No Pain, No Gain? Exploring the use of gain-loss framing in political climate debates in Germany and Sweden Helen Hellmessen Ingrid Gunnarsson Thesis: 30 hp Programme: Master in Communication Level: Second Cycle Year: 2025 Supervisor: John Currie Examiner: Ben Clarke Word count: 15,810 1 Abstract As the urgency of climate change increases, competing narratives about the potential gains and losses of climate action play a central role in shaping political discourses and policies. This thesis explores the extent and ways in which gain-loss framing is used in political climate debates (i.e. emphasizing positive or negative outcomes to promote or discourage climate action) in Germany and Sweden – two countries considered to be at the forefront of environmental policy in Europe. Thereby, the study addresses a lack of discourse approaches to gain-loss framing, and further adds to the limited multilingual research on climate communication in non-English-speaking countries. Adopting a corpus-assisted discourse study (CADS), the research combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of climate-related parliamentary debates in Germany and Sweden in 2024. The findings show that gain- and loss-framed arguments appear frequently and to similar extents in both Germany and Sweden, primarily to promote rather than discourage climate action. Three main discursive patterns emerge across both corpora: 1) maintaining prosperity and competitiveness, 2) preserving living conditions, and 3) balancing short- and long-term gains. Country-specific differences were mostly noticeable between political parties. Overall, the analysis suggests that climate action is often framed through cost-benefit logic, and shaped by tensions between immediate and future concerns. To increase support for sustainable policy-making in light of increasing urgency, politicians should continue to reframe short-term losses as long-term investments. Keywords: climate change, political discourse, gain-loss framing, corpus-assisted discourse study, multilingual 2 Table of Contents Abstract..................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 5 Literature Review...................................................................................................................... 8 Framing............................................................................................................................... 8 Frame theory.................................................................................................................8 Framing climate change................................................................................................ 9 Gain-loss framing.........................................................................................................10 CADS-approaches to climate change communication.......................................................13 Climate change discourses in Germany and Sweden........................................................ 14 Summary........................................................................................................................... 17 Methods.................................................................................................................................. 18 Corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS).........................................................................18 Data................................................................................................................................... 21 Data source..................................................................................................................21 Data collection.............................................................................................................23 Data analysis................................................................................................................24 Ethical considerations........................................................................................................28 Findings................................................................................................................................... 30 Frequency of gain-loss framing......................................................................................... 30 Discursive patterns of gain-loss framing............................................................................34 3 The green transition: Maintaining prosperity and competitiveness........................... 35 Environment, people and infrastructure: Preserving living conditions....................... 40 Reaching climate goals: Balancing short- and long-term gains................................... 45 Discussion................................................................................................................................51 Conclusion...............................................................................................................................60 References...............................................................................................................................65 List of Tables............................................................................................................................81 Appendices..............................................................................................................................82 Appendix A........................................................................................................................ 82 Appendix B........................................................................................................................ 83 Appendix C........................................................................................................................ 84 Appendix D........................................................................................................................ 87 Appendix E........................................................................................................................ 90 4 Introduction In recent decades, political actors are facing increasing pressure to address climate change. The World Meteorological Organization recently confirmed that 2024 was the warmest year on record, surpassing the critical 1.5°C warming threshold for the first time (WMO, 2025). This highlights the growing threats of climate change, including extreme weather effects and ecosystem collapse. At the same time, developments such as decreasing EU emissions through progress in the energy transition (Swedish Climate Council, 2025) suggest that a livable and sustainable future may still be within reach. Yet, the International Panel on Climate Change warns that “there is a rapidly closing window of opportunity” (IPCC, 2023, C.1). In this context, competing narratives about what is to be gained or lost play a central role in shaping public and political discourse around climate action. Since climate change is often not directly perceivable, it is through language that we construct meaning around it (Fløttum, 2017; Gjesdal & Andersen, 2023; Nerlich & Koteyko, 2010). Whether climate action is framed through hope or fear, opportunity or crisis, politicians’ narratives often reflect deeper ideological positions, and affect how climate change is perceived and what solutions are deemed acceptable (Fløttum & Gjerstad, 2017; Jones et al., 2017; Mah & Song, 2024; Saab, 2023; Willis, 2017). Such gain-loss frames both reflect and shape public debates (Leipprand et al., 2018), as they are often reproduced through media narratives (Robbins, 2020; Schmidt et al., 2013). Although climate change effects remain concerning, political parties may struggle to gain voter support for climate action, as attention shifts toward even more immediate and tangible concerns like war and economic instability (Breher, 2024). How politicians communicate climate action is therefore critical to further examine. 5 While climate change is a global phenomenon, it is also embedded in national contexts that influence how it is framed and understood. To gain a deeper understanding of these dynamics, multilingual and cross-national analyses are needed (Cunningham et al., 2022; Grundmann, 2022). While Germany and Sweden share societal, political, and cultural similarities, the countries have distinct self-images and different positions within the EU: Germany as a leading European economy and Sweden as forerunner in the green transition. As members of the EU, both are committed to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045 under the European Green Deal (Die Bundesregierung, 2024; Government Offices of Sweden, 2023). Still, both countries currently diverge from previously progressive climate agendas (Germanwatch, 2025a, 2025b; Walsh, 2017). During the past years, Sweden has reversed several ambitious measures, raising concerns about its future commitments (Germanwatch, 2025b). Expert bodies are warning that the current political trajectory fails to achieve set climate goals (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2025; OECD, 2025). While Germany is making progress in the energy sector, it still faces criticism for insufficient action in emission reduction and fossil fuel phase-out (Germanwatch, 2025a). An increasing influence of right-wing parties in both countries also leads to further polarization of climate debates (Forchtner et al., 2018; Gruber, 2025; Vihma et al., 2021). The current developments offer an important opportunity for analysis. The purpose of this thesis is to understand how gain-loss framing is used in recent parliamentary climate-related debates in Germany and Sweden, through a corpus-assisted discourse study (CADS). As most previous research has studied gain-loss framing in experimental settings (see pp. 11-13), this study offers an early exploration of how gain-loss framing discursively functions in political climate change communication. Although some studies have examined cross-cultural corpora (e.g. Vessey, 2013), few have applied CADS to 6 multilingual research. The specific approach of a cross-linguistic CADS offers a structured approach to analyzing climate communication across languages, to uncover discursive trends that transcend linguistic and cultural boundaries (Taylor, 2014; Taylor & Marchi, 2018). To allow for insight into current language use, the study analyzes debates from the year of 2024. Given the increasing urgency of climate action and the influential role of political language in shaping public perceptions and policy outcomes, this makes for a highly relevant subject of research. The study is guided by one main research question and a corresponding sub-question: ● To what extent and in what ways do politicians use gain-loss framing in climate-related parliamentary debates in Germany and Sweden in 2024? ○ To what extent and in what ways do the two countries display differences and/or similarities in gain-loss framing patterns? The study is structured as follows. The first chapter discusses key theoretical and empirical literature regarding framing theory, CADS-based approaches to climate change communication, and political climate change discourses in Germany and Sweden. Next, the second chapter outlines the methodological approach by clarifying the rationale behind CADS as a method, as well as the process of data collection and analysis. The third chapter presents the quantitative and qualitative findings of the study, which are discussed and contextualized in the subsequent chapter. The thesis concludes with final remarks and suggestions for future research. 7 Literature Review This chapter reviews key theoretical and empirical literature relevant to this study. The first section introduces framing theory in three subsections: The first outlines its interdisciplinary foundations, the second examines its relevance to climate change communication, and the third focuses on gain-loss framing, exploring how climate action is presented in terms of positive or negative outcomes. The second section reviews studies that adopt CADS-based approaches to climate change communication, to analyze media narratives and political discourse. The third section compares research on political climate discourse in Germany and Sweden. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of key research gaps to position this study within the broader literature. Framing Frame theory Frame theory aligns well with discourse analysis since they share a focus on discursive devices, sensemaking and power in language-in-use (van Hulst et al., 2024). Framing widely informs the field of environmental and climate change communication, drawing on a variety of disciplines including communication, sociology, economics, political science, psychology, and linguistics (Borah, 2011). The highly interdisciplinary nature of frame theory makes for a scattered but resourceful research area. In an attempt to unify dispersed understandings and conceptualizations of framing, Entman (1993) provides a widely referenced definition, built on the idea of selection and salience. He explains that ‘‘to frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’’ (p. 52). Hence how climate 8 change is framed in the political debate can either open up or close down possible responses (Paterson, 2021; Stibbe, 2021). Researchers agree on framing as a constructivist concept but differentiate between sociological and psychological traditions (Borah, 2011; Guenther et al., 2024). Sociological framing research explores frames in texts, images, or news (Borah, 2011), i.e. “frames in communication” (Druckman, 2001). The psychological tradition is more concerned with cognitive frames, or “frames in thought” (Druckman, 2001). Cognitive frames can be understood as structures or schemas which are activated through word choices and associated with sets of meanings (Lakoff, 2010; Stibbe, 2021). Acknowledging that frames can occur at the level of language, thought, and communication helps to bridge these two traditions (Sullivan, 2023), which both inform this interdisciplinary research project. Framing climate change There are numerous climate change frames which can differ in efficacy between social-political contexts (Badullovich et al., 2020). Different ways of conceptualizing or framing climate change – such as global warming (Liu & Huang, 2022) and climate crisis/emergency/breakdown (Paterson, 2021) – call for different measures. Similarly, framing climate change as a problem or a predicament imply responses of different complexity (Stibbe, 2021, p. 60). Common themes in climate change framing include economic, environmental, scientific and morality frames (Badullovich et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2022; Dasandi et al., 2022). While Nisbet (2009) argues that any frame can be used to advocate for or against climate action, scholarly views on the legitimacy and effectiveness of different frames vary – especially when it comes to the economic frame. For instance, ecolinguistic research often criticize economic climate frames as non-transformative, expressing concerns that already over-consuming economies appropriate altruistic values, 9 such as securing global and future well-being, as a means to sustaining their own economic growth (Horváth & Lovasz, 2025; Stibbe, 2021, pp. 54-57). In contrast, other well-established theories, often derived from the domains of business and economics – such as the three pillars of sustainability (Purvis et al., 2019) – put economic growth as a fundamental component or even a prerequisite for sustainable development. Gain-loss framing In recent years, discourses around climate change have shifted from debating the extent of human influence on the climate to focusing on ideal mitigation and adaptation strategies (Flottum, 2017). A great body of research therefore examines how climate change and climate action is framed in terms of gains or losses. Gain-loss framing, similar to valence-framing (i.e. positive or negative framing; Dasandi et al., 2022), concerns whether alternatives are presented with reference to attaining desirable outcomes or avoiding negative ones (Toll et al., 2007). Gain-loss framing originates from behavioral economic theory, namely prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984), which demonstrates the role of framing effects in choice selection. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) argue that presenting the same information differently, i.e. in terms of gains or losses, can influence both the experience of the outcome and the choice made. They note that people perceive negative outcomes more positively if they are framed as costs (i.e. necessary investments) rather than losses. Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrate that people are more likely to take risks if losses are highlighted compared to gains. Hence, as Van der Linden et al. (2015) argues, “when climate change impacts are framed as potential (i.e., uncertain) losses in the distant future, whereas climate change solutions are framed as certain losses for society at present, it encourages people to conclude that maintaining the 10 status quo may be ‘worth the gamble’” (p. 760). Accordingly, understanding the role of gain-loss framing in political climate debates is highly relevant. Most studies on gain-loss framing in environmental communication derive from interdisciplinary fields informed by psychological science, such as communication (e.g. Nabi et al., 2018), behavioral economics (e.g. Svenningsen & Thorsen, 2021) and health communication (e.g. Toll et al., 2007). Hence, gain-loss framing arguably encompasses both communicative and cognitive dimensions. Given that the theoretical outset focuses on frame effects, it is not surprising that much research on gain-loss framing relies on experiments, with numerous studies exploring gain- and loss-framed messages in the climate change domain. Such experiments often test whether gain- or loss-framed messages have a higher influence on attitudes and perceptions about climate change (León et al., 2021), more specifically about climate policies (Armbruster et al., 2022; Bertolotti & Catellani, 2014; Dasandi et al., 2022; Nabi et al., 2018; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Svenningsen & Thorsen, 2021). Other experiments, for example, considered the influence on recycling behavior (White et al., 2011), household low-carbon behavior (Li et al., 2023), support for invasive species management (DeGolia et al., 2019), or climate adaptation measures of farmers (Ngo et al., 2022). Due to the different experimental settings, evidence on which of these frames is more effective in promoting pro-environmental behaviours and attitudes appears to be mixed, ranging from support for gain-framed messages (e.g. Ngo et al., 2022) to tendencies towards loss-framed messages (e.g. DeGolia et al., 2019). Other researchers rather point out that efficacy information as well as individual and contextual factors are more influential on climate change perceptions and behavior, regardless of gain- or loss-framing (Armbruster et al., 2022; Bertolotti & Catellani, 2014; León et al., 2021; White et al., 2011). 11 As effects of gain- and loss-frames are mediated by emotions (Nabi et al., 2018), this type of framing also relates to similar concepts such as hope and fear. Gains can be framed in a hopeful, prevention-focused way, while losses can be based on threatening fear-appeals (Armbruster et al., 2022, p. 3; Tannenbaum et al., 2015, pp. 1181–1182). Extensive research in climate change communication has examined hope- and fear-framing, exploring whether hope or fear is more effective in promoting pro-environmental behavior. Besides inconclusive results regarding this question (Ettinger et al., 2021; Feldman & Hart, 2018, Ojala, 2023), efficacy seems to be a key factor in influencing whether climate change messages are impactful. Balancing messages with clear action instructions can increase feelings of hopefulness and behavior intentions (Feldman & Hart, 2018; Ojala, 2023; Ruiter et al., 2014, p. 68). While threat-appeals may be scientifically motivated and increase the sense of urgency, emotionally laden climate change discourses can cause ‘climate change fatigue’ or push for simplified solutions that address symptoms rather than causes (Saab, 2023). The effectiveness of fear- versus hope-framing was also shown to depend on factors such as political ideology and prior beliefs about climate change (Feldman & Hart, 2018). These results are in line with research on gain-loss framing. Few studies have adopted discourse approaches to gain-loss framing. Liersch and Stegmaier (2022) provide one example, as they explore discourses around ending coal mining in the Hambach Forest in Germany. They identify a key framing mechanism – the “cost-lose-gain nexus” – where actors construct narratives emphasizing either the benefits of preserving the forest (nature- and climate protection, intergenerational responsibility) or the economic and social costs/losses of coal discontinuation (job losses, energy security). Some studies do not specifically apply gain- and loss-frames, but still identify discourses that draw on similar logics and concepts. Gain-oriented discourses tend to frame climate change and 12 associated measures as an opportunity (e.g. Dahl & Fløttum, 2019; Zannakis, 2015), while loss-oriented discourses frame it as a threat (e.g. Saab, 2023), risk (e.g. Bevitori & Johnson, 2022) or sacrifice (e.g. Zannakis, 2015). As political climate debates increasingly focus on mitigation measures, skeptics now tend to challenge solutions rather than climate science itself (Coan et al., 2021; Painter et al., 2023). Accordingly, climate change frames emphasizing losses related to policy costs rather than costs of inaction have been identified as counter-frames (Coan et al., 2021; Shehata & Hopmann, 2012), populist climate discourses (Vihma et al., 2021) and “discourses of delay” – i.e. which acknowledge climate change but justify inaction or insufficient efforts by emphasizing downsides of climate policies, shifting responsibility, and casting doubt on mitigation possibilities (Lamb et al., 2020; Painter et al., 2023). CADS-approaches to climate change communication Previous research has used CADS-approaches to explore climate change communication among a variety of actors, including politicians (e.g. Currie & Clarke, 2022; Kirk-Browne, 2021; Willis, 2017), news media (e.g., Dayrell, 2019; Liu & Huang 2022, 2024), activists (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2022), corporations (e.g. Dahl & Flottum, 2019), and laypersons (e.g. through online reader comments; Koteyko et al., 2013). Most studies analyze media outlets’ communication, revealing how it reinforces scientific consensus and shapes public concern (Dayrell, 2019). Studies have also used CADS to detect national and regional biases, such as different connotations of climate change and global warming in the United States (Liu & Huang, 2022), framing of responsibility between developed and developing countries (Liu & Huang, 2024), as well as risk- and resilience-related discourses in the Global North and Global South (Bevitori & Johnson, 2022). 13 Previous CADS research on political climate discourses have largely been set in a British context (Cunningham et al., 2022; Currie & Clarke, 2022; Kirk-Browne, 2021; Willis, 2017), with research on countries such as Germany and Sweden lacking. Studies of political climate change discourses in the UK in the mid-2000s reveal a dominance of the economic frame (Kirk-Browne, 2021; Willis, 2017), whereas human and social dimensions are often neglected (Cunningham et al., 2022; Currie & Clarke, 2022; Kirk-Browne, 2021; Willis, 2017). In an attempt to ‘tame the climate’, policymakers selectively use scientific evidence, often focusing on market-based solutions and technological advancements (Willis, 2017). Politicians tend to focus on industry and finance, compared to activist discourses which tend to lay emphasis on social justice narratives (Cunningham et al., 2020). Research further found that consensus around climate action has weakened over time, while climate skepticism is experiencing a resurgence (Kirk-Browne, 2021). Lastly, UK parliamentary debates in the late 2010s increasingly framed climate change as a ‘conflict’, highlighting its negative impacts on people and growing political urgency, while downplaying human causation (Currie & Clarke, 2022). In Norway, terms like greenhouse gas, carbon, and CO₂ have become increasingly differentiated in parliamentary debates, each linked to distinct framings of climate change, including technological, economic, and moral perspectives. (Gjesdal & Andersen, 2023). These findings highlight how lexical changes reflect evolving political and conceptual understandings of climate change, illustrating how language serves as a discursive tool to shape policy debates and public perception. Climate change discourses in Germany and Sweden Political climate change debates in Germany and Sweden reflect broader tensions between economic concerns, technological optimism, and justice-based arguments. While 14 both countries pursue ambitious climate policies, their political discourses reveal distinct framings that either highlight the benefits of action (gain-framing) or emphasize the risks and costs of the green transition (loss-framing). Most studies examining political discourses surrounding climate change in Germany and Sweden adopt qualitative approaches to discourse analysis, reviewing material such as party papers, policy documents, websites, articles, and parliamentary debates (Christley & Ullström, 2024; Fischer et al., 2024; Forchtner et al., 2018; Kulanovic & Nordensvärd, 2021; Schmidt et al., 2019; Zannakis, 2015). Similar approaches include qualitative case studies (Gruber, 2025; Vihma et al., 2021), and qualitative content analysis (Berker & Pollex, 2021; Leipprand et al., 2017; Markard et al., 2021). In Germany, debates have long revolved around the energy transition, with two competing narratives that can be related to gain-loss framing: An Energy Transition discourse that frames renewables as an economic and environmental opportunity (gain-framing) and an oppositional Energy Mix discourse that underscores the financial and social costs of a rapid transition (loss-framing) (Leipprand et al., 2017; Schmidt et al., 2019). The coal phase-out debate further illustrates this framing dynamic, with pro-coal actors shifting from outright opposition to advocating for a “careful” transition, effectively delaying stronger climate action (Markard et al., 2021). Center-right and right-wing actors, particularly the AfD, reinforce loss-framing by portraying climate policies as economically harmful, threatening jobs, and undermining national sovereignty (Forchtner et al., 2018; Forchtner & Özvatan, 2022; Gruber, 2025). This further increases the polarization of German climate debates (Berker & Pollex, 2021). Swedish climate debates similarly feature economic and justice-oriented narratives. Discourses emphasizing economic benefits (gain-framing) and moral responsibilities of 15 climate action have traditionally driven Sweden’s ambitious climate targets (Zannakis, 2015). However, economic counter-discourses remain prominent (Zannakis, 2015), with center-right and right-wing actors framing ambitious climate policies as costly burdens, especially on rural populations (loss-framing; Vihma et al., 2021); a strategy that parallels Germany’s loss-framed opposition to rapid decarbonization. Distributive concerns, (particularly the question of who should bear the costs) are prevalent in Swedish transition debates, where politicians tend to invoke justice concerns that serve their voters’ interests while neglecting broader solidarian concerns (Fischer et al., 2024). Debates on sustainable aviation further illustrate divided discourses: center-right, industry-backed arguments promote technological solutions to reduce emissions while maintaining economic growth (gain-framing), whereas center-left parties and environmental groups advocate for reduced air travel, framing sustainability as requiring personal and societal sacrifices (loss-framing) (Christley & Ullström, 2024; Kulanovic & Nordensvärd, 2021). Diverging views on sustainable pathways reveal how uncertainty about appropriate measures and their outcomes shapes how political actors use gain-loss framing differently. Overall, economic framing characterizes political climate discourse in both Germany and Sweden. In both countries, right-wing actors leverage economic concerns to challenge ambitious climate policies, signaling an increasing polarization in political climate discussions. This mirrors broader trends in climate discourse, where gain-framed narratives present climate action as an opportunity for economic and technological advancement, while loss-framed arguments stress financial burdens, job losses, and the need for more cautious climate action (Armbruster et al., 2022; Liersch & Stegmaier, 2022). Nonetheless, the specific focus of debates varies: While research on German climate discourse is more 16 focused on energy policy and coal-phase-out conflicts, Swedish research more often concerns technological optimism versus structural lifestyle changes. Summary This literature review provides a broad foundation for understanding how climate change is framed in political discourse, highlighting key theoretical approaches and empirical findings. However, while discourse analysis and framing theory have been widely applied to climate change communication, studies adopting CADS-methodologies remain limited, particularly in political settings. Most research in this area has focused on media discourse or single-country case studies, often centered on the UK. There is a notable gap in comparative studies of parliamentary climate discourse, including Germany and Sweden – two countries with distinct political landscapes but shared commitments to climate policy. While gain-loss framing has been extensively studied in experimental settings, its discursive manifestations in political speech remain underexplored. More research is needed to understand how gain-loss framing operates across different political contexts and languages. This study addresses these gaps by conducting a comparative CADS of parliamentary climate change debates in Germany and Sweden, focusing on how gain-loss framing shapes political discourse. By integrating insights from framing theory, CADS research, as well as German and Swedish discourse studies, this study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how politicians in different national contexts construct meaning and narratives around climate action. 17 Methods This chapter outlines the methodological approach of the present study. The first section gives an overview over the methodological synergy of corpus-assisted discourse studies, discussing its advantages, disadvantages and the reasoning for choosing this method. The second section outlines the research design, divided into three subsections: arguing for the choice of data, expanding on the process of compiling the corpora, and explaining the data analysis process. The final section discusses how the study addresses potential ethical considerations. Corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS) Corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS) is a mixed method approach that combines corpus linguistics (CL) with discourse analysis (DA) (Ancarno, 2018; Gillings et al., 2024). The use of corpora in discourse analysis gained traction in the early 1990s (Ancarno, 2018; Baker, 2023, pp. 6–7) and increasingly crosses disciplinary boundaries, demonstrating the value of linguistically informed approaches to studying discourse beyond traditional linguistic fields (Ancarno, 2020, p. 180). While the term “assisted” in CADS might imply a subordinate role for CL, both corpus and discourse analysis contribute equally to this “methodological synergy” (Baker et al., 2008, p. 274). Corpus linguistics uses computational tools and linguistic metrics such as lists of keywords and collocations (words/phrases that typically occur alongside each other) to quantitatively analyze trends in language (Ancarno, 2018; Cheng, 2013). This study makes use of concordance lines, which list all occurrences of a specific word or phrase in a corpus and put them in the context of the surrounding words (Ancarno, 2020; Baker, 2023). CL examines corpora, which can be understood as a “large body of naturally occurring language 18 data stored on computers” (Baker, 2023, p. 1). Corpora should consist of a representative sample of language, i.e. not randomly compiled (Ancarno, 2018; Baker, 2023). Discourse analysis, on the other hand, qualitatively examines “patterns of language across texts as well as the social and cultural contexts in which the texts occur” (Paltridge, 2022, p. 1). It explores how language shapes and reflects different worldviews, identities, and power structures, which emphasizes that language is not neutral but plays an active role in the construction of social reality (Fairclough, 1992; Markard et al., 2021, p. 317; Paltridge, 2012; van Dijk, 2008). A combination of CL and DA via CADS is said to leverage their advantages while mitigating their limitations (Baker et al., 2008). CL-techniques might risk overlooking the meanings that emerge from sentence structures, phrase sequencing, and grammatical constructions (Salway, 2017, p. 156). Additionally, automated corpus techniques alone cannot fully account for the social, political, historical, and cultural contexts in which language is used (Baker et al., 2008). A common critique of DA is its frequent reliance on small-scale analyses, which may struggle to capture dominant discourses or distinguish between frequent and less frequent narratives (Baker et al., 2008, p. 283). CADS, in turn, has the ability to handle large corpora and identify linguistic patterns, styles, and repeated language use that might otherwise go unnoticed (Cunningham et al., 2022; Willis, 2017). The repeated co-occurrence of certain words in naturally appearing language provides stronger evidence of an underlying dominant discourse than isolated examples, which can increase the generalizability and reliability of findings (Baker, 2023, p. 16; Egbert & Schnur, 2018). Most importantly, CADS allows researchers to move seamlessly between macro-level overviews and micro-level detail, contextualizing statistical patterns within their broader socio-political and ideological frameworks (Ancarno, 2020; Gillings et al., 2024; Liu & Huang, 19 2022). Especially in light of the cross-cultural nature of the present study, CADS helps to consider the different contexts of production and allows for a more holistic picture of the issue (Baker, 2023, pp. 18–21; Liu & Huang, 2022, p. 17; Taylor, 2014). While comparative discourse studies have a long tradition, the explicit use of CADS for cross-linguistic analysis has only semi-recently gained prominence through the work of Vessey (2013) and Taylor (2014). Contributions in this field have looked at public and parliamentary debates in the UK and Italy (Taylor, 2014), Spain, the UK and EU (Calzada Pérez, 2023), as well as Russia and Ukraine (Karpenko-Seccombe, 2020). Still, a lack of comparative multilingual research is noted by multiple authors (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2022; Norton & Hulme, 2019; Schmidt et al., 2013). One approach to cross-linguistic CADS looks at linguistic differences at the lexical and grammatical level, which introduces challenges as different languages are often not directly comparable (Vessey, 2013, p. 115). Another approach is to focus more on cultural comparison, where language serves as a vehicle for broader socio-political analysis. The present study is positioned in the latter area, which not only reduces difficulties of cross-language comparison, but also allows to explore communication patterns across cultures and languages (Taylor, 2014; Taylor & Del Fante, 2020). A key drawback of CADS is that the findings depend on the selection and scope of the corpus. Generally speaking, while the method is said to reduce bias, it does not eliminate it, which underscores the need for transparency around the process of corpus compilation and data analysis (Baker, 2023; Taylor & Marchi, 2018). As corpora cannot reveal what they do not contain, another limitation is absence of perspectives that are not included in the dataset or not captured by the specific research design – though the comparative approach of this study helps to reveal relative absences (Baker, 2023, p. 229; Duguid & Partington, 20 2018). Despite these challenges, a comparative, multilingual and data-driven approach such as CADS is suited for identifying patterns across extensive parliamentary debate protocols – especially given the complexity, volume, and evolving nature of climate change discourse (Salway, 2017). The triangulation through CADS provides the methodological flexibility needed to explore not only linguistic patterns but also enable findings to be put into country-specific contexts (Baker et al., 2008), altogether making CADS a suitable approach for this study. Data Data source This study analyzes parliamentary debate protocols from the German and Swedish parliaments, focusing specifically on discussions around climate change from the year 2024. Two monolingual corpora were compiled from these parliamentary debates, one for each country. Parliamentary debates serve as a valuable data source because they provide naturally occurring language, needed to create a representative corpus (see p. 19), in a formal political setting. Although debates may to some degree be pre-scripted or undergo minor corrections before publishing, they largely capture spontaneous speech, argumentations, and negotiation processes among policymakers – especially compared to other parliamentary documents such as party motions or bills (Schmidt et al., 2013, p. 776). They can also be assumed to reflect wider societal debates to a certain degree (Gjesdal & Andersen, 2023; Leipprand et al., 2017). The chosen time frame of one year gives enough relevant but also recent data. Given that the German and Swedish parliament protocols are similar in structure and composition, they create two comparable corpora for this multilingual analysis. 21 To support more nuanced interpretations of the data, it is important to consider the composition of the two governments at the time of analysis. In 2024, the German parliament consisted of 733 members from seven political parties. The governing coalition is formed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD; 207 seats) with the Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the Green Party (The Greens; 117 seats), and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP; 90 seats). After 16 years of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) leading the government, the 2021 elections brought a major shift. The CDU/CSU forms the biggest opposition (196 seats), followed by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) (76 seats). The left wing consists of two parties (The Left; Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance), which hold 38 seats in total (Deutscher Bundestag, 2025b). In Sweden, the national parliament (Sveriges riksdag) comprises 349 seats held by eight political parties during the 2022–2026 electoral period. The governing center-right coalition consists of the Moderate Party (M; 68 seats) with Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, the Christian Democrats (KD; 19 seats) and the Liberal Party (L; 16 seats), cooperating with the Sweden Democrats (SD; 72 seats) through the Tidö Agreement. The opposition is largely represented by the Social Democratic Party (S; 106 seats). The Centre Party, the Left Party, and the Green Party together hold the remaining 66 seats (Sveriges riksdag, 2024). As two European democracies, Germany and Sweden share similar political systems overall. While their respective party systems largely overlap, there are slight differences in distribution and composition of parties within the parliaments. As outlined above, it is most notable that the governing coalition in Germany leans center-left, whereas the governing coalition in Sweden leans center-right during the time of analysis. While these differences are important to keep in mind, they do not hinder meaningful comparisons of parliamentary debate language between the two countries. 22 Data collection To compile the datasets for this study, parliamentary debate protocols from the official archive platforms of the parliaments in Germany (Deutscher Bundestag, 2025a) and Sweden (Sveriges riksdag, 2025) were collected. The selection process focused on debates from the year 2024 that address climate change and related policy discussions. All protocols from 2024 were manually reviewed, beginning with an examination of their content sections to identify relevant debates. In cases where the relevance of a debate was unclear, a closer reading was conducted to determine whether it met the inclusion criteria. Only debates involving active discussion were considered, which excluded formal procedures such as official readings or structured question-and-answer sessions. Debates were selected based on their direct connection to climate change, including discussions on mitigation strategies, environmental policies, and the consequences of climate change. Keywords such as Klima [G]/ klimat [S] (‘climate’), Umwelt [G]/ miljö [S] (‘environment’) and Nachhaltigkeit [G]/ hållbarhet [S] (‘sustainability’) guided the selection process of debates. Additionally, debates on broader topics where the issue of climate change permeated the debate – such as energy transitions, sustainable economic policies, and green mobility – were also included due to their significant impact on climate policies. Once the relevant debates were identified, they were manually extracted from the protocols and compiled into two separate corpora – one for German and one for Swedish parliamentary debates (see Appendix A). In total, the German parliament published 63 protocols during the year 2024. 24 protocols with 31 debates were then identified as fitting the criteria. This resulted in a corpus of 292,434 words. For Sweden, the parliament published 141 protocols during 2024, out of which 27 protocols with 39 debates fit the criteria, producing a corpus of 288,719 words. Since each researcher was proficient in only 23 one of the two languages, the selection of debates was conducted separately for each country. To ensure consistency, translations of debate titles were reviewed and discussed collaboratively before finalizing the dataset. Data analysis To analyze gain-loss framing in parliamentary debates, this study employed an iterative approach, which is commonly used in CADS (Ancarno, 2020). The analysis was conducted using the corpus linguistic tool Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff et al., 2014). In order to identify gain-loss framing instances within the corpus, an initial list of 110 words that could trigger this framing was compiled. The word list differentiated between words with positive connotations (gain-related; e.g. stärken [G]/ stärka [S], ‘strengthen’), negative connotations (loss-related; e.g. gefährden, bedrohen [G]/ hota [S], ‘threaten’), and neutral connotations (e.g. verursachen [G]/ orsaka [S], ‘cause’). As neutral expressions are often used to establish causal connections, they were expected to trigger both gain- and loss-frames. To ensure linguistic comprehensiveness, all identified terms were translated across English, German, and Swedish. The initial word list was compiled through a dictionary/thesaurus approach and by referring to previous experimental studies that tested the effectiveness of gain-loss framing by manipulating climate change messages (Armbruster et al. ,2022; Nabi et al., 2018; Ngo et al., 2022; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). The word list was refined in an iterative process by exploring collocations and concordance lines of these words in Sketch Engine to assess frequency and contextual relevance. A pilot study further examined the framing potential of the remaining words. The pilot coded a random sample of 180 concordance lines from each corpus to explore who argues for what to be gained or lost by whom, why, and when. Words that were too broad or generic were excluded, such as erhöhen [G]/ öka [S] (‘increase’), verringern [G]/ minska [S] (‘decrease’), and brauchen [G]/ behöver [S] 24 (‘need’). Words that most frequently and clearly trigger gain- and loss-frames were retained. This resulted in the final selection of 27 gain-loss framing trigger-words (gain-related = 14; loss-related = 10; neutral = 3) (see Appendix B). These numbers account to the english translations of the words – due to linguistic differences between the two languages, some words have multiple translations in each language. Using the final word list, Corpus Query Language (CQL) search strings were conducted in Sketch Engine to separately retrieve concordance lines for each set of gain-related-, loss-related, and neutral words within both corpora (see Appendix C). The search results were cleaned in Excel to ensure that only clear instances of gain-loss framing were included. Out of 4,171 concordance lines, 1,508 framing-instances (36%) were identified as relevant (see Table 1). The German corpus contained 549 relevant framing instances out of 1,760 concordances (31%), while the Swedish corpus contained 959 hits out of 2,411 concordances (40%). The cleaned data set then allowed for a quantitative descriptive analysis of the words which most often triggered gain-loss framing, which provides a broad overview of framing trends across the two parliaments. 25 Table 1 Descriptives of the concordance lines retrieved and analyzed Concordance Lines Germany Sweden Total Total retrieved 1,760 2,411 4,171 (before cleaning) Gain-related 1,028 936 1,964 Loss-related 629 1,126 1,755 Neutral 103 349 452 Relevant framing instances 549 (31%) 959 (40%) 1,508 (36%) (% of total) Relevant gain-related 287 413 700 Relevant loss-related 226 392 618 Relevant neutral 36 154 190 Sample for qualitative 140 240 380 analysis (25% of relevant) Gain-related sample 72 103 175 Loss-related sample 58 98 156 Neutral sample 10 39 49 Based on the pilot and initial reading of the data, a coding scheme was developed in order to support the qualitative discourse analysis. The scheme categorizes framing instances by type, argumentation strategy, thematic focus of gain or loss (allowing for up to three themes per framing instance), mediators, speaker partisanship, and temporal references (see Appendix D). Due to reasons of feasibility, a random 25% sample of the framing instances from each search string in each corpus were analyzed and coded (see 26 Table 1). The sample coding was intended to support and ground the qualitative findings presented in the second section of the Findings chapter. After the data cleaning, each concordance line was assigned a random number in Excel using the =RAND() function and sorted in ascending order, separately for each search string. The top 25% of the concordance lines for each search string were selected to form the sample, ensuring balanced representation of instances triggered by words with positive connotation (i.e. the gain-related search string), negative connotation (i.e. the loss-related search string) and neutral connotation (i.e. the neutral search string). While tools like SketchEngine offer built-in random samplers, this manual approach allowed to limit the population to relevant concordance lines, while enabling stratified random sampling. Hence this approach provides a practical and valid approximation of randomness to support the qualitative analysis. Throughout the analysis of the coded samples, concordance lines from both corpora were compared to identify similarities and differences in framing strategies. This allows for a deeper understanding of the ways in which the parliaments in Sweden and Germany use gain-loss framing to communicate climate change and related issues. Similar to Armbruster et al. (2022), this study differentiates between four different forms of gain- and loss-framing (see Table 2). Negated gains and losses create “mixed frames” that result in subtypes of gain-loss framing (Armbruster et al., 2022, p. 5): Gain-framing can be articulated as either a clear gain (i.e. emphasizing positive outcomes) or a non-loss (i.e. avoiding negative outcomes). Loss-framing, on the other hand, can be articulated as either a clear loss (i.e. emphasizing negative outcomes) or a non-gain (i.e. missing out on positive outcomes). This distinction allows for more nuanced identification of how gain-loss framing is employed. 27 Table 2 Explanations of the four gain-loss framing subtypes Gain-framing Loss-framing Framing in terms of positive outcomes Framing in terms of negative outcomes Gain Non-loss Loss Non-gain “Investing in “This law will help “Increasing extreme “If we don’t achieve renewable energies preserve the nature weather threatens these goals, we will will create and biodiversity of peoples’ homes and have gained nothing thousands of new our country.” lives.” for the climate.” jobs.” However, it is important to keep in mind that, depending on the perspective, both gain- and loss-frames can be used to promote or discourage/delay climate action. For instance, highlighting economic benefits from preserving traditional industries – such as the coal or automobile industry – may frame less ambitious climate policies as gains. At the same time, loss-frames can be used to argue both for and against climate action by emphasizing negative outcomes of action or inaction, respectively. Hence the analysis also examines how the frames are operationalized, i.e. whether they are used to promote or discourage more ambitious policies. Ethical considerations While the mixed methods approach of CADS helps to improve accuracy and accountability of findings, it does neither fully eliminate bias nor guarantee objectivity (Taylor & Marchi, 2018). Since the study relies on publicly available protocols from the parliaments’ official websites in Germany and Sweden, the data collection is overall unobtrusive and poses lower risk of reactivity and ethical risks compared to methods such as interviews or observations (Clark et al., 2021, pp. 676-677). Still, the process of manually 28 selecting debates from parliamentary protocols introduces a level of subjectivity. Differences in interpretation, selection, and coding between the German and Swedish datasets could introduce further variations in how debates are classified and analyzed. To address these concerns, texts were continuously translated and discussed between the researchers throughout the data collection and analysis process. Moreover, as Baker (2023, p. 22) notes, corpus outputs are not analytical results in themselves; it is the researcher’s responsibility to interpret them with contextual sensitivity. This includes avoiding distortion of speaker intent – especially when examining concordance lines outside their full context – and acknowledging the influence of the researcher's own ideological or cultural background. Being reflexive about the researcher's stance and interpretive role is essential for maintaining integrity and transparency throughout the research (Stibbe, 2021). Lastly, while the data derives from public sources and concerns officials acting in their professional roles, this analysis may indirectly expose politicians to critique or reputational harm. To mitigate this risk, quotations and conclusions consistently reference political parties rather than individual politicians, and findings are presented in a balanced and respectful manner. 29 Findings This chapter presents the findings of the CADS conducted on climate change-related debates in the German and Swedish parliaments. The first section presents the quantitative results, focusing on the frequency of gain-loss framing and the most common gain-loss trigger-words. The second section analyzes discursive patterns that emerged from both corpora, based on qualitative reading and thematic coding of a 25% sample of concordance lines. Three main discursive patterns used to promote or discourage climate action are identified and presented in three corresponding subsections: 1) maintaining prosperity and competitiveness, 2) preserving living conditions, and 3) balancing short- and long-term gains. Frequency of gain-loss framing Throughout the 1,508 identified gain-loss framing instances (see Table 3), comprising 549 German and 959 Swedish instances, gain- and loss-framing is used to very similar extents in both countries (approximately 50:50; see Table 3). Looking at the specific framing subtypes in both corpora, loss-frames – i.e. emphasizing negative impacts such as economic damage or human suffering – are the most frequently used overall (G = 39%; S = 43%). Gain-frames, where arguments emphasize potential positive outcomes, are the second most common (G = 32%; S = 29%). Non-loss and non-gain frames – more nuanced variations that emphasize preservation or failure to achieve potential gains – are used less frequently. Still, non-loss-frames (G = 20%; S = 19%) appear more often than non-gain-frames (G = 9%; S = 9%). Moreover, gain- and loss-frames are often used together in the same argument, especially in the Swedish corpus. As previously established, both gain- and loss-framing can argue for more or less ambitious climate action. Therefore, it is important to also look at how the frames operate in 30 the debates. In the two countries, both gain- and loss-framing are mostly used to promote rather than discourage or delay climate action (see Table 3). In Germany, 81% of the relevant framing instances aim to promote climate action, most commonly through gain-framing (49%), but also through loss-framing (32%). Similarly, in Sweden, 92% of the analyzed concordance lines advocate for climate measures using gain-framing (45%) as well as loss-framing (47%). This suggests that both hopeful and cautionary frames are used to argue for climate policy across both countries. Framing used to discourage or delay climate action is less common. In Sweden, such arguments appear in just 8% of the cases, mainly through loss-based arguments (5%). In Germany, however, this is comparably more common: 19% instances fall under this category, which mainly use loss-framing (16%) but also gain-framing (3%) to discourage or delay climate action. Table 3. Frequency of gain-loss framing used to promote or discourage/delay climate action, and frequency of framing subtypes in Germany and Sweden Country Framing Type Used to Used to Framing Subtypes Total Promote Discourage/ (%) (%) (%) Delay (%) Germany Gain-framing 49 3 Gain: 32, Non-loss: 20 52 Loss-framing 32 16 Loss: 39, Non-gain: 9 48 Total 81 19 100 Sweden Gain-framing 45 3 Gain: 29, Non-loss: 19 48 Loss-framing 47 5 Loss: 43, Non-gain: 9 52 Total 92 8 100 Number of concordance lines: 1,508 (Germany = 549; Sweden = 959) 31 When looking at the words that trigger instances of gain-loss framing within each search string, both German and Swedish parliamentary debates show comparable frequency patterns (see Appendix B for distribution of all trigger-words). The gain-related search string led to a total of 700 concordance lines (G = 287; S = 413), which mostly contained instances of gain-framing (G = 79%; S = 86%). The distribution of the trigger-words shows that politicians from both countries frequently use terms such as schützen [G]/ skydda [S] (‘protect’; G = 13%, S = 15%), stärken [G]/ stärka [S] ('strengthen'; G = 9%, S = 22%) and sichern [G]/ säkra [S] (‘secure’; G = 11%, S = 7%). This suggests a central discussion around safeguarding existing structures, ensuring security, and reinforcing resilience. A second focus concerns goal attainment and progress, as illustrated by frequent use of the word erreichen [G]/ upnnå [S] (‘reach’; in terms of reaching climate goals) in both corpora, especially the German (G = 24%; S = 9%). Furthermore, the words investieren [G]/ investera [S] (‘invest’; G = 8%, S = 5%) and voranbringen, vorantreiben [G]/ främja, gynna [S] (‘advance’; G = 8%, S = 11%) are used frequently, indicating a forward-leaning approach to climate action. The following concordance lines exemplify how the trigger words identified above are employed in the parliamentary debates. 1) We are doing everything we can to protect this country and the people in it from being hit hard by these crises in the future. (The Greens, Germany) 2) By investing in climate adaptation, we can build safer homes, develop effective warning systems and strengthen our infrastructure to better withstand these events. (Christian Democrats, Sweden) The loss-related search string resulted in 618 concordances (G = 226; S = 392), which mostly showed instances of loss-framing (G = 81%; S = 91%). The first noticeable pattern highlights concerns about threats and risks, using words such as gefährden, bedrohen [G]/ 32 hota [S] (‘threaten’; G = 18%, S = 9%), schaden [G]/ skada [S] (‘damage’; G = 11%, S = 19%) and verlieren [G]/ förlora [S] (‘lose’; G = 10%, S = 11%). Most noticeably in the Swedish corpus, the words risk [S] (‘risk’) is used in around 26% of the gain-related concordance lines (compared to 3% of the German concordances), which shows a prevalence of risk-framing in the context of climate action. A second pattern focuses on financial losses. The words kosten [G]/ kosta [S] (‘cost’; G = 22%, S = 17%) and bezahlen [G]/ betala [S] (‘pay’; G = 14%, S = 5%) are among the most frequent loss-related terms, particularly in Germany. This suggests a strong emphasis on financial burdens that are associated with climate action or inaction. 3) Climate change and species extinction are threatening our livelihoods. (Social Democratic Party, Germany) 4) Buying emission allowances risks being terribly expensive for the Swedish people. (Social Democratic Party, Sweden) The neutral search string resulted in 190 concordances (G = 36; S = 154) with a relatively even distribution of gain-framing (G = 39%; S = 52%) and loss-framing (G = 61%; S = 48%). The trigger-words führen zu [G]/ leda till [S] (‘lead to’; G = 44%, S = 50%) and beitragen zu [G]/ bidra till [S] (‘contribute to’; G = 36%, S = 41%) are used most frequently in both corpora, whereas the word verursachen [G]/ orsaka [S] (‘cause’) is less prominent (G = 19%; S = 9%). This could suggest that in terms of claiming causality, politicians prefer a softer rather than deterministic tonality. 5) High energy prices are leading to great financial hardship for the population. The domestic solar industry can help. (The Left, Germany) 6) Climate change contributes to poverty and food insecurity, which can also have serious consequences for peace and security. (Moderate Party, Sweden) 33 Overall, the quantitative findings show that gain- and loss-framing appear frequently and evenly across both corpora, with a slight prevalence of the subtype of loss-frames. Both gain- and loss-framing are primarily used to promote rather than resist climate action, while arguments to delay climate action mainly draw on loss-frames. Moreover, gain-related words mainly triggered gain-framing, loss-related words triggered loss-framing, and neutral words evenly generated gain- and loss-framing. Discursive patterns of gain-loss framing After having established the prevalence of gain-loss framing in the corpora, the following section further explores in what ways gain-loss framing is used in the parliamentary climate debates – in order to identify underlying discursive patterns used to promote or to discourage/delay climate action. The analysis is supported by the thematic coding of a random 25% sample of the identified relevant concordance lines from each search string in each country. Overall, the German and Swedish debates demonstrate strikingly similar thematic focuses and argumentation logics. In both countries, the governing coalition tends to use more gain-framing (around two thirds), while opposition parties rely more on loss-framing (around two thirds). However, this dynamic plays out differently due to reversed constitutions of the countries’ ruling governments during the time of the analysis (G: center-left governing; S: center-right governing). Through close reading and iterative analysis of the expanded concordance lines together with numerical insights from the sample coding, three main discursive patterns of gain-loss framing emerged across both corpora: 1) maintaining prosperity and competitiveness (in which climate action and the green transition is framed as both a risk and opportunity for national economic strength), 2) preserving living conditions (which focuses on protecting nature, 34 human life, and infrastructure from climate change-related harm), and 3) balancing short- and long-term gains (in which diverging strategies and timelines reveal conflicts between long- and short-term political or economic interests). The green transition: Maintaining prosperity and competitiveness Across the sampled data of both the German and Swedish corpora, economy emerges as the most prominent topic with around one third of the concordance lines on this theme. This pattern is further reinforced by frequent use of trigger-words with economic implications such as kosten [G]/ kosta [S] (‘cost’; G = 22%, S = 17%) and bezahlen [G]/ betala [S] (‘pay’; G = 14%, S = 5%). In both countries, arguments are relatively evenly distributed between economic gains and losses, with policies and political decisions as key mediators. The primary concerns relate to the potential loss of jobs, large companies and skilled workers leaving the country, as well as a decline in international competitiveness. In contrast, the green transition is also framed as an opportunity to preserve economic competitiveness, attract investment, create employment, and enhance the countries’ appeal as business locations. The overarching objective of these discussions appears to be to maintain the economic competitiveness of Germany and Sweden. While gain- and loss-framing is mostly used to advocate for ambitious climate action, the degree of urgency and the preferred pathways vary with the partisanship of the speakers. The result is a rather complex interplay of discourses that balance climate concerns with economic pragmatism. One recurring line of argumentation frames the green transition itself as the foundation for future economic growth, job creation, and international competitiveness. In Germany, this view is mostly supported by the Social Democratic Party and The Greens, both part of the governing coalition, and The Left. They argue that ambitious goal-setting, clear regulations, and investment in sustainable infrastructure will save and strengthen the 35 economy long-term. Using both gain- and loss-framing, they exclusively promote more ambitious efforts to enable the green transition. Hence, words like retten [G]/ rädda [S] (‘save’), and stärken [G]/ stärka [S] (‘strengthen’) are recurrently used in this context, as seen in this quote from the German Green party (see Appendix E for quotes in original language): 7) If we want to maintain and strengthen Germany and Europe as a business location, we must also consistently drive forward the transformation in our country. (The Greens, Germany) While from a similar political spectrum, in Sweden it is the opposition consisting of the Social Democratic, Centre, Left, and Green Party that take on this argumentation. In line with the German debates, they draw on both gain- and loss-framing to exclusively argue for more ambitious action. Arguments emphasize that failing to act will lead to job losses and harm Sweden's global standing, whereas investing in the transition is said to secure prosperity and competitiveness. 8) The climate transition is a driving force for strengthened competitiveness and sustainable social development throughout the country. (Green Party, Sweden) A second line of argumentation, which is most prominent among center-right parties in both countries, emphasizes the need to protect economic stability as a prerequisite for successful climate policy. The emphasis lies on supporting the transition, while avoiding disruptions to important industries, preserving jobs, and maintaining international competitiveness. Loss-framing is therefore commonly used to warn of the threat to industrial strength and employment. In Germany, the Christian Democratic Union tends to 36 promote a more cautious approach that stresses the potential costs of a rushed transformation: 9) The elements of economy, social affairs and sustainability do not stand side by side. Economy is the foundation. Only if it is strong can we pay for the pillars of social affairs and sustainability. (Christian Democratic Union, Germany) A parallel stance appears in Sweden’s Moderate Party, which also frames sustainability goals as dependent on maintaining a stable economy: Climate action must be compatible with productivity, and environmental regulations must be “reasonable” and paced to avoid harming businesses and citizens. 10) If Sweden is to maintain growth, jobs and businesses, we cannot have an environmental policy that is tougher than that of other EU countries, penalizing our businesses and threatening the countryside. (Moderate Party, Sweden) A variation of this discourse is promoted by liberal parties such as Germany’s Free Democratic Party and Sweden’s Liberal Party in particular. While they are supportive of climate action, they also put the economy in the forefront of other measures. In line with neoliberal theory, an emphasis is put on market-driven innovation over state intervention. Gain-framing is used to argue that deregulation, less bureaucracy and clear legal frameworks will encourage private investments and push the transition without endangering economic growth. 11) It is primarily companies that will invest in innovation, create new markets and enable the transition to a climate-neutral economy. We want a clear legal 37 framework that incentivizes the private sector to invest in sustainable projects. (Free Democratic Party, Germany) 12) Obstacles must be removed to speed up the climate transition. Measures to simplify and shorten permit processes are essential if Sweden is to succeed with the green transition. (Liberal Party, Sweden) While economic arguments are most often used to promote more ambitious climate action, counter-discourses that seek to delay or even prevent climate action are also present. These make up around one third of the German instances and one fourth of the Swedish instances and are most often (but not exclusively) expressed by the right-wing parties. Economic counter-arguments portray climate policy itself as the “threat”, often using emotive loss-framing to argue that climate action will harm domestic industries, increase costs for citizens, and have little benefit overall. In Germany, the AfD often uses economic loss-framing to argue against climate action. It further employs extreme language, which is often aggressive and/or ironic to frame climate policies as ideologically driven and economically harmful. Thus, they frequently use strong loss-related words such as zerstören [G] (‘destroy’). 13) The world's stupidest energy policy, accompanied by even more ruthless exploitation of the German people, is moving on to the next round. [...] No other industrialized country [...] is destroying its functioning economy in order to produce electricity, drive and heat with hydrogen in the future. Only the Greens in all the cartel parties, from the Left to the CDU, are so stupid, so naive and so irresponsible. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) Likewise, the Sweden Democrats is the only party in the Swedish context found to explicitly express that climate politics might be directly harmful to the national economy and 38 competitiveness. They use loss-framing to argue that a naive self-image as a green leader will only be self-harming. 14) Neither China, India nor any other major emitter will ever want to follow in our footsteps because we are so obviously self-inflicting destruction. [...] The climate is not the problem for Sweden and Swedes - it's climate policy. (Sweden Democrats, Sweden) Mainstream parties in both countries frequently challenge these counter-discourses. They defend the economic reasoning of the green transition and accuse right-wing actors of endangering national progress and credibility. 15) The German SME sector is in the midst of modernization and is benefiting from this transformation. If anyone is deindustrializing here, it's you. You are damaging our economy, Germany and Europe. (Social Democratic Party, directed towards the Alternative for Germany, Germany) Given that the nature of CADS research only allows to reveal what is actually being said, it is also important to consider which aspects fall short in the parliamentary debates. In the context of debates around the green transition, previous research suggests that politicians tend to focus on technological advancements to ‘easily solve the climate crisis’ (e.g. Willis, 2017). While some politicians – mostly from the liberal spectrum – do push for investments and innovation (for instance, see concordance 11 above), scientific and technological solutions were comparatively rarely promoted in the German and Swedish corpora. To summarize, debates revolving around the green transition frequently feature economic arguments that both promote and discourage ambitious action. Most parties use 39 economic-centered gain-loss framing to advocate for the green transition as a means to secure prosperity, jobs, and international competitiveness. However, opinions differ in terms of pace, responsibility, and policy approach. Center-left parties frame the economic transformation as a necessary investment to gain – or prevent losing – future economic resilience, with liberal parties emphasizing a need for market-driven solutions. Conservative actors tend to promote a more cautious approach with the loss of current economic competitiveness in mind. Right-wing parties raise similar concerns but use arguments of economic decline and national self-harm to question the legitimacy or feasibility of ambitious climate policy altogether. These competing frames underscore how the green transition is not primarily viewed as an isolated challenge, but closely tied to competing ideologies and associated economic rationales. Environment, people and infrastructure: Preserving living conditions While economy is the most often employed theme on its own, gain-loss framed arguments on the themes of nature and biodiversity, human livelihoods, and societal functions taken together occur in around half of the sampled concordance lines in both corpora. In this context, politicians use a mix of gain-, non-loss, and loss-frames to communicate positive and negative effects of climate change, climate action, and climate policies. In both corpora, these arguments are predominantly expressed by center-left parties (the Social Democratic, Green and Left parties) to advocate for stronger measures aimed at preserving and strengthening living conditions. Across the German and Swedish corpora, gains and losses related to nature and biodiversity are occasionally framed in terms of intrinsic value. For instance, the natural environment is presented as worth being preserved in itself in the following quotes. 40 16) With the Natural Climate Protection Action Program, we can also protect seagrass and salt marshes as important ecosystems. (The Greens, Germany) 17) Protecting the importance of forests for biodiversity and the climate requires a change in forestry. [...] With the insufficient resources allocated by the government, many of these forests risk being felled instead. [...] Irreplaceable natural values will be lost. (Left Party, Sweden) However, arguments more often reflect their instrumental value to human survival and well-being. As such arguments are largely human-centered, this offers insight into morals and motivations behind climate discourses. In both countries, politicians in the corpora argue that resilient ecosystems are critical for human survival. 18) Local authorities can apply for funding to unseal areas, improve water retention in the landscape and preserve forests. There is so much to gain: a living, vibrant nature that protects us humans from the consequences of global warming. (The Greens, Germany) Given that much of Sweden is covered by forest, Swedish climate debates about forestry often reflect its long-standing importance, for the economy as well as outdoor recreation. Arguments such as the following further reveal human-centered gains of environmental protection. 19) Sweden is a forest country. 70% of our surface is forest, and this forest will be used, harvested and managed in different ways. [...] We need to use it wisely, not just preserve it. (Liberal Party, Sweden) Along the lines of instrumental motivations for climate action, German and Swedish climate debates often center on the implications of extreme weather events. Primarily 41 center-left parties argue that increased extreme weather poses existential threats to human lives, homes and infrastructure, and brings economic costs. In this context, they mostly argue for more ambitious climate action and policies. Loss-framed arguments used words such as verlieren [G]/ förlora [S] (‘lose’), kosten [G]/ kosta [S] (‘cost’), schaden [G]/ skada [S] (‘damage’), and drabba [S] (‘inflict’), while non-loss frames used words like schützen [G]/ skydda, värna [S] (‘protect’) and bewahren [G]/ bevara [S] (‘preserve’). 20) Climate change is a worn-out word in many circles. Let's briefly remind ourselves: if we carry on as before - which includes achieving what we set out to do - then over 1.3 billion people will lose their homes in the coming decades because they will become uninhabitable. (Social Democratic Party, Germany) Across the German and Swedish corpora, a lack of attention to public health concerns (e.g. heat-related illnesses) was noticeable – compared to the common highlighting of more severe or existential threats such as extreme weather. A notable feature of the discourse on extreme weather threats is that politicians in both corpora tend to use more emotive and figurative language than in other climate-related topics. By emphasizing severe and already felt effects of climate change, arguments like the following convey a sense of urgency. 21) Freedom is not threatened by a speed limit, it is not threatened by the end of combustion engines and wind turbines. No, freedom is threatened by floods, droughts and heatwaves. That threatens people's existence and freedom. (The Greens, Germany) 22) Tell those who have lost loved ones in Spain not to cry wolf! Tell those in the Philippines who have damaged and destroyed houses not to cry wolf! (Green Party, Sweden) 42 The discourse on extreme weather threats in both the German and Swedish corpora moreover acknowledges local as well as global effects of climate change. 23) The climate crisis is already a cruel reality and is causing great suffering in many regions of the world. That said, climate protection is an instrument that leads to more global justice and more social justice, including for us in Germany. (The Greens, Germany) 24) In Beijing, there was record rainfall with several deaths in the downpours. [...] Sweden was no exception. Heat, heavy rain and rapid snowmelt hit Småland and also caused the Torne River to flood. [...] Things are serious, in Sweden and around the world. (Social Democratic Party, Sweden) Nonetheless, counter-discourses to climate action relating to preserving living conditions are also present in the parliamentary debates. Arguments that question or oppose ambitious measures are primarily articulated by the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and to some extent the Sweden Democrats (SD). The AfD mostly uses economic loss-framing and occasionally invokes landscape protection arguments to discourage climate measures, for instance to oppose renewable energy infrastructure like wind farms. 25) Destructive wind turbines at sea are being sold to us as nature conservation. A more audacious deception of the voter can hardly be imagined. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) In general, the type of counterclaims to climate action appear to differ between the AfD and the SD. Recurrently in the German corpus, the AfD denies scientific evidence of climate change, its threat to human livelihoods and the necessity of emission reduction. In 43 comparison, the SD do not neglect climate change but argue that other issues are more pressing. 26) We would only have 13 years left to save the earth. In the 1970s, the saying was that we would get a new ice age, and there were warnings about that. But no, nothing points to a climate catastrophe. Many scientists and Nobel Prize winners say the same. The Pacific islands have not sunk. The polar ice caps still have plenty of ice [...]. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) 27) If we don't address the immediate and existential threat posed by Russia, we are unlikely to have to worry about protecting the environment at all in the future. (Sweden Democrats, Sweden) Moreover, a trend of ironic usage of the word retten [G]/ rädda [S] (‘save’) appears in counter-discourses to climate action across climate debates – particularly in the German corpus, where the term almost exclusively is used sarcastically by the AfD. In the Swedish corpus, the SD employs a similar use of the expression, though less frequently. Most instances feature figurative and often harsh language about ‘saving the world’ or ‘saving the environment’, as illustrated in the examples below. 28) But, dear citizens, these people don't want to save the world, they want to fleece you like a Christmas goose and use German money to line the already bulging pockets of their clients and, to a not inconsiderable extent, their own pockets. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) 29) The green communists and all those who pant after them are in no way concerned with saving the environment or the earth. It's about the profit interests of their clients. It's about plundering the citizens to the point of poverty, expropriating them, wiping out the German economy in order to get 44 rid of them once and for all as competitors on the world market. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) 30) To this problem, we should perhaps add the self-image that many have - that Sweden, the responsible little country in the north, alone will save the world. (Sweden Democrats, Sweden) Overall, climate-related impacts on the environment, people, and infrastructure appear central to justifying climate action. These arguments are particularly voiced by center-left parties. Politicians appear to evoke urgency by highlighting concrete, already-felt consequences and occasionally using emotive and moral language. At the same time, right-wing parties in both countries challenge these concerns by framing climate action as harmful and using irony to dismiss urgency and responsibility. The German AfD adopts a more extreme position compared to the Sweden Democrats, including denying the consequences of climate change. Reaching climate goals: Balancing short- and long-term gains Parliamentary debates in both countries frequently revolve around the need to reach environmental and climate goals, often centering on emission reduction. Gain- and loss-framed arguments on this topic make up close to one third of the sampled concordance lines in both the German and Swedish corpus. The word erreichen [G]/ uppnå [S] (‘reach’; in the sense of reaching climate goals) was moreover one of the most recurring framing-triggers in the gain-related search string, especially for Germany (G = 24%, S = 9%; see Appendix B). The sample coding further revealed that gain- and loss-framed arguments predominantly refer to the present or future (and less to the past), often combining references to both. This suggests that climate discourses frequently frame present action in 45 regard to long-term outcomes – a tension which becomes particularly apparent in the context of reaching climate goals. While there is general cross-party support for climate goal attainment – with the exception of right-wing parties – opinions clearly diverge with regards to how these goals should be achieved. A notable tension lies between short- and long-term gains in the context of climate policy, revealing diverging views on the urgency of reaching said goals. This links closely with the discourses presented thus far, on maintaining economic competitiveness as well as living standards. However, this chapter focuses more specifically on goal-reaching as a theme on its own – particularly as it relates to overarching targets such as emissions reductions and compliance with international climate treaties like the Paris Agreement. Across most parties in both countries, the need to reach climate goals is predominantly framed as a gain or non-gain. The act of reaching climate targets is presented both as inherently valuable and as a pathway to broader societal benefits – including global justice, economic resilience, and environmental protection. Reaching targets is therefore often positioned as a gain. In Germany, all major parties except the AfD explicitly advocate for goal achievement as a central pillar of their climate discourse. 31) We still have a lot of catching up to do, but also so much to gain: Reaching the goals of the 2030 Agenda means: global justice, global health, a planet worth living on. (The Greens, Germany) In Sweden, this perspective is similarly echoed across the political spectrum (excluding the Sweden Democrats) as parties argue for more ambitious policies or increased investments to reach national and international climate targets. 46 32) If we prioritize a green transition and invest in sustainable solutions, we can reach the climate goals by 2030. (Left Party, Sweden) However, differing political perspectives result in disagreements about the most effective or realistic strategies to meet climate targets, revealing power struggles between opposition and governing parties. Opposition parties often critique the governing coalition’s current measures as insufficient or misdirected. Within this discourse, failure to meet climate goals is frequently articulated as a non-gain – something valuable that could have been achieved but is being missed due to ineffective or delayed action. 33) Right now, it would be important to make smart and sustainable decisions that take future generations into account. I miss these sustainable decisions with the [current] government. (Christian Democratic Union, Germany) 34) For us Social Democrats, the green transition is about securing investments in our country and securing the decent jobs of the future and with it the welfare of our future generations. To succeed, we need to lead the transition. The government's reduction of the reduction obligation throws us to the back of the pack. (Social Democratic Party, Sweden) The debates on goal-reaching often relate to the temporal dimension of climate politics. Political actors frame climate decisions in terms of their long-term consequences, often contrasting them with short-term effects. A salient discursive pattern in both corpora is the use of long-term loss-framing to emphasize the costs of inaction. Short-term expenses and sacrifices are said to be necessary to avoid more severe long-term losses. This includes loss of biodiversity, economic stability, and human livelihoods. While most parties in 47 Germany argue for the high cost of inaction, in Sweden these arguments are particularly present among center-left parties. 35) Yes, the heating transition also costs money. I just want to point out to you that global warming [...] will be even more expensive. And the voters you want to protect will later be confronted with the consequences of this global warming. (Christian Democratic Union towards Alternative for Germany, Germany) 36) By delaying necessary action now, we risk causing irreversible damage to our planet, which in turn will have profound effects on everything from biodiversity to human health and even the economy. (Social Democratic Party, Sweden) In both parliaments, reducing emissions is a key area where short- and long-term logics intersect. Politicians debate whether policies aimed at reducing emissions – such as renewable energy expansion or fossil-free mobility – should be prioritized despite their associated costs. Counter-arguments then often emphasize the need to avoid economic burdens for citizens. In Germany, this debate is particularly present in the context of the energy transition. The consensus is that energy must be clean and affordable to avoid burdening citizens with high costs of living. However, the question of how an affordable and secure energy supply can be achieved is highly controversial. Center-left parties argue with long-term gains, saying that investments today will bring long-term relief for citizens through lower energy prices and supply security: 37) Perhaps what the AfD is calling for will secure short-term profits, but in the long term, technological expertise would be lost in Germany. (The Left, Germany) 48 Conversely, center-right parties focus more on immediate burdens and risks to the energy supply. Their arguments often rely on loss-framing by emphasizing the shortcomings of current policies in ensuring short-term affordability and supply security. This is, for example, articulated by the Christian Democratic Union: 38) Security of energy supply is at risk, electricity is expensive [...]. The energy transition is in danger of failing. This would have serious consequences for Germany as a business location. (Christian Democratic Union, Germany) Along the same line, political parties in Sweden disagree on the legitimacy of the Act on Reduction Obligation for gasoline and diesel. This policy is aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector, and ultimately increased fuel prices. Center-right parties occasionally use gain-frames but more often draw on loss- or non-loss-frames, emphasizing that a high reduction obligation brings economic burden for citizens. 39) Many households and businesses are still under pressure, not least from inflation, which we are now seeing start to fall, but it is disrespectful and irresponsible to force the part of the population that is dependent on the car to pay the bill. (Moderate Party, Sweden) Left parties, on the other hand, primarily use loss-framing to argue against lowering the reduction obligation, stating that the high increase in emissions will have severe impacts on the climate, people, and the economy in the future. 40) In addition to the fact that the reduction obligation will lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions, failure to meet climate targets, reduced crisis preparedness, increased dependence on non-democracies, [...] the reduction of 49 the reduction obligation risks entailing very high costs for the state and thus for Swedish taxpayers. (Green Party, Sweden) Altogether, the parliamentary debates around reaching climate goals reveal a broader struggle over how to balance immediate costs with long-term benefits, particularly when it comes to emission reduction efforts. Most parties in Germany and Sweden emphasize the importance of meeting national and international climate targets. They tend to highlight long-term societal and economic gains of climate action while warning of the non-gains associated with inaction. However, the strategies for achieving set goals diverge and are further influenced by different political priorities. Center-right parties appear to more often bring forward arguments about short-term affordability and stability, sometimes questioning the feasibility and fairness of current measures. Right-wing parties, again, appear to reject the premise of goal-reaching altogether, portraying climate action itself as harmful. Ultimately, these tensions underscore the political challenge of reconciling urgent climate ambitions with competing views on fairness and responsibility. 50 Discussion The purpose of this thesis is to explore the extent and ways in which politicians use gain-loss framing in climate-related parliamentary debates in Germany and Sweden in 2024 – and whether these trends align or differ between the two countries. This chapter situates the findings within previous research and societal trends to discuss the broader implications of gain-loss framing in political climate communication. Regarding the extent of gain-loss framing, the findings reveal that this rhetorical strategy is widely employed in German and Swedish climate-related parliamentary debates. This reinforces gain-loss framing as a promising theoretical lens to explore climate politics from a communication perspective. Broadly speaking, the frequency and distribution of gain-loss framing instances appear strikingly similar between the two countries – which could speak for similar tendencies and challenges within the EU. The findings show a balance between gain- and loss-framing in the two corpora – where both mostly promote rather than discourage climate action (see Table 3). This suggests that politicians strategically use a combination of optimism and realism to make climate action more compelling. A slight dominance of the subtype of loss-frames was noted in both Germany and Sweden, which indicates a rhetorical strategy consistent with findings that loss- and fear-framing can be more effective in influencing opinions and behavior (e.g. DeGolia et al., 2019; Tannenbaum et al., 2015). Still, the high presence of gain-framing in both corpora also shows that hopeful, opportunity-oriented narratives remain central in political climate rhetoric. Positive narratives can help counterbalance the often negative tone surrounding climate debates and keep the public engaged, especially in the face of so-called ‘climate change fatigue’ (Saab, 2023). This balance could particularly be important in political settings, where working with 51 different parties and appealing to diverse voter bases might require both emotional resonance and perceived efficacy – the latter of which studies have found to be particularly effective in promoting sustainable thinking and behavior (e.g. Armbruster et al., 2022; White et al., 2011). Frequent co-occurrences of gain- and loss-frames within single arguments may also reflect efforts to enhance perceived efficacy. The somewhat ambiguous or complicated argumentation of non-gain-frames is less common (see Table 3), which could suggest a general preference for clearer messages. The notable use of non-loss-frames (see Table 3) further emphasizes the perceived stakes in climate policy and reflects a desire to protect economic security, social stability, and the environment. Even though non-loss arguments frame in terms of positive outcomes, they may in reality also convey threat-appeals by implying that something might be lost. Hence, while this study finds gain- and loss-framing to be evenly balanced within the debates, the question of whether positive and negative sentiments are also balanced remains. To better understand in what ways gain-loss framing is employed in political climate discourse, a random 25% sample was analyzed to qualitatively explore framing in the German and Swedish parliamentary debates. Once again, notable similarities in usage emerge across both contexts, with most differences occurring along party lines. As demonstrated in the second section of the Findings chapter, the analysis found three main discursive patterns to emerge. The first pattern of maintaining prosperity and competitiveness reveals that economic concerns are prevalent in both German and Swedish parliamentary debates, which is consistent with previous CADS research (e.g. Kirk-Browne, 2021; Willis, 2017). These economic concerns might relate to the countries' aims of maintaining their positions as strong European economies. Another plausible reason, as Willis (2017) suggests, is that 52 presenting the complex issue of climate change in economic terms might make it more tangible and accessible for both politicians and the broader public. The fact that gain- and loss framing is used to similar extents supports the cost-lose-gain nexus proposed by Liersch and Stegmaier (2022), demonstrating that the economic frame can be used to argue both for and against climate action. A deeper look into the lines of argumentation reveals clear internal conflicts over what brings economic stability and prosperity. Broadly speaking, center-left parties tend to frame the green transition as a prerequisite for long-term economic resilience. Center-right parties, on the other hand, tend to put economic concerns first and argue that a stable economy and industry competitiveness is needed first to then address sustainability issues. As Coan et al. (2021) and Painter et al. (2023) suggest, climate skeptics increasingly shift their focus from denying climate science to attacking climate policy. The findings of this study also reflect this pattern, particularly among right-wing parties, which often employ loss-framing to present ambitious climate measures as economically harmful (see concordance 14, p. 39). While counter-discourses are present in both countries, they are more prominent in Germany, where the AfD makes use of emotionally charged loss-framing to discourage action (see concordance 13, p. 38). The identified counter-discourses can be related to the broader trend of polarization in climate discourses seen beyond Germany and Sweden, and points to real-world consequences in terms of weakened or delayed policy efforts. For instance, the newly elected German government has been advocating to lift the EU's planned combustion engine ban, although it hinders the country's progress in reducing emissions in the mobility sector (Alkousaa, 2025). In a broader sense, the economic focus reflects how climate action is often evaluated primarily in terms of its compatibility with economic interests. This suggests a tension between treating climate policy as a fundamental versus a secondary concern to other 53 priorities – reflecting the diverging views on the effectiveness of the economic frame revealed in the literature review (see pp. 9-10) When climate concerns are consistently framed in relation to competing issues, it may indicate less urgency, reinforcing the impression that climate action is an add-on rather than a central concern of current politics. The second discursive pattern, preserving living conditions, is also similarly employed across the German and Swedish corpus. In both countries, politicians tend to push for climate action aimed at safeguarding and improving living conditions, mainly using loss-, non-loss-, and gain-frames. This discursive trend carries ethical dimensions, consistent with previous studies that highlight the moral responsibility of avoiding harm as a driving discourse for climate action (e.g. Saab, 2023; Zannakis, 2015). Such arguments were almost exclusively voiced by center-left parties, suggesting a connection between framing strategies and political ideology, as seen in prior research (e.g. Christley & Ullström, 2024; Kulanovic & Nordensvärd, 2021). However this study cannot confirm any causality. The frequent emphasis on climate change threats to people, nature, and society contrasts with earlier CADS research, which finds political climate discourses to largely overlook human and social dimensions (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2022; Kirk-Browne, 2021; Willis, 2017). Yet as Currie and Clarke (2021) note, it is important to distinguish between acknowledging human causation and highlighting impacts on people. In this study, mainly the latter is noticeable. In contrast to findings by Fischer et al. (2024), parliamentary speakers also acknowledge both local and global effects of climate change, signalling solidarian perspectives. Extensive use of loss- and non-loss-frames, especially around extreme weather threats, can be viewed as threatening fear-appeals – which are further amplified by the frequent use of emotive and figurative language, and the tendency to highlight existential threats. This could further reflect a preference for more dramatic rhetorical appeals over “softer” but equally significant 54 dimensions of long-term resilience such as public health concerns (e.g. heat-related illness; World Health Organization, 2023). Fear-based messages may be scientifically motivated and increase the sense of urgency, however they risk contributing to ‘climate change fatigue’ and rushed, simplified solutions (Saab, 2023). While environmental protection is occasionally framed in terms of nature’s intrinsic value, the arguments more often reveal instrumental views on the natural environment (see concordances 16-19, pp. 40-41). Although this could appear hypocritical – i.e. is nature really viewed as valuable? – it still functions to support more ambitious climate action. The third discursive pattern, balancing short- and long-term gains, highlights how policy outcomes rarely bring solely positive or negative effects. More often, they involve trade-offs between gains and losses of varying nature, significance, and timeframes. While not explicitly stated, similar dynamics appear within political climate discourses in the reviewed literature. For example, literature on Germany’s energy transition reveals competing discourses where some emphasize long-term economic and environmental benefits of renewables, while others focus on the immediate costs of a rapid transition (Leipprand et al., 2017; Markard et al., 2021; Schmidt et al., 2019). Similar tension is visible in the present study, for instance as illustrated by the Swedish debate over tolerable fuel prices versus the need to reduce emissions from the transport sector (see concordances 39-40, p. 49). In line with the findings by Fischer et al. (2024), Swedish politicians appear to prioritize distributive concerns that align with voter interests. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that people are more willing to take risks when facing potential losses rather than gains. Hence the tension between potential future gains and certain immediate losses is likely to reinforce short-term thinking, consistent with Van der Linden et al. (2015). However, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) also show that negative outcomes are 55 perceived more favorably when framed as costs rather than losses. This suggests that politicians benefit from presenting short-term sacrifices as long-term investments for climate goals. Finally, the link between rhetorical claims about policy effectiveness and their actual effectiveness can be questioned, i.e. policies argued to reach goals might in reality delay progress. For instance, recent reforms of Sweden’s climate politics by the current government have been found by expert bodies, such as the OECD (2025) and the Swedish Climate Policy Council (2025), to increase emissions and failing to meet set climate targets. Nevertheless, this study finds that the governing parties predominantly use gain-framing around the achievement of climate goals, while only center-left parties acknowledge that current policies may be insufficient. This stands in contrast to the German debates, in which all parties (except from the AfD) point out the future high costs of inaction (see concordances 35-36, pp. 47-48). Similar to prior CADS research (e.g. Gjesdal & Andersen, 2023; Liu & Huang, 2022), the analysis finds that specific keywords appear to trigger certain frames and arguments more often than others. This reinforces the idea that single words can become charged with different meanings and associations, serving as mental shortcuts tied to broader domains or values – as illustrated by the concepts of cognitive frames (e.g. Lakoff, 2010), or “frames in thought” (Druckman, 2001). For example, the term erreichen [G]/ uppnå [S] (‘reach’) consistently appears in contexts that emphasize goal attainment (see concordances 31-32, p. 46), suggesting a thematic association. Moreover, the term retten [G]/ rädda [S] (‘save’) was used almost exclusively in a sarcastic tone by AfD speakers in the German debates (and occasionally by the SD in Sweden) (see concordances 28-30, pp. 44-45), which further suggests that words can become ideologically loaded. This aligns with previous research findings from Norway, where terms like greenhouse gas, carbon, and CO₂ have gotten 56 different connotations in parliamentary debates (Gjesdal & Andersen, 2023). In a broader perspective, this raises the question of whether entire gain- and loss-arguments can also become associated with certain meanings and ideologies over time – similar to the way the AfD appears to have appropriated the word retten [G] (‘save’). This could help explain why arguments for protecting nature, people, and infrastructure from climate impacts – issues that arguably affect all citizens – are voiced primarily by center-left parties. If certain frames or argument structures are repeatedly associated with specific parties or ideologies, they may begin to trigger resistance and influence whether particular arguments are heard at all, regardless of their actual content. This could impact the quality and constructiveness of climate debates, not only in parliaments but across society. Both the extent and the different ways in which gain-loss framing is used raise further questions regarding the ways that these trends reflect broader political dynamics – and what implications this might hold for climate policies in Germany and Sweden. Within both countries, the governing coalition shows a tendency for gain-framing whereas the opposition leans more on loss-framing. This pattern once again raises questions about causality – whether these tendencies are rooted in political positioning (government vs. opposition) or reflect deeper ideological orientations. However, the governing coalition and opposition in the two countries come from opposite political spectrums (G: center-left governing; S: center-right governing). This indicates that parties which lead the political course do so in an optimistic way by using gain-framing, whereas the opposition counters with loss-framing to criticize the ruling parties and defame their policies. Hence, climate action – shaped through such rhetorical strategies – might be influenced more by political positioning rather than consistent ideological commitments. Consequently, far-reaching progress might be hindered by the desire to gain or maintain public support and votes. In 57 Germany, further internal tensions can be seen in the governing coalitions’ approaches to sustainability, especially in light of economic concerns. Although all three parties use gain-framing to argue for more climate action, they promote different policies and approaches. Here, the ideological and political splits within the governing coalition are clearly noticeable, which ultimately led to the dissolution of the German government and new elections in the beginning of 2025. Another prominent pattern that reflects broader political dynamics and carry implications for climate policy efforts is counter-discourses, mainly voiced by right-wing parties in both countries – a trend that transcends all three identified discursive patterns. Consistent with prior research (e.g. Forchtner & Özvatan, 2022; Vihma et al., 2021), they mostly use (economic) loss-framing and emotionally charged language to advocate against ambitious climate action – in contrast to the rest of the parties. While the Sweden Democrats (SD) employ such rhetoric, they do not deny climate change but rather argue that other issues are more pressing. A clear difference to the Alternative for Germany (AfD) can be seen here, which partly even denies scientific facts and the threat that climate change poses (see concordance 26, p. 44). This corresponds with previous research that observes a weakening consensus around climate action (e.g. Berker & Pollex, 2021; Gruber, 2025). The AfD, which has only recently been labelled 'extremist' by the German intelligence agency (Janjevic, 2025), reached almost 21% of the votes in the 2025 federal elections (Die Bundeswahlleiterin, 2025). Considering similar political shifts across Europe and other regions, these developments raise concerns not only for the tone and quality of climate change debates, but also for the general ability of democracies to pursue efficient climate action in face of growing urgency. While other parties occasionally use economic loss-framing to argue for a more cautious transition, the more extreme rhetoric has not yet 58 been widely adopted – at least not within the corpora studied. Still, should this rhetoric grow to be normalized, it would further undermine climate action, which warrants for future monitoring of whether other parties begin to mirror this framing strategy. 59 Conclusion This thesis aimed to examine the extent and ways in which gain-loss framing is used by politicians in climate-related parliamentary debates in Germany and Sweden in 2024, through a corpus-assisted discourse study (CADS). The thesis further explored how the framing usage and discursive patterns compare between the two countries – highlighting both similarities and differences. Overall, the findings demonstrate that gain-loss framing is used frequently to debate climate action. The main rhetorical function is not to discourage or delay climate action but to promote it, evenly focusing on opportunities (gain-framing) and threats or risks (loss-framing). Arguments to delay climate action mainly draw on loss-frames – this pattern appears more often in Germany. Both countries demonstrate a slight predominance of the subtype of loss-frames. The qualitative analysis identified three main discursive patterns across both the German and Swedish corpus: 1) maintaining prosperity and competitiveness (in which climate action and the green transition is framed as both a risk and opportunity for national economic strength), 2) preserving living conditions (which focuses on protecting nature, human life, and infrastructure from climate change-related harm), and 3) balancing short- and long-term gains (in which diverging strategies and timelines reveal conflicts between long- and short-term political or economic interests). No key themes are observed for one country and not the other; country-specific differences are mostly noticeable between political parties. While right-wing counter-discourses in both countries frame climate action as a costly burden, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) uses more extreme rhetoric than the Sweden Democrats (SD) and even denies scientific findings. Moreover, center-right parties in Sweden lean more on gain-framing while center-left lean more on loss-framing; this pattern is reversed in 60 Germany. However, it remains uncertain whether this difference rather relates to government-opposition dynamics (at the time of analysis, Sweden is center-right- and Germany is center-left-governed). Lastly, while all parties in Germany (except from the AfD) emphasize the high cost of climate inaction, this argument is only forwarded by center-left parties in Sweden – suggesting a lack of accountability from the governing center-right parties, especially in the light of current critique from expert bodies. This study contributes with a first attempt to analyze how gain-loss framing is discursively used in political climate change communication. A few theoretical conclusions can be drawn from the research – first and foremost, that gain-loss framing is a valuable concept to be studied from a communication perspective. Around a third of the concordance lines derived from the search strings were identified as relevant instances of gain- and loss-framed arguments. Gain-related words mainly triggered gain-framing, loss-related words triggered loss-framing, and neutral words evenly generated gain- and loss-framing. This suggests that the study's approach captures a substantial portion of framing instances and underscores the value of distinguishing between gain-, loss-, and neutral words when constructing gain-loss search strings. Moreover, the multilingual approach proved valuable, revealing communicative patterns that transcend linguistic and cultural borders. Given that frames can occur in language, thought, and communication (Sullivan, 2023), political actors’ use of gain-loss framing not only reflects rhetorical strategies, but also suggests underlying views on climate change and the urgency of climate action – views that further shape media narratives, public perception, and policy outcomes (Lakoff, 2010). Taken together, the findings highlight that some of the main obstacles to climate action remain economic and political. Climate action is often considered in terms of economic 61 compatibility, with a tendency for human-centered, instrumental lines of argumentation. This may reflect a broader societal framing of climate change as a problem to be managed primarily through cost–benefit logic, potentially undermining more ecocentric approaches to sustainability. While the application of gain-loss framing puts a spotlight on tensions between competing goals, the observation that climate action often involves trade-offs between short-term costs and long-term climate gains is far from new; similar argumentation logics have appeared since climate change gained increasing political attention towards the end of the 20th century, and still stand today. Yet as the urgency of action grows, so does the scale of necessary measures, suggesting that the tension between immediate versus future gains and losses will only intensify. From a psychological perspective, this tension likely reinforces short-term thinking – a tendency that may be amplified in politics, where public and electoral support often motivate to prioritize immediate gains. Hence, reframing potential short-term losses as long-term investments may increase public and political support for sustainable policy-making. While this thesis offers new insights and perspectives to communication research, certain limitations are worth noting. Since parliamentary debates are public speeches, they do not reveal motivations or beliefs behind framing choices. Debate protocols further lack the ability to capture nuances that might impact the interpretation of arguments, such as tone of voice and body language. Moreover, high visibility in debates does not always translate to actual political influence. Therefore, this study cannot draw conclusions on the persuasiveness of specific frames. Even though multilingual research provides considerable advantages (e.g. allowing for cross-country comparisons), it comes with its limitations in terms of language barriers. While German and Swedish are Germanic languages (and therefore similar in structure and translations), each researcher in this study is proficient in 62 only one of the two, which leaves room for possible errors. Given that CADS only allows to reveal what is specifically being said in the data, the findings are also highly dependent on the debates included during the compilation of the corpora. Similarly, although the gain-loss search strings have proven to be effective in detecting framing instances, the selection of trigger-words naturally impacts the findings. Lastly, as the study examines two countries in the time span of one year, the possibility to generalize the findings to the level of European politics remains limited. This thesis highlights several possible pathways for future research in the field of political climate change communication. To begin with, the gain-loss search strings developed in this study could usefully be refined and applied in other linguistic, national, or political contexts. Expanding the scope of data sources – such as party programs, legislative texts, websites, and social media – may offer a more comprehensive picture of political language around climate change. Given the limitations of debate protocols mentioned above, multimodal approaches, such as the analysis of video-recorded debates or interviews, could provide a more nuanced understanding of how climate change and climate action is framed in political communication. As this study covers a fixed period of one year, longitudinal studies would help to observe patterns and potential changes over time, while also clarifying the relationship between political ideology and framing strategies. This connection may be explored further through case-studies on gain-loss-framing of specific political parties and actors. For instance, future research should continue to examine rhetorical patterns of right-wing parties to gain a better understanding of their position in climate debates. Moreover, adopting a positive discourse perspective could support political parties as well as other actors in developing more effective communication strategies for promoting climate action. Experimental research may clarify the persuasiveness of specific 63 frames. For instance, research could test whether the probability of potential outcomes – another dimension of gain-loss framing not expanded on in this study – influences an arguments’ rhetorical power. Moreover, survey approaches such as interviews with politicians could provide more insights into motivations and beliefs behind framing choices. Continuing to apply other theoretical frameworks – such as metaphor theory or alternative framing models – to CADS research might also contribute to more clarity regarding the way climate change is conceptualized and communicated in politics. 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Retrieved May 13, 2025, from https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health World Meteorological Organization. (2025, January 10). WMO confirms 2024 as warmest year on record at about 1.55°C above pre-industrial level [Press release]. https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/wmo-confirms-2024-warmest-year-record-abou t-155degc-above-pre-industrial-level Zannakis, M. (2015). The blending of discourses in Sweden’s “urge to go ahead” in climate politics. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 15(2), 217–236. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-013-9235-0 78 List of Tables Table 1. Descriptives of the number of concordance lines retrieved and analyzed. Table 2. Explanations of the four gain-loss framing subtypes. Table 3. Frequency of gain-loss framing used to promote or discourage/delay climate action, and frequency of framing subtypes in Germany and Sweden. 79 Appendices Appendix A Links to Sketch Engine with the German and Swedish corpus containing the parliamentary climate-related debates German corpus Link: https://ske.li/8et Swedish corpus Link: https://ske.li/8e5 Note: When opening the links to Sketch Engine, an initial message saying “Page is not available” might appear. In that case, press the red button “Go to Dashboard”. The corpus should then be available to access. 80 Appendix B List of trigger-words and distribution of framing instances triggered by each word Table 1 Final list of trigger-words and the distribution of framing instances in absolute numbers and as percentage of relevant instances generated by each search string (gain-, loss-related and neutral) English German Framing Swedish Framing Translation Word Stem instances Word Stem instances (%) (%) Gain-Related Achieve erziel* 4 (1) åstadkomm* 11 (3) Words Advance voranbr*/ 23 (8) främja*/gynna 42 (11) vorantreib* * Win gewinn* 8 (3) vinna*/vinst* 16 (4) Improve verbess* 4 (1) förbättr* 15 (4) Invest invest* 23 (8) invester* 20 (5) Maintain erhalt* 20 (7) behåll*/bibeh 22 (6) åll*/ upprätthåll* Protect schutz* 38 (13) skydda*/värna 63 (15) * Reach erreich* 69 (24) uppnå* 38 (9) Save rett* 11 (4) rädda* 5 (1) Secure sich* 32 (11) säkra*/trygga 27 (7) * Strengthen stärk* 25 (9) stärka*/förstä 94 (22) rka* Support unterstütz* 14 (5) stödj*/stötta* 24 (6) Preserve bewahr* 4 (1) bevara* 20 (5) Prevent verhind* 12 (4) förebygg*/ 16 (4) motverka* Loss-Related Burden belast* 17 (8) belast*/börda 13 (3) Words * Cost kost*/preis* 51 (22) kosta*/pris* 67 (17) 81 Table 1 Continued English German Framing Swedish Framing Translation Word Stem instances (%) Word Stem instances (%) Loss-Related Damage/ schad* 24 (11) skada*/drabba 76 (19) Words Inflict * Destroy zerst* 23 (10) förstör*/föröd* 23 (6) Lose verlust* / 23 (10) förlust*/ 45 (11) verlier* förlor*/tappa* Miss verfehl* 5 (2) missa* 9 (2) Pay bezahl* 31 (14) betala* 20 (5) Risk risiko*/risk* 6 (3) risk* 102 (26) Suffer leid* 6 (3) lida* 3 (1) Threaten gefahr*/bedr* 40 (18) hot*/fara*/ 36 (9) äventyr* Neutral Cause verursach* 7 (19) orsaka* 14 (9) Words Contribute to beitrag*/trag* 13 (36) bidra* till 63 (41) bei Lead to führ*/führ* zu 16 (44) led* till 77 (50) Number of concordance lines from Germany’s search string = 549 (Gain-related = 287; Loss-related = 226; Neutral = 36) Number of concordance lines from Sweden’s search string: 959 (Gain-related = 413; Loss-related = 392; Neutral = 154) 82 Appendix C Search strings German search strings Gain: [lemma="rett.*|sich.*|erhalt.*|schutz.*|schütz.*|beschütz.*|bewahr.*|invest.*|gewinn.*| verbess.*|voranbr.*|vorantreib.*|stärk.*|unterstütz.*|erreich.*|erziel.*|verhind.*"] Loss: [lemma="bedr.*|gefahr.*|gefähr.*|risiko.*|risk.*|kost.*|preis.*|schad.*|schädig.*|verlust. *|verlier.*|zerst.*|belast.*|leid.*|verfehl.*|bezahl.*"] Neutral: [lemma="trag.*"] [ ]{0,10}[lemma="bei"] [lemma="beitrag.*|verursach.*"] [lemma="führ.*"] [ ]{0,10}[lemma="zu"] Swedish search strings Gain: [lemma="rädda.*|säkra.*|trygga.*|behåll.*|bibehåll.*|upprätthåll.*|skydda.*|värna.*|be vara.*|investera.*|vinna.*|vinst.*|förbättr.*|främja.*|gynna.*|stärk.*|förstärk.*|stödj.*|s tötta.*|uppnå.*|åstadkomm.*|förebygg.*|motverka.*"] 83 Loss: [lemma="hot.*|fara.*|risk.*|kost.*|pris.*|skada.*|förlust.*|förlor.*|tappa.*|förstör.*|förö d.*|börda.*|belast.*|äventyr.*|lida.*|drabba.*|missa.*|betala.*"] Neutral: [lc=""led.*"" | lemma_lc=""led.*""][lc=""till"" | lemma_lc=""till""] [lc=""bidra.*"" | lemma_lc=""bidra.*""][lc=""till"" | lemma_lc=""till""] [lc=""orsaka.*"" | lemma_lc=""orsaka.*""] 84 Appendix D Coding scheme for qualitative sample analysis Framing type 1. Gain 2. Non-loss 3. Loss 4. Non-gain Argumentation strategy 1. Promote ambitious measures through gain-framing 2. Promote ambitious measures through loss-framing 3. Discourage/delay climate action through loss-framing 4. Discourage/delay climate action through gain-framing Thematic focus of gain or loss 1. Economy (e.g. industry competitiveness, investments) 2. Work & employment (e.g. job opportunities, employment rate) 3. Nature & environment (e.g. biodiversity, landscapes) 4. Human livelihoods (e.g. lives, purchasing power) 5. Societal functions (e.g. infrastructure, crisis preparedness) 6. Climate (e.g. emissions, climate goals) 7. “The country” (e.g. country image, national reputation) Mediator of gain or loss 1. Climate change (e.g. extreme weather) 2. Policies & politics (e.g. directives, political priorities) 3. Emissions & pollution (e.g. CO2, chemicals) 4. Economic situation (e.g. inflation, price and tax level, competitiveness) 85 5. Inaction (e.g. absence of certain policies, postponing action) 6. Climate action (e.g. adaptation and mitigation measures, investment) 7. State of affairs (e.g. geopolitical uncertainty) 8. Technology & innovation (e.g. e-fuels) 9. Humans (e.g. human behavior) Partisanship of speaker Germany 1. Social Democratic Party 2. Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union 3. The Greens 4. Free Democratic Party 5. Alternative for Germany 6. The Left 7. Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance 8. Non-attached Sweden 1. The Democratic Party 2. The Sweden Democrats 3. The Moderate Party 4. The Left Party 5. The Centre Party 6. The Christian Democrats 7. The Green Party 8. The Liberal Party 86 9. Non-attached Temporal reference 1. Past 2. Present 3. Future 87 Appendix E Concordance lines in original language 1) Wir tun alles dafür, dieses Land und die Menschen in diesem Land davor zu schützen, dass sie von diesen Krisen künftig hart getroffen werden. (The Greens, Germany) 2) Genom att investera i klimatanpassningar kan vi bygga säkrare bostäder, utveckla effektiva varningssystem och stärka vår infrastruktur för att bättre stå emot dessa händelser. (Christian Democrats, Sweden) 3) Klimawandel und Artensterben bedrohen unsere Lebensgrundlage. (Social Democratic Party, Germany) 4) Att köpa utsläppsrätter riskerar att bli fruktansvärt dyrt för svenska folket. (Social Democratic Party, Sweden) 5) Die hohen Energiepreise führen zu großen finanziellen Nöten in der Bevölkerung. Die heimische Solarindustrie kann Abhilfe schaffen. (The Left, Germany) 6) Klimatförändringarna bidrar till fattigdom och otrygg livsmedelsförsörjning, vilket också kan få allvarliga konsekvenser för fred och säkerhet. (Moderate Party, Sweden) 7) Wenn wir den Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland und Europa erhalten und stärken wollen, müssen auch wir die Transformation bei uns konsequent vorantreiben. (The Greens, Germany) 8) Klimatomställningen är en drivkraft för stärkt konkurrenskraft och en hållbar samhällsutveckling i hela landet. (Green party, Sweden) 9) Die Elemente Wirtschaft, Soziales und Nachhaltigkeit stehen nicht nebeneinander. Das Fundament ist die Wirtschaft. Nur wenn sie stark ist, können wir die Säulen Soziales und Nachhaltigkeit bezahlen. (Christian Democratic Union, Germany) 88 10) Om Sverige ska behålla tillväxt, jobb och företag kan vi inte ha en miljöpolitik som är hårdare än andra EU-länders och som straffar våra företag och hotar landsbygden. (Moderate Party, Sweden) 11) Es sind vor allem Unternehmen, die in Innovationen, neue Märkte schaffen und den Übergang zu einer klimaneutralen Wirtschaft ermöglichen werden. Wir wollen einen klaren rechtlichen Rahmen, der den privaten Sektor anreizt, in nachhaltige Projekte zu investieren. (Free Democratic Party, Germany) 12) Hinder måste rivas för att klimatomställningen ska kunna skyndas på. Åtgärder för att förenkla och förkorta tillståndsprocesserna är helt nödvändiga för att Sverige ska klara den gröna omställningen. (Liberal Party, Sweden) 13) Die dümmste Energiepolitik der Welt einhergehend mit noch skrupelloserer Ausplünderung des deutschen Volkes geht in die nächste Runde. Niemand auf der Welt geht den Weg der Fantasten und ideologischen Spinner in Deutschland mit. Kein anderes Industrieland schaltet gleichzeitig alle seine fossilen Kraftwerke und Kernkraftwerke ab, um seine Wirtschaft und seine Bevölkerung nur aus Wind- und Sonnenenergie mit Strom zu versorgen. Keines zerstört seine funktionierende Wirtschaft, um zukünftig mit Wasserstoff Strom zu produzieren, zu fahren und zu heizen. So dumm, so naiv und so verantwortungslos sind nur die Grünen in allen Kartellparteien: von Linke bis CDU. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) 14) Varken Kina, Indien eller någon annan av de stora utsläpparna kommer någonsin att vilja gå i våra fotspår eftersom vi så uppenbart förstör för oss själva. (Sverigedemokraterna, Sweden) 15) Der deutsche Mittelstand ist mitten im Umbau der Modernisierung und profitiert von dieser Transformation. Wenn hier jemand deindustrialisiert, dann sind das Sie. Sie 89 schaden unserer Wirtschaft, Deutschland und Europa. (Social Democratic Party, Germany) 16) Mit dem Aktionsprogramm Natürlicher Klimaschutz können wir auch Seegras- und Salzwiesen als wichtige Ökosysteme schützen. (The Greens, Germany) 17) För att värna skogens betydelse för den biologiska mångfalden och klimatet krävs en omställning av skogsbruket. [...] Med de otillräckliga resurser som regeringen avsätter riskerar många av dessa skogar att i stället avverkas [...]. Oersättliga naturvärden går därmed förlorade. (Left Party, Sweden) 18) Kommunen können dort Gelder beantragen, um Flächen zu entsiegeln, den Wasserrückhalt in der Landschaft zu verbessern, Wälder zu erhalten. Es gibt so viel zu gewinnen: eine lebenswerte, lebendige Natur, die uns Menschen vor den Folgen der globalen Erhitzung schützt. (The Greens, Germany) 19) Sverige är ett skogsland. 70 procent av vår yta är skog, och denna skog kommer att nyttjas, skördas och hanteras på olika sätt. [...] Vi måste nyttja den på ett klokt sätt, inte bara bevara den. (Liberal Party, Sweden) 20) Klimawandel ist in vielen Kreisen ein abgenutztes Wort. Rufen wir uns kurz in Erinnerung: Wenn wir so weitermachen wie bisher – das schließt ein, dass wir das erreichen, was wir uns vornehmen –, dann verlieren wir in den kommenden Jahrzehnten über 1,3 Milliarden Menschen ihr Zuhause, weil es unbewohnbar wird. (Social Democratic Party, Germany) 21) Die Freiheit wird nicht durch ein Tempolimit, wird nicht durch das Verbrenner- Aus und Windräder bedroht. Nein, die Freiheit wird bedroht durch Überschwemmungen, durch Dürren, durch Hitzewellen. Das gefährdet die Existenz von Menschen und die Freiheiheit. (The Greens, Germany) 90 22) Säg att vargen inte har kommit till dem som har förlorat sina nära och kära i Spanien! Säg till dem i Filippinerna som har skadade och förstörda hus att vargen inte har kommit! (Green Party, Sweden) 23) Die Klimakrise ist bereits grausame Realität und verursacht in vielen Regionen der Welt großes Leid. Dabei ist Klimaschutz ein Instrument, das zu mehr globaler Gerechtigkeit, zu mehr sozialer Gerechtigkeit führt, auch bei uns in Deutschland. (The Greens, Germany) 24) I Peking var det regnrekord med flera döda i skyfallen. [...] Sverige var inget undantag. Värme, kraftigt regn och snabb snösmältning drabbade Småland och fick dessutom Torne älv att svämma över. [...] Det är allvar, i Sverige och i hela världen. (Social Democratic Party, Sweden) 25) Uns werden zerstörerische Windindustrieanlagen auf See als Naturschutz verkauft. Eine dreistere Irreführung des Wählers lässt sich kaum ausdenken. (AfD, Germany) 26) Wir hätten nur noch 13 Jahre Zeit, um die Erde zu retten. In den 70er-Jahren war der Spruch, dass wir eine neue Eiszeit bekämen, und davor wurde gewarnt. Aber nein, nichts deutet auf eine Klimakatastrophe hin. Das sagen auch etliche Wissenschaftler und Nobelpreisträger. Die pazifischen Inseln sind nicht untergegangen. Die Polkappen haben immer noch ordentlich Eis. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) 27) Om vi inte hanterar det omedelbara och existentiella hot som Ryssland utgör kommer vi sannolikt inte att behöva bekymra oss alls om att värna miljön i framtiden. (Sweden Democrats, Sweden) 28) Aber, liebe Bürger, diese Leute wollen nicht die Welt retten, sie wollen Sie ausnehmen wie eine Weihnachtsgans und mit deutschem Geld die sowieso schon prall gefüllten Taschen ihrer Auftraggeber und zu einem nicht unerheblichen Teil die 91 eigenen Taschen füllen. Die Energiewende ist gescheitert, schon lange, und wir als AfD werden sie rückabwickeln. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) 29) Es geht den grünen Kommunisten und allen, die ihnen hinterherhecheln, also keineswegs um die Rettung der Umwelt oder der Erde. Es geht um Profitinteressen der Auftraggeber. Es geht darum, die Bürger auszuplündern bis hin zur Armut, sie zu enteignen, die deutsche Wirtschaft auszuradieren, um sie ein für alle Mal als Konkurrenten auf dem Weltmarkt loszuwerden. (Alternative for Germany, Germany) 30) Till det här problemet ska vi kanske lägga självbilden som många har - att Sverige, det ansvarstagande lilla landet i norr, ensamt ska rädda världen. (Sverigedemokraterna, Sweden) 31) Wir haben also noch viel nachzuholen, aber auch so viel zu gewinnen: Die Ziele der Agenda 2030 zu erreichen, bedeutet: globale Gerechtigkeit, globale Gesundheit, ein lebenswerter Planet. (The Greens, Germany) 32) Om vi prioriterar en grön omställning och satsar på hållbara lösningar kan vi uppnå klimatmålen till 2030. (Left Party, Sweden) 33) Gerade jetzt wäre es wichtig, kluge und nachhaltige Entscheidungen zu treffen, die die kommenden Generationen in den Blick nehmen. Diese nachhaltigen Entscheidungen vermisse ich bei der Ampelregierung. (Christian Democratic Union, Germany) 34) För oss socialdemokrater handlar den gröna omställningen om att säkra investeringar i vårt land och att säkra framtidens sjysta jobb och med det våra kommande generationers välfärd. För att lyckas behöver vi leda omställningen. Regeringens minskning av reduktionsplikten kastar oss längst bak i klungan. (Social Democratic Party, Sweden) 92 35) Ja, auch die Wärmewende kostet Geld. Ich will Sie nur darauf hinweisen, dass die Erderwärmung – wir steuern jetzt auf 3 Grad zu – noch viel teurer sein wird. Und die Wähler, die Sie schützen wollen, werden später mit den Folgen dieser Erderwärmung konfrontiert sein. (Christian Democratic Union, Germany) 36) Genom att skjuta upp nödvändiga insatser nu riskerar vi att orsaka irreversibla skador på vår planet, vilket i sin tur kommer att ha djupgående effekter på alltifrån biodiversitet till mänsklig hälsa och även ekonomi. (Social Democratic Party, Sweden) 37) Vielleicht sichert das, was die AfD fordert, kurzfristige Profite, aber langfristig ginge in Deutschland technologisches Know-how verloren. (The Left, Germany) 38) Die Versorgungssicherheit ist gefährdet, der Strom ist teuer, und die Auswirkungen der Energiewende kann die Bundesregierung nicht umfassend bewerten. Insgesamt haben sich die Risiken seit 2021 verschärft. Die Energiewende droht zu scheitern. Dies hätte gravierende Folgen für den Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland. (Christian Democratic Union, Germany) 39) Många hushåll och företag är fortsatt pressade, inte minst av inflationen som vi nu ser börjar sjunka, men det är respektlöst och oansvarigt att tvinga den del av befolkningen som är beroende av bilen att stå för den notan. (Moderate Party, Sweden) 40) Utöver att sänkt reduktionsplikt leder till ökade växthusgasutsläpp, att klimatmålen inte nås, sänkt krisberedskap, ökat beroende av icke-demokratier, [...] riskerar sänkningen av reduktionsplikten att innebära mycket höga kostnader för staten och därmed för svenska skattebetalare. (Green Party, Sweden) 93 Disclosure Statement: Use of generative AI tools As non-native English speakers, we utilized generative AI tools to assist with proofreading and language correction. Additionally, generative AI was used to support the creative process during the brainstorming for the title and headlines. All AI-generated suggestions were carefully reviewed and used solely as sources of inspiration. The final text and all findings presented are our own work. 94 Statement of Division of Work Throughout the process of designing, conducting, and writing this thesis, the two of us have been working together in close collaboration. However, since the analysis builds on multilingual analysis, the process of compiling the two corpora and carrying out the sample coding for the qualitative analysis was carried out separately for the most part, with each of us focusing on our respective native languages (German: Helen, Swedish: Ingrid). Throughout this phase, we continuously translated, compared, and discussed texts and findings to ensure consistency and coherence. The final synthesis and interpretation of findings were conducted together. In sum, all chapters were co-written and revised by both, and the overall workload has been shared more or less evenly between the two of us. 95