MASTERS THESIS

INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Understanding Swedish Democracy Aid: An analysis of political party assistance.

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14 August 2013
Abstract

The Swedish government commissioned a committee led by Hadar Cars in December 1993 to report on the question of channeling assistance for building democratic structures through Party Affiliated Organizations (PAOs). The report laid down the foundation for what can be seen as the Swedish template for political party assistance. A set of guidelines on how assistance for the establishment of democracy was to be initiated in cooperation with Swedish political parties in the Swedish parliament was outlined. The main aim was identified as assisting in the build-up of stable democratic societies in the Third World and in Eastern Europe. Among other proposals, it was also suggested that partners in cooperation abroad should be democratically constituted movements (political parties and other groups) engaged in work to achieve democratic government and protection of human rights. Consequently, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) has supported Swedish PAOs in this regard through a special allocation in the development assistance budget since 1995. In 2010 its board submitted at the request of the government, a strategy proposal for special democracy support through PAOs which would cover the period 2011-2015. This strategy introduced multi-party support in addition to the traditional sister party support. The Swedish government thus decided in September 2010 that Sida take responsibility for the execution of the strategy to realize the two main goals of (a) well functioning democratic parties and (b) democratically grounded and well functioning multi-party systems in developing countries. Like with other forms of development assistance, the effectiveness of party aid has recently been questioned in political circles and in the development field. Despite the growth of party aid over the years, academic interest in the field of party assistance has however been low. Carothers (2006) notes that the “paucity of reflective, analytic assessments of past work and a dispersion of accumulated wisdom are not just characteristic of party aid but of democracy aid generally.” Against this background, this paper seeks to explore the contours and dimensions of Swedish party assistance, paying particular attention to their goals, challenges, operational environment, strategies to reach their stated goals and why Sweden shifted from the traditional sister party support to include a component of multi-party support in its party assistance package. In order that the nature of Swedish party aid is elucidated, a series of interviews were conducted with secretaries general and/or chairpersons of the PAOs and Sida staff. Understanding the Swedish approach at a time when democracy aid practitioners are faced with unclear and incoherent transitions in the world and at worst backlashes against democracy and its promotion may compel a relook at strategies and methods. The paper concludes that Swedish party assistance strategy has been influenced by political context rather than ideas about democracy and democratization.

1 Demokratier Kräva Dessa Partier: Report by the Committee on Extended Contributions towards Democratic Construction. Swedish Foreign Affairs ministry Ds 1994:63 p.3
Acknowledgements

I wish to extend sincere gratitude to all those without whom this paper would not have materialized. Special thanks to Martin Ängeby and staff at Swedish International Liberal Centre (Silc) for allowing me to carry out the research parallel to my internship and arranging interview contacts with the other party foundations. I am equally indebted to all from the PAO community, Sida and Swedish MFA who took time off their busy schedules for the interviews.

Last but not least, I am very thankful to the staff at Gothenburg University’s Department of Political Science and all the colleagues whom I had occasion to interact with during my studies.

Thank You!
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Centre Party International Foundation/Centerpartiets Internationella Stiftelse</td>
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<td>GF</td>
<td>Green Forum</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<td>JHS</td>
<td>Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation/Jarl Hjalmarson Stiftelsen</td>
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<td>KICS</td>
<td>Christian Democratic International Center/Kristdemokratiskt Internationellt Center</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
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<td>Ministry for Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MSEK</td>
<td>Million Swedish Crowns</td>
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<td>OPIC</td>
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<td>SEK</td>
<td>Swedish Crowns</td>
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<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
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<td>Left International Forum/Vänsterns Internationella Forum</td>
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1 Introduction

Democracy aid has been criticized as having little if any impact in building democratic societies and the slow pace and at times failure of democratic transitions pose a serious challenge to the full realization of global democracy. The problem of unclear and incoherent democratic transitions after decades of democracy aid calls for a relook at the strategies of aid providers and how these strategies can be improved in response to dynamic global politics. Skepticism is highlighted by inter alia Max Bader (2010) for example, who argues that the environment for international party assistance in Central Asia is highly adverse and party assistance is unlikely to make any meaningful impact citing uneven playing fields⁴. Compounding this situation is what Carothers (2006) calls the “standard lament”- an apparent abhorrence and mistrust of political parties by citizens of the developing and post communist parts of the world⁵. He argues that political parties are widely viewed by some citizens as corrupt and divisive political entities and donor organizations also find it hard to work with them for the same reasons. At the same time, donors working with political parties risk being accused of meddling in the internal politics of other nations to effect regime change and thus threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those states. Since the PAOs and similar organizations are state funded, their activities might be seen as indirect meddling in the affairs of other states by the states funding the PAOs and similar organizations.

Paradoxically, the depth and pervasiveness of their problems notwithstanding, political parties are best suited in articulating and aggregating varied interests of citizens, organizing the citizens in making choices at elections and ultimately forming, overseeing and controlling government. They also play a vital role, in opposition, as the staunchest scrutinizers of government performance. Without a vibrant opposition, there is less accountability. These foregoing functions of political parties can hardly be outsourced to civil society organizations which while playing a crucial role in the democratization process are beset with an array of their own limitations. For instance, civil society organisations’ disaggregated nature of representation as characterized by their focus on narrow interests and issues make it difficult for them to structure choices and compete for and run government.

Sweden’s history of assisting political parties can be traced back to the 1950s when victims of apartheid in South Africa and later SWAPO of Namibia were assisted with scholarships and legal assistance including support for the exiled political movements. It was however not until 1995 that individual Swedish political parties, through PAOs, could engage in contributing to the “… the building up of stable democratic societies in developing countries and countries in Eastern and Central Europe”. It is important to stress at the outset that, the Swedish government helps to strengthen civil society organizations as part of its strategy to support democratization processes focusing on civil and political rights, institutions and procedures, rule of law and actors of democratisation.

So, while this paper will focus on support by PAOs to political parties, democracy support therefore is a broad concept. In the Swedish context, democracy support to strengthen freedom of expression and the development of free, independent media, key institutions and actors such as political parties, human rights defenders, religious groups etc. Important to note also is that as a matter of policy, all form of Swedish international development cooperation, PAO party assistance included, must be underwritten by a human rights perspective entailing the principles of “participation, non-discrimination, public access and transparency, responsibility and accountability”.

1.1 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of Swedish political party assistance through PAOs and interrogate policy evolution to address its effectiveness in building democratic societies. Special attention will be given to the policy shift from a strictly sister party support model to a hybrid model which includes a multi-party assistance component.

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6 Demokratier Kräva Dessa Partier: Report by the Committee on Extended Contributions towards Democratic Construction. Swedish Foreign Affairs ministry Ds 1994:63 p. 14


9 ibid..p. 14-19

10 ibid..p. 11
In other words, the paper examines the goals, methods, challenges and results of the PAOs with a view to create an understanding of their work for further improvements in democracy building. The paper argues that strategic differentiation as evidenced by the inclusion of multi-party support programmes is a response to a diverse array of political contexts in the field and not a change in the Swedish government´s conceptualization of democracy and democratization.

1.2 Significance of the Study

Several factors inform the significance of this study. First, as Carothers (2006) points out, the subject of party aid has received little or “no extensive up-to-date analytic treatment.” Secondly, an overwhelming proportion of party assistance is public funded and as such requires critical assessment and evaluation for accountability purposes. In the Swedish context, this is a ground breaking holistic study of political party assistance provided by seven foundations with links to seven political parties in the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament). Thirdly, critical assessment and evaluation from an academic perspective is of paramount importance for informing design and implementation of party assistance programmes in the future. This will help both existing democracy support organizations and new ones in the field. Fourthly, the study can also help party assistance partners on the other end by providing them with information they can use to identify the assistance they need and can thus actively seek without being subjected to the donor´s agenda. Finally and not least, interrogating the Swedish model of political party assistance is a worthwhile enterprise considering the importance attached to aid effectiveness as enshrined in the Paris Agenda (2005) among other international commitments in the development cooperation community.

1.3 Research Questions

The study seeks to answer two research questions:

1. What are the main contours and dimensions of Swedish political party assistance?

2. Why did Sweden introduce multi-party support in the new political party assistance/aid package?

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This inquiry and in particular the structuring of these questions is motivated by the current and ubiquitous discourse on accountability and effectiveness in development cooperation in general and political party assistance in particular. By the *contours and dimensions* of Swedish political party assistance is meant the institutional framework e.g. the PAOs, their partners, political parties, Sida and their goals, relationships with one another, methodological approaches and challenges etc.

1.4 Delimitation

This thesis studies political party assistance provided to parties in former communist and developing countries by Swedish political party foundations, so-called Party Affiliated Organizations (POAs). While representatives of the PAOs, Sida staff, and an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were interviewed, it would have been desirable to interview representatives from the partner organizations or political parties. Partners for each PAO could have been interviewed on how they relate with the PAOs but for logistical limitations, specifically time and financial resources for travel. A further limitation is that availability of independent literature on the work of individual PAOs is limited and thus the study relies primarily on the interviews, internal policy documents and handbooks for a deep insight into the organizations. Likewise, the availability of literature on party assistance in general is limited. Carothers (2006) rightly points out that there has been little effort to do cross-national or cross regional comparisons. This study could not undertake such an ambitious enterprise given the time and financial resources as already cited above but several model examples in other countries will be cited if only to highlight the peculiarities of the Swedish model. Nevertheless, a deep understanding of Swedish party assistance programs provides a solid foundation for future cross-national comparative studies.

1.5 Thesis Disposition

The rest of this paper shall proceed as follows: the next section will provide a detailed theoretical framework and review of existing literature on the subject of party assistance including definitions of approaches in the field.

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That would be followed by an outlay of the design and methodology of this thesis in section 3 wherein pertinent aspects of inter-alia data gathering and treatment will be discussed. Section 4 presents the empirical findings followed by a discussion in section 5 and finally by conclusions in section 6.

2. Theoretical Framework

This section will outline the approaches in democracy assistance and the methods used to support political parties. This paves the way for later analysis of the Swedish approach and strategies for party assistance. Section 2.1 defines the developmental approach while the political approach will be defined in section 2.2. The two methodological strategies of sister/partisan party support and multiparty support are discussed in section 2.3 followed by an evaluation of the linkage between the theoretical approaches and methodological strategies which form the basis of the theoretical model.

2.1 Defining the Developmental Approach

Carothers (2009) outlines four dimensions to compare the developmental and the political approaches to democracy support, namely the value of democracy, their conceptualisation of democracy and democratisation, and their method of supporting democracy. In the developmental approach, democracy may be a goal but it is mainly seen as a means to development.

Value of democracy: The developmental approach links democratic governance to socioeconomic development such that while democracy principles are good in their own right, they are usually seen as a means to socioeconomic progress.

Concept of democracy: Given the value placed on democracy in the developmental approach, social and economic rights are not less important than political and civil rights. In other words, there is a broader conceptualisation of democracy that looks past political procedures like elections to include welfare, justice and equality.


**Concept of democratisation:** Democratisation is conceived as a slow, iterative process which goes hand in hand with socioeconomic development. This is underpinned by the belief that democratic governance produces socioeconomic development which in turn helps sustain democracy. In this school of thought, it may be preferable to achieve a certain level of socioeconomic development and the rule of law before democratisation can start.

**Method of supporting democracy:** The linking of democracy and socioeconomic development is manifested in the methods of supporting democracy which are indirect. Democracy support is thus directed towards social and economic development in the hope that this will in turn support democracy. In so doing, confrontation with the host government is avoided by avoiding politically sensitive support to change agents like opposition political parties and activists. Instead, support is given to build state capacity and good governance in partnership with the host government or to civil society at the grassroots level as opposed to national level political advocacy work. Where party work is supported, it is done usually in a nonpartisan framework with the hope that “stronger, more capable democratic parties will contribute to development by ensuring that citizens’ economic interests (especially the interests of the poor) will be better represented, and by helping parties to develop a greater capacity for formulating effective socioeconomic policies”\(^{15}\). In the same vein of avoiding confrontation and to deflect charges against interventionism, an emphasis is placed on human rights which are more universally accepted legal principles compared to democracy. The human rights perspective here serves the purpose of integrating political, civil, social and economic rights.

**2.2 Defining the Political Approach**

**Value of democracy:** Democracy is supported as an end goal rather than a means to some higher objective because it is a positive value itself which generally ensures political dignity. While this approach acknowledges the contribution of democracy to social and economic development, its focus is on promoting political and civil rights thereby relegating social and economic rights to second place.

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**Concept of democracy:** Meaningful participation in democratic political processes e.g. in competitive elections is key to the political approach even though democracy supporters sometimes include development of core institutions like an independent judiciary etc. Social and economic elements rarely feature in the programmes of democracy supporters who follow this approach.

**Conceptualisation of democratisation:** The political approach is predicated on the underlying notion that there can never be democracy until democrats are in power. It therefore places a special emphasis on democratic actors who must be supported in their political struggle with nondemocratic forces. While also accepting that democratisation is a long process, the political approach sees the process as marked by key junctures e.g. breakthroughs and reversals.

**Method of supporting democracy:** Democracy actors like political parties or politicians are supported either directly through training programmes, funding etc or indirectly by funding institutions which ensure fair procedures for democrats e.g. funding the electoral management body to run a credible election by say acquiring transparent ballot boxes etc. Unlike the developmental approach, this approach can be confrontational since its focus is on assisting pro-democratic political actors and not the host government per se. Such support may include assisting exiled opposition parties to broadcast into the country (so called pirate radio stations) or supporting civic groups that assist the opposition to mobilize citizens e.g. the independent media.

**2.3 Partisan vs. multiparty support**

Having outlined the two broad approaches in democracy support in general, there are two distinct methods in supporting political parties, namely the fraternal/sister party method and the multiparty method\(^{16}\). Aid is directed to ideologically like-minded parties (fraternal/sister party method) or to all or at least significant parties in a country, usually those with a representation in parliament (multiparty method). Partisanship models can be controversial in recipient countries as helping certain parties and not others can be viewed as political interventionism—i.e. to influence electoral outcomes and to instill their own political gendans\(^{17}\).

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\(^{17}\) ibid…p. 148
One notable advantage is however that, party aid providers have the advantage of cultivating useful relations, reducing transaction costs. Proponents argue that providing aid to all parties carries the risk of supporting nondemocratic parties.

Instead of a party or party foundation supporting another party, the multiparty or system oriented approach seeks to foster changes in all parties in a country at once through modifications of the underlying legal framework in which parties are anchored or changes in how parties relate to and work with each other. Multiparty support can take the form of promoting interparty dialogues where party representatives get together to discuss issues of mutual interest e.g. political reform measures. Joint training sessions can be difficult because parties may not want to discuss sensitive campaign strategies openly in the presence of political opponents for example. Given the two main approaches in democracy support and the two distinctions relating to political party support, the main task is to locate Swedish political party assistance in these categories and the attendant challenges and opportunities in building democracy.

### 2.4 Evaluating the Link between Approaches and Strategy

“The divide between the political and developmental approaches to assisting democracy…starts from contrasting ideas about both democracy and democratization and leads to very different configurations of assistance programmes”.

The above quote from Carothers (2009) indicates that there is more than one way of conceptualizing democracy and democratization as described above and that such conceptualization determines the approach to assisting democracy. It can also be deduced from this theoretical statement that a given approach leads to a specific set of strategies. In a nutshell, configuration of assistance programmes or democracy assistance strategy is dependent on the value and conceptualisation of democracy and democratisation (see fig 1 below).

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Recalling the primary focus of this paper and that political party assistance is only a part of broad democracy support, is Swedish party assistance strategy sensitive to conceptualisation of democracy and democratisation?

Democracy can be seen on the one hand as an end goal of democracy support because it is a positive value itself which generally ensures political dignity by according citizens basic political and civil rights\textsuperscript{20}. According to this school of thought, democratic competition is considered to be good because it can be seen as a positive value that dignifies humans by allowing them to determine the course of their lives. Democracy provides the necessary conditions for the upkeep of human rights by ensuring that citizens have the choice to elect their leadership and hold it to account in dispensing its power. Respect for human rights therefore is not only a product of democracy but the two mutually reinforce one another. In essence, parliament and publicly elected bodies at various levels of governance, national institutions for the defence of human rights, electoral processes, independent judicial systems, and non-partisan and professional security sector are necessary conditions for human dignity.

On the other hand, democracy can be perceived as crucial for socioeconomic development thereby making its promotion a critical component of development aid\textsuperscript{21}.

\textsuperscript{20} http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/01_20_1_carothers.pdf p. 7 (accessed 2013-04-12)

\textsuperscript{21} ibid. p. 8
Citizens can hold political leaders to account and have the power and possibility to replace them through democratic elections if they do not act in accordance with the public interest. Democracy thus ensures relatively more effective and equitable use of national resources as the political elite compete for and depend on a mandate from citizens to rule. From a socioeconomic development perspective, political competition is good because citizens will most likely support and thus vote for a party programme that enhances their socioeconomic well-being. Opposition parties will also play an oversight or a scrutinizing role over the ruling party or coalition as the case maybe and thus reduce or limit corruption. Reducing or limiting corruption in turn means that national resources can be used to provide more and better social services like education, health etc. Ensuring that political parties have the capacity to frame their programmes and play the oversight role when they are in opposition or have the capacity to govern when they are in power is thus in the best interest of efficient socioeconomic development. This in turn informs the need for supporting political parties in developing and former communist countries as part of broad development cooperation. One can thus say, supporting political parties and a multiparty system with fair and transparent elections, leads to efficient development (see Fig 2 below).

Do the different perceptions of democracy, either as a positive value in itself or as a means to socioeconomic development matter in the structuring of political party support by aid givers in the field? In other words, what implications do these two perceptions have for political party support policy and / or methodology in Sweden?

Modern representative democracy is inextricably connected with political parties. In any society, different people would have different ideas on how their society should be governed. These different ideas need to be aggregated in coherent programmes that can be presented as an alternative to other programmes so that citizens may make choices on how their society should be governed and what it should provide. Ideally therefore, well –functioning political parties compete to produce the best programmes covering provision of public services, how they will be financed, foreign policy etc. Importantly, political parties provide a crucial link between citizens and institutions of the state. This is the role and essence of parties and the multi-party system in democracy.
Non-democratic societies may also show signs of development but without the checks and balances inherent in a democracy that development can hardly be efficient. If poverty is taken to also mean lack of freedom and political power and thus lack of freedom of expression, the chance to participate and influence, then citizens of a non-democratic polity remain poor even without lack of material resources.

While acknowledging the inevitability of political parties in a democracy, Carothers (2006) points out that they are the weakest link in democratic transitions and offers alternatives for making party aid to work better\(^2\). He advocates getting deeper than the supply driven trainings and workshops provided by western experts and also suggest a focus on party-state relations, the relationship of parties to the overall distribution of power, diplomatic pressure on governments etc. depending on the context. International IDEA calls for systematized, “coherent standards and principles with regard to what projects should achieve, how appropriate activities can be identified and how effects can be measured”\(^2\)\(^3\). Michael Johnstone (2005) argues against focusing too much on corruption control when financing parties in new democracies as it creates a politically disinterested citizenry who seek to free ride on the civic/anti-corruption public good\(^2\)\(^4\). As such, he controversially argues that “engaging the self-interest of citizens and groups in financing politics and in political processes generally, are vital aspects of democracy building.”\(^2\)\(^5\)

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\(^3\) International IDEA 2007 *Effective Part Assistance, Stronger Parties for better democracy* p.5


\(^5\) ibid..p.3

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The different arguments proffered on party assistance do not point to a clear dismissal of party assistance as a means of democracy promotion, but rather reflect a differentiation of approach to broad democracy support. Bader(2010)’s skepticism on the impact of party aid in Central Asia finds resonance with Carothers(2006) conceptualization of party systems in terms of parties’ relationships to the distribution and exercise of power in the society. Carothers (2006) suggests less focus on providing support for internal democracy but on helping parties gain space in the political system and challenge those who hold the power that keeps parties down. On Russia for example, he suggests “concentrating on exerting pressure for independent media than continuing with conventional training programs that does nothing to increase the limited political space available to political parties”. The all important question is whether the conceptualization of democracy and democratization would still matter with strategic differentiation.

Is the conceptualization of democracy aid as either developmental or political useful in putting Swedish party assistance into perspective? Swedish model of party assistance makes a clean fit in any of the approaches or is there a strategic policy mix and if so what really informs the design or model of Swedish party assistance? Why does Sweden support political parties in other countries and why do the party foundations go about it in the manner they do?

2.5 HYPOTHESIS

The first research question of this thesis seeks a broad understanding of Swedish political party understanding including the Swedish government’s conceptualisation of democracy and demeratisation as stated in official policy and other documents. Theory states that strategy in democracy support is dependent on conceptualisation of democracy and demeratisation. From the theory we derive the hypothesis that:

Party assistance strategies should be consistent with broad approach to democracy support.

This hypothesis will be tested to answer the second research question namely, why did Sweden introduce multi-party support in the new political party assistance/aid package?

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27 ibid...p. 222
If there is indeed a causal relationship between the conceptualisation of democracy and democratisation on one hand and the choice of strategy then we would expect the introduction of multi-party assistance in 2010 to have arisen from a change in conceptualisation of democracy and democratisation.

2.6 Summary

The developmental approach to democracy support lends emphasis on and sees democracy as a means towards socioeconomic development. It is less confrontational since aid providers try to work in partnership with the host government to build state capacity and support grassroots civil society in an apolitical manner. Strengthening political contestation is avoided. The political approach takes the line that democracy is a positive value which must be supported for the inherent political dignity it accords citizens in civic and political rights. It takes a confrontational approach by choosing to work with democrats against nondemocrats. Support is given to the political actors or to support institutions which in turn favour the cause of democrats. With regards political party support, there are basically two forms i.e. partisan or so called sister party support and multiparty or system oriented support. Sister party support clearly fits the profile of the political approach. Multiparty or system-oriented support on the other hand has a long-term developmental outlook.

3. Methodology, Design and Material

3.1 Choice of Design

Elucidating the contours and dimensions of Swedish political party assistance requires that the study be conducted in an embedded, single case study design because it primarily involves more than one unit of analysis. While the main unit of analysis is the Swedish PAO model, the PAOs, their partners and intermediary units like Sida are important. So, conducting the study at the abstract level in a holistic single case design will not be very helpful. According to Yin (2003), regardless how such other units are selected, such a design inevitably becomes an embedded single case design. This design has the advantage that it adds “significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case”.

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29 ibid., p.46
In addition and as Fylvbjerg points out, case studies generally “produce concrete context-dependent knowledge.”

3.2 Case Selection

The choice of Swedish political party assistance for this study is motivated by several factors. Political parties are intrinsically connected to modern representative democracy yet they continue to form a weak link in the democratization process despite significant resources being channeled to them. Close to two decades ago, Sweden put in place a special institutional arrangement to support parties in other countries following the partisan approach even though policy descriptions and recommendations back then had undertones of a developmental-political mix. Recently, the Swedish government instituted a new strategy which also incorporates the multi-party mode of assistance. Sweden presents an interesting case because this strategic differentiation which as Carothers (2009) observed, has been going on for almost a decade in major donor countries. Yet, in Sweden multiparty support was pronounced in the 2011-2015 strategy. It is thus important to interrogate this recent policy shift on the ground against the theoretical assumptions of the different approaches.

3.3 Material

Qualitative data collected from semi-structured interviews of representatives of six out of a total of seven party foundations or PAOs, supplemented by other organizational information extracted from their websites form the major basis for the empirical analysis. Since Swedish political party assistance is not organized under one institution but spread through the seven party foundations, it was necessary to reach out to as many of them as possible since they in some cases operate in different regions/countries, have different political backgrounds etc and thus have different experiences and challenges. The advantage of using various sources of information i.e. interviews with the representatives of PAOs and their partner organisations, information from official websites and brochures, pamphlets etc hereinafter referred to as organizational documents is that one could actually triangulate the data.

Additionally, since the policy itself is not directly made by the party foundations themselves, interviews with their representatives provided the opportunity to get their views on the institutional arrangement or the model.

### 3.3.1 Semi-structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the party foundations (PAOs), their partners and Sida were preferred and these lasted between 30-45 minutes. The interviews started with asking the interviewees to give a general historical background of the organization to make them feel at ease and comfortable followed by deeper questions on challenges, successes etc. Semi structured interviews thus gave interviewees the opportunity to answer core questions as well as give their opinions on related issues and events. It gave me important insights and I was able to use such propositions as the basis for further inquiry. This way valuable information was obtained and this proved helpful considering that there is limited literature on the subject of Swedish party assistance. There was therefore considerable variation between the questions posed to the various interviewees. For example, there was no need to ask a question that the interviewee had elaborated on as some of the information would have already been given in a prior question.

While interviews generally provide important insights into little known issues considering the apparent lack of academic interest and literature on the subject of political party assistance, Darren G. Lilleker warns that “some details may be exaggerations”\(^{33}\). It is possible for example that the interviewees may have concealed some vital information about how they relate with one another for example for professional reasons. It is equally possible that a PAO representative would not want to speak about a problematic relationship with a partner organization/party for fear of losing trust and future cooperation. For this reason, empirical data was reinforced by other data sources like independent evaluation reports and other documentary sources, a process better known as triangulation.

### 3.3.2 Selection of interviewees

Interviews with heads or secretary generals of six of the seven Swedish party foundations were carried out at their respective offices in Stockholm.

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These were targeted with a view to get a broad and deep insight into the organization and its policies. The assumption was that those who have risen to such high posts would have possibly worked many years and therefore has more to tell in respect of policy development over the years. The programme manager with direct responsibility on the operations of the PAO was also interviewed at the Sida head office in Stockholm. It was important to interview the programme manager as his office is responsible for scrutinizing the PAO budgets and monitoring their operations. The MFA official was specifically selected because he works in the ministry’s department for development policy and was involved in the formulation of the new strategy. The interview was done over the telephone.

3.3.3 Organizational documents

The Swedish PAOs make regular publications detailing their various programmes and projects. These range from flyers to magazines which also carry valuable information like the organizational short and long term objectives. These provide important reinforcement to interviews as they can give information missed in interviews. Falling under this category are evaluation reports from SADEV and government policy decision papers. For reasons already mentioned, it was difficult to get partner organizations’ evaluation reports of the programmes and projects or their other publications which could be used to triangulate interview data.

3.4 Choice of Analytical Approach

Understanding the Swedish model of political party assistance requires first, an exploratory mapping of the institutional framework. In other words, questions that need to be addressed include, who provides the funding, who are the main actors, where are they active, what are the objectives, challenges etc? Thus the question of the contours and dimensions or the nature of Swedish party assistance is answered by attending to these questions as obtained in the semi-structured interviews and other material as already stated. Secondly, the institutional make-up of the Swedish model and its historical background are crucial to the explanatory part which seeks to answer the second research question of this paper, namely Why did Sweden introduce multi-party support in the new political party assistance/aid package?
In order to determine why Sweden made the recent change to its political party assistance model to include multi-party support, it is necessary to first understand the Swedish government’s ideas about democracy and democratisation to determine the Swedish approach. This will then be related to the PAO strategies in political party assistance from 1995 to 2010 through to the current strategy to test for consistency with theory which effectively makes this a deductive study. Once the broad approach is determined and if there is no consistency between theory and strategy in party assistance we will turn to alternative explanations using process tracing. According to David Collier (2011) it is “often invoked by scholars who carry out within-case analysis based on qualitative data...” and “… inherently analyses trajectories of change and causation, but the analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not adequately described”\textsuperscript{34}. Consequently, detailed descriptions of how certain phenomena may or may not have caused the inclusion of multiparty support will be given using the method of elimination. This method assumes that by eliminating all other plausible explanations, the remaining one is the correct one.

3.5 Ethics

Only one interviewee expressly requested anonymity and some of the PAO representatives indicated that some of the relationships or projects especially in difficult political environments may not be discussed because they are discrete. As a result all interviewees were promised anonymity especially where sensitive programmes or projects are discussed. This does not affect the quality of the findings and discussions of this paper. It must also be stated that this paper was written during my internship with one of the PAOs with the advantage that it made access to the other PAOs easier but objectivity in discussing the other PAOs will be maintained.

4. Empirical Findings

4.1 Swedish Party assistance: policy development since 1993

The general intention of the PAOs has remained unchanged over the years but guidelines and

\textsuperscript{34} David Collier (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. PS: Political Science & Politics, 44, p. 823
objectives issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the responsible ministry for all development cooperation have been reformulated several times. For example, the official objective for the period 1998-2001 changed slightly from “...to assist build-up of stable democratic societies in developing countries and countries in Eastern and Central Europe” to the “...build-up of a well functioning and pluralistic party system and democratic societies in developing countries and countries in Central and Eastern Europe.”35 For the 2001 to 2006 period, “promoting representative democratic governance in these countries” was added to the official objective.36 The 2006 to 2010 objective was more comprehensive and specified aspects requiring attention e.g. respect for human rights, equality, political participation and making political parties more democratic in their internal organization and their policies etc.37 The current programme strategy covers the period 2011-2015 and is different in that for the first time, it introduces multiparty support in addition to the traditional support of ideologically like-minded parties or sister parties.38

The tripartite of PAO, Sida and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) which is the ministry responsible for all development cooperation have a special interest in learning more about results, what works in different contexts and how to evaluate programmes. For example, the government carried out an evaluation of PAO cooperation through the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV) in 2009 whose recommendations had an impacted on the current strategy. The focus of the evaluation was on how to improve PAO methods, approaches and target groups.39 The evaluation also had a special focus on how Sida could strengthen its administrative and management role including capacity building of PAOs.

PAO activities are circumscribed by government policy that a human rights perspective is to be mainstreamed in all development cooperation and the current policy for democratic development covers the period 2010-2014.40

36 ibid... p.31
37 ibid... p.31
The strategy for special democracy support through Swedish PAO covering the period 2011-2015 operationalises and derives from this policy for democratic development and human rights in Swedish development cooperation. The current PAO programme strategy will be evaluated in 2015.\footnote{Strategi för särskilt demokratistöd genom svenska partianknutna organisationer 2011-2015: Swedish Foreign Affairs ministry. Instrument UF2010/34078/UP. p.10}

\section*{4.2 The Swedish PAO Model}

The Swedish PAO model consists of seven autonomous organisations that have close links to Swedish political parties represented in the Swedish parliament and they differ in self-perception in the sense that they invariably see themselves as development organizations or as party organizations engaged in international cooperation\footnote{Sadev (2010), Support to Democracy through Party Affiliated Organisations: Evaluation p.27}. The MFA is responsible for setting the general orientation of party assistance while Sida reviews project proposals and disburse funds. PAOs plan and manage the various projects in collaboration with their partner organisations. The main strategic objective of the PAOs can be summarized as organizational strengthening. Strengthening partner organisations include training youth and female leaders and facilitating international conferences that provide knowledge exchange and networking opportunities. In some cases, PAO works with groups of a kindred ideology and support them in their transformation into political parties particularly in authoritarian states and post-conflict situations, if this is the choice of the groups\footnote{Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010), Change for Freedom: Policy For Development and Human Rights In Swedish Development Cooperation, 2010-2014 p.17}.

The PAOs are funded through the budget for the so-called Global Programmes\footnote{Strategi för globala utvecklingsinsatser 2008-2010, Regeringsbeslut III:6, UD2007/47594/USTYR op.cit Sadev (2010)…pp.33-34}. Total funding increased steadily from MSEK 10 in 1996 to MSEK 75 in 2008 even though in 2002, there was a considerable budget increase to MSEK34 from MSEK16 in 2001 and there was also a significant increase in 2007 to MSEK from MSEK52 in 2006\footnote{http://bit.ly/17O9uSk p.2 (accessed 2013-07-04)}. There was no instance since the establishment of PAO in 1995 that the yearly budget was decreased (see appendix 1). The current budget totals MSEK80 and of that MSEK 57 was allocated to objective one which is support to sister parties while the multi-party component was allocated MSEK21.2\footnote{http://bit.ly/17O9uSk p.2 (accessed 2013-07-04)}.
For the reason that there is more emphasis cooperation with sister parties in other countries and in tandem with the new strategy, a larger component of the budget (70%) thus goes to supporting sister parties with 30% reserved for multiparty system support. The 70% that goes to sister party support consists of an equal basic allocation to each PAO with the remainder shared proportional to the number of parliamentary seats held by the mother party. For example, in the 2007/2008 period, the basic amount was SEK650 000 (approximately 78 000 Euro) and SEK 170 000 (approximately 20000 Euro) per representative. Applications for the multiparty system support funds can be submitted individually by each PAO or jointly by several of the PAO. Where several PAOs submit a joint application for multiparty support, Sida requires that one of them has overall responsibility for the programme. Whereas there is no competition in accessing sister party funding, the 30% for multiparty system support is granted on competitive merit of the programme proposals. This does not mean that programme proposals for sister support is not scrutinized by Sida, but once they meet the requirements funding is guaranteed based on the formula of a basic allocation and number of parliamentary seats.

PAO cooperation with partner organisations is mostly political on two dimensions. Partner organisations are political players who meet certain criteria and those who do not meet the requirements are left out. This makes the support partial or partisan. On the other hand, there is a political dimension in Sweden in that PAO is closely linked to the same parties politically responsible for formulating development and reform policy. The board members of PAO usually come from the respective party and the people working in the PAO usually have a party background. In spite of the political connections between the PAO and their respective parties in parliament and government, there is no evidence of abuse of corruption or favouritism.

If a Swedish party loses its mandate in parliament, i.e. if it falls below the 4% threshold, funding to the respective PAO does not stop abruptly. The PAO is allowed to continue with its programmes as funding is reduced gradually.

49 ibid..p.20
Adjustment starts with the organization getting 75% of the recent budget the first year; followed by 50% and 25%. If the party wins back its mandate funding is restored\(^{50}\).

The PAO hold about four meetings a year where they exchange information between themselves and other organisations not in the PAO system like International IDEA. They also participate in formal and informal networks like the European Network of Political Foundations (ENoP) and the so called Wiltons Park or Political Party Peer Network. In addition, the PAO hold membership in ideological party international organisations like International Socialist Organisation, the Liberals International and so on.

The following is a brief description of the seven PAO in alphabetic order:

**Centerpartiets Internationella Stiftelse (CIS)** - CIS is affiliated with the Centre Party and has a long history of working with solidarity and peace-building since 1983\(^{51}\). When the opportunity came up from the Swedish government to work with democracy support connected to the party in 1995, it was easy to transform the organization into a foundation as they are today. The current budget is approximately MSEK 4, 5.

The foundation’s stated goal is to work for the development of democracy and human rights through supporting sister parties and multi-party systems in Africa and Eastern Europe and in carrying out this work, they see themselves as democracy consultants assisting with capacity building, giving advice and helping to create important networks\(^{52}\). CIS has a special focus on supporting the youth, women’s rights, political participation. In Africa they work in Malawi with a sister party project and then in West Africa they have the joint multiparty project, the Programme for Young Politicians in Africa (PYPA) together with some of the PAO. In the multi-party programme they are responsible for four countries in West Africa namely Benin, Niger, Mali and Burkina Fasso. They are also active in Belarus where they work with a gender project.

**Green Forum (GF)** - Green Forum was formed in 1995 and became a foundation in 1999\(^{53}\).

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\(^{50}\) Demokratier Kräva Dessa Partier: Report by the Committee on Extended Contributions towards Democratic Construction. Swedish Foreign Affairs ministry Ds 1994-63 p.99

\(^{51}\) [http://www.centerpartiet.se/Lokal/CIS/Om-oss/Historia/](http://www.centerpartiet.se/Lokal/CIS/Om-oss/Historia/) (accessed 2013-05-10)

\(^{52}\) [http://www.centerpartiet.se/Lokal/CIS/Om-oss/](http://www.centerpartiet.se/Lokal/CIS/Om-oss/) (accessed 2013-05-10)

It is affiliated with the Green Party (MP) which appoints its board. Its purpose according to their statutes its overarching goal is to work for long-term sustainable democratic societies that live and work within the framework set by nature. More concretely they aim at helping green organizations develop to political parties, and more generally build democratic structures in countries where such structures are lacking.

Current budget is 4, 9 million SEK per year, over a three year period. Their partners are a federation of green parties in Africa, green parties and networks in Eastern Europe plus green organizations in Bolivia, Colombia and Guatemala. Green Forum is also a co-partner to CIS in West Africa in the multiparty Program for Young Politicians in Africa. Support to partners includes helping them conduct seminars and other different training sessions and arranging meetings for sharing experiences. Green Forum also helps them with concrete advice and the experiences they have had in building a green party in Sweden.

Among the achievements of GF is the establishment of the African Green Federation a few years ago, a well functioning green party in Albania and a network of green youth in East Europe is well established.

**Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS)**-JHS is affiliated with the centre-right Moderaterna party and the foundation was founded after the fall of the Berlin wall with the aim to promote co-operation and European development based on freedom, democracy and market economy. Historically, the foundation worked in five countries Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia but has since expanded operations to other countries and regions.

The foundation has presence in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey, the Balkan region, Africa and Latin America. In these countries and regions, JHS helps political parties with building networks, educating on politics and policy issues, campaign methods, strategic development and media management and in the case of European countries the focus is also on European integration. The foundation currently has the highest PAO budget totaling MSEK 21,4.

**Kristdemokratiskt Internationellt Center (KIC)**-KIC is an organisation whose members are the Christian Democratic Party (KD) and its associated units like the youth wing and the women’s wing. It was formed in 2005 as an independent organisation but operated as Kristdemokraterna Council for Democracy and Development (KRDU) between 1995 and 2005 as a part of the Christian Democrats party.

The Program for Young Politicians in Africa which runs from 2012-15 is KIC’s biggest project which they carry out together with the Centerpartiets Internationella Stiftelse (CIS) and Olof Palme International Centre using the multiparty support strategy. KIC has the lead role in the project and is responsible for East Africa i.e. in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Other projects are in Ukraine, Cuba and in Hungary where they support the Robert Schuman Institute in Budapest.

According to the statutes of KIC, the organisation seeks to promote democracy and well-functioning party systems as a means to achieve good government practice, human rights, social development and consensus internationally and in Sweden. KIC prioritizes youth and female participation as well as strengthening internal democracy procedures in political parties and in countries with repressive regimes they cooperate to strengthen independent media and Christian Democratic Movements while using a multi-party approach in new democracies.\(^5\)\(^6\). The annual PAO budget allocation for KIC currently stands at MSEK17,3.

**Olof Palme International Centre (OPIC)**-OPIC was founded in 1992 by the Social Democratic Party(S) as a merger between two organizations, the Swedish Labour Movement’s International Centre (Arbetarrörelse Internationella Centrum, AIC) and the Swedish Labour Movement’s Forum for Peace (Arbetarrörelsens Fredsforum) with the goal to work for democracy, human rights and peace.\(^5\)\(^7\). They support political parties by offering training for party leaders and members, organizational development and sharing of knowledge and experience.\(^5\)\(^8\). Besides supporting individual sister social democratic parties, they are also in the multi-party Programme for Young Politicians in Africa together with the CIS and KIC. OPIC covers Southern Africa i.e. Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique.


Today OPIC consists of 26 member organisations out of the Swedish labour movement and support them in their international work while it also carries out its own activities and programmes. OPIC does much more than PAO work. The PAO budget currently stands at MSEK18.4 and that represents about 20% of the total budget for the organization.

**Swedish International Liberal Centre (Silc)** - Silc is affiliated with the Folkpartiet (Fp) and it was founded in the late 80s following a request from Sida at the time who wanted to support pro-democracy actors in Southern Africa and in particular the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). It was at that time called the Liberalt Utvecklingscentrum (LUC) and changed names in the 1990s.

Silc is driven by the philosophy that democratization requires strong political actors who can mobilize citizens and institutions to achieve necessary changes and following its strong liberal background, the foundation emphasizes the need for individual citizens to say what they think and to defend their interests by participation in the electoral processes. The goal of the foundation is to support liberals in other countries, liberals in a broad sense of people who believe in liberal democracy but also more specifically when it comes to liberal parties and sister parties. There are ongoing projects with sister parties in Russia, Cuba, Belarus in cooperation with Green Forum, Venezuela, Tunisia and in Egypt and the current budget is about MSEK7.7.

**VIF- Vänster Internationella Forum (VIF)** - The Left International Forum (VIF) was founded in 1995 and is affiliated with the Left Party and has presence in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. In Africa they have partners in South Africa, Burkina Faso and Sudan while in Asia they work in Indonesia and the Philippines. In Europe, they work in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine whereas in Latin America their partners are in Colombia, El Salvador and Bolivia. There are also projects in Palestine and Lebanon.

The Left Party appoints its board for the duration of a congress period. VIF manages the grant for democracy-building in developing countries, Central and Eastern Europe.

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60 [http://silc.se/om-silc/](http://silc.se/om-silc/) (accessed 2013-03-06)
Its statutes state that activities shall seek to encourage respect for human rights and freedoms, combat oppression, exploitation and discrimination, encouraging democratic processes in partner organizations and promote ecologically sustainable development. The statutes also state among other things that VIF should maintain contacts with other Swedish PAO which carry out similar activities and establish contacts with organisations and parties in other countries that have similar goals. VIF has a current annual budget of MSEK 5,7

4.3 Interview data

A total of eight interviews were conducted i.e. with officials of six PAOs, one Sida official and an MFA official.

4.3.1 PAO Interviews

The questions for PAOs were focused on a brief history of the organization, goals, challenges, operational environment and strategy. The response to the question of goals was clustered together with a brief history of the organization etc to keep a flow and allow the interviewees to relate the history, goals and the successes. Goals were narrowly defined by the interviewees and there was no attempt to link the goals to some other goal as shown in the three examples from the interviews. As one interviewee simply put it, the goal was

“to contribute to good governance in our partners” (A).

The foundation’s website however explains the link between democracy and development defined as the improvement of poor people’s living conditions. Interviewee B explained their goal as

“Overarching goal is to work for long-term sustainable democratic societies that live and work within the framework set by nature. More concretely we aim at helping ..... organizations develop to political parties, and more generally build democratic structures in countries where such structures are lacking” (B).

Interviewee C responded in similar fashion i.e without linking support to some higher goal by expressing the Foundation’s goal as

“... to support liberals in other countries, liberals in a broad sense of people who believe in liberal democracy but also more specifically when it comes to liberal parties and sister parties” (C).

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On the questions of how and if the goals have changed over time, noted changes were in fact the addition of party assistance to other goals that the organizations had prior to the decision in 1995. Since the introduction of multi-party support is covered in the overall objective of “democracy-building” the foundations hardly altered their statutes.

The interviewees highlighted several challenges that stand in the way of achieving their goals. The most common challenge cited was corruption. As one interviewee pointed out

“That is really a challenge to work with our parties, not to say that they are very corrupted but that they are in a very corrupted system and that can make it very hard for us to go through with the way we look at democracy. If you can buy a vote for a piece of bread or for a cap or whatever, how on earth can you work on building and strengthening democracy?”(D)

A list of other challenges that came up from the interviews are listed below:

a) Stringent laws that prohibit parties from receiving foreign funding, repressive regimes (E)(B)

b) Choosing the right partner that not only upholds the values of liberal democracy but has the potential to develop and have political influence and determining what can be done for them i.e. in which way to employ resources and knowledge efficiently to make the partner a stronger a party/movement.(C)

c) Measuring results and attributing them to the specific interventions is difficult(A)(C)

d) The standard lament-Promoting interest and participation in political processes is difficult where and when people’s immediate concerns are food, water and other life essentials yet PAO activities are limited in scope. People just do not trust parties to deliver on these things.(D)(F)

e) Shifting to multi-party support creates trust and credibility problems between PAO and old sister party partners (E).

f) Supporting not so democratic parties in the multi-party approach without giving them an unfair advantage i.e. without equipping them with skills that can only be used to further foster undemocratic tendencies.(C)
To mitigate some of these challenges, the PAOs meet every few months to exchange notes and these meetings are considered to be very helpful by most of the foundations.

“We learn a lot from each other’s experiences on how other PAO:s manage similar challenges that we face. We can also take advantage of our different organizations’ appearance in the same country; we can share our judgments on how the political situation is developing etc”. (B)

On why multiparty support was introduced, there were several answers ranging from pursuit of neutrality, effectiveness and conformity to criteria for all developmental cooperation funding by inducing competition and results based management frameworks. One interviewee summed it thus

“I think in 2007/2008 they wanted to introduce more cooperation between the PAOs and that’s when they had a demand then that a ratio of the projects should be done by the PAOs in cooperation. So, they were not 100% satisfied with working with the parts in the system to strengthen the system so they were trying to achieve something more systemic or they wanted more political neutrality. In other words I think they were not comfortable with the political interference which is part of the sister party support model”. (C)

There were mixed feelings towards the inclusion of multiparty support in the party assistance package. One foundation particularly saw it as a distortion to the work they were previously doing as they had to cut funding on some projects or drop them altogether.

“So when they (Sida) said that 30% of the budget must be used for the multiparty approach they took the 30% out of the sister party support that we did and I think that was a problem” (E).

Given a choice, the interviewee (E) would rather that they concentrate on sister party support by adding that

“I think that we are a political organization with a clear party political affiliation and maybe there are other institutions that could do the multi-party approach. So everyone should do what they are best at”. (E).

The introduction of multi-party support was also seen as presenting conflict when applied in one country together with sister support resulting in probable loss of credibility. The solution as one interviewee put it is that they apply the two strategies separately in different countries.

“I think we would not be able to work in multiparty support and sister party in the same country because then we would lose credibility so what we do is in some countries we do multiparty support and in other countries we work with sister party support” (A).
However, not all foundations found the current two pronged methodological approach to be problematic. As one interviewee put it citing the PYPA programme

“We believe that giving young politicians the right tools to conduct politics in a perhaps different way than their predecessors can be the best way to enhance democratic development in that continent”.(B)

4.3.2 Sida and MFA Interviews

Two officials, one from Sida and one from the MFA were interviewed on the specific reasons for incorporating multiparty support in the part assistance package. According to them, the decision stems from the recommendations of the 2010 Sadev evaluation report.

“The evaluation cited legitimacy issues and effectiveness, the PAO budget was based on parliamentary mandates and not on performance and so there was need for competition. In a way it was in response to that criticism”. (MFA)

The Sida official also mentioned the element of effectiveness adding that the new strategy was designed to be;

“...more strict and clear in that sense and is at least clarifying somehow what we have to present and how that will be reviewed and assessed and what are some sort of baseline and you know, a logical framework in terms of results based management”(Sida)

4.4 Summary of Findings

The institutional arrangement or model of Swedish party assistance comprises three key institutions. The ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) is responsible for all development cooperation policy which it administers through Sida. The third tier comprises the seven PAOs which are active in the various countries they operate in. The formal institutionalization of PAOs in 1995 is preceded by some of the organizations which in their various forms had long established international relations with political parties in other countries. Contrary to the elaborate goals of some PAOs on their websites linking the goals to broader goals of poverty alleviation and fostering socio-economic development, the inter views revealed more politically focused goals of simply achieving democracy. While there are various challenges in achieving the goals, the PAOs are confident that their work makes a difference even though it is sometimes difficult to attribute success to their specific interventions.
It was only in 2010 that the Swedish government made a formal commitment on sister party and multiparty strategies stating that 70% of funding can be allocated to the earlier with rest available for the latter. In carrying out multiparty support work, the PAOs can choose to do joint programmes. There are mixed feelings among the PAOs on the applicability and effectiveness of multiparty support given the long tradition of sister party. Multi party support is variably viewed as an experiment, as a distortion and seen by some as a welcome strategy. The general feeling among all interviewees is that the government will not scrap it in 2014 when it’s due for evaluation. On the other hand, interviews with the MFA and Sida officials on the question of why multiparty support was introduced point to issues relating to effectiveness and criticism of the funding structure of PAOs in Sweden as contained in the 2010 Sadev evaluation report.

5. Discussion

The Hadar Cars committee of 1993 which led to the establishment of the PAOs as they are currently constituted described democracy as “both a prerequisite for development and a social order that facilitates economic, social and cultural progress.” Read together with the overall purpose of Swedish development cooperation which is to “contribute to making it possible for poor people to improve their living conditions”, democracy support in general and therefore party support has a developmental outlook from the Swedish perspective. The mainstreaming of human rights in Swedish development cooperation and in particular democracy support confirms the desire to avoid confrontation which is a key characteristic of the developmental approach. This is because the concept of human rights is easily acceptable compared to democracy and the important thing is that the human rights perspective integrates political, civil, social and economic rights. Carothers(2009) also makes the point that human rights are more rooted in universal legal principles than is democracy and appeals to supporters of the development approach as being more easily defensible against charges of external interventionism.

63 Demokratier Kräva Dessa Partier: Report by the Committee on Extended Contributions towards Democratic Construction. Swedish Foreign Affairs ministry Ds 1994:63 p.17
64 http://www.government.se/sb/d/11962 (accessed 2013-07-23)
These pieces of evidence point to the developmental approach in broad Swedish democracy support considering also that a larger proportion of democracy support goes to support parliaments, public administration and civil society development to address social and economic problems.\(^{66}\)

The orientation of Swedish democracy assistance is developmental, a point which is also confirmed by Carothers (2009) when he states that the developmental approach is dominant in Europe when compared to the US admitting that European democracy is multifaceted and both approaches are identifiable\(^ {67}\). While in the Swedish context, there is clear evidence of the political approach in terms of methodology in supporting sister parties it is difficult to tie that down as having derived from the Swedish conceptualization of democracy and democratization and the value that Sweden places on democracy. It is clear from policy pronouncements that Swedish democracy support is dominantly developmental but this does not reflect in the configuration of party assistance strategies. It appears, Swedish party assistance is an exception to the notion that the value of democracy, conceptualization of democracy and democratization leads to specific configurations of assistance programmes.

For a very long time Swedish party support has been modeled along partisan assistance against the backdrop of a developmental approach to democracy support. In fact, Sweden’s policy had never concretely specified which strategy to use in supporting parties until 2010 when PAOs’ cooperation with sister parties in other countries was explicitly mentioned. Sadev noted in 2009 that the programme then was open to various interpretations.\(^ {68}\) Even though the Hadar Cars committee recommended that “assistance shall support public engagement in political parties and their associates, who have the will and capacity to develop policy options and seek democratic mandate for these”\(^ {69}\), that did not necessarily prescribe sister party support. PAOs nonetheless used sister party strategy which is a political approach methodology.


\(^{67}\) [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/01_20_1_carothers.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/01_20_1_carothers.pdf) p.16 (accessed 2013-04-12)


\(^{69}\) Demokratier Kräva Dessa Partier: Report by the Committee on Extended Contributions towards Democratic Construction. Swedish Foreign Affairs ministry Ds 1994:63 p.98
Even when one considers the objective of party assistance at the inception of the PAOs in 1995 which was to “assist build-up of stable democratic societies in developing countries and countries in Eastern and Central Europe”\textsuperscript{70}, the choice of strategy did not match the prevailing developmental approach as then articulated in the Hadar Cars report.

Strategy did not change to include multiparty support when the objectives were restated for the period 1998-2001 as “build-up of a well functioning and pluralistic party system and democratic societies in developing countries and countries in Central and Eastern Europe”\textsuperscript{71}. The inclusion of “pluralistic party system” in the objective could have stimulated the PAO to work at the system level back then. That this did not happen is probably because as Carothers\textsuperscript{(2006)} explains, a pluralistic party system can still be achieved using sister party support because ideally “different parties or party foundations from any one aid-providing country will each develop their own relationships with a counterpart in the recipient country thereby ensuring a multipartisan balance of aid”\textsuperscript{72}. However, it cannot be taken for granted that all other parties will be taken care of via the cooperation of other donors.

Assuming that overall Swedish development cooperation policy and indeed democracy support policy mirrors the value of democracy, conceptualization of democracy and democratization then up to 2010 the sister party assistance strategy used is not consistent with the overall developmental orientation. The argument is not that the two approaches cannot co-exist but that strategy in supporting political parties is not necessarily determined by how Sweden as a donor country conceptualizes democracy and democratisation as reflected in its policies. Without taking anything away from the division between developmental and political approaches which implies that ideas about democracy and democratisation lead to specific configurations of democracy assistance, it appears that it is not so with reference to Swedish party assistance. In fact, Carothers\textsuperscript{(2009)} acknowledgement of strategic differentiation where democracy aid providers are “exploring varied strategies aimed at the increasingly diverse array of political contexts in the world”\textsuperscript{33} seem to rule out the link between approach and strategy.

\textsuperscript{70} \url{http://www.oecd.org/derec/sweden/pao.pdf} p.31 (accessed 2013-04-12)
\textsuperscript{71} ibid..p31
\textsuperscript{33} \url{http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/01_20_1_carothers.pdf} p. 5 (accessed 2013-04-12)
It is more helpful to think that strategic decisions are made on the basis of political context independent of idealized values and conceptualizations of democracy and democratization.

Interviews with MFA and Sida officials indicate that the decision was based on the recommendations of Sadev which among other things noted that sister party support only solves part of the problems of the party system and results in underutilization of PAO competences\textsuperscript{74}. The same evaluation report also noted that PAO funding benefited from differential treatment from most other developmental and reform cooperation and should be subjected to increased degree of competition to address effectiveness. It is true that these recommendations could have provided the stimulus for policy change but it is equally true that the decision to effect these changes through the new strategy was not arrived at as a result of changes in Swedish conceptualization of democracy and democratization.

The issue of competition for accessing the funds by PAO could have been addressed by changing the mandate system without necessarily changing the strategy to include multiparty support. The argument on some parties not receiving support under sister party assistance raised in the SADEV evaluation is weakened by the fact that sister support can arguably strengthen the system and in any case even multiparty support cannot reach all parties. Besides, the same report’s recommendation number 19 called for a reduction of projects and partner countries\textsuperscript{75}. What it may mean therefore is that the Swedish government took the opportunity to adjust strategy to prevailing political contexts in the world.

To get a clearer picture of why political context is more important, the two periods before and after the introduction of multiparty support in 2010 are analysed recalling also that the main task is to explain why Sweden took the decision to include multiparty support in the period 2010-2015. The two periods are looked at in turn in terms of possible explanations for the respective strategies (see table below)


\textsuperscript{75} ibid., p. 95
Table 1.

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<tr>
<th>Plausible reasons for policy direction</th>
<th>Pre 2010 characterisation</th>
<th>Diagnostic Evidence</th>
<th>Post 2010 Characterisation</th>
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<td>Political context</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>-Voluntary Sister party support by all PAO despite an underlying developmental approach -Autocratic regimes including one party states</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>-increased institutionalization of multiparty politics in recipient countries -Allocation of 30% to multiparty support is recognition of changing circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit of neutrality</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>-Sister party support is the least neutral of the two strategies</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>-High proportion of support still goes to sister party support (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of democracy, conceptualization of democracy and democratisation</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>-Democracy is linked to poverty alleviation and development of economic markets -party support seen as tool to achieve overall development cooperation objectives thus supervised by Sida -Human Rights mainstreaming</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>-General orientation remains developmental -Effective endorsement of sister party support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontent with sister party results</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>-Sister party funding increased over the years -Positive Sadev evaluation report</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>-High proportion for sister support while multiparty support is only optional -More stringent application procedures for multiparty support funds</td>
</tr>
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</table>
One could argue that since PAOs or at least some were already operating prior to 1995
supporting like-minded organizations or parties, it was only natural that they continue with
the same strategy. This historical argument is good but while it was indeed an advantage for
the organizations or foundations to continue doing what they were experienced in, it does not
discount the element of political context. Foundations like Silc for example, which had long
established contacts in South Africa dating back to the late 1980s would not have gone for
multiparty support and include apartheid parties no matter what ideas of democracy and
democratisation Sweden may have had at the time. So their strategy back then was also
determined by the political context in South Africa.

It can well be argued that the PAOs enjoy autonomy and thus have their own ideas about the
value of democracy, and a different conceptualization of democracy and democratisation
which are fundamentally political in approach and which as would be expected are the reason
for the political strategy. This seem to be supported by the narrow definition of goals and
objectives coming out of the interviews, but as discussed, the goals are more elaborate on the
websites unless these are just a window-dressing. This argument is however also flawed for
two reasons. Firstly, it makes perfect sense to imagine that some political parties in Sweden
and therefore some PAOs harbour the political approach to democracy and democratization as
defined by Carothers (2009). Why then did we not see strategic differentiation from the
beginning in 1995 to reflect the different orientations? It could not have been a coincidence
that all the PAOs interpreted the policy in 1995 in political rather than developmental terms
and that strategy remained the same despite subsequent reformulations of objectives which
gave ample span to reconfigure strategies to include multiparty support. Secondly, the
autonomy of PAOs is not as straight forward as it may appear. As mentioned earlier, the
PAOs are managed by people with close ties to and are members of the parties that sit in
parliament which makes policy.

Therefore, ideas about democracy would not be so different between the Swedish political
parties, PAOs and the government. The choice of a uniform strategy by all PAOs across the
political divide can only therefore be linked to a factor that was common to all PAOs i.e a
political context in recipient countries with very limited or no democratic space to even
consider multiparty support.
Coming to the post 2010 era and looking at possible explanations for the introduction of multiparty assistance, one could argue that this was because Sweden wanted to be more neutral in its approaches. That point is however weakened by the fact that if Sweden wanted neutrality, it would not have pegged the proportion of party aid available for multiparty support at a lowly 30% which is anyway applied for optionally. Even if the neutrality argument were correct, the ratios for sister party and multiparty support only serves to confirm that in some political contexts it may be necessary to be neutral and in others partisan approaches will be taken. Consequently, it does not discount the main argument that the move was circumstantiated by political context on the ground. It therefore makes more sense to argue that budget space was created to cater for those unique cases where the political context in recipient countries had developed to the point that more democratic space had been created and dialogue by the parties to consolidate the gains was more desirable. Neutrality is a troublesome concept to deal with in all forms of party assistance anyway because even in multiparty support, parties can never have equal absorption capacity and so interventions will benefit some parties more than others. The marginal benefit of aid to a well-established ruling party with all sorts of networks and resources is less compared to a small and poorly networked opposition party.

It can also be argued that the introduction of multiparty support may have to do with dissatisfaction by the Swedish government with the results of sister party support hence the need to try new strategies. The Sadev evaluation report of 2010 noted that objectives “were mostly if not always met”76. From the interviews, there was speculation but no concrete evidence that the Swedish government was not satisfied with sister party support. In fact, when government had to make the decision to include multiparty support they had three options and they settled for the 70% for sister party support which represented the highest allocation for that strategy. In a sense, the move represents an endorsement of sister party support.

An argument can be made that the introduction of multiparty support is meant to realign strategy with the general developmental orientation of Swedish democracy support, i.e. in pursuit of policy coherence.

That argument is however flawed for the simple reason that the government’s new strategy actually does the opposite by effectively endorsing sister party support as the flagship of Swedish party assistance and leaving multiparty support optional, allocating only 30% of funding for the purpose.

Assuming that the introduction of multiparty support which is a developmental strategy signals more developmental orientation by the Swedish government, then the net effect here runs in the opposite direction considering the relative weights given to the two strategies. There would have to be compelling reasons for a policy shift, leaving political context as the only feasible explanation.

The PAO interviews revealed that there were mixed feelings about the multiparty approach and in particular one foundation felt that they were not the right institutions to carry out the task even though they have multiparty projects anyway (interviewee E). If as this paper argues, the change of strategy is context based then one can argue that the PAO who by all means are closer to the ground should readily embrace it. This scenario does not in fact discredit the context argument. Rather, it points to a practical problem of including other parties where you had cultivated strong ties with one particular party over a long period of time and especially if that party is the ruling party and can stifle diplomatic relations and other bilateral arrangements. This point was also confirmed by another interviewee (A) who stated that they try not to have the both strategies in one country to avoid losing credibility. This attests to their reading of the political context as a party foundation and as expected different people would read the political contexts differently. That changing political circumstances require restructuring of interventions was widely accepted by the PAOs as explained by the interviewee who stated that “If you have a situation where maybe you have had three democratic elections and government has changed each time and there is no obvious dominating force in that country, then it’s very hard to say which one to support more than the other ones”(C).

A glance at the PYPA multiparty programme reveals that it is run in countries which while struggling with consolidating their democracy have made commendable progress. Zambia has changed governments several times, South Africa is no longer under apartheid and is considered as one of Africa’s best democracies.
Mozambique, Angola, Malawi etc are countries that have now institutionalised multiparty democracy and it is prevailing circumstances and not necessarily a change in how Sweden values democracy and conceptualizes democracy and democratisation that could have led to the programme. Most of these countries e.g. Zambia, Kenya, Malawi were once one party states and that has changed.

Another telling example of changing political context is Zimbabwe where a government of national unity was built by three parties in parliament to run the country between 2008 and 2013. It would only make sense to include Zimbabwe in the PYPA programme and Swedish PAO took the opportunity to promote dialogue between the youth of the respective parties. Given the situation, a partisan approach supporting the democratic forces in the MDC formations would have destabilized the unity and even worked against them as ZANU PF would simply confirm their long held view that there is a regime change agenda by western countries. These are contextual circumstances that require strategic decisions independent of whatever ideas the donor has about democracy and democratisation.

6. Conclusion

The institutional arrangements of Swedish party assistance make it appear as if there are two centres of decision making power i.e. the PAOs and the government/Sida each with different ideas about the value of democracy, conceptualization of democracy and democratisation. This false impression stems from the political strategy of sister party support preferred by PAOs which does not seem to fit the developmental profile of the Swedish government’s democracy support. The PAOs with their close ties to the same parties that sit in parliament should be expected to share the same developmental orientation which theoretically should have led to multiparty and not sister party support. Alternatively, the PAOs varied political backgrounds should have reflected in the chosen methodology for party assistance. That this was not the case and that they all took the same strategy reflects that there was already strategic differentiation from the inception of the Swedish model of party assistance which stems from the political context prevailing at the time. While there is overwhelming evidence to support the Swedish government’s developmental orientation, there is nothing to show that PAOs think otherwise save for the political strategy. This makes it difficult to connect broad approach with strategy in Swedish party assistance.
It is helpful to think about political context in designing strategy or the configuration of assistance models as it ensures that the mistakes of facing democratisation problems with a straight jacket are avoided. In other words, assistance packages which are informed by the donor’s own conceptualizations are more likely to fail the test of ownership as the interventions will be modeled on a “we know all” basis. Aid interventions which are tailored to the needs and conditions in the field can also be more effective compared to those that are dominated by what the donor thinks is right. The inclusion of multiparty support in Swedish party assistance is thus plausibly related to political context and not Sweden’s idealized views of the value of democracy, and the conceptualization of democracy and democratisation. The Sadev recommendations which importantly address internal (Swedish) institutional requirements and conformity to developmental cooperation guidelines could alone not have resulted in the policy change without taking into account the political context in recipient countries. The recommendations thus presented the Swedish government with the pretext to restructure strategy in light of changing political circumstances. More research work should however be carried out on the appropriate time to introduce multiparty support and how to remain credible vis-avis the longstanding relationships built with the sister parties.
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### Appendix 1

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