The EU-Turkey Foreign Policy Relationship: A Security Approach

An analysis of Turkey’s orientation to the European Security Strategy and human security and its impact on the EU-Turkey relationship

Master thesis in European studies
Spring semester 2011
Author: Karl-Fredrik Ahlmark
Tutor: Professor Rutger Lindahl
Abstract

The slowing down of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU has led to an increased emphasis of the foreign and security policy relationship. This thesis argues that this development, while merging with the EU enlargement policy, will have increased importance in the future. This creates the problem of how to measure Turkish compliance within this area, and the thesis advances the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the theory of human security (HS) as reasonable starting points. Besides elaborating on the possible problems appearing from this emerging merger, three explanatory continua – one treating socio-cultural securitised/normative self-images at an aggregated level, the second traditional political cleavages and the third the notion of geography in the foreign and security policy formulation – are devised for the analysis of Turkey’s orientation to these European views. This methodological skeleton aims moreover to circumvent the methodological nationalism easily trapping country-based studies. In parallel to a discerned duality in the Turkish actorship, suggested to provide a strategic quid pro quo between Turkish foreign and domestic policy, there are clear orientation to the European principles of the HS and the ESS. However, this does not in itself play to Turkey’s advantage in the EU accession negotiations, the thesis concludes.

Keywords: European Union, Turkey, foreign and security policy, foreign policy, Human security, European Security Strategy, AKP, Davutoğlu

Sökord: Europeiska Unionen, Turkiet, utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik, utrikespolitik, Human security, Europeiska säkerhetsstrategin, AKP, Davutoğlu

The EU-Turkey Foreign Policy Relationship - A Security Approach.
An analysis of Turkey’s orientation to the European Security Strategy and Human security and its impact on the EU-Turkey relationship

MA thesis in European studies
Spring semester 2011
Author: Karl-Fredrik Ahlmark
Tutor: Professor Rutger Lindahl
Number of pages: 80
# Table of contents

List of abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 3

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 4
   1.1. The organisation of the study ............................................................................................ 6

2. Why foreign and security policy and why now? .......................................................................... 7
   2.1. An explanation from the European perspective ................................................................. 7
   2.2. An Explanation from the Turkish perspective ..................................................................... 8

3. The relationship between the EU and Turkey: a merger of enlargement and foreign and security policies .................................................................................................................. 10
   3.1. Two paradoxes as well as two important theoretical notions ............................................ 10
      3.1.1. The question of continuity and the soi-disant “everything changed with 1989”-thesis ................................................................................................................................. 10
      3.1.2. The question of spatial eclecticism and the soi-disant incommensurability-thesis 13
   3.2. Why foreign policy and why now? Seen in the light of the spatial and temporal theoretical underpinnings .................................................................................................................. 15
   3.3. The process and problem of merging enlargement and foreign and security policy .... 16
   3.4. A problem with European foreign and security policy? .................................................... 17

   4.1. Presenting the EU-side ........................................................................................................ 18
      4.1.2. Why human security? .................................................................................................... 20
   4.2. Human security .................................................................................................................. 21
   4.3. The European Security Strategy ....................................................................................... 26

5. Explanatory framework for the analysis .................................................................................. 31
   5.1. Continuum no. 1: The socio-cultural, dual self-image ..................................................... 31
   5.2. Continuum no. 2: The political cleavages ......................................................................... 34
   5.3. Continuum no. 3: The geographical direction .................................................................... 37
      5.3.1. Turkey and the Arab spring ......................................................................................... 39

6. Material: ..................................................................................................................................... 40

7. Methodological considerations ................................................................................................ 42
   7.1. Methodological tools and philosophical building-blocks .................................................. 42
   7.2. Interviewing ....................................................................................................................... 44
   7.3. Generalisability and truth ................................................................................................ 45
   7.4. Inferential criteria .............................................................................................................. 46

8. Presentation of the empirics ...................................................................................................... 47

9. Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 56
   9.1. Initially remarking on the context[s] ............................................................................... 57
   9.2. Human security, international governance and the [mis]-conceptualisation of FSP praxis and enlargement lexis ....................................................................................................... 57
   9.3. How does Turkey’s behaviour play into its EU relationship? ........................................... 60
   9.4. Tracing the continua ......................................................................................................... 62
   9.5. The questions of limitation and generalisability: a forward-look and a call for realism and leadership .................................................................................................................. 67

10. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 70

10.1. Literature: ............................................................................................................................ 70

10.2. Speeches: ............................................................................................................................. 77

10.3. Interviews: ........................................................................................................................... 78

Sammanfattning (in Swedish) ...................................................................................................... 80
List of abbreviations

AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CoE – Council of Europe
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy
EC European Commission
ECHR – European Convention of Human Rights
EEAS – European External Action Service
ESS – European Security Strategy
EU – European Union
FM – Foreign minister
FSP – Foreign and security policy
HDR – Human Development Report
HS – Human security
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
LDC – Least Developed Countries
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGSB – Turkey’s National Security Policy Document
NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OSCE – Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PM – prime minister
R2P – Right to Protect
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
WMD – Weapons of mass destruction
1. Introduction

In the European Commission’s (EC) enlargement strategy of November 2010 (EC 2010a:20, 69), Turkey’s more dynamic and high-profiled foreign policy of late is acknowledged and appreciated as a value for the EU, provided it is developed and designed in coordination with the EU. In December, The General Affairs Council of the EU endorsed this approach in the annual conclusions on the EU enlargement policy. It is welcomed in paragraph 11 of the conclusions, and Turkey is encouraged to progressively align with European positions and policies. In this regard, the council stands ready to intensify its existing dialogue with Turkey within the frame of foreign policy questions of mutual concern. This is the first time that the enlargement conclusions bring foreign policy to the fore as a separate policy domain to develop and refine. Barysch (2010) as well as Grabbe & Ülgen (2010) argue that the EU and Turkey should deepen their strategic cooperation on this score. This not at least to unlock the stalemate and looming dead end in the EU accession negotiations (with 18 chapters frozen, just three remain to be opened), but also as a way of recognising each other’s foreign policy importance, and to draw benefit from mutual interests in thematically adjacent areas.

This investigation takes as a starting point above strengthened pronunciation of a foreign policy dialogue between Turkey and the EU, to analyse whether Turkey is conforming to what can be deemed a European foreign and security policy view. Assuming Turkey’s ever-increasingly foreign policy activity merits a scrutiny of whether that assumption holds true. Thus, as a framing space of reflection to the main question, a discussion around whether the current foreign policy indicates rupture or continuity in Turkish politics will too take place.

In general, foreign policy analysis is very broad in its approach. Often there is a tendency to bundle together a wide spectrum of issues connected to an entity’s external relations. A variety of instruments, historical examples and leadership styles and doctrines are treated, as are the foreign countries which the entity has relations with. This provides interesting reading and conveys an overview, but often constitutes imprecise, if not poor science - the choice of cases and analytical units does not always meet scientific standards. This deficiency is also illustrated in the Turkish case. Either one of two extremes is made: purely descriptive reviews of temporal development, or assortment of an unlimited or dishevelled amounts of empirics into on beforehand taken-for-granted theoretical models. It can be expressed in synthetic expositions, on a country by country basis, e.g. In “The future of Turkish foreign policy” (Martin 2004), or in separate country-based studies, covering those countries/entities which are ever-
present in studies of Turkish external relations.¹ For a critique of mentioned approaches, see Aydin who argues that our understanding of foreign policy would increase and be more productive if we eschewed “looking at general forms of behaviour in international relations that could explain all the relationships between states and instead, attempt to locate each case in its specific conditionality within the international system” (Aydin 2004:8). Although various foreign policy analysis approaches can bring about partial explanations for state behaviour, almost all fail in explaining Turkish foreign policy as a coherent whole (Aydin 2004:8).

Alternatively, the inclination is to, chronologically and exhaustively, go through Turkish history, from the Ottoman Empire until the present, in which the domestic is interwoven with the external (e.g. Zürcher 2009, Findley 2010, Öktem 2011). A similar attempt has been to nail down the new in Turkish foreign policy based on domestic transformations (Aras & Karakaya 2007; Alessandri 2010).

The relationship to the EU has more or less exclusively been directed to the accession process (which constitutes a scholarly literature of its own). The membership prospect has been treated part and parcel of Turkey’s foreign policy aspirations (see e.g. Doğan 2005). Alternatively, the EU-relationship has been synthetically treated from every and all possible aspects (Jörgensen & Lagro 2007). The positive and consistent exceptions within this literature are Emerson & Tocci (2004) with regard to foreign policy; Aykan (2005) with regard to security policy, as well as Barysch (2010) and Grabbe & Ülgen (2010) in the argumentation for an enhanced EU-Turkey dialogue on foreign and security policy. These contributions do, however, all suffer from lack of theoretical clarity. When such clarity is provided, framed in a commendable methodology treating impacts from Europeanisation on Turkish foreign policy, as of Aydin & Acikmese (2007) this is unfortunately done with a uni-directional top down-perspective. In the case of Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy (2010) it is done with a deficient operationalisation of how to measure europeanisation.

Another approach has been to analyse foreign policy from a beforehand taken-for-granted theoretical model (without elaborating on any potential causal correlations between ideology and foreign policy actions, making the accounts static), e.g. Özalism in the 1980s (Laciner 2009), Davutoğlu’s strategic depth thinking in the 2000s.² The clear exception here is the study conducted on the kemalist heritage in Turkish foreign policy (bagdonas 2008).

¹ For studies on Turkey’s foreign policy toward or relationships of recent with Israel, see Oğuzlu (2010), with the Middle East in general see Altunışık (2008), with Greece see Öniş and Yilmaz (2008), with regard to the Kurdish question see Karlsson (2008); with Iran see Efegil & Stone (2003), with Cyprus see Theophanous (2009), with Russia see Yanik (2007).
² whose policy implications are accounted for by Walker 2007, and whose theoretical underpinnings are presented by e.g. Murinson (2006) or by Davutoğlu himself (2008). For positive accounts, see Walker (2007), Aras (2009), and for more sceptical views, see Öniş & Yilmaz (2009); Abramowitz, Barkey (2009); Öniş (2011).
A final problematic type of foreign policy research is purely descriptive, in measuring compliance with EU declarations (EC 2010:96).³

The present investigation, with its chosen limitation in the scope and precision in the analysis, aims to avoid above-mentioned, in the Turkish case emblematic, foreign policy research problematic. The study contributes at two levels; partly with its orientation of the lens toward Turkish orientation to EU-agreed foreign and security policy (FSP)⁴ as well as the competing theory human security. Partly it takes a further step and considers EU-membership not only as a foreign policy goal but investigates how Turkish foreign political positioning, within the EU-agreed framework, eventually can affect the accession process.

1.1. The organisation of the study
This study argues that FSP will play a more important role in the EU-Turkey-relationship in the future, both within the accession process as well as beyond it. The study highlights the potential problem of this, since the FSP area is driven and characterised by qualitatively different patterns and dynamics than the accession process.

The study starts off in chapter 2 with a broad perspective on why foreign and security policy has become such an emphasised policy domain of late, and it also treats the possible problems with this development for the future. Chapter 3 continues by placing this perspective in the EU-Turkey relationship, and in addition it develops the two ontological underpinnings – one spatial and one temporal – which the study is based upon and its immediate implications for the object of study and analysis. Chapter 4 presents the study’s EU-side, consisting of the two extremes which are argued to constitute the European position against which to measure Turkish compliance: human security and the European Security Strategy. In chapter 5, the research design and the three explanatory frames to structure the analysis are advanced: the first treating a securitised/normative self-image in the Turkish case, the second the traditional military/civilian and secularist/religious cleavages in Turkish society and politics; and the third treating the current foreign policy regime based on Turkish FM Davutoğlu’s principles.

³ In 2010, Turkey, when invited, did align with 54 out of 73 relevant EU declarations and Council decisions. This sort of content analysis cannot explain why the rate of compliance is at the level demonstrated. It is based on declarations and decisions where Turkey is invited by the EU, which raises questions regarding the representativity of the sample.

⁴ Hereafter, the acronym FSP will be used. The concepts of foreign policy and security policy are used interchangeably in this study. Encyclopedian definitions of the two terms (in Oxford Reference and in Encyclopedia Britannica, as well as the definition provided by Biscop 2005:1) all suffer in regarding foreign policy as a part of the security policy’s broader scope. I argue that the two of them rather are co-constitutive where security-political considerations and foreign-political stances reciprocally affect each other. Hence the fusion of them here. There are also practical reasons behind the study’s choice to merge foreign and security policy: these areas are treated simultaneously in the European Security Strategy, and in the EU acquis foreign and security and defense policies are all assembled under one and the same chapter (chapter 31).
Chapter 6 presents and justifies the document and interview material used. Chapter 7 expounds on some methodological considerations, discusses alternative methodologies and presents the interview technique as well as develops the inferential criteria for the analysis. Chapter 8 presents the empirical material and chapter 9 consists of the analysis and conclusions.

2. Why foreign and security policy and why now?
How come that FSP is the field to be treated in the relationship between Turkey and the EU? To understand this, we initially have to take a broader look at this relationship. Perchoc (29/12/2010) says that the EU has to find an image of its own; it is premature, and lacks confidence, not the least in the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) – the antithesis to what Turkey is supposed to have and be. The Turkish government’s communication strategy has previously been based on what Barysch (2007) calls "I will self-destruct in three minutes", entailing that Turkey, if it is not taken on as member by the EU, will risk falling apart into nationalism and chaos; an interpretation of Turkey as inherently unstable. It is today more common that Turkish representatives are emphasising the contributions Turkey can make to the EU in fields such as energy security, economic growth and common European FSP (Barysch 2007:6).

2.1. An explanation from the European perspective
In the EU, a similar discursive pattern can be discerned. Turkey-supporters make often use of strategic and long-term economic arguments, while sceptics/opponents often use socio-cultural and short-term argumentation models. This situation makes them often talk past one another (Barysch 2007:2-3). Tocci, editor of a report on what factors do shape the EU-Turkey-debate (2009a), argues that the debate often function as a proxy debate for other, deeper, existential questions regarding national and union identity. According to tocci, p. 8, this has led to a disconnect between the public and the scientific debate, and generated a superficial and low-quality European debate on Turkey. This function that Turkey has been bestowed in and for the debate - more or less a pretext for existentially mulling one’s own insecurities - has made other countries, which face similar challenges and/or structures, discussing Turkey (and the EU’s future) in varied ways. Tocci, pp. 27, 30, thus suggests that a country’s argument depends on whether it frames the question of Turkish membership as a FSP issue (the UK and Spain), or as a part of a national/union frame (e.g. as in France and Germany).
Tocci’s classification – from the level at which countries attempt to steer the debate (2009a:17-22), is, however, not helpful for us here. Advocates like to speak of strategic FSP issues, where Turkey’s added value to the EU is more easily discernible, while sceptics/opponents rather speak of Turkey’s impact on the EU’s institutional character and of cultural questions. If this classification held firm, it would be difficult for FSP to become such a catchword in the debate as it has become of late, despite the slowing down in Turkey’s accession process. Tocci’s argument is also indirectly belied by Aydin & Esen, who, in a later contribution in the same report recall that media is the key force in shaping opinions and debates in contexts where respondents and actors are ambivalent or lack sufficient knowledge, and where contacts and information are scarce (2009:137). The ability for predictability in FSP is most limited, the views on Turkey’s activity in this area has certainly led to ambivalence and uncertainty among many, suggesting that countries should logically have a reduced space to shape the agenda on their own (in the way tocci implies). The FSP area is moreover characterised by other layers of security arrangements tearing down Tocci’s theoretical unity. Accordingly, this classification would not help us understanding why this emphasis of the FSP-dimension EU-Turkey has taken place now. For it would seem quite a paradox that the emergent speak of strengthened strategic FSP-connections is happening at a time when one for just a few years back looked positively at the momentum in the accession process and in Turkey’s domestic reform process, whereas one now all the more is using words such as train crash, derailment and halt to depict Turkey’s accession process (Aydin & Toksabay 2009:137).

This should, however, not be too difficult to comprehend: strategic dialogue and FSP cooperation, can for some be a substitute for the accession process and for other possibly a restart. This can once again unite the countries which in Tocci’s typology were separated at an aggregated level. This made it possible for France and Germany, framing the question in a domestic cultural pattern, to veer away and lock up the relationship to Turkey on an alternative track, whereas for the UK and Spain it offers a hope to reinject new energy to the accession process.

2.2. An Explanation from the Turkish perspective

The development would neither seem paradoxical from the Turkish viewpoint. Contrarily, it would be quite logical that the government (at a time when the accession process is put on hold, the popular support both in Turkey and the EU for a Turkish membership is held on a

3 An illustrative case in point: for example, as demonstrated by Çandar (2004:50) and Alessandri (2010:14-15) several of French and German foreign policy stances have been in harmony with Turkish ditto during the 2000s, whereas Turkey-friendly countries such as the UK and Italy have taken differing positions compared with Turkey.
low, and where the domestic patterns of conflict have increased) in fact looks for alternatives than collecting all the stakes in one uncertain EU bet. Oğuzlu argues that such a multidimensional outlook does not indicate a turn away from the West; rather a Turkish recognition that a pronunciation of the country’s Islamic character and its Ottoman legacy may accrue her gains in the relation to the West. In this respect, the renunciation of the old ideological Turkish belief that denial and jettison of its Eastern connections was the only way of Westernisation and modernisation, becomes a pragmatic stand (Oğuzlu 2008:8). Establishing such a multipolar outlook must not even be justified from strategic considerations, but may constitute a genuine idea on part of Turkish actors that the road to success does not lie in EU-alignment but in closer relations to a multiplicity of other international actors (Alessandri 2010:13).

However, for Turkey, EU-membership has always meant something more than pure economics: it represents a civilisatoric and cultural choice of direction, a culmination of the Westernisation process initiated during late-Ottoman period but which took modern shape in the foundation of the republic in 1923 and the ensuing radical reform orientation (Aydin 2004:38). This civilisatoric sediment makes Turkey unwilling to accept alternatives to full membership, such as privileged partnership; which would entail a denigration and less-than-full recognition of Turkey’s Western identity (Larrabee 2009:63; Eralp 2004:70; Aydin 2004:16-7). Relations to the EU therefore gained a psychological, almost an intrinsic, character (Oğuzlu 2008:11). The European choice of path was a natural extension to the wish for admittance to the European system of alliance, harking back to the late 1700s (Findley 2010:323). The fact that Turkey regards EU-membership as its prime strategic objective, and even when upset over “Europe’s” behaviour, still clings to a maintained EU-process, makes specifically the EU-relationship in Turkish external policy pertinent to study. I argue that the FSP domain is a policy area expected to gain even greater significance in the EU-Turkey relationship ahead. In addition, as we could see, analyses of Turkey’s FSP have rarely been connected to the accession process, and the accession process has not been steered toward FSP. This is to change, and this study is a contribution to this coming characterisation.

It is in this light of pronounced willingness to a strengthened FSP dialogue between the EU and Turkey, and in this gap of theoretical understanding with which we are left after reviewing Tocci, that this study finds its entry point. How do Turkish FSP positions and thinking conform with a European FSP view? Several possible questions might be chipped away from such a frame, but chosen question finds its motivation in that the EU’s acknowledgement and encouragement of Turkey’s strengthened FSP actorship is conditioned upon the normative criterion that it is Turkey’s FSP that shall be aligned and coordinated with EU’s position
(normatively implying that EU’s positions are superior, the measure against which to measure others’ compliance). This main question will be framed against the backdrop of whether the current FSP indicates rupture or continuity in Turkey.

3. The relationship between the EU and Turkey: a merger of enlargement and foreign and security policies

The EU-Turkey-relationship has been formatted and assorted as part of the enlargement policy, and it is not until recently that the relationship has been cared with FSP relevance. December 2010 showed the first time ever when the Council conclusions brought up FSP in relation to Turkey as an area to advance. However, as we will see, one should no longer advantageously view the FSP and the enlargement policy as two distinctly separate spheres; it would be to overlook the merger of these two spheres which has taken place recently and which, I argue, will be ever more accentuated ahead.

3.1. Two paradoxes as well as two important theoretical notions

3.1.1. The question of continuity and the soi-disant “everything changed with 1989”-thesis

A temporal and a spatial paradox underlie the relationship EU-Turkey as well as the image of the Turkish actor. The first relates to the soi-disant changing nature of world politics and securitised thinking with the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, the question of the Turk’s Europeanised nature has been ever more intensified in the post-Cold War Europe. According to Oğuzlu (2008), Europe’s relationship to Turkey has post-9/11 become more dominated by the logic of identity than by interest (2008:13)⁶. The Turk as the other in Europe’s identity-creation has historically played a key role. This was, however, said to have been downplayed in the Cold War-era, but the international convulsions toward the late 1980s gave way for more postmodernist and identity-oriented thinking, and opened up for an insertion of cultural markers in Europe’s extern-relational self-image as well as re-injected the image of the Turk. On the other hand, the military-strategic and security considerations have hardly faded away (with the end of the Cold War, although the socio-cultural thinking has been undergoing a revival). All too often, pundits describe how the Cold War’s military-strategic considerations

⁶ Ironically, Turkey (previously directed by norms) is now acting more pragmatically, whereas Europe (previously strategically calculating) now in its relationship to Turkey is preoccupied with norms and identities. Thus, the seemingly ever-present disconnect between the EU and Turkey reinforces itself.
dominated the relations to Turkey, downplaying other considerations in the efforts of tying Turkey to the west and use it as a buffer to Soviet (Larrabee 2009; Aydin 2004:100). Aydin describes this subjection of Turkey to the military-strategic thinking as a result of its geographical location (Aydin 2004:24). Stephen Kinzer suggested that Turkey previously, for security reasons, had been a junior partner lacking a FSP of its own, whereas the evaporation of this security contemplations has allowed Turkey to advance a more independent FSP (Kinzer, cited by Zeynalov 15/03/2011).

Even if these “hard” considerations are not expressed in the same vein as earlier and even if the threat-images are different, they are as present, I argue in opposition to above suggestion (which is of a kind easily and uncritically reproduced by analysts of international politics). The soi-disant breach with the events around 1990 may in retrospect have been exaggerated in that the scientific rationalism in the Cold War era accumulated its materialist connotations when fused with the realist accounts of factual politics, not the least when dealing with nuclear deterrence-related matters (Fearon, Wendt 2002:59). Smith argues that theories of international relations contribute to constituting this world’s factual international relations (Smith 2004: 505-7, 510-1). (A process resembling the one for which the Delphi forecasting method has received huge criticism.) Thus, as the conduct and the evolving nature of politics and science were mutually reliant and hence fixated in the positions where they reached a disciplinary hegemony and became taken as granted, this narrowed the space of manoeuvre for alternative thinking and consequently led to theories making themselves obsolete (Smith 2004: 500-2). In a similar vein, the rise of postmodernist and constructivist thinking took place in tandem with and as a corollary of the tumultuous political events of the real world. These depictions channelled our eyes into imagining and believing in this putative breach.

Examples abound of the prematurity to uncritically embrace the suggestion that military-strategic considerations now have been secondary. The scope for using military force has expanded sharply post 1991, and Matlary argues that this is because the ends of such use does not longer imply total war and total destruction. The rationale for using force has been more important, as more issues are today considered as threats to peace and stability. Humanitarian value concerns have conflated with security policy concerns (Matlary 2008:134-5). In the event where individual states do not afford maintaining high spending levels, these responsibilities have either been pooled and shared at a regional level (as in the case of the EU and in the fact that the demise of NATO, predicted by many, did not occur, but rather expanded and

7 For descriptions of how military spending worldwide has risen post-Cold War and not even shrunk post the financial crisis of 2007-09, see e.g. Rogers (2009); Francis (2010). For exact figures, c.f. SIPRI yearbook 2010, chapter 5.
extended in realm and scope) or it is sold off, privatised downwards (Kaldor & Beebe 2010:34-35). Kaldor & Beebe (2010:37) write: “New wars are not only difficult to contain in time; they are also difficult to contain in space”. Howorth recalls the paradox that at the same time as the number of NATO forces sharply was reduced during the 1990s, a substantial amount of the forces during the Cold War never saw action, whereas the less-numbered counterparts today are seriously overstretched (Howorth 2008:82). While the EU decreased its military investment in the 1990s, Turkey did the exact opposite, on a perception that the surroundings had been more dangerous (Göçek 2011:169-70).

All these are tokens that the same forces are in play behind a new guise. This is what this study aims to disclose. Garton Ash speaks of the emergence of an illiberal capitalism and not a unipolar, nor a multipolar but a non-polar world, characterised more by disorder than order (Garton Ash 27/01/2011). It is exactly such a systemic disorder, characterised by what Rogers call lost control, which has made the world watching more serious Sabre-rattling and sky-rocketed military spending and the paradoxical reversion to a Cold War but with more sophisticated military techniques and solutions (Rogers 2011). In lieu of yielding to dichotomous divisions of postmodern and realistic, military-strategic and socio-cultural, securitised and normative, I argue that one rather is to see in our world an emerging merger of these two spheres. Military-strategic thinking is shaped by and driven by culture, and securitised notions can act in tandem with normative stances. This implies a sense of temporal and spatial continuity.

Above is not to suggest that security polities/politics/policies have not shifted, not been subject to new realities post-1989-1991; rather that such opinions tend to look at purely cooperation patterns in the international politics and thus neglecting the stability in terms of security images, representations and how ideas do co-vary together with factual actions. Today’s fluidity leans toward overlooking the stability (in the continuous emphasis on military strength and on the national sovereignty discourse) as driving forces in international politics.

Illustrative for my purpose is Kirisci, who, using Richard Rosencranz’s theories, argues that Turkey is on the brink of becoming a trading state, where economic considerations shape FSP positions and decisions (Kirisçi 2009:40ff). Underlining this theory is a thought of linear, universal progression of history and mankind, and the economic sphere is said to be isolated from the politico-military sphere, implying that when economics take over as decisive determinants, the entity pursuing that approach is becoming a benign power. Economic considerations are believed to act in the spirit of the good. Drawing on Davutoğlu, Kirisci explains that Economic interdependence has two functions: 1) a tool for conflict resolution and peace-
building, and 2) it provides markets for Turkish businesses (2009:42). However, such an analysis overlooks the role that economics can play for the consolidation of status quo. The belief that economics and politico-military considerations are two separate and mutually non-communicative paths and vessels, does not conform with this study. In practise, too, it neglects the way which military-strategic considerations can back up a country’s economic interests, and vice versa, how economic relations can consolidate securitised interests.

3.1.2. The question of spatial eclecticism and the soi-disant incommensurability-thesis

Previous section provided for the kind of understanding of temporal continuity undergirding this study. It leads over to the second ontological statement this study takes as an entry-point, accepting a merger in the space dimension. This was partially treated above, in the view I take on the interplay between socio-cultural and hard-security thinking, and this section will provide some further reasoning behind it.

Fearon & Wendt argue that rationalism/realism and constructivism when treating ideas and matters need not be dichotomous – both of the paradigms accepts the value of ideas, and if this is conscious or not from the actor is less important. The act in case remains irrespective of whether it is casually traceable or constitutive (Fearon & Wendt 2002:59). This also creates empirical difficulties in identifying actions discussed in regard to norm compliance (2002:61-3): rationalism and constructivism can explain the same outcome similarly. Realism and constructivism are not mutually exclusive, since the agentship (constitutively constructed) becomes the exogenous context wherein the realism explains the actor’s behaviour.8

To put the argument under an even stricter scrutiny, we can turn to hacking (1999), who establishes a checklist comprising three critical points where social constructionism is argued incommensurable to realist accounts: contingence/inevitability, nominalism and stability. I will treat the second and the third as one. In the first case, contingence, a distinction is made between objects and matters. Hacking argues that the current scientific level is not inevitable; the language for and measure of scientific success is defined by the science itself, since this constitutes a potential to debate trajectories without being locked up in truth-claims (1999:97ff). Interestingly is, however, that Hacking later reaches the conclusion that even if this level of science is not inevitable (expressed in that another, equally successful science but

---

8 A problem resembling the one rational choice theory faces, in which the actor’s preferences and information-access are taken for granted beforehand, whereby also their behaviour becomes given in advance; an aspect that has led some to regard rational choice as structural (Hay 2002:52-53, 102-04).
with a different knowledge, different models, were to have evolved) this alternative model is, in spite of its contingency, merely different, not incommensurable (1999:101-2). Even more surprisingly, given hacking’s hard position earlier; he accepts that denying the contingency is not tantamount with claiming that the necessity is valid; yet one can accept the evolution of an alternative science; it merely says that if the science were to be successful, it has to be of the same fashion as today’s science (1999:110). The second critical point refers to nominalism, i.e. supposing that the world lacks a structure, but is rather represented in our sensory functions. The constructionist is nominalist - she does not think that the world has a privileged structure preceding our capabilities and methods of describing and defining it (1999:115). The world and its laws must be phrased in a language, and structured within a theory, in order to be comprehensible. Suggesting that the world and its laws existed before this language is, however, uncontroversial, but what the constructionist argues is that the world and its laws previously lacked meaning and function, since it was not used consciously by mankind. Moreover, what in our imagination are more timeless laws such as Newton’s law of gravity or Maxwell’s equations, have been found not absolute in time or space, but have been reinterpreted, reconceptualised (1999:116-7). But hacking overlooks that the stability of a law of nature also depends on – by the realist’s begged - exogenous factors, for example variations in the ozone or CO2 density for the aerodynamics, to function as it does today. Thus, the realist is not totally rejecting the instability thesis, and the constructionist is also dependent on factors advanced by the realist.

Hence, we have witnessed three allegedly incommensurable critical points, which in their encounter with empirics do not seem as incommensurable as they did in theory. Consequently, the dimensions dealt with are to be seen as simultaneously both real and socially constructed. This will have major bearing for this study’s ontological grounds - called the ontological duality of the Turkish actorship, entailing an embrace of seemingly contradictory beliefs and images (see further under the section Continuum no. 2). Considering Mouffe (2008), in her argument of the possibility to, drawing on a post-structuralist and discourse-analytical perspective, embrace the belief of the inerasable nature of the antagonism at the same time as accepting democratic pluralism (2008:17-26), displays a trust in the ability of the seemingly non-rational and non-logical and a belief in the complexity of political societies. My position is moreover inspired by Johannisson (13/03/2011), who argues that parsimonious and heady theories/conclusions are not appropriate for studies of human agents and societies. We should allow scope for the complexity in our understanding and outlook; Johannisson writes: perhaps
can individuals be both victims and actors, societies both humanitarian and power-exercising, and languages both ambiguous and clearcut.

### 3.2. Why foreign policy and why now? Seen in the light of the spatial and temporal theoretical underpinnings

Above background makes the recent leap in European-Turkish relations over to a stronger emphasis of the strategic FSP dimensions less paradoxical. This changing direction in and of the relationship has been borne forth by the socio-cultural identity crisis. The socio-cultural crisis has strings of continuity beyond the turn of the 1989-91 attached. This understanding of the non-exclusive relation between the cultural and securitised values is what enables us to bridge Tocci’s typology and understand why countries with differing views and opinions actually in accord can argue that a strengthened FSP-dialogue with Turkey is beneficial. The question has gained further fuel, ironic as it seems but logical in its causality, from the slowing down of Turkey’s EU-accession negotiations. Regardless of the intercausality between interrupted reforms, a plummeted popular support for Turkish membership and a wanting encouragement from the European side, these aspects have in turn contributed to the talk of a strengthened FSP-dialogue – either to reinject new energy into the accession process or to seek to veer them onto an alternative track. The unexplored in this policy domain is exactly whether it corresponds to the European preferences whose candidate country conformance constitutes the value which the EU has defined lies in it.

The torn down dichotomy between securitised and normative values has also implications for the choice of theoretical variable. In order to cover the whole spectrum of the emergent fusion of these two spheres, a reliable review of whether Turkish FSP (irrespective of whether one conducts such an investigation over time or in a more snapshot frame) depends on a covering of the necessary width such a fusion requires. Hence, the establishment of European FSP priorities will rely on partly EU-agreed positions and partly on a broader approach, for which human security (HS) is used as an ideal-typical extreme.

Summarising so far; the normative notion underpinning this study that military-strategic, securitised and socio-cultural, normative values and spheres should not be seen as separate, isolated magnitudes, or that the latter have replaced the previous in the post-Cold War era, has immediate implications for choice of entry in a broader sense (European-Turkish relations), choice of subject (how Turkish FSP relates to a designated European FSP position), and for the choice of theoretical framework (EU-agreed positions and, as an extreme paradigm, HS).
3.3. The process and problem of merging enlargement and foreign and security policy

Tocci (2009b) argues that the enlargement policy is an exception when assessing the EU’s normative external power, since it stricto sensu is not foreign policy. This entails that the same possible quid pro quo-type bargaining between e.g. trade-related matters and conditionality on human rights-issues of the kind the EU has exercised towards Belarus, not in a similar vein is possible to carry through within the enlargement policy in order to preserve the EU’s credibility. Such an argument is, however, pilloried by its own ideal-typical Parochialism; Tocci is deriving, without exposing it, in her analytical refinement a view that the enlargement policy is a stricto sensu technical criterion-based process. But as Hilleon (2010:18-28) has demonstrated in the case of the enlargement policy’s development by and large, and as Missiroli (2004) argues in the specific case of Turkey; this policy area is bestowed an inherent potential to be politicised rather than directed by technical considerations.

Tocci makes here an interesting and important note. The problems for the EU are not deficient FSP-means or capabilities, but that normative means tend to be deployed solely, or first and foremost, when the EU is acting within the frames of its contractual third country relations and when the EU has few or not any compelling instrument at its disposal. At the same time, the external environment is critical in its impact on the EU’s ability to act normatively.9 It is in this regard that Turkey becomes such an imperative case. Turkey is the only country in the European neighbourhood which also is involved in an accession process, that partly has the ability to, in the capacity of its size and its democratic credentials, and partly in the capacity of actually exposing a foreign policy in such a direction, actually able to face up with the EU’s normative ability with a normative power of its own. Consequently, Turkey becomes partly an actor in the external milieu which can impact on the EU’s ability to successful normative activity, but Turkey is simultaneously a subject for the EU’s own normative arsenal. The success potential for the EU’s FSP in areas where also Turkey has links and interests is thus constrained; dependent on whether the EU is de facto acting or de jure is averring that it is acting normatively or not, and on whether the EU’s positions are in line with Turkey’s. Thence the insertion of the paragraph 11 in the General Council’s enlargement conclusions of December 2010 that in order to acknowledge the Turkish FSP hyper-activity’s added value to the accession process, this activity has to converge with the EU’s. This can be interpreted as a

---

9 This section does not aim at describing the EU as a normative foreign policy actor, but is rather tied to the relation between enlargement and foreign policy within the EU. For an account of the EU as a normative actor, see Manners (2002:244-252).
FSP weakness on part of the EU, and an underlining recognition of that it cannot be success-
ful in the greater Eurosphere unless Turkish FSP is on-board.

On the other hand, the enlargement policy – being alloyed with the FSP policy domain, and should not even ideal-typically be assorted in the way tocci does – can be said to be, provided its asymmetry and character, an in Tocci’s definition imperialistic process. Herein lies a deep contradiction in the classical liberal political view, which Girdner calls our attention to. Arguing that the west is embodying the truth and morality, the blame is put on the subjects who are opposing their designated role as law-abiding subjects (Girdner 2005:5). In the moment norm-based arguments are transferred from a measurable criterion-based process such as the enlargement policy into a much more fragile, reactive, heterogeneous sphere such as FSP, we run the risk that these patterns of dominance are reproduced: the enlargement process characteristics making their way into the FSP area. Consequently, what happens is the reverse process to what Hilleon (2010) describes: a criterion-based process is not politicised as Hilleon argues, but a contrario; a political sphere, encrusted with an expectation to be assessed with the help of strict, measurable criteria.

It is in this fusion, in the intersection where military-strategic and socio-cultural, securitised and normative thinking have been alloyed with each other, and where the political sphere of FSP has been allowed to merge with the enlargement process’ criterion-based ditto – where Turkey’s FSP fulfilment shall be examined. The reader must keep in mind these domain-specific conditions for the remainder of the journey.

3.4. A problem with European foreign and security policy?
We are, however, not yet completely ready to move on. In Leonard’s comparison between the EU’s and the US’ FSP doctrines, the previous seems radically more modern, sustainable, progressive, effective, balanced (Leonard 2005:68-71). Leonard suggests, p. 13, that the EU’s FSP contributes by being a transformative power. However, the mistake Leonard, and many with him, tend to do, is to take the EU’s FSP view for granted as uniform. Strömvik (2009) points to the divergence among EU-27; no uniform definition exists for a common notion of security and not even an interest for visionary thinking. FSP lacks an institution which like the Commission can act for the common interest. Rather, it is the member states which must take on this double role, and because of the varied interest degree among the countries the FSP tends to be dominated by them who are more proactive and strategic considerate beyond the every-day positioning. Thus, the FSP is not an area primarily ruled by broadly agreed and
strate visions, but an area which in an abnormally great degree is defined by a few active parties (Strömvik 2009:56-7). In addition, when these magnitudes – the enlargement and the FSP processes – are fused together, the enlargement policy’s advantages risk dilution. It is precisely in this vacuum - this Sisyphusian task to normatively commence from positions that A) not always exist, B) not are underpinned by a political vision of whether one is stepping in the right direction and what one wants to do with the individual positions, and C) to a great degree are affected by external developments, to which Turkey according to the EU shall align - where this study finds its entry. How the study treats this intrinsic problem of defining what a European FSP view is deemed to be, is the subject of next chapter.

4. The investigation’s EU-side: Human security and the European Security Strategy

The previous chapters presented the investigation’s entry point, its research problem, and delineated in this framework a couple of paradoxes, constituting the study’s ontological underpinning. Partly the one that the FSP dimensions in the relations between Turkey and the EU are pronounced and can be expected to be strengthened further in the time ahead, a coincidence that e.g. Tocci could not explain. Partly the separation, which too often uncritically is taken as self-evident, military-strategic/socio-cultural, rationalist/constructivist, securitised/normative. Such distinctions can have analytical value but underperform in explaining the reality and behaviour in space and time, and risk overlooking and under-estimating the complexity in human beings and in all societies. This chapter will depict the investigation’s EU-side, i.e. presenting Human security (HS) and European Security Strategy (ESS).

4.1. Presenting the EU-side

Provided the great heterogeneity within the EU-27 on FSP, there is limited amount of material which can represent a European FSP list of priorities. There is, however, one document, the ESS from 2003 and its implementation report from 2008, which constitutes an updated view of what the European countries view as the security political extern-relational problem of today. Given that this document is agreed upon and the priorities in it can be expected to meet
the shifting values and priorities amongst the EU-27, it constitutes a well-founded base to distil a list of criteria over European FSP against which to analyse Turkish compliance.\(^\text{10}\)

Moreover, HS will be used in distilling an alternative viewpoint of what European FSP is and can be. As will be seen in chapter 5, Turkish politics is dual in several regards, oscillating between extremes, positions which I argue can be present in an actor at one and the same time. Hence, the choice of theoretical perspectives has to demonstrate a width in its range correspondent to the continuum which the object of study of the empirical analysis likewise demonstrates. In this sense, the ESS represents the strictly security-oriented, reactive, realistic, hard endpoint of the continuum, whilst HS represents the more civil, proactive, normative, soft endpoint. Consequently, the explanatory level corresponds between theory and object of study in the way which guarantees sustainable and valid criteria for analysis and inference. Speaking the language of variables one could say that we have sought maximal variation on the independent variable (Esaiasson et al 2007:113).

Beyond the compatibility between theoretical perspectives and the object of study at the explanatory level, there are also other reasons why the broad span between EU-agreed positions in the ESS and the theoretical refinement HS has been sought. Provided the EU’s feature as an ever evolving negotiation machinery, requested are criteria from other than merely EU-documents; also additional layers of European FSP can be expected to influence thoughts, ideas on how Europe shall further its FSP. FSP is in addition a policy area evolving over time, affectable in a greater degree for surrounding factors than other areas, which is another argument for a broader approach; it is today impossible to predict which future eventualities that might impact the EU’s FSP. Moreover, the fact that Turkey is part of an accession process expected to take long time, gives that every-day criteria of today not necessarily represent the EU’s position at a future date when Turkey’s negotiations might reach a more critical stage. This also explains the need to take as a reference point the ESS rather than operationalised policy documents designed for specific events (only the first kind of material can be guaranteed to be preserved over time in positions and orientations). Fourthly, FSP (even considering changes enabled by the Lisbon treaty) is to a large extent an intergovernmental affair with decision-making based on consensus and a patchwork of different models. This, argues Narbone (2009:86), makes it more difficult to establish clear-cut and unambiguous guidelines of how reforms shall be carried out in a candidate country. Restricting the establishment of Eu-

\(^{10}\) A remark may be that end products of this sort from these processes without e.g. complementary data collection in the form of interviews or protocols not provide information about factual positions and possible divergence within the EU. However, such a method would represent a completely different research task than here treated.
European FSP criteria by the means of yielding to the instrument of conditionality (used in the enlargement policy) brings with it problems as different FSP-models are represented in the EU; such a putatively technical method tends thus be politicised. Such a technical approach is more or less only attainable, as Tocci demonstrates, with regard to the most elementary freedoms and rights where a uniform ground for legislation, judicial systems and practises exist (Tocci 2009:11-5). This is not valid when it comes to FSP. Fifthly, it is not expected that a coordination and consultation of Turkish and European FSP is expressed in precise units of measure, why a broader visionary approach to the criterion-design is required.

4.1.2. Why human security?

With above said, why HS? The EU is promoting itself as a normative power. The ESS 2008, p. 2 and p. 10, mentions explicitly HS as a complementary approach to the classical security-concept. Even if this paradigm has been discussed but less practised, it is likely that this approach garners an ever-increasing future importance, not at least rhetorically and conditionally. The Barcelona report of 2004, entitled “A Human security Doctrine for Europe”, claims a HS base for the ESDP11 for three reasons: 1) human rights are becoming ever more prominent in international politics, 2) the EU has a legal obligation to do so (provided its treaties), 3) it is in the EU’s enlightened self-interest to advance a sustainable security policy (2004:10).

A sixth, and perhaps most important, argument for a broad span in the theoretical approach: when in a situation where the FSP area lacks measurable units, there is high likelihood that precisely HS, in its extremity, is chosen to constitute a political condition towards EU-candidates; it may pose the hardest test for a would-be member to stand and a new qualifier possible to reach unity around. Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy acknowledge the problem of measuring europeanisation of a candidate country’s FSP, and end up devising two propositions for this endeavour, based on commonly agreed norms on part of the EU, acting as a normative power: 1) democratic institutions’ role in decision-making, operationalised as civilian lead over unelected bureaucracies or the military establishment. 2) The use of economic and diplomatic tools to achieve FSP objectives (2010:409-10). They find that Turkish FSP has been Europeanised along these lines. However, they do not explain from where such possible norms emanate on the EU side (which makes such an assessment at best purely academic without political value, and at worst speculative), and they miss out in recognising that both

---
11 With the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) changed name to CSDP, Common Security and Defense Policy, which hereafter will be the acronym used.
would-be and EU member states in fact can align with these norms but still be considered as breaching the EU’s FSP acquis.

4.2. Human security

“[W]e cannot have a perceived policy by proxy or that is event-driven, because it makes no sense […]” (Kaldor & Beebe 2010:2). Kaldor & Beebe, in their ambition to uncover the continuous use and way of perceiving security over time but wish to turn this into a change, take as a starting point precisely this anachronistic feature of today’s international security environment. They define HS – the term introduced by the UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR) as of 1994 – as comprising three features: 1) “[…] It is about the everyday security of individuals and the communities in which they live rather than the security of states and borders”, 2) “[…] it is about different sorts of security, not just protection from the threat of foreign enemies. […] it is about both freedom from fear and freedom from want.” And 3) it “recognizes the interrelatedness of security in different places” (Kaldor & Beebe 2010:5).

This notion is grounded on a rationale of the interconnectedness of the world; insecurities (violence, illness, poverty, resentment), seemingly geographically insulated, impact on the safety in other parts of the world. The UNDP in its establishment of the term aimed at expanding the traditional security concept from a pure focus on hard security, borders and states, by establishing seven HS elements: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and finally political security (HDR 1994:ch 2).

The HS approach aims to prevent eruptions of violence by addressing the factors behind it. During on-going conflicts the focus is on dampening the violence rather than narrowly focusing on how to win or escape. In the post-violent phase, it focuses not merely on reconstruction but on how to prevent new outbreaks of violence (Kaldor & Beebe 2010:7). The notion of hard security and practical use of it is, however, not completely refuted, but it has to be deployed in collaboration with civilian-led operations and be subordinated to the aims of securing the HS end-goals. The Barcelona report of 2004 established seven HS principles for the CSDP: 1) the primacy of human rights. In HS operations, protecting civilians, not defeating an adversary, is the end goal. Methods - military or not - must be appropriate. 2) Clear and Legitimate Political Authority. “The job of outside forces is to create safe spaces where people can freely engage in a political process that can establish legitimate authorities” (Kaldor & Beebe 2009:8). There must be a close linkage between policy-makers and the people on the ground, and the success of military means, if used, has to be subject to local consent. 3) Effec-
tive Multilateralism, i.e. a commitment to work through and in respect of the procedures of international institutions and law, norms and rules, and in structures which enhance coordination and reduce duplicity and rivalry. 4) A Bottom-up Approach, i.e. taking account of the most basic needs identified by the people affected. This requires a continuous dialogue and consultation with and involvement of the locals, and is a precondition for a preventive approach. 5) Regional Focus. Human insecurity and new conflict-patterns have no clear boundaries. 6) Use of legal instruments, i.e. a focus on and investment in law enforcement. Parties have to act in a legal framework applying and applicable to individuals, with legal accountability mechanisms in force. Kaldor & Beebe (2009:9) call this Clear Civilian Command. Civilians are in command, and the military has to work under rules of engagements and laws more close to civilian and police work. 7) Appropriate use of force. The lives of the personnel deployed cannot be privileged. The aim is instead to protect people and minimise all casualties (Barcelona report 2004:14-20; Kaldor et al 2007:283-86; Kaldor & Beebe 2009:7-10).

HS is more than mere crisis management, it offers a perspective on crisis itself. From a HS perspective, the aim is not just political stability; it encompasses a notion of justice and sustainability (Kaldor et al 2007:279). The tasks for a HS approach can be assorted in four clusters: 1) Sustainable Security - the establishment of sustainable perceptions of safety and stability. “If people fear for their immediate survival, they will mortgage their tomorrows for survival today - abandoning livelihoods, destroying land on which they depend, turning to unsavory strong-men for protection” (Kaldor & Beebe 2010:90). The key is to protect civilians from violence. This differs from traditional peace-keeping, aiming at separation of combating parties. Tools and means must seek to reinstate monopoly of force and law and order, contrasting with traditional counter-insurgency. The rules of engagements are under jurisdiction of domestic laws rather than under laws of war or conflict. Soldiers have to act more as civilian actors, carrying out what traditionally is regarded as non-military or civilian tasks (2010:90-7). 2) Sustainable Livelihoods. As sustainable security revolved around civil rights, sustainable livelihoods focus on economic, environmental and social rights. It is about targeting the fact that in many zones, the grey and black economies may be the only way for people to subsist, and is about securing basic everyday needs to these people. Moreover, it is about ensuring investment and maintenance of social services, education, health et cetera (2010: 97-101). 3) Sustainable Governance. In order to ensure the sustainability of security and livelihood, legitimate and functioning governance is key. Legal mechanisms are required, but capacity-building is particularly necessary, not at least via a bottom up-approach to decreasing the gap between rulers and the ruled (2010:101-05). 4) Sustainable Development - the end
state which unites the three sustainable tasks above. Primary is the dignity of the individual. The end goal for HS is development (2010:101-06).

The Madrid reports suggested paths for the institutionalisation of the concept within the CSDP, e.g. via a public declaration on the principles on part of EU27, providing clear guidance, operating procedures and rules of engagement, on how to act collectively and effectively. This would have the added benefit of clarifying to the EU’s partners the defining characteristics of its FSP (Madrid report 2007:23-25). Martin (2009) proposes a HS base for the set-up of the EEAS; which should be the servant of the EU’s FSP principles rather than just its institutional needs. Elite contacts would give way for multilevel channels allowing ordinary people access to the EU and civil societal actors would be considered on par with governments in the external relations. Openness and communication are key means, and addressing substate actors as well as abiding with international norms rather than pushing the member states’ interests are imperative in establishing legitimate political authority (2009:10). These recommendations have, however, not led to further and furthered clarity, but merely an insertion of the HS notion to the by 2008 implementation report of the by then already established ESS. So, rather than rewriting, the EU has decided to add a new layer of thinking to an already established security view, thus running the risk of generating more fuzz than clarity.

Martin & Owen (2010) develop a so-called threshold concept to HS; rather than seeing it as a list of threats which by definition shall be viewed as security issues, one could establish a threshold where threats first with their crossing of this are considered as security threats (2009:221). The advantage is enhanced precision and conceptualisation, thus improving the opportunities for the concept to be considered in policy-making (something that has been a main problem). A possible factor behind this failure is to be found in Roberts (2009). He argues that the HS concept has mainly been theorised in the abstract but rarely attuned to the factualities of security (2009:152-7). Moreover, there is the problem that the governance is the systemic machinery which also is causing the problems it is supposed to cure. From a Foucauldian thinking of the biopolitical, this has produced criticism saying that HS is but a new form of control over individuals rather than control by individuals (2009:47).

Martin & Owen 2010) distinguish between the UN-type and the EU-type of HS. They argue that the latter has better chances of being successful in the 21st century, as it is more attuned to

---

12 For a description of how a HS approach to the Libya crisis of the spring 2011 would differ in comparison with the one chosen, see Wallis (2011) and Kaldor (2011): “The current attacks on Libya … are intended for humanitarian ends, the protection of civilians but the means are those of war.”
the policy dimension of policy-making. They call the UN-type the first generation and the EU-type the second (2010:212). Early on in the UN process, it was clear that the original HS conceptualisation of 1994 did not find its operationalisation and workability. Martin & Owen argue that three factors do explain this failure or lack of expected success: 1) ambiguity around the use and development of HS; 2) a deficient distinction between human rights and HS; and 3) a possible conceptual overstretch in the UN’s use of it (2010:213). The first problem relates to the lacking consistency between the nearly insipid definition and the policy-oriented use of it. This creates disconnects and misunderstandings (2010:214-16). The conceptual overstretch refers to the tendency, due to lacking clarity, to include all and sundry threats to the individual in the UN conceptualisation, leading to the discouragement of its use. This can create “false priorities and hopes, create causal confusion and encourage military solutions to non-military problems and non-military solutions to military problems” (2010:216). Still is a disconnect between what Martin & Owen call the doctrinal and the institutional development of the CSDP (2010:218). Therefore, one should not over-estimate the emphasis put on HS in the ESS 2008 report. An underconceptualisation of it even on this side of the Atlantic pond is demonstrated in the lack of one single European way of thinking around FSP as well as around HS. However, the EC has played an active role in holding forth and clarifying the concept of HS, and it is this definition which is different from the UN-type – combining physical protection and material security and located firmly in a crisis management as well as a conflict resolution policy frame. This EU-type stressed less underdevelopment in itself but more the integration of a development perspective into the EU’s FSP toolkit (2010:219). This conferred a greater usability potential upon the HS concept for usability than in the UN. However, a key EU-particular aspect Martin & Owen overlook is that it is not the Commission which sits alone in the driving seat when it comes to FSP. Even heeding the changes in

13 An assessment supported by Rifkin (2011), who argues that the EU is ideally positioned to lead the 21st century, characterised by a third industrial revolution, based on continental governance. The EU is well suited for the new age; however, it requires an acknowledgement of the shift from geopolitical to biosphere politics and the correspondingly new tools. This acknowledgement, which Rifkin implies more or less is forced upon the actors, will reconfigure the notion of security in the direction of emphasising the human, individual components of society (EurActiv 01/02/2011)

14 The reader should here notice - and if she does not, I will explain – the similarities between the term conceptual overstretch and the impreciseness of foreign policy research in general and towards Turkey that this study took as a point of departure. False priorities (the tendency to a priori take for granted certain countries or relationship of value to study when it comes to Turkey), causal confusion (the problem in isolating independent factors and trustworthily claim a clear and present causal arrow going from e.g. the EU enlargement conditionality to the foreign policy actions on the part of a candidate country), and the disconnect between solutions and problems (the tendency to reduce the relationship between the EU and Turkey to purely the accession process, overlooking the ever increasing importance of the foreign policy dimension).

15 Matlary argues, however, that HS’s contribution to the EU is only in giving a name to a security paradigm based on the human rights of the individual, useful at the rhetorical level, but does not add anything to existing EU policies and principles. HS operations may require campaigns just as tough as traditional state security operations in order to succeed. In reality, therefore, HS is not a softer or less warlike concept than state security (Matlary 2008:142).
the Lisbon treaty, FSP is still very much subject to an intergovernmentalistic logic. The EU’s articulation, which Martin & Owen refer to, is not the same as its implementation. In addition, even if this is accounted for, HS implementation is not sufficient if it is not backed up by quick, coherent and efficient measures. This makes it more pertinent to spell out my aim not to distil an HS-internal ideal-type (e.g. contrasting the EU- with the UN-type). HS is here rather seen ipso facto, as an extreme to the state-centric view prevalent in traditional security thinking and as an extreme to the blur characterising the EU thinking.

Even if this disconnect goes a long way in arguing for the wide span in the theoretical perspective, is it really a valid representation of the actually pursued EU-policies? Differently phrased: what is the meaning of looking at principles and shared visions if these not necessarily are broken down in the implemented FSP actions, i.e. may this constitute a validity problem for me? Actually not; such an interpretation would be a misreading of the study’s purpose. It is - provided the asymmetry characterising the relationship between the EU and a would-be member - precisely this unity as represented in the ESS and the ideal-typical features of HS that probably will be used on part of the EU as a yardstick and a stick (sic) towards the candidate in order to measure compliance. This as the individual subject occupies a centre position in the EU’s legislation and spirit. Consequently, even if this representation of the EU’s policies will not exactly reflect the actual actions and stances on part of the EU in a crisis situation, the refinement will still be used in the EU’s relation with the candidate.16

This division between the lexis (what is said and written) and praxis (what it means in terms of everyday actions, from policies to tactics on the ground) is perhaps as most accentuated in Kaldor et al (2007:273-86). However, such a distinction is taken for granted within by and large the whole HS-literature, both among supporters of the concept (e.g. Kaldor et al 2007; Kaldor & Beebe 2010), among its critics (e.g. Matlary 2008) or among the ones who in general are positive to it but criticizes the way it has been conceptualised and operationalised (e.g. Martin & Owen 2010; Roberts 2009). My approach can be seen as a criticism of this all-embracing epistemological ground within the HS literature, a deficiency which presumably may be traced to a lack of knowledge among these authors about how the EU functions. To the extent they are familiar with the EU, it boils down to CSDP. But as I have argued, the enlargement politics is guided by different dynamics and characterised by different features than the FSP domain. Provided this area’s asymmetrical patterns, the distinction between lexis and praxis does not hold full relevance when it comes to the conduct of EU politics.

16 One can speak of double standards and criticize the EU for not holding firm to its principles when it acts, but this study is not the right forum for such a criticism. This study accepts the crude reality of EU politics as a realistic entry point.
4.3. *The European Security Strategy*

What is the ESS? The ESS was initiated and agreed upon in 2003. It was the first-ever single strategic framework to guide the EU’s CFSP and CSDP – earlier, approaches, positions and policies had been advanced piecemeal. The 9/11 events and The Iraq war with its EU-internal divisions proved to be external stimuli and catalysts in generating a willingness to agree upon such a framework. But also two internal developments interplayed in laying the critical contextual patchwork behind the adoption of the ESS; the enlargement process forcing the EU to re-configure its relationship to the outer world, and simultaneously a growing recognition among the CFSP and CSDP stakeholders that a limit had been reached; the bottom up approach designed did no longer suffice for effectively agreeing on emergent threats post-9/11. The ESS was by more or less all commentators considered as an extraordinary achievement. This was, however, made possible thanks to a significant emphasis on the transatlantic link as the EU’s most important partnership. That satisfied both the Iraq war-opponents and its supporters. The ESS demonstrates a strong consensus on the basic direction of the EU’s FSP (Biscop 2008:7, 12; Menotti, Vencato 2008:103). The ESS serves two functions: it provides an EU-wide “frame of reference for both long-term strategies and for current political problems […] and provides a common base for negotiations with other countries and organisations on issues of strategic importance” (Andersson 2008:136).

The magnitude of this decision can only with difficulty be overstated, and fears (or, on part of some, hopes [!??]) that the ESS would turn into a paper tiger have by practise been refuted. The reader who, by way of its name, may have got the impression that the ESS is merely a security policy document, should also be called to second thought: to the contrary, the ESS is omnipresent in EU-external discourse, it has reached a status of invaluable reference for documents and day-to-day policy-making within the broader field of the EU’s FSP (Biscop 2008:1-3). The strategy nails down the long term overall objectives, the instruments and the way of achieving these objectives, in parallel to broad guidelines for development of means and capabilities (Biscop 2008:129).

The ESS was adopted in the midst of the post-9/11, war on terror spirit, leading to a renewed focus on the politico-military dimension and on defense (Biscop 2005:14-15). In this study, the ESS is used as a refinement of the state-centric and politico-military view of securi-
ty, as a counter-position to the HS. This approach is based on a two-fold recognition, one ESS-internal and one connected to its practise. In the first part, the ESS-lexis, even Biscop admits that the ESS has a tilt toward the politico-military camp, and does not offer clarities beyond it. The ESS is mentioning a wide range of public goods important to generate international security, but does not prioritise between them nor specify objectives and instruments for this, nor does it specify how the current system of international governance may be improved (2005:130). There is an imbalance in favour of the politico-military dimension of this effective multilateralism - reinforced if considering policy practises and other EU-related documents (2005: 131). Since this is acknowledged by one of the strategy’s most ardent and optimistic supporters, this can be taken as a convincing reading. The ESS itself is tellingly underscoring that states remain as the prime partner, and it makes explicit that “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (ESS 2003:12).

For the first time in the EU’s history, the ESS contains a list of identified threats, it establishes principles and sets objective for advancing the EU’s FSP interests based on the union’s core values. After stating that large-scale aggression against a EU member state is today improbable, five new major threats are identified; more diverse, less visible and less predictable: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states, and organised crime (ESS 2003:4-6). It makes not explicit the internal ordering between these threats, but if qualified, international terrorism and WMD proliferation are considered as the greatest – the rest of the threats are phrased in such a way that they may be even more threatening if/since they can lead to the activation of the two first threats, i.e. organised crime, state failure and regional conflicts can be as most threatening if they provide the breeding ground for terrorism and provide the contextual conditions for WMD proliferation.

Three strategic objectives are spelt out. On the first, addressing the threats, the “hard” and terrorism-centric way of thinking reverberate when enumerating the ways and measures with which the EU has combated terrorism, WMD proliferation, and the state-centric view preserves its dominance when addressing state failure, organised crime and conflicts (ESS 2003:7). The second object reverts to a thinking where geography still is regarded as important, building security in the neighbourhood, where integration and deepened relationships aim to form a ring of well-governed countries. The third objective is an international order based on effective multilateralism (ESS 2003:11). This latter still, however, grounds its ontological claim on the state system’s sustainability and prime referent. This is perhaps at its ut-

---

17 This is not to invalidate or belittle other possible readings of the ESS, which for certain can be possible – for example Biscop (2005; 2008) views it in a much more positive light.
most expressed under this heading as: “The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (2003:12.) In contrast to HS, this section is though not endowed with goals set to prevent duplicity and rivalry and to enhance coordination.

Gowan illustrates how the ESS’ emphasis on effective multilateralism is translated into an orientation toward the UN. In the UN, the EU is not wielding its power through single and coherent action, but rather in co-opting, reinforcing and shaping the processes of the UN system. This course of action is manifested in the ESS’ blur of the line between EU-autonomous measures and support for the UN. Operational and political elements are blurred, and the depicting keyword for EU action herein is complexity, based on an evolutionary, functionalist approach to multilateralism (Gowan 2008:58). However, Menotti & Vencato (2008) argue that behind this rather abstract principle of effective multilateralism lies a well-established practise of the transatlantic alliance, cast as it is in the ESS as an ordering principle, holding forth the transatlantic relationship as one of the core pillars of the international system. It goes on clarifying that NATO is an important expression of this relationship (2008:114). Consequently, what in essence was a normative ambition is conflated with an already taken-for-granted, prioritised relationship. Menotti & Vencato describe this as an unresolved tension between two visions: “on the one hand, an explicitly discriminatory concert of great powers (with the two variants, capability based and democratically oriented); on the other, the horizontal, non-discriminatory multilateral philosophy of ‘one government, one vote’” (2008:118).

The aim of building security in the EU neighbourhood is one of the two pillars, along with contributing to an international system based on effective multilateralism. Implicitly, the ESS recognises that the EU is only partially a global actor, but this ambition can have meaning through its engagement in/with its neighbourhood; thus constituting a testing ground for the EU’s transformational power (Dannreuther 2008:62-3). This power - representing the second part in my two-fold recognition of using the ESS as a counter-position to HS (but is also the non-refined way of viewing what European FSP actually is, the praxis) - is though compromised and often negated by more narrow security-driven interests supporting a more reactive, status quo-oriented approach. According to Dannreuther (2008), the ESS itself is partly to blame for this: it is primarily focused on the security threats posed by the EU’s neighbours rather than identifying the potentials for transformation (2008:65, 72). The conservative interests with their counter-balancing impact revolve around matters such as immigration, energy security, terrorism and international crime (2008:74-6). The problem is that these push toward
a geopolitical securitised view on the uncertainties and vulnerabilities that the EU face in these policy areas rather than the needs and the transformative potential in these countries.

In the ESS implementation report from 2008, HS is advanced as one of the pillars in EU’s work for making the world more secure. The achievements are said to be the results of a distinct European approach to FSP (ESS 2008:2). Opinions influenced by the R2P-principle are recognisable. However, simultaneously, the respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are said to be non-negotiable (which may be seen as an illustration of the inherent dilemma built-in the R2P principle). Paradigm shifts should though be treated carefully, as the ESS 2003 is stated to be “comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant” (ESS 2008:3). The ESS of 2008 is said not to replace the ESS 2003 but to reinforce it. The need for a renewal of the multilateral system is more strongly emphasised, but the transatlantic partnership is still stated as an irreplaceable foundation (2008:11). The UN and NATO are corner stones in the EU’s vision for the international system of governance.

The threats identified as of 2003 are not said to have gone away, rather, some of them have been more significant and all more complex. As the ESS 2008 is an implementation report, enumerating what has been done during the five years since 2003, and spells less out new challenges, objectives or policy implications but rather take them a step further and deepen them, it will here be treated parsimoniously.18 The still wanting dimension, thought of by the problematisations of status quo interests, delineated by Dannreuther, is a joint security concern approach with migratory countries to the issue of migration; a recognition of the energy-exporting countries needs and dependence on the EU; a more long-term approach to nearby not very democratic regimes rather than accepting stability as an argued buffer to figments of imaginations such as the only alternatives being Islamism or chaos (2008:74ff); and a jointly shared burden on climate change adaptation and mitigation. Hence, there are valid grounds to discuss the basic assumptions of the ESS, despite its significant but still partial improvements. Striking too is the lack of socio-economic threats, given the financial crisis eruption of 2008.19

Recognised should be that the ESS stresses HS as a key ground for missions: there must be a continuous mainstreaming of human rights issues in all activities, through a people-based approach coherent with HS (ESS 2008:10). The ESS 2008 is moreover more explicit on tackling the root causes of conflicts and on qualifying the military- and state-only-centred orienta-

18 A new threat recognised is cyber security. Threats further expounded on, now merited a place of their own in the enumerated list of threats are energy security and climate change.

19 Instructive here is the distinction that Nye (2005) does between traditional military security issues which are more often collective shared, and respectively economic and social issues, which are more “often less broadly shared; there are more differences of interest” (Nye 2005:226). Thus, security as a unifier and socio-economic issues as a divider illustrate how and why the ESS may be seen as more politico-military to its very nature and spirit.
tion. However, the risk, despite its outspokenness, is that this approach does not translate into the threat-based approach, nor the partnership approach which the ESS is organised around. In the first case these threats are the epistemological base wherein the EU views the world, and in the case of partnership, rather terrorism-combating and the countries’ involved prosperity and stability (in order to enhance the EU’s own security) are highlighted (reminiscent of the interpretation Dannreuther made in relation to the ESS 2003). This leaves a wide scope of manoeuvre for interpretation of the essential goals, which Menotti & Vencato (2008) showed poses problem in practise.20 Egnell (22/03/2011) argues that wars and military interventions, regardless of whether their causes are just or not, by definition are marred with violence and misery. The problem is our expectations and the liberal rhetoric which cloaks this brute truth. The reality of wars has, in Egnell’s words, been washed out of our security-political discourse. This opens up for a prolongation and a temporal continuation of the war - just or not, so be it – conducted in the same way, but only discursively phrased in a different, morally superior way, enabling it to be subject to popular and political support. Also this points to the logic in refining the ESS as the state-centric end. Brommesson & Fernros (2009) argue that the development of the R2P, as of how it was conceptualised in the report preceding the adoption of the R2P principle at the UN World Summit 2005, has potential to represent a radicalisation toward individualisation in international law. This is, however, not realised; rather it consolidates the already existing type of individualisation, as the report presupposes the rights of the state to intervene for humanitarian causes rather than the right of the individual to be protected. In essence, this establishes a right of the states to carry out humanitarian intervention rather than a duty, i.e. bequeathing the privilege of decision to the state (2009:321). Similar tendencies were also, as argued, discernible in the ESS.21

20 Noteworthy is that the ESS here explicitly singles out Turkey as a partner in its region: “There is a particular opportunity to work with Turkey, including through the Alliance of Civilisations” (ESS 2008:11). One can here reiterate the early mentioned figures on Turkish alignment, when invited, with 54 out of 73 relevant EU declarations and Council decisions (EC 2010b:96). This represents an alignment rate of 74 %. In comparison with the other candidate countries in the same year (2010), Iceland had a 92 % alignment rate, whereas Croatia and FYROM demonstrated 100 % alignment (see the EC’s enlargement webpages for further clarity).

21 It is important, however, for reasons of operationalisation, not only to treat the ESS as an ideal-typical position representing the state-centric end of a continuum on which HS represents the opposite end-point, but also accept it as the European position ipso facto. This methodological problem is mainly solved by looking also at in what way Turkey in its FSP formulation and manifestation actually refers to EU positions, policies, values (irrespective of what these constitute of).
5. Explanatory framework for the analysis

This chapter will in three subsequent sections devise the three continua used for the analysis. The purpose with this exercise is to structure the analysis of Turkey’s compliance, and offers in addition a frame of reflection for elaborating on continuity vs. rupture in Turkey.

In their study of Europeanisation of Turkish FSP, Aydin & Acikmese (2007) recall the difficulties and demand caution in isolating and saying that it is the EU’s conditionality (either funneled via the CFSP acquis, via the political Copenhagen criteria or via the emphasis put on peaceful settlements of bilateral disputes) which is the independent variable determining a member state’s or would-be members’ FSP course of action. They note the necessity in addition also comprising domestic and international factors in such an exercise, in order to make the FSP paths comprehensible (2007:266-8, 274). Still, they end up assessing the EU-impact from a top down- unidirectional vantage point, omitting the possibilities of a co-constitutive approach (i.e. EU and Turkey interplaying in a process of mutual impact). Aras & Karakaya single out explicitly domestic issues for the understanding of Turkish FSP of today: the domestic reform processes of the last decades have contributed to a new geographical imagination. They treat 1) the areas national security; 2) the bureaucratic/authoritarian culture (given way for a civilian/societal lead role in FSP); and 3) economic liberalisation and stability (2007:472-7). Although these dimensions roughly resemble my two first continua, they omit the importance of the international dimension that Aydin & Acikmese highlighted as well as the eventuality of an EU-related impact. Even more methodologically problematic; Aras’ & Karakaya’s first and third areas of study are handled tautologically: the process of de-securitisation and re-politisation (the main feature of the re-ordered national security understanding) are exactly the variable illustrating the shift in the second area of a more civilian, societal FSP debate and making as of today. This runs the risk of making the criteria for conclusion askew. My three analytical continua below are hence an attempt to bridge the gap between and the inferential deficiencies on part of these two scholarly contributions.

5.1. Continuum no. 1: The socio-cultural, dual self-image

It can in both cases, EU and Turkey, be argued that it is the security policy considerations which are Leitmotivs in shaping the foreign-political leeway. In the EU-case, in the absence of formalised foreign policy unity, it is basically the ESS that underpins the foreign political outlook beyond reactive every-day actions. In Turkey, is it security as concept, a self-image, which has constituted the linchpin of the foreign policy. It is this force which points to conti-
nuity. The Turkish republic has, given its geographically and strategically exposed location, historically sought accession to political and military alliances in order to reach collective security (Soysal 2004:44-5). This manifests a recognition that she, in the international arena, is not autarchic. Here we find the Turkish Exertion for westward orientation. During the late-ottoman period, the focus in Turkey’s FSP was exclusively on preserving as much as possible from the collapsing empire. That impacted on the thinking and made the foreign policy defensive and security-oriented. When much of this thinking, in contrast to what often is believed, was preserved into the Turkish republic from the ottoman time, the concept security policy became according to Çandar synonymous with foreign policy and Turkey’s foreign policy priorities became dictated by securitised obsessions (Çandar 2004:55). Aydin recalls that Turkey in the post Cold War era is located at the intersection of this epoch’s most insecure areas, whereby security matters are expected to dominate its foreign policy formulation ahead (Aydin 2004:42, 112-13). Geopolitical location provides for continuity in a surrounding world ever-increasingly in flux. Aydin (2004) distinguishes between structural and conjunctural factors determining an actor’s FSP. While the previous ones (e.g. geographical position, historical experiences, cultural background, national stereotypes and images of other nations) and the latter (e.g. changes in the international system, shifts in the world’s present balance of power domestic political changes, daily scarcities of economic factors and the personalities of specific decision-makers) do interplay (2004:9-10), this provides for a parallel evolution of change and continuity in tandem and not in mutual exclusion.

In connection to the transition from empire to republic in the 1920s, domestic, ethnic conflict-lines were converted into the foreign policy (Findley 2010: 256). This created a temporal possibility for the leadership to concentrate on revolutionising the domestic sphere, and consolidate the reforms, an opening which was given until the lead-up to WW2 (2010: 248). But also in Atatürk’s ideology lied a notion that domestic and foreign policy were two sides of the same coin; coined in his famous motto: “Peace at home, peace abroad”, which has guided Turkish foreign policy since. The internal organisation of the state impacted on the foreign policy and a peaceful foreign policy was a prerequisite for the internal reforms (Aydin 2004:31). This followed logically in the sense that what was earlier domestic now was outside the new nation-state’s borders, but to speak of this change purely in terms of a changed social and physical geography will overlook the more long-term implication from this time: the Sèvres-syndrome mentality. As Aydin writes on this transformational continuity (sic):

“The struggle for survival and the play of realpolitik in the international arena, together with an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage left strong imprints on the national philosophy of Turkey and the character of her people. […]Good or bad,
right or wrong, historical experiences colour a nation’s reaction to events and forces in the political system. They limit the foreign policy options of the political leadership and are filters for viewing international reality.” (Aydin 2004:12)

Göçek (2011), in her Laudable exposé over the permanence of the Sèvres syndrome, notes a re-emergence of the Sèvres syndrome post Cold War, despite the favourable environment, hoped to be conducive for neutralising it. She suggests three factors which have co-produced this: the staunch anti-EU-stand on part of the Turkish military; the inability of political parties to generate and inject popular confidence in visions for the future; and a lack of societal and popular deliberation on Turkey’s history (2011:181ff). Although the military has been all the more marginalised thanks to a democratisation of the public sphere in recent years, military leaders are still accused of interventions in the political and civilian life. Underlying Göçek’s exposé is still a wind of optimism on the possibility for the syndrome to subside, thanks to the changing international environment and its emphasis on human rights rather than state security. However, such a conclusion is conditioned on a positive development in external relations (which evidently has not been the case when considering the EU accession process). The EU cannot therefore easily act as a catalyst for this development.

The WW1 victors forced the Ottomans to sign the Sèvres treaty 1920, according to which Turkey would be partitioned into pieces. Atatürk was the only leader among the war’s four crumbling empires that successfully resisted this externally imposed carve-up, and he re-in-stated Turkey within today’s boundaries with the Lausanne-treaty from 1923. From this convulsive birth was begotten a schizophrenic Turkish self-image and outlook, combining a short of paranoid fear that foreign powers wish her ill with a pride, sometimes tilting into arrogant sense of superiority. This latter part of the syndrome is rarely discussed, but is an as important feature of it, I argue. This blend in expressing one’s power but at the same time implying that small European countries purely of national self-interest hold up Turkey’s accession process; this blend of demonstrating one’s proactive multi-dimensional foreign policy at the same time as almost jerkily clinging to the accession route, are emblematic in demonstrating the schizophrenic historical continuity from Sèvres and beyond.

Bagdonas (2008) in his study of how Kemalist policies has, over time, been used to justifying seemingly contrary policies by multifarious political actors, calls this divide defensive and integrationist (2008:170-6, 206-7). Meriting in his approach, an ontology this study draws upon, is its acceptance of the possibility that one and the same ideology can be multifariously reconceived, used and interpreted. The problem, however, is that he does not infer from this

22 Such accusations are directed at Turkey from Cyprus and Greece. Göçek’s argumentation about the military can b updated to fit today’s domestic realities, by letting its problem dimension be converted into a majoritarian view of democracy, goading AKP to turn more nationalistic in order to preserve its absolute parliamentary majority.
epistemological point of departure an ontological viewpoint enabling the same actor to comprise this rupture (see continuum no. 2). This is illustrated in that his divide is based on the defensive’s and the integrationist’s identity and rationalist grounds respectively. The problem (despite the merits of his constitutive approach to the relationship between ideology and FSP actions and his approach of rejecting the taken-for-granted dividing line between matters and ideas) is that this implies a divide also between identity and rationalist criterion grounds of motivations, implying that the integrationist approach, regardless by whom it is pursued, is more rationalist, while the defensive approach is more identity-driven. Although Bagdonas merits commendation in that he not a priori confers the attributes of identity or rationality onto the actors not earlier than in the analysis (2008:231), the problem remains since these analytical templates require an empirical separation of the inherent duality of the Turkish subject. The problem would not have been as big as it is unless this ontological point of departure has direct implications for the objects of study. This is the sort of deficiency, which I intend to overcome with my eclectic way of thinking around actorship.

Consequently, we have distilled continuum no. 1 through which to explain Turkey’s FSP orientation to a European view. Are there discernible features in the Turkish FSP, manifested in chosen material, bearing traces from a securitised defensive thinking, connected to a historical continuity, or are there traces of a disconnect from this and the turn into a more ideational, normative foreign policy outlook? Are there traces of a reactive and proactive stance, are there discernible traces of a sèvresque sense of minority and superiority respectively?

5.2. Continuum no. 2: The political cleavages
Mufti (1998) describes above continuum not as much as a schizophrenia - in contrast to me (implying that one and the same actor in one and the same act and thinking can express both of these two extremes) – but rather as positions that different actors take. Hence, some actors represent defensivity and status quo, whilst others represent intrepidity, proactive and normative thinking. Öktem (2011) describes in the same dialectical way Turkey’s history, where these two poles - reformatory, civilian, political, and on the other hand bureaucratic, status quo, military – have been involved in a struggle which formed the unfolding of history.23

A study of Turkey, a country characterised by a continuous turf-war between ideological actors, cannot overlook political cleavages. However, these cleavages are perhaps not as pro-

23 However, mentioned shall be that one of Öktems points is that this distinction is not as clear in every single epoch as many are prone to think. Rather, often has in fact the politically driven and generals-led foreign policies respectively converged, alternatively the civil foreign policy has allowed the generals to decide the direction (Öktem 2011:58).
nounced in the FSP, in the sense that the above continuum’s two complexes – the defensive, security-oriented thinking and the Sèvres-schizophrenic Janus face may have transcended the classical cleavages and become dominant. An explanation to Turkey’s willingness to establish itself as a major FSP-actor may be found in the observation Cook does; despite the polarised nature in Turkish politics there is generally quite a unity along the political spectrum on the country’s external security policy (Cook 2010).24 Personally though, I think that such a unity is applicable more within the political sphere, where features of continuity and consistence for example exist from PM Menderes in the 1950s, PM and president Özal in the 1980s, foreign minister Cem around the millennium, and president Gül, PM Erdoğan and FM Davutoğlu in the 2000s (Öktem 2011:43, 75-8, 170-81; Murinson 2006). Alternatively, the consistence is understood in terms of the Kemalist base for legitimisation for contradictory FSP actions over time (Bagdonas 2008:233, 238).

Kirisci (2009) argues that Turkish FSP of late has increasingly been determined by economics. FSP has become a domestic issue, “not just for reasons of democratisation, identity and civil society involvement, but also because of employment and wealth generation” (2009:39). Öniş argues similarly that the FSP has been a political asset for AKP domestically. It has helped AKP to maintain its popularity during times of economic crises, as its independent character has transcended the party’s core constituency and appealed also to nationalistic sediments. AKP has been particularly adept in making use of this (seen also in the light of a very weak and introvert political opposition), depicted by Öniş as: “[h]ence, what we observe in the recent Turkish context is that domestic politics has become heavily inter-twined with foreign policy, and foreign policy has emerged as a major instrument for gaining a competitive edge in domestic politics” (Öniş 2011:57-8).

However, there is a reverse force which makes consistence more difficult to uphold, why – recalled by Berlinski (2010) - consistent policies not necessarily are to be expected from this unity. This consistence exists as above shown, on the internal plane, but Düzgit & Tocci (2009) illuminate also the risk for what can be called an extern inconsistence (but make no analysis of wherefrom this potential inconsistence in FSP stances emanates). Berlinski thinks of the internal inconsistence in terms of the divide civilian-military, which also is one of the recent domestic transformations that Aras & Karakyapolat (2007) are treating. Their argument is that there has occurred a break-up of the bureaucratic insulation of Turkey’s foreign policy-

24 Exemplified for instance, in the leader of the main opposition party CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s, rare backing of PM Erdoğan’s critical stance against France during president Sarkozy’s visit to Ankara on February 25 (Today’s Zaman 26/02/2011), or in his consent of the government’s position on Libya (today’s Zaman 21/03/2011).
making (an insularity in which also the MFA has been part) thanks to a re-politisation and de-securitisation. Traditionally, governments had obediently to stick to the red lines of the secular, bureaucratic FSP establishment. Securitisation of external relations hindered a lively public, societal debate, and it was not earlier than via the EU-related reforms that civil society was strengthened and could take a role in politics, in turn leading to a “widening of normal politics and the narrowing of the boundaries of security dominated realms” (Aras & Karakyapolat 2007:474-5). Slowly but steadily this transformed the public landscape, transferred taboos to public debate, and opposition began be tolerated. In the end these processes, in parallel to a socio-economic liberalisation, has transformed the geographical understanding. However, Aras & Karakyapolat never delineate on whose part this new understanding is held. In addition, as was seen above: this distinction - that Berlinski and Aras/Karakyapolat as well as the vast majority of other pundits base their assessments on - should not ontologically be taken for granted. Rather, I suggest that this inconsistence stems from a “struggle” at the sèvresque schizophrenic Turkish identity, with the potential to outdo the cleavage secular-Islamic or civilian-military continua, and which enables a study with a snapshot character, where an actor in a frozen moment can display a double nature. Thus, this ontological premise brings with it direct implications for the study’s design. If Mufti’s (1998) premises were accepted, that the Turkish schizophrenia is to be found in different actors, it would demand a temporal interval in the empirical analysis more outstretched than now required (as it is but first in the temporal dimension that actors’ positions can demonstrate internal variation). My premise that this is not the case offers possibilities for a spatial operationalisation.

Consequently, we have distilled continuum no. 2 through which to explain Turkey’s FSP orientation to a European view. Are there discernible features in the Turkish FSP, manifested in chosen material, bearing traces of the political cleavage civilian-military, secular-religious? Or can these cleavages be detected as outdone?

---

25 It is in this regard that Bagdonas (2008) provides inspiration for the study’s notion of the concept continuity. As Bagdonas demonstrates, the kemalist-doctrine can, over time, be multifariously reconceived, used and interpreted and thus be made to constitute a justificatory, equal ground for what intuitively are contradictory foreign policy activities (in Bagdonas’ case, the Turkish foreign policy’s Western orientation and its Cyprus politics).

26 It can be argued that other cleavages are to be found in the Turkish society. One that easily comes to mind is the ethnic cleavage. However, as the Turkish republic’s history is a history of out-and-out unitary politics, ethnic minorities have not been forming the governmental layers of the society, and since my study is limited to the governmental actorship, this cleavage makes less point in this kind of study. It is rather around the above mentioned cleavages the governmental regimes have formed; consequently my identification of precisely those.
5.3. Continuum no. 3: The geographical direction
From an observation, connected to the question of consistency, by Düzgit & Tocci (2009) that the Turkish FSP in order to be efficient has to be viewed, by its addressees, as universalist in its principles rather than ethno-religious, stems a final continuum. In which external direction is Turkey turning? This continuum serves to be a challenge to continuum no. 1 and 2. Turkey has under Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prof. in international relations, previously the PM’s advisor and since 2009 FM, entered a new phase. Turkey’s security concept had earlier been primarily treated as an internal matter, FSP was viewed as an extension to domestic considerations, accompanied by a tendency to externalise domestic problems. One of Davutoğlu’s goals has been to transfer these attitudes to the past. Aras (2009:130) argues that this has been a method to disconnect FSP from its domestic shackles and establish it as a policy area in its own right.

Davutoğlu has presented a new geographical world of ideas, based on a new recognition of Turkey’s historic and cultural roots in the neighbourhood. What were territorial and attitudial borders are opened up in a recall of Turkey’s ottoman wealth (Aras 2009:132). The FSP is a process being integrated in a framework for coherent policy formulation, beyond the hierarchical priority-order characterising the Cold War. In Davutoğlu’s eyes, such a fluid, procedural version of FSP refutes allegations that the current policy is a shift of axis (such one-dimensional categories make err inferences based on individual acts not representative) (Aras 2009:134). Formulating sustainable strategic perspectives in such a context, one must take stock of the historic depth, based on a realistic account of the linkages between the past, the present and the future, as well as the geographic depth, penetrating the dynamic between the regional and the global. The geocultural, geopolitical and the geoeconomic factors shaping a country’s strategic depth can only be interpreted adequately at the intersection between these historic and geographic paradigms (Öniş & Yılmaz 2009:8-9). The sediment is that a state’s value in world politics is based on its geostrategic location and historic depth (Walker 2007:26). Murinson (2006) traces the origins for this position to Özal’s neo-Ottomanism in the 1980s, to Erbakan’s multi-dimensional foreign policy in the 1990s and to Davutoğlu’s own innovative approach to geopolitics (2006:947), implying a slightly more complicated thread than being completely new. Simultaneously, Davutoğlu criticises the FSP of the 1990s for failing to advance all-embracing policies toward all regional issues (2006:953).

Davutoğlu develops five principles constituting the core of his philosophy: 1) balance between security and democracy. A country is disabled from influence abroad unless heeding this balance. A country must offer its citizens security, though not on the expense of democracy and human rights. 2) The relations to neighbours shall be characterised by a zero problem
policy. This ambition is an ideal, taking concretion in the quest for minimal problems by eliminating firstly more acute problems. 3) Establish relations to the neighbourhood and with countries beyond it. A Turkish perspective should be present wherever conflicts erupt. 4) A multidimensional foreign policy. Turkey’s relations to other global actors shall be complementary, not competitive. The strategic relations to the US, the EU-accession process and the nowadays good relations to Russia and the policy of synchronisation in Eurasia are to be seen as integrated parts in a coherent approach; representing Turkey’s shift from a central, strategic country to a global power. The multi-dimensionality should be steered by equidistance. FSP should be carried out carefully, with equal distance to all involved; without entering alliances with regional groupings on the expense of others. 5) A rhythmic diplomacy. The means are mobility and proactivity in mediation and attainableness in international fora. Domestically, a total-performance aims to include civilian-society organisations in the formulation and mobilise them in the phase of initiation. (Aras 2009:134-35; Davutoğlu 2007:79-84).

These five operative principles are trussed by three methodological principles: 1) a visionary rather than crisis-oriented approach; 2) consistence and coherence; 3) the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style by which to spread soft power (Davutoğlu 2009). Öniş & Yılmaz (2009) argue that the rhetoric of the radically new in this FSP doctrine hides continuity in much of its system of beliefs and practises. Both the European and the Eurasian elements have co-existed previously, and striking is the turn toward the Eurasian in times of disappointment and debilitation in the European ties. They call the discernible shift post-2005”loose Europeanisation” or “soft Eurosianism”. This is not necessarily an exclusive shift, but the multi-directionality is stressed without any clear European anchorage (which earlier was the case) (Öniş & Yılmaz 2009:12, 15-6). However, they omit explaining this movement and do not answer the question: does the Euro-asian orientation occur as a consequence of the deterioration in the European ties, or is it the Euro-asian turn that has led to the European deterioration? Traub (2010) attempts a tentative answer: Turkey, as an emerging regional/global actor, but with a history to bear and represent, is aspiring for quite a few too many things - aspirations internally contradicting each other. Forced to choose, the neighbouring area tends to be prioritised, on the expense of the international (read: the European/American) diplomatic course. A new balance between competing identities is required for Turkey to be something more than an actor with limited influence (Traub 2010). Once again, such an interpretation is conditioned on a denial of what I call the ontological duality of the Turkish actorship; contingent on the premise that one and the same actor at one and the same moment not only can carry multiple identities but also show what intuitively seem as mutually contrary ideas.
5.3.1. Turkey and the Arab spring

Walker writes in an early analyse of the Arab spring that the focus on grassroots movements and pent-up frustration has led people overlooking the effect on the regional dynamic: the side-lining of traditional powers of the region and the remarkable emergence of a great power - Turkey, not since the height of the Ottoman Empire has been that diplomatically active as now. Turkey demonstrated in the Egyptian case that it was the region’s self-appointed king-maker (Walker 2011a). Turkey’s popularity in the region must too be highlighted, enabling AKP, uncommon in traditional Turkish FSP, to drawing benefits from its common history with the Middle East; earlier something handicapping.27 AKP has aimed to ameliorate the relations to every neighbour and to privilege the formerly “Ottoman space”. This has led to a reorientation, a vision attempting to thwart revisionist and securitisation trends dominant in Turkish history (and still by and large in the region), by the same time acting as an economic powerhouse (Walker 2011). Walker (2007:35) notes that inherent in the strategic depth is a need to cultivate good relations with all relevant poles of the world, which anchors the ideology in a pragmatism. However, he concludes, it is truly a sophisticated treading of a tightrope, balancing American, European, and Middle Eastern perspectives in the same frame.

The new FSP does not only entail possibilities but also challenges. In a latter analysis, taking account of the developments in Libya during the spring and Turkey’s way of approaching Libya deviating from how was done with Egypt, Walker (2011b) is significantly more cautious about Turkey’s possibilities to be an ideational actor: Libya revealed Turkey’s realpolitik footing as Preponderant. Krastev (2011) is even more sceptical, speaking of a window of vulnerabilities rather than of opportunities. Not at least as its economic development is quite an economy on loose ground, but also because Turkey has been one of the key beneficiaries of regional status quo. Turkey’s difficulties in sticking to its declared principles when approaching Libya (and later Syria), is succinctly explicated by Krastev as: “Turkey’s huge investments in Libya make it reluctant to embrace any anti-Gaddafi actions or forces; siding with Gaddafi would hurt Turkey’s claim to speak for the aspirations of democratic publics in the region; yet for Turkey’s ambitious and self-confident leaders to remain on the sidelines would be to accept their country’s marginalisation in the very area they have so assiduously cultivated” (Krastev 2011). Barkey has the same perspective; Turkey, provided its economic

27 See “Perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East 2010”, conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and KA Research, in which 85 % of the respondents in the Middle East said that they had very favourable or favourable views on Turkey, which by margin made Turkey the most popular country (see Doğan 03/02/2011).
ties with regional countries, has to be mindful of its commercial interests when formulating its FSP (Barkey 2011). Paul points to a similar wavering in formulating a consistent democratic stance when approaching Syria, in the same vein jeopardising Turkey’s credibility: “Ankara seems having a selective policy when it comes to the removal of dictators” (Paul 2011).

Walker argues that anchoring Turkey in a European frame requires at first that Western leaders acknowledge the shift that has taken place in Turkish FSP, and that they calibrate their politics toward Turkey in line with such an insight. A Turkey not anchored in the west has a plethora of other alternatives to pick - the strategic depth produces a Turkish self-understanding that it is not purely a dependent appendage to the West -, options not guaranteed to be fully desirable for Europe (Walker 2007:35). Thus, even if it is far too simplistic to characterise Turkey’s identity and orientation as either Western or Eastern, likewise the question about west or east has to be put. In one way the question about east or west is less relevant at the ontological level but highly relevant at the epistemological.

Consequently, we have distilled continuum no. 3 through which to explain Turkey’s FSP orientation to a European view. Are there discernible features in the Turkish FSP, manifested in chosen material, bearing traces of an orientation away from the west and the EU, or can this orientation be put into harmony with European priorities? Thus, are east and west valid concepts, are they compatible or incommensurable in the case of Turkish FSP?

6. Material:
Speeches and articles on part of Turkey’s FM, PM and president will be used. In order to create an unbiased selection of material, minimising the risks of skewness and/or lack in representativity, I have chosen to select the ten last major speeches held by FM Davutoğlu. The time-span is roughly half a year, and the speeches are delivered in a wide range of contexts, addressing varying audiences. I hope that this method of choosing material provides for beneficial conditions for capturing the whole variety of the Turkish FSP. I have also chosen to

28 I. For accounts that Turkey was not as pro-Gaddafi or pro-status quo in Libya as has been suggested, see e.g. Aydintaşbas (Milliyet 19/03/2011) who argues that Turkey has attempted, in contrast to Western countries (which have taken sides against Gaddafi), to act equidistantly to the warring parties and seeking the role of a mediator; or Bozkurt (26/03/2011) who emphasises that Turkey had almost succeeded in brokering a deal between the conflicting parties, in order to secure an ordered transition and attempted to prioritise the individuals as prime referents, intentions stymied by the UNSC resolution 1973 and its sanction to establish a no-fly zone with its ensuing military bombardments. II. I will though not dwell more on Turkey’s role and action in the Arab spring, as this is still an event yet to unfold. Quick conclusions, made in the midst of the turmoil and based by all likelihood on incomplete information, is therefore problematic.

29 The government consists of individual actors. Önış (2011) argues that leadership and ownership of FSP is a natural starting point in dissecting the current Turkish foreign FSP (2011:53). President Gül has according to Önış acted as a complementary de facto foreign secretary to Davutoğlu, and PM Erdoğan has pursued an almost as active stand himself.
include a couple of major lectures held by president Gül and PM Erdoğan, penning down the Turkish external outlook in a more comprehensible way. This kind of material-type is partly such which is sustained over time, but has also a communicative quality - in the present and in the context where it is held – of the signals the government wants to convey.

An objection may be that I rely on officially published documents. Is it not the actions and the crisis management which disclose the de facto FSP? However, Turkish actors negotiated and compromised on these texts – written/deliberated on/conveyed by an actor which is a representative of the official policy - and agreed that these texts in a public format and published form shall display the official FSP. Hence, the texts represent positions which the Turkish actors have to defend, and if later contradicting the texts, the responsibility lies with them to justify this discrepancy. When published, the logic of incentives kicks in. In order to reach respectability, influence and to be seen as a civilised actor, one has to behave. To retaining this leverage and perception, one cannot act no matter how. Visibility civilises, as Bjereld argues in his argumentation in favour of transparency in diplomacy (Bjereld 2010).

My argumentation is, ineluctably, partially normative. Were one rather to take Takiyye as a starting point, this choice and this limitation of the material would not suffice. Hence the importance of underscoring this study’s normative assumption that publicity and participation has a civilising impact. The investigation is a textual one, and does not primarily look at how the ideas are enforced in practise, but as argued, in a civilised world the publicity and the official stances matter, in order to be accepted as a reliable partner in the international game of politics. For Turkey - in contrast to countries such as e.g. China, Iran or Russia –, striving for such an image and status, these considerations are believed to be decisive. Hence, it is more the image of the FSP than the exercised policy which constitutes the generaliseable scope.

Nonetheless, in order to take stock of the layers beyond the surface, the study will also consult primary qualitative interviews for the analysis. The interviews were conducted with academics, journalists and think tank representatives, comprising a variety of political positions. The material was gathered during a five-week visit to Turkey enabled by a scholarship from the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul. In total eight interviews were conducted, all roughly one hour long. This material will, however, not be used in an exhaustive manner, but aims to support the analysis, hence not presented as primary empirics. It will thus feature, with parts of it corresponding to the purpose, in the analysis chapter.

30 A Turkish term meaning that one hides one’s true intentions, having a hidden agenda.
Another possible point of criticism relates to the material chosen, or rather, the material not chosen. The most obvious document in this matter is, could be argued, the National Security Policy Document (MGSB), put to revision every five years. The most particular with the last preparation in the fall of 2010 was that it for the first time ever was civilian-led (this had earlier been a [quasi-] military prerogative). However, this document is strictly classified, and there is not even published an official summary. For certain, much of the contents have reached the public thanks to leaks to the press. However, studying press material is kittle as long as the reasons behind the leaks are not clear. The leaks may be sanctioned by the regime, or be part of political intrigues. Unless such issues are clear, using that kind of press material may create spurious reasoning. Not only such considerations play into my decision not to use the MGSB, though, since using press material would in essence constitute a different kind of study. Rather, I argue, the MGSB can be said to represent the internal base through which actions and positions are crystallised and manifested in the public. So, in fact, the material I have chosen can be seen as prolongations of this doctrine, and thus also the operationalised forms of it, and the more relevant to cast light on.31

7. Methodological considerations

7.1. Methodological tools and philosophical building-blocks

Underlining the methodology is an eclecticism in the scientific approach, combining text-analysis and complementary interviews. At the outset, it is demanded to briefly dwell on alternative procedural courses of action. Provided this study’s qualitative limitations, the most obvious alternative would be a quantitative content analysis capturing frequencies in Turkey’s declared FSP positions. However, a major deficit in all quantitative research boils down to the need to translate complex phenomena into numbers in order to conduct the analysis mathematically. This would enable a larger amount of empirics, but would be accompanied by a reduced possibility to more rigorously scrutinize and analyse a number of key documents, which is the added value with a study like this. Following from this, it is important to stress the fact that the study is not making use of a traditional variable terminology. Such terminology is inappropriate here, as I do not intend to investigate causal correlations.

31 A related criticism is that I may overlook factual influence. Do shifts in wording and language of speeches and documents necessarily reflect the reality? However, such a criticism is concentrated on a phase in the policy-making chain conditioned on an earlier stage, i.e. a shifted way of thinking and parlance. In between these two exists an asymmetric exchange; a changing politics is conditioned on a changed way of thinking and parlance to a larger extent than a changing way of thinking and parlance are dependent on new politics (this should though not be confused with the fact that new politics and new language usages may be dependent on new realities). The power of naming, D’Eramo recalls, is crucial in making the object named real (D’Eramo 2001:424-5).
Argumentation analysis is also ruled out since this approach is more appropriate for contexts wherein the actor or producer of a text strives to persuade the audience of a specific claim’s rightfulness. In such a case, the arguments undergirding or logically underpinning these claims are the object of study. However, this study does not consider the arguments’ logos, ethos or pathos, nor their consistency or relevance. In the longer run, these considerations may though be of interest, not at least for seeking clarity to whether the degree of these aspects of the Turkish FSP arguments actually impact their reception on the EU side (irrespective of its orientation to a European view). However, this is seed for future investigations.

Content analysis regards political messages as a set of arguments. The intention is to test the relevance and sustainability of the arguments. In contrast, in the functional analysis, political messages are not primarily regarded as arguments but variables in a chain of events (Beckman 2005:12-13). This latter approach embraces the way political messages is viewed in this inquiry. Explanatory analyses often spell out why-questions while a descriptive analysis treats what-questions (2005: 80). This inquiry focuses rather on how-questions. Often, explanations are reduced to causal correlations, but the human behaviour and societal actions are more complex than such a reduction implies, comprising also motives, intentions, reasoning, emotions etc (2005: 82-85). It is in the recognition of such a complexity that the how-questions are framed in the explanatory continua. According to Bergström & Boréus (2005), the functional analysis of the ideas deviates from true text analysis in its explanatory ambitions, and in its treatment of the origins of ideas and their functions, which requires other additional techniques (2005:156-7). Vedung’s (1977) definition of political ideas is extremely wide, spanning from systems of beliefs to simple suggestions publicised in a political context (1977:16). Ideas in this study relate to views on and representations of FSP. In a classical analysis of the ideas, the ideas which to be explored are defined, to be connected to specific concepts (Beckman 2005:33). This is not the course here. Inspired more by the functional element and the text analysis as such, I argue that the techniques for analysis of the ideas likewise are fruitful for a study like this, irrespective of the definition of what a specific idea is. The functionality built-in in this design refers also to the possible function the FSP sphere might have on the EU-accession process and vice versa. The focus on the context justifies this approach, and the importance I ascribe to the context (illustrated in the devised explanatory continua) indicates my reluctance to associate myself with merely one methodological path.

32 Keep in mind though that the introductory sections attempted to answer why-questions of the kind why and how FSP was an area which had been pronounced even stronger in the realm of the accession process, and why this phenomenon is likely to remain a constitutive element of the relationship between the EU and Turkey in the future.
Therefore my intention to generate methodological triangulation in the form of interviews for the explanandum, to enhance the validity of the conclusions.

The theoretical and analytical frameworks attempt moreover to benefit from both of the two classical idea-analytical building-stones – ideal-types and dimensions (Bergström & Boréus 2005: 159-66). This enables me partly to refine a phenomenon into ideal-types (in the theoretical deduction) against which to measure the reality, and partly to induct the analytical frames from research close to the empirics. This secures that the frameworks have direct relevance for the analysis and for the empirics on which this is based. The design does not view deduction and induction as mutually exclusive (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2005:55ff). The additional benefit is not only a validation-proof but that it also secures the flexibility in the design which Marshall & Rossman (2006:52) argue is essential for high-quality qualitative research. The benefit in this triangulation of methods and combination of material is that the documents and speeches are material which I as a researcher have not impacted on, whereas the interview-material is such that has evolved as a product of the research question. The combination of these sorts of methods and material is desirable but rare in the social sciences (Titscher et al 2000:32). Much criticism, primarily from constructivists, against triangulation as method for validation is based on that its area of application is narrowed to positivist-like points of departure assuming an objective reality (Seale 1999:472ff). Rather, my view on triangulation adheres to a personal and scientific belief that more than one method can deepen the understanding, led by the position that actions and suggestions in one milieu impact on and are influenced by other milieus, where the research unearths multiple, constructed realities.

7.2. Interviewing
Esaiasson et al (2007) refer to five various purposes for qualitative interviews: when exploring uncharted territories; when we want to know how actors themselves are perceiving the world; when our purpose is to advance concepts; when conducting theory-testing; or as complementary to other methods (2007:281-4). For me, the three last areas of use are relevant. The concepts, and the representations of Turkish FSP, advanced in this study will be put under the interviewees’ scrutiny; the ESS and HS will be tested; and lastly, the interviews are complementary to the document analysis and aim to support the analysis.

The technique used is semi-structured thematic interviewing, where I advance a number of systematic questions put to all interviewees. This set of questions is derived from the three dimensional continua advanced, in order to keep the interviews within the thematic frames.
This satisfies both the need for systematicity and offers flexibility. I will also advance questions on the basis of the ESS and HS thinking. The social desirability and the acquiescence problem is a general problem in all kinds of surveys and interviews; people may be liable to answer in a certain way irrespective of the de facto question in order to please the interviewer or not to embarrass oneself. Normally this is a problem when it comes to questions regarding social status, and is particularly prevalent in face-to-face-interviews with people with low education (De Vaus 2002:107). However, it may also pose a problem in elite interviews; the interviewees know exactly what to say. Nonetheless, because the interviewees are not officials or representatives of a particular political party discourse, but independent academics and journalists, it is my strong belief that this risk is minimised. Importantly, this problem is prevalent in all kind of interviewing and I cannot conclude that my context is more problematic than any else. Kept in mind should also be that my interviews are not used as primary empirics but aimed at supporting the analysis and will therefore feature not earlier than in the analysis chapter in the form of additional reflections, thus reducing my reliability on purely this method and material. Finally, the particular methodological modelling I have been involved in, not drawing on traditional FSP research models, can, I hope, contribute to reducing the leeway for the interviewees to purely respond in a pre-construed way.

### 7.3. Generalisability and truth

The choice of material is viewed as a representation of the image Turkey wants to produce of itself in the FSP domain. The risk this limitation runs is its temptation for the researcher to make general claims illustrated with material from the single case. That would enable an illustration of the claim, but falls short of proving it (Titscher et al. 2000:44). However, my aim is not to conduct a strict hypothesis test to clarify the causal relationship between independent and dependent variables. The strategic sample is rather tasked with attempting to attain representativity in the manifested expression of the FSP stands. If speaking in terms of explanatory variables, these are generated in the form of the three continua. These are the dimensions which are expected to provide an explanatory framework in the Turkish case but also enable generalisation to other country-studies. Hence, the scope of generalisability lies rather with the model than the contents. Moreover, the explanatory framework for the analysis is the correspondence which bridges the contents with the context, thus establishing an explanatory frame for a dimensional understanding of the contents. Thanks to this, we are 1) able to get closer to the correspondence between the expression of foreign policy stances and the contex-
tual spheres such as the EU and the three dimensions comprised in the explanatory continua, which in addition are both Turkey-specific and generaliseable, as well as 2) deepen the understanding of the significative meaning ascribed to these stance by the producer of the speech. Thirdly, the discursive speak of foreign policy matters, given its context, by governmental representatives indicating their view on the matters’ usefulness.\textsuperscript{33}

7.4. Inferential criteria

On the continua, the conclusions will be consistently drawn upon with illustrative examples from the empirics, enabling the reader to follow. What is urged to say, however, is that an explicit rejection of let us say a defensive, security-oriented approach on part of a civilian/normative actor detected in a manifested material, would not on its own amount to being a token of such an actor’s approach. Such a rejection would constitute a necessary but not sufficient criterion. Rather, to be accounted as a civilian normative perspective, the absence of patterns related to this securitised, defensive perspective has to be upheld consistently. This latter criterion applies primarily to continuum no. one, when assessing the ontological duality in the Turkish actorship, but also to continuum no. two. It is thus important to keep in mind that this logic does not go along with continuum number three. The reverse logic applies here. An explicit rejection of west in the argumentation for an eastward outlook, or vice versa, would amount to being a token of such a direction in the outlook.

We have also the task in front of us to assess Turkey’s orientation to the European FSP view. It is noticeable that parts of the continua respectively go along with measuring the conformance with the European FSP-view at a general level. Criteria for drawing conclusions on how the stances count toward fulfilment are the following (and here we go down merging the three continua, distilling a measure whose fusion is indicative of the continuas’ aggregated conformance): markers indicative of a disconnect from the historically continuous trajectory toward a more civilian-run and normatively based politics, with less emphasis on a militarised, defensive approach, combining a non-religious ground for justification of the politics but rather orienting toward the force of the argument in the legitimisation formulation. Overall, these features would have to be framed in a way which emphasising the Western affiliation ahead of the Eastward orientation.

\textsuperscript{33} These three aspects capture the three dimensions of truth – correspondence, significance and pragmatism – which Alvesson & Sköldberg (2005:47ff) argue constitute important pillars in qualitative social science. This criticises the one-dimensional view of truth implying that nominally a theoretical perspective by course of its test easily can be refuted or strengthened.
To get into the more precise business, the European FSP view was divided into the HS end, whose correspondence is regarded as strengthened when detecting a prioritisation in the security discourse of people and communities ahead of states and borders. Secondly, it requires an identification and pronunciation of threats which are seen as threats but not necessarily, at the time of its identification, are considered as, yet can turn into, security threats. These are rather seen as conditions-based vulnerabilities, which in themselves are not considered as threats but in conjunction with others they emerge as a potentially threatening reality. Thus, one can say that the conformance with this approach requires multi-dimensionality and violence-preventive activities in order to tackle the pre-violence conditions. In events in the midst of violence, it focuses on how to dampen the violence rather than on winning. In the aftermath, the focus is not merely on reconstruction but also on preventing new outbursts of violence. Consequently, in the various types of material we will analyse, this three-fold dimension – pre-, on-going and post-conflict – can more easily secure analytical relevance and exhaustion.

A HS compliance would additionally require a bottom up-approach, a focus on human rights under civilian control, a clear ambition toward legitimate political authority within a framework of effective and coherent multilateralism, a regional focus and recognition of the spatial interrelatedness of threats across the globe, and scepticism toward military usage.

The other end of the spectrum is represented by the ESS. Its correspondence is strengthened when there in the Turkish FSP formulation is discerned a clear-cut correlation to and legitimisation of actions, stances, opinions wherewith the EU’s positions. There is also expected a stronger emphasis on a state-centric view and on borders in the emerging threats addressed. Military usage is not seen as mutually exclusive to civilian action.

8. Presentation of the empirics
This chapter will present illustrative and representative excerpts from the chosen speeches, lectures and articles. The discussion around these will appear in chapter 9. The presentation is of no particular order other than chronological, commencing with FM Davutoğlu’s speeches, after which PM Erdoğan’s and president Gül’s contributions appear. That means that the order of the empirics does not impact on the way in which one shall read this chapter.

In a speech delivered 28/02/2011 within the UN’s Human Rights Council, FM Davutoğlu stresses that the world has entered a new era, based on the supremacy of human rights: “Let us build a new order that crowns human dignity based on universal values. […] The new human rights order to be established must carry the respect of all. This order must be all encom-
passing and in this order there can be no room for exceptions or privileged states [...] Individuals are in the lead. In this new order, ordinary people are able to make a difference. Systems which disregard the right to life are no longer tenable. A way of life that wholly embraces human rights has become essential.”

Citing the Mavi marmara crisis between Israel and Turkey of 2010, he states, with a clear reference to the Quran: “[H]umanity was the victim, regardless of citizenship [...] if one kills an innocent person, it is as if he had killed the whole of humanity!” He does not shy away from that Turkey itself has a lot to do in the field of human rights, referring to the constitutional reform package adopted in a referendum in September 2010, testifying to the government’s determination: “However, this naturally does not constitute an end in itself. We are aware that Turkey must continue to progress in many fields.”

Addressing the Ministerial Meeting “Harnessing the Positive Contribution of South-South Cooperation for the Development of LDCs” (18/02/2011), Davutoğlu points out the key problem for the LDCs’ (Least Developed Countries) as: “It is regrettable that … many LDCs are yet to provide their people with safe drinking water, water for sanitation, electricity, access to health facilities, which are essential human needs. They are caught in the vicious trap of poverty and hunger.” What needs be done? “[O]ur efforts must be focused on increasing LDCs’ resilience by enhancing their human, institutional and productive capacities through strengthened international support measures. [...] The international community cannot remain indifferent and continue with a ‘business as usual' attitude.” The Quran again: “In fact, the message has always been very simple and continuous throughout human history; “Help the needy and defend their rights”. It's in the Koran; it is in the Torah; it is in the Gospels; it is in the Rig Veda, it is in the Upanishads and other holy texts of humanity.” A broad approach to the work needed is sketched out: “[B]road support from all stakeholders, including the civil society, along with parliamentarians and the private sector, is essential in effectively implementing development strategies and monitoring the delivery of commitments on the ground.” For the fourth LDC high-level meeting hosted by Turkey in May, Davutoğlu has “instructed my colleagues to organize, as a special event, an Intellectuals/Academicians Forum [...] to deliberate on the moral philosophy, which I believe will add an intellectual depth and dimension to our undertakings.” The historical, cultural imperatives are emphasised: “[T]he least economically developed countries … possess the most cultural, civilizational, historical and traditional depth puts them in a special category that few ‘developed countries’ can hope to attain for centuries. [...] We should be proud of our cultural identity and legacy. This will guide us in our development efforts.” (}
In Davutoğlu’s aim to re-establish Turkey as a player in its geographical and strategic depth, he consistently stresses the shared and common legacies, bonds and history with the countries addressed. In an article in China Daily (02/11/2010) this emphasis overshadows the imperative to bring up problems with human rights: “Our historical experiences expose striking parallelisms: both countries generated their own solutions with their home grown leaders and they raised the welfare level of their people. They both assumed their rightful place in the international community as beacons of stability and modernity.” Stability is rather the key message conveyed. “With our friendship rooted in respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, we share similar approaches in global and regional issues.” The wish to deepen the cooperation is not qualified with any assistive measurements, but becomes a goal per se: “Sharing same goals, Turkey is ready to work more closely with China.”

Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) (24/1/2011), Davutoğlu joins in with the CoE’s position on the development in certain non-EU countries in Europe and encourages their way toward the EU fold. However, he stresses the universality of the principle lying beneath: “We are here not only because we share a common geography and our nation states are linked together by our borders … We are here also because we have shared together a common history, from which we have drawn conclusions. On these conclusions we have established ideals and values that have become our common duty to defend and take further. Today, these are in no way under the hegemony of “Europe”, where they have been born and nourished, but are these to be shared by the whole mankind.” Moreover, he paints these principles as being extra-EU, not the least as he brings up the accession of the EU to the ECHR: “We strongly believe that this accession will offer the whole of Europe a coherent and credible system for the protection of fundamental rights by creating a single and binding legal space in our continent. […] The Council of Europe is the only pan-European organisation which has the mandate and the necessary tools to effectively and comprehensively monitor the compliance by member states with their obligations on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.” Pertinent mentioning too is the section where he enumerates the international partners the CoE has, naming only the UN and the OSCE.

When addressing the 19th Economic Cooperation Organization Council of Ministers Meeting (23/12/2010), Davutoğlu treats the economic pillars in the organisation’s and in Turkey’s external cooperation patterns. He emphasises the equi-distant as well as the door-opener characteristics of the Turkish role as: “that of a “facilitator” where we provide a secure place for parties to meet and most important, no hidden agenda. We are only trying to bring together the key players for important regional problems to enable an exchange of views on how these
problems can be solved.” He stresses the cruciality of private sector involvement “as a driving force behind economic cooperation schemes” beside the pivotal role of free trade agreements. Still, in a separate section, he brings up the vitality necessity of stepping up the work in the field of human resources development and poverty alleviation: “…reducing poverty and hunger as well as child and maternal mortality rates” also need robust action on the part of member countries.” In a region historically marred with conflicts and violence, Turkey is now actively aiming to “contribute to the improvement of security, stability and welfare both in our close neighborhood and beyond”. “In line with our aim of establishing a beltway of peace, security and stability in our neighborhood, we are actively working towards facilitating the opening of channels of dialogue between countries in our region.”

At the UNSC High Level Meeting on Iraq (15/12/2010) Turkey does not deviate from the UN and EU positions, but noteworthy is that Davutoğlu is not referring or adhering explicitly to these organisations when formulating Turkey’s position, implying an independent position-making. Despite the context’s of the speech focus on Iraq, his opening lines are noticeable: “There are strong undercurrents of change and a new dynamism can be felt in international affairs. As the prevailing realities of this new era emerge slowly but surely, the need to promote and bring about a restoration of regional and international order becomes ever more evident.” Stating “[t]his is the future for Iraq and it is the future of our region” indicates a flat approach, as its justification does not lie with Turkish self-interest but with the stability for the region as a whole. “[F]undamental political concepts like inclusiveness, national reconciliation and partnership will continue to be crucial building blocks for ensuring a political framework within which democracy, human rights and the rule of law irreversibly take root.” […] Gradually altering both the perception and language of politics in Iraq from that based on ethnicity and sectarianism to one defined by political parties and blocs is also vital.”

On 11/12/2010 Davutoğlu expresses the view on the Central Asian region, in an address on a conference on the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan. Neutrality in the region, ridden by the big players’ geopolitical games, is depicted not merely as a legal status, but as:

“In the case of Turkmenistan, being neutral should not, and does not mean maintaining a passive and indifferent stance in the face of critical events that merit close attention. Being proactive and neutral does not contradict each other. […] This is an active position, full-scale involvement in international processes through building peace, providing assistance in developing effective models of economic cooperation. This is the provision of a political platform for tackling problems existing in the region and beyond in order to establish lasting peace, security and facilitate sustainable development and progress.”

This serves as a harbinger for the position on Afghanistan: “… Turkey … deems it absolutely necessary to address the humanitarian needs of the Afghan people as much as possible. It does so by building social infrastructure, supplying electricity and fuel. […] Most crucially, the
Project, when implemented, will contribute concretely to the economic development of Afghanistan and assist interdependency among these crucial regional countries.”

Despite the potential, stability in Central Asia still faces challenges, thus it is “our common task, as members of the international community, to coordinate and combine our efforts for an effective and result-oriented engagement with the region to assist these countries … to become stable and fully-integrated into the international system”. After citing but a few examples on the variety of cooperative relations to this region, he refers to the rhythmic character of Turkish diplomacy: “We must establish robust relations and networks in a wide spectrum of fields to unleash the outstanding potentials and capabilities the region already possesses. Efforts must be conducted simultaneously in a great variety of fields that will include politics, economics, science and technology, good governance, education and human rights.”

At a Regional Security Summit of the Manama Dialogue (04/12/2010), Davutoğlu treats Turkey’s security policy perceptions. On the substance of regional security, he criticises the still recurrent tendency to refer solely to hard, military-centred security-thinking: “But in our region, a substance of security based on hard power will not bring us to a sustainable peace. There should be a much more comprehensive understanding of security. Security in the sense of economic cooperation, security in the sense of cultural and political dimensions. […]If we do not have economic, political, cultural and energy substance of regional security, there cannot be military or hard security.” To achieve this, he refers to preventive security “to prevent any crisis, any tension, any war in our region. […] To prevent crises before crises emerge, not just to respond and react to a crisis, but more; trying to be proactive in securing the crisis.”

The second pillar of the methodology is a visionary security: “If we respond to the crisis, we cannot establish a sustainable security.” The visionary security approach is said to comprise four blocks; A) Security for all: “If we want to achieve security in our region, there should not be discrimination regarding any group of people or any country; it must be inclusive for all.” B) Political dialogue: “There should be more high-level cultural dialogue.” C) Economic interdependency; “the best means of security”. D) Preserved and respect for the multitude and multicultural character of the region and its civilisations.

Three dimensions of the security are finally enunciated. The first is national security: “All nations have the right to protect its nation. […] That is the main principle of international law; we need to respect territorial sovereignty.” The second dimension is bilateral relations: “we do not have natural borders in this region. […] We have to respect borders. There should not be any attempt to change the borders, but at the same time, we need to have trans border relations. We need to make these borders as flexible as possible in order to have full economic
interdependency.” The third dimension is a regional one. The objective is a secure regional order. Here, the Israel-Palestine conflict is the main destabilising factor. There is too a global dimension to regional security.\(^{34}\) The fourth and final security dimension is a cultural one: “[i]f there is cultural peace in our region, there will be cultural peace in the world.”

In the opening statement at the Fourth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (03/11/2010), Davutoğlu emphasises the promotion of regional cooperation by removing barriers to trade and movement. Noticeable is what he brings to the fore as the challenges of the Afghan people: “unemployment, inadequate health services and energy shortages remain among the foremost real-life challenges …” The aim is not only development of the local economy but capacity-building. Besides this meeting, he is keen in stressing the parallel business forum, as well as an academic gathering elucidating this dimension to security: “The Academic Platform for Afghanistan was a significant step towards adding an intellectual perspective in support of enhanced regional cooperation without which enduring peace and stability cannot be attained.”

PM Erdoğan, holding a major lecture at the International Strategic Research Organization, USAK (26/02/2010), stresses the great reserve of unleashed capability in Turkey: “Although the great majority of the population is Muslim, as a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law, we are aiming to integrate with European organizations. We are a European country but at the same time, we can understand the policy, sociology and psychology of the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans, Africa and the Near East very well.” He raises the stakes for the role that Turkey should and could play in today’s world: “Our accumulation of history, our cultural prosperity, human potential and geographical position provide us with inimitable opportunities and attribute to us very important missions. […] Turkey's features make it an effective actor, not an ordinary one.” Although it is not spelt out from whom expectations come, there is a responsibility lying on Turkey, which it has to shoulder: “Even if Turkey wants to be a country that is autistic, passive, uninterested and takes no notice of the developments in the world, it cannot behave as such.” However, a shift in perspective is also demonstrated when delineating not only the expectations on Turkey, but also the expectations Turkey sets on other actors to consider Turkish action: “The initiatives that Turkey will take … must be taken into consideration.” In a world in flux, Turkey has, however, risen to the occasion: “Today, … this vicious circle has been broken. Frankly speaking, Turkey is rising

\(^{34}\) The Iran/nuclear issue is a case in point. Turkey bases its approach on three principles: “all nations have the right to obtain peaceful nuclear technology and energy, based on the principles of the NPT and the IAEA. […] [W]e are against nuclear weapons, wherever they are.” Thirdly, “[m]ore diplomacy, more transparency, more international effort, more contributions … is needed for a solution.”
to a point where it can use and produce knowledge at maximum, and Turkey is not a country that is introverted and wastes its energy with interminable discussions.” Today’s problems are said to be highly different from yesterday’s ditto, necessitating new tools, methods and perspectives: “The problems that have been moved to the global level bring a need for global cooperation. A local problem that exists in one side of the world is going to affect the whole world, and an illness that affects one part of the world threatens the entire world. […] We, as Turkey, have to accommodate such a world, make positive contributions for the earth and humanity. Turkey, with its historical and cultural accumulation, has the potential both to orient this change, and to undertake constructive and active roles in the new order.” Turkey’s new role follows from a strengthened confidence: “In parallel to the economy, we let others know about our power both in foreign policies and global problems. The roles we have undertaken in the international organizations indicate the growing importance of our country.”

Required is a mentality-change: “The actual threats are ignorance, wrong perceptions, prejudice and insistence on the mistakes. […] The creation of imaginary threats domestically or abroad in order to be able to design the public policy and the perception of neighbors as enemies came to an end with the Cold War period. […] Nobody has a chance to gain success while producing fear, threatening, and consternating such a world where the flow of information and the news are so fast through the channels of the Internet and the media.” This though is still said to be made through continuity in the principles: “That's why we act in a manner to gain friends -not to generate enemies- and we try to implement Atatürk's principle of ‘peace at home, peace abroad’. ” The anti-status quo-approach is returned to, and practised as of: “We believe that this approach encompassing the Cyprus issue, the relations with the European Union, the relations with the Armenia and Syria, the Kurdish and minority problems is not right.” What is needed is a merger of normative and realistic elements to the foreign policy positions: “Not only turning back on real politics detach us from the realities of life and make us unsuccessful, but also standing away normative politics eliminate the thing what makes us who we are, alienate ourselves and cause us to be scattered to a different point.” However, the roots need be firm, familiar: “The conjuncture, current situation, and real policy could not be the main determining factors of the foreign policy. Such an understanding, which is disconnected from our culture, morality, and conscience, cannot produce a humanitarian policy.”

On the EU relationship finally, after up to this point not even having mentioned the EU in the lecture: “However, it should not be forgotten that the process of full membership requires some obligations not only for us, but also for the European Union. We are expecting the Un-
ion to stick to its obligations. We are requesting from the European Union not to forget that they would also obtain major advantages from our membership in the Union and they would become a much more active power in the global dimension. [...] However, it should not be forgotten that no accession process could last forever. If the existing window opportunity were to close, no one knows when it would open again.”

In a Newsweek op-ed (17/01/2011/) Erdoğan paints the current socio-economic situation in much gloomy colours: “At the end of this century’s first decade, we can observe how the locus of power has shifted in world politics. [...] The [EU] cannot be the one sphere that is immune to these changes in the balance of power.” Turkey is touted as the ultimate contrast to this: “Turkey has been putting its imprint on the global stage with its impressive economic development and political stability. [...] Turkey is bursting with the vigor that the EU so badly needs. [...] Turkey is becoming a global and regional player with its soft power. [...] Turkey has been an active player in all the major areas of global politics and we do not intend to surrender this momentum.” Arguments like these provide markers for the new Turkish vigor and expressed self-confidence, but Turkey still clings to the EU track in a short of desperate tone:

 “[T]he case for Turkey’s membership of the EU is self-evident and requires little explanation. [...] Eighteen out of 22 negotiation chapters pending for discussion are blocked on political grounds. This is turning into the sort of byzantine political intrigue that no candidate country has experienced previously. In this treatment, Turkey is unique. Our European friends should realize that Turkey-EU relations are fast approaching a turning point. In the recent waves of enlargement, the EU smoothly welcomed relatively small countries and weak economies in order to boost their economic growth, consolidate their democracies, and provide them with shelter. Not letting them in would have meant leaving those countries at the mercy of political turmoil that might emerge in the region. No such consideration has ever been extended to Turkey. [...] And yet, the fact that it can withstand being rebuffed should not become reason for Turkey’s exclusion. Sometimes I wonder if Turkey’s power is an impediment to its accession to the Union. If so, one has to question Europe’s strategic calculations. [...] We are no more a country that would wait at the EU’s door like a docile supplicant. Some claim that Turkey has no real alternative to Europe. This argument might be fair enough when taking into account the level of economic integration between Turkey and the EU—and, in particular, the fact that a liberal and democratic Europe has always been an anchor for reform in Turkey. However, the opposite is just as valid. Europe has no real alternative to Turkey. Especially in a global order where the balance of power is shifting, the EU needs Turkey to become an ever stronger, richer, more inclusive, and more secure Union. I hope it will not be too late before our European friends discover this fact.”

Addressing the parliamentary committee of the CoE (13/04/2011) Erdoğan elaborates on the religious-cultural factor, saying while the Christian and Muslim world previously were situated in an adversarial relationship with each other, while the encounters over time have “provided an opportunity for these two differing civilizations to get to know each other, to mutually understand and influence one another. [...] History is not only made of war and conflict. But it also involves cultural interaction and convergence as well as an experience of getting to know one another.” History has to be renewed and renew itself as to meet today’s challenges: “We have to stop reading history through wars, conflicts and polarization. Those who read history only through conflict cannot help build a future based on peace.” The CoE is said to represent universal values key for universal peace. Even if it is not obviously related to FSP,
Erdoğan views the harsh reactions on part of the EU against press freedom in Turkey as: “[T]he allegations in recent weeks concerning censorship and oppression against the media and freedom of expression do not reflect the realities on the ground.”

On the EU position, he repeats Turkey’s good record, its strength in economy, fulfilment of EU criteria and Turkey’s dynamic, key role in having an impact in an ever widened geography. Following from this, he reiterates the lack of leadership in the EU: “I therefore find it hard to grasp how, despite all these facts, Turkey’s negotiations with the EU can be hampered on false pretexts and for populist purposes, how new impediments can be invented along the negotiation process. Turkey is a country with considerable power. […] Let me be very clear with you: Membership is a process of mutual commitment. The EU and Turkey need to cooperate on this process.” On the Arab spring, he states: “We have to start focusing on the human tragedies in the Middle East and North Africa, without being fixated on the oil wells. The emergence of ethnic, sectarian and religious divisions and violation of territorial integrity of states would run against the spirit of these events as well as the will of the people. […] [W]e need to avoid external military intervention, except for humanitarian purposes, to assure the legitimacy of these democratic movements. We do not want the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq to repeat themselves in the Middle East and North Africa.”

In a prize-awarding address to the Chatham House (08/11/2010) Gül elaborates on the core elements of a well-functioning international order, a new strategic environment initiated with the end of the Cold War. However, the upshots of this “did not mean that all threats to peace suddenly subsided: “The Cold War order was not abruptly replaced by a new system that was capable of managing international relations effectively.” He delineates three systemic problems: “[T]e current international system is at the state of a three dimensional “imperfect equilibrium”. This … emanates from deficits in the political, economic and socio-humanitarian domains … [T]his “imperfect equilibrium” emerged … mainly because of the absence of a new international order following the end of the Cold War.” The problems in these domains are: “the world does not revolve around the two super powers anymore. […] [T]he global economic crisis has deeply exposed the weaknesses of international economic governance. […] Today, the road to peace, stability and welfare passes through democratic values and the enhancement of human rights standards. […] It is also depressing that only a small portion of the world’s population is benefiting properly from these social and humanitarian values.”

An effective international order paving the way for a prosperous future must, Gül argues, embrace a range of nine interplaying elements: 1) an order able to address the three above-mentioned problems in the existing order; 2) countries should not be categorised in an obso-
lete manner as being 1st, 2nd or 3rd world countries; 3) an order based on universal values, rejecting Euro-centrism; 4) an order where “principles and goals prevail[s] over club membership reflexes”; 5) an order enabling us to win the hearts and minds of the defeated, replacing an order where actors are purely rewarded or punished; 6) a participatory and just order embracing all, having also the capacity and means to confront threats whenever necessary; 7) “a multi-cultural, multi-dimensional, heterogeneous but harmonized order”; 8) an order refusing a single hegemon but renders the multitude of powers interdependent; and finally 9) Turkey aspires “to an order where people distinguish themselves not by bearing symbols but qualifications, and express themselves not with rhetoric but with their deeds”.

The international order is changing, but Turkey takes its place in it, preserves its main, traditional features, deserving its place thanks to its consistency: “Benefiting from thousands of years of state tradition, and having inherited the experience, memories and reflexes of great empires, contemporary Turkey certainly will take its rightful place in this new and normal international order. Our rich human resources, developing economic power, deep-rooted culture and the virtue of our democracy will be the fundamental driving forces in this process.”

9. Analysis

“The well-being of citizens must be the priority of every political leader.” These words were uttered by Davutoğlu to a group of journalists on the way back from a failed mediation attempt in the internal political crisis in Lebanon January 2011, cited in today’s Zaman (23/01/2011). In its succinctness, the sentence encapsulates the various dimensions in which this text appears, and is a useful elucidation before wandering through the analysis. The gist of the view expressed in the sentence corresponds to firstly the HS perspective, with the well-being of citizens as front and centre, secondly to the ESS in which this approach is coming in. On the continua devised, it strikes concordance with the observation of an absence (at least a loosening) of a securitised thinking within FSP domain (continuum no. 1), with the religious and parallel civilian justificatory grounds for the policy legitimisation (no. 2), and it conjoins with the East/West-reconcilableness (in the recognition Turkey does: it admits having reached its limits and withdraws, handing the responsibility over to the international community, even when the example in question relates to a predominantly Muslim brother country).
9.1. Initially remarking on the context[s]

Before proceeding, first some required remarks on the contexts in and audiences for which some of the aforementioned speeches are held.

The UN’s Human Rights Council, to which Davutoğlu turns 28/02/2011, has been scathed because of member countries with not very solid or convincing democratic credentials. It should, however, not be ruled out as a forum disincentivising obligations for the speaker. The case to make from the context here would kick in by cutting slack these fillips for taking a firm stand, but in this case we see the reverse demonstration; the speaker takes a firm position contradicting such countries within the very same frame. As noted earlier, for Turkey, in contrast to other less democratically aspiring countries (e.g. China, Iran, Russia), it matters what she says publicly and officially. The reliability of the message is additionally strengthened given Davutoğlu’s stance qualitatively distinguishing Turkey from these countries.

However, the way China is addressed indicates how relationships to these sorts of countries on a bilateral footing still may chip away such powers. Stability was shown in the China daily article, by all accounts, as the over-riding interest. Emphasising too the emerging strength of Turkey - “As the 15th largest economy in the world, 6th in Europe, with a continuously growing market for investment, Turkey is on its way to joining the ranks of major global actors by most parameters” – it seems this is perceived as conferring upon her a sovereign right to decide which countries she shall have relations with, and what kind of relationships. Since China is such a big country and a crucial international player, such statements and orientations to a human rights-violator may not provoke the same anger on part of Turkish Western allies as has been the case with Turkey’s somewhat Infatuation with Iran and Sudan of recent years, since these latter countries do not belong to the crucial international game-players. This points to a problem of consistency and contingency. For a would-be member to the EU and a country espousing with the West, this may pose bigger problems than for a country without such aspirations or in another situation.

9.2. Human security, international governance and the [mis]-conceptualisation of FSP praxis and enlargement lexis

Important to keep in mind for the remaining reading is that, provided the material limitations, I can mainly speak about representations, not the factual policy conducted.

In his Manama address, Davutoğlu challenges sharply the hard security regime and thinking as unviable. Cultural, economic and political security-dimensions are rather the preconditions
Such a qualification is in line with the HS approach, and goes some steps along the way of reaching co-existence with the ESS of 2008. However, in the same address, he goes against the pure HS approach when bringing up the territorial sovereignty and national security principles as the key principle of international law.

Allow me a paragraphical deviation expounding on a possible criticism toward this reasoning. One could on this score argue that, if Turkey’s position is expected to adhere to a principle considered as a well-recognised tenet in international politics, it may not be Turkey posing the constitutive problem but instead the HS, if this HS intrinsically possess elements contradicting the incumbent hegemony. This is also a view expressed by several academics rejecting outright, or being slightly suspicious of, this kind of claim, arguing that such a measurement is less relevant since countries and regimes across the whole world do not respect the HS principles, hence it should not rest upon solely Turkey to comply with it (e.g. Turan 14/03/2011; Doğan 15/03/2011; Aktar 22/03/2011; Kirişçi 01/04/2011). However, this view expressed is premature. It fails on either one of two points: 1) it confuses idealism with realism, saying that such a criterion should not be directed solely at Turkey when so many other actors are defaulting on it. Such an instinctive statement does, however, not heed – or does lack knowledge about - the clear development in the direction of HS which has taken place within the EU. 2) Alternatively, and more importantly, it fails in realising the context-specific and asymmetric characteristics of the EU’s enlargement policy area, differing in quality from the FSP, and the emerging conflation of these two domains. Such a claim expressed would not lack in logic were these two domains still separate from each other: in a world where everything is categorised in non-interplaying policy spheres, the distinction between lexis and praxis preserves its greater validity. However, as I have argued, this is no longer the case, and will be even less so in the future. Particularly the traits of the enlargement policy area cut up the thematically relevant separation, but provided this area’s asymmetric character, this does no longer hold true. To get stuck in this trap is – despite the spurious inferences it may create – excusable, as the below-the-surface and slowly but steadily changing reality not easily, without an effort, captures the casual glimpse-catcher’s attention, but is only discovered through a critical and careful perusal. This study aims to provide a contribution to such an understanding. Of course, such an understanding is still to be spread and corroborated further, and this initial step, will have bearings for both the research into the EU enlargement policy and for the FSP praxis.

The fact that there are both HS-conforming and HS-deflecting signs discernible in the above-mentioned address, goes actually quite far in conforming to the position held by the
EU; lumping together hard and comprehensive security. However, mentioned should be the observation that Davutoğlu in fact never does resort to an argumentation in favour of military usage, nor does refer to it as a means. In the ESS, although it is likely to be prioritised even more in the proposed renewal as of 2013, the HS approach is still phrased in a way possible to interpret as an appendage, whilst it in the expressed FSP-positions on part of all the leading Turkish actors, is upped qualitatively differently. This is additionally reflected in the emphasis recurrently put on renewal of the current international system of governance, to a various degree present in all the speeches (and also present in contexts where such reasoning is not expected), universality and all-embracingness are the guiding principles. Focus is primarily on the institutional set-up of the world order, particularly when it comes to post WW2-institutions, connoted as Western ones and ill-suited for today’s multi- or non-polar world, as stressed by Turan (14/03/2011). Turan argues that this goes a certain extent in explaining Turkey’s stances on the one hand on the Arab spring’s developments in Tunisia and Egypt, and on the other hand, its divergent, more boggling actions toward Libya (and later, Syria): Egypt and Tunisia are both part of the Western hemisphere, its interest sphere, whereas Gaddafi and Assad are rebellions against the international order. Therefore, in the wish to reform the international system of governance, it is less costly to take a firm anti-regime stance in these two cases than was with Tunisia and Egypt. (This goes also with the way Turkey has approached other rebellion regimes such as Iran and Sudan; see further below.)

The speeches do also reveal wherefrom these principles are brought: the world is new, undergoing thorough changes, and its institutions and principles have to be adapted accordingly, but Turkey’s role in this new world and its values are continuous: a continuous flow stemming from the history, culture, civilisation of Turkey. A contradiction in terms? Not necessarily. I rather argue that this aims to represent and legitimise the rightful place among the leading actors in the international game, a privilege and right Turkey had been denied for too long. Seen in this light of the history, overcoming suspicious minds, both domestic and foreign ones, is a daunting and not-so-easy task to accomplish. An example of the complexity of the current and wished-for change of the current state of international affairs is displayed in Turkey’s approach to the Libya and Syria parts of the Arab spring. What is hidden beneath on the surface conveyed criticism against Turkey’s said-to-be hesitation and selectiveness, are arguments that Turkey’s actions have been firmly guided by a clearly humanitarian perspective (as emphasised by Alpay 25/03/2011; Demirtas 04/04/2011). Turkey has clearly taken a critical stance against the usage of military means, which of course was not obvious: Turkey, with the second largest military force within NATO, could have chosen another path, using it,
but did not. Instead, after some initial turbulence it chose to face fait accompli before France’s and the UK’s readiness to go on it alone, and Turkey began arguing in favour of a broad, political backing within the NATO frame in order to secure international legitimacy for and national control of the operation. Turkey, however, continuously stuck to the humanitarian-first approach, and provided evacuation facilities along with offers to provide the oppositional forces with food and medicine, disregarding the fact that the rebels rejected these provisions and did not defer to the rebels when they demanded weaponry supplies instead. It would be difficult to find a stronger indication for a HS approach to such a situation (irrespective of how sustainable it is). Alongside this HS approach is a contextual background, in which Turkey has been acting as a role model, and specific measures of this posture can be argued to have provided catalysts for the popular mood behind the Arab spring; for example the lifting of visa requirements that Turkey has extended to a number of nationals of the region.

However, on the other hand, this can also be construed as a window of opportunity conducive for the pursuit of exactly such a perspective. The leeway is conferred when other actors (NATO in the Libyan case) are fending for the military, hard security responsibility. The scope is thus widened and the cost is reduced for others to take on a more critical, in this case a humanitarian profile. Turkey has in this matter woven this stance together with its criticism of the current system of international governance. Still Turkey has a clear conviction that global challenges have to be solved at international and not solely at regional level. It attaches great importance to the UN system, as manifested, although this is running alongside the reformist stance to the international system of governance. On this score, it is noticeable that the EU does not take such a firm and consistent stance toward the need for UN reforms, most likely due to internal divisions on how such reforms should look like. The EU positions on UN reforms rather boil down to an ambition to boost its own clout in it – represented by the “super observer” status it finally, in May, after many long wrangles, was given in the UN’s general Assembly. If the differing positions on international governance is a given and seen as a variable in the EU-Turkey relationship, it may cause spaces for conflict, at a general level but also in concrete situations (be mindful of the cases of Libya, Syria and Iran).

9.3. How does Turkey’s behaviour play into its EU relationship?
Enlightening here would be to delineate the main distinctnesses between the EU and Turkey as entities with regards to FSP. I argue that Turkey’s limitations in this area are structural and policy-related, whereas the EU’s are institutional and political. To explicate: the EU system is
marred with divisions on the main FSP outlooks and on how the EEAS should function. The preferences of the community actors (leading in promoting the set-up of the EEAS in order to streamline and enhance the EU’s FSP clout) could cohabitate with breakers’ preferences, held by many EU member states. The ongoing tussle between these various actors can continue, opponents and advocates are satisfied, the EEAS can be designated and designed, while the member states can or at least attempt to maintain the privilege to control the process. The lack of a common ground on FSP within the EU creates a propensity to reactivity on part of the EU in its external relations. Turkey does not suffer from this institutional contingency. This provides a greater possibility for Turkish proactiveness. In comparison with the EU, this has also provided an enhanced possibility for Turkey to, in a more coherent and straightforward way, continue with its ambitions in the FSP area. However, its limitations are structural: other actors need to be acknowledging Turkey’s positions in order to allow it to have international clout (conditioned the Turkish positions do not only correspond to international needs of today but also to the main game-players’ preferences). Thus, even if Turkey’s ability in strengthening its FSP position is consolidated, from this does not automatically follow that Turkey will profit from it internationally or in its relation to the EU. The EU does not suffer from this latter limitation, thanks to its sheer size: if the EU’s institutional and political deficiencies are overcome, if the institutionalisation, strengthening, coordination, consolidation and implementation of its FSP are successfully carried out, this will by all likelihood rapidly reach a globally relevant role, notwithstanding the behaviour of other international actors.

So how does the HS approach, partial or thorough, on part of Turkey, play into Turkey’s EU orientations? Unless it is not corresponding to EU-positions, a refined HS approach does not necessarily play to Turkey’s advantage when it comes to its orientation toward the EU and to its EU accession process. One can be as upset as possibly is over this (as indicated by many Turkish actors when referring to double standards), but the problem is, as has been argued, that the decision-power lies with the EU, and is mainly a political, not a legal one. Therefore, in what way the Turkish activity during the Arab spring is considered as true to its high-minded principles, with a HS approach to be found under the surface or if it raises doubts of its consistency and actual capacity to live up to its ambitions and foreign policy potential, this may, I argue, given how it is handled, be a problem both in the longer and in the short term. If the HS principles are not conformed with, as some argue, this should pose a problem for Turkey in the longer run, as the Copenhagen’s political criterion is the decisive one, and as the HS by all likelihood will play a more front and centre role within the EU’s doctrine ahead, and consequently also in the enlargement policy area (since there are no clear criteria set for
the FSP when this is getting closer to and partially subsumed within the enlargement policy area). On the other hand, provided Turkey will be considered as a strategically key country for the EU and as a realpolitik asset in the region, such values may be side-lined. However, it is crucial to be mindful of that such a possible latter development would not count toward Turkey’s EU membership prospects, but rather Turkey would be taking the place as a privileged ally to the EU in this domain. This prospect might sound negative, and for ideally devoted Turkophiles, it certainly is – construed as a victory for all Turkey naysayers. In comparison to full EU membership, each alternative format is of course seen as something denigrating. Unless we have an alternative line-up among the European leaders, possessing true leadership, and viewed from the vantage point of how the real world looks like and of how EU politics works rather than compared with one’s ideal state, the talk of phased membership for Turkey with FSP as a door-opener, does perhaps not – lest the accession process is resumed - sound as such a calamitous option. It should, however, be admitted that such a phased integration may act to the detriment of Turkey’s possibility, as of now, to acting proactively and independently formulating FSP positions and solutions when it has to be subsumed into the EU arrangements, unless the format of the European way of cooperating on FSP matters is reformed (which hopefully may be possible thanks to a new phase-based integration pattern).

My reasonings demand further investigation. Particularly so because the judgements to fall on Turkey’s FSP behaviour are not legal, but political. Neither the ESS nor the HS are legally binding documents/perspectives, which opens up for interpretations and re-interpretations.

9.4. Tracing the continua
Relating to above are frequent references to religion and Islam. As shown in chapter 8, Islam is not the sole justificatory ground; when possible, these references extend to include other faiths, probably in order to enhance the reach of the legitimisation. When considering the cleavage religious-secular in continuum no. 2, there is an unambiguous propensity of referring to religion when justifying a message of humanity and morality in foreign relations. This is not to deny problems and fuzz that have appeared in Turkish selective relationships with certain countries, on part of many in the international community perceived as non gratae, such as Iran and Sudan, where the relationships among the leaders sometimes seem more than courteous, if not affable. However, making conclusions from showcase paraphernalia may create misjudgements. As several of the interviewees note, the relationships with these countries would perhaps not have differed substantially if we were to have had another govern-
ment in Turkey (Turan 14/03/2011; Kirści 01/04/2011; Demirtas 04/04/2011). Economic interests and wish for stabilisation have been important in shaping better relationships. Some of these initiatives preceded AKP. Much of it carries a symbolic, less substantial, stamp, and a different government would perhaps be less intimate with these foreign leaders than the AKP leaders have been, but not deviate from the general direction. However, cultural issues may play a role, as the leaders feel more comfortable in the company of Arab-Muslim brothers than in the company of European diplomacy and politics, which Kirisci mentions, however how much out of 100 these matters kick in is impossible to say, but it may be just enough to tip the balance. Dogan (15/03/2011) points to the alternative perception on part of the incumbent government on how religious beliefs should play and do play into interpersonal relationships, as different to oppositional actors in Turkey, implying too this less substantial difference. This would go some way in tilting towards the religious end along continuum no. 2.

However, religion is not the sole ground for policy legitimisation. One may believe that politics spearheaded by religion would not have the same sorts of self-imposed limitations to its remits as a reasoned one would have. The assistive role that Turkey can play in its region, in the Western perception, has been ever increasingly acknowledged. Dogan stresses the populist nature of Turkey’s government: if they find an area fruitful, they polish it and convert it into an award. But it is guided by a great self-awareness – he cites the latest internal Lebanese crisis of the winter 2010/11 where Turkey firstly attempted to play a mediating role, but when realising the futility of these attempts, it withdrew, acknowledging also its own limitations (Dogan 15/03/2011). This implies a greater degree of awareness and self-mediated populism on part of Turkey than argued by commentators stuck in a mere focus on the religious dimension to it and who consider it as something intrinsically problematic. The limitations to Turkey’s clout is moreover acknowledged by the government itself and the politics adapted accordingly – Turkey is not a superpower, but still a very important international player. In order to boost its leverage internationally, Turkey has accordingly, also along with Davutoğlu’s recognition of the key importance of multilateralism, consciously made use of the language of international law, garnering a mechanism for legitimisation vis-à-vis the international community. This goes also for enhancing its legitimisation domestically. In the midst of the Ship to Gaza-crisis between Turkey and Israel, Turkey was rocked into turmoil, but very soon, the FM began using the language of international law, in order to pull all anger and nationalist discourse onto the level of international law, argues Dogan. This pattern is in addition discernible in the speeches treated. On this score, the civilian component dominates.
The civilian and religious components have thus gained an increased role. These two components do, however, neither contradict nor harmonise completely with each other. They rather, I would argue, complement one and another. The religious dimension is evidently a driving force, providing the intellectual and moral backbone for the civilian-led formulations. The civilian legitimisation trajectory is thus a consistently enforced way of enhancing its legitimation, by embracing other interests, parties and stakeholders to a certain issue area than would have been possible with a narrow follow-through on purely one’s own principles. Therefore, populism and principles do interplay in a systematic way. This interplay does not always chime. The ambitions of multi-dimensionality and equi-distance, often translated into neutrality, have sometimes led Turkey astray, wobbling between neutral stands and taking sides in a seemingly not very coherent manner. This character differs from the EU, which rather is a dominant actor promoting clearcut norms and therefore more easily takes sides.

Regarding the securitised continuity, believed to be displayed alongside its opposite forces such as proactive, normative stances, comprised by the same actor at the same time, a belief which I entitled the ontological duality of the Turkish actorship; such a securitised thinking does not represent itself in the manifested empirics. However, I argue, such an inference needs to be qualified: this sort of securitised thinking is actually less prevalent in the FSP. It seems that the qualitative leap into a new paradigm on this score has been carried through and pulled off, as Alpay (25/03/2011) argues. Not on a single occasion is hard security opted for, and when mentioned, it is to problematise the concept of security, making the hard core of it expanding, reaching a comprehensive understanding. The objective in the FSP seems to be universalism. Of course, it is not successful every time – think of the Libya and Syria cases (although these can and have been argued to be espoused by a clear humanitarian position), and of the Iran nuclear crisis of 2010 when Turkey turned against the entire international community by together with Brazil striking the uranium swap deal. But which country does succeed to 100 %? As a relative new-beginner, extremely active and proactive on the international scene, but still on a testing ground, it is but natural that Turkey sometimes hits explosive devises in the minefield of international politics – it is part of the process of daring, acting grandiloquently and being in the grabbing-at-phase. In addition, as Doğan noted, the government is still aware of its limitations. Importantly, regardless of whether one considers Turkey’s stance toward the internal crises of Libya and Syria during the Arab spring as reactive, misguided by its own economic and stability interests, or if one considers it as representing a humanitarian-first position; the behaviour was not indicative of a fearful Sèvres-mentality but, if so, by traditional liberal intergovernmental interests. Thus, Turkey is not deviating from
international politics in general, but would be quite an ordinary player in this Western family of state actors. The problem is, however, that in the asymmetric accession process, such espousal may not be enough for boosting a candidate country’s accession prospects.

So, the Sèvres-syndrome mentality does not display itself in the assessed FSP positions. The ontological duality of the Turkish actorship could therefore not be proved right or wrong. However, turning to the domestic sphere and to the formalised EU-accession negotiation process, I argue, traits of a Sèvresque continuity are still discernible. This was also believed to be the case by Özdoğan (15/03/2011) and Kirişçi (01/04/2011). Just to mention but a few examples; think of the harsh rhetorical character of the general election campaign. Think of the polarised political climate where criticism is regarded as threats and attacks. And think of the very emotional, fierce reactions on part of Turkey’s government toward the European parliament progress report published in March 2011 which took a critical position on the press freedom in Turkey, calling the report unbalanced, produced by unbalanced people. Moreover, demonstrated most clearly in Erdoğan’s Newsweek op-ed but also a general undercurrent in the speeches highlighting Turkey’s own pride in being a country, now able to serve for itself and with a potency making it able to handle its own affairs. Turkey is said to be unique among the candidate countries. However, at the same time, the sting is consistently directed at the EU, and in a short of desperate tone it clings to the EU track - indicating something substantially civilisatoric for Turkey, manifesting something much more important in this relation than in other international relationships.

With regard to the traits of this securitised thinking in the domestic sphere and the detected lack of it in the FSP sphere, it is interesting to ponder the possibility of the FSP sphere consciously used for enacting a normative and ideational actorship. From a vote support-maximisation perspective, this may appeal to a certain constituency of electoral support whereas a different, quite a more nationalistic or reactive, stand in the domestic and the EU-membership spheres may appeal to other groups in the society. Thus, these different spheres have various functions and purposes for the governmental party, offering it a possibility to expand its support; and creates, in the eyes of the onlooker, patchy representations.

These sides of the coin have not been investigated in this study, but are seeds for future research, from the view-point of my ontological belief of a duality in the Turkish actorship on securitisation. Coming studies can moreover take account of the degree to which such thinking would be prevalent in the domestic sphere, which has been impossible for me here.

On the East-West ends, not one interviewee thinks that the Turkish government pays heed to specifically the EU when formulating FSP positions. Nor is the EU, in the speeches, dis-
played as a decisive factor. The way the positions are phrased is rather indicating an independent positioning, driven by a wish to let Turkey reclaim the rightful place and to activate the strategic depth-grounded principles in the international arena. This forges a leeway for Davutoğlu, in the LDC summit in Istanbul May 9-13, to criticise the developed North for an innate propensity on their part to deny any impact at all from the colonial past on the development of the poorest countries of the world and the attendant lost possibility for these to undergo the successive transition into the global economy as has been the feature of the Northern economies. At the same time, he does not shy away from dismissing the tendency in LDC countries to shut their eyes for bad economic management and in blame avoidance put all the culpa on history and the formerly colonial powers. East and West are not perceived as mutually exclusive; rather, the spirit goes in the direction of perceiving Turkey as a Western country (not the least shown in the EU attachment), but a country re-discovering its old bonds also in other directions. Such a reflection is corroborated when pondering Turkey’s activity under the Arab spring. Critics who are suggesting that Turkey is turning Islamist and turning its back to the West because its visible rapport with Muslim/Arabic regimes holding not democratically lustre credentials, should in this respect be forced to qualify their inferences. Turkey has been caught as off guard as anyone else before the unfolding of the Arab spring, and rather, Turkey’s leverage with these countries, mainly Libya and Syria, Ottoman dominions as they were, has been revealed as not as strong as believed (and hoped for). Allowing space for the complexity, as Johannison (12/03/2011) exhorted us to do, enables such a mutually double-edged direction in the outlook and orientation.

The current seems to be a mix of old and new, or, rather that the new is dressed in old guises. The new is usurped and ushered by old, timeless principles. Hence, there is some qualitatively new to this, but that does not mean – as never in Turkish history, regardless of the rhetoric – a complete discharge of what once was. Paradoxically, the new, although it partially builds on previous Islamic-leaning political parties, is that it obviously is based on references to and principles formulated on a religious basis. Probably the greatest change is to be found in the civilian-military dimension; nothing left of militarily-emanated argumentation or influence stemming from this is observed (Turan 14/03/2011; Doğan 15/03/2011; Alpay 25/03/2011). The FSP formulation process has been opened up, becoming susceptible also for a broader spectrum of societal opinions.

To summarise, the securitised character is not prevalent in the foreign policy formulation on part of Turkey (but may still reverberate in its domestic sphere and in its relationship to the EU, suggested to constitute a quid pro quo between these policy spheres). On the second con-
tinuum, the civilian and religious dimensions are strengthened, lumped together in a systemic and populist approach, and on the third continuum, the East-West outlook has been transformed but is not mutually exclusive. There are partial but at the same time clear Turkish orientation to the European principles of the HS and the ESS, as the case is too in EU’s position itself. At the same time, the references to the EU in the formulation of positions are infrequent, if scarcely traceable. However, this does not in itself play to Turkey’s advantage in the EU accession negotiations. At the end of the day, the European assessment of Turkey’s compliance is not legal, but political.

9.5. The questions of limitation and generalisability: a forward-look and a call for realism and leadership

Some may be inclined to dismiss the empirical claims in this study as language close to nonsense. However, language matters, as well as representations and brands within the international politics. It does matter how a country is perceived. If these representations for a country with ambitions to turn its back to isolation and dictatorial legacies are violated in practise, it would ruin the country’s credibility. This particularly so for a country like Turkey. The analytical claims made are in addition assisted by primary interviews in order partly to corroborate the results from other sources and partly to look into discussions on the practical execution of the representations. Moreover, if one is the least knowledgeable about Turkish history, both recent and past, one should know that the qualitative leap in rhetoric and practise which has taken place of late is not nonsense. Turkey, becoming even more securitised and threat-exposed post the Cold War was not predestined to go in this direction. Of course, nor anything for the future is predestined, but aware of the security-consciousness in Turkey and the historical disinterest for its Eastern and Arabic connections, this development has to be considered as something unique, warts and all. Yet, real challenges lie ahead if Turkey wants to be successful in the ambitions of playing a continuously growing role internationally.

I do not claim that my three-folded continua are exhaustive. However, I believe they are both pertinent and useful when treating the Turkish case. The reader may recall Beck’s methodological nationalism, running the risk of making the social sciences blind and creating blindness for Europe (Beck 2006:34). However, the continua are devised in such a way that they address both country-specific characteristics and are left to be applied also to other countries. True, much of the findings and discussions are Turkey-specific, but that does not exclude the use of the methodological skeleton devised for studies of other countries and for
further studies of Turkish politics. It is even theoretically and epistemologically desirable. Think of Sweden. The first continuum was feeding from a national self-image showing a double nature, seemingly mutually contradictory but on a closer look actually possible to bestow upon and held by one and the same actor at one and the same moment. In the Swedish case, such a two-pronged character displays itself in a hyper-individualisation and a simultaneous collectivist, even conformist, mentality. On part of the same Swedish actor, a tradition and preserved belief of being morally and socially superior to foreign, unknown countries and people, a will to act as the world’s moral conscience, can work side by side with the spirit of the “Jante Law”, the cultural code (originally developed in the Danish writer Aksel Sandemose’s novel “A fugitive crosses his tracks” from 1933) goading the actor not thinking she has higher morals or is better than anyone else. Coming to continuum no. 2, it could be used for a study of any country taking into the lens the country’s political cleavages. A reasonable translation of continuum no. 3 into a Swedish perspective would be to ask whether Sweden has a continental or Nordic turn and referent in its FSP formulations, based on a belief that geopolitics do matter. Consequently, the continua, motivated as they are for their embraciveness, are easily converted to other countries, thus circumventing the methodological nationalism trap. I am too content that the methodological model is applicable in other policy areas than purely FSP, which made me unwilling to exclusively call it a foreign policy analysis. This study has moreover been mainly based on an ideal-typic or refined view of the politics, polity and policies. Therefore, instructive for further research would be to bring this methodology a step forward and take a more rigorous look into the practical conduct of politics.

I am, as repeatedly stressed, well aware that at the end of the day it is a political assessment from the EU’s side which will be decisive in deciding whether Turkey’s FSP action and compliance will improve its EU accession prospects. The fact that the process is contingent on a political, and not a legal or a moral, opinion, is too often overlooked by pundits commenting on the process. Even politicians themselves, particularly Turkey-advocates, tend to forget this when raising their voices. The compliance rate ipso facto will not tell much about this process or the prospects. However, I would like to show that the Turkish actions and positions do not deflect in a significant way from the norms and ideals which influence the EU FSP position, and do in fact bear clear traits of the principles which will play an even greater importance ahead in the EU’s FSP as it is subsumed into the EU’s enlargement policy. The Turkish behaviour bears traits of partly a HS approach but also partly the state-centric view and particularly the comprehensive perspective and the flexibility along which the ESS, as first in its implementation report of 2008 and even more in the future revisions will steer toward. Such a
contribution provided by this study should be a value per se. It is also a call for both realism and leadership on part of politicians, scientists and pundits dealing with EU-Turkey relations.
10. Bibliography

10.1. Literature:
AYDINTAŞBAS, Asli (19/03/2011) “TURK EY HAS ABANDONED QADDAFI”, milliyet


Barysch, Katinka (2007) ”What Europeans think about Turkey and why” Centre for European Reform, Policy brief, August 2007

Barysch, Katinka (2010) ”Turkey and the EU: Can stalemate be avoided?”, Centre for European Reform, Policy brief, May 2010


Berlinski, Claire (2010) ”Smile and Smile: Turkey’s Feel-Good Foreign Policy”, World Affairs July/August 2010


Bozkurt, Abdullah (26/03/2011) “Turkey walks gray line in Libya” Today’s Zaman


Cook, Steven (2010) “Friends or Enemies? The U.S. and Turkey”, Foreign Policy 01/06/2010


Davutoğlu, Ahmet (02/11/2010) “Taking Sino-Turkish relations forward” China Daily


Doğan, Yonca Poyraz (03/02/2011): “Survey shows Turkey highly favored in many Mideastern countries”, today’s Zaman


Egnell, Robert (22/03/2011): ”Är vi beredda på att ta ansvar för Libyens framtid?”, Dagens Nyheter debatt


Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip (17/01/2011) “Turkey has the vigor that the EU badly needs” Newsweek

EU can lead world on 'lateral' governance, says Rifkin.


European Security Strategy: A secure europe in a better world 2003), Brussels , 12 December 2003


Garton Ash, Timothy (27/01/2011) “The optimists of Davos past now face a world whose script has gone awry”, The Guardian

Girdner, Eddy J. (2005) "SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCES OF GLOBAL CONFLICT AND INSECURITY”, in AYDIN, Mustafa (eds) "Regional In/Security: Redefining Threats and Responses”, Ankara University Faculty of Political Science Publication No: 593


Hacking, Ian (2000) ”Social konstruktion av vad?” Thales


Johannisson, Karin (13/03/2011) “Barn som offer och aktör”, Dagens Nyheter


Karabat, Ayşen (23/01/2011) “Meditation for Lebanon standoff: mission almost impossible” Today’s Zaman


Mouffe, Chantal (2008) “Om det politiska”, tankekraft


Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and Gürsoy, Yaprak(2010) 'Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates'. Turkish Studies, 11: 3, 405 -427


Onar, Nora Fisher (04/04/2011) Opendemocracy “Europe’s tipping-point, Turkey’s solution”. http://www.opendemocracy.net/nora-fisher-onar/europe%E2%80%99s-tipping-point-Turkey%E2%80%99s-solution

Oğuzlu, Tarik(2008) “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?”, Turkish Studies, 9: 1, 3 — 20


Paul, Amanda (24/04/2011) “Is Turkey losing credibility in the Middle East?” Today’s Zaman
Perchoc, Philippe (29/12/2010) “Europe is a troubled adolescent that just needs to grow up”, The Guardian’s My Europe series
Rogers, Paul (28/01/2010): “China’s military: threat or twist”, Opendemocracy,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/china%E2%80%99s-military-threat-or-twist
Strömvik, maria (2009) ”Strävan till gemensam utrikes- och säkehretspolitik”, in Gustafsson, Sverker &, Oxelheim, Lars & Persson, Lars (eds) ”Hur gemensam är den europeiska gemenskapen?”, Europaperspektiv 2009
Tocci, Nathalie (2009a) “Unpacking European Discourses: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations”, in Tocci, Nathalie (eds) “Conditionality, impact and prejudice in EU-Turkey relations”. Istituto Affari Internazionali and TEPAV
Tocci, Nathalie (2009b) "When and Why Does the EU Act as a Normative Power in its Neighbourhood?”, in Emerson, Michael “Readings in European Security”, VOLUME 5, Volume 5, Centre for European Policy Studies

Today’s Zaman (26/02/2011): “Sarkozy praises Turkey’s importance, but opposes EU bid”

Today’s Zaman (21/03/2011) “PM Erdoğan criticizes Gaddafi, calls for swift end to operation”

Traub, James (2010) “All Roads Lead to Istanbul” Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel 15/10/2010


Walker, Joshua (2011a) “Return of the Turks as Middle East kingmaker”, The Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel 03/02/2011

Walker, Joshua (2011b) “Turkey's Regional Leadership in the Middle East: Principle or Realpolitik?”, Turkey Analyst. VOL. 4 NO. 6, 21/03/2011

Wallis, Tim (01/05/2011) “Protecting civilians: too important to be left to the military”, Opendemocracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/tim-wallis/protecting-civilians-too-important-to-be-left-to-military


Zeynalov, Mahir (25/03/2011) “Erdoğan discusses alternatives with Gaddafi to end crisis” Today’s Zaman


10.2. Speeches:

Unless anything else is mentioned, the following speeches are available at Turkey’s MFA:
http://www.mfa.gov.tr


18/02/2011. Address by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at the Ministerial Meeting “Harnessing the Positive Contribution of South-South Cooperation for the Development of LDCs”, 18-19 February, New Delhi

24/01/2011. Speech Delivered by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey and Chair of the Committee of Ministers, to the Parliamentary Assembly, 24 January 2011, Strasbourg

23/12/2010. Address by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at the 19th ECO Council of Ministers Meeting

05/12/2010. Statement by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at UN Security Council High Level Meeting on Iraq, 15 December 2010

11/12/2010. Address by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, at the International Conference on Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan: Cooperation for Peace, Security and Development, 11 December 2010

04/12/2010. Statement by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at the 7th IISS Regional Security Summit of the Manama Dialogue


03/11/2010. Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at the Fourth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, 3 November 2010, İstanbul

04/10/2010. Address By H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of The Republic Of Turkey, On The Occasion Of The Relief Campaign For The Victims Of The Flood Catastrophe In The Islamic Republic Of Pakistan (Ankara, October 4th, 2010)


10.3. Interviews:

14/03/2011. İltür Turan, Professor of Political Science, Istanbul Bilgi University

15/03/2011. Erhan Doğan, Assistant Professor of political science and international relations, Marmara University, Istanbul
15/03/2011. Gunay Gukso Özdoğan, Professor of political science, Marmara University, Istanbul.

22/03/2011. Cengiz Aktar, assistant professor of european Studies, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul.

25/03/2011. Sahin Alpay, doctor and senior lecturer in political science, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul.

01/04/2011. Kemal Kirişçi, Professor of International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair in European integration, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul.

Sammanfattning (in Swedish)


För den kommande analysen utformas tre förklarande kontinua: 1) ett som berör sociokultuella självbilder baserat på dikotomier såsom säkerhetiserad/normativt och defensivt/proaktivt. Uppsatsten kritiserar den, inte minst i analys av turkisk politik ofta förekommande, reduktionistiska ontologin härvidlag, och argumenterar för att dessa positioner inte av nödvändighet måste intas av olika aktörer vid ett och samma tillfälle (spatialt sett) eller av samma aktör fast vid olika tidpunkter (tidsligt sett). Det är denna ontologiska eklektiska utgångspunkt som möjliggör studiens spatiala operationalisering. 2) Ett andra kontinuum berör de i det turkiska fallet typiska politiska skiljelinjerna civilt/militärt och religiöst/sekulärt och ställer frågor kring huruvida dessa är att förväntas bli återfunna även på det utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiska planet. 3) ett sista kontinuum tar upp den geografiska komponenten, närmare bestämt öst-väst-riktningen, i policyformuleringen, en fråga som kan tyckas ytlig. Detta är i så fall en ytlig som stannar på det ontologiska planet medan på det epistemologiska planet kvarstår frågan som högst relevant.


Analysen finner att tesen om aktörskapets säkerhetiserande inte finns representerad i FSP-sfären, men kan fortfarande skönjas klinga i inrikespolitiken och i Turkiets relation till EU. En medveten klyvna i aktörskapet mellan dessa sfärer kan argumenteras bero på politisk-strategiska överväganden, men dessa slutsatser kräver vidare forskning. Den civila och religiösa komponenten i policyformuleringen har stärkts, och förenas i en systematisk, populistisk ansats från regeringspartiet. Öst-väst-orienteringen har transformerats men är inte ömsesidigt uteslutande, utan dess oberoende position möjliggör samtidigt kritik och anslutning åt båda håll. Delvis men samtidigt tydlig turkisk uppfyllnad av HS och ESS går att skönja – emellertid är referenserna till EU i formuleringen knappt skönjbara. Detta utgör dock inte i sig själv en självklar fördel för Turkiets i dess relation till EU; till syvende og sidst är bedömningen från EU:s sida av huruvida Turkiets stärkta aktivitet på området ska gynna dess medlemskapsutsikter avhängig en politisk, inte en legal eller moralisk, bedömning.