-structured interviews to try and gather what local people think and what their perspectives are. This could be done to try and gain some further perspective on any findings that have already been made from previous sections in my research. Asking basic questions related to political, demographic and media related subjects, such as who they normally vote for, their ages and what newspapers they read could be useful. The semi-structured nature of the questions will allow the researcher to go into more depth and find out the reasons why they have given certain answer. For example, if they have voted for UKIP or not voted at all, rather than for their usual choice, then they could find out specific reasons. They may also provide a different insight into some of the local issues, or at least their perceptions of local issues, than newspapers or politicians would. This could therefore act as a validation exercise.
of previous analyses. There could also be a more detailed analysis of the role of the media and of different articles that have been published, as my section was intended to only be a general analysis.

The future successes or failures of UKIP will also no doubt play a part in further research, and with the European Elections in 2014 and the next UK General Election in 2015 there will surely be many further opportunities to test new and existing hypotheses.
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10.0 - Appendix

Appendix (i)

Lincolnshire County Council Elections
Electoral Division Map - Boston Coastal

- RANSOME, F.E.E 45.7 % (828)
  UK Independence Party Up 20.5% GAIN
- BEDFORD, P 40.4 % (730)
  Conservative Down 14.0%
- GLEESON, P.M 13.8 % (249)
  Labour Up 4 %
- 0.2 % (3)
  Spoilt Vote Up 0.2%
- Electorate: 5795
  Turnout: 1808 (31 %)

Lincolnshire County Council Elections
Electoral Division Map - Boston East

- RANSOME, S. 40.9 % (675)
  UK Independence Party Up 40.9% GAIN
- KENNY, P.R 20.4 % (306)
  Labour & Co-op Down 3.5%
- GILBERT, M. 19 % (313)
  Conservative Down 18.8%
- DORRIAN, A.M. 5.8 % (154)
  Independent Up 9.9%
- DUNWORTH, R. 9.5 % (156)
  Lincolnshire Independents Up 9.5%
- 0.3 % (5)
  Spoilt Vote Up 0.3%
- Electorate: 6680
  Turnout: 1849 (24 %)
Interview with Dr. Matthew Ashton in full

Interview with Dr. Matthew Ashton from Nottingham Trent University.

1) What role do you feel the media has had in the success of UKIP nationally?

I think that the media has played quite a significant role in bringing UKIP's views and policies to a national audience. Because of Duverger's Law Britain remains a 2 or 2.5 party system. Therefore in the past it has been very difficult for minor political parties to make any sort of impact. The media take the view that the party won't do well in an election and so they receive very little press coverage. UKIP have managed to break this circle for a number of reasons:

1) Holding views that the owners of some large media companies agree with (anti-Europeanism etc).
2) Having a charismatic frontman in Nigel Farage. In an age of career politicians who are often perceived as being dull/identical, Farage is what we in Britain often call 'a character' eg he speaks his mind a lot. In this sense he's a bit like Boris Johnson. Of course this approach also carries risks.
3) The British media thrive on novelty and at the moment UKIP seems to be offering something new hence they receive more coverage.
4) The British media thrive on bad news and conflict. UKIP is causing serious conflict and problems in the Conservative party (eg how they respond to the UKIP threat/defections etc). As a result this gets a lot of coverage.
5) UKIP has a lot of maverick politicians and this means that there is always the risk of scandal/gaffes which sells newspapers.

2) Do you feel that UKIP have received a proportionate amount of publicity with regards to their size and their popularity?
I think that they've received a hugely disproportionate amount of coverage considering their poll ratings and actual electoral success. For instance the Green Party has one MP and doesn't get anywhere near as much coverage as UKIP do. The big question is whether UKIP can keep this momentum up. They do well in EU elections but if they fail to win any of the next GE then it will be hard to keep up claims that they have momentum on their side.

3) To what extent is Nigel Farage responsible for UKIP's media image, and do you think this has been a positive or negative thing for the party?

The trouble with Farage is that his dominance of UKIP stories is that it runs the risk of making the party look a bit like a one man band. In the popular imagination Farage is UKIP. That's fine to a certain extent if you intend your party to be a single issue party. However if you want to be seen as a serious party of government you need more spokespeople/big figures. Also because they rely on Farage so much it would cause problems if he was incapacitated for any length of time.

4) UKIP have been able to approach the immigration issue and appear on programmes such as Question Time without the same amount of opposition as other parties have in the past, e.g. BNP. Why do you think they have managed this?

Mainly because the BNP is a far right fascist party and UKIP has so far managed to stay on the right side of political perception of that issues (despite the activities of some of its members). At the moment UKIP have managed to focus their views on immigration almost entirely around the EU and have mostly managed to avoid talking about the tricky issue of race (although they can't do this forever).

5) To what extent do you feel UKIP have relied on being a eurosceptic party? Are there other issues that they push that may explain their success, e.g. being anti-establishment etc? (in polls I have noticed that Europe has a fairly low salience as an issue, but the economy and immigration were the top 2. Has Farage managed to link the EU to both of these successfully?)

I think Farage has been successful at linking both to the EU. They've also had some success pushing the anti-establishment line as well as traditional Tory issues eg their opposition to gay marriage. The trouble is that now gay marriage is on the books it will be difficult for Farage to promise to repeal it.

The problem with the party being focused on EU/immigration/economy is that they're doing well at the moment because of our economic situation. Once the economy improves will they still manage to attract the same support? Highly debatable.

6) What kind of publicity for other political parties has contributed most to UKIP's success?

Anything involving bad data eg economic or immigration. Farage tends to avoid going after parties/politicians on certain gaffes (I think), because his own party is so vulnerable in this area.

7) What effect do you feel UKIP's success in byelections, such as Eastleigh, have had on their credibility in the media and their prospects or portraying themselves as serious electoral contenders rather than just also-rans?

I think Eastleigh was a tricky one for Farage and UKIP. On the one hand they came second, but on the other they didn't win and in the UK there isn't a prize for second place. It also underlined the party's lack of big figures. UKIP got a huge amount of publicity during the Eastleigh campaign but it
was almost all centred on Farage. I suspect most people had no idea who the candidate even was and voted for the party rather than the person.

8) Have recent defections of politicians from other parties, such as Roger Helmer in the East Midlands, added to the credibility of UKIP as a serious political force?

I don’t think so no. Helmer was quite old and not a rising force in the Conservatives (also a maverick). I think it probably helped UKIP but not by that much.

9) In Lincolnshire during the May local elections, UKIP made significant gains - especially in Boston. What factors do you think could explain these results? (Nigel Farage making a high profile visit there, ‘the Boston protest’, the Question Time programme where a Boston resident complained about the situation in the town, the changing demographics, the negative press Boston has received in the press such as the Mail and Express etc., the independent nature of Boston electorally - they have elected pro-bypass and English Democrat councillors before at various levels, the lack of a strong Labour or Liberal challenge in the area, the election being fought on national rather than local issues, the timing of the Euro crisis and subsequent debates).

I think of all those issues could have played a role. I think that the EU/financial crisis was probably the most important though.

10) Why were they successful in some specific areas rather than others? e.g. other areas with high migration levels.

Depends on the specific area. In some places with high immigration the economic situation is better or the other main parties have stronger roots.

11) Is UKIP’s success likely to make things more difficult for them in the future, especially in terms of media scrutiny?

Absolutely. They’re going to get a lot more scrutiny in the future and events like the Godfrey Bloom gaffe will get much more media mileage.