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THE EUROPEANISATION OF SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND BREXIT: THE CASE OF SWEDEN

Measuring the impact of the European Union's relationship with Sweden using Brexit as the before-and-after catalyst for changes in Europeanisation

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Abstract

The Europeanisation of Swedish development policy looks into the impact the European Union (EU) has had on influencing Sweden's development policy. This study will explain if Brexit has had an impact on Sweden's development policy due to the change in the trend of global development, and understanding if as a result Sweden's level of Europeanisation changed. The main research question for this study is; Has the British Referendum in 2016 impacted the EU's Europeanisation efforts on Swedish Development Policy? Due to the absence of research in the Europeanisation of development policy, Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) approaches will indicate whether the EU had an impact and how the EU uses PCD tools to formulate and implement its development policy. Coherence as a method of development cooperation is embedded within the foundation of the EU's Maastricht Treaty, and is a recurring theme throughout the 2000s before-and-after Brexit. Using PCD as an analytical tool to determine the aggregate level of Europeanisation of Swedish development policy will be applied when analysing the PCD materials. The materials will be categorised into three main phases that will determine the level of Europeanisation per phase, then illustrated onto a one-dimensional typology diagram. The three phases of PCD materials will look before-and-after Brexit to determine the level of Europeanisation. Phase 1 pre-Brexit reviews materials between 2000-2008, Phase 2 pre-Brexit reviews materials between 2009-2016, and Phase 3 post-Brexit reviews materials between 2016-2019. The results of the study reveals there was no change in the level of Europeanisation of development policy because the EU development model is heavily influenced by the Swedish development policy.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Brexit – British Exit

D.V. – Dependent Variable

EEAS – European External Action Service

EC – European Commission

ECD – European Consensus on Development

ECDPM – European Centre for Development Policy Management

EP – European Parliament

EU – European Union

EUM – European Union Member

I.V. – Independent Variable

MDG(s) – Millenium Development Goal(s)

NECD – New European Consensus on Development

NGO(s) – Non-Governmental Organization(s)

OECD-DAC – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee

PCD – Policy Coherence for Development

PGD – Policy for Global Development

PCSD – Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development

SDG(s) - Sustainable Development Goal(s)

SIDA – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

TEU – Treaty of the European Union

TFEU – Treaty of the Functioning European Union

UN – United Nations

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1. Introduction

1.1 Research Problem

Despite attempts of the European Union (EU) to impact European Union Member (EUM) states development policies through the Europeanisation of development policy, it does not seem to be working. Jan Orbie and Maurizio Carbone point out in their article, *The Europeanisation of Development Policy,* that; "(…) while the development policies of European donors have been studied extensively, the potential relevance of EU membership and Europeanisation tendencies have been ignored." (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 2) The absence of studies into this field due to neglecting the relevance of EU membership has limited Europeanisation efforts to a superficial absorption of norms and values on the EUM's behalf. (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 2)

One of the tendencies that has been overlooked are the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) initiatives by the EU. PCD is a regulatory instrument that was introduced in the European Consensus on Development (ECD) in 2005. The concept behind PCD is that the European Commission (EC) would send out a PCD questionnaire to the EUM states asking if they were and by how much their domestic development policies aligned with the EU's development policy according to the ECD. The PCD questionnaire answers from the EUMs would then be collected and published by the European Commission (EC) into a PCD report that would analyse the answers from the questionnaires. This was a biennial process since 2005 up until 2019 aimed at looking at coherence of development policies on the EUMs part rather than highlighting the EU's impact on the EUMs formulation of development policy, which for the sake of this study will focus on Sweden.

The Nordic development model refers to following three EUMs Denmark, Finland, Sweden and one non-EUM Norway as the cause of the limited Europeanisation efforts and impact the EU faces as Orbie and Carbone explain, "(…) the (alleged) end of Nordic exceptionalism – a model characterized by the provision of large volumes and effective aid – to ask whether Europe has played any role in such a significant change." (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 7) Orbie and Carbone are referencing Ole Elgström and Sarah Delputte's article, *An end to Nordic exceptionalism? Europeanisation and Nordic development policies*. The Nordic development model challenges Europeanisation because of the size and effectiveness of aid the Nordic countries have traditionally been involved with in their own development policies. However, the only reference to the potential change in the status quo of development policy, in that the Nordic development model could be impacted by Europeanisation efforts would be from external events as Elgström and Delputte explain; "Neither can we expect Europeanisation in the case of aid objectives. Changes in this respect will probably come, but then as a the result of global development trends, rather than of EU initiatives." (Elgström & Delputte, 2016, 39)

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This study assumes that Brexit had the potential to affect the global trend of development policy including the EU initiatives that followed after the vote in 2016. Therefore, Brexit will be used as the causal mechanism because this paper proposes it led to an overall change in the EU's efforts to Europeanise policies among its members in general, in this case looking more specifically at development policy. The initial insight into this change would be Federica Mogherini's June 2016 address in the EU Global Strategy directly after the British referendum was held and decided to leave the Union; "(…) This is even more true after the British referendum. We will indeed have to rethink the way our Union works, but we perfectly know what to work for. We know what our principles, our interests and our priorities are. This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a Strategy. We need a shared vision, and common action." (EU, 2019, 3) This call for unity would be the first step into reassuring current EUM's to keep their faith in the Union.

This reassurance was needed because 2016 was a tumultuous time for the EU with Euroscepticism on the rise resulting in increasing fragmentation within EUMs domestically that challenged the value of membership, only for the British referendum to actually decouple from the Union as Lafan states; "Brexit was a major blow. For European institutions and the remaining member states, Brexit was an existential threat to the entire European project. It represented a disintegrative moment that could morph into systemic disintegration. Fear of contagion and a potential domino effect from Brexit loomed large. The remaining member states and EU institutions were determined to defend and protect the essence and achievements of their collective endeavour and to reassert the importance of the Union for their shared future." (Lafan, 2022, 86)

This reaction of the EUMs forces the EU to take action or risk a domino effect of other Eurosceptic members throughout Europe, this was a stark realization that; "The outcome of the Brexit referendum in Great Britain provided a first glimpse of what may lie ahead when Eurosceptic sentiment hardens." (De Vries, 2018a, 3) De Vries delves deeper into the magnitude of this vote explaining that; " The Brexit vote was historic. It marked a new era in the process of European integration. Exit is possible. A population decided to turn its back on the European Project, and exit the EU." (De Vries, 2018b, 154)

This is the cue for the EU to increase their Europeanisation efforts among all EUMs, institutions, and place greater emphasis on following with their initiatives to have an impact. The broad overhaul meant greater Europeanisation including development policy creating the possibility to see a before-and-after of EU rhetoric and initiatives leading up to, and after Brexit.

To determine whether there has been a change in the level of Europeanisation the study will look at policy documents before-and-after Brexit to determine whether there has been a shift. These policy documents take the shape of PCD initiatives that are an integral part of the EU's Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and have been in use since 2005 with the European Consensus on Development (ECD). This is why Sweden has been chosen to be used as a case study for this study because they had created the initial PCD initiative in their own development policy dubbed Policy for Global Development (PGD). The materials extend before-and-after Brexit in the form of PCD reports, one PCD Questionnaire, and development consensus's and strategies on the EU's behalf, and as government communications, bills, and directives on Sweden's part. The vast number of materials will be divided into three phases; 1) Phase 1 Pre-Brexit: 2000-2008, 2) Phase 2 Pre-Brexit: 2009-2016, and 3) Phase 3 Post-Brexit: 2016-2019.

Due to the aggregate approach of Europeanisation an analytical tool operationalizing the PCD/PGD documents will be used to indicate whether there has been a change in Europeanisation within each phase dependent upon if the policies were vertically coherent between the EU and Sweden, and then analyzed towards the end. The methodological approach to measuring Europeanisation, vertical coherence and the operationalization of PCD will be described in further detail in the methodological framework.

1.2 Aim and Research Questions

Orbie and Carbone lay the foundation of the research problem that Europeanisation of development policy is not working despite using initiatives such as PCD align EU and EUM policies together. Elgström and Delputte point out that the reason for this blockage in Europeanisation is due to the competing Nordic development model, therefore a change would be due to an external global event rather than another EU initiative to increase Europeanisation, in this case, of development policy. Brexit is the proposed change that could make an impact on the global development trend, as seen in Mogherini's address.

The aim of this study is to determine whether or not there has been a change in the level of Europeanisation of Swedish development policy. To determine the changes of Europeanisation an operationalised analytical tool using a vertical coherence typology will be used. The coherence typology will analyze the 'top-down' influence of the EU within the PCD/PGD materials for each of the phases. Each phase will determine whether there are low, modest, or high levels of Europeanisation based on what the coherence typology indicates, which can then be used as the aggregate to show the overall changes in Europeanisation. The empirical summary will then determine the level of Europeanisation and explain how Brexit caused it and why.

The main research questions for this study;

Has the British Referendum in 2016 impacted the EU's Europeanisation efforts on Swedish Development Policy?

If the British Referendum did have an impact on the Europeanisation of Swedish Development Policy how was Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) used to accomplish this?

1.3 Limitations of the Study

When looking at the methods of how Europeanisation has impacted the EUMs, PCD is one of the most consistent methods used throughout. However, it is also one of the only methods used to compare development policies between the EU and a fellow EUM creating a gap of available materials outside of PCD reports to delve deeper into the topic unless looking at a EUM's development policies individually. Therefore, when collecting and addressing the materials it will not be a entirely systematic but will include PCD-related documents that aid in the analysis on the influence of Europeanisation taking place.

The additional PCD-related documents are limited to the policy formulation stage of the policymaking process rather than at the implementation stage. This was done intentionally to avoid relying on information from aid workers and development specialists working in the field. This is partly due to the lack of access to the notes, thoughts, and opinions that are not readily available or plentiful to derive a meaningful conclusion for the study. Another reason is the difficulty in piecing together a full picture on how Europeanisation affected development policy in developing countries because it goes beyond the scope of EU influence impacting Sweden. For this reason other external events considered to be potential variables in affecting how trends in global development could have been changed have also been phased out. These potential variables being 'the migration crises' in 2015-16, as well as domestic incidents occurring in Sweden at the time. This is done in the hopes of narrowing the scope to the EU, Sweden, and Brexit which could be considered as limiting.

1.4 Relevance for EU Studies

This study is relevant for EU studies because it aims to deepen the understanding of the Europeanisation of development policy between the EU and Sweden. By focusing on the relationship between a high-functioning development actor (Sweden) as well as that of a rising actor (EU) in the development field helps to show how Brexit was able to change the global development trend. The study will also help fill the gap in research of the Europeanisation of development policy by using PCD as a way to indicate if the EUM is attempting to cohere or adopt the EU norms and values into their own domestic policies.

1.5 Thesis Structure and Research Design

Chapter 2: Review of Existing Research

In chapter two the review of existing research is broken into three different sections. The first section 'The EU leadership and framing policy' underlines the importance of the EU as a credible leader in the development policy field, and the strategies used to ensure that policy coherence was happening via a method called 'framing'. The second section 'The EU difficulties with Europeanisation efforts' discusses the difficulty the EU had in impacting EUMs through policy coherence, reinforcing the issue that there is a push-back of Europeanisation efforts. This contextual helps to navigate the extent of the problem before the Brexit vote. The third section 'The consequences of implementing incoherent development policies' looks a the consequences of policy that are superficially absorbed into the EUMs development frameworks from the formulation stage by presenting accounts on the implementation stage. This study focuses mainly on the policy aspect of development policy, in this case formulation, rather than implementation, but is mentioned to illustrate the point and its relevance for this study.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

Chapter three will explore the theoretical framework behind Europeanisation as Economides defines; "Europeanisation implies institutional/organizational changes but also ideational ones affecting not only how but also why decisions are made: membership of the EU will over time affect how policymakers think about policy issues and thus shape domestic policy preferences." (Economides, 2023, 93) The theoretical framework will also establish the dimension, measurement, and direction of Europeanisation presented throughout the study.

Understanding the applications of Europeanisation will help to substantiate why policy was the focus of the study. Once the theory has been explained the study goes into a discussion on Brexit that Kubicek defines as the; "British withdrawal from the EU which led to even more economic and political uncertainty, both in Great Britian and across Europe, as some feared (or welcomed) the prospect of a weakened or dismantled EU." **(**Kubicek, 2017a, 2-3) This political uncertainty is why Brexit was chosen as the independent variable and causal mechanism for change. It also leads to the introduction of the dependent variable of measuring Europeanisation through three levels of low, modest, and high. Due to the aggregate approach of Europeanisation a coherence typology tool is created to analyse the PCD materials.

Coherence is one of the cornerstones in the creation of the European Union as the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 there were the 3 C's – Coordination, Complementarity, and Coherence, and was the first step into creating the European Union according to the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Carbone provides a complete definition of the three C's here; "Complementarity means that the member states and the EU share competences in development policy, which must be exercised alongside each other. Coordination implies that member states and EU should coordinate their policies and consult on their aid programmes, including in international organizations and during international conferences. Coherence entails that the EU "shall take account" of the objectives of its development policy "in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries". (Carbone, 2008, 330) Coherence was chosen because of the accountability factor that implies the EU influence in the formulation of development policy, and is the best indicator for Europeanisation.

This coherence element also meant the incorporation of coherence typologies in this case; vertical coherence that looks at the both the internal EU development polices that will be applied to the external Swedish foreign development policies together. Vertical coherence is then applied to the PCD materials dating from 2000 up until 2019. Three phases of the PCD timeline created to illustrate how Europeanisation could be measured before-and-after Brexit; Phase 1 Pre-Brexit: 2000 – 2008, Phase 2 Pre-Brexit: 2009 – 2016, and Phase 3 Post-Brexit: 2016 – 2019. At the end the direction of Europeanisation is explained to help determine whether Brexit Europeanised Swedish development policy.

Chapter 4: Methodology and Materials

The methodology and materials in chapter four covers the approach of the study, tools to be used for the materials, and the collected materials itself. The first part of the methods section will present the 'Three Phase One-Dimensional Typology: Europeanisation of Swedish Development Policy' demonstrating how the measuring of Europeanisation will be used and the design of the coherence typology to determine whether or not there has been a change. This also introduces the PCD analytical tool using both Europeanisation theory and vertical coherence to be operationalised when analysing the materials. The materials are presented in a table organized by dates to show the progression of the policy documents involved, and how the three phases themselves are separated. After the table is the evaluation of the materials, as well as the strengths and limitations of the methodology and materials as a whole.

Chapter 5: Analysis

The analysis in chapter five is divided into the three phases each employing the operationalised PCD analytical tool in Phase 1 Pre-Brexit: 2000 – 2008 and in Phase 2 Pre-Brexit: 2010 – 2016. In Phase 3 Post-Brexit: 2016 – 2019 the operationalised PCD analytical tool will be applied alongside the independent variable and causal mechanism of Brexit to determine whether there was a change in the level of Europeanisation. The empirical summary of the results will make an overall analysis that takes into account the three pre-and-post-Brexit materials, and the final 'Three Phase One-Dimensional Typology: Europeanisation of Swedish Development Policy' that will show what the materials indicated when measuring Europeanisation theory, and determine what effect Brexit had.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The conclusion will answer the research questions on whether Brexit had an impact on the Europeanisation of Swedish development policy, the results of the study, and the potential for future research in the study.

2. Review of Existing Research

Research into the field of Europeanisation in development policy is in itself a niche academic field, in that it directly looks into the relationship of the impact of the EU with an EUM (in this case Sweden) based on the 'likeness' or 'alignment' of their development policies.

2.1 EU Leadership and 'Framing' Policy

In Maurizio Carbone's 2011 book, *The European Union and international development: the politics of foreign aid* looks into the internal and external policies of development policy on the EU and provides a detailed analysis. Carbone's first chapter *Leadership in the European Union: The European Commission and the EU decision-making process* discusses the European Commission's (EC) leadership potential and roles. Since the EC is in itself not a sovereign actor and borrows its leverage from its fellow EUMs and needs to find innovative methods to sway the collective voices of the Union towards the private and communal interest as what Carbone refers to the EC as an institutional entrepreneur. One of these methods is by 'framing' that looks at how politically feasible proposals can be dependent upon how it is framed. (Carbone, M, 2011a, 25-26) Once tactic in framing is to frame the proposals controversially to begin the process of making it more acceptable to potential opponents, but most importantly; "By framing, the commission is able to set the parameters within which negotiations take place in the council." (Carbone, M, 2011a, 26) Framing is related to Europeanisation because it is the EC's approach to ensuring that other EUMs are following suit with the EC's approach. This justifies why the EC is willing to make bold moves dependent upon the international political climate it navigates through to fully utilize the opportunities available to solidify its credibility as is the case of the European Consensus on Development in 2005, which was contested by the northern EUMs as an infringement on how they formulated and implemented their development policies in the field.

Carbone explains in greater depth here that; "Framing provides Member States with new reasons to cooperate, imparts the basis for direction in the integration process, is a way to address at an early stage all the interests that may be affected or exclude potential adversaries by narrowing policy options necessary, which implies creating a different policy image." (Carbone, M, 2011a, 26) By using this explanation it becomes clearer that the EU needs to take on the role of an institutional entrepreneur to keep the EUMs engaged, deepen interlinkages, and constantly trying to innovate old and new ways of policy-making. However, the EU and EC are not only tied to engaging in policies that engage with EUMs, but also among other international organizations and stakeholders in the development field that can also further the EU's cause. Carbone explains here; "The objective is not only to exclude potential adversaries, but also to look for new allies. These venues may be either internal or external to the EU." (Carbone, M, 2011a, 27) When looking at the external factors that could act as potential allies towards the EU's cause of a global development actor the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) come to mind. These international organizations also have stakes in the field of development policy and influence the turnout of decisions.

2.2 EU Difficulties with Europeanisation Efforts

Carbone's second chapter *The politics of foreign aid in the European Union: The EC, the Member states and the end of aid fragmentation* is a contextual background on the EU development policy challenges such as fragmentation explaining that; [a] "(…) high degree of fragmentation has undermined the effectiveness of EU aid and prevented it from influencing the course of international development. The adoption of the European Consensus on Development and the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour, following the collective commitment to boost the quality and enhance the quantity of aid in the context of Monterrey and Paris processes, indicate a change of direction." (Carbone, M, 2011b, 30) These EU initiatives of the ECD and Code of Conduct are attempts of the EU to create incentives for EUMs to ensure that they are aligned alongside the EU development model. However, fragmentation has been a recurring problem in the EU development policy since the early 2000s that is being addressed with the incorporation of more EU's frameworks and legal instruments that ensure that there is accountability on the EUMs to follow through. Carbone strengthens this point when mentioning; "In general, most of the existing contributions see the priorities of the Member States as the driving force shaping EC development policy." (Carbone, M, 2011b, 37) Again, reinforcing the argument that EU initiatives are not the driving forces that change the trends in development policy-making.

To make Europeanisation efforts more difficult are the separate dealings between the Nordic Ministers that leave out the EU intentionally to ensure that a consensus is met before the formal meetings. (Carbone, M, 2011b, 46) The consensus between the Nordic ministers is not tied to EU as Carbone explains here; "They also tend to work with other like-minded countries (i.e. Norway, Canada, New Zealand) to influence the global debate on international development." (Carbone, M, 2011b, 46) Carbone also mentions that while the four northern Member states; Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands are the best performers of foreign aid in quantity and quality means they are selective in their resource allocation preferring the UN, they however differ in their approach to engaging with the EU as Carbone explains; "Their view on a truly European development policy is split: on the one hand, the Netherlands and Finland tend to be more supportive of the efforts of the European Commission to co-ordinate development policy at the EU level; on the other hand, Sweden and Denmark are much more critical and see the EU as an additional layer of bureaucracy." (Carbone, M, 2011b, 46)

Carbone's insight into the EU institutions as well as the attitudes of the EUMs in this case Sweden helps to understand where the reluctance to Europeanise development policies in any capacity creates areas of interest to figure out why this is the case, even though there are multiple initiatives to compensate for these shortcomings. The adoption of the 2005 ECD is what Carbone claims, "(…) marks an important change in the role of the EU as a global actor." (Carbone, M, 2011b, 56) However, it seems to be a reluctant change for EUMs in the early 2000s with the EU's proposal to upgrade their development proposal into a strategy was not taken well as Carbone explains; "(…) criticized by several Member States (i.e. the northern Member States and the UK), which 'wanted to defend their right' to carry out their development policies autonomously (Interview, November 2005)." (Carbone, M, 2011b, 55)

This goes back to 'framing' where the EU is having to frame controversial proposals to try and innovate change, in part due to the Laeken declaration in 2001 as well as the 2003 EU Security Strategy that called for more policy coherence in the European development model.

Despite the reluctance of the EUMs, progress was underway as Carbone explains; "(…) the European Commission recommended the establishment of a common thematic framework around a number of themes and an action plan aiming at reinforcing the aid co-ordination and harmonization and at promoting a better division of labour between the EC and the Member States. (…) A first group (i.e. Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the UK) opposed the idea of a common EU vision and the Commission's coordinating role." (Carbone, M, 2011b, 56) Carbone's observations and contextual writings helps to understand the state of the relationship between the EU and Sweden during this period, as well as reluctance of the EUMs in the early 2000s to Europeanize with the EU in their development policy. The EU has the difficult task of trying to bring together these states, when the states themselves can easily coordinate amongst themselves without interruption by the EU.

2.3 Consequences of Implementing Incoherent Development Policies

Now looking at the implementation of development policy is Sarah Delputte and Jan Orbie discussing in their article *The EU and Donor Coordination on the Ground: Perspectives from Tanzania and Zambia* written in 2014 uncovers what was happening on the ground with the policy implementation through coordination. Delputte and Orbie's perspective on the policy implementation discusses other actors, organizations, and stakeholders involved mentioning; "Aid effectiveness was put on top of the international development agenda after the UN Conference on Financing for Development (2002) and coordination was portrayed as one of the leading strategies. The OECD-DAC has organized four High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness, namely, in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2009) and Busan (2011), where the international donor community, developing countries and civil society organizations agreed on international principles and a monitoring process. The Paris Declaration has served as the cornerstone of this agenda, as it was the first explicit agreement between donor and recipient countries to improve coordination and align aid to national development strategies." (Delputte & Orbie, 2014, 678) This quote was included to show another dimension of international development policy occurring simultaneously as the EU initiatives for their own development strategies, instead, showing how EUM or non-EUM states may go about coordinating and implementing aid in developing countries outside the periphery of the EU bureaucracy.

Delputte and Orbie then go into the EU periphery and discuss the EU's leadership implications and potential as a result of the EU treaties and agreements in policy formulation; "Around the turn of the millennium, a combination of internal and external factors enabled the EU to manifest its coordinator role – at least at the level of policy formulation. The increased international attention to donor coordination described above provided a window of opportunity for the EU to deepen and strengthen its coordinating role internally and to present itself as a major supporter of the new aid agenda. In 2005, for the first time in 50 years of development cooperation, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament agreed on a common development statement: the European Consensus. The Consensus is based on the aid effectiveness agenda and symbolizes the EU's commitment to providing more and better aid through better coordination and complementarity." (Delputte & Orbie, 2014, 679-680) Again, further supporting Carbone's understanding that the EU fully utilized the opportunity to bring about a centralized development strategy, albeit unpopular, a necessary step towards greater Europeanisaton of development policy as well as a uniform model to implement development. However, Delputte and Orbie also point out Sweden's reluctance on their role of policy alignment in aid policy on the ground with the EU as one of the interviewees explains that

Sweden has; “turned towards approaches that allow for more control and for using aid as a foreign policy instrument.” (Delputte & Orbie, 2014, 686) This shifting priority of excluding EU involvement within Sweden’s development model approach signifies a lost sense of willingness and faith in the EU development model. According to an account of Swedish and EU coordination on the ground by Elgström and Delputte that strengthen this reluctance in their article *An end to Nordic exceptionalism?* Referring to interviewee n#1’s response to the EU development model that the; “EU aid was considered ‘outmoded’ and its aid structures were considered frustratingly bureaucratic and ineffective.” (Elgström & Delputte, 2016, 35) Despite numerous attempts by the EU to create an effective development model it is still according to aid workers in the field, overly burdensome.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Summary

Europeanisation considers the impact that membership and participation in EU foreign policy has on member states by negotiating common approaches that utilizes discussion, coordination and intermediation between member states as a process. (Economides, 2023, 92) However, the literature on Europeanisation has lessened in recent years due to three reasons in the conceptual and policy domains as Economides explains; “First is the conceptual logjam which characterizes discussion on Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, rendering the topic static. Second, the EU has become very introspective and fragmented in dealing with the divisive consequences of the successive Eurozone and refugee crises, the rise in populism, Brexit, and the Covid-19 pandemic. Third, there has been a creeping renationalization of foreign policy, linked to EU uncertainties as well as external challenges to EU unity posed by China, Russia, Turkey, and others, which raises the potential for a significant de-Europeanization of foreign policy.” (Economides, 2023, 92) Points two and three discussing Brexit fragmenting the Union as well as the renationalization of foreign policy undoing the efforts of Europeanisation, leading to a de-Europeanisation process which is a troubling predicament for the EU to navigate through. This provides further reason to use Brexit as the catalyst for this study as it represents the antithesis of Europeanisation efforts, and therefore must have had an affect to urge EU bodies and institutions to take action.

When looking at how the Europeanisation process will take place for this study is the direction influence of the EU dictates into the policymaking process of Swedish development policy employing the ‘national adaptation’ approach as Economides explains; “Adaptation assumes a European level of policymaking which provokes a top-down or trickle-down effect on member states: there is a direct causal link between the ‘EU level’ and the national level in which the forms affects the domestic political and institutional behaviour of the latter.” (Economides, 2023, 93) This ‘top-down’ approach of the EU influencing Sweden’s national level will be the intended direction of Europeanisation that will be indicated through the PCD typology when analyzing the materials to uncover to what extent the Brexit vote had based on the EU’s efforts of Europeanising Sweden’s development policy. The emphasis on policy is important as Economides mentions that; “ European level of policymaking, is often considered a key source of Europeanization. (…) Decisions taken at this European level create European policy which then has an impact on national level preference formation and policymaking.” (Economides, 2023, 103) Policy is where Europeanisation is strongest making it an ideal theory, and the focus for this study.

The discussion on the theoretical approach for this paper built on the premise that there is a problem in the Europeanisation of development policy in that the EU cannot influence the development policies of its EUMs. This was especially true of Sweden’s case and its fellow northern EU and non-EUM states, despite the EU initiatives to do so. Instead, relying on the shifts within the global trend of development policy such as Brexit to be the catalyst where the EU is able to influence EUMs. Otherwise, it could risk further fragmentation on the EU’s part by not reacting or adapting to the changing political landscape that required bolder ambitions and goals to be established. One of the methods of doing so is through PCD, where the policy between and EU and EUM could not be contradictory without risking a misalignment in cooperation from the policy formulation stage into the implementation stage within a recipient developing country.

Strategies on the approach on how EU initiatives should be presented to create this much needed incentive lends itself to the 'framing' efforts of the EU as an institutional entrepreneur. An entrepreneur that would have to innovate using the means available to it, otherwise running the risk being left redundant actor. The EU's constant efforts to innovate were unsuccessful when considering the policy implementation accounts from the on the ground aid workers, and interviews pointing towards the EU as an inefficient development actor. However, this study takes an approach that uses Europeanisation as the aggregate theory to indicate whether or not the EU has had an impact on Swedish development policy but using PCD as an operationalised analytical tool to unpack the levels of Europeanisation before-and-after Brexit. This is to prove whether the EU has actually had in impact on Swedish development policy through PCD and to what extent.

3.2 Europeanisation Dimensions

Orbie and Carbone break down where Europeanisation theory is occurring into three distinct but related dimensions: 1) the policy, 2) polity, and 3) politics. (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 5) Orbie and Carbone go on to explain that; 1) Policies looks at instruments, objectives and discourses in development, where Europeanisation will be highest, and mentioning that, "(…) the impact on policy standards and instruments will be higher than on policy paradigms." (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 5) 2) The polity, "(…) includes domestic institutions, public administrations and state society relations which can change as a result of EU influence." (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 5) However, this dimension is difficult to identify since it would also look at the domestic institutions of Sweden rather than the foreign policy relation to the EU making it difficult to identify the Europeanisation of their development policy. (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 5) 3) The politics area "(…) concerns processes of interest formation, representation and public discourses." (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 5) Again, making this is difficult to relate to the foreign policy of Sweden. For the sake of this study it will be focusing on the first dimension; policy. As Orbie and Carbone mention it is the dimension where Europeanisation will be highest, thus there will be clearer indicators to show whether or not there are any changes in the Europeanisation of development policy when measured against the lowest-to-highest scale mentioned above. Another reason as to why policy was chosen is because it will also look at the EU initiatives that were proposed, and how Sweden reacted to it.

3.3 Brexit as the Independent Variable and Causal Mechanism

Brexit was chosen as the independent variable (I.V.) and as a causal mechanism because until the British referendum in 2016 there had been a growing level of euroscepticism that saw it as the breaking point until Great Britain's eventual breakaway. Kubicek's explains that; "The EU demands that its members democratize and ensure rule of law, but itself lacks openness, transparency, and a real connection to people; it has a costly and inefficient bureaucracy that unnecessarily imposes another layer of governance in Europe; and it has complicated decision-making procedures." **(**Kubicek, 2017b, 75) Brexit was the result of these long-held views and shortcomings of their membership in the Union and in knowing this it provided the EU with an opportunity to deal with these weaknesses. The EU's new sense of commitment after the British referendum in 2016 meant urgent and real commitments to Europeanise in a is why the study uses it as an I.V. and a causal mechanism to see whether the EU has taken the steps to become a credible global development actor through PCD and in turn impacting Sweden in the process.

3.4 Measuring Europeanisation as the Dependent Variable

This study will employ Carbone's and Orbie's scale of measuring Europeanisation theory in development policy as the dependent variable (D.V.) to show to what extent the relationship of the EU and an EUM have on a lowest-to-highest scale starting from the lowest absorption (**LOW**), to accommodation (**MODEST**) and then finally the highest transformation (**HIGH**). This scale because it has been used in previous research to indicate levels of Europeanisation, and will do so as well for this study as well.

Carbone and Orbie explain their scale in greater depth here; "Absorption means that 'member states incorporate European policies or ideas into their programs and domestic structures, respectively, but without substantially modifying existing processes, policies, and institutions'. Accommodation implies 'adapting existing processes, policies, and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective understandings attached to them'. Transformation refers to countries that 'replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed'." (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 4) This scale will indicate the levels of Europeanisation between the EU and Sweden looking at it as an aggregate once the PCD coherence typologies have been applied to the research as an analytical tool.

3.5 PCD as an Analytical Tool for Europeanisation

There is now a scale of measuring Europeanisation, a policy dimension, as well as method to view how Europeanisation is happening. However, for the purposes of this study PCD will be used as an analytical tool in connection with Europeanisation. PCD is a preliminary stepping stone into the Europeanisation of development policy because it aimed to implement EU values and norms alongside the EUM, and has a legal framework written into the treaty of the EU. PCD is used as an indicator of looking how far EU influence has penetrated into Swedish development policy, and what initiatives related to PCD have been successful or not. PCD was chosen as the analytical tool because it aims to understand how coherent the development policies between the EU and Sweden which will in turn determine the level of Europeanisation. The typology of coherence will be used, more specifically 'vertical coherence' will be applied as an approach due to its conceptual similarity with Europeanisation.

3.6 Vertical Coherence

A coherence scholar Paul Hoebink looks into a variety of different typologies to research areas of incoherence and coherence of EU development policies in his chapter *Evaluating Maastricht's Triple C: The "C" of Coherence*. Hoebink provides a range of different classifications, however, for the sake of this study it will look at the typology that looks at vertical coherence; "The vertical type concerns the coherence of the policy of the member states and developing countries, of the European Commission and of international institutions (financial and otherwise)." (Hoebink, 2005, 192) The table below illustrates the coherence typology that Hoebink designed;

Hoebink's Figure 3: Classification 3: Different Type of (In)coherence) Institutional

		Vertical		
		International Organizations		
Horizontal	DG I (Commerce)	**DG I/ DG VIII (Development)**	DG VI/XIV (Agricultural/Fisheries)	DG XI (Environment)
		(Ministries) Member states/ Central Banks		
		Governments/Ministries (Developing countries)		

(Hoebink, 2005, 192)

Vertical coherence highlighted in bold is the link that bridges the gap between coherence studies and Europeanisation it where **DG I/DG VIII (Development)** is placed within the table is the EU element, but is also where the European Commission and its foreign policy policies, instruments, and initiatives are centralized between the Directorate-Generals (DGs) into one approach and then applied through vertical coherence.

While Hoebink creates the typologies, it is Carbone's article *Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for Development*, that establishes the link between coherence and the potential impact of the EU. Vertical coherence as Carbone explains, "(…) refers to the relations between the member states and the EU; more specifically to development policy, it refers to the consistency between different policies across various member states in terms of their combined contribution to development." (Carbone, 2008, 326) Focusing on vertical coherence solely as well as the different definitions provided by Hoebink and Carbone, it is clear that Hoebink sets up the general parameters for the application of policy coherence. This general framework places all the actors, terms, and into the right categories, however, it is Carbone that brings about a Europeanisation element into the coherence discussion by defining it as a 'relation' between the EUMs and the EU in policy formulation.

Carbone does admit that there are shortcomings to coherence mentioning; "(…) a certain degree of incoherence is inevitable in a pluralist society because of the fragmentation of policy systems." (Carbone, 2008, 326-327) This limitation in using coherence as tool in development policy is pointed out in Clara Portela's chapter, *Conceptualizing Coherence in EU External Action*, that 'Coherence' is the most difficult of the three C's to measure because by definition it means that any and all policies between the EU and an EUM cannot or should not contradict one another. Portela also mentions that policy coherence has had a major influence on EU development policy, but also in foreign policy in general explaining; "In the past twenty years, every major document on EU external relations has thus highlighted the promotion of coherence." (Portela, 2021, 88)

It is also for this exact reason that the PCD reports were chosen as a the main resource material for this study because it is the most consistent effort by the EU before-and-after Brexit that can provide the most reliable indications of where the level of Europeanisation of stood between the EU and Sweden within the three formative phases of the EU's development and foreign policy creation. Another caveat in the limitations within policy coherence as Portela mentions is in the usage of this tool has been focused on foreign policy generally, it lacks a theory to help guide the research of coherence studies. This study suggests the use of Europeanisation theory and the analytical tool of policy coherence together within development policy is an opportunity to deepen the research in the Europeanisation of development policy and creates a path for coherence studies to use a theory to guide the research.

3.7 Establishing the Direction of Europeanisation

Based on the Europeanisation indicators provided by the PCD analytical tool it will establish the level of Europeanisation within each of the phases which can then be aggregated for a result in the empirical summary of the analysis. Once the level of Europeanisation has been established the direction of Europeanisation can also be determined. This is also based on Orbie and Carbone's method to show how Europeanisation can occur through a vertical, horizontal, or round-about approach in terms of whom it is that is spreading norms and values throughout the Union; Vertical (EU to EUM), Horizontal (EUM to EUM), and Round-about (EUM to EU to EUM) (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, 5) This is the conceptual similarity to vertical coherence and the extent of Vertical Europeanisation is direction this study aims to understand. This approach follows the 'national adaptation' top-down approach when reviewing the materials, however, the horizontal and round-about directions of Europeanisation are mentioned here as a reference. Understanding how Europeanisation can occur and influence Sweden will help to figure out where the influence of norms and values are occurring within Europeanisation narrowing down the focus on how EU influence is being received and formulated in the Swedish development policy.

4. Methodology and Materials

Europeanisation occurs as the EU policymakers influence from a 'top-down' approach that adapts on the national level of the EUM that forms their domestic attitudes to match the general interest of the EU. One of these policymaking instruments is PCD, which is a regulatory EU initiative aimed at lessening the policy contradictions. Coherence policy is well-suited for development because it was conceived to ensure that a unitary approach would be formulated, and applied according to the EU development model. A vertical coherence typology will be used to bridge the gap between the theory of Europeanisation and the policies of the PCD because it can look at both policymaking decisions internally on the behalf of the EU as well as the externally on the behalf of Sweden. This bridge allows for PCD to be used as an analytical tool when reviewing the materials, and stills adheres to the Europeanisation focus on the EU's efforts to shape foreign development policy of Sweden.

This bridge that looks at PCD both internally and externally is crucial when understanding the EU's policymaking decisions because the EU's institutional powers are constantly changing and evolving based on the political climate. Essentially if the EU makes internal changes that expand upon their foreign policy capabilities, it will then create the opportunity to influence EUMs externally. The dual usage of PCD as a regulatory policy means that a single approach has been devised, formulated, and agreed upon according to the EU and its members, however, whether all the policies under the coherence bracket have been implemented within the EUM merits investigation. The vertical coherence typology will be Europeanised to only find instances where the EU is influencing Sweden.

When analyzing the first two phases the Europeanised vertical coherence typology will be applied to gauge the level of Europeanisation for the dependent variable pre-Brexit. It is only in the final phase the independent variable and catalyst of post-Brexit to be used to establish to what extent the EU's Europeanisation efforts had on Sweden's development policy. These changes in Europeanisation will be indicated through the vertical coherence typologies that are applied throughout each of the three phases in the study.

In terms of the approach of the study the materials will be broken into three distinct phases in the PCD developments that reflect the level and method of Europeanisation. The research is a single-case explanatory study of the Europeanisation of development policy between Sweden and the EU using PCD as the analytical tool to indicate level of Europeanisation. Using Brexit as the causal mechanism and independent variable explains the EU's efforts to prevent further fragmentation by trying to get EUMs to cohere and Europeanise deeper. The relationship of Europeanisation will be the dependent variable because it helps to determine at what level Sweden and the EU were on. The three phase one-dimensional typology below provides an illustration of the three phases, independent and dependent variables, and Brexit as the causal mechanism.

4.1 Three Phase One-Dimensional Typology: Europeanisation of Swedish Development Policy



The blue arrows represents each of the phases individually and group the main events together to simplify the analytical process. The dependent variable will be measured in each group indicating their level of Europeanisation. The D.V. is represented by the green rectangles along the blue arrows. For the sake of clarity all of the rectangles have been colored in green as an example of how the level of Europeanisation will be represented. The independent variable and causal mechanism will be presented on the red line and dot where the change in-between the first two phases below the line and the last phase above the line. This is to illustrate the change in direction before-and-after Brexit. Another version of this diagram will be presented in the empirical summary under results and analysis chapter that will show each phase's rectangle colored green to represent their D.V. during that phase showing their level of Europeanisation. Once the analysis is complete the 'Three Phase One-Dimensional Typology: Europeanisation of Swedish Development Policy' will connect the colored in green rectangles between phase one and two, travel through the I.V. and causal mechanism, and to phase three to show the direction of Europeanisation after 2016 to indicate whether there has been a trend of the EU Europeanising Swedish development policy.

4.2 Research Design: The Three Phases of the PCD Materials

The PCD materials for the analysis have been split into three different phases. Phase 1 Pre-Brexit: 2000 – 2008 looks at the initial initiative to use PCD within development policy between the EU and Sweden from 2000 until 2005 with a centralized development strategy in the form of the ECD coming into effect. The period between 2005 and 2008 are the first stages of the PCD reports published by the EC, and Sweden's government communications discussing their commitment to them. Phase 2 Pre-Brexit: 2009 – 2016 looks at the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty providing the EU with an expanded legal framework into foreign policy formulation and implementation.

This period takes into account the groundwork of the ECD and PCD and the expanded reach of the EU to have a greater impact on Europeanisation with help of the treaty. These two phases create a asymmetry in the materials provided, however, are necessary to understand the extent of change and efforts in vertical policy coherence highlight the EU's impact and narrowing the focus onto Sweden's development policy. Phase 3 Post-Brexit: 2016 – 2019 will examine the extent of change within Europeanisation of Swedish policy taking into consideration the New European Consensus on Development (NECD) in 2017, an actual PCD questionnaire from 2018, the final PCD report in 2019 and Swedish government communication discussing policy coherence in their development policy.

Each phase represents a significant change in the PCD capabilities available to them that consistently and progressively increase their effectiveness whether it be the scope of their influence in the formulation of development policy or the legal obligations involved in their implementation. Phase 1 has the first ECD to consider, a legal obligation agreed to by all EUMs and EU institutions in the hopes to create an effective and coherent approach to policy as well as the first enrolment of the PCD questionnaires and reports. Phase 2 has the Lisbon Treaty that expands the external dimension of the EU through the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), as well as the first round of criticisms from the PCD reports. This phase considers if the issue with coherence was the lack of legal pressures enforced upon EUMs to cohere, in this seeing if any type of Europeanisation was impacting Sweden in any meaningful way. Finally, Phase three utilizes the independent variable and causal mechanism of Brexit to see whether the Europeanisation process differed from the first two phases using the NECD, only PCD questionnaire available, and report simultaneously. While the third phase may be smallest section and compiled of the fewest materials, it does have the most significant materials that can illustrate how all the PCD materials come together.

4.3 Europeanised PCD Analytical Tool

A Europeanised PCD analytical tool using Hoebink's coherence typology has been recreated to focusing on vertical coherence and applying the Europeanisation aspect. This will be the analytical tool used to go through the PCD materials of both the EU and Sweden. The table below shows the original vertical coherence typology on the left and the recreated Europeanised PCD vertical coherence tool on the right focusing solely on the EU impact on Swedish development policy.

4.3.1 Standard Vertical Coherence Recreated into a Europeanised PCD Vertical Coherence Analytical Tool



The standard PCD vertical coherence on the left shows that when left alone it will assess all types of coherence between the different actors and bodies throughout the column, and creates the limitation of a general overview of policy coherence as a whole. The Europeanised PCD vertical coherence keeps the same structure, however, only focuses on the EU's impact on Sweden's development policy. This removes outliers and narrows the focus of the study towards Europeanised PCD with Sweden through a 'top-down' Europeanised approach. The design is meant to illustrate the focusing of the PCD scope and the Europeanisation aspect as one tool. This tool will then help to measure the changes in Europeanisation of Swedish development policy through each of the three phases and then determine the extent of the changes. The following design will represent the operationalised version of the PCD analytical tool.

4.4 Operationalised Europeanised PCD Analytical Tool

In the table below it show the Europeanised PCD vertical coherence analytical tool that will be applied to phase one and two on the left, as well as the operationalised version of the Europeanised PCD analytical tool design on the right illustrates the concept of application when engaging with the PCD materials in phase three.

4.4.1 Europeanised PCD Vertical Coherence Analytical Tool



The Europeanised PCD vertical coherence pre-Brexit: phase 1-2 table on the left shows the exact same design in the analytical design before, however, grouping both phase one and two together because they are indicating changes in Europeanisation for the dependent variables. Whereas the Europeanised PCD vertical coherence post-Brexit: phase 3 does include both the independent and dependent variables of study. This phase will indicate Europeanisation with the pressure of the I.V and causal mechanism, and will then be measured against phase one and two. This criteria will be used as a guide when engaging with the PCD materials, and will help in breaking down the information into indicate changes in Europeanisation.

Criteria of the PCD analytical tool

1. How will the PCD materials be organized to explain the change in Europeanisation of Swedish development policy?
    a. PCD capabilities of the key points where the EU has the potential to impact Swedish development policy
2. How will Europeanisation and policy coherence be operationalised and applied throughout the analysis of PCD materials?
    a. How is the PCD tool being implemented to formulate coherent EU development policies?
3. Dependent Variable: Indicator of Europeanisation
    a. Absorption (low), to accommodation (modest) and transformation (high)

4.5 Materials

There is a total of 19 policy documents between the EU and Sweden for the analysis. There are 10 documents for the EU materials; Six are PCD reports collected from the PCD Questionnaires sent out to the EUMs to write the reports, one PCD questionnaire from 2018 that contains Sweden's answers, two EC consensuses (2005, 2017), and one EU Lisbon treaty (2009). Unfortunately, the other PCD questionnaires could not be found, that is why the PCD reports were used. There are 9 documents for Sweden's materials in the from of Government Communications sent on the behalf of Swedish Foreign Ministry and Government Offices; Sweden's version of PCD called Policy for Global Development (PGD) government communications is mentioned, two of the communications are used to show the directive and implementation of the SDGs into their constitution that are PCD-related.

It should be noted that Sweden's PGD approach predates the PCD, and that the EU would begin to utilize PCD initiatives with the ECD in 2005 and following up with the PCD reports biennially. The reports would be based on the PCD questionnaires the EC would send out to its members that would then be formulated into a report, published, and addressing the points that needed to be addressed. The PGD government communications on Sweden's part started annually and then shifted to biennially. However, both PGD and PCD documents occur during the same time period, and are relevant to indicating the level of coherence during that phase. All collected materials follow a chronological order of dates starting from the latest and progressing until the most recent period of events. These events have been organized into three phases, each indicating their level of Europeanisation later in the analysis.

4.6 Policy Coherence pre-and-post-Brexit Materials Table

EU Policy Documents		Sweden's Policy Documents	
Year/Date	Name/Description	Year/Date	Name/Description
Phase 1: 2000 - 2008			
		May 15th 2003 (Annual)	Government Bill 2002/03:122 Shared Responsibility: Sweden's Policy for Global Development
		September 9th 2004 (Annual)	Sweden's Global Development Policy 2004/05:4
2005	European Consensus on Development (ECD)		
		2006 (Biennial)	Sweden's policy for global development: Communication 2005/06:204
2007 (Biennial)	PCD Report		
		2008	Global Challenges - Our Responsibility Communication on Sweden's policy for global development: Government Communication 2007/08:89: Sweden's Policy for Global Development

Phase 2: 2009- 2016			
2009 (Biennial)	PCD Report + Lisbon Treaty		
		2010 - Research	The Global Challenge of Economic Exclusion: Government Communication on Policy Coherence for Development 2012: Government Communication 2011/12:167 Implementation of Policy Coherence for Development – Focus: the Global Challenge of Economic Exclusion
2011 (Biennial)	PCD Report	2011 - Research	
		2012 - Research	
2013 (Biennial)	PCD Report		
2015 (Biennial)	PCD Report		
		2016	(Occurred First) Dir. 2016:18. – New directive indicating a change of direction. Revamping internal policy coherence to fit the new agenda. (Occurred Afterwards) 2015/16:182 Swedish Government Communication indicating a shift towards the SDG Agenda.
		2016	Government Communication 2016/17:62 Policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance
British Referendum June 2016			
Phase 3: 2016 - 2019			
2017 (Biennial)	No PCD Report + New European Consensus on Development (NECD)		
2018	PCD Questionnaire	2018	Government Communication 2017/18:146 Policy for global development in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda
2019 (Biennial – End of the PCD Reports)	PCD Report		

4.7 Evaluation of the Materials

There is a large assortment of policy documents between the EU and Swedish policy documents, to a point where grouping them together was necessary due to some reports and/or communications being lighter or denser with information than others. This is due to the events surrounding some of these reports and communications when they were written presenting two dilemmas; The first being that certain reports and communications repeat at times what previous documents had already mentioned due to the lack of space in between initiatives to see a real change. The second being a shift in priority from focusing on solely PCD, on perhaps other events such as signing international agreements, or taking on new initiatives that aimed to achieve a similar goal of PCD in the field of development policy. Something to keep in mind is that while the tools created and theories used focus on the relationship between the EUMs and the EU, there are numerous mentions and occasions where other development actors and stakeholders from international organizations or non-EUM peripheries are brought into the fold to determine what the best development policy is. The policy formulation of what the ideal development policy is, as well as the added pressure of making it a global development policy to be implemented by all EUMs in the effort of poverty reduction, and then implementing those ideals harbour unintended as well as unexpected consequences that steer away from the Europeanisation of development policy. The analysis section will delve deeper into these shifting trends and indicate the level of Europeanisation.

4.8 Strengths and Limitations of the Methodology and Materials

The strengths of the Europeanised coherence typology methodology is presented through three points. Firstly, a strength of this method is that there is a theory using parts of an established coherence typology at work to measure the level of Europeanisation between the EU and Sweden. The one-dimensional typology helps to frame the independent and dependent variables into a diagram that clearly depicts if there has been a change in the level of Europeanisation. The coherence analytical tool goes through the collected materials, and helps to identify the most relevant pieces of information.

Secondly, there are plenty of materials that address the EU's policy coherence in the form of PCD reports, and in Sweden's case government communications that as well. The documents themselves also span before-and-after Brexit and both actors produced their policy/government documents during the same periods. The exact documents used will be presented in a table within the materials section, and then grouped into phases via different color schemes.

Thirdly, the causal mechanism of Brexit is a profound catalyst within the EU meaning that some type of change will be observed and the study will figure out to what extent. It was profound in that a 2016 Global Strategy directly addressed the topic of the British Referendum when laying out the potential EU initiatives it aimed to implement, one of these being the 2017 New Consensus on European Development. There is a also a PCD questionnaire from 2018 that is the most recent and final survey the EU has published in relation to policy coherence followed by the final report in 2019. The following events after Brexit strengthens the argument because they stem from a strategy that was created to quell any further fragmentation of fellow EUMs.

The limitations of the methodology understands that using policy coherence can be somewhat vague, and this presents two issues. The first issue is being able to asses how policy coherence is happening generally and why in which particular sectors of foreign policy including development policy. The second issue being policy documents are formal publications and do not offer notes from key individuals, policymakers and/or stakeholders at times meaning the exact source of the information may be unknown. The vagueness could be addressed by conducting interviews, however, this study has not opted to do so. Instead, through the creation of a Europeanised coherence tool helps to narrow the ambiguity of general foreign policy coherence. This is achieved when using the coherence tools to show the 'top-down' vertical coherence between the EU and Sweden within PCD reports, questionnaires, government communications, and bills. The materials are not only limited to PCD reports, but also relevant policy documents that can aid in the indication of Europeanisation.

5. Analysis

5.1 Phase 1 Pre-Brexit: 2000 - 2008

This section of the analysis will go through the materials within the Phase 1 category and will list each of the EU and Swedish policy documents, followed by the PCD analytical tool to go through the collected materials, and determining the level of Europeanisation for this period. This criteria of the PCD analytical tool that will be answered at the end of each phase and has been placed here as a point of reference.

1. How will the PCD materials be organized to explain the change in Europeanisation of Swedish development policy?
    a. PCD capabilities of the key points where the EU has the potential to impact Swedish development policy
2. How will Europeanisation and policy coherence be operationalised and applied throughout the analysis of PCD materials?
    a. How is the PCD tool being implemented to formulate coherent EU development policies?
3. Dependent Variable: Indicator of Europeanisation
    a. Absorption (low), to accommodation (modest) and transformation (high)

5.1.1 Swedish Government Bill 2002/03:122

The Swedish government bill 2002/03:122 was the first Policy for Global Development (PGD) written on the 15/05/2003 (day/month/year), two years prior to the ECD that would enable the EU to implement the PCD initiatives. From these initial documents it also presents what Sweden's intentions are in their foreign policy and how they want to engage with the EU. When the Bill is presented it is also seen as an opportunity for Swedish foreign policy;

> "Cooperation within the EU offers great scope for mutual learning. It provides opportunities for influencing the EU in the direction of more equitable and sustainable policies in relation to the developing countries." (Persson & Karlsson, 2003, 15)

It is also clear that on Sweden's part in the government bill 2002/03:122 is the one leading and influencing EU policy-making in the field of development policy and makes it clear that it has the operational know-how to get the EU on track to becoming a development coordinator.

> "Sweden is one of the countries that has drawn attention to the weaknesses of the operational component, i.e. the EU's development cooperation that is administered by the Commission. Sweden has also taken initiatives on measures designed to remedy the problems. Among other things, the EU has adopted Sweden's view that poverty reduction should be an overall goal of development cooperation and that cooperation should concentrate on those sectors where the EU has a comparative advantage." (Persson & Karlsson, 2003, 16)

Sweden's government bill 2002/03:122 proposes that as a solution for the EU's operational weakness that the concept of development must be expanded upon through policy coherence that seeks to incorporate all the ministries and activities in government affairs to achieve global development alongside the EU as well;

> "This applies both to the national level and to the international levels of the EU and the UN. Enhanced collaboration and coordination are also required between various actors if a coherent policy pursued by e.g. Sweden and the EU is to succeed in promoting development. Closer collaboration is also needed among other sectors of society. The efforts being made in poor countries themselves must continue to be supported through international development cooperation." (Persson & Karlsson, 2003, 18)

There are efforts on Sweden's part to be more vertically coherent with the EU in terms of development policy to become more efficient in their promotion of policy. The bill also recognizes that there are shortcomings in their efforts to become more vertically coherent with the EU. Understanding that development policy between Sweden and the EU will face challenges;

> "Coordination and coherence between different policy areas should be improved in order to make policies better able to promote development. Conflicting objectives should be identified, and should be the focus of well-informed and well-considered strategic choices." (Persson & Karlsson, 2003, 31)

Despite this, the bill does grant an opportunity of the EU to Europeanise Swedish and other EUMs development policies emphasizing that "(…) both the national policies and policies formulated and pursed through the EU must be coherent" (Persson & Karlsson, 2003, 31-32) While Sweden does for the most part aim for international applicability it also does focus on its relationship with the EU in the bill Sweden's reason being;

> "Sweden should actively promote better coherence in EU policies relating to developing countries and the integration of development aspects into all EU policy areas. Sweden should seek to ensure that international commitments to equitable and sustainable global development are effectively monitored and evaluated by the EU." (Persson & Karlsson, 2003, 52)

These EU friendly approaches should show potential indications for closer coherence and Europeanisation from Sweden's willingness to cohere through their domestic instruments to support the EU in their goal of becoming a development provider in the donor community as seen in the excerpt below;

> "The EU could be an important force for equitable and sustainable global development in the world. The fundamental values that unite its Member States, such as respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, gender equality and the pursuit of peace and sustainable development, must be promoted not only in the EU and its neighbouring region, but also globally. The EU is the primary partner in trade for many developing countries. Its Member States account for more than half of all international development cooperation. The EU's development policies must be based on a long-term approach." (Persson & Karlsson, 2003, 52)

5.1.2 Swedish Government Communication 2004/05:4

The government communication 2004/05:4 published afterwards in 09/09/2004 then discusses the progress of the bill 2002/03:122 and will focus on the efforts between Sweden and the EU during this period; "Influencing policymaking at the EU level is therefore one of the greatest

challenges when it comes to implementing the new global development policy." (Persson & Jämtin, 2004, 7) Sweden explains that despite these challenges in influencing policymaking at the EU level, there is still great potential in the pursuit;

> "Achieving rapid changes of EU policy in a policy area where vital national interests are at stake is no simple matter. However, a joint EU decision makes a great impact and can lead to great changes in the conditions in developing countries. Sweden therefore intends to continue to take advantage of its opportunities as an EU Member State in order to gain support for a policy that accommodates the various interests of developing countries." (Persson & Jämtin, 2004, 8)

Rather than the EU taking advantage of Sweden's membership to cohere it towards a European development model, it is clear that Sweden is taking the initiative and turning the influence of vertical coherence direction towards the EU. However, this direction goes beyond the EU, and aims to cohere with other international organizations involved within development policy on a global level;

> "Sweden aims for coherence between development cooperation and other policy areas within the framework of equitable and sustainable global development at the national level, in the EU, the OECD, the UN and the international financing institutions." (Persson & Jämtin, 2004, 56)

Sweden's joint commitment to the EU and bilateral relations with international organizations is based on the national PGD efforts to improve policy coherence among other development actors such as NGO's, the private sector, and using the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) do so. This shows the bilateral element in development cooperation aligning the Swedish interest of reducing poverty even if it does risk of being vertically incoherent under the EU purview. (Persson & Jämtin, 2004, 56)

5.1.3 European Consensus on Development in 2005

The 2005 ECD is the first implementation of PCD as shown in points 9, 35, 46, and 109 by the EU to be employed upon the EUMs. The excerpts below provide a deepened understanding of the direction and use of PCD within the ECD framework, the emboldened parts of the excerpts are important for the Europeanised PCD tool.

> 9) "We reaffirm our commitment to promoting policy coherence for development, based upon **ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies** that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives." (Michel, 2006, 12)

> 35) "**The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence for Development** in a number of areas. It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practice to further these aims. This constitutes a

substantial additional EU contribution to the achievement of the MDGs." (Michel, 2006, 22)

46) "Within its competences as conferred by the Treaty, the Commission has a wide role in development. **Its global presence, its promotion of policy coherence for development, its specific competence and expertise, its right of initiative at community level, its facilitation of coordination and harmonisation as well as its supranational character are of special significance**. The Community can be distinguished by its comparative advantage and added value, which enable complementarity with bilateral policies of Member States and other international donors." (Michel, 2006, 28)

109) "The Commission and Member States will prepare a rolling Work Programme on the implementation of the May 2005 Council conclusions on PCD. This Work Programme will propose priorities for action; define roles and responsibilities of Council, Member States and Commission and set out sequencing and timetables, with the aim of ensuring that non-aid policies can assist developing countries in achieving the MDGs. **The Commission will reinforce its existing instruments, notably its impact assessment tool and consultations with developing countries during policy formulation and implementation, and considering new ones where necessary in support of a strengthened PCD.**" (Michel, 2006, 47)

5.1.4 Swedish Government Communication 2005/06:204

This government communication 2005/06:204 was published in 2006 which was right after the 2005 ECD solidifying the EU development model that the EUMs should cohere towards;

> "To make the fight against poverty more effective, greater coherence is necessary between different policy areas and actors, including the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) the international financial institutions, other multilateral institutions and individual countries." (Ringholm & Jämtin, 2006, 1-3)

One of the ways this greater coherence would be made attainable according to the government communication 2005/06:204 is Sweden's account of the EU, that a greater level of ambition in May 2005 by the EU Council of Ministers as required, and so in December of the same year the policy of the ECD was adopted;

> "Since the decision in May, Sweden has taken an active part in the work of producing a draft operational programme for the EU's coherence work which defines priorities as well as roles and allocation of responsibility between the Commission, the Council and the member states. The idea is that this will be updated on an ongoing basis to take into account internal EU priorities as well as external events on the global development agenda. Sweden will continue to press to ensure that concrete priorities are expressed. In the long term, the EU has the potential to assume global leadership in policy coherence in global development work. Current treaties already contain clear references to the need of policy coherence that has the interests of the developing countries in mind. Last year's decision in the field of coherence, and the work on an operational programme with clear priorities, roles and methods, further improve the chances that

> coherence ambitions will be converted into action." (Ringholm & Jämtin, 2006, 9)

This is a direct reference to ECD and is perceived as Sweden's as the main driver for a coherent global development policy, going as far as drafting coherence initiatives on the EU's behalf. This creates doubts of the EU impacting Sweden through vertical coherence within PCD because of the Swedish oversight in the PCD process that it has already been aligned to, and has created its own interpretation. This creates a lessened change for greater Europeanisation of Swedish development policy. However, this is still a significant milestone for the EU, even as Sweden mentions, it is their opportunity to step into a leadership role.

However, Sweden does take full accountability for its influence and guidance within the EU processes, it also reveals that the current Europeanisation occurring within policy coherence is now recognized and seen to be an essential tool within the international development model, a tool that Sweden is overseeing and leading . This is made clear referring to a need for a 'coherent grasp';

> "Sweden's policy for global development is unique in that it takes this coherent grasp. The groundwork has been laid for a coherent Swedish policy that contributes to equitable and sustainable global development (…) Work within the EU has also become more clearly focused on coherence; Sweden has helped bring this about. The account in this communication shows that the policy for global development is having growing impact on overall Swedish policy." (Ringholm & Jämtin, 2006, 73)

Sweden's growing role in the EU's development policy is also mentioned;

> "Coherence for global development is a priority issue for Sweden, in its work within the EU work and in other international contexts. Growing interest within the EU in greater coherence, on the part of the Commission as well as the member states, lends support to Sweden's ambition to more clearly work with its policy for global development within the framework of its cooperation within the EU." (Ringholm & Jämtin, 2006, 73)

This means to make Sweden more vertically coherent impacting European development policy rather than the other way around.

5.1.5 EU PCD Report 2007

The initial EU PCD 2007 report is a first attempt of the EU to take on the role of a lead coordinator by way of incorporating documents and events into one centralized approach when it comes to development policy;

> "(…)this first European Union report on coherence represents another significant step forward. It constitutes the third pillar of an approach that intentionally places coordination, complementarity and coherence at the heart of our concerns and aims to build fairer relations with the developing world." (EC, 2007, 3)

One of the ways to ensure that EUMs were on par with following was by following the 'whole of government' approach within policy coherence, meaning that the EUMs follow the EU norms and values exactly to ensure that there are no contradictions in policy formulation and eventually implementation;

> "Countries that have adopted a 'whole of government' approach to policy coherence for development (i.e. the Netherlands and Sweden) have an easier task on PCD, as the entire government rather than a single ministry or agency is responsible for development cooperation." (EC, 2007, 28)

This shows a willingness on Sweden's behalf to cohere closer alongside the EU to ensure that there isn't any incoherence as mentioned here;

> "The Swedish approach to PCD, for example, is that the whole government shares the ownership of the PCD. This means that the policy itself is formulated and designed at the different offices of government." (EC, 2007, 31)

The report also points out the shortcomings of 'whole-of-government' approaches;

> "There are disincentives to PCD-coordination mechanisms and whole-of-government approaches: they are more time-consuming, often entail compromises, offer less visibility to individual departments or ministries, and are more costly, as they require adequate staff capacity both at headquarters and in the field." (EC, 2007, 31)

The 'whole-of-government' approach is important because in Europeanisation terms it aims for a high transformative approach to fully incorporate the EU into the EUM domestic policy realm. This presents an opportunity on the EU's part to Europeanise Sweden's development policy, however, keeping in mind that the government communication 2005/06:204 had also shown the role Sweden had in contributing to the EU frameworks on policy coherence creates somewhat of a contradiction as to which actor is impacting one another, in this case Swedish development policy greatly impacting the EU.

5.1.6 Swedish Government Communication 2007/08:89

The government communication 2007/08:89 published in 2008 discusses a new departure in Sweden's policy for global development that strengthens itself and overall global development. (Reinfeldt & Carlsson, 2008, 1) The communication goes onto explain that due to the interlinkage of national, regional, and global perspectives there are increasingly cross-border issues that affect these perspectives with international repercussions that challenge for more coherence and cooperation across policy areas have not met expectations. (Reinfeldt & Carlsson, 2008, 5) The communication points out that the lack of action creates negative consequences for the peoples and countries struck by poverty, simultaneously hurting the credibility of the EU and Sweden as global actors.

> "Sweden's policy for global development must be aimed at helping poor countries to meet challenges specific to them, in promoting synergies between policy areas and dealing with policies in Sweden and the EU that constrain development, as well as at tackling global challenges that hinder equitable and sustainable development. Both development cooperation and other policy areas must contribute to these aims." (Reinfeldt & Carlsson, 2008, 7)

To address this downfall Sweden has conducted an examination and deduced that in accordance with the Swedish government bill 2002/03:122 it has; "(…) intensified results-based management, greater harmonisation, a focus on a smaller number of partner countries and coordination with other donors." (Reinfeldt & Carlsson, 2008, 8)

Which are all the positives according to Sweden's own PGD criteria within the bill. The next consideration is with the term coherence as there is a different interpretation of pursuing an uncontradictory policy in the formulation, and then implementation stage, as pointed out below;

> "However, with regard to the policy coherence – the policy component intended to ensure that account is taken of development aspects in the policy as a whole through coherent action across policy areas – implementation has been found to be deficient in some respects." (Reinfeldt & Carlsson, 2008, 8)

This shows that even Sweden knows its weaknesses of implementing 'coherent' policies alongside partners in the development field is difficult and has generated resistance. The government communication 2007/08:89 concluded in reference to coherence that; "It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of how efforts to strengthen coherence have developed over time, or of what the policies pursued have achieved." (Reinfeldt & Carlsson, 2008, 9) This is due to the inherent difficulties of knowing what policies are coherent, need to be coherent, or are incoherent are only discovered once these formulated policies are actually implemented on the ground. This is one of the main weaknesses of looking at vertical coherence, without assessing the impact of the EU membership within PCD. However, Sweden places emphasizes the EU on the potential impact the it will have on development policy;

> "(…) Sweden's membership in the EU is vital to our ability to contribute to equitable and sustainable global development. The Government therefore lays particular emphasis on the Union's crucial significance and is actively seeking to strengthen its role as a global actor for peace, freedom and poverty reduction. Work currently under way in the European Commission and the Council of Ministers to strengthen efforts to promote policy coherence for development is an important step in this direction." (Reinfeldt & Carlsson, 2008, 12)

Reading further into the government communication 2007/08:89 does highlight the EU's potential to influence and change the global agenda through the Lisbon Treaty ratification in 2007 obligates policy coherence for development pointing towards the newly established EU foreign service efforts; "Active Swedish efforts in the EU to promote policy coherence for development are essential if Sweden's global development policy is to have international impact." (Reinfeldt & Carlsson, 2008, 54) This active Swedish involvement of its foreign interests and representatives within the EU institution shows a growing interest and investment into the EU development project as well as reinforcing their role as a global actor.

5.1.7 PCD Analytical Tool Applied to the Collected Materials

Criteria of the PCD analytical tool

1) The PCD materials were organized chronologically to present the impact each event, observations, and analysis had upon one another. There were multiple references to Sweden's foreign policy interests in overseeing, shaping, and influencing the EU development model. The PCD capabilities were centralized through the ECD, and had shown to make an impact in both the Swedish government communications as well as the enaction of the PCD questionnaire and reporting process to begin with.

2) When reviewing the documents from both the EU and Sweden it was clear to see that the PCD tool was looking at terms directly related to 'policy coherence' mentioning both the EU

and Sweden together. There was also the indirect element of assessing the decisions commented upon would impact, or perceive the impact of influence within the PCD process. The PCD as a tool is still in its infancy to have a serious effect in the change of development policy for the EUMs let alone the Swedish development policy.

3) When determining the level of Europeanisation for this phase it is at an absorption **LOW** level of Europeanisation due to the lack of influence had in impacting development policy in a serious way. It was a solution to creating a more convenient method of development policy through policy coherence, but has been perceived by Sweden to have a large potential to make genuine changes development policy once the weaknesses in the instrumentalization and implementation of policy coherence is less vague and nuanced, rather clearer and sharper.

5.2 Phase 2 Pre-Brexit: 2009 – 2016

This section of the analysis will go through the materials within the Phase 2 category and will list each of the EU and Swedish policy documents, followed by the PCD analytical tool to go through the collected materials, and determining the level of Europeanisation for this phase.

5.2.1 The Lisbon Treaty and EU PCD Report 2009

The Lisbon Treaty expanded the EU's foreign policy powers as seen in the changes made in the New Part Five External Action by the Union, Title III in the First chapter of Development Cooperation under point 161 being;

> 161) "1. Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. The Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other.
>
> Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries." (EU, 2007)

While point 161) does make an attempt at addressing the weaknesses of the implementation of PCD through development cooperation, it does not address the nuances of how it will do so. The EU PCD 2009 report attempts to address this by expressing the most essential points on its new-found potential in influencing its EUMs development policy;

> "The strengthening of the PCD instruments was necessary in order to better harness the potential of EU policies for development. However, in order to make real progress, the EU needs to change its approach. Rather than monitoring the impact of all policies on developing countries the EU could promote PCD more effectively through a more focused approach. The EU should select some key development challenges, analyse how it can contribute to achieving them through the broad array of its policies and instruments, and ensure political mobilisation around these challenges." (EC, 2009, 4)

This highlights the weaknesses of vertical coherence in the previous phase being the lack of direction when assessing how policy coherence is managed in regard to the goals formulated. This realization is the first step into honing policy coherence into a more Europeanised scope

to focus development policy generally, but is also applicable to Sweden's development policy especially.

5.2.2 EU PCD Report 2011

This EU PCD 2011 unveils disappointing results despite the expansion of vertical coherence efforts to establish the EU impact meaningfully via greater foreign policy capabilities as well as a growing concern over how the PCD mechanisms are being implemented stating;

> "A few Member States, such as the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden, were more critical of the PCD work of the Council and saw little progress since 2009. Much like Portugal, which considered that, although the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty had been an opportunity to increase coherence, no substantial progress has been achieved until now, maybe due to some persistent institutional uncertainty and also to the very recent establishment of the EEAS. Portugal regretted that, for instance, some previous discussions on PCD (e.g. the nexus between security and development, linked to the discussion on an "EU Strategy for States in a Situation of Fragility") had in fact been put on hold since 2009. Luxembourg called for a further in-depth discussion on the meaning and the objectives of PCD at the occasion of the publication of this report, as "there still seemed to be no consensus among all Member States as to the definition and implications of PCD."" (EC, 2012, 18)

A lack of consensus among EUMs leads to increased frustrations in the usage of PCD initiatives generating unwillingness to implement them into their own development policies. This seems counter-productive since the establishment of the 2005 ECD and 2009 Lisbon Treaty was created as a foreign policy tool and body to centralize a formulated development policy that all EUMs should follow, and is instead being misinterpreted. Despite the poor results the report shows, "(…) further progress has been made in terms of policy formulation, dialogue and implementation." (EC, 2012, 88) Providing opportunities for more vertical coherence and Europeanisation, while still having to shoulder the poor performance.

5.2.3 Swedish Government Communication 2011/12:167

This government communication 2011/12:167 published in 2012 follows up on the commitments made in the previous 2007/08:89 government communication, and addressing what still needs to be improved upon. Government communication 2011/12:167 discusses Sweden's internal government assessment of PCD between 2010 and 2012 using the OECD's three components; 1) Policy formulation and performance, 2) Coordination and cooperation, and 3) Knowledge and analysis and then categorized on a three-point scale from 'good', 'relatively good', and finally 'there are certain deficiencies'. (Bildt & Carlsson, 2012, 5) Concluding that Sweden's 1) Policy formulation and performance was well developed, 2) Needed to improve coordination and cooperation, and 3) Had relatively good knowledge and analysis within PCD with the EU. (Bildt & Carlsson, 2012, 5) (Appendix 1.1.) The need for improvement in enhanced coordination and cooperation is addressed in the excerpt below;

> "There is a reinforced commitment regarding Policy Coherence for Development within the EU through the Treaty of Lisbon. The treaty states that the development objectives shall be taken into account in the implementation of policies that may affect developing countries (Art. 208) and that the EU shall ensure coherence between the broad foreign policy and other policy areas (Art. 21). Influencing different EU policy areas in order to contribute to a deepened

> development perspective is a priority for the Swedish government." (Bildt & Carlsson, 2012, 6)

This is no longer the EU influencing Swedish development policy, rather Swedish interests dictating what the direction for international development policy through the EU once again. These conflicts of interests do occur in policy formulation due to the differing political interests and objectives creating potential repercussions on development policy formulation. (Bildt & Carlsson, 2012, 8) This is negatively affects the vertical coherence tool, because there is no indication that Sweden is being significantly impacted by the EU within their development policy. However, despite the poor performance the Lisbon Treaty according to this communication has had made progress as mentioned in the 2011 EU PCD report;

> "The Lisbon Treaty, which came into effect in 2009, has reinforced the development perspective in all EU policy areas. The Treaty commitment on Policy Coherence for Development state that "the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries" (Art. 208). The Treaty also states that the EU shall ensure coherence between foreign policy and other policy areas (Art. 21). **According to the Lisbon Treaty, the development goals are goals for EU foreign policy**." (Bildt & Carlsson, 2012, 86)

This provides an ample opportunity for the EU to begin implementing vertical coherence utilizing its new foreign policy instruments to impact the development policy of its EUMs. However, the excerpt below shows that even with the expansion of the EU powers and potential impact through the treaty to influence greater strides of Europeanisation in development policy. Sweden still influences the EU development policy to a greater extent;

> "(…) is working in order for the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the underlying EU delegations to have clear roles in the work on Policy Coherence for Development, and in order for the different coordination mechanisms between the EEAS, EU institutions and Member States to function satisfactorily. **Sweden has since long worked actively with the EU framework for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD).** Sweden has contributed in the focusing on five priority areas within the Commission's work programme for PCD 2010-2013 (trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration, and security). This was partly **inspired by the Swedish PCD** focus on six global challenges."(Bildt & Carlsson, 2012, 86)

This goes against the Europeanised vertical coherence model because it shows Sweden having an impact on the EU's development policy rather than the other way around.

5.2.4 EU PCD Report 2013

The EU PCD 2013 report is more optimistic than the former 2009 and 2011 EU PCD reports because it also employs the 2010 OECD PCD assessment explaining that it was important for the; "(…) implementation of PCD: policy formulation and implementation; coordination and cooperation; and knowledge and analysis." (EC, 2013, 36-37) The EU reports between comparing the 2010 and 2012 assessments "(…) a general conclusion is that implementation of PCD has come furthest as regards policy formulation and implementation." (EC, 2013, 36-37)

In comparison to the government communication 2011/12:167 that had also done an assessment of their policy coherence, positive gains have been made from Sweden by taking the initiative to involve other development actors into the mix and try to constantly improve their PCD tools of policy formulation and implementation. However, this also tends to reinforce the argument that Sweden is taking a lead in formulating the development policies as to the standard they should be upheld to, and furthering their credibility as an effective development actor that is doing so on its own initiative rather impacted by the EU. The topic of PCD among other EUMs has also been a growing topic during this period as PCD awareness and implementation has progressed since 2009 and has become a heightened political interest as the EU reports, "(…) possibly thanks to its relevance in the post-2015 discussions, sustained pressure from civil society and regular reporting and policy discussions at EU and OECD level." (EC, 2013, 40) The post-2015 is in reference to the upcoming 2030 UN Agenda on Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's) in 2015, and the sustained pressured that the EU mentions has generated a sense of urgency among EUMs as the EU reports;

> "The emergence of national parliaments in PCD discussions and the political demand they create for more accountability and for the promotion of 'development-friendly' policies has been a strong trend in recent years, at least in some Member States (e.g. the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark)." (EC, 2013, 41) These are incentives for more vertical coherence due to their lacking prior to 2013.

5.2.5 EU PCD Report 2015

This EU PCD 2015 report takes notice on the progress of the PCD efforts as well as laying the groundwork for the upcoming 2030 Agenda.

> "At present, in the context of Post-2015, the PCD concept is evolving to Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) and the various toolkits are being updated to support the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This work is also intended to facilitate constructive dialogue between policy-makers and key stakeholders." (EC, 2015, 19)

This is an interesting evolution of laying the preparations for a new type of PCD that will be known as PCSD to encapsulate not only coherent EU development policies, but also universal development policies. However, while there is a sense of urgency in the momentum of the upcoming 2030 SDG Agenda, there are still issues concerning PCD;

> "Institutional mechanisms for monitoring, analysis and reporting are lacking in several countries with some countries using this EU report on policy coherence as their main reporting channel. For example, Sweden publishes a biennial report on policy coherence but lacks indicators for field monitoring (…) To move forward on policy coherence for development, it is essential that countries develop mechanisms for screening their policies and impact. Similarly, reporting directly and consistently to parliaments on PCD efforts is key." (EC, 2015, 29)

A deeper look into the PCD monitoring mechanisms and indicators meant that the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) analysed the "Use of PCD Indicators by a selection of EU Member States" in a paper published in January 2015 looking into 8 different EUMs including Sweden. (EC, 2015, 30) The paper comes to the conclusion that no matter how coherent an EUM is with an EU institution that there will be recurring problems with coherence;

> "The paper stressed that the different approaches are dependent on domestic politics and policies which is unavoidable but problematic. A general observation is that in monitoring, the use of objectives, targets, actions and indicators is often mixed up. The paper calls for the development of "explicit chains of causality" to underpin indicators. However, in practice identifying explicit chains of causality for certain policies and the interplay with other policies is inherently complex due to multiple interlinked relationships of policy and non-policy issues. Our capacity to understand how development occurs and to clearly identify chains of causality and isolate interventions is very limited. However, it is possible to establish loose casual links between specific policies and their outcomes, which can then be used as guidance when creating or revisiting policy." (EC, 2015, 30)

Keeping in mind these shortcomings are is perhaps one of the reasons why so much preparation is going into the post-2015 agenda as the next step in answering these 'loose causal links' as the EU report points out;

> "Post-2015 will be very different from the development agenda of the MDGs and will encompass a universal agenda for sustainable development with a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including means of implementation and a system for monitoring and review. It is meant to be a transformative agenda towards sustainable development for all and it will require actions from all countries. The implementation of the new framework requires commitments from all nations: advanced, emerging and developing countries." (EC, 2015, 109)

This stepping up of EU PCD mechanisms alongside the UN for the 2030 Agenda complicates matters by adding pressure to the vertical coherence tool because of the necessity to remain consistent throughout the process of formulation, cooperation, and then implementation;

> "Policy coherence is at the core of a truly conducive and effective policy environment. For the global partnership to succeed, all policies at national and subnational level need to contribute coherently to the achievement of the SDGs both domestically and internationally." (EC, 2015, 109)

Another risk of adding additional players into the coherence tool are the different impacts of influence straying away from the EU sphere into the UN sphere albeit following the same strategy;

> "The post-2015 Agenda presents a great opportunity to address the interlinked challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development. Making the most of this conjunction is a key priority for the EU and its Member States. The new agenda, being universal, aims to bring transformative change to enable sustainable development for all. At the international level, all countries will need to ensure that "beyond aid" policies support, or at least, do not undermine progress towards the agreed global goals. In a new Global Partnership, all developed, upper-middle income countries and emerging economies should commit to set up systems to assess the impact of adopting new policies on poorer countries. The EU remains committed to ensuring increased PCD taking account development objectives in those policies which are likely to affect developing countries and will contribute to the global agenda by promoting its own experience on PCD as a key contribution

> to the collective effort towards achieving broader policy coherence for sustainable development." (EC, 2015, 109)

This forces a greater interlinkage of commitment and policies to be expected in the upcoming agenda, that should spur greater vertical coherence of development policies.

5.2.6 Committee Directive 2016:18 and Swedish Government Communication 2015/16:182

In 2015 was the signing of the 2030 Agenda in October, in the following months in early 2016 before the Brexit vote was the direct implementation of the 2030 Agenda into the Swedish constitution. The "Kommittédirektiv Genomförande av Agenda 2030 för hållbar utveckling" is directive 2016:18 that was passed in the Swedish constitution to accommodate the 2030 SDG Agenda. (Regeringen. 2016, 1) The "Regeringens skrivelse 2015/16:182 - Politiken för global utveckling i genomförandet av Agenda 2030" is the government communication that came after directive 2016:18, as well as revamping the PGD according to the 2015/16:182 government communication establishing a new start on the PGD since the passing of the 2030 SDG Agenda. (Löfven & Löfvin, 2016, 2)

5.2.7 Swedish Government Communication 2016/17:62

This government communication 2016/17:62 published in 2016 is indirectly related to the to the EU PCD progress alongside the 2030 agenda;

> "Policy coherence is now more relevant than ever. The global challenges that must be tackled, such as challenges facing human rights, and the universal impact of the 2030 Agenda clearly signal the need for more cohesive action across policy areas to contribute towards fair and sustainable global development(…)Similarly, Sweden's Policy for Global Development (PGD) is a central tool in implementing the 2030 Agenda and meeting its SDGs. The 2030 Agenda demands a cohesive policy and new ways of working in which synergies and conflicts between goals can be highlighted and tackled." (Löfven & Wallström, 2016, 42)

The was supported by the passing of directive 2016:18 into the Swedish constitution focusing on the 2030 SDG Agenda which was led to a relaunch of Sweden's PGD. This pattern of taking a lead within the PCD process is similarly seen in the first phase with the initial introduction of the PCD instrument that was pioneered by Sweden. Upon the new rapid implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the incorporation of sustainability goals dating as far back as the early 2000s, Sweden has a comparable advantage in influencing the direction of development policy, whereas the EU in the case of impacting Sweden's development policy, does not.

5.2.8 PCD Analytical Tool Applied to the Collected Materials

Criteria of the PCD analytical tool

1) The PCD materials have been arranged the same as the previous phase, chronologically as the dates and events occurred to help gain an understanding of the usage of the PCD tools introduced in Phase 1. Unfortunately, the newly designed PCD tools performed poorly due to a difference in interpretation what was expected to be coherent with the EUMs development policy. There had been assessments by the OECD done both by the EU and Sweden to determine what their strengths and weaknesses were, essentially being the implementation of policy coherence. There is a growing shift in the usage of the vertical coherence tool due to

the added pressure of international development actors becoming involved with the Europeanisation efforts through the 2030 Agenda. This rendered the original PCD tools capabilities to be problematic in their lack of clear indicators and tracking in-field policy implementations in real time, resulting in little impact in influencing Swedish development policy. However, with the introduction of the post-2015 talks and 2030 Agenda meant there has been a revival in the PCD tools parameters including sustainability, as well as the extent of their implementation due to the Lisbon Treaty coming into effect in 2009.

2) There have been other players involved in the policy coherence schemes and mechanisms as a consequence of redesigning them creating the issue of added outside pressures of influence also impacting Swedish development policy. The analytical tool is still navigating through the relationship between Sweden and the EU within development policy, and there are policy coherence documents that reference both actors. However, the PCD tools are being recreated to encompass a greater universal applicability, that also needs to deal with the issue of indicating 'loose causal links' of incoherence in development policy.

3) When determining the level of Europeanisation for this phase it is at an absorption **LOW** level of Europeanisation due to initial poor performance of the PCD tools employed as well as the recreation of the tools by integrating with other international development actors for greater effectiveness. Policy coherence is perceived to be the way forward, but in the case of Europeanisation it has had little effect on Sweden's development policy, again, the opposite direction in vertical coherence is true.

5.3 Phase 3 Post-Brexit: 2016 – 2019

This section of the analysis will go through the materials within the Phase 3 category and will list each of the EU and Swedish policy documents, followed by the PCD analytical tool to go through the collected materials, and determining the level of Europeanisation for this phase taking into account the independent variable and causal mechanism Brexit.

5.3.1 The New European Consensus on European Development in 2017

Upon reviewing the NECD the key takeaways in relation to PCD are points 10, 111, and 123 that address the future of policy coherence;

> 10) "**This Consensus is the cornerstone of the EU's development policy, which is part of the overall EU response to the 2030 Agenda.** The primary objective of EU development policy, as laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The EU and its Member States will apply the principle of policy coherence for development (PCD), and will take into account the **objectives of development cooperation in all external and internal policies which they implement and which are likely to affect developing countries. PCD is a fundamental part of the EU's contribution to achieving the SDGs."** (EC & EC & EP, 2019, 6)

Point 10 takes the strengths of the 2005 ECD and the 2009 Lisbon Treaty by combining a centralized objective with strong legal footing and sense of urgency by the Brexit catalyst. The goal of the EU the actor that will impact Swedish development policy is utilizing the NECD's new stance as a platform to ensure stronger vertical coherence through PCD as well as PCSD.

> 111) “Delivering on the new universal framework for sustainable development in the field of development cooperation is a shared responsibility of all stakeholders. Sustainable development requires a holistic and cross-sector policy approach and is ultimately an issue of governance which needs to be pursued in partnership with all stakeholders and on all levels. **The EU and its Member States will therefore promote whole-of-government approaches and ensure political oversight and coordination efforts at all levels for SDG implementation**. In order to better support policy formulation and decision-making, they will ensure the evidence base of policy impacts on developing countries through consultations, stakeholder engagement, ex-ante impact assessments and ex-post evaluations of major policy initiatives. Ongoing EU action towards sustainable global supply chains, such as in the timber and garment sectors, illustrate the added value of pursuing a coherent approach. Policy initiatives should, wherever relevant, indicate how they contribute to sustainable development in developing countries. This is also instrumental for improving the EU and its Member States’ monitoring and reporting on PCD.” (EC & EC & EP, 2019, 53)

The promotion of ‘whole-of-government’ approach is the biggest indicator of change within scope of Europeanisation, because of the transformative potential of shaping EUMs domestic policy as EU policy. It is an ambitious goal to aim for, and a consideration that connects with Phase 1.

> 123) “**A mid-term assessment of the implementation of this Consensus will be carried out by 2024.** It will outline how the Consensus has been applied and what it has achieved in support of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The EU and its Member States will systematically measure progress and adjust their actions to ensure that their development cooperation, including through its links with related policy areas, continues to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in developing countries.” (EC & EC & EP, 2019, 56)

The extension of the PCD reporting from annually, biennially, to seven years in between provides a proper assessment of what the issues of PCD, and PCSD when operating in development policy.

5.3.2 EU PCD Questionnaire 2018

During this period no EU PCD 2017 report could be found, according to the EU website the reasons being; “In 2017, PCD was integrated in the overall Commission work on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.”(EC, 2024) Thus, there were no EU PCD reports happening while the new PCSD mechanisms were being implemented. Instead, there is an EU PCD Questionnaire from 2018 that will go into the 2019 EU PCD report. This questionnaire will focus on Sweden’s reply within the questionnaire. The questionnaire shows the decisions Sweden made in response to the 2015 SDG agenda, as well as what their response was in 2018;

> “In 2015, all ministries drew up internal action plans for working on global development policy linked to the new SDGs. In 2016, The Government decided to structure the biannual report to the Parliament along the 17 SDGs in an effort to reinforce the strong connection between Sweden’s policy for global development and the implementation of the Agenda 2030. In 2018, the

> Government delivered a follow-up report to the Swedish Parliament following the same structure as the previous report from 2016. This report includes actions and results during the period 2015-2017, as well as new decisions ahead. The report from March 2018 has been translated to English (link to report in question 1.1) Within the Swedish Government, all ministers are responsible for the implementation of Policy for Global Development (PGD) as well as for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda." (EC, 2018, 3)

Based on this excerpt the Swedish PCD approach did not change since the implementation of Agenda 2030. This means that despite Brexit and the NECD employing 'whole-of-government' approaches, the EU's efforts to impact Sweden's development policy was redundant. This is due to Sweden's already advanced development model, that has been used by the EU to create their development model.

5.3.3 Swedish Government Communication 2017/18:146

This is the final government communication 2017/18:146 published in 2018 that discusses the huge overhauls in policy since the 2030 Agenda in 2015, the relaunching of the PGD in 2016, British referendum later in June 2016 and the establishment of the 2017 NECD. The government communication 2017/18:146 points out Sweden's foreign policy goals;

> "The 2030 Agenda is an ambitious agenda but, within many areas, Sweden has even greater ambitions (…) Sweden's focus in the international implementation of the 2030 Agenda is aimed at equitable and sustainable global development. The Government is conducting an ambitious policy coherence with this as a goal. The policy for global development (PGD) was adopted by the Riksdag in 2003 and, since 2014, has been applied with increased vitality through the relaunch of the policy that the Government has implemented. (Löfven & Löfvin, 2018, 5)

Despite the EU's efforts impact Swedish development policy through recreating and assessing PCD tools and ramping up Europeanisation efforts, Sweden is still pioneering its development policy. When looking at what the communication it addresses the EU's treaty obligations to promote harmonious development which Sweden has been actively involved regarding the implementation of the 2030 agenda since before the adoption of NECD in 2017, and Brexit in 2016. (Löfven,& Löfvin, 2018, 11) Sweden's ambitions and goals for development policy is pointed out below;

> "During the negotiation of the Council conclusions concerning the EU's implementation of the 2030 Agenda, Sweden worked particularly for an overall raising of the ambition level, among other things by ensuring that the agenda is integrated in the EU's current and future policy work. The issues which Sweden has particularly promoted address gender equality, sexual and reproductive health and rights, the environment, peace and security, aid goals, sustainable enterprise, trade, social dialogue, tools for harmonious development, including sustainable development, and active participation of stakeholders in the EU's work on the agenda. Most of the Swedish positions were positively received and Sweden is positive to the Council's proactive work on the EU's implementation of the agenda. In order to better address the implementation phase of the 2030 Agenda which the EU is now entering, a permanent Council working party is being established which will coordinate and promote the work on the EU's internal and external implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The group will

> function as a support to other Council constellations which continue to be responsible for substantive parts of the 2030 Agenda and the Global Goals. Sweden is actively participating in expert groups for harmonisation within both the EU and the OECD. These expert groups are aimed at discussing methodology and exchanging experiences." (Löfven & Löfvin, 2018, 11)

This shows strong indication that it is still Sweden who is influencing the EU development policy and not the other way around, resulting in low vertical coherence, if any at all.

5.3.4 EU PCD Report 2019

This is the last EU PCD report in 2019 that presents a complete shift in premise with the incorporation of the 2030 Agenda, the SDGs, as well as the PCSD's. The report addresses this in the difference between PCD and PCSD explaining that;

> "PCD is a legal obligation in the EU Treaty, whereas PCSD stems from the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. In addition, in the case of PCSD, given that the SDGs are universal, policy makers have to secure multi-directional coherence by pursuing multiple goals globally, whereas for PCD, coherence is more focused, i.e. it is directed towards a single cause, which is the interest of developing countries." (EC, 2019, 4)

This has also presented problems of interpretation among EUMs due to this distinction of what is legally required under the NECD and what is not by the 2030 Agenda. The EU report goes onto mention that;

> "The new European Consensus on Development has confirmed the role of PCD as part of the EU's contribution to SDGs and to the broader objective of PCSD. Ensuring PCSD, as embedded in the 2030 Agenda, requires taking into account the impact of all policies on sustainable development at all levels – nationally, within the EU, in other countries and at global level. PCD responds fully to the 2030 Agenda, since it seeks to support developing countries across the three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental)." (EC, 2019, 4)

This is an example of the EU pushing to vertically cohere with its EUMs within development policy taking place through the increased PCD mechanism while trying to implement the PCSD as well;

> "The new Consensus on Development provides a framework for a common approach to development policy for the EU and its Member States based on the SDGs. It constitutes an important part of the EU's overall response to the 2030 Agenda implementation in assisting partner countries to achieve the SDGs." (EC, 2019, 5)

This is where a stronger sense of vertical coherence is called upon with the implementation of the NECD aimed to utilize PCD and PCSD together. However, this has been an approach that Sweden has adopted since 2003, and has continued to be the main driver of this approach actively influencing the EU, rather than vice versa.

5.3.5 PCD Analytical Tool Applied to the Collected Materials

Criteria of the PCD analytical tool

1) The PCD materials will be organized the same way as in Phase 1-2, chronologically through the events that happened and decisions made based on these events. Phase 3's goal was to measure level of Europeanisation due to the Brexit causal mechanism that would spur change. However, upon reviewing the series of events and policies there has not been any significant impacts on the vertical coherence efforts employed by the EU to impact Swedish development policy. The increase of PCD capabilities both in the new consensus and employing the foreign policy instruments did not have an effect on impacting Swedish development policy, in fact, it lead to an even more ambitious Swedish development policy.

2) The policy coherence tool reviews all the PCD materials reinforce the lack of vertical coherence influencing Swedish development policy, as well as the recurring issue over the misinterpretation of policy coherence among other EUMs. The PCD tools have expanded their reach, created external evaluations, and focused the loose causal links around three main challenges of economic, social and environmental. The tools will impact those EUMs that do not have a development policy as developed as the Nordic model.

3) When determining the level of Europeanisation for this phase it is at an absorption **LOW** level of Europeanisation due to the lack of improvements the EU had to offer to the Swedish development policy. However, both development policies are aligning closer and closer, but not due to the impact of the EU influence on Swedish development policy.

5.4 Empirical Summary – Determining the Level of Europeanisation .

Phase 1 pre-Brexit: 2000 – 2008 presented the introduction of the concept of a global development policy at the start of the millennium due to the UN MDGs that inspired Sweden's approach, and push to incorporate policy coherence into development policy. It was a way to ensure as much help as possible was going towards poverty stricken parts of the globe. The Swedish foreign ministry developed the PGD as a method to ensure universal applicability in 2003, and would eventually inspire the EU development model. Reviewing the government communications of Sweden and it is clear it sought influence the EU through their own development model that had been tried and tested by its Nordic neighbours. Eventually through the ECD and introduction of the PCD questionnaires, reports, and initiatives it laid down the foundation for a global development policy to take place. However, in the case of EUMs having already developed long-standing and effective development models there was little impact on their development policies, in the case of Sweden. However, it also highlighted how ahead Sweden was in regard to their development policy formulation and implementation based on the PGD criteria it had already created and implemented into their constitution. While there were low levels of Europeanisation of Swedish development policy, there was a push to incorporate EU norms and values through the whole-of-government approach that Sweden implemented when dealing with the EU. Ultimately, it was Sweden's influence that impacted how EU development policy was formulated and used to achieve a coherent development policy among its EUMs to alleviate poverty-stricken countries.

Phase 2 pre-Brexit: 2009 – 2016 saw the early stages of PCD being tested on the fellow EUMs development policy as well as the expansion of EU foreign policy with the Lisbon Treaty coming into effect. The expectation of greater performance of coherence within EU development policy was undermined by the lack of clarity and interpretation of policy coherence to begin with. The solutions to deal with this problem was spearheaded by Sweden by undergoing external reviews through OECD on its policy coherence practices, as well as applying them to the EU development model. This undermined the EU's impact to influence the Swedish development policy, despite the expansion of powers. In light of this poor performance since the Lisbon Treaty took effect, there had been discussions on the Post-2015 that aimed to create an all encompassing development policy that would effectively replace the MDGs with SDGs. However, as the initiatives for PCD grew greater and increasingly effective, they had little affect on the Swedish development policy that was still leading and shaping the EU's development policy. Upon the completion of the 2030 Agenda, Sweden implemented it into its constitution, again aligning closer to the EU through a 'whole-of-government' approach but was not impacted by the EU to make that change.

Phase 3 post-Brexit: 2016-2019 would be change the EU needed to fully utilize the opportunity for ambitious Europeanisation to prevent further fragmentation and scepticism among EUMs. Implementing the 2017 NECD with an increasing emphasis PCD and PCSD within the development process. When reviewing Sweden's answers to the 2018 PCD questionnaire about their methods of coherence, it is clear to see that there were long-standing mechanisms in place that already achieved what the EU had set out to do. Brexit did not change the level of Europeanisation for Swedish development policy, because EU development model had been influenced by Sweden's initiatives since the 2000s.

Based on the results of the PCD analytical tools the diagram represents no change in Europeanisation throughout all three phases.

5.4.1 Three Phase One-Dimensional Typology: Europeanisation of Swedish Development Policy



6. Conclusion

When reviewing the materials and analysis of the study it is clear that the British referendum in 2016 did not affect the level of Europeanisation of Swedish development policy because the EU development policy is based on Swedish influences. Despite previous materials indicating a gap in the development models between the northern EU/Nordic members policies that prevented further Europeanisation, this study aimed to explain why that was the case. The findings reveal that Europeanisation of development policy is ongoing and the PCD tools are getting stronger, wider reaching, and more comprehensive, however, this does not apply to Sweden, or other northern EU members due to their established traditions in aid and development policy. The PCD regulatory policies used to accomplish further Europeanisation in development policy was rendered null by Sweden's active incorporation of a 'whole-of-government' approach that followed their own PGD initiatives before PCD.

The study aimed to deepen the research in the Europeanisation of development policy by applying the measurements used in Carbone and Orbie's studies. Using PCD as an analytical tool to research the decisions made within the policy documents helped due the PCD reports availability and transparency in the case of the 2018 PCD questionnaire. The problem in using policy coherence is the ambiguity of which policy to cohere to in particular while also having to create a consensus among multiple EUMs that they can follow. The research field of Europeanisation of development policy is still applicable, but perhaps not towards EUMs with well-established development policies, rather those that do not have a long-standing tradition in the hopes of achieving the greatest level of Europeanisation to remedy the lack of a development policy or to set the norm.

The policy implications of the Europeanisation of development policy means that the EU is impacting EUMs in a way that furthers the EU's and the EUMs interests. Actively centralizing foreign policy and ensuring that the EU plays a role on the global stage means it needs to constantly innovate and take charge of the opportunities available. Brexit did not change the level of Europeanisation for Swedish development policy. It could have affected another EUM in a significant way if they had not employed a development model not cohering to the EU's approach or policy.

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Appendix

Appendix 1.1



(Bildt & Carlsson, 2012, 5)