The Impact of Regional Challenges on Qatar’s Response in Foreign Policy from 1995 to 2024 Rabab Hashish Master’s Thesis 30 credits MaPS - Master's Programme in Political Science Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg Supervisors: Adrian Hyde-Price and Helena Olofsdotter Stensöta 2025 Word count: 15966 1 Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…4 Ch1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………….……5-8 Research problem and main question………………………………………………….…...…6-7 Ch2. Theories and literature……………………………………………………………………….…...…9-19 International relations theories…………………………………………………………….….…9-11 Theories expectations………………………………………………………………………….….…12 literature review……………………………………………………………………………………….….13-19 MENA challenges impact on foreign policy……………………………………………………13-17 Qatar's foreign policy…………………………………………………………………………………17-19 Literature Gap………………………………………………………………………………….….……19 Ch3. Methodology…………………………………………………………………………………….…………20-29 Research design, measurements, and operationalization …………………….…………20-27 Research questions……………………………………………………………………………………27-28 Data sources………………………………………………………………………………….….…….28 Validity, reliability and limitation……………………………………………………………….…28-29 Ch4. The Findings………………………………………………………………………………………….……30-43 QFP response to the Arab spring………………………………………………………….………30-32 QFP response to regime changes…………………………………………………………………32-35 QFP response to failed states and civil war……………………………………………………35-38 QFP response to crises and conflicts……………………………………………………………38-42 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….…42-43 Ch5. Discussion and conclusion…………………………………………………………….……………44-49 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………….……50-56 Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………………….…...……57-144 2 Acknowledgments I would like to thank Dr. Adrian and Dr. Helena for their guidance and patience during my study. Many thanks to dear Maria Lillisete for her kind soul and kind words. Thanks extend to Prof. Diab Al-Badayneh for his support and encouragement. A special thank you goes to my parents, Salwa and Karim, to my dearest friend, Sada Sarhan, and finally, my thanks to Dr. Adnan Hayajneh. Dedication I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother Salwa, and father Karim, for attaching my wings and allowing me to fly. To my beloved grandma and grandpa, may your souls rest in peace. 3 Abstract This study explores the impact of MENA regional challenges (the Arab Spring, regime changes, failed states and civil war, and regional crises and conflicts) on Qatar’s foreign policy (QFP) (actions, policies/discourse, and alliances) from 1995 to 2024. Utilizing multiple qualitative approaches (case study, content analysis, process tracing) as research tools of this study. An integrated theoretical framework composed of international relations (IR) theories of realism/neorealism, constructivism, omni-balancing, and small state theories used as a theoretical framework to this study. A tringle method was used to ensure the validity and reliability of the research tools of this study. Findings showed that Qatar's foreign policy (actions, policies, and alliances) has been shaped by regional challenges (the Arab Spring, regime change, failed state, regional crises, and conflicts). In specific, during the Arab Spring, Qatar adopted a proactive foreign policy, focusing on military engagement and support for revolutions. With regard to regime changes, Qatar's actions became more ideologically defined (patron of Islamic-oriented post- revolutionary regimes), selective, and quickly engaged with new governments. Moreover, the emergence of failed states and civil wars, Qatar responded with a hyperactive strategy that includes early military engagement, later-stage mediation, long-term diplomacy, media, humanitarian aid, backchannel alliances, and selective neutrality. Finally, regional crises and conflicts showed two traits in QFP; When directly involved in a crisis, it tends to rely on Crises diplomacy, Multilateralism discourse, and intensifies hedging strategy regionally as well as globally. In crises where it is not directly implicated, mediation emerges as its principal foreign policy instrument. Political implications such as policy making, regional challenges, foreign policy response were discussed. Keywords: Qatar’s foreign policy (QFP), regional challenges, alliances, actions, discourse, Arab Spring, failed states, civil war, regime change, crises and conflicts, international relations theories. 4 CHAPTER 1 1.1 Introduction: The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional system has undergone significant transformations since the end of the Cold War, with particularly dramatic changes following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. These transformations have altered the distribution of power, alliance patterns, and security dynamics in the region, creating both constraints and opportunities for regional actors. Gause (2017) argues that the post-2011 Middle East has been characterized by a complex cold war involving multiple competing powers rather than a simple bipolar confrontation. These evolving regional challenges have profound implications for the foreign policies of states in the MENA region. Qatar is a small rentier Gulf state, its economy mainly relies on natural gas and oil exports, with a population of approximately 3.1 million, of whom only about 3108,306 are citizens (Population Today, 2025). Qatar is located in the Arabic/Persian Gulf sharing its only land border with Saudi Arabia. The political system in Qatar is constitutional monarchy and Al Thani tribe is the ruling family. Its current emir is Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who has been in power since 2013, and before him was his father Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani since 1995. The Emir holds significant executive authority, though there is a consultative council (Shura Council) with limited legislative powers. (Shura Council, n.d.). Qatar presents a particularly intriguing case for examining the relationship between regional challenges and foreign policy behaviour. Despite its small size, Qatar has pursued an ambitious and often controversial foreign policy that has positioned it as a significant player in regional affairs. Robert (2012) observes that Qatar's foreign policy activism has far exceeded what traditional theories of international relations would predict for a state of its size and conventional capabilities. 1.2 Background on Qatar foreign policy Qatar’s foreign policy is characterized by pragmatism, strategic alliances, and soft power diplomacy. Sheikh Hamad, the previous prince of Qatar, rise to power in 1995 marks the beginning of Qatar’s foreign policy’s transformation and independence from the Saudi umbrella. Despite its small size, Qatar has played an outsized role in regional and international affairs, leveraging its wealth, media influence, and diplomatic mediation efforts. (Robert, 2012) 5 Doha’s media influence is carried out through Al Jazeera network, which was established in 1996 as the first move of independence from the Saudi influence. Qatar exerted soft power through Al Jazeera, which has challenged authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, amplified the voices of opposition movements during the Arab Spring 2011, and criticized neighbouring gulf regimes (especially Saudi Arabia and UAE), straining diplomatic ties in many occasions including the years of 2002, 2014 and 2017, and leading to a security backlash seen in the blockade that was imposed on the country by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and other countries from 2017 to 2021. (Naier, 2021). Qatar’s soft power strategy also included carrying out regional and international mediation efforts, as it has built a reputation as a regional and international mediator using its neutral stance and wealth to broker peace talks and resolve conflicts. For instance, it hosted U.S- Taliban negotiations, leading to the U.S. withdrawal agreement in 2020. It also brokered peace deals in Lebanon (Doha agreement 2008) and in Darfur (Sudan peace talks 2011). Additionally, It Positioned itself as a diplomatic player during the Russia-Ukraine war, balancing Western ties while keeping communication open with Russia. In addition to several other mediation efforts. (Milton, Elkahlout, & Tariq, 2023) Qatar’s relations and key alliances vary. On the international level, it maintains close military and economic ties with the U.S. Qatar hosts the Al Udeid air base, the largest U.S. military base in the middle east, which was established in 2002, making Doha a key U.S. ally. However, Doha also maintains relations with U.S. rivals. Regionally, it has strong military and economic ties with Turkey. For instance, during the 2017 blockade, Turkey sent military support to Qatar, solidifying their alliance. (Naier, 2021) 1.3 Research Problem Qatar has been under the focus of the international lens because of its high-profile foreign policy which is disproportionate to its size (Qablan, 2020). Over the past three decades (1995- 2025), it has adopted an active role in regional and global affairs. Mostt notably, its significant role in U.S/Afghanistan peace making dialogue, in Gulf war mediation (Yemeni crisis), in the Russia/Ukraine war mediation, in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, in addition to other regional and international mediation efforts (Milton, Elkahlout, & Tariq, 2023). Located in the MENA region, Qatar’s foreign policy, like that of other regional countries, is impacted by the volatile nature of the region. The MENA region has been going through 6 various challenges on the political, economic, social, and military levels that undermine the stability and security of its countries, forcing them to reshape their external behaviour in response, (Mohammadzadeh, 2017) especially since the events of the Arab Spring in late 2010, which had destabilizing implications on the region’s security, stability, and status quo. Though existing research on MENA regional challenges provides perceptive study of how regional challenges impacted the responses of foreign policy, knowledge of how they particularly affect Qatar's foreign policy is still much lacking. In addition, most studies on QFP primarily focus on domestic factors, global power relations, or soft power approaches, less attention has been paid to how macro external factors have impacted Qatar's external behaviour. (Qabalan, 2020). For instance, Mohammadzadeh (2017) argues that Qatar’s foreign policy activism cannot be fully understood through materialist or survivalist lenses alone; instead, it must be situated within a macro framework that takes status concerns and regional structural shifts seriously. Moreover, Qablan (2020) advocated that Qatar’s ability to manoeuvre amid structural pressures requires a more detailed investigation as the existing literature does not sufficiently explain the evolving interplay between agency and structure in Doha’s foreign policymaking, especially in light of intensifying regional rivalries and instability. This study tries to narrow this research gap by exploring how multiple regional challenges have impacted Qatar's foreign policy responses since 1995. This research attempts to explores how MENA regional challenges have impacted Qatar's responses in foreign policy between 1995-2024. In specific, this study explores the major MENA regional challenges (Arab Spring, regime change, failed states and civil war, and regional crises and conflicts) impacts on Qatari’s response in FP (actions, discourse/policies, alliances). The primary research question is: How MENA Regional challenges (Arab Spring, regime change, failed states and civil war, and regional crises and conflicts) impacted Qatar foreign policy responses (actions, discourse/policies, alliances) from 1995 to 2024? 1.4 Significance There are several significant contributions to this study including but not limited to the understanding of Qatar's responses in the MENA in regards to the region’s challenges, a topic of considerable policy relevance given Qatar's involvement in regional conflicts, mediation efforts, and support for various political movements. 7 The findings of this study could serve as knowledge-driven policy guidance by using Qatar's case to inform how states can develop foreign policy responses to macro regional challenges. Moreover, Qatari decision makers could utilize such findings in reevaluating, reshaping, and modifying the country’s foreign policy in the desirable path in the future. The research also contributes to bridge the gap in research in understanding MENA challenges and its impact on politics and international relations. Moreover, the research area of MENA regional challenges and foreign policy has not gained the desired academic/scholars’ interest, especially in term of quantity and quality in specific countries like Qatar, regardless of its importance in shaping state foreign policies in the region. In addition, this study has contributed to a theory-building through the application of relevant significant theories of the international relation filed, mainly realism/neorealism, constructivism, omni-balancing, and small state theories, to understand the impact of regional challenges on Qatar foreign policy. Finally, this study employed case study that utilized qualitative analysis methods (content analyses, and process tracing) as research tool. 8 Chapter 2 Theories and Literature 2.1 Introduction The theoretical framework and the literature review are presented in this chapter. The chapter first identifies and applies four major theories of international relations to QFP. The second section presents review of the literature on a key regional challenges’ (the Arab Spring, regime changes, failed states/civil wars, and regional crises/conflicts) impact on state’s foreign policy in the MENA. Subsequently, literature review then introduces existing studies on Qatar foreign policy. Lastly, the literature gap is presented. 2.2 Theoretical Framework To understand the impact of the regional challenges (the Arab Spring, regime changes, failed states/civil wars, and regional crises/conflicts) on QFP responses, four major theories of international relations—realism/neorealism, constructivism/soft power, omni balancing, and small state theory—were presented with their applications to QFP. 2.2.2 International relations (IR) theories and their applications to QFP A. Realism and Neorealism According to realism, the international system is anarchy, lacking central authority, forcing states to prioritize survival and security above all else. States are seen as rational, unitary actors primarily whose main goal is to maximize their power and security relative to others. Realists contend that since the system is self-help oriented, conflict is inevitable. (Mearsheimer, 2001). Neorealism, or structural realism, particularly as articulated by Kenneth Waltz (1979), places more emphasis on the distribution of material power and capabilities within the international system than on human nature as the primary factor influencing state behavior. Accordingly, states' behaviors are limited and affected by the anarchy system, which forces them to either balance (allying with others against a dominant threat) or bandwagon (aligning with the dominant power) to ensure their security. 9 Application to QFP. Realism and neorealism provide a possible framework for explaining Qatar’s responses to regional challenges, emphasizing its objectives of maintaining security, preserving its sovereignty, and managing Gulf rivalries. According to this theory, a small state like Qatar, situated between more powerful adversaries in an anarchic violate MENA regional structure, would probably be forced to prioritize survival and relative power. (Robert, 2012; Qabalan, 2020). Because of the violate nature of the MENA regional system, this framework is suitable to look at how Qatar might react to regional power dynamics and security threats. B. Constructivism In contrast, constructivism posits that shared ideas, identities, norms, beliefs, and social interactions, rather than traditional material power, are what really shape international politics (Wendt, 1999). The way states view themselves and other people, their historical interactions, and the dominant international norms they either seek to uphold or contest all have an impact on state behavior. In this context, Joseph Nye’s (2004) concept of ‘soft power’ as the ability to influence others and achieve desired outcomes through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion (hard power) or payment, becomes particularly relevant. Soft power resources include a nation’s culture, political values, and foreign policies, when legitimate, influential, and attractive. Application to QFP: Constructivism provides a perspective in which Qatar’s response to regional challenges might be understood through the role of identity, norms, and soft power. constructivism invites examination of how regional instability might create opportunities for Qatar to enhance its mediation role, by positioning itself as a neutral diplomatic actor, leveraging its constructed identity (Steinberg, 2023). This framework focuses the analysis on the interplay between regional challenges, Qatar’s brand-building, and its strategic use of soft power. Similarly, the analysis could explore how Qatar, potentially driven by the external threats, seeks to fulfill foreign policy goals like attracting diverse partners or enhancing diplomatic influence through soft power means rather than coercion (Nye, 2004). C. Omni balancing omni balancing theory, proposed by Steven David (1991), was mainly developed to explain the foreign policy behavior of states in the developing world, particularly authoritarian regimes by modifying the traditional balance of power (BOP) theory. It suggests that leaders 10 in authoritarian states are concerned not only with external threats but also with internal threats to their own regime survival (e.g., coups, public upheavals). Consequently, foreign policy choices, including alliance formation, are driven by a calculation of balancing against both internal and external threats. Leaders align with external powers not just for security against other states but also to gain legitimacy, or direct support to control domestic opposition and secure their hold on power. Application to QFP: Noting that Qatar is an authoritarian developing state, this theory could explain Qatar’s leadership responses to regional challenges as a calculation aiming security from both external and internal threat. This theory posits that regional challenges, such as the disturbance of the regional status quo, could be evaluated by Qatar not only for its external threat potential but also for its implications for domestic legitimacy and stability. Qatar’s foreign policy choices regarding security, managing rivalries, and balancing relations might be shaped by this dual threat perception. D. Small State Theory Small state theory examines how states with limited material capabilities (size, population, military, or economy) navigate an international system dominated by larger powers. Lack of material capacity force small countries to employ alternative strategies to ensure survival, prosperity, and influence (Thorhallsson, 2006; Cooper & Shaw, 2009). These strategies include seeking shelter under the protection of a great power, pursuing hedging strategies by diversifying alliances to avoid over-dependence on a single actor while maintaining strategic autonomy, engaging actively in multilateral institutions to amplify their voice and constrain larger states through international law and norms, and developing specialized niche diplomacy roles (e.g., mediation, aid, specific advocacy). Application to QFP: Giving that Qatar is a state with limited land size, population, and military power, this theory could be applied to understand how the country navigates regional challenges to pursue its foreign policy. (Thorhallsson, 2006; Cooper & Shaw, 2009). Regional challenges, such as heightened competition or instability, creates a security dilemma for Qatar forcing it to adopt specific small state strategies to both secure itself and enhance its regional and international position, such as the use of soft power through mediation and Al- Jazeera, balancing rivals (Saudi Arabia and Iran), seeking shelter (through the U.S. military base , or the use of niche diplomacy, potentially enhancing its international standing and leverage (Robert, 2012; Qablan, 2017; Steinberg, 2023). 11 2.2.3 Theatrical Expectations In this section a discussion of the theoretical expectations of how the IR theories of realism/neorealism, constructivism, omni-balancing, and small state interpret the Qatari’s response in FP. All theories are macro-structured and have a common shared assumption that can explain Qatar foreign policy, yet each theory has distinct assumption and unique theoretical explanation to QFP responses. Realism theory frames Qatar's external responses in terms of external power balancing; Constructivism highlights Qatar's identity-building (brand building) and norm projection strategies; Omni balancing stresses Qatar's concern with both external threats and internal security in the face of regional upheaval; and Small State Theory offers a lens to understand Qatar's use of diplomacy and diversified alliances to negotiate regional volatility. Table (1) outlines the expected interpretations of each theory regarding Qatar’s foreign policy. Qatar's foreign policy response to the challenges in the MENA region is likely to be seen by realism/neorealism as focused on security, survival, or forming alliances to deal with direct threats; and would be explained by constructivism as responses driven by ideology, such as soft power use, branding strategies, identity-building efforts, and norm projection. Omni- balancing would explain Qatar’s responses as a mean to address both external threats and internal regime pressures, particularly in high-stakes ideological political settings or legitimacy crises. Finally, small state theory expects Qatar’s responses to be highly engaging in hedging strategies, multilateral, and niche diplomacy, shaped by its material limitations, geographic size, and population constraints. These theoretical expectations guide the discussion chapter, where they are evaluated against the findings of Qatar foreign policy responses. Table (1) Theoretical expectation of QFP* Theoretical Expectations of Qatar’s Foreign Policy according to each theory Realism/Neorealism Constructivism Omni-balancing Small state theory QFP is expected to QFP is expected to QFP is expected to QFP is expected to reflect immediate focus on identity aim at balancing include hedging, security concerns, construction, norm both external threats multilateral diplomacy, survival calculations, projection, or soft and internal regime or niche diplomacy or alliance-building to power engagement threats, especially in due to Qatar’s counter power based on ideological legitimacy crises. geographical threats. factors. constraints. *Note: The Table is the author's original analytical tool and is grounded in the foundational assumptions of each theory. 12 2.3 Literature Review 2.3.1 Introduction This section reviews the existing relevant literature on Qatar foreign policy, and on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional challenges’ impact on foreign policy. First, it reviews literature on how MENA regional challenges (Arab Spring, regime change, failed states and civil war, and regional crises and conflicts) affect the foreign policy behaviour of the region’s countries. Second, it reviews previous studies on Qatar foreign policy. The review concludes by identifying the research gap in the existing literature and how this study fills this gap. 2.3.2 Relevant Literature on MENA Challenges and its impact on Foreign Policy Over the past three decades (1995-2025), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has faced significant political, economic, and security challenges that drastically changed the regional landscape and produced a complicated new reality whereby regional countries must navigate through their foreign policy responses. (Lynch, 2016) The most notable challenges are the Arab Spring, that was followed by regime changes, which caused the emergence of failed states and civil wars, in addition to other regional crises and conflict. These have had profound implications for foreign policy formulation to states in the region, including Qatar (Gause, 2017). The following is a review of each of these challenges’ impact on foreign policy decisions across the region. - Arab Spring Starting in late 2010, the Arab Spring revolutions dramatically changed the scene of foreign policy in the MENA region. According to Lynch (2016), the uprisings disrupted the regional order, creating uncertainty and volatility forcing all states in the region to rearrange their foreign policy approaches. The overthrow of long-standing regimes and the emergence of new political players altered established patterns of regional alliances, creating instability that demanded foreign policy responses. Similarly, Soubrier (2023) argues that the Arab Spring catalysed a significant shift in the foreign policy orientation of many MENA countries, with a notable trend toward increased 13 militarization of foreign policy, which represents a complex interplay of sovereignty considerations, security concerns, and economic interests for the countries. This new security dilemmas created by the Arab spring prompted states to adopt more assertive and interventionist foreign policies to safeguard their interests and influence regional outcomes. To add, the conflicts that emerged from the Arab Spring turned into venues for foreign policy rivalry between regional and global powers. Gause (2014) shows how Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Qatar locally, and Russia and the US globally supported different factions to further their foreign policy interests. This proxy competition complicated conflict resolution efforts and fostered what Gause (2017) calls a "new regional cold war" marked by competing foreign policy blocs. Furthermore, greatly affecting foreign policy formation are the sectarian aspects of post-Arab Spring conflicts. Matthiesen (2013) shows how political conflicts in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen became progressively framed in sectarian terms, initiating the rise of transnational Islamist networks, intensifying Sunni-Shia tensions, and opening doors for outside powers to intervene along sectarian lines, reshaping foreign policy alliances and enmities, in pursue of increasing foreign policy interests. To add, the refugee crises resulted by Arab Spring conflicts have created additional foreign policy challenges for the MENA countries. Dionigi (2016) argues that massive refugee flows from Syria produced humanitarian challenges and political tensions in neighbouring countries, forcing them to develop new foreign policy approaches to manage these flows and their domestic implications. For example, in their reactions to refugee flows, host nations like Egypt and Turkey have had to balance humanitarian concerns with security considerations. - Regime Change Regime transition in the MENA has often set off major foreign policy adjustments for both national players reacting to the new status quo and for the countries undergoing transformation. Gordon (2020) lays out what he refers to as the "iron rule of regime change in the Middle East," arguing that its costs are invariably higher than predicted and that unexpected consequences frequently undermine the foreign policy objectives that motivated intervention in the first place. 14 Post-Arab Spring Tunisia and Egypt especially show how changing governments affect foreign policy. While Tunisia initially pursued a more democratically oriented foreign policy following its regime-change, Egypt's foreign policy, especially in regarded to its alliances, underwent dramatic shifts first under the Muslim Brotherhood government (aligned with Turkey and Qatar) and subsequently once more following the military takeover headed by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (diverged from Turkey and Qatar) (Bizuru, 2022). Therefore, regime change often leads to significant foreign policy reorientations as the new leaders seek to establish legitimacy through and secure their position through alliances. To add, regime change’s effects travel to surrounding nations offering both opportunities and constrains for the development of their foreign policy mostly because of security threats. Ryan (n.d.) emphasizes how, with governments creating and abandoning alliances based mostly on calculations about regime survival rather than conventional national interests, regime security remains the fundamental driver of alliance politics in the Middle East. Seeking to either contain democratic contagion or exploit new opportunities for regional influence, many MENA states rapidly adjusted their foreign policies in response to the regime changes that followed the Arab upheavals. According to Cordesman (2020), regime change has often led to state collapse in the MENA, generating power vacuums that regional and international players seek to fill through their foreign policies responses which have often intensified rather than ameliorated instability, as external actors pursue conflicting agendas that that compromise efforts at state reconstruction. - Failed States and Civil Wars State collapse and civil war are closely interconnected in the MENA; each of them reinforces the other in a cyclical manner. Civil war weakens the state, which creates more opportunities for armed groups and the emergence of civil war, which further weakens the state. A cycle that is difficult to break without significant external support and internal political will. State failure and civil war in the MENA region have profound implications for regional foreign policy dynamics. According to Lauer (2022), foreign actors sometimes view the cost of intervening in failed nations as rather low, which results in several, conflicting interventions that complicate conflict resolution even more. This perception has driven interventionist 15 foreign policies from regional powers seeking to shape outcomes in countries such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Furthermore, According to CISAC (2016), state collapse can have catastrophic and destabilizing effects on nearby and even distant nations, forcing adjustments in their foreign policy approaches. The spread of failed states has presented major security issues for MENA nations that forced them to reorient their foreign policy to an increased defence spending and security cooperation. The study emphasize that the complexity of each situation demands a tailored response. Moreover, terrorist groups find safe refuge in failed regimes, therefore posing transnational security concerns influencing regional foreign affairs. Gerges (2016) explains how groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and their backers have leveraged state weakness in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya to enhance their power, therefore forcing surrounding states to give counterterrorism high priority on their foreign policy agendas. This has resulted in new security plans and international alliances aimed at controlling terrorist risks. According to Ianchovichina and Abu-Bader (2018), non-humanitarian foreign military operations in failing nations often ignite religious division, emphasizing the complex loops between conflict dynamics and foreign policy decisions, with interventions often having unexpected effects requiring more foreign policy alterations. - Regional Crises and conflicts Regional crises in the MENA take various forms including territorial disputes such as the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, military interventions as seen in Iraq and Libya, proxy conflicts as seen in Libya, Syria, and Yemen (Gause, 2014), diplomatic crises such as the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis (Naier, 2021), and transnational security threats, which are Crises stemming from non-state actors operating across borders, including terrorist organizations, transnational criminal networks, and militant groups (Gerges, 2016). MENA crises have consistently triggered significant foreign policy responses from states within and outside the region. These types of conflicts gave radical and terrorist organizations rich footing, which drove regional states to build more aggressive foreign policies to handle these threats. It also has resulted in the forming of new security alliances meant to control regional unrest. 16 Likewise, according to Istituto Affari Internazionali (2022), MENA crises have led to shifting foreign policy cooperation and rivalry as governments pursue progressively autonomous and assertive foreign policies instead of coordinating responses through conventional regional institutions This shift mainly caused by the countries’ aim to secure their interest aligned with their perception of international institutions as ineffective because of their failure to manage the regional crises which have contributed to a narrative of overall international disorder. 2.3.3 Relevant literature on Qatar's Foreign Policy A significant body of research has been developed, specifically around the year 2011 where Qatar role during the Arab spring was significant, to explain the motives behind its high- profile foreign policy. various studies focused on the domestic factors as the primary drivers of Qatar's foreign policy such as Fromherz (2012) who argues that Qatar's foreign policy reflects the intersection of traditional tribal politics with modern state-building ambitions, and Boyce (2013) who states that Qatar’s ambitious foreign policy is driven by the emir himself. Kamrava (2013) further develops this perspective, emphasizing on the role of regime security and leadership ambitions in shaping Qatar's external behaviour. He contends that the emir's desire to guarantee the nation's survival in a violating area is the main driver for QFP, emphasizing the importance of the ruling family's internal challenges and the personal networks of key decision-makers in shaping Qatar's external behaviour. Ulrichsen (2014) also highlights how Qatar's regional involvement is shaped by domestic legitimacy concerns, stemming from the authoritarian nature of the country, leading its leadership to pursue high profile foreign policy as a source of legitimacy. He further asserts that Qatar's small citizen counts reduced internal restrictions on leadership decision-making, while its great natural gas abundance gave the financial means required for its ambitious foreign policy. Other group of literature examines Qatar's foreign policy through the lens of its relationship with global powers, particularly the United States. Wright (2011) analyses how Qatar has leveraged its strategic partnership with the US while simultaneously preserve relationships with players against American interests. This is, he says, a "hedging strategy" meant to maximize Qatar's security and autonomy in a region of uncertainty. 17 Roberts (2012) further confirms this perspective, arguing that Qatar's contradictory alliances and foreign policy reflect a balancing strategy to appease its security patron the U.S., while keeping its regional relationships independent. Khatib (2013) examines how Qatar has negotiated its ties with both Western powers and regional players. She points out that Qatar has shown its capacity to strike a compromise between conflicting worldwide interests by hosting Taliban officials as well as US military installations through its pragmatic foreign policy. In a more recent study by Araghchi and Samadi (2024) further confirm Qatar’s hedging strategy as a mean to secure itself and ensure regional positioning. Another body of research has evolved focuses on Qatar's use of soft power tools, including media influence through Al Jazeera, international investments, sports diplomacy, and cultural initiatives. Peterson (2006) contends that Qatar aims to establish an international brand and to have a regional influence and is doing so through investment in Al Jazeera. He notes that Al Jazeera's coverage of regional politics, particularly during the Arab Spring, positioned Qatar as an influential actor in shaping public opinion across the Arab world. Likewise, Khatib (2013) looks at how Qatar has shaped regional discourse and politics via Al Jazeera and other soft power instruments. She argues that Qatar's investment in media and cultural diplomacy represents a strategic choice to overcome the limitations of its small size and military capabilities. Qabalan (2020) further stresses on Qatar soft power tools that was used during the 2011 events as a tool to both distinguish and secure itself from its Gulf neighbours. Developing this viewpoint, Milton, and others (2023) examines Qatar's humanitarian diplomacy and soft power tool mediation initiatives. They argue that Qatar created diplomatic leverage disproportionate to its size and enhanced its global standing through its mediation efforts in Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and elsewhere. In conclusion, previous studies suggests that QFP is primarily driven by domestic factors, such as its size, regime security, and leadership ambitions, particularly with the U.S. to ensure survival. These studies often underestimate the influence of regional challenges on Qatar's decision-making and focus on its small size as the bigger challenge. Other studies focus on Qatar relations and its need to diverse alliances using hedging strategy regionally and internationally. These studies overlook the wider regional factors that shape QFP choices. Lastly, various studies focus on Qatar use of its natural gas wealth to provides financial resources for its ambitious foreign policy utilizing the use of soft power tools, such as media 18 influence through Al Jazeera, international investments, sports diplomacy, and cultural initiatives, to shape regional discourse, establish a distinctive international identity, and project influence disproportionate to its size. These studies often underestimate the extent to which Qatar has employed hard power approaches, particularly in Libya and Syria. 2.3.4 Literature Gaps This section highlights the literature gap in the presented academic studies as follows: 1. A lack of related theoretical explanations and applications that account for the complicity of the case of Qatar as a small state, situated in a violate region, suffering from a security dilemma, and multiple security backlashes that were caused due to its external behavior, yet continues to pursue a high-profile foreign policy response. 2. Though existing research on MENA challenges provides perceptive study of how they effect the creation of foreign policy, knowledge of how they particularly affect QFP is still much lacking. 3. Most studies on QFP primarily focus on domestic factors, global power relations, or soft power approaches, rather than examining how external factors shaped QFP. These gaps call attention to a macroanalysis of how the external factors of the MENA regional system have impacted Qatari responses in FP. This study attempts to narrow the gap by exploring how various regional challenges have impacted Qatar's foreign policy responses since 1995. Specifically, QFP Reponses (actions, discourse/policies, and alliances) to the major MENA regional challenges (Arab Spring, regime change, failed states and civil war, and regional crises and conflicts). Finally, it utilizes the application of relevant significant theories of the IR field, mainly realism/neorealism, constructivism, omni-balancing, and small state theories, to understand the impact of regional challenges on Qatar's foreign policy. 19 Chapter 3 Methodology 3.1 Introduction This chapter outlines the research methods used to address the central research question. It details the research design, including the operationalization of both the independent and dependent variables. It composed of case studies, content analysis, and process tracing methods as research tools to describe the impact of regional challenges on Qatar’s foreign policy. Followed by presenting the research questions. The chapter concludes by addressing the reliability, the validity, and the methodological limitations of the study. 3.2 Research Design 3.2.1 operationalization In this section, regional challenges (the independent variable) and Qatar's foreign policy (dependent variable) from 1995 to 2024 are operationalized as outlined in Table (2) Table (2) operationalization of independent variables and dependent variables. Independent variables Dependent Variable Regional challenges Qatar Foreign Policy 1995-2024 Variables: Variables: 1. Arab Spring 1. Actions 2. Regime changes 2. Policies 3. Failed states and Civil wars 3. Alliances 4. Regional Crises and Conflicts Measurement: Case study Analytical Method: Content analysis, & Process Tracing 20 3.2.1.1 Methods of Measurement and Analysis This research uses a case study, and this consists both of content analysis of documents and tracing processes over time. These research tools are used to identify and measure both regional challenges and QFP responses. A case study is a detailed description and assessment of a specific real-world situation, aiming to provide generalizations and insights about an individual, group, organization, or event (Britannica, 2025, & Yin, 2018). In addition to QFP being the case study, this thesis also utilizes the case study method to identify, categorize, and measure the regional challenges (Arab Spring, regime changes, failed states and civil wars, and regional crises and conflicts). Within each of these broader cases, case study identifies specific cases (particular events) to provide output of QFP responses in specific contexts. Content analysis is a research method for describing official documents, statements, speeches, and media content related to the contexts of certain dependent variable (Krippendorff, 2019). This research method provides a systematic analysis to documenting Qatar's foreign policy positions and narratives across different challenges. Process tracing is a qualitative method used to identify potential causes influencing changes, examining evidence strength and potential influence through formal tests. (Simister& Scholz, 2017). Through identifying/tracing paths in QFP over time, this method is appropriate for this research because it emphasizes the temporal sequence of events, helping to establish that regional challenges preceded and influenced foreign policy responses rather than the reverse (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). 3.2.1.2 Independent Variable: Regional challenges Regional challenges are measured by a case study method and contains the cases of 1) the Arab spring (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Sudan). 2) regimes changes (Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, and Syria). 3) the emerge of failed states and civil wars (Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Sudan). 4) Regional crises and conflicts (Bahraini protests, second Palestinian intifada, U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saudi Qatari diplomatic crises, the Lebanon war, the Southern movement in Yemen, the Houthis conflict in Yemen, Gulf diplomatic crises, the rise of Islamists violence armed non state actors such as ISIS, and the 2017 GCC blockade). 21 - Case description summary/Scoop 1) The Arab Spring (2011-2019): a case study of series of popular uprisings, protests, and revolutions that swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) beginning in late 2010. It was a wave of civil resistance against authoritarian regimes, fuelled by long- standing grievances related to corruption, political repression, unemployment, poverty, and lack of political freedom. (Rantisi, 2014) The Arab Spring includes the following cases: a) The Tunisian revolution case. Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab spring where the protests were sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor protesting police harassment. The protests took place in December 2010, resulting in the overthrown of the now fallen President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali after 23 years in power. (Rantisi, 2014) b) The Egyptian revolution case. After the success of the Tunisian protests, Egypt followed the same path where massive protests in Tahrir square in January 2011 led to the resignation of the then President Hosni Mubarak after 30 years in powers. Muslim brotherhood came to power through election, (Rantisi, 2014) c) The Libyan revolution case. In Libya, the protests took place in February 2011 and escalated into civil war, leading to the NATO military intervention and the overthrown and killing of the then-president Muammar Gaddafi that was replaced by the transitional council. (Rantisi, 2014) d) The Syrian revolution case. In Syria, the protests took place in March 2011 against Bashar al-Assad and turned into civil war. The Islamist Ahmed al-Sharaa-led transition government took office when Bashar resigned in 2024 and departed to Russia. (Reuters, 2025; AP News, 2025) e) The Yemeni revolution case. In Yemen, the 2011 protests against the then President Ali Abdullah Saleh led to his resignation in 2012 and the rise of Abd Aal-Rabo government. The event has also led to a severe human crisis and a civil war. (Rantisi, 2014) 22 f) The Bahraini protests case. In Bahrain, the Shi’a protests that occurred in 2011 did not evolve into a revolution as it was quickly and violently suppressed by the Sunni monarchy with support from Saudi Arabia and the other gulf countries. (Rantisi, 2014) g) The Sudanese revolution case. In 2018, Sudan's Muslim brotherhood president Omar al-Bashir was overthrown, leading to the rise of the Sudanese Armed Forces under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, sparking civil war with the Rapid Support Forces. (Financial Times, 2025) 2) Regime changes cases: They are tracked through transitions in leadership or political systems in regional states that affected regional relationships. Regime change in the MENA from 1995-2024 includes the following cases. a) Iraq case. In March 2003, the United States led an invasion on Iraq, citing false claims of the presence of weapons of mass destruction. By April, Baghdad fell, and the then- President Saddam Hussein's regime was dismantled. Iraq was placed under a U.S.-led occupation and governed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Paul Bremer. (cfr, 2011). b) Tunisia case. After the overthrown of Ben Ali following the 2011 protests, Tunisia held its first democratic constituent assembly election to draft a new constitution, and Ennahda Islamic party won the most seats under new president Moncef Marzouki and prime minister Hamadi Jebali, an Ennahda member. (Rantisi, 2014). c) Egypt Case. The Egyptian revolution demanded President Hosni Mubarak's resignation in 2011, leading to the military's transfer of power. In 2012, Mohamed Morsi won Egypt's first democratically elected civilian president (Rantisi, 2014). In 2013, the military ousted Morsi, suspending the constitution and establishing an interim government. (Hoffman, 2023) d) Libya case. Following NATO intervention in Libya, rebel forces captured Tripoli and Gaddafi was killed. In 2012, the first democratic election was held, but civil war hindered stabilization (Rantisi, 2014). In 2015, the Government of National accord (GNA) was formed, backed by Islamists and the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. (Mezran, 2021). 23 e) Yemen case. Following the mass protests beginning in 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to transfer power. On February 27, 2012, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi officially took office after elections, marking the end of Saleh's 33-year rule. (Rantisi, 2014) f) Sudan case. On April 11, 2019, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown by the military after months of protests against his 30-year rule. A transitional military council took over led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. However, this resulted in civil war in Sudan, which has continued as of 2025 (Bland, 2025). g) Syria case. After 9 years of the Syrian revolution that demanded the overthrown of al- Assad regime, On December 8, 2024, armed rebels captured Damascus, leading to President Bashar al-Assad fleeing to Russia. Subsequently, a transitional government was established under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa. (Reuters, 2025; AP News, 2025) 3) Failed/Fragile States. Identified through the collapse of central authority in certain countries, creating power vacuums and opportunities for external intervention. Emerging of failed state in the MENA includes: a) Iraq case. After the 2003 U.S. invasion, Iraq became a failed state. State institutions, especially the military and Ba'ath Party, collapsed, creating a power vacuum. Sectarian bloodshed, the establishment of al-Qaeda in Iraq and later ISIS, and political instability resulted from this gap. (Helfont, 2023) b) Libya case. The 2011 NATO intervention and Muammar Gaddafi's fall led to a fragile state, primarily due to civil war, power vacuum, rival governments, militia proliferation, and ongoing conflicts over resources and territory. (Adbessadok, 2017) c) Yemen case. The state's fragility worsened after 2014's Houthi takeover and 2015's Saudi intervention, exacerbated by a complex civil war involving Houthi rebels, government, separatists, and extremist groups. (Robinson, 2023). d) Syria case. The Assad regime's 2011 civil war has led to a failed state, resulting in civilian casualties, displacement, refugee crises, and fragmentation of state authority. (Balanche, 2024) 24 e) Lebanon case. The state's fragility, after the 2019 economic collapse and the 2020 Beirut port explosion exacerbated by political corruption, sectarian divisions, economic mismanagement, and inadequate public services, has led to widespread poverty and emigration. (Molana-Allen, 2023). f) Sudan case. Sudan's fragile state worsened after 2021 military coup and civil war in 2023, causing widespread violence, displacement, and humanitarian crises due to conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. (El-Affendi, 2023). 4) Regional Crises and Conflicts: These conflicts include territorial disputes, military interventions, conflicts, proxy conflicts (Gause, 2014), diplomatic crises (Naier, 2021), and transnational security threats (Gerges, 2016) that altered regional dynamics. Regional crises and conflicts include the following cases. a) The Bahraini protests case. In 1996, Bahrain experienced protests and unrest, led by Shi'a opposition groups demanding political reforms, leading to a security crackdown and human rights abuses. (Daniszewski, 1996; Reuters, 2011). b) Second Palestinian intifada case. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict involves non-violent protests against Israeli settlements, separation barrier, and Al-Aqsa Mosque, resulting in significant casualties and increased Israeli militarization following Ariel Sharon's visit in 2000. (Adam, 2020). c) Saudi Qatari diplomatic crises case. In 2002, Saudi Arabia withdrawn its ambassador from Qatar due to media criticism and political rift, but relations normalized in 2008, and ambassadors were reinstated. (Al Jazeera, 2002) d) The Lebanon war case. in 2006, Israel went to war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The 34-day war resulted in significant casualties and infrastructure damage in Lebanon, particularly in the south. (Aljazeera, 2006) e) the Southern Movement in Yemen case. It emerged in 2007, advocating for the rights of southern Yemenis and, in some factions, the secession of South Yemen. The movement was against the Yemeni national unity represented by the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh which led to increase tension and instability in Yemen. (Raya, 2007) 25 f) The Houthis conflict in Yemen case. The Houthi insurgency in northern Yemen began in 2004 and escalated into a conflict in 2007, capturing Sana'a in 2014 and prompting Saudi intervention in 2015. The ongoing war has led to a humanitarian crisis. (cfr, 2025) g) Lebanon vacuum of power case. After an 18-month political stalemate and brief armed conflict in May 2008, Lebanese factions reached the Doha Agreement on May 21, 2008. This accord led to the election of Michel Suleiman as president, ending the presidential vacuum. (Harb, 2022). h) Gulf diplomatic crisis case. In 2014, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain withdrawn their ambassadors from Qatar accusing it of internal affairs interference, but relations were restored same year after policy changes. (Black, 2014). i) The rise of Islamists violence armed non state actors such as ISIS case. In 2014, ISIS expanded, declaring a caliphate and capturing significant areas in Iraq and Syria. This led to international military interventions, reshaping counterterrorism strategies, and impacting global security. (Guttmann, 2022) j) 2017 GCC blockade case. In 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar, escalating tensions due to history and role during the Arab Spring events. The crisis ended in January 2021 with diplomatic thaw and reintegration efforts. (Ramanl, 2021) In addition to these crises, other crises that Qatar took a mediating role during are: the crisis of the Bulgarian nurses in Libya 2007, Gaza war 2009, Darfur crises between Sudanese government and the Liberation and Justice Movement 2011, Djibouti-Eritrea crisis over border dispute 2011, Fatah and Hamas dispute 2012, escalation of fighting in Darfour 2013, Gaza war 2012, Gaza war 2014, Syrian nun crises 2014, the aftermath of 9/11 between the US and Taliban 2014, Lebanese conflict with Gahbhet Al-Nasra Islamic group 2015, Libya armed conflict between Tubu gunmen and the national security center 2015, the Afghanistani war between the government and Taliban 2015, crisis between dijabouti and Eritrea 2016, 2017 Sudan inner conflicts, The 19 years American war on Taliban in Afghanistan 2000-2019, Gaza war 2021, dispute between Kenya and Somalia 2021, the fail of Iran nuclear deal with the U.S. 2015- 2022, Iran-US ongoing tension 2023, and lastly the 7th of Octobers attacks carried out by Hamas On Israil 2024. (Aljazeera, 2022) 26 3.2.1.3 Dependent Variable: Qatar Foreign Policy The variables of Qatar foreign policy are measured by actions, policies/discourse, and alliances. Below is the variable operationalization. 1. Actions. Identified as the external behaviour of Qatar which is taken as a reaction of one of the regional challenges listed above. The actions vary between Mediation, aid, intervention, military participation, peace proposal, ceasefire brokering, and more. 2. Policies/discourse. Identified as the official statement given by the current, the previous emir of Qatar, the spokesman of ministry of foreign affairs, and other officials such as the prime minister statements. It also includes official positions, Speeches, UN declaration, MOFA press releases, etc 3. Alliance. Identified through any political, economic, military partnership between Qatar and any other country in the region or outside the region. Alliances could be categorized as formation, divergence, strengthening, weakening, alignment, parallelism. 3.3 Research Questions Research major question 1- How MENA regional challenges impacted Qatar foreign policy responses 1995-2024? Sub Questions The following are the sub-questions: 1) How was QFP responses (actions, policies, and alliances) to the Arab spring 2010- 2024? 2) How was QFP responses (actions, policies, and alliances) to regime change 1995- 2024? 3) How was QFP responses (actions, policies, and alliances) to the emergence of failed states and civil war 1995-2024? 27 4) How was QFP responses (actions, policies, and alliances) to regional crises and conflicts 1995-2024? 3.4 Data sources Data in this study is a secondary data. The data sources include: 1. Academic databases (JSTOR, ProQuest, Google Scholar) to identify relevant scholarly literature on QFP and MENA challenges. Think tanks included (Foreign policy research institute, Arab centre for research and policy studies). Search inclusion criterion composed terms such as "Qatar foreign policy"; "MENA challenges"; "Arab Spring Qatar "; "Failed states"; "regime change and civil wars"; "conflict and crisis"; "Qatar alienises", and "Qatari emir speeches". 2. Media Archive: Reviewed media coverage of QFP actions and regional developments from various international and regional news outlets. Media sources included Al Jazeera Arabic and English, the BBC, the guardian, foreign policy magazine, and Reuters. These sources provide contemporaneous reporting on events and policy decisions. 3. Government Archive: included collecting official statements, speeches by Qatari leaders, foreign ministry statements, international organization repositories, and official policy documents. that were mostly gathered from Qatar’s ministry of foreign affairs and Qatar’s Amiri Diwan. These sources provide insights into QFP objectives, justifications, and responses to regional developments. 3.5 Validity and Reliability This section outlines the strategies used to ensure the reliability and validity of the research design and findings. 3.5.1 Reliability The study employs triangulation, a reliable qualitative research method, to confirm findings and reduce researcher bias. (Flick, 2004). It uses data, methodological, and theoretical triangulations to cross-verify information, measure variables, and interpret results. These methods improve consistency, reduce subjective bias, and prevent data misinterpretation, ensuring the findings are not reliant on a single method, source, or perspective. 28 3.5.2 Validity To strengthen construct validity—ensuring the research accurately measuring the concepts under investigation—the study follows Yin’s (2018) recommendation of using multiple sources of evidence to build converging lines of inquiry. The use of three qualitative methods (case study, content analysis, and process tracing), each targeting different dimensions of the research variables. This integrated, triangulated and structured approach supports both the internal and construct validity of the research design. 3.6 Limitations of the study The research faces some data limitations including limited Access to Primary Sources. It also faces potential Source Bias. Hence, using triangulation to ensure the validity and reliability of the data. 29 Chapter 4 Findings 4.1 Introduction This chapter presents the findings of the study. The analysis is structured based on the research questions, describing Qatar’s responses (actions, policies/discourses, and alliances) to the four sets of regional challenges (the Arab Spring, regime change, failed states and civil wars, and regional crises and conflicts). 4.2 The Impact of Regional Challenges on Qatar's Responses in Foreign Policy This section addresses the sub-questions concerning Qatar’s responses to each specific type of regional challenge. 4.2.1 How was QFP responses (actions, policies, and alliances) to the Arab spring? Qatar has aligned with the Arab social movement from the outset in various countries, including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen in support of the Arab people's transition towards democracy. It has supported the opposition factions with political backing, financial aid, military cooperation, and media support. Qatar has also participated in military intervention through NATO in Libya and armed the rebel in both Libya and Syria. On the other hand, it provided military support for the Bahraini regime to maintain its status que through joining the Saudi-led military coalition known as the Gulf Shield. Indicating that Qatar’s foreign policy towards the revolutionary movements was proactive, pro-democracy, but selective (table 3). Table (3) QFP responses to the Arab spring summary* Country Actions Policies/Statements Alliances Tunisia Financial aid, political Then-Emir (2011): 'Arab people Aligned with Turkey, support, are making their way towards the revolutionary and media support democracy... regimes can no movements; diverged longer act as if the people were from the status quo, absent.' KSA and UAE Egypt Financial aid, political Emiri Diwan: 'Qatar salutes the Aligned with the support, and media role of the Egyptian Armed revolutionary support Forces... looks forward to Egypt movements, Turkey; restoring its leadership role.' 30 diverged from KSA, UAE, the status quo. Libya Military intervention Al Thani (2011): 'If it’s allowed to Allied with NATO, (NATO), weapons, aid the rebellion, military-wise opposition, against recognition of the or in any other form, we are the status quo, opposition willing to do so.' Syria Shift from mediation to Qatari officials (2013): 'We will Aligned with opposition support via strive... so that this body is the opposition & Turkey; political, economic, only and legitimate one which diverged from Iran, media, and military represents all Syrians.' Russia, UAE. means (Arms transfers). Yemen Shift from mediation to Qatari FM (2012): 'Saleh is Aligned with full opposition support evasive... will not accept any opposition; diverged agreement that leads to him from GCC norms relinquishing power.' Bahrain Military support for the Qatar MOFA (2011): 'Sending Aligned with Bahrain, regime (GCC joint Gulf Shield comes in KSA, UAE, the status force) implementing GCC quo, diverged from agreements... to support Iran Bahrain’s dialogue.' Sudan Support for the regime, Emir (2018): 'Qatar stands with Aligned with the no aid to the Sudan... ready to offer all Bashir regime, the revolutionary necessary to help Sudan status quo; diverged movement. overcome this ordeal.' from the revolutionary movement. *For more details, see appendix 1. A. Actions Qatar supported popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen during the Arab Spring, providing financial aid, military intervention, and opposition support. The most significant shift from its old neutral policy was in Libya, where Qatar participated in NATO-led operations and provided arms to rebels. However, Qatar's revolutionary approach was challenged in Bahraini protests, highlighting the importance of Gulf regional stability over revolutionary change. B. Policies/discourses Qatar’s official discourse during the Arab Spring was strongly pro-change and pro- democracy, with officials framing the uprisings as a legitimate expression of the people's will. Then, Emirs and officials openly criticized authoritarianism and celebrated political transitions. 31 “Now, Arab people are making their own way towards democracy and citizenship after announcing their presence... the ruling regimes are no longer able to act as if the people were absent and did not have opinions.” – Then-Emir (Al Thani, 2011). This statement from the early days of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions reveals Qatar’s public alignment with calls for change and the dismantling of entrenched authoritarian regimes. In Libya, Qatar’s leadership framed its actions in moral and political terms: “We are supporting the people of those countries who are asking for justice and dignity… if this is influence then it’s a healthy influence.” -(Al Thani, 2012). Such rhetoric positioned Qatar as a normative actor, not just reacting to regional instability, but promoting a vision of governance based on popular legitimacy. While Qatar emphasized democracy, it also set clear differences between different protest settings. Its rhetoric in Bahrain and Sudan turned to issues of stability, dialogue, and sovereignty. Therefore, illustrating a selective and context-sensitive deployment of pro- change narratives. C. Alliances The Arab Spring era deepened Qatar’s alliances with like-minded actors and increased its divergence from rival Gulf states:  Qatar aligned closely with Turkey across all cases, sharing support for change and strategic recalibration of the regional order.  It experienced increasing divergence from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, especially over its perceived activism and support for post-revolutionary governments.  In Bahrain, however, Qatar reinforced its GCC alignment, participating militarily to suppress protests.  Qatar also maintained parallel stances with Iran (e.g., in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya), where both supported revolutionary movements, but without direct coordination, reflecting issue-based tactical overlaps rather than strategic alliances. 4.2.2 How was QFP responses (actions, policies, and alliances) to regime changes 1995-2024? Whether by foreign intervention, revolution, or internal military coups, regime change has profoundly affected Qatar’s foreign policy. It showcased the level of Qatar’s engagement 32 with Islamists, its fast endorsement to the new regimes-especially when Islamists led-, and its ideology-driven foreign policy. When the new regime emerged, Iraq received debt relief and reconstruction support from Qatar, Tunisia received political and financial aid, Egypt received financial investment and diplomatic backing, Libya received military support, Yemen received humanitarian aid and political support, and Syria received early recognition. All are examples of Islamists led governments except Iraq. To further illustrate, when regime change took place in Sudan against an Islamic-led regime, Qatar aligned with the Muslim-brotherhood Bashir regime instead of endorsing regime change, and with Muslim-brotherhood Mursi regime in Egypt against the 2013 military coup. Hence, QFP actions, statements, and alliances became more ideologically defined, particularly in its alignment with Islamist-oriented post- revolutionary regimes, Turkey, its parallel stance with Iran, and its divergence from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. See table (4) Table (4) QFP responses to regime changes summary* Country Actions Policies Alliances Iraq Debt relief, support Endorsed transition, Aligned with the for reconstruction democratic new regime, parallel discourse with the U.S. Tunisia Economic aid, Celebrated the Alliance with military and revolution, Islamic Ennahda, diplomatic support encouraged Arab Turkey, diverged unity from KSA/UAE Egypt (2012) Financial No ceiling on Allied with investment, cooperation Morsi/Brotherhood, diplomatic backing discourse, pro-Gaza Turkey, diverged policy shift from KSA/UAE Egypt (2013) Maintained ties with Criticized coup, Sustained the Brotherhood, urged prisoner Brotherhood ties, advocated release. isolated in GCC reconciliation Libya Military support, oil Backed NTC, Aligned with sales facilitation justified Islamists, diverged intervention from UAE/Egypt Yemen Aid, humanitarian, Supported the Aligned with Hadi, and political legitimacy of the diverged from Iran support Hadi gov’t Sudan Backed Bashir, later Supported Bashir, Initially, with Bashir, mediated post- then praised the later engaged both regime change transition deal sides. Syria Supported the Called for lifting Alliance with the transitional sanctions, new gov. government, supported unity and embassy reopening stability *For more details, see appendix (2) 33 B. Actions Qatar frequently responded to regime change by quickly engaging with new governments: In Tunisia (2011) and Egypt (2012), Qatar was the first Gulf country to embrace the new Islamist-led regimes, offering extensive economic aid and diplomatic recognition. Qatar offered military support during the conflict in Libya and provided financial and logistical support for the National Transitional Council (NTC). In Syria, Qatar strongly supported the formation of a new transitional government post-Assad in 2024. In Yemen, Sudan, and Egypt 2013, Qatar’s actions varied: it welcomed the transitional regimes when they were Islamist- aligned but became more hesitant or neutral when regime change favoured secular or anti- Islamist forces. C. Policies/discourses Qatar’s official rhetoric reflected enthusiastic support for regime change when the new leadership aligned with its ideological preferences, exceptionally moderate Islamists. “We know what happened... in Tunisia and the change that has occurred, and we in Qatar naturally support the approach to cooperation between the State of Qatar and the Arab countries.” – Then-Emir Hamad, Tunis visit in 2012 (Rantisi, 2014). In Egypt, Qatar’s leadership declared: “There is no ceiling on cooperation or investing in Egypt.” – Then-Emir Hamad, 2012 (Rantisi, 2014). But the most revealing insight comes from Qatar’s position on extremism during the Libyan regime change. The Emir offered a philosophy of inclusion as a solution to extremism: “The tone of extremism exists in every revolution... But if there is popular participation, you will see that this extremism will shift toward civic life and civil society.” – Then-Emir (Al Thani, 2011) This quote highlights a core tenet of Qatari foreign policy during regime transitions: democratic inclusion, not suppression, is the antidote to radicalism. However, Qatar was less vocal or supportive during regime changes not aligned with Islamists, such as Sudan (post-2019), where it initially backed al-Bashir and later attempted cautious engagement with the transitional authorities. D. Alliances Regime changes brought a significant realignment of Qatar’s alliances, particularly around Islamist politics: 34  Qatar formed strategic alliances with Islamist-led governments: Tunisia (Ennahda), Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood), Libya (Brotherhood-aligned GNA), and Yemen (Islah Party).  These alliances led to sharp divergence from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, which opposed Islamist influence in regional politics.  Qatar’s relationship with Turkey deepened, as both states championed Islamist parties and framed them as legitimate democratic actors.  Qatar’s pro-Islamist stance was parallel with Iran, which viewed the rise of Islamist governments as ideologically consistent with the legacy of its own 1979 revolution, though no direct coordination occurred. The contrast between Qatar’s proactive engagement with Islamist regimes and its caution with military or secularist takeovers (e.g., Egypt 2013 coup, Sudan post-2019) illustrates how ideology became a key driver in alliance formation post-regime change. 4.2.3 How was QFP responses (actions, policies, and alliances) to the emergence of failed states and civil wars 1995-2024? Failed states and civil wars posed complex challenges for Qatar, which needed careful balancing of ideological goals, humanitarian responses, and long-term strategic calculations. Unlike the ideologically driven responses observed during regime changes, Qatar’s responses to civil wars and the emergence of failed states exposed a context-driven hybrid strategy, using a varied mix of military early engagement, later-stage mediation, long-term diplomacy, media, humanitarian aid, backchannel alliances, and selective neutrality. See table (5) Table (5) QFP responses to failed states and civil wars summary* Country Actions Policies Alliances Iraq Debt relief, Preserve unity, Aligned with Sunnis, humanitarian aid democracy as a parallel to Turkey solution. Libya Supported GNA Support UN-backed Allied with GNA, militarily and GNA aligned with Turkey, financially diverged from UAE and Egypt Yemen Initially military Backed Hadi, later Expelled from coalition, later supported coalition, diverged neutral mediator ceasefires from UAE/KSA 35 Syria Military and Called Assad Aligned with Turkey, financial support for illegitimate, diverged from opposition endorsed Iran/Russia/UAE intervention Lebanon Financial aid, Support for Aligned with military & reconstruction Lebanon army and humanitarian discourse institutions support Sudan Mediation efforts, Praised Aligned with humanitarian agreements, backed Burhan, Turkey, support stability discourse diverge from UAE For more details see appendix (3) B. Actions Qatar’s actions in response to failed states and civil wars reveal three key patterns: 1. Military alignment in early stages: o Yemen (2015): During the civil war, Qatar joined the Saudi-led coalition backing President Hadi, reflecting early GCC alignment. o Libya (post-2011): Participated in NATO operations and later backed the 2019 Turkish military role supporting the GNA. o Syria (2012–2017): Qatar and Turkey coordinated indirect military support of funding and arming opposition factions in early stages of the civil war. 2. Humanitarian and reconstruction aid: o In Lebanon (2019–2021) and Iraq (2003–2006), Qatar focused heavily on humanitarian initiatives (aid, hospital construction, bond purchases) without military engagement. o In Sudan (2023–2024): Qatar Sent over 300 tons of aid, financed refugee support, and backed infrastructure stabilization. 3. Later-stage mediation and long-term diplomacy o Qatar consistently employed long-term diplomatic engagement during and after the emergence of failed states. In cases such as Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, and Sudan, it provided development aid, pursued reconstruction initiatives, and engaged in diplomatic normalization well beyond the peak periods of civil war. In Syria 36 and Yemen, Qatar maintained active diplomatic channels with opposition forces or internationally recognized authorities. o Later-stage mediation served not only to facilitate conflict de-escalation, ceasefires, and humanitarian negotiations, but also as a strategic mechanism for Qatar to shape outcomes and retain influence. For example, In Sudan (2019– 2024), Qatar transitioned from backing President al-Bashir to mediating between General Burhan and the RSF following a rupture in bilateral relations. Similarly, in Yemen, after being expelled from the Saudi-led military coalition in 2017, Qatar repositioned itself as a mediator, emphasizing dialogue and humanitarian solutions. These cases show how failed state contexts evolved for Qatar as hybrid foreign policy venues where it uses soft and hard instruments based on the situation. C. Policies and Statements Qatar consistently framed its actions in failed states around three discourses:  Unity and Sovereignty: "We support the unity and sovereignty of [country]" — a line repeated in contexts like Sudan, Lebanon, and Yemen.  Support for Legitimate Authorities: Qatar underlined the need of acknowledging internationally backed governments (such as GNA in Libya, Hadi’s presidency of Yemen).  Humanitarian urgency: demands for diplomatic, humanitarian, and international aid, especially clear during the Beirut port explosion and during the Libyan conflict. This approach gave Qatar a moral leadership image, especially where other Gulf states took more militarized or factional positions. D. Alliances Alliance behaviour in failed states was fluid and strategic, shaped by Qatar’s assessment of:  Islamist actor involvement: Qatar prioritized alliances with Islamist groups, backing Islah in Yemen, Brotherhood-aligned militias in Libya, and favouring Islamist factions within Syria’s opposition. In Lebanon, where no strong Sunni-Islamist bloc dominated, 37 Qatar’s posture was more neutral/humanitarian. Notably, in all these cases, Qatari and Turkish positions were aligned.  Gulf competition: Where UAE and Saudi Arabia were deeply entrenched (e.g., Yemen, Libya), Qatar engaged directly through military coalitions or interventions. In Iraq or Lebanon, where Gulf stakes were less competitive, Qatar pursued soft influence or neutral engagement.  Opportunities for mediation: Qatar saw failed states as a stage to exercise and showcase its diplomatic identity. It invested in being the neutral broker, sometimes even after backing one faction (as in Sudan or Yemen post-2017), proving a capacity to shift from partisanship to peace-making, a key soft power asset. This diversity of alignments underscores Qatar’s flexibility and strategic autonomy, a core trait of its foreign policy in conflict-ridden environments. 4.2.4 How was QFP responses (actions, policies, and alliances) to regional crises and conflicts 1995-2024? Regional crises and conflicts, including proxy war, interventions, interstate wars, diplomatic fallouts, and armed non-state violence, have defined and shaped the state’s modern foreign policy identity. Through repeated confrontation with regional pressures, security threats, and ideological rivals, Qatar crafted a foreign policy centred on diplomatic resilience, strategic balancing, and global legitimacy. Crisis diplomacy and mediation became a core defensive strategy in QFP. Unlike moments of ideological alignment (e.g. regime change), crises pulled Qatar into the heart of geopolitical rivalries, not just as a bystander, but as both a target and a broker. See table (6) Table (6) QFP responses to MENA crisis and conflict summary* Event/Conflict Actions Policies Alliances Bahraini Protests Neutral stance Sovereignty With GGC norms (1996) discourse Second Intifada Diplomatic support, Consistent pro- With the Palestinian (2000) aid to Palestinians Palestinian stance Authority, Hamas, opposed Israel US Invasion of Iraq Supported Iraqi Backed sovereignty, Aligned with the US- (2003) reconstruction post-conflict aid led post-war agenda Saudi/GCC Qatari Managed tensions, Emphasized Diverged from Diplomatic Crises engaged in diplomatic KSA/UAE, alignment (2002 & 2014) mediation resolution with Turkey and Iran 38 Lebanon War (2006) Humanitarian aid to Condemned Israeli Aligned with the Lebanon, sent aggression Lebanese gov, troops opposed Israel Southern Movement No direct military Called for dialogue, Aligned with Yemeni - Yemen (2007) engagement; political unity in unity stance diplomatic support Yemen to the regime Houthi Conflict - Joined the coalition Initially condemned Initially with KSA, Yemen (2015) and was then the Houthis, later later divergence expelled neutral 2017 GCC Blockade Maintained Rejected external Strengthened ties sovereignty, demands, with Turkey, Iran, diplomatic outreach emphasized the U.S. independence, and international law norms Rise of ISIS (2014) Counter-extremism Condemned Aligned with Turkey policy, media violence, supported on Syria/Iraq framing counter- radicalization Bulgarian Nurses Mediation between Humanitarian With EU and Libya in Crisis (2007) Libya and Bulgaria commitment, crisis resolution negotiated release Darfur Conflict Mediation, aid to Endorsed inclusive With Sudanese gov (2008-2011) displaced peace in Sudan & LJM (Darfur) Taliban-US Hosted talks, Praised withdrawal With US, Taliban Mediation (2010– supported Afghan frameworks, peace mediators. 2019) peace efforts narrative Gaza Wars (2009, Financial, Called for Aligned with 2012, 2014, 2021) humanitarian, and ceasefires, Hamas, diverged reconstruction aid denounced from Israel allies to Gaza occupation 7 Oct Hamas-Israel Diplomatic appeals, Called for restraint, Aligned with War (2024) emergency relief to emphasized Palestinian cause, Gaza, mediation humanitarian law diverged from effort Israel/UAE For more details, see appendix (4) B. Actions While mediation was Qatar’s most used tool during regional crises, a broader toolbox of survival and influence was reflected in its foreign policy. Actions were shaped by whether Qatar was a participant in the crisis or a third-party actor. 1. When Qatar was the target (2002, 2014, 2017): In 2002, when Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador, Qatar responded with quiet defiance, refusing to change its media policy (Al Jazeera) and deepening trade ties with Iran. 39 In 2014, facing GGC-diplomatic tie-cut over the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar again resisted compliance and worked to rebuild intra-GCC trust without ideological surrender. In the 2017 blockade, Qatar took the most decisive actions including secured air routes via Iran, activated mutual defence pacts with Turkey, leading to Turkish troop deployment and an opening of a Turkish military base in Doha, expanded Al Udeid base and deepened security ties with the U.S., and launched global PR and legal campaigns to portray itself as a victim of coercion These episodes show a pattern: when targeted, Qatar doubles down on autonomy, activates alliances, and seeks global legitimacy rather than regional appeasement. 2. In broader regional crises (not directly targeting Qatar):  Mediation was the lead instrument, seen in Sudan, Gaza, Afghanistan, Eritrea-Djibouti, U.S.-Iran nuclear disputes. Qatar supported ceasefire deals, hosted rival factions, and built long-term mediating relationships (Taliban, Hamas, Sudanese transitional govs).  Material aid and reconstruction were deployed to boost its role: Gaza, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan.  Occasionally, Qatar used military or intelligence cooperation (e.g., in Lebanon 2006, Afghanistan evac 2021), but always under multilateral or humanitarian frames. Qatar defined its role in crises through limited intervention and controlled engagement, always calibrated to maximize diplomatic capital. This made Qatar the most diplomatic active Gulf state, generally trusted even by hostile parties. C. Policies The speech related to crises involving Qatar shows a constant reliance on international legitimacy, setting it apart from the realpolitik tone of its rivals. Key themes include:  Sovereignty and dialogue: “We are with the principle of dialogue to resolve the Gulf crisis, but clarified that dialogue also requires lifting the embargo.” -Qatari Emir. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Qatar, 2017) 40  International law: “The blockade violates the UN Charter and basic principles of international relations.” Ambassador Sheikha Alya Al-Thani, addressed the Security Council, stating “The State of Qatar has reiterated adherence to resolving the crisis with the blockading countries by peaceful diplomatic means and through mediation and constructive unconditional dialogue.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Qatar, 2020)  Victimhood and resilience: Qatar portrayed itself not as defiant, but as “unjustly targeted” for having an independent foreign policy. This discourse wasn’t only used in self-defence. In other regional crises, Qatar repeatedly positioned itself as a responsible global actor:  Emphasizing humanitarian principles in Gaza  Framing mediation with the Taliban and Iran as contributions to global stability  Hosting conflict parties under UN-endorsed frameworks Rather than relying solely on realpolitik, Qatar actively employed multilateral discourse emphasizing legal and humanitarian norms to reinforce its legitimacy and shape its image as a responsible actor. D. Alliances Crises revealed the deep undercurrents of divergence between Qatar and its regional neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, and simultaneously cemented strategic ties with global and regional powers. 1. Gulf and Egypt: Early divergence, long hostility The 2002 and 2014 crises show that Qatar’s break with the Gulf consensus is not new, tensions over foreign policy autonomy, Islamists, and media predate the blockade. The 2017 blockade merely formalized a process of alienation, where Qatar’s model of influence (media, mediation, Islamists) directly clashed with the Saudi-UAE vision. Qatar’s mediation role has also frequently provoked hostility from its regional rivals, particularly when undertaken without coordination or involving politically sensitive actors. This was evident in Egypt’s criticism of Qatar for hosting the 2008 Gaza summits, as well as the absence of Saudi and Emirati participation. Similar patterns of dissatisfaction have emerged in other cases: Qatar’s role in Sudanese mediation was seen as hindering the UAE’s influence; its engagement with Hezbollah in Lebanon conflicted with Saudi’s position; and its hosting of the Taliban’s political 41 office was met with criticism from both Saudi Arabia and UAE. Last but not least, Qatar’s mediation effort in Gaza was heavily objected by Egypt, citing national security concerns. 2. Iran becoming a balancing partner After the 2002 rift with Saudi Arabia, Qatar viewed Iran as a strategic alternative and used it for balancing relations with Saudi Arabia. This balancing strategy allows Qatar to have relations with Iran without having to endorse its entire agenda, which is a unique position no other GCC state occupies. In 2017, Qatar’s Iranian relationship strengthened in the economic and logistic fields as a mean to counter the blockade’s effect. To add, Qatar used this alliance not only for survival but also for regional standing, as seen by its mediation between Iran and the United States over the nuclear agreement. 3. U.S. and Turkey: From friends to foundational pillars Turkey’s military base and deployment of troops in 2017 marked a shift where their alliance was no longer symbolic due to similar ideology, but strategic, militarily, economic, and enduring. As for the U.S., Qatar moved from hosting CENTCOM to becoming a key diplomatic facilitator including the Taliban talks (2013, 2018, 2020–2021), Iran-U.S. indirect negotiations (2022–2024), and Afghanistan withdrawal coordination. Qatar’s mediation role for the U.S. reflects a shift from patron–client ties to a utility-based, multidimensional partnership. 4.3 Findings’ conclusion During the Arab Spring, Qatar adopted a proactive risk-taking foreign policy, focusing on military engagement and support for revolutions. This marked a departure from its neutral mediator-focused approach and a first in its modern foreign policy. Qatar's actions during regime changes were increasingly ideologically driven, with quick engagement with new governments, particularly Islamist-oriented post-revolutionary regimes. The emergence of failed states and civil wars led to a hybrid strategy, combining early military engagement, later- stage mediation, humanitarian aid, and selective neutrality. Regional crises and conflicts showed two traits in QFP. When directly involved in a crisis, Qatar tends to rely on approaches grounded in international legitimacy, diplomatic dialogue, defensive posturing, and the strategic use of diverging alliances. In crises where it is not directly implicated, mediation emerges as its principal foreign policy instrument. The country's foreign policy demonstrated 42 variation in rationale, tools, discourse, and alliances, underscoring the importance of context- specific calculations in its foreign policy. Table (7) QFP responses to regional challenges Challenge Actions Policies/Discourse Alliances Arab Spring proactive, Pro-democracy, Alignment with Turkey, interventionist, revolutionary legitimacy opposition groups, divergence aid, change of the from KSA/UAE/Egypt status quo Regime Early engagement Merge radicalized groups Flexible ties with transitional Change and aid, Islamic into civil society, the authorities, deepened Islamist patronage, and legitimacy of ties, alignment with Turkey, ideology-driven democratically elected parallel stance with Iran, and governments, and Stability. intensified Gulf divergence. Failed Hybrid: early Sovereignty, humanitarian Shifting alliances, alignment States/Civil intervention + law, international with Turkey. Wars later-stage responsibility mediation + humanitarian aid Regional Defensive Legitimacy framing, Strengthened regional and Crises strategy, crisis multilateralism, resilience, global alliances (Turkey, Iran, diplomacy, sovereignty U.S.), early balance of power mediation (KSA and Iran), autonomy from GCC To Summarize, as seen in Table (7), Regional challenges has impacted Qatar foreign policy, where Qatar showed different response to each regional challenge. QFP was all focused on early engagement, intervention, humanitarian aid, mediation, diplomacy, military economic and political backing, and a hybrid discourse of sovereignty, pro-democracy, multilateralism, humanitarian law, and international responsibility. These events led Qatar to follow a balancing strategy between rivals, independent foreign policy, and the strengthening of regional and global alliances. 43 Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusions 5.2 Discussion: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Applications 5.2.1 Qatar’s response in FP to the Arab spring. - Proactive risk-taking. Qatar responded to the Arab spring by adopting a proactive risk-taking foreign policy, focusing on military engagement and support for revolutions, but was selective when it was related to the Gulf region status que. Its discourse was pro- democracy, emphasizing the legitimacy of the will of the people, and opposed the status que of the authoritarian regimes in the Arab countries. Its alliances opposed the GCC norm and aligned with Turkey and the revolutionary movements. This finding fits uneasily into realist assumptions, which prioritize survival through caution, however, it supports the constructivist approach expectations. Drawing on constructivist, the Arab Spring as a regional challenge is not just material threat but also involve ideational dimensions, such as clashes over legitimacy, norms, and regional identity (Wendt, 1999). Explaining Qatar’s leveraging of ideational tools in response, including its intensified efforts to craft a new identity in the MENA through its narrative of “supporting the legitimacy of the will of the people”, its pro-revolutionary stance, and pro-democracy discourse, while using power assets like Al Jazeera, financial assistant, and humanitarian aid to implement this new identity/branding of itself. Moreover, this regional identity is distinct from that of Saudi Arabia or the UAE, one rooted in popular legitimacy, soft power, and the projection of moral leadership. By backing revolutionary movements, Qatar wasn’t just choosing sides, it was defining itself. From the omni balancing perspective, Qatar’s support for popular uprisings could also be interpreted as a calculated move to deflect domestic discontent, projecting itself as a champion of the people to gain both regional legitimacy and domestic insulation. This finding is supported by other scholars' findings, such as those of Kamrava (2013) and Ulrichsen (2014), who describe Qatar’s foreign policy as heavily driven by regime security and legitimacy-seeking. This supports the finding that its Arab Spring positioning was partly about building credibility in a changing region. 44 5.2.2 Qatar’s response in FP to regime changes. - Ideology-driven: Regime changes were followed by Qatar’s actions becoming more ideologically defined, selective, with quick engagement with the new governments, particularly Islamist-oriented post-revolutionary regimes. Its discourse focused on the legitimacy of the new democratic elected governments, Qatar’s willingness to offer them support, and the need to integrate radicalized group into civil society. Ideology became a key driver in alliance formation, aligning with Turkey, Islamists factions, parallel with Iran, and divergent from Saudia Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. This finding can be interpreted by Constructivism, which explains this shift well; Qatar aligned with actors that resonated with its preferred identity narrative: that of a progressive, Muslim, yet reform-friendly state. Small state theory suggests this is also about niche diplomacy, by becoming the main state sponsor of Islamist democratic transitions, Qatar carved out a foreign policy niche distinct from its neighbours. In the context, ideology for Qatar might not be rigid, but rather a means of differentiation. When the region tilted toward chaos, Qatar placed its bet on those who could deliver new legitimacy, particularly Islamist movements, which are recognized as having broad popular support across the Arab world Moreover, Omni balancing explains this result. its framework encourages an examination of how the imperative to counter both internal and external dimensions of regional challenges such as the rise of transnational movements, constant regime change, and the disturbance of the status que could shape the pursuit of Qatar’s core foreign policy objectives. By embracing Islamist regimes abroad, Qatar may have sought to moderate Islamist sentiments at home by offering external outlets for ideological alignment, thus securing internal regime stability. But most importantly, Omni balancing justifies the selective behavior practiced by Qatar in supporting regime changes. Qatar’s opposition to regime change in Bahrain and its participation in the Saudi-led military coalition to support the Bahraini monarchy reflect not only its prioritization of Gulf security over its revolutionary stance, but also its deep caution regarding the potential domino effect of domestic unrest spilling over from its geographically proximate neighbour.When faced with a challenge like the possibility of disturbing the status que in the Gulf region, omni balancing directs the analysis to consider how Qatar’s responses (e.g., participation in a GCC Suadi-led military coalition) might simultaneously aim to address the external threat (Gulf security) and reinforce the regime’s internal standing. 45 This finding is consistent with Khatib’s (2013) and Milton, Elkahlout, and Tariq (2023) description of Qatar’s use of soft power and ideological branding as central to its diplomatic toolkit. However, Roberts (2012) cautions against overstating ideology, arguing that Qatar's behaviour remains strategic and opportunistic. This tension mirrors the finding: Qatar’s ideological choices were not absolute but selectively instrumental, aligning where beneficial, avoiding where threatening. 5.2.3 Qatar’s response in FP to the emergence of failed states and civil wars. - Context-dependent hypered strategy: The emergence of failed states and civil wars led Qatar to follow a foreign policy of context-dependent hypered strategy employing military early engagement, later-stage mediation, long-term diplomacy, media, humanitarian aid, backchannel alliances, and selective neutrality, aiming to shape outcomes and maintain regional presence. Its discourse reflected a moral leadership image focused on humtarian urgency and the legitimate authorities of internationally backed governments. Its alliances pattern showed flexibility, shifting from partnership to peace-making, while keeping close ties with Turkey and prioritizing Islamic groups. These findings align with small state theory; Qatar exercised niche diplomacy through conflict mediation, humanitarian aid, and media activism. The theory framework also suggests that external instability (in this case the emergence of failed state and civil war) might trigger specific diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at navigating constraints and pursuing Qatar’s core foreign policy objectives. This explains Qatar’s use of hypered strategy aiming to secure regional position and influence the outcome by a pragmatic shapeshifting of use of hard power/soft power tools according to the shifting context of each crisis. One moment, it funds rebels; the next, it hosts peace talks. Even though this strategy looks incoherence, but for a small state like Qatar, it ensures it to remain indispensable in every phase of a crisis. For a small state, relevance is survival. The finding also reflects constructivist use of identity as Qatar positioned itself as a moral actor in a region marked by the use of realpolitik. Realism, too, has a role in explaining this finding; through early interventions and backchannel alliances, Qatar ensured it remained part of the political endgame in fragmented states. Omni balancing is particularly instructive here. Qatar’s hyper-adaptability allowed it to influence external dynamics without threatening domestic cohesion, a delicate balancing act that secured the regime internally even amid external turbulence. 46 This finding agrees with CISAC’s (2016) argument that the complexity of each failed state situation demands a tailored response. This clearly explain the reason why QFP responses to failed state emergence were not following a single pattern and being driven by a Context- dependent hypered strategy. The findings also agree with Peterson (2006), Milton, Elkahlout, and Tariq (2023), and Araghchi and Samadi (2024) who emphasize Qatar’s soft power and mediation roles. Their views affirm the finding that Qatar leaned on non-coercive instruments for long-term influence. However, Qatar hybrid strategy was not relied solely on soft power, Kamrava (2013) mentions that Qatar was also willing to deploy hard power, especially early in civil wars, suggesting its moral positioning was built atop a foundation of pragmatic power projection. 5.2.4 Qatar’s response in FP to regional crises and conflicts. - Crises diplomacy, Multilateralism, Mediation, and Hedging Strategy: Regional crises and conflicts showed two traits in QFP; When directly involved in a crisis, Qatar tends to rely on approaches grounded in international legitimacy, diplomatic dialogue, defensive posturing, and the strategic use of diverging alliances (e.g. Turkey), and the use of balancing strategy (e.g. Iran and KSA). In crises where it is not directly implicated, mediation emerges as its principal foreign policy instrument. In some cases, mediation cost the country a divergence from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt, but strengthen its relations with the U.S., Iran, and other regional and international actors. This finding reflects neorealist balancing behavior; regional challenges, such as crises, conflicts, interventions, widespread instability caused by the emergence of violence non-state actors, or more directly, the three crises involving Qatar (2002, 2014, 2017), could be interpreted through realism as systemic pressures threatening Qatar’s security and autonomy. Consequently, QFP might be analyzed as attempts to employ strategies like balancing (e.g., forming alliances with dominant regional actors such as Turkey and Iran) to offset Saudi/UAE pressure, or seeking external security guarantees (as strengthening military ties with the U.S. and other international actors such as Russia and China following the blockade) to mitigate these threats and secure its core interests and sovereignty. This finding also aligns with Araghchi and Samadi (2024) and Qabalan (2020), faced with challenges like intense Gulf rivalries, small state theory directs the analysis towards examining whether Qatar intensified hedging strategies (e.g., diversifying partnerships with 47 actors like Turkey, Iran, and Western powers) to achieve its balancing aim and maximize autonomy. The finding can also be interpreted by small state theory; faced with challenges (in this case intense Gulf rivalries, the blockade), small state theory suggests the small country to intensify hedging strategies (e.g., Qatar diversified partnerships with actors like Turkey, Iran, and Western powers) to reduce dependency, achieve its balancing aim, and maximize autonomy. It also suggests the use of multilateral forums and discourse to amplify its voice and seek collective security in response to regional pressures, which is evident by Qatar’s use of multilateral discourse during its 2017 crises in particular, and most of regional crises in general. As for constructivism, it explains the use of soft power (e.g., mediation, Al Jazeera, hosting global events) to build sympathy and narrative control. Qatar’s identity as a neutral mediator was amplified during crises to reinforce legitimacy at home and abroad. To add, from this perspective, Qatar’s mediation isn’t neutrality, it’s calculated involvement. Mediation gives Qatar a high moral ground and a seat at the table, but it’s also a tool of selective distance. Qatar mediates not just to resolve other’s conflict, but to remain central in a region where irrelevance can be fatal, and according to Omni balancing; it’s about managing its own legitimacy and leverage vis-a-vis domestic and regional audiences. This finding is consistent with Wright (2011) and Khatib (2013), who both emphasize Qatar’s hedging strategy, affirming this finding. However, Gause (2014) suggests Qatar’s divergence from the GCC undermines regional unity, casting doubt on the long-term benefits of its autonomous stance. The finding supports this partially but argues that short-term autonomy enhanced long-term leverage with non-GCC actors like the U.S. and Iran. Across all four findings, one truth becomes clear: Qatar’s foreign policy is not a deviation from theory but a fusion of them. It borrows realism’s survival instinct, constructivism’s identity narrative, omni balancing’s dual threat logic, and small state theory’s nimble strategy. This hybridity is its signature strength. In a region torn between revolution and regression, Qatar has crafted not a perfect path, but a survivable one, stitched together with ambition, adaptability, and acute political imagination. 5.3 Conclusions Across all four findings, one fact becomes clear: Qatar’s foreign policy is not a deviation from theory but a fusion of them. Different parts of Qatar foreign policy seem to be 48 explained/mirrored by different theories. It mirrored constructivist during the Arab spring as it intensified efforts to craft a new identity in the MENA through adopting a proactive foreign policy, pro-democracy discourse, focusing on support for upheavals, the legitimization of the will of the people, and aligning with the revolutionary movements. During regime changes, QFP responses seem to be explained by both constructivism and omni-balancing, as Qatar actions became more ideologically defined, yet selective. It aligned with actors that resonated with its preferred identity narrative of a progressive, Muslim, yet reform-friendly state, yet being selective when it comes to the security and the status quo of the Gulf region, explained by omni-balancing as a cautious attempt to avoid internal threat that can be caused through the spreading of the Bahraini upheaval. QFP responses to the emergence of failed states and civil wars align with small state theory expectations, ensuring relevance and maintaining regional presence in a complex situation, by following a context-driven hyper strategy that includes early military engagement, later-stage mediation, long-term diplomacy, media, humanitarian aid, backchannel alliances, and selective neutrality. Regional crises and conflicts showed two traits in QFP that mirror neorealism balancing behaviour, where Qatar intensified its alliances regionally and globally as a response to security threats, and it also mirrored small state theory expectation; When directly involved in a crisis, it tends to rely on Crises diplomacy, Multilateralism discourse, and intensifies hedging strategy regionally as well as globally. In crises where it is not directly implicated, mediation emerges as its principal foreign policy instrument, ensuring relevance as well as security and sovereignty. To sum, Qatar's foreign policy is a fusion of theories, borrowing realism's survival instinct, constructivism's identity narrative, omni-balancing's dual threat logic, and small state theory's nimble strategy. 49 5.4 Bibliography Abdessadok, Z. (2017). Libya Today: From Arab spring to failed state. AlJazeera net. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/5/30/libya-today-from-arab-spring- to-failed-state Adam, A. (2020). Palestinian Intifada: How Israel orchestrated a bloody takeover. AlJazeera net. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/28/palestinian-intifada-20-years-later- israeli-occupation-continues Al Jazeera. (2002, September 29). للتشاور قطر في سفيرها تستدعي Saudi Arabia]السعودية recalls its ambassador in Qatar for consultations]. Al Jazeera. Aljazeera. (2006). Qatar condemns Arab countries' approval to strike Lebanon. Aljazeera net. Aljazeera. (2022). Files that the Qatari mediation succeeded in resolving with agreements. Aljazeera network, Files Successfully Resolved by Qatari Mediation with Agreements | Encyclopedia | Al , Jazeera Net (aljazeera.net) Al Thani, H. B. K. (2011, April 14). Interview with Wolf Blitzer [Video]. CNN. https://youtu.be/_UsJDekjGvw Al Thani, H. B. K. (2012, January 15). Interview with Bob Simon – 60 Minutes [Video]. CBS News. https://youtu.be/2a9iZ18PiVs Al Thani, H. B. K. (2012, November 18). Interview on the developments in Gaza with Abdel Fattah Fayed [Video]. Al Jazeera Egypt. https://youtu.be/Atz_h8AB3RA AP News. (2025, May 8). Syrian leader says his country is holding indirect talks with Israel to avert an escalation. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/a93c7517d7669f67fc661b2b25f383c9AP News Araghchi, S. A. and Samadi, A. (2024). The role of Strategic Hedging strategy in Qatar's foreign policy. Foreign Relations, 16(2), 1-28. doi: 10.22034/fr.2024.462506.1543 Balanche, F. (2024). After 13 years of conflict, Syria is a failed state. North press agency. https://npasyria.com/en/112149/ Bennett, A., & Checkel, J. T. (Eds.). (2014). Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 50 Bizuru, K., O. (2022). A model of regime change: The impact of Arab Spring throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Wright state University Libraries. https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/2466/ Black, I. (2014). Arab states withdraw ambassadors from Qatar in protest at 'interference. The guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/arab-states- qatar-withdraw-ambassadors-protest Bland, A. (2025). Two years into the brutal civil war in Sudan, a London summit makes little progress. The Gurdian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/16/first-edition- sudan-civil-war-humanitarian-crisis-anniversary Boyce, S. G. (2013). QATAR’S FOREIGN POLICY. Asian Affairs, 44(3), 365–377. https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2013.826003 Britannica. (2025). Case study. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/science/case-study CFR. (2011). 2003-2011 The Iraq war. Council on foreign relations organization. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war Cfr. (2025). Conflict in Yemen and the Red Sea. Center for preventive action. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen CISAC. (2016). Examining policy responses toward failed states, civil wars. Stanford University. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/policy-responses-examined-failed-states-civil- wars Cooper, A. F., & Shaw, T. M. (2009). The diplomacies of small states: Between vulnerability and resilience. Palgrave Macmillan. Corden, A., Millar, J. (2007). Time and Change: A Review of the Qualitative Longitudinal Research Literature for Social Policy. Social Policy and Society, 6(4), 583–592. doi:10.1017/S1474746407003910 Cordesman, H., A. (2020). The greater Middle East: From the "Arab Spring" to the "Axis of Failed States". Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states 51 Daniszewski, J. (1996). Unrest in persian Gulf Isle of Bahrain has U.S. Unsettled. Los angeles times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-05-13-mn-3651-story.html David, S. R. (1991). Explaining Third World alignment. World Politics, 43(2), 233– 256. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010472 Dionigi, F. (2016). The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon: State fragility and social resilience. LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, 15. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296702476_The_Syrian_Refugee_Crisis_in_Leban on_State_Fragility_and_Social_Resilience El-Affendi, A. (2023). Sudan is heading towards complete state collapse. Al-Jazeera net. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/7/24/sudan-is-heading-towards-complete-state- collapse Financial Times. (2025, May 6). Sudan's wartime capital hit by drone attacks for first time. Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/92d610b3-e16e-41b3-93d1- fa349de93bc7Financial Times Flick, U. (2004). Triangulation in qualitative research. In U. Flick, E. von Kardorff, & I. Steinke (Eds.), A companion to qualitative research (pp. 178–183). SAGE. Fromherz, A. J. (2012). Qatar: A modern history. Georgetown University Press. Gause, F. G. (2014). Beyond sectarianism: The new Middle East cold war. Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, 11, 1-27. https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2016/06/English-PDF-1.pdf Gause, F. G., III. (2017). Ideologies, alignments, and underbalancing in the new Middle East cold war. PS: Political Science & Politics, 50(3), 672-675. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096517000373 Gerges, F. A. (2016). ISIS: A history. Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691211916/isis?srsltid=AfmBOoo26Uo3oP V1rAycoOnDYiwDUilJVzW1PgUZDVlaYQehhf4AecdL Gordon, P. H. (2020). Losing the long game: The false promise of regime change in the Middle East. St. Martin's Press. https://a.co/d/g8JcOVt 52 Guttmann, A. (2022). The Rise of ISIS as a Partial Surprise: An Open-Source Analysis on the Threat Evolution and Early Warnings in the United Kingdom. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 36(3), 686–710. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2095543 Harb, K., I. (2022). Lebanon faces a prolonged presidential vacuum. Arab center Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/lebanon-faces-a-prolonged-presidential- vacuum/ Helfont, S. (2023). How America misunderstood Iraqi politics and lost the war. Foreign policy research institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/03/how-america-misunderstood- iraqi-politics-and-lost-the-war/ Hoffman, J. (2023). Ten years after coup, the U.S. still supports tyranny in Egypt. CATO institute. https://www.cato.org/commentary/ten-years-after-coup-us-still-supports-tyranny- egypt Holland, J., Thomson, R., & Henderson, S. (2006). Qualitative Longitudinal Research: A Discussion Paper. London: London South Bank University. Ianchovichina, E., Abu-Bader, S. (2018). Unintended consequences? Foreign intervention, polarization, and conflict in MENA. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unintended-consequences-foreign-intervention- polarization-and-conflict-in-mena/ Istituto Affari Internazionali. (2019). Regional dynamics in the MENA region. MENARA Policy Brief No. 2. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_pb_2.pdf Kamrava, M. (2013). Qatar: Small state, big politics. Cornell University Press. Khatib, L. (2013). Qatar's foreign policy: The limits of pragmatism. International Affairs, 89(2), 417-431. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12025 Lauer, B. (2022). Yemen and the dynamics of foreign intervention in failed states. University of New Hampshire. https://www.unh.edu/inquiryjournal/blog/2022/04/yemen- dynamics-foreign-intervention-failed-states Lynch, M. (2016). The new Arab wars: Uprisings and anarchy in the Middle East. PublicAffairs. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/04/the-new-arab-wars-uprisings- and-anarchy-in-the-middle-east?lang=en 53 Matthiesen, T. (2013). Sectarian gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that wasn't. Stanford University Press. https://a.co/d/eKmTXny Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. W. W. Norton & Company. Mezran, K. (2021). Libya 2021: Islamists, Salafis & Jihadis. Wilson center organization. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/libya-2021-islamists-salafis-jihadis Milton, S., Elkahlout, G., & Tariq, S. (2023). Qatar’s evolving role in conflict mediation. Mediterranean Politics, 30(1), 53–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2023.2266665 Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Qatar. (2017, June 19). Foreign Minister: No solution to Gulf crisis unless siege lifted, then dialogue. https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest- news/details/2017/06/19/foreign-minister-no-solution-to-gulf-crisis-unless-siege-lifted-then- dialogue Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Qatar. (2020, July 23). Qatar reiterates adherence to resolving crisis with blockading countries by peaceful means. https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/1441/12/02/qatar-reiterates- adherence-to-resolving-crisis-with-blockading-countries-by-peaceful-means Mohammadzadeh, B. (2017). Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar’s Emergence in Perspective. The International Spectator, 52(2), 19–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1298886 Molana-Allen, L. (2023). Lebanon struggles to emerge from financial crisis and government corruption. PBS news. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/lebanon-struggles-to- emerge-from-financial-crisis-and-government-corruption Naier, T. (2021). Qatar soft power: from rising to the crisis. International Journal of Business and Applied Social Science, 7(8), 43-52. Neale, B. (2019). Qualitative Longitudinal Research. Bloomsbury Academic. Neale, B. (2021). The craft of qualitative longitudinal research. (Vols. 1-0). SAGE Publications Ltd, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781036212834 54 Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs Books. http://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/publicaffairsbooks-cgi- bin/display?book=1586482254. Peterson, J. E. (2006). Qatar and the world: Branding for a micro-state. Middle East Journal, 60(4), 732-748. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4330320 Population TODAY. (2025, May 21). Qatar population (2025). https://populationtoday.com/ar/qa-qatar/ Qabalan, M. (2020). Actors, Structures and Qatari foreign Policy. Arab centre Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/actors-structures-and-qatari-foreign-policy/ Ramanl, S. (2021). The Qatar Blockade Is Over, but the Gulf Crisis Lives On. Foreign policy magazine. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/27/qatar-blockade-gcc-divisions-turkey- libya-palestine Rantisi, S., M. (2014). Qatar's Foreign Policy towards the Arab Spring Countries and the Palestinian Issue 2011-2013. Aljazeera centre for studies. السياسة الخارجية القطرية تجاه بلدان الربيع (flippingbook.com) العربي Raya. (2007, June 17). قطر تطفئ حريق الحوثيين في جبال صعدة[Qatar extinguishes the Houthi fire in the Saada mountains]. Raya. Raya. (2007, September 16). السكان بتسليح يهدد الحاكم الحزب Yemen: Ruling party]اليمن: threatens to arm citizens]. Raya. Reuters. (2011). Timeline: Anti-government protest in Bahrian. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/timeline-anti-government-protests-in-bahrain- idUSTRE72F4RR/ Reuters. (2025, May 7). Syrian leader heads to France in first European trip. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/syrian-leader-heads-france-first-european-trip-2025-05-07/ Roberts, D. B. (2012). Understanding Qatar’s Foreign Policy Objectives. Mediterranean Politics, 17(2), 233–239. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.695123 Robinson, K. (2023). Yemen’s tragedy: war, stalemate, and suffering. Council on foreign relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis 55 Ryan, R., C. (n.d.). Regime security and shifting alliances in the Middle East. POMEPS organization. https://pomeps.org/regime-security-and-shifting-alliances-in-the-middle-east Shura Council. (n.d.). Council specialties. The Shura Council – Qatar. https://www.shura.qa/en/Pages/About-Council/Council-Specialties Simister, N., & Scholz, V. (2017). Process tracing. INTRAC. https://www.intrac.org/app/uploads/2017/01/Process-tracing.pdf Soubrier, E. (2023). The impacts of militarized foreign policy in the MENA region. PRISME Initiative. https://prismeinitiative.org/blog/impacts-militarized-foreign-policy-mena- region-emma-soubrier/ Steinberg, G. (2023, April). Qatar’s foreign policy. (SWP Research Paper RP 2023/04). Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://doi.org/10.18449/2023RP04 Ulrichsen, K. C. (2014). Qatar and the Arab Spring. Oxford University Press. Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. McGraw-Hill. Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183 Wright, S. (2009). Foreign policies with international reach: The case of Qatar. In D. Held & K. Ulrichsen (Eds.), The transformation of the Gulf: Politics, economics and the global order (pp. 292–308). Routledge. Yin, R. K. (2018). Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.). SAGE Publications. 56 Appendixes: Appendix 1: Qatar foreign policy response to the Arab Spring Timeline The Arab Qatar Foreign Policy (dv) Spring as a Regional challenge (iv) Actions Policies/discourses Alliances Late The Tunisian Following the Then-Emir Hamad -Strengthened ties 2010- revolution Tunisian bin Khalifa Al Thani with Tunisia post- 2011 revolution, Qatar stated: revolution, through emerged as a early diplomatic prominent “Now, Arab people support, financial supporter of are making their own assistance, and Tunisia’s political way towards political transition. It was democracy and engagement. the first country citizenship after to express announcing their support for the presence using ways -Ideological revolution and di erent from one country to another. alignment with backed it Turkey, both backing politically, In the countries political change and economically, which have gone and through through change, supporting the legitimacy of media and there is currently a debate on the revolutionary military movements. cooperation. Al complicated Jazeera provided transition to extensive pro- democracy. revolution However, even in the -Parallel pro-change countries where no stance with Iran, coverage, while Qatari o icials change has yet though without direct coordination held high-level occurred, the ruling or alliance. meetings with regimes are no successive longer able to act as Tunisian leaders. if the people were absent and did not -Divergence from Qatar invested heavily in have opinions.” Saudi Arabia, which Tunisia’s (Al-Thani, 2011, April viewed Qatar’s 2 enthusiastic support recovery, 8) for revolutionary including a $500 2 Al-Thani, H. (2011, April 8). His Highness Speech at Los Angeles World Affairs Council. Amiri Diwan of the state of Qatar. https://diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2011/apr/8/los-angeles-world-affairs-council?sc_lang=en 57 million loan, This statement change as a energy and shows the Emir challenge to the finance advocating for regional status quo agreements, and revolution, the end and monarchical security aid. of the status quo, stability. Military ties also the removal of old strengthened, regimes, the pursuit with Tunisia of democracy, and -Divergence from participating in the a irmation of UAE which opposed Qatari-led the people's will. Qatar’s ideological exercises and activism and its receiving donated perceived armored vehicles. empowerment of (Rantisi, 2014).1 populist forces. -Divergence from Egypt because of its view of Qatar as subverting regional status quo. (Thurston & others, 2017)3 Late The Egyptian During and after Qatar was the first -Strengthened ties 2010- revolution Egypt’s 2011 among Arab with Egypt post- 2011 revolution, Qatar countries in its revolution, o ering strongly reaction to political support and supported the Mubarak's positive media Egyptian people’s resignation and the coverage. call for change. transfer of power to Politically, it the Supreme expressed early Council of the -Strengthened solidarity with the Armed Forces; The engagement with the revolution, Emiri Diwan in Qatar transitional military distancing itself described this as a: council (SCAF) from pro- “positive and through diplomatic Mubarak states. important step” A overtures and aid, Economically, statement from the signalling support for Qatar pledged Emiri Diwan read as stability. $10 billion and follows: “The State strengthened ties of Qatar has through high-level followed with great 1 Rantisi, S., M. (2014). Qatar's Foreign Policy towards the Arab Spring Countries and the Palestinian Issue 2011-2013. Aljazeera centre for studies. Retrieved from السياسة الخارجية القطرية تجاه بلدان الربيع العربي (flippingbook.com) 3 Thurston, A., McQuaid, J., Faber, P., & Knoll, D. (2017). The same, yet different: United States and Gulf state interests in the post-Arab Spring Maghreb. CNA Analysis. https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/dop-2016-u-014233-1rev.pdf 58 visits, including interest the -Ideological by Emirs Hamad developments of the alignment with and Tamim. current events in the Turkey, both Diplomatically, it sisterly Arab endorsing political upgraded its Republic of Egypt, change and the end representation and while expressing of Mubarak’s rule. and supported its respect for the Egypt’s will of the Egyptian transitional people and their -Parallel pro-change authorities. Al choices, it salutes stance with Iran, Jazeera amplified the great role of the though without revolutionary forces of the direct coordination voices, reflecting Egyptian Armed or alliance. Doha’s broader Forces in defending media backing. Egypt, the Arab Qatar’s response nation, and the -Divergence from was swift, interests of the Saudi Arabia, which praising the Egyptian people… viewed Qatar’s quick military’s role The State of Qatar support for regime post-Mubarak looks forward to change as a and seeking Egypt restoring its challenge to regional deeper leadership role in stability and cooperation supporting and monarchical through initiatives advocating for the legitimacy. like the Egyptian- issues of the two Qatari nations: Arab and committee. Islamic.” (Rantisi, -Divergence from the (Rantisi, 2014)4 2014)5 UAE, which shared This statement Riyadh’s view that implicates Qatar’s Qatar’s behavior early endorsement empowered of the military’s destabilizing transitional role, revolutionary forces. signaling its respect (Darwisheh, 2015) 6 for the Egyptian people’s will while simultaneously aligning with the armed forces to maintain stability and preserve relations with the 4 Previous reference 5 Previous reference 6 Darwisheh, H. (2015). Regime survival strategies and the conduct of foreign policy in Egypt. Middle East Review, Institute of Developing Economies. https://ir.ide.go.jp/record/29648/files/ZCR201503_013.pdf 59 post-Mubarak authorities. 2011 The Libyan Qatar's actions in The Then-Emir -Divergence from the revolution Libya were Hamad bin Khalifa Al Gaddafi regime, as unexpected and Thani stated in an Qatar openly marked a interview: supported significant international military departure from its “We are not toward action and opposed usual foreign taking Ghadafi out, the Libyan policy. In March our aim is how the leadership. 2011, Qatar Libyan decide their supplied six future through the Mirage aircraft to democracy they were trying to do.” -Initial alignment participate in air operations He added, regarding with Libyan alongside the Qatar weaponizing opposition groups, through political North Atlantic the rebels: Treaty “We are acting recognition and according to the logistical support for Organization (NATO). This Security Council NATO-backed forces. represented a resolution, if it’s major shift in allowed to give aid to Qatari foreign the rebellion, -Ideological policy. In the military wise or other alignment with Turkey, both past, Qatar had form of aid we are willing to do.” advocating regime primarily engaged change and in mediation (Al Thani, 2011)8 supporting e orts to resolve This emphasizes his intervention in line international conflicts. support for with pro- democracy, the will revolutionary However, it had of the people, and narratives. never openly endorsed one Qatar’s readiness to side or carried pursue military engagement under -Parallel pro-change out a direct the framework of stance with Iran, military intervention. international though without legitimacy and direct coordination (Rantisi, 2014)7 multilateral or alliance. authorization. -alignment with the Arab league decisions, 7 Previous reference 8 Al Thani, H. B. K. (2011, April 14). Interview with Wolf Blitzer [Video]. CNN. https://youtu.be/_UsJDekjGvw 60 At a meeting of the particularly the Arab foreign support for a no-fly ministers — which zone and paved the way for international the Security intervention. Council’s decision to impose an air embargo over Libya -Tactical — the then-Qatari strengthening Prime Minister alliance with the called on the NATO/Western international powers, through community to active military contribute participation and e ectively to the strategic liberation of the cooperation. Libyan people. He also expressed support for arming -Divergence from the rebels, stating: Saudi Arabia, which “It is natural to was surprised by empower the Libyan Qatar’s proactive people to be able to military role. defend themselves.” He added: “A few weeks ago, -Divergence from there was no UAE, which viewed discussion about viewed Qatar’s providing the Libyan military enthusiasm people with a means with suspicion to protect (Thurston & others, themselves. 2017)10 However, it is now seen appropriate and acceptable to empower the Libyans to defend themselves.” (Rantisi, 2014)9 This indicates Qatar’s strategic positioning as a regional actor willing to translate political rhetoric into 9 Previous reference 10 Previous reference 61 material support, particularly under the legitimacy of pan-Arab and international frameworks. 2011 The Syrian Between 2011 At the beginning of -Initial alignment revolution and 2013, Qatar the revolution, the with the Syrian shifted from a then-Emir, Hamad regime, followed by a position of bin Khalifa Al Thani, complete divergence cautious stated in an after Syria rejected diplomacy to full- interview: Arab League fledged support mediation and for the Syrian “I believe Bashar attacked Qatar’s opposition. started the embassy. Initially, it reforms… he is advocated changing the dialogue through government and allow free election; -New alliance the Arab League, he’s going to fight formation with the but escalated its the corruption… I’m Syrian opposition, stance following the attack on its against any killing in including early recognition of the embassy in the street by force Damascus and but I believe what is Syrian National Syria’s rejection happening in Syria to Coalition and of Arab peace be tackled in a hosting its embassy. initiatives. wisely way, because Politically, Qatar unfortunately I hear that some o icers -Strengthened ties led Arab e orts to isolate the Assad and military are with Islamist groups, regime and was being shot, so until particularly those now it’s grey I don’t linked to the Muslim the first state to Brotherhood within recognize and know exactly what’s the Syrian host the Syrian happening.” National (Al Thani, 2011) 11 opposition. Coalition as the This statement legitimate shows Qatar’s -Strategic alignment representative of initially positive with Turkey, based the Syrian people. stance toward the on joint support for Through Al Bashar al-Assad regime change in Jazeera and regime, expressing Syria and o icial hope for reform and coordination in diplomacy, Qatar amplified the 11 Previous reference 62 voices of the caution toward the military and opposition, while unfolding events. diplomatic aid. militarily and financially, it However, Qatar later became the adopted the largest supporter opposite position, -Strategic divergence of the Syrian firmly backing the from Iran, as Qatar opposition. This shift opposed Assad while opposition — reportedly was made clear Iran backed him as a spending $3 when Qatari o icials core regional ally. billion and stated: facilitating over “Trust us, because -Strategic divergence 70 arms we will strive from from Russia, which shipments via now on to fully strongly backed the Turkey during this recognize this new Assad regime, period (BBC, body, and we will placing Qatar in 2013; Rantisi, strive in the Arab opposition to 2014). League, in the Moscow's regional Cooperation objectives. Council, with European friends, and also with the -Divergence from Americans, so that Saudi Arabia due to this body is the only competition over and legitimate one in leadership of the which represents all Syrian opposition Syrians.” and Qatar’s support (Rantisi, 2014)12 for Islamist-aligned This referred to factions; while Qatar’s full limited tactical recognition of the coordination Syrian National emerged in 2013, Coalition as the sole strategic di erences legitimate persisted. representative of the Syrian people. -Divergence from the UAE which strongly opposed Qatar’s backing of Islamist groups and saw its Syria policy as 12 Previous reference 63 destabilizing. (Ryan, 2017)13 2011 The Yemeni During the At the second -Divergence from the revolution Yemeni extraordinary Yemeni regime of Ali revolution, Qatar meeting of the Abdullah Saleh, after initially pursued foreign ministers of Qatar shifted from mediation the Gulf mediation to open between the Cooperation Council political and media opposition and countries on April support for the President Ali 10, 2012, the Qatari opposition. Abdullah Saleh, Prime Minister but shifted to full voiced his objection political, to modifying the -New alignment with financial, and original terms of the Yemeni opposition media support for Gulf Initiative to forces, following the the opposition resolve the Yemeni failure of mediation after its e orts crisis. He stressed e orts and Qatar’s were rejected. that President Ali call for Saleh to step The Then-Qatari Abdullah Saleh down. Minister of Foreign A airs “is evasive and will was the first continue to evade international and will not accept -Ideological any agreement that alignment with o icial to call for the president to leads to him Turkey, as both states maintained step down, and relinquishing power.” pro-revolution, pro-demonstrations Before that, and change positions were held by the Yemeni following the during the Arab community in announcement of Spring, despite the Gulf Initiative, Turkey’s non-Doha demanding the former president involvement in Saleh’s resignation — had announced that Yemen. even though the he welcomed it but momentum of rejected Qatari involvement in -Parallel anti-Saleh popular protests stance with Iran, in Yemen was still Yemen’s internal weak at the time. a airs. (Rantisi, though no direct 2014)15 coordination Through its occurred; Qatar and stance in the Which indicates that Iran both opposed Yemeni Qatar maintained a the regime, but revolution, Qatar firm stance against appeared to Gulf concessions to 13 Ryan, C. R. (2017). Regime security and shifting alliances in the Middle East. In M. Lynch (Ed.), The Qatar crisis (pp. 36– 40). Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS). https://www.academia.edu/download/56335866/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf 15 Previous reference 64 continue its Saleh and sought to pursued di erent broader pattern hold him regional agendas. of supporting accountable for Arab uprisings undermining the and asserted the transition process, -Strategic divergence independence of even at the cost of from Saudi Arabia, its foreign policy regional consensus. which saw Qatar’s from the Gulf early pro-opposition consensus. stance as (Rantisi, 2014)14 undermining Gulf stability and consensus within the GCC. -Strategic divergence from the UAE, which viewed Qatar’s support for revolutionary movements, especially those tied to Islamists, as threatening to regional order. (Rantisi, 2014)16 2011 The Bahraini Unlike Qatar’s Qatar stated -Alliance with the protests stance on the regarding its military Bahraini regime, both Tunisian, participation in politically and Egyptian, and Bahrain: militarily, as Qatar Libyan supported the revolutions, Qatar “Sending the Gulf monarchy’s survival took a supportive Shield comes in and rejected the position toward implementation of protest movement. the Bahrani the agreements regime against signed between the the protests. countries of the Gulf Cooperation -Military alliance It participated in Council, and in light with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf shield of the invitation of through joint troops in 2011 to the crown prince of participation in the provide military Bahrain’s Sheikh Gulf Shield Force to assistance to the Salman bin Ebrahim suppress unrest and Al Khalifa, and the reinforce need for a national 14 Previous reference 16 Previous reference 65 Bahraini regime. dialogue in this monarchical (Rantisi, 2014)17 precise and stability. sensitive situation.” (Rantisi, 2014)18 Indicating that Qatar -Military alliance framed its with the UAE, which intervention as a also deployed forces collective GCC to Bahrain, reflecting obligation, shared Gulf security emphasizing Gulf priorities. regional unity and stability over support for protest -Strategic divergence movements— from Iran, which particularly when condemned the they involved a intervention and neighboring Gulf expressed rhetorical country. support for the Shi’a- led protests in Bahrain. -Divergence from Bahraini opposition groups, as Qatar aligned with the state against a domestic revolutionary movement — a rare stance compared to its Arab Spring policy elsewhere. -Reinforcement of Qatar’s political and military alignment within the GCC bloc, showing temporary solidarity with the conservative monarchies during a 17 Previous reference 18 Previous reference 66 period of regional instability. (Rantisi, 2014)19 2018- The Sudanese Unlike its stance Qatar's Emir, Sheikh -Continued alliance 2019 revolution in Libya, Tunisia, Tamim bin Hamad Al with the Sudanese and Egypt, the Thani, called regime under Omar then-Emir of Sudanese President al-Bashir, expressed Qatar met with Omar al-Bashir to through diplomatic President Bashir express his support support and public during the for Sudan after days a irmations of Sudanese of anti-government Sudan’s "unity and uprising and protests, according stability," indicating expressed his to a statement from preference for support for Bashir’s o ice. regime continuity Sudan’s “unity over revolutionary and stability.” “During the call, change (Donelli & Sheikh Tamim Pericoli, 2024).20 declared that his This reflects a country stood with degree of Sudan and was -Strategic strategic ready to o er all that preservation of ties with Islamist actors, flexibility in was necessary to Qatar’s foreign help Sudan particularly the Sudanese Muslim policy, overcome this Brotherhood-linked particularly when ordeal, stressing his networks, as part of the regime at risk keenness for the Qatar’s ideological is associated with stability and security alignment. the Muslim of Sudan.” Brotherhood. The (Reuters, 2018) 21 Qatari position This indicates -No alliance with during the Qatar’s preference Sudanese opposition Sudanese for regime continuity protest groups, protests in Sudan during the indicating a shift demonstrated a uprising, reflecting a from Qatar’s earlier preference for strategic departure Arab Spring pattern regime continuity from its more pro- of supporting over immediate revolutionary revolutionary actors. revolutionary stances in Libya, change. Tunisia, and Egypt. 19 Previous reference 20 Donelli, F., & Pericoli, A. (2024). Foreign aid, identities and interests: Qatar and the UAE in Sudan. The International Spectator. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2024.2416892 21 Reuters. (2018). Qatar's emir offers support for Sudan - Sudan presidency. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/world/qatar-s-emir-offers-support-for-sudan-sudan-presidency-idUSKCN1OL0NM/ 67 -Divergence from Saudi Arabia, which eventually supported Bashir’s removal and favored a military-led transition, contrasting with Qatar’s hesitancy to endorse the protest movement. -Divergence from the UAE, which coordinated with Egypt and Saudi Arabia to back Sudan’s military council and marginalize Islamist- aligned actors. -Divergence from Egypt, which opposed Islamist influence in Sudan and aligned with UAE-Saudi e orts to reshape Sudan’s post-Bashir political order. -Alignment with Turkey, as both maintained close relations with the Bashir regime and opposed the counterrevolutionary Gulf axis's interference. -Parallel stance with Iran, as both Tehran 68 and Doha supported Bashir’s regime and criticized Gulf interventionism, though there was no direct coordination. (Donelli & Pericoli, 2024)22 Appendix 2: Qatar foreign policy response to regime changes Timeline Regime Qatar foreign policy (dv) changes as regional Actions Policies/discourses Alliances challenges (iv) 2003 Iraq. Following the 2003 The then-prince -Divergence from U.S.-led invasion Hamad Al-Thani Saddam of Iraq and the stated, “we in Qatar Hussein’s regime, subsequent fall of welcomed the as Qatar Saddam Hussein's establishment of the supported the regime, Qatar Transitional U.S. adopted a Governing Council intervention’s cautious yet and the new cabinet goals and constructive as a step in the right distanced itself approach toward direction, leading to from Baathist the new political the formulation of a authoritarianism. order. While it did new constitution not immediately and the holding of endorse the free elections that -Alliance with the Coalition will allow the new Iraqi regime, Provisional fraternal Iraqi reflected in Authority, Qatar people to choose its Qatar’s pledge to signalled support representatives and cancel $4 billion for Iraq's build its in debt and reconstruction constitutional support Iraq’s and political institutions.” (Al sovereignty and transition. Thani, 2003)24 reconstruction. Indicating Qatar’s In a significant early political gesture, Qatar endorsement of pledged to write -Mild divergence Iraq’s transitional o nearly $4 from Saudi institutions and billion in Iraqi debt Arabia, as Qatar’s 22 Previous reference 24 Al Thani, H. H. Sheikh H. Bin K. (2003, October 16). Speech at the 10th Islamic Summit Conference [Official statement]. Amiri Diwan, State of Qatar. https://diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2003/oct/16/10th-islamic-summit- conference 69 in 2004, aiming to support for U.S.- acceptance of alleviate Iraq's backed regime Iraq’s new Shia- financial burdens change, framed led government and facilitate its through a discourse contrasted with recovery. This of democratic Riyadh’s deep moves transition, national mistrust of Shia underscored sovereignty, and political Qatar's regional stability. ascendancy. commitment to supporting Iraq's sovereignty and -Strategic stability. (voice of parallelism with America, 2004)23 the UAE, as both states cautiously cooperated with the post-Saddam order while maintaining close U.S. ties. -Nascent coordination with Turkey, based on shared concern for Iraqi stability and future political developments, though no formal cooperation emerged at the time. -Indirect alignment with Iran, through Qatar’s non- hostile approach toward Shia political actors, paralleling Iran’s 23 voice of America. (2004, January 20). Qatar pledges to write off $4 billion in Iraqi debt. https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13- a-2004-01-20-1-qatar/299617.html 70 rising influence in Baghdad. (Ulrichsen, 201925; Bianco, 202026; Gervais, 201627; Voice of America, 200428) 2011 Tunisia Following the The then-Emir -Divergence from election in Tunisia, visited Tunisia on the Ben Ali Qatar actively January 13, 2012, regime, as Qatar embraced the new where he met with supported the political President Moncef revolutionary landscape, Marzouki and transformation becoming one of congratulated him and endorsed the the earliest and on the first post- most engaged anniversary of the authoritarian supporters of the revolution. The Emir transition. post-revolutionary rea irmed Qatar’s government. High- support for the level visits transformation -Alliance with the between Qatari taking place in the new Tunisian and Tunisian country, stating: regime, o icials “We know what especially intensified, and happened during the Ennahda, through Qatar extended last months in direct financial substantial Tunisia and the aid, diplomatic economic aid, change that has backing, and including a \$500 occurred, and we in security million loan and Qatar naturally cooperation multiple support the agreements in approach to energy, finance, cooperation -Strategic and infrastructure. between the State of alliance with Politically, Qatar Qatar and the Arab Islamist actors, aligned with countries.” 25 Ulrichsen, K. C. (2019). GCC foreign policy: The struggle for consensus. In S. Akbarzadeh (Ed.), Routledge handbook of international relations in the Middle East (pp. 212–227). Routledge. https://www.defence.lk/upload/ebooks/Shahram%20Akbarzadeh%20(editor)%20- %20Routledge%20Handbook%20of%20International%20Relations%20in%20the%20Middle%20East- Routledge%20(2019).pdf 26 Bianco, C. (2020). The GCC monarchies: Perceptions of the Iranian threat amid shifting geopolitics. The International Spectator, 55(2), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1742505 27 Gervais, V. (2016). The changing security dynamic in the Middle East and its impact on smaller Gulf Cooperation Council states' alliance choices and policies. In M. Kamrava (Ed.), The small Gulf states: Foreign and security policies before and after the Arab Spring (pp. 27–45). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315619576-3 28 Previous reference 71 Tunisia’s new He further notably Ennahda leadership, expressed his hope and a iliated particularly the for the emergence of Muslim Ennahda a unified Arab bloc, Brotherhood movement, and similar to the figures, supported European Union, positioning Qatar Tunisia’s foreign saying: as the leading policy direction. Al “We have a historic regional backer Jazeera played a opportunity in the of elected major role in transformations Islamists post- amplifying taking place in a Arab Spring. revolutionary number of Arab voices, while countries to create military an entity as -Alignment with cooperation was happened in the Turkey, which reinforced through European entity.” shared Qatar’s joint agreements (Rantisi, 2014)30 ideological and security aid, including the Indicating Qatar’s a inity for strong political Ennahda and donation of armored vehicles endorsement of supported the (Rantisi, 2014)29. Tunisia’s new post- Tunisian revolution regime, transition through and its broader economic, ambition to leverage political, and regional transitions diplomatic to foster inter-Arab engagement. cooperation and a new regional order. -Parallel pro- Islamist stance with Iran, though no direct coordination occurred; Iran viewed the rise of Islamist governments as ideologically consistent with the legacy of its own 1979 revolution. 29 Previous reference 30 Previous reference 72 -Sharp divergence from Saudi Arabia, which viewed Ennahda’s rise as a threat to monarchical conservatism and suspected Qatar of exporting Islamism. -Deepening conflict with the UAE, which aggressively opposed Islamist governance and accused Qatar of destabilizing regional monarchies through its support for Brotherhood- linked parties. (Dihstelho & Lohse, 202031; Tekineş & Yüksel, 202132) 2011- Egypt After the Muslim A directive from -Divergence from 2012 Brotherhood Father Emir Sheikh the Mubarak assumed power in Hamad declared regime, as Qatar Egypt with the that distanced itself election of “there is no ceiling from Egypt’s old President on cooperation or guard and Mohamed Morsi in investing in Egypt.” actively 2012, Qatar (Rantisi, 2014)34 supported the became one of the He also expressed revolutionary 31 Dihstelhoff, J., & Lohse, A. (2020). Political Islam as an ordering factor? In The reconfiguration of the regional order in the Middle East since the Arab Spring (pp. 21–45). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_2 32 Tekineş, H., & Yüksel, E. (2021). Turkey’s love-in with Qatar: Drivers of Turkish Qatari relations. Clingendael Institute. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/drivers-of-turkish-qatari-relations.pdf 34 Previous reference 73 new government’s satisfaction in an shift in strongest regional interview regarding governance. backers. how the new Politically, it Egyptian regime had maintained close improved regional -Alliance with the diplomatic dynamics, new Egyptian engagement particularly with regime, led by through frequent Gaza: President high-level visits, “We thanked His Mohamed Morsi, with Emir Hamad Excellency the through bin Khalifa Al President of Egypt substantial Thani meeting for the humanitarian financial President Morsi on and medical aid assistance, multiple Egypt has provided, frequent high- occasions. and for opening its level diplomacy, Economically, hospitals to and coordinated Qatar pledged wounded media support. significant Palestinians—this is financial support, the first time we’ve including a $1 seen such actions -Strategic billion grant, a $4 from Egypt. After the alliance with billion deposit in Arab Spring Islamist actors, Egypt’s Central revolutions, we see particularly the Bank, and a di erent situation; Muslim investment Egypt is now Brotherhood, commitments di erent. If we go positioning Qatar totaling $18 back to 2008, Egypt as the principal billion. In parallel, was unable to o er Gulf patron of Al Jazeera strongly anything to the elected Islamist supported the people of Gaza. movements in revolution’s Now, under the new the post-Arab narrative, circumstances, the Spring period. dedicating Egyptian Prime extensive Minister visits Gaza, coverage and the Tunisian Foreign -Ideological hosting opposition Minister visits Gaza, alignment with voices critical of and I myself visited Turkey, as both the Mubarak Gaza a few weeks states backed the regime and ago. Had there not Morsi supportive of the been change in government new leadership Egypt, I would not ideologically and (Rantisi, 2014).33 have been able to do materially, so. The situation sharing a broader commitment to supporting moderate 33 Previous reference 74 now is di erent.” (Al Islamist Thani, 2012)35 governance. Indicating Qatar’s enthusiastic embrace of the new -Parallel pro- post-Mubarak Islamist stance regime, with Iran, though characterized by no formal expanded economic coordination; and political Tehran viewed investment, and a the shared ideological Brotherhood’s alignment over the democratic Gaza issue— ascent as particularly in ideologically contrast to Egypt’s resonant with its previous position own under Mubarak. revolutionary narrative. -Severe divergence from Saudi Arabia, which perceived the Brotherhood as a regional threat and saw Qatar’s backing of Morsi as undermining monarchical security. -Escalating divergence with the UAE, which was alarmed by Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and took countermeasures to suppress 35 Al Thani, H. B. K. (2012, November 18). Interview on the developments in Gaza with Abdel Fattah Fayed [Video]. Al Jazeera Egypt. https://youtu.be/Atz_h8AB3RA 75 Brotherhood influence at home and abroad. (Darwisheh, 2015; Ulrichsen, 2019)36 2013 Egypt Initially, Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin -Continued expressed Hamad Al Thani sent alliance with the concern over the a congratulatory Muslim political upheaval. message to interim Brotherhood, as It was the only President Adly Qatar remained Gulf monarchy not Mansour, stating the only Gulf to express its that Qatar would monarchy to satisfaction at the “respect the will of oppose the coup unfolding events Egypt and its people and maintained in Egypt, as Qatar across the high-level has been the main spectrum.” contact with Arab backer of the (Kirkpatrick, 201339 Brotherhood Brotherhood even leaders. before Mursi came Following the to power. military coup, (Kirkpatrick, Qatar’s Foreign Minister stated in an -Divergence from 2013)37. Qatar the new military maintained its interview with Al support for the Jazeera that Egypt regime, as Qatar Muslim must release jailed rejected the Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood legitimacy of the Foreign Minister leaders to help coup, criticized Khalid al-Attiyah resolve the political the crackdown on Brotherhood visited Cairo and crisis after the figures, and met with jailed ousting of President Mohamed Morsi. He advocated for Brotherhood leader Khairat El- said: political reconciliation. Shater, advocating “My wish for the for the release of brothers in Egypt is political prisoners to release the political prisoners -Sustained as a step toward as soon as possible strategic alliance resolving the with Islamist crisis. (Aljazeera, because they are the key to unlocking actors, 2013)38 this crisis… Without rea irmed by Qatar’s 36 Previous references 37 Kirkpatrick, D. (2013, December 23). Can Qatar regain influence in Egypt? HuffPost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/can- qatar-regain-influenc_b_4516454 38 Aljazeera. (2013). Qatar: Egypt must free political prisoners. Aljazeera net. Retrieved from Qatar: Egypt must free political prisoners | News | Al Jazeera 39 Previous references 76 a serious dialogue diplomatic with all the parties, outreach to jailed and most Brotherhood importantly with the o icials and political prisoners ongoing because they are rhetorical/media the main element in support through this crisis, I believe Al Jazeera. things will be di icult.” The Foreign Minister -Ideological also spoke about his alignment with visit to Cairo, Turkey, which explaining that he condemned the had met with jailed coup and aligned Brotherhood deputy with Qatar in leader Khairat El- supporting the Shater for an hour ousted Morsi and a half. He also government and met with interim Islamist Vice President legitimacy. Mohammed ElBaradei but was unable to see Morsi -Parallel pro- or army chief Islamist stance General Abdel with Iran, though Fattah El-Sisi. He limited to added: rhetorical “There had been an alignment; agreement that I Tehran viewed would be able to the meet all parties, but Brotherhood’s our luck allowed us fall as a setback only to meet with for revolutionary engineer Khairat El- populism but did Shater during this not openly visit.” (Al Jazeera, coordinate with 2013)40 Qatar. Indicating that while Qatar formally -Severe acknowledged the divergence from interim government, Saudi Arabia, it continued to which endorsed signal political the coup as a support for the corrective 40 Previous reference 77 Muslim Brotherhood measure against and viewed its political Islam inclusion as and viewed essential to Egypt’s Qatar’s pro- stability—thereby Brotherhood positioning itself at stance as odds with the destabilizing. emerging military- backed regime. -Intensified divergence from the UAE, which strongly supported the new regime and viewed Qatar’s position as contrary to Gulf security consensus. -Severe intra- GCC alliance rupture with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, culminating in the 2014 withdrawal of their ambassadors from Doha over Qatar’s continued support for the Brotherhood and refusal to align with counter- Islamist regional policies. (Darwisheh, 2015; Tekineş & Yüksel, 2021)41 41 Previous reference 78 2011- Libya Following the The then-Emir -Divergence from 2012 collapse of the Hamad bin Khalifa the Gaddafi Gaddafi regime, Al Thani stated in an regime, as Qatar Qatar was the first interview about openly supported Arab country to Libya: the NATO-led recognize the “We are supporting intervention and Libyan National the people of those backed rebel Transitional countries who’s forces militarily Council (NTC) as asking for justice and politically. the sole legitimate and dignity… if this is representative of influence then it’s a the Libyan people, healthy influence.” -Alliance with the positioning itself (Al Thani, 2012)43 new Libyan as a key regional supporter of the The former Qatari regime, Prime Minister recognizing the post-Gaddafi National order. It played a described the NATO–Qatar military Transitional leading role in Council as the supporting the intervention in Libya NTC politically as: sole legitimate “This is the first authority, and and militarily, including fruitful coalition providing between the Arabs political, military, supplying and financial weapons, training and the NATO to fighters, and help an Arab support. deploying special country.” forces in (Al Thani, 2012) 44 -Strategic coordination with He also justified the alignment with NATO operations. call for military Islamist actors, Economically, intervention by Qatar provided saying: including figures financial “But when we see linked to the assistance people dying every Muslim amounting to minute after minute, Brotherhood and approximately history will never Libyan Islamic $400–500 million forgive us. We Fighting Group by May 2011 and believe in dialogue, empowered by facilitated the sale but Gaddafi did not the NTC, of one million believe in it.” reflecting Qatar’s barrels of oil on (Rantisi, 2014)45 ideological behalf of the NTC priorities in post- to address urgent Addressing Arab Spring fiscal needs. It concerns about contexts. also guaranteed extremism in the 43 Al Thani, H. B. K. (2012, January 15). Interview with Bob Simon – 60 Minutes [Video]. CBS News. https://youtu.be/2a9iZ18PiVs 44 Previous reference 45 Previous reference 79 payment for fuel Libyan revolution, shipments to the Emir explained: Libya when “The tone of -Ideological international extremism exists in convergence with companies every revolution in Turkey, as both hesitated. These the Arab world, but countries backed e orts reflected the question we the NTC and Qatar’s strategic must ask ourselves Islamist-a iliated investment in is: if revolutions lead factions within Libya’s post- to a democratic Libya’s revolutionary process, what transitional leadership and its causes the landscape. desire to shape extremists to be the emerging extreme? Their political extremism is the -Parallel pro- landscape result of oppressive Islamist stance (Rantisi, 2014)42. or dictatorial with Iran, though governments that limited to denied them justice rhetorical and security. That’s alignment and what led to lacking direct extremism. But if coordination. there is popular participation, you will see that this -divergence from extremism will shift the UAE, which toward civic life and later countered civil society. I know Qatar’s influence that in Libya, most of in Libya by those labeled as supporting rival extremists believe in secular and anti- pluralism, civil Islamist factions, society, and foreshadowing democracy.” the regional (Al Thani, 201146) polarization that would intensify in Indicating that 2014. Qatar’s leadership framed its intervention in Libya -Neutral or not only as a passive posture humanitarian and from Egypt and political obligation, Saudi Arabia in but also as a the initial post- strategic investment Gaddafi period, in transitioning so- 42 Previous reference 46 Previous reference 80 called extremists though both into democratic would later align actors—supporting with UAE policy the belief that against Qatari- democratic backed Islamist inclusion and civil groups during society would Libya’s second moderate their civil war. behavior over time. (Gehrmann, 202247; Dalacoura, 202148) 2012 Yemen Following the No o icial -Divergence from ascension of statement from the the Saleh regime, Yemeni President Qatari leadership as Qatar Abd Rabbu was found, but in distanced itself Mansour Hadi to 2015, during a from Yemen’s power, Qatari United Nations long-standing Yemeni relations Security Council authoritarian were restored to session, Qatar's order and an o icial level. representative— welcomed the speaking on behalf GCC-brokered Qatar provided of the Gulf transition. significant support Cooperation to Yemen under Council—rea irmed President Abd support for Yemen’s Rabbu Mansour -Alliance with the unity and Hadi through new Hadi regime, sovereignty, and diplomatic through o icial emphasized the engagement, diplomatic legitimacy of humanitarian aid, restoration, President Hadi’s and political humanitarian government. The backing. Following assistance, and statement rejected restored relations financial the unilateral in 2012, Qatari development actions of the o icials hosted projects, Houthis and Yemeni leaders in reflecting Qatar’s underlined the Doha to support for the importance of strengthen ties. transitional restoring stability in Qatar Charity and authority. Yemen to allow the the Qatar Red 47 Gehrmann, A. (2022). Emerging smart power in the Gulf region: Qatar’s foreign policy nexus [master’s thesis, University of Groningen]. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366123002 48 Dalacoura, K. (2021). Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East: Power projection and post-ideological politics. International Affairs, 97(4), 1125–1143. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353011849_Turkish_foreign_policy_in_the_Middle_East_power_projection_and_ post-ideological_politics 81 Crescent Society resumption of its implemented political process. projects worth (United Nations -Strategic millions, including Security Council, alignment with building homes, 2015)50 Islamist actors, hospitals, and notably Yemen’s schools, while Indicating that Qatar Islah Party, an also delivering aligned itself with influential medical and food the broader GCC Brotherhood- aid. Qatar position during the linked movement supported post-Houthi backed by Doha Yemen's Islah takeover period, in line with its Party, aligning with supporting the broader post- its broader internationally Arab Spring regional strategy recognized Islamist (Rantisi, 2014)49 government and diplomacy. rejecting armed insurgent control, while continuing to -Ideological promote Yemen’s alignment with territorial integrity Turkey, as both and political states supported transition. the political inclusion of Islamist parties like Islah and backed Hadi’s transitional process. -Parallel Islamist accommodation with Iran, though limited and indirect, as both countries maintained ties with rival Yemeni factions—Qatar with Islah, Iran with Houthi networks. 49 Previous reference 50 United Nations Security Council. (2015, June 2). Security Council press statement on the situation in Yemen (SC/11915). United Nations. https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc11915.doc.htm 82 -Emerging divergence from the UAE, which viewed Qatar’s ties to Islah with suspicion and later backed anti- Islah elements, laying the groundwork for future intra-GCC rifts in Yemen. -Weakened bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, as Doha’s support for Islah increasingly conflicted with Riyadh’s anti- Islamist posture and regional security priorities. (Dorsey, 201351; Parker, 202152) 2019 Sudan in Sudan, Qatar On July 9, 2019, -Sustained stood with al- through alliance with the Bashir Ambassador Ali al-Bashir regime, Khalfan Al Mansouri, grounded in Because of Doha's Qatar expressed Qatar’s long- ties to the satisfaction with the standing support Islamists and the agreement between for Sudan’s deposed regime, Sudan’s Transitional Islamist Sudan severed Military Council and leadership and ties with it after the Alliance for integration into the revolution. Freedom and Doha’s regional (Mirghani, 2021) Change concerning Islamist network. However, the the formation of the relationship Sovereign Council 51 Dorsey, J. M. (2013). Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar challenges Saudi Arabia. RSIS Working Paper No. 262. https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/20056 52 Parker, T. B. (2021). Transforming Yemen? Divergent Saudi and Emirati intervention policies. Middle East Policy, 28(1), 98–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12573 83 between the two and the countries has establishment of a bolstered again civilian government. -Severance of with the Qatari Qatar emphasized diplomatic mediation e ort its support for relations with between the two Sudan’s unity, Sudan’s conflicted parties, stability, and transitional the Chairman of sovereignty, and authorities, as the Sudanese expressed hope that the post-Bashir Sovereignty the agreement leadership cut Council, Abdel would fulfill the ties with Qatar Fattah Al-Burhan, Sudanese people’s due to its backing and the aspirations for of the deposed Commander of freedom, peace, and regime. the Rapid Support justice. Forces, Mohamed (Ministry of Foreign Hamdan Dagalo A airs of the State of -Strategic (Hemedti). Qatar, 2019)53 alignment with Islamist actors, (Aljazeera, 2021) Indicating that Qatar particularly welcomed the Sudan’s Muslim negotiated transition Brotherhood– as a stabilizing linked elites and compromise, former regime aligning itself with figures. the new power- sharing arrangement and signaling a shift -Initial from its earlier engagement with support for the Sudan’s Bashir regime to transitional recognition of the government, emerging civilian- demonstrated by military structure. Qatar’s mediation between General Abdel Fattah al- Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), in an attempt to re- 53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar. (2019, July 9). The State of Qatar expresses its satisfaction with the agreement between Sudan's Transitional Military Council, Alliance for Freedom and Change. https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2019/07/09/the-state-of-qatar-expresses-its-satisfaction-with- the-agreement-between-sudan%27s-transitional-military-council-alliance-for-freedom-and-change 84 establish influence. Temporary divergence from Saudi Arabia, which backed the transitional military leadership early on and sought to isolate Qatari influence in Sudan. -Continued divergence from the UAE, which maintained support for Hemedti and opposed Qatari involvement, aligning with Egypt in promoting an anti-Islamist political structure. -Gradual convergence with Egypt in the post- Burhan period, as Qatar adjusted its diplomatic posture to Sudan’s new power center under military control and sought pragmatic cooperation. 85 -Pragmatic coordination with Iran, which also re-engaged Khartoum after the transition, resulting in shared diplomatic space amid shifting alignments. -Consistent alignment with Turkey, rooted in their shared support for al- Bashir’s Islamist government and later e orts to regain influence following the revolution. (Mirghani, 2021; Al Jazeera, 2021; Cook & Ibish, 2019) 2024 Syria Following Syria’s In a statement on -Divergence from 2024 regime December 24, 2024, the Assad change, Qatar Qatar’s Foreign regime, as Qatar swiftly supported Ministry had consistently the new spokesperson, Dr. opposed Assad transitional Majid Al Ansari, since 2011 and government, called for the swiftly endorsed reopened its immediate lifting of the new embassy in international transitional Damascus, and sanctions on Syria, leadership post- called for lifting arguing that the removal. sanctions reasons for them— imposed on the linked to the former former regime. regime—no longer -Alliance with Qatari o icials exist. He Syria’s new emphasized emphasized Qatar’s government, 86 backing the Syrian ongoing marked by people’s commitment to embassy aspirations, urged humanitarian reopening, inclusive assistance, support for governance, and referencing an air sanctions relief, engaged in high- bridge delivering and commitment level talks to medical and food to support Syria’s supplies, and urged reconstruction. unity, stability, and the international reconstruction community to e orts. (Lawal, support Syria’s -Military and 2024)54 stability and logistical recovery. alignment with (QNA, 2024)55 Turkey, as both Indicating a shift in states Qatar’s posture coordinated toward conditional support to normalization with opposition forces the Syrian regime, during the aligning more conflict and closely with a jointly backed regional trend of re- stabilization engagement while e orts in the framing its position post-Assad through phase. humanitarian and sovereignty-based discourse. -Strategic alliance with Islamist actors, particularly Sunni opposition networks formerly marginalized by the Assad regime, -Divergence from Iran during the Assad era, as Qatar backed the 54 Lawal, K. (2024, December 24). Qatar says sanctions on Syria must be lifted quickly. Channels Television. https://www.channelstv.com/2024/12/24/qatar-says-sanctions-on-syria-must-be-lifted-quickly/ 55 QNA. (2024). Qatar prioritizes humanitarian approach in addressing situation in Syria: Adviser to Prime Minister and Foreign Ministry's spokesperson. The Peninsula Qatar. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/24/12/2024/qatar-prioritizes- humanitarian-approach-in-addressing-situation-in-syria-adviser-to-prime-minister-and-foreign-ministrys-spokesperson 87 opposition while Iran remained the regime’s primary military and ideological sponsor. Collaborative engagement with Iran in the post- Assad era, as Qatar and Tehran pursued mutual diplomatic normalization and worked together on managing Syria’s political transition. -limited security alliance with Saudi Arabia, which joined stabilization and reconstruction e orts later, aligning with Qatar and Turkey in a broader Arab engagement framework. -Diplomatic coordination with Jordan and Iraq, to support Syria’s regional reintegration and cross-border stability. 88 -Continued divergence from the UAE, which had earlier normalized ties with Assad and remained cautious about Islamist political resurgence under the new order. -Underlying tension with Egypt, which remained skeptical of Qatar’s ties to Syrian Islamist factions and resisted rapid normalization with the new government. -Ideological and geopolitical opposition to Russia, as Qatar backed the transition that directly undermined Russian regional objectives in Syria. (EvanT24, 202456; Middle East Monitor, 202457; Chen, 202458) 56 evant24. (2024). Turkey and Qatar lead efforts to stabilize and rebuild Syria. https://levant24.com/news/international/2024/12/turkey-and-qatar-lead-efforts-to-stabilize-and-rebuild-syria/ 57 Middle East Monitor. (2024). Iran and Qatar count on 'friendly' relations with Syria. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241209-iran-and-qatar-count-on-friendly-relations-with-syria/ 58 Chen, M. (2024). Qatar and Jordan extend support to Syria amid new leadership. National Courier https://nationalcourrier.com/2024/12/23/qatar-and-jordan-extend-support-to-syria-amid-new-leadership/ 89 Appendix 3: Qatar foreign policy response to failed state (civil war) Timeline Failed State Qatar foreign policy (dv) as a regional challenge (iv) Actions Policies/discourses Alliances 2003 Iraq In the aftermath The then-Prince of -Divergence from the of the invasion, Qatar stated: Shia-led post- following Iraq “Our perspective on Saddam regime, as becoming a the situation in Iraq Qatar remained fragile state, is based on firm cautious toward Qatar engaged in principles: the need Baghdad’s Iran- humanitarian for preserving Iraq’s aligned political initiatives and unity, helping it to order. diplomatic overcome its long- e orts to support standing ordeal, and Iraq's enabling it to regain -Alignment with reconstruction its independence Sunni political and stability. and sovereignty and factions, particularly Qatar pledged to to choose its those marginalised write o nearly leadership in a free after the U.S. $4 billion in Iraqi and democratic invasion, consistent debt in 2004, manner. This is with Qatar’s broader aiming to because a regional Islamist alleviate Iraq's democratic Iraq will strategy. financial burdens greatly contribute to and facilitate its strengthening recovery. This security and stability -Strategic alignment moves in the region, and with Turkey, which underscored will pave the way for shared Qatar’s Qatar's that land of support for Sunni commitment to civilizations to actors and rejection supporting Iraq's regain its natural of Iranian dominance sovereignty and place in the in Iraq. stability. Qatar international also engaged community.” diplomatically by (Al Thani, 2004)60 -Divergence from supporting Sunni Indicating Qatar’s Iran, whose deep factions and concern over Iraq’s backing of Shia exploring fragmentation and militias and political economic ties 60 Al Thani, H. B. K. (2004, January 10). Speech at the 2nd Doha Conference on U.S.-Islamic World Relations [Official statement]. Amiri Diwan, State of Qatar. https://diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2004/jan/10/2nd-doha- conference-on-relations-between-us-islamic-world 90 (voice of descent into elites clashed with America, 2004)59 instability, and its Qatar’s approach to preference for a post-conflict unified, democratic stabilization. Iraq as a bulwark against regional chaos — aligning its -Partial convergence position with e orts with Saudi Arabia, to prevent state particularly in failure and sectarian opposing Iranian fragmentation. influence, though with distinct tactics and less overt sectarianism. (Afzal & Yaseen, 202361; Bianco, 202062; Voice of America, 200463) 2011- Libya After Libya In 2020, Qatari -Alliance with the 2020 became a failed Foreign Minister National Transitional state in 2011, Mohammed bin Council (NTC) after and during Libya Abdulrahman 2011, through civil war, Qatar stated: military, political, actively “It has become and financial supported the clear that the only support, including National way to resolve the weapons, funding, Transitional Libyan crisis is to and oil facilitation. Council, support the supplying arms Government of and funds to National Accord, -Strategic alliance rebel groups, and commit to with the Government lobbying for implementing the of National Accord international Skhirat Agreement, (GNA), as Qatar intervention. It Security Council backed the UN- continued to resolutions, and the recognized politically, outcomes of the government financially, and Berlin Conference.” politically, militarily, military back the (CNN, 2020)66 and in international UN recognized Indicating Qatar’s forums. government of continued political 59 Previous reference 61 Afzal, N., Yaseen, Z. (2023). Power competition in the Middle East: Emerging alliance of Turkey and Qatar, and response of Saudi Arabia. Global International Relations Review, 3(1), 35–45. https://humapub.com/admin/alljournals/girr/papers/MqJWVPqYZS.pdf 62 Previous reference 63 Previous reference 66 CNN. (2020). Qatari Foreign Minister explains the “only way” to resolve the crisis in Libya: supporting the Accord and Skhirat. CNN. لحل األزمة في ليبيا: دعم الوفاق والصخيرات "السبيل الوحيد"وزير خارجية قطر يبيّن - CNN Arabic 91 national accord and diplomatic led by Seraj, alignment with the aligning with Government of -Military and Turkey against National Accord strategic alignment Khalifa Haftar’s (GNA) as a with Turkey, forces, while legitimate authority, especially during using Al Jazeera and its support for and after 2019, to promote pro- internationally jointly supporting the GNA narratives. backed frameworks GNA against Haftar’s Although it to resolve the Libyan forces, in defiance of played a limited civil war. regional consensus. role in reconstruction, Following Turkey’s Qatar decision to -Strategic alliance consistently intervene militarily with Islamist advocated for in Libya, the Qatari factions, particularly Libyan Foreign Ministry groups aligned with sovereignty and responded that it the Muslim democratic “received with great Brotherhood and transition in surprise and other Sunni militias international astonishment the active within the forums. (Gürcan, Secretary-General GNA framework. 2020)64 of the Arab League's allocation of non- It also diverged Arab military -Divergence from from the interventions in Egypt, which backed collective Libya as a rejection.” Haftar and viewed agreement (Sky News, 2020)67 Qatar’s support for among Arab nations and Meanwhile, the the GNA and Libyan House of Islamists as a direct aligned itself with Turkey in the Representatives regional threat. latter decision to accused Qatar of intervene military complicity, stating: “Turkey seeks to -Sharp divergence in Libya in 2019. control the field to from the UAE, whose (Sky-news, strengthen its counterrevolutionary 2020)65 position,” and posture led to its “Qatar is Ankara’s military and political biggest supporter in support for Haftar in stirring up chaos in opposition to Qatar’s Libya.” pro-GNA stance. (Al Arabiya, 2020) 64 Gürcan, E. (2020). International security after the Arab Spring: Domestic and international sources of the Syrian and Libyan conflicts (2011–2020). ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340539546 65 SKY-news. (2020). Qatar disagrees with the Arabs and supports the Turkish intervention in Libya. Sky news. Retrieved from قطر تخالف العرب.. وتدعم التدخل التركي بليبيا | سكاي نيوز عربية (skynewsarabia.com) 67 previous reference 92 Indicating Qatar’s -Divergence from strategic alignment Saudi Arabia, which with Turkey in the aligned with the UAE Libyan civil war, and Egypt in backing reinforcing a military Haftar and opposing and ideological Qatari-Turkish partnership in influence in Libya. opposition to UAE- Egypt-backed factions, and -Contradiction of rejecting Arab Arab League League attempts to consensus, as Qatar isolate non-Arab rejected the interventions. League’s opposition to Turkey’s military intervention in Libya and backed Ankara’s involvement in 2019. -Iran remained peripheral, with no notable alliance shift, as Tehran had limited involvement in the Libyan conflict. (Tekineş & Yüksel, 202168; Shoaib, 201669; Refaat, 202170) 2014- Yemen Following Qatar, along with -Military alliance 2015 Yemen’s descent Saudi Arabia, the with Saudi Arabia, as into state failure UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar joined the during the civil Kuwait, issued a 2015 Saudi-led war, Qatar joint statement coalition to defend initially aligned declaring: the Hadi government with Saudi Arabia “Our countries have and counter the Iran- by joining the decided to respond 68 Previous reference 69 Shoaib, M. (2016). Turkish intervention in the Libyan civil war: Aims and challenges. Journal of Strategic Affairs. https://www.academia.edu/download/65794740/Turkish_Intervention_in_The_Libyan_Civil_War_Aims_and_Challenges.pd f 70 Refaat, M. (2021). Crimes against humanity in Libya: The criminal role of Saudi Arabia and UAE. European Institute for International Law. https://eiir.eu/images/Books/Crimes_against_humanity_in_Libya_The_Criminal_Role_of_Saudi_Arabia_and_UAE.pdf 93 2015 Saudi-led to the request of backed Houthi military coalition President Abd insurgency. to support Rabbuh Mansur President Abd Hadi, President of Rabbo Mansour the Republic of -Alignment with the Hadi against the Yemen, to protect Hadi government, in Houthi-led coup. Yemen and its dear support of Yemen’s This move people from the internationally reflected Qatar’s aggression of the recognized early Houthi militias, leadership and commitment to which were and still territorial integrity regional stability are a tool in the during the early war and its support hands of external phase. for the forces that have not internationally stopped tampering recognized with the security and -Divergence from the government. stability of brotherly Houthis, due to their However, in Yemen.” ties with Iran and 2017, amid the (MOFA-1, 2015)72 seizure of power Gulf crisis and rising tensions Indicating Qatar’s through armed force. with its military and political neighbors, Qatar alignment with the Saudi-led coalition -Expulsion from the was expelled at the onset of the coalition in 2017, from the Yemeni civil war, marking a rupture in coalition. Since supporting military cooperation then, Doha has President Hadi’s with Saudi Arabia, shifted toward a internationally the UAE, and Bahrain more neutral stance, recognized amid the broader government and Gulf crisis. supporting diplomatic framing the Houthis solutions and as proxies for destabilizing foreign -Strategic divergence welcoming the actors—primarily from the UAE, which coalition’s Iran. deepened following ceasefire the Gulf rift, declaration in especially due to 2022. Qatar's Emirati backing of evolving position separatist groups illustrates a and anti-Islah actors broader shift in opposed by Qatar. its foreign policy — from military participation to -Divergence from advocating Egypt, which 72 MOFA-1. (2015). Statement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait on developments in Yemen. Ministry of foreign affairs. 94 conflict remained aligned resolution and with the UAE and de-escalation in Saudi Arabia in Yemen. (Mo at, countering Islamist 2024)71 actors and the Houthis. -Sustained divergence from Iran, due to its military and ideological backing of the Houthis, in opposition to Qatar’s initial anti-Houthi stance. -Alignment with Turkey, as both countries advocated for a diplomatic resolution and shared sympathy for Yemen’s Islah Party. -Shift toward neutrality after 2017, as Qatar adopted a non-military posture, welcomed ceasefire e orts, and emphasized humanitarian assistance and diplomacy. (Mo at, 2024)73 2011- Syria Following Syria’s Qatar’s then-Emir -Divergence from the 2024 collapse into civil stated that military Assad regime, as war and e ective intervention may be Qatar was the first 71 Moffat, J. (2024). New Avenues of Diplomatic Resolution to the Saudi-Iran Rivalry: The Yemeni Crisis and the GCC. Charles University. PDF 73 Previous reference 95 state failure, necessary to stop Gulf country to cut Qatar adopted atrocities in Syria, ties in 2011 and one of the most comparing it to demanded Assad’s assertive regional Libya— removal. stances against clearly suggesting the Assad the Syrian state had regime. It lost legitimacy and -Alliance with the became the first e ective control. Syrian National Gulf country to (Al Thani, 201275) Coalition, hosting it cut diplomatic in Doha and ties with Syria in Indicating that Qatar viewed the Syrian supporting it as the 2011 and emerged as a conflict as legitimate major supporter surpassing the representative of the opposition. of the armed threshold of opposition. Qatar domestic unrest and backed the entering the realm of -Strategic alliance rebellion with civil collapse, political, justifying military with Islamist measures as part of factions, especially financial, and military aid, a broader those a iliated with humanitarian and the Muslim hosted the Syrian Brotherhood and National regional security Coalition in strategy. Sunni armed groups within the Doha, and In a televised opposition. aligned itself with statement, the then- Turkey, and, to an Emir openly extent, Saudi proposed sending -Military and political Arabia, while Arab forces to Syria, alignment with opposing Iranian arguing that Assad’s Turkey, through joint and Russian actions had backing of support for destroyed state opposition forces Assad. In a bold credibility and and coordinated move, then-Emir security— regional diplomacy. Sheikh Hamad signaling the view of bin Khalifa a de facto failed proposed in a state. -Temporary 2012 CBS (Doha News, 201276) alignment with Saudi interview sending Indicating Qatar’s Arabia, particularly Arab forces into Syria—an willingness to in the early war years, before alternative to pursue direct Arab NATO and Qatar military engagement diverging over reminiscent of in Syria, aligning Islamist roles and Libya—and by itself with 75 Previous reference 76 Doha News. (2012). 60 Minutes: Emir of Qatar favors Arab troops in Syria. Doha News. https://dohanews.co/60-minutes- emir-of-qatar-favors-arab-troops-in-syria/ 96 2013, Qatar interventionist regional escalated its policies to counter a competition. stance by regime seen as pushing for irreparably arming the delegitimized. -Sharp divergence opposition. In 2022, Qatar from Iran, due to (Rantisi, 2014) expressed support Iran’s deep military It also worked for Turkey’s military and political backing within the Arab invasion in Syria. In of Assad and League and used a previously hostility toward its media confirmed position Qatari-backed Sunni influence— from 2019, Qatar’s groups. especially via Al Deputy Prime Jazeera—to Minister and Foreign amplify anti- Minister Mohammed -Divergence from Assad narratives. bin Abdulrahman Al Russia, whose Unlike Egypt, Thani defended intervention in 2015 Saudi Arabia, and Turkey’s operations directly opposed the UAE, which by calling them Qatar’s regime- later shifted “part of Ankara’s change objective toward pragmatic legitimate right to and support for rebel engagement with secure its border.” forces. Assad, Qatar (Al Jazeera, 2019) maintained a consistent policy Qatar also stated -Sustained in favor of regime that Ankara can't divergence from the change. remain silent to UAE, which initially (Ulrichsen, threats from inside opposed Assad but 2014)74 Syrian territory. later moved toward (Barakat, 2019)77 normalization, Indicating a contrasting with sustained military Qatar’s consistent and strategic anti-Assad stance. alignment with Turkey within the Syrian conflict, -Divergence from reinforcing Qatar’s Egypt, which viewed commitment to Qatari support for Turkish-led Islamist factions as a stabilization e orts threat and eventually in the face of Syrian supported Assad’s state fragmentation. survival. (Tekineş & Yüksel, 74 Ulrichsen, K. C. (2014). Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-policy-drivers-and-regional- implications-pub-56723 77 Barakat, B. (2019). Turkey “can’t remain silent to threats”: Qatar. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle- east/turkey-cant-remain-silent-to-threats-qatar/1614580 97 202178; Ulrichsen, 201479; Phillips, 201780) 2019 Lebanon Following Qatar’s Deputy -Strengthened Lebanon's 2019 Prime Minister and bilateral alliance economic Foreign Minister with the Lebanese collapse and the Sheikh Mohammed state, as Qatar 2020 Beirut port bin Abdulrahman Al expanded financial, explosion, Qatar Thani stated that the humanitarian, and significantly decision to military support to expanded its purchase Lebanese key institutions, involvement in government bonds especially the Lebanon through worth half a billion Lebanese Armed financial aid, dollars was Forces. strategic intended to support investment, Lebanon through its humanitarian economic crisis. He -Partial alignment assistance, added, in an with Turkey and diplomatic interview with France, through engagment, and Bloomberg TV during shared emphasis on military support. the World Economic economic In 2019, Qatar Forum in Davos, that stabilization, announced the the Emir of Qatar, humanitarian aid, purchase of $500 Sheikh Tamim bin and diplomatic million in Hamad Al Thani, engagement post- Lebanese had discussed the crisis. government matter with bonds to Lebanese President stabilize the Michel Aoun during -Divergence from economy (Al the Arab Economic Saudi Arabia, which Jazeera, 2019)81. Summit in Beirut. withheld aid and After the Beirut Aoun had assured limited political port explosion in him that engagement due to August 2020, “any assistance by Hezbollah’s role in Qatar responded purchasing government and swiftly by Lebanese bonds will Beirut’s alignment dispatching field have an impact on drift. hospitals, the stability of the medical economy.” 78 Previous reference 79 Previous reference 80 Phillips, C. (2017). Eyes bigger than stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in Syria. Middle East Policy. Link (PDF) 81 Aljazeera. (2019). Qatar: Buying Lebanese bonds helps overcome the crisis. Aljazeera net. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2019/1/23/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1- %D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA- %D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9- %D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%89 98 supplies, and The Qatari o icial -Divergence from the search and emphasized: UAE, which adopted rescue teams to “Based on that, we a restrained assist with relief made our decision approach and e orts. (Hamadi , to help, but it is also avoided major 2023)82 On the an investment financial or political military front, decision.” commitments during Qatar provided (Al Jazeera, 201984) Lebanon’s collapse. ongoing support to the Lebanese In 2020, following Armed Forces: in the Beirut Port 2021, it pledged explosion, the Emir -Divergence from Egypt, which echoed 70 tons of food announced during supplies per the donor Gulf caution and month for one conference in Paris refrained from direct year, and in 2022, that Qatar would economic it committed $60 contribute $50 engagement or large- million in direct million in aid, scale aid. aid to the army— stating: an e ort “Qatar—its people welcomed by and institutions— -Balanced stance Prime Minister- rushed to respond to toward Iran, the call of its maintaining state-designate Najib brothers in Lebanon, level engagement Mikati as vital to and provide them without endorsing national stability Hezbollah’s (Al Jazeera, with urgent relief aid 2020)83. These worth $50 million, as dominant political- a contribution to military role. measures reflect Qatar’s broader relief operations and foreign policy alleviating the -Non-alignment with strategy of su ering of the Lebanese people to Israel, as Qatar bolstering maintained Lebanon’s overcome their sovereignty and extremely di icult traditional Lebanese sovereignty positions resilience amid circumstances.” 85 and did not engage state failure. (Al Jazeera, 2020) with Israeli-led Indicating Qatar’s regional frameworks. strategic use of (Al Jazeera, 201986 financial assistance 82 Hamadi, G. (2023, September 28). A timeline of Qatari aid to Lebanon. L'Orient Today. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1350247/a-timeline-of-qatari-aid-to-lebanon.html 83 Aljazeera. (2020). At the Paris Donors Conference... Emir of Qatar announces $50 million and additional contributions to help Lebanon. Aljazeera net. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2020/8/9/%D9%81%D9%8A- %D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1- %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86- %D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1- %D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86 84 Previous reference 85 Previous reference 86 Previous reference 99 and humanitarian and 202087; Hamadi, diplomacy to 202388) stabilize Lebanon amid its collapse into economic failure and governance breakdown— positioning itself as both a regional benefactor and soft- power investor in fragile Arab states. 2023 Sudan In response to The Qatari Emir -Strengthened Sudan’s ongoing stated: bilateral alignment civil war and “Regarding the with Sudan, as Qatar humanitarian Sudanese issue, we backed the Burhan- crisis, Qatar has call on all Sudanese led government supported parties to stop through mediation e orts fighting, and we humanitarian aid, and provided a irm our support development substantial for all regional and funding, and humanitarian international e orts diplomatic assistance. In to end this crisis in a engagement. June 2023, it way that will ensure pledged $50 the unity of state million toward institutions and the -Alignment with humanitarian sovereignty and Turkey, based on response and stability of Sudan.” shared support for regional refugee (Al Thani, 2024)90 Sudan’s central support, followed This speech institutions and by an additional emphasis on $25 million in confirmed Qatar’s April 2024 at an call to end the sovereignty and fighting and its mediation. international donor support for regional conference. and international -Partial alignment Qatar also e orts that preserve operated an air Sudan’s institutional with Saudi Arabia, unity and through joint support bridge that for humanitarian delivered 318 sovereignty. response e orts and 87 Previous reference 88 Previous reference 90 Al Thani, T. B. H. (2024, September 24). Speech at the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Amiri Diwan, State of Qatar. https://www.diwan.gov.qa/en/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2024/september/24/hh-the-amir- speech-at-the-79th-unga-opening-session 100 tons of food and Additionally, Qatar’s stabilization under medical supplies mediation posture Burhan’s leadership. and evacuated did not obscure its 1,784 political preference. individuals. According to a -Divergence from the Furthermore, in statement issued by UAE, which March and April Sudan’s Transitional maintained ties with 2024, it Sovereignty Council, Hemedti’s RSF dispatched Al-Burhan faction and took a multiple aid “expressed his fragmented planes carrying appreciation and the approach to the 71.2 tons of appreciation of the conflict. medical supplies Sudanese people for and 25 tons of the sincere humanitarian positions of the -Divergence from aid, including State of Qatar and Egypt, which two ambulances its leadership in remained cautious support of the (Qatar Fund for and avoided full government and Development , commitment to people of Sudan.” 2024)89 either side, (MEMO, 2024)91 contrasting with Indicating that Qatar’s clear despite its formal engagement. mediation role, Qatar has aligned diplomatically with -No alignment with Burhan and the Iran, which remained Sudanese Armed largely disengaged Forces as the and peripheral to legitimate actors in Sudan’s internal the civil conflict— conflict. consistent with its broader interest in preserving state -Consistent with its cohesion and broader post-Arab backing military- Spring strategy, institutional Qatar reinforced its leadership during image as a backer of internal state sovereignty, fragmentation. humanitarian diplomacy, and soft- power engagement. (Qatar Fund for 89 Qatar Fund for Development. (2024, March 24). The State of Qatar sends two planes carrying humanitarian aid to support the Sudanese people. https://www.qatarfund.org.qa/project/the-state-of-qatar-sends-two-planes-carrying- humanitarian-aid-to-support-the-sudanese-people/ 91 MEMO. (2024). Qatar confirms its support for the legitimate gov’t in Sudan. Middle East Monitor. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240725-qatar-confirms-its-support-for-the-legitimate-govt-in-sudan/ 101 Development, 202492; MEMO, 202493) Appendix 4: Qatar foreign policy response to crises and conflicts Timeline Regional crisis Qatar foreign policy (dv) and conflict as regional Actions Policies/discourses Alliances challenges (iv) 1996 The Bahraini Qatar did not Qatar made no -Neutral stance protests support the 1996 o icial statement toward the Bahraini uprising regarding the 1996 Bahraini and refrained Bahraini protests, monarchy, as from any military and no record exists Qatar neither or political in the Diwan backed the ruling interference. archives. Al Jazeera regime nor According to had not yet been supported the Daniszewski established, and Shi’a-led (1996)94, Qatar Qatar’s foreign opposition maintained a policy remained movement. neutral stance— quiet and non- neither backing interventionist the opposition under its new -Non-alignment nor openly leadership. The only with the supporting the indirect reference opposition, Bahraini comes from a maintaining monarchy— foreign envoy, who diplomatic silence unlike Saudi remarked: and avoiding any Arabia, which “Arab rulers stay in material or played an active power,” adding that rhetorical support role in Gulf states despite rumors of reinforcing “won’t stand for sectarian Bahrain’s anything to happen, sympathy. internal security. because it would set Despite regional a bad precedent,” rumors implying a shared -Alignment with suggesting regional stance that Saudi Arabia, Qatari sympathy included Qatar. through a shared 92 Previous reference 93 Previous reference 94 Daniszewski, J. (1996). Unrest in persian Gulf Isle of Bahrain has U.S. Unsettled. Los angeles times. Retrieved from https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-05-13-mn-3651-story.html 102 toward Shi’a (Daniszewski, preference for opposition 1996)95 regional regime groups due to stability and non- tensions with Indicating that intervention in Manama over Qatar, while publicly internal Gulf territorial silent, implicitly unrest. disputes, aligned with the particularly the GCC consensus in Hawar Islands, support of Bahrain’s monarchy— -Alignment with no credible other GCC states, evidence ever reflecting an early- emerged to stage, status quo- which collectively oriented foreign endorsed a policy substantiate of non- those claims. policy that avoided interference in interference and Qatar’s domestic unrest solidarity with leadership at the time, newly within Gulf Bahrain’s neighbors. monarchical transitioned system. under Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, -Divergence from was focused Iran, which was inward on accused by domestic Bahrain of reforms and supporting the regional image- Shi’a opposition, in building, rather contrast to Qatar’s than interfering restrained and in its neighbor’s non-provocative internal unrest. posture. (Daniszewski, 1996)96 2000- second Qatar's foreign The then-Prince -Alignment with 2005 Palestinian policy response Hamad bin Khalifa the Palestinian intifada. to the Second Al Thani stated: Authority, through Intifada (2000– “The Palestinians diplomatic 2005) was today are subjected recognition, public consistent with to the ugliest forms solidarity, and its broader pro- of repression and financial and Palestinian injustice…. Security humanitarian aid. stance, and peace in the emphasizing Middle East have diplomatic certain -Alignment with solidarity, requirements, and Turkey, based on 95 Previous reference 96 Previous reference 103 humanitarian cannot be achieved shared pro- aid, and media unless UN Palestinian support, but resolutions are rhetoric and without direct implemented and condemnation of military the Palestinian Israeli actions, involvement. people regains all its without direct legitimate national support for armed Qatar rights, foremost of resistance. maintained a which is its right to firm pro- self-determination, Palestinian the establishment of stance by -Alignment with its independent condemning Arab public state on its national Israeli sentiment, as soil with Jerusalem aggression, Qatar positioned as its capital and supporting the itself as a vocal Israeli withdrawal Palestinian supporter of from all the Arab Authority Palestinian rights lands that it diplomatically, across media and occupied in 1967.” and providing diplomacy. (Al Thani, 2002, May financial and 15)97 humanitarian aid through state Indicating Qatar’s -Divergence from and charitable firm alignment with Iran, which directly channels. It the Palestinian supported armed used its platform cause during the Palestinian at Arab League Second Intifada, factions, whereas summits to call grounded in Qatar emphasized for international international legal non-military protection for norms and pan-Arab engagement and Palestinians. solidarity— humanitarian Additionally, Al positioning itself solidarity. Jazeera, Qatar’s with broader Arab (Gause, 2003)98 state-funded consensus against network, played Israeli occupation a pivotal role in and in support of broadcasting the Palestinian self- Intifada with determination. sympathetic coverage, bolstering Qatar’s regional image as a vocal 97 Al-Thani, H. B. K. (2002, May 15). His Highness speech before the Parliament of South Africa. Amiri Diwan of the state of Qatar. https://diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2002/may/15/south-african-parliament?sc_lang=en 98 Gause, F. G. (2003). Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choices in the Gulf. Security Studies, 13(2), 273– 305. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248944987_Balancing_What_Threat_Perception_and_Alliance_Choicein_the_Gul f 104 defender of Palestinian rights. (Al Jazeera, 2004). 2002 Saudi Qatari In response to Then-prince Hamad -Severance of diplomatic crises. the 2002 has stated: “our diplomatic diplomatic crisis foreign policy is relations with with Saudi based on mutual Saudi Arabia, Arabia, Qatar respect, common following Riyadh’s resorted to soft interests, good withdrawal of its power and neighborly relations, ambassador over backchannel non-interference in Al Jazeera’s diplomacy rather the internal a airs of editorial freedom than other states and the and Qatar’s refusal confrontation. need to settle to concede. Despite Saudi disagreements and Arabia disputes between withdrawing its countries by -Divergence from ambassador peaceful and broader GCC over Al Jazeera’s diplomatic means consensus, as criticism, Qatar through direct most Gulf states neither censored negotiations, or by echoed Saudi the network nor resorting to concerns while issued public international Qatar asserted its concessions. arbitration.” (Al- autonomy and Instead, it Thani, 2002, May non-alignment on emphasized 15)100 regional media dialogue and maintained its This statement and reform. stance on media showcases Qatar’s independence, preference for using public dialogue, diplomatic -Initiation of a balancing strategy speeches by resolution, and legal then-Emir mechanisms as between Saudi central pillars of its Arabia and Iran, as Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Gulf regional Qatar expanded ties with Tehran to Thani to call for strategy, rather than regional confrontation or o set Saudi pressure while tolerance and coercive alignment, reform. Qatar’s particularly in crises avoiding full that directly involve alignment with approach either side. reflected a it. 100 Previous reference 105 broader strategy of asserting autonomy -Enhanced through alliance with controlled Turkey, based on liberalization shared regional and soft power interests and projection, mutual political rather than support amid GCC direct political tensions. alignment (Ulrichsen, 2014)99 -Alignment with Islamist factions, reflecting Qatar’s evolving outreach to Islamic political movements as a foreign policy tool. -Improved relations with other Arab states, using diplomatic diversification to mitigate the e ects of Saudi- led isolation. (Ulrichsen, 2014101; Qablan, 2020102) 2003 American military Qatar’s The then-Foreign -Strategic invasion of Iraq. response to the Minister Sheikh alignment with the 2003 U.S. Hamad bin Jassim United States, by invasion of Iraq stated: hosting U.S. was marked by a “I personally went to Central Command balancing Saddam with a at Al Udeid Air strategy that proposal at the time, Base and providing combined public and it caused quite a direct operational 99 Previous reference 101 Previous reference 102 Qabalan, M. (2020). Actors, Structures and Qatari foreign Policy. Arab centre Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/actors-structures-and-qatari-foreign-policy/ 106 diplomacy with stir. The proposal support for the strategic was that he invasion. cooperation. announce elections While Qatar within a year and expressed withdraw from the -Alignment with diplomatic political scene. His Saudi Arabia and opposition to response was the UAE, through unilateral essentially a shared military military action, rejection. Still, I had cooperation with supported Arab a three-hour, very U.S. forces, League e orts to frank discussion despite find a peaceful with him in person. di erences in resolution, and While I was in public rhetoric. o ered Baghdad, I publicly mediation, it declared that Qatar nonetheless would cooperate -Public alignment provided critical with the United with the Arab operational States in the League, by support to U.S. upcoming military endorsing forces through Al operation. In reality, diplomatic Udeid Air Base, everyone in the resolutions and which became region was expressing the primary hub cooperating with the opposition to for U.S. Central Americans — and unilateral military Command the evidence is intervention. operations. clear: most of the Former Prime missiles, cruise Minister Hamad missiles, and -Balancing bin Jassim aircraft used in the strategy between acknowledged operation came U.S. military that Gulf states, from our countries.” commitments and including Qatar, (Arabi, 2023)104 regional did not refuse Indicating Qatar’s diplomatic U.S. requests for pressure, allowing support after dual-track approach Qatar to preserve mediation of pursuing both its Western e orts with diplomatic de- escalation with alliance and Arab Saddam Saddam while legitimacy. Hussein failed, highlighting simultaneously Qatar’s aligning militarily with the United -Divergence from pragmatic Iran, which approach to States—reinforcing condemned the alliance its strategic obligations partnership with invasion and Western powers and positioned itself in staunch 104 Previous reference 107 (Arabi, 2023)103. acknowledging the opposition to the This dual-track broader, though U.S. military policy reflected covert, Gulf presence in the Doha’s broader consensus in Gulf. foreign policy support of the 2003 (Arabi, 2023)105 doctrine: invasion. publicly advocating dialogue and multilateralism, while maintaining strong security ties with Western powers. 2006 The Lebanon war Qatar responded Qatar’s o icial -Alignment with to the 2006 stance during the Lebanon’s political Israeli war on 2006 Israel– sovereignty, Lebanon with Lebanon war through direct both economic strongly opposed economic and military Israeli aggression assistance and support. Qatar and rejected the post-war provided quiet approval reconstruction in economic aid to expressed by some southern Lebanon. Lebanon by Arab governments. launching the Then–Foreign “Reconstruction Minister Sheikh -Military alignment Program of Hamad bin Jassim with the UN, as Lebanon,” which publicly criticized Qatar contributed was responsible Arab states that troops to UNIFIL — for fully gave a “green light” its first rebuilding four to the bombing of independent areas destroyed Lebanon, calling military by the war, as such approval a deployment well as restoring “dangerous outside collective all places of process” He Arab frameworks. worship emphasized that throughout Qatar’s support for southern Lebanon reflected 103 Arabi. (2023). Testimony of a former Qatari official about the invasion of Iraq ignites social media. Arabi21 news. Retrieved from https://arabi21.com/story/1501631/%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9- %D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A- %D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D9%88- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B9%D9%84- %D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84- %D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF 105 Previous reference 108 Lebanon public sentiment -Departure from (Rashid, within the country the collective Arab 2006)106. and challenged position including Militarily, Qatar sectarian framing by Saudi Arabia, also contributed asking, “If we Egypt, and other troops to the respect Christians Arab states, which United Nations and Jews, why don’t remained neutral Interim Force in we respect each or expressed tacit Lebanon other as sects?” alignment with (UNIFIL), Qatar also denied Western positions established facilitating U.S. during the war. under Security arms transfers to Council Israel, reinforcing its Resolution 1701, balanced diplomatic -Partial alignment making it the posture. He added: with Turkey, which only Arab “We do not support also supported country to Hezbollah militarily, Lebanese participate in but we do not sovereignty and this accept the logic of criticized the scale peacekeeping eliminating a of Israeli military mission (Al Lebanese political operations. Jazeera, group by foreign 2008)107. military force.” (Al Jazeera, 2006)108. Qatar’s -Clear distinction These statements participation in from Iran, as Qatar reflect Qatar’s UNIFIL marked did not support policy of non- its first Hezbollah intervention in independent militarily or Lebanese internal military politically, instead a airs while engagement advocating a state-opposing foreign without broader based response interference, Arab alignment rooted in indicating its — a pivotal sovereignty and political support for moment that diplomacy. Lebanon’s right to signaled a shift resist and its toward a more rejection of e orts 106 Rashid, T., Z. (2006). Qatar develops 50% of southern Lebanon and prepares for the second phase. Aljazeera net. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2006/12/27/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1- %D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1-50-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8- %D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF- %D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A9 107 Aljazeera. (2008). Qatar announces not extending the mission of its battalion in Lebanon. Aljazeera net. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2008/2/7/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86- %D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9- %D9%83%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A 108 Aljazeera. (2006). Qatar condemns Arab countries' approval to strike Lebanon. Aljazeera net. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2006/8/1/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1- %D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%83%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9- %D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89- %D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8 109 autonomous to delegitimize -Alignment with and values- Hezbollah. Lebanese public driven foreign sentiment, by policy, grounded investing in in Arab reconstruction and legitimacy and visibly opposing national Israeli military sovereignty. actions. (Rashid, 2006109; Al Jazeera, 2006110, 2008111) 2007 The crisis (mediation) -No statements -Strengthening of Bulgarian nurses were found, which is bilateral ties with in Libya. an example of the Czech (Aljazeera, Qatar mediated Qatar’s quiet Republic, through 2022)112 and as a result diplomacy, where successful the Bulgarian the state plays a role diplomatic nurses in Libya behind the scenes engagement in have been without overt public securing the released. announcements. release of the (Aljazeera, detained nurses. 2022)113 -Positive alignment with the European Union, as the European Commission publicly praised Qatar’s mediation, enhancing its diplomatic credibility with EU institutions. Associated Press , 2007)114 109 Previous reference 110 Previous reference 111 Previous reference 112 Aljazeera. (2022). Files that the Qatari mediation succeeded in resolving with agreements. Aljazeera network, Files Successfully Resolved by Qatari Mediation with Agreements | Encyclopedia | Al , Jazeera Net (aljazeera.net) 113 Previous reference 114 Associated Press. (2007, July 24). Libya frees HIV case medics. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/24/libya 110 2007 the Southern In 2007, as the -No statements -Alignment with Movement in Southern were found. the central Yemeni Yemen Movement (Al- government (Ali Hirak) emerged Abdullah Saleh), in Yemen calling rea irming for greater support for autonomy in the Yemen’s national south, Qatar unity and territorial maintained a integrity. neutral position toward the group and focused -Diplomatic instead on distance from Al- supporting Hirak, as Qatar Yemeni national avoided unity. The Qatari engagement with regime the Southern politically Movement’s backed autonomy President Ali demands and Abdullah Saleh’s maintained a government, unitary-state rea irming its position. commitment to Yemen’s territorial -Divergence from integrity and emerging UAE centralized narratives, authority. As especially the noted in Raya UAE’s later (2007)115, Qatar’s support (post- position was 2015) for southern explicitly in favor autonomy, which of national unity stood in contrast and against to Qatar’s unity- separatist focused stance. tendencies. At the same time, (Raya, 2007 117; al Doha channeled Jazeera, 2019) 118 its diplomatic energy into 115 Raya. (2007, September 16). اليمن: الحزب الحاكم يهدد بتسليح السكان[Yemen: Ruling party threatens to arm citizens]. Raya. https://www.raya.com/2007/09/16/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%85- %D9%8A%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AD- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%A7/ 117 Previous reference 118 Al Jazeera. (2019, September 20). Who are South Yemen's separatists? https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/20/who- are-south-yemens-separatists 111 mediating the conflict in northern Yemen between the government and Houthi rebels, rather than engaging with southern demands. (Raya, 2007)116 2007- The Houthis Between 2007 Qatar’s position was -Alignment with 2010 conflict in Yemen. and 2010, Qatar o icially a irmed by the Yemeni played a unique Mohammed bin government (Ali role in Yemen’s Abdullah Al- Abdullah Saleh), Houthi conflict Rumaihi, Qatar’s through public by positioning Assistant Minister of support for itself as a Foreign A airs, who national unity and regional stated: “The level of territorial integrity. mediator rather Qatari diplomatic than a partisan dynamism qualifies actor. It brokered it to work -Diplomatic multiple successfully on engagement with ceasefire issues that concern the Houthis, as agreements the security of the Qatar uniquely between the region and the positioned itself as Yemeni world… Doha's a mediator without government and successful endorsing the the Houthi mediation between group’s political or movement, Sana'a and the military objectives. starting with the Houthis in Saada 2007 Doha- Governorate comes -Divergence from brokered deal. within the the UAE, which Despite framework of the dismissed the repeated policy of Houthis as a threat breakdowns in establishing the and did not the truces, Qatar foundations of participate in remained regional and global diplomatic diplomatically stability” (Raya, resolution e orts engaged, 2007)120. This during this period. 121 marking the only statement (Barakat, 2012) Gulf state underscores Qatar’s 116 Previous reference 120 Raya. (2007, June 17). قطر تطفئ حريق الحوثيين في جبال صعدة[Qatar extinguishes the Houthi fire in the Saada mountains]. Raya. https://www.raya.com/2007/06/17/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%81%D8%A6- %D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86- %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9/ 121 Previous reference 112 involved in direct framing of its Houthi negotiations mediation as part of with both parties a broader strategy to during that enhance its regional period. While role through soft maintaining power and open diplomatic communication engagement. with the Houthis, Qatar did not endorse their political goals or military actions. It publicly supported the legitimacy of the Yemeni government under Ali Abdullah Saleh and emphasized Yemen’s national unity and territorial integrity. Qatar’s approach reflected its broader regional strategy of conflict mediation, non- military engagement, and soft diplomacy. (Barakat, 2012)119 2008 Lebanon vacuum In 2008, Qatar This success was -Balancing of power played a pivotal underscored by between regional diplomatic role then-Emir Sheikh rival blocs, in resolving Hamad bin Khalifa particularly the Lebanon’s Al Thani, who Saudi- and Iran- prolonged declared at the aligned Lebanese political crisis, close of the factions, without which had left negotiations: “I 119 Barakat, S. (2012). The Qatari Spring: Qatar’s Emerging Role in Peacemaking. London School of Economics, Brookings Doha Center. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-qatari-spring-qatars-emerging-role-in-peacemaking/ 113 the country would like to assure overtly siding with without a the people of either. president for Lebanon who took over 18 months. to the streets Under Qatari demanding that the -Improved indirect sponsorship and leaders coming here relations with Iran, mediation, only return when through e ective Lebanese they strike an engagement with political factions agreed-upon deal, Hezbollah during reached a and they are now on the mediation historic their way back, process. agreement after turning together and five days of with their people a negotiations in new page that will -Alignment with Doha, ending hopefully be clear Turkey, years of political and peaceful” (Al- foreshadowing paralysis. The Thani, 2008, May deeper strategic resulting Doha 21)123. His statement ties post-2011 Agreement, emphasized Qatar’s through shared brokered by role not only as a support for Qatari Prime political mediator inclusive Minister Sheikh but also as a governance and Hamad bin facilitator of political dialogue. Jassim bin Jaber national consensus Al Thani, rooted in public outlined the demand and -Enhanced election of regional legitimacy. credibility with General Michel Western powers, Suleiman as a including the U.S. consensus and France, due to president, the Qatar’s successful formation of a peacemaking and national unity role in stabilizing a government volatile Arab state. (comprising 16 ministers from the majority, 11 -Alignment with from the international and opposition, and regional actors, by 3 appointed by delivering a the president), negotiated and the adoption outcome that was of a new widely endorsed electoral law. as a legitimate This mediation resolution to the 123 Al-Thani, H. (2008, May 21). Closing session of the national Lebanese dialogue. Amiri Diwan of the state of Qatar. https://diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2008/may/21/closing-session-of-the-national-lebanese-dialogue 114 was widely political deadlock. recognized as a (Barakat, 2012)124 major success in Qatari diplomacy and reflected its growing influence as a regional conflict mediator (Al Jazeera, 2008)122. 2009 Gaza war as part (mediation) Then-prince Hamad -Strengthened of the has stated: “We alignment with Palestinian/Israeli called in Qatar for Hamas, through conflict. Mediation e ort an emergency Arab direct political (Aljazeera, that led to a summit to take a engagement, 2022).125 truce between stand on the public support, the Palestinian aggression on Gaza. and hosting factions and the The movement of leadership figures Israeli the Arab street and in Doha following occupation. many peace forces the war. (Aljazeera, in the world proved 2022).126 that this is the least that people expect -Strained relations In addition to from us. Our opinion with Egypt, due to holding an was and still is that Cairo’s opposition emergency Arab we can do to Qatar’s summit. (Al- something and that unilateral decision Thani, 2009, Jan the problem does to host an 4)127 not lie in the emergency Arab summit, but in our summit without will that we bring to Arab League the summit. When consensus, which we have the will, we Egypt viewed as can take decisions undermining its that will have an central role in impact on the Gaza-related international arena diplomacy. 122 Previous reference 124 Previous reference 125 Previous reference 126 Previous reference 127 Al-Thani, H. (2009, Jan 4).to the Arab nations on the occasion of the Israili aggresion on Gaza. Amiri Diwan of the state of Qatar. https://diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2009/jan/4/to-the-arab-nation-on-the-occasion-of-the- israeli-aggression-on-gaza 115 and on Israel.” (Al- -Tension with Thani, 2009, Jan 4)128 Saudi Arabia, which declined to Indicating Qatar’s attend the summit push for assertive and preferred the Arab diplomacy in Egyptian-led response to the diplomatic Israeli assault on framework, Gaza, highlighting viewing Qatar’s its e ort to position move as a itself as a proactive challenge to regional mediator traditional Gulf aligned with popular leadership. and Islamist sentiments, and contrasting with the more cautious or -Divergence from status quo-aligned the UAE, which Arab states. supported Egypt’s position and remained wary of Qatar’s ties to Hamas and Islamist factions. -Alignment with Turkey, which condemned Israeli actions in Gaza and backed Qatari-led humanitarian and political responses, reinforcing emerging Qatari- Turkish coordination. -Parallel alignment with Iran, as both states strongly condemned Israel and supported Palestinian 128 Previous reference 116 resistance movements, though without coordinated mediation. -Divergence from Israel, through direct condemnation of Israeli military action and e orts to position Qatar as a mediator and humanitarian actor favoring Palestinian factions. (Al Jazeera, 2009a)129 2011 Darfur crises (mediation) The Qatari Minister -Strengthened between of State for Foreign alignment with the Sudanese A airs, Ahmed bin Sudanese government and Mediation: Abdullah Al- government, as a the Liberation Darfur Peace Mahmoud, co- result of the lead and Justice Document chaired the All mediating role in Movement (Aljazeera, Darfur Stakeholders the Darfur peace 2022)130. Conference in May process and 2011, which laid the hosting the 2011 groundwork for the Doha Agreement. DDPD. Stated: “We (Sudan Tribune, hope this deal will 2011)132 be the basis to reach a peace agreement in Darfur.” “We believe that the people of Darfur are the key to the solution,” he 129 Al Jazeera. (2009a, January 13). Egypt rejects Arab summit call. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/1/13/egypt- rejects-arab-summit-call 130 Previous reference 132 Sudan Tribune. (2011, July 15). Sudan and LJM rebels sign a Darfur peace agreement in Doha. https://sudantribune.com/article44505/ 117 added. (United Nations, 2011) 131 2011 Djibouti-Eritrea (mediation) -No statements -Strengthened crisis over border were found. bilateral ties with dispute. both Djibouti and Mediation: Eritrea, as Qatar Djibouti-Eritrea became the only reconciliation Gulf country agreement trusted by both (Aljazeera, governments 2022)133. during the dispute. 2012 Fatah and Hamas (mediation) -No statements -Strengthened ongoing dispute were found. alignment with Hamas, as Qatar Mediation: hosted the Reconciliation reconciliation talks between Fatah and supported and Hamas Hamas politically and financially. (Aljazeera, 2022)134. -Temporary engagement with Fatah, through facilitating Mahmoud Abbas’s participation in the Doha Agreement, although tensions later resurfaced over implementation. -Contrasting approach to Egypt, which viewed Hamas as a security threat and remained skeptical of 131 United Nations. (2011, May 19). Qatar hosts Darfur peace talks in Doha. UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/05/376632 133 Previous reference 134 Previous reference 118 Qatar’s support for the group. -Reinforced alignment with Turkey, as both countries shared strategic support for Hamas and called for unified Palestinian representation. -Divergence from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which remained distant from Hamas and favored a Fatah- dominated Palaestian authority without Islamist influence. Gause, 2014)135 2013 Fighting escalates (mediation) Qatar ministry of -Maintained strong in Darfur, and the foreign a air issued ties with the agreement signed a statement stating: Sudanese with Qatari Mediation e ort “Qatar urges all government under mediation in 2011 which didn’t fully Darfur parties to Omar al-Bashir. was violated succeed but adhere to the Doha Qatar eased the Peace Agreement tension and avoid returning (Aljazeera, to armed conflict.” 2022)136. This reflects Qatar’s e ort to sustain its mediating credibility and reinforce the legitimacy of the 135 Gause, F. G. III. (2014). Beyond sectarianism: The new Middle East cold war. Brookings Doha Center. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/beyond-sectarianism-the-new-middle-east-cold-war/ 136 Previous reference 119 DDPD framework. (Al Jazeera, 2013)137 2012 Gaza war as part (mediation) -No statements Diplomatic of the were found. engagement with Palestinian/Israeli Israel, albeit conflict Mediation e ort indirectly, by led to A truce facilitating a truce between the without formal Palestinian recognition or factions and the direct diplomatic Israeli relations. occupation (Aljazeera, 2022)138. - Strained relations with Egypt, which viewed Qatar’s direct involvement with Hamas as encroaching on Cairo’s traditional role as mediator in Gaza. - Increased Western visibility, especially with the U.S., which recognized Qatar’s role in maintaining temporary calm but remained cautious about its Hamas ties. (Gause, 2014)139 2014 Gaza war as part (mediation) -No statements -Strengthened of the were found. alignment with Palestinian/Israeli Hamas, as Qatar, conflict Mediation e ort alongside Turkey, led to A truce advocated for between the Hamas’s ceasefire Palestinian demands and factions and the supported post- 137 Al Jazeera. (2013, April 7). Fighting flares in Darfur despite peace deal. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/4/7/fighting-flares-in-darfur-despite-peace-deal 138 Previous reference 139 Previous reference 120 Israeli war reconstruction occupation e orts in Gaza. (Aljazeera, 2022)140. -Indirect coordination with the U.S., which acknowledged Qatar’s role as a key interlocutor with Hamas, despite Washington’s o icial designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization. -Tension with Egypt, which rejected the Qatari-Turkish ceasefire proposal and insisted on its own Cairo-led framework, viewing Qatar’s involvement as undermining its regional influence. -Divergence from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which supported Egypt’s position and viewed Qatar’s engagement with Hamas as destabilizing and aligned with political Islam. 140 Previous reference 121 -Close coordination with Turkey, reflecting a unified diplomatic front in supporting Hamas politically and advocating for Gaza’s reconstruction. (Gause, 2014)141 2014 nuns detained in (mediation) -No statements -Reinforced Northern Syria were found, which is alignment with an example of Islamist and Mediation e ort Qatar’s quiet armed Syrian led to the diplomacy, where opposition groups, release of nuns the state plays a role by acting as an detained in behind the scenes e ective mediator Northern Syria without overt public trusted by factions (Aljazeera, announcements. holding the 2022)142. hostages. -Informal coordination with Lebanon, particularly through operational collaboration with General Abbas Ibrahim during the negotiation and release process. -Divergence from Egypt and the UAE, as the mediation further amplified their criticisms of Qatar’s ties to Islamist actors and its role in 141 Previous reference 142 Previous reference 122 Syrian opposition networks. (Al-Jazeera, 2014)143 2014 The after math of (mediation) -No statements -Significant September 11 were found. Strengthened of between the US the strategic and Taliban Mediation e ort alignment with the led to the United States, by prisoner facilitating the exchange prisoner swap and between the becoming Taliban and Washington’s America primary (Aljazeera, intermediary for 2022)144. future negotiations with the Taliban. -Initiated diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, through hosting its political o ice in Doha, positioning Qatar as a neutral conduit rather than a partisan actor. (Ulrichsen, 2020)145 2014 Gulf diplomatic Qatar’s In March 2014, -Severance of crisis response to the following the diplomatic 2014 Gulf withdrawal of relations by Saudi diplomatic crisis ambassadors by Arabia, the UAE, reflected a Saudi Arabia, the and Bahrain, strategy of United Arab following tactical de- Emirates, and accusations escalation Bahrain, Qatar against Qatar of 143 Al-Jazeera. (2014, March 10). Nuns kidnapped in Syria freed after three months. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/nuns-kidnapped-syria-freed-after-three-months- 2014310231735492120.html 144 Previous reference 145 Ulrichsen, K. C. (2020). Qatar and the Gulf Crisis. Hurst & Company. https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/qatar-and- the-gulf-crisis/ 123 without o icially expressed supporting the abandoning its "regret and surprise" Muslim core foreign over the decision. Brotherhood and policy The Qatari interfering in principles. The government regional a airs. crisis was emphasized its triggered when commitment to the Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation -Divergence from UAE, and Council (GCC) and Egypt, which, Bahrain maintained that it while not formally withdrew their had not interfered in involved in the ambassadors the internal a airs rupture, politically from Doha, of its neighbors. (Al aligned with Saudi- accusing Qatar Jazeera, 2014)147 led pressure of supporting the Which indicates against Doha. Muslim Qatar’s preference Brotherhood and for diplomatic interfering in restraint and its -Sustained regional a airs. attempt to frame the alignment with While Egypt was crisis as a Islamist actors, as not an o icial misunderstanding Qatar refused to party to the rift, rather than a renounce its it supported the confrontation, support for pressure against reinforcing its Brotherhood- Qatar politically. broader linked figures and In response, commitment to continued backing Qatar chose not regional unity and ideological allies to reciprocate by non-intervention. regionally. recalling its own ambassadors, highlighting its -Strengthened commitment to strategic alliance regional stability with Turkey, and unity. deepening Instead, it bilateral ties into a engaged in quiet broader regional diplomacy and partnership took limited centered on conciliatory shared support for steps, including the Syrian the expulsion of opposition and several high- Islamist profile Muslim movements. Brotherhood figures in 147 Al Jazeera. (2014, March 6). Saudi, UAE, Bahrain withdraw Qatar envoys. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/3/6/saudi-uae-bahrain-withdraw-qatar-envoys 124 September 2014 -Reinforced and a noticeable diplomatic and softening in Al economic Jazeera’s coordination with coverage of Iran, including Egypt’s military cooperation in regime. energy and However, Qatar regional de- did not escalation, despite fundamentally sectarian and alter its strategic ideological posture or di erences. renounce its relationships with Islamist -Solidified actors, instead alignment with maintaining a Western powers, calibrated particularly the distance while U.S., U.K., and rea irming its France, commitment to maintaining media autonomy defense and and regional security mediation. The cooperation crisis was throughout the formally crisis. resolved with the Riyadh Agreement in -Avoided formal November 2014, rupture with GCC, brokered by not recalling primarily by ambassadors or Kuwait, which exiting the alliance restored structure, opting diplomatic ties instead for tactical without requiring de-escalation and Qatar to shift its eventual ideological reconciliation orientation through the Riyadh (Ulrichsen, Agreement. 2014; Al Jazeera, (Carmon & Meital, 2014)146 2014148; American Iranian Council, 146 Previous reference 148 Carmon, Y., & Meital, C. (2014). Turkey-Qatar relations: From bilateral ties to strategic partnership. JNS. https://www.jns.org/turkey-qatar-relations-from-bilateral-ties-to-strategic-partnership 125 2022149; Ulrichsen, 2014150) 2014- The rise of In 2014, Qatar’s In August 2014, -Military alignment 2015 Islamists response to the Qatari Foreign with the U.S.-led violence-armed rise of ISIS was Minister Khalid bin coalition, providing non state actors multifaceted, Mohammad Al strategic and such as ISIS involving military Attiyah publicly logistical support cooperation, rejected allegations through Al Udeid diplomatic that Qatar Air Base, in engagement, supported ISIS, coordination with financial stating: "Qatar does the U.S., U.K., regulation, and not support France, and other public extremist groups, NATO allies. condemnation. including [ISIS], in Qatar joined the any way. We are U.S.-led repelled by their -Alignment with coalition against views, their violent Gulf partners, ISIS, providing methods and their including Saudi logistical and ambitions" (Reuters, Arabia, the UAE, strategic support 2014)152 and Jordan, in through Al Udeid Air Base, which This statement opposing ISIS served as a key indicates Qatar’s militarily and participating in operational hub e ort to publicly for coalition distance itself from coalition e orts. airstrikes in Syria violent extremist and Iraq. groups and rea irm its alignment with -Strengthened Although Qatar’s strategic direct military international counterterrorism coordination with role was limited, it aligned with norms, while Turkey, especially managing regional through regional powers criticism and intelligence-such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, maintaining its sharing, and Jordan in support for more humanitarian support, and opposing ISIS moderate militarily. It also opposition factions. aligned political goals in northern cooperated Syria. closely with Turkey in diplomatic -Sustained e orts, alignment with the intelligence- 149 American Iranian Council. (2022). Media guide: Iran-Qatar relations. https://www.us-iran.org/resources/2022/3/1/media- guide-qatar 150 Previous reference 152 Reuters. (2014, August 27). Qatar rejects claims it supports Islamic State militants. https://www.reuters.com/article/us- iraq-security-qatar-idUSKBN0GR0F820140827 126 sharing, and Syrian opposition, humanitarian maintaining assistance in diplomatic and areas a ected financial support by ISIS, for anti-Assad particularly groups — some of northern Syria. which operated in At the same contested terrain time, Qatar with ISIS. maintained support for Syrian -Partial divergence opposition from coalition groups fighting partners, due to both the Assad Qatar’s continued regime and ISIS, support for though this drew Islamist factions international within the Syrian scrutiny over opposition, which potential links to drew Western extremist scrutiny over elements. In ideological overlap response to and alleged global pressure, extremism. Qatar enacted counterterrorism financing -Enhanced reforms, alignment with increasing international oversight of counterterrorism private norms, following donations and global pressure, by tightening tightening financial regulations to regulations and prevent illicit increasing funding flows. oversight to Additionally, prevent terrorist Qatari o icials financing. and media publicly . (Al Jazeera, denounced 2014) 153 ISIS’s ideology and actions, emphasizing the group's deviation from Islamic 153 Previous reference 127 values and framing it as a threat to regional and religious stability (Al Jazeera, 2014)151 2015 Conflict after al- (mediation) -No statements -Strengthened Nusra Front were found. alignment with kidnapped Lebanon, Lebanese Mediation e ort particularly soldiers led to the through direct release of cooperation with kidnapped its military and Lebanese intelligence soldiers services during the (Aljazeera, mediation 2022)154. process. -Reinforced informal alignment with Syrian Islamist factions, by facilitating negotiations with al-Nusra Front and other armed groups involved in the hostage situation. -Divergence from the UAE and Egypt, which opposed engagement with Islamist armed groups and viewed Qatar’s mediation as legitimizing extremist actors. 151 Previous reference 154 Previous reference 128 -Contrasting alignment posture with Iran and Hezbollah, as Qatar’s successful mediation elevated its role among Lebanese Sunnis, countering Tehran’s and Hezbollah’s influence in the Lebanese arena. (Al Jazeera, 2015)155 2015 During Libya’s (mediation) -No statements -Informal civil war, an were found. alignment with armed clashes Libyan tribal occurred after Mediation e ort factions, Tubu gunmen led to Tabu and particularly Tuareg attacked the Tuareg and Tabu actors, National Security agreement in through mediation Centre controlled Libya (Aljazeera, aimed at reducing by a Tuareg 2022)156. The local conflict in armed group. mediation e ort southern Libya. positioned Qatar as a tribal-level peace facilitator -Indirect alignment in Libya with Libya Dawn– a iliated groups, whose political networks overlapped with the tribal actors Qatar supported. -Divergence from Egypt and the UAE, which backed the 155 Al Jazeera. (2015, December 1). Qatar-brokered deal secures release of Lebanese soldiers. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/1/qatar-brokered-deal-secures-release-of-lebanese-soldiers 156 Previous reference 129 rival Haftar-aligned Libyan National Army and rejected Qatar’s engagement with Islamist and non- state actors. (Al Jazeera, 2015a)157 2015 The war in (mediation) While no formal -Strengthened Afghanistan statement was strategic between the issued on the alignment with the government and The Afghan Ministry’s website, United States, by Taliban government and Qatar’s role in hosting the Taliban the Taliban facilitating dialogue Political O ice in negotiations between the Afghan Doha and aiming at ending government and the facilitating early of war. Taliban in 2015 was peace contacts (Aljazeera, widely with U.S. backing. 2022)158. acknowledged by regional media and This mediation supported by the -Reinforced enhanced continued operation diplomatic Qatar’s of the Taliban engagement with reputation as a Political O ice in the Taliban, conflict Doha. (Aljazeera, positioning Qatar mediator as it 2015b) as a long-term positioned Qatar intermediary in as a neutral Afghan regional broker negotiations. with both Western and Islamist actors. (Aljazeera, -Divergence from 2015b)159 the UAE and Egypt, whose governments criticized Qatar’s outreach to the Taliban as part of its broader engagement with Islamist actors. (Aljazeera, 2015b) 157 Al-Jazeera. (2015a, November 24). Tuareg and Tebu sign Qatar-brokered peace deal. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/24/tuareg-and-tebu-sign-qatar-brokered-peace-deal 158 Previous reference 159 Al Jazeera. (2015b, July 8). Afghanistan holds first official peace talks with Taliban. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/7/8/afghanistan-holds-first-official-peace-talks-with-taliban 130 2016 Crisis between (mediation) The Foreign Minister -strengthened Djibouti and of Qatar, Sheikh Qatar’s bilateral Eritrea Mohammed bin ties with Djibouti, Mediation e ort Abdulrahman Al- which publicly led to the Thani, stated that praised Doha’s release of “the State of Qatar role. Djiboutian has made intensive prisoners in e orts over the past Eritrea period to broker the -It allowed Qatar (Aljazeera, release of the to serve as a 2022)160. Djiboutian prisoners neutral of war in Eritrea,” interlocutor with adding that “HH the Eritrea, a state Emir of Qatar Sheikh with limited Gulf Tamim bin Hamad engagement at the Al-Thani was time. personally overseeing the process.” This -boosted Qatar’s statement credibility within implicates Qatar’s the African Union strong commitment and Horn of Africa to high-level more broadly, diplomacy and its contributing to its investment in strategic outreach regional stability beyond the Gulf. through direct leadership -However, the involvement. It also e ort was abruptly reflects Qatar’s disrupted in 2017 preference for soft when Qatar power and withdrew its mediation as core peacekeeping tools of its foreign forces from the policy. (Ministry of Djibouti–Eritrea Foreign A airs – border following Qatar, 2016)161 the Gulf blockade — a decision that strained trust and left the mediation unresolved. 160 Previous reference 161 Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Qatar. (2016, March 18). Foreign Minister: Qatar made intensive efforts to release Djiboutian prisoners of war in Eritrea. https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2016/03/18/foreign- minister-qatar-made-intensive-efforts-to-release-djiboutian-prisoners-of-war-in-eritrea- 131 (Ulrichsen, 2020)162 2017 The completion of (mediation) -No statements -Strengthened peace process were found. bilateral alignment between with Djibouti, Sudanese Mediation e ort which publicly government and led to praised Qatar’s the movement of Agreement mediation and “the Sudan between the peacekeeping Liberation Army- Government of e orts during the Second Sudan and the border crisis. Revolution "Sudan Movement” Liberation Army - Second -Initiated Revolution" diplomatic movement engagement with (Aljazeera, Eritrea, acting as a 2022)163. rare Gulf intermediary with a diplomatically isolated state. -Expanded regional alignment with the African Union and Horn of Africa actors, enhancing Qatar’s soft-power presence and outreach across East Africa. -Severance of alignment with both parties in 2017, following Qatar’s withdrawal of peacekeepers amid the Gulf blockade, which 162 Previous reference 163 Previous reference 132 damaged trust and ended its mediating role in the conflict. (Ulrichsen, 2020)164 2017 2017 GCC In 2017, Qatar's Qatar's Foreign -Full severance of blockade response to the Minister, Sheikh diplomatic, diplomatic crisis Mohammed bin economic, and involved several Abdulrahman Al- territorial ties by key actions. It Thani, emphasized Saudi Arabia, the filed that any resolution UAE, Bahrain, and international to the Gulf crisis Egypt, which complaints with must begin with imposed a land, global lifting the blockade. air, and sea organizations to He stated: “We are blockade on Qatar, address the with the principle of accusing it of diplomatic rift. dialogue to resolve supporting The country the Gulf crisis, but terrorism and adopted a clarified that destabilizing the defensive rather dialogue also region. than o ensive requires lifting the approach in its embargo.” foreign policy. -Military alliance Qatar also He further stressed with Turkey, pursued that Qatar remained dialogue and open to diplomatic activated through attempted solutions. (Ministry the 2014 defense reconciliation of Foreign A airs - agreement, Qatar, 2017) 167 resulting in the with the deployment of blockading Turkish troops and countries. (Coll, the establishment 2017)165 On 19/9/2017 Emir of a permanent Sheikh Tamim bin In parallel, it military base in Hamad Al Thani leveraged its Qatar. rea irmed Qatar's relationships commitment to with other dialogue: nations and -Restoring full sought “We have taken an diplomatic and alternative open attitude economic 164 Previous reference 165 Coll, S. (2017, June 29). How can the Qatar crisis be resolved? The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-can-the-qatar-crisis-be-resolved 167 Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Qatar. (2017, June 19). Foreign Minister: No solution to Gulf crisis unless siege lifted, then dialogue. https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2017/06/19/foreign-minister-no-solution-to-gulf- crisis-unless-siege-lifted-then-dialogue 133 sources for food towards dialogue relations with Iran, and other without dictation as Qatar restored essential and have expressed diplomatic ties supplies. As part our readiness to and expanded of its broader resolve di erences trade cooperation, strategy, Qatar through particularly in food activated a compromises based supplies and military on common airspace access agreement undertakings.” during the signed with (Amiri Diwan , blockade. Turkey in 2014, 2017)168 which led to the establishment of -Reinforced a Turkish military Qatar's Permanent strategic base on Qatari Representative to alignment with the soil (Daily the United Nations, United States, Sabah, 2021)166 Ambassador maintaining Additionally, Sheikha Alya bint military Qatar launched Ahmed bin Saif Al- cooperation the media outlet Thani, addressed through Al Udeid Al-Araby Al- the Security Air Base and Jadeed as an Council, stating receiving strong alternative to Al “The State of Qatar U.S. backing Jazeera, aiming has reiterated against security to present a adherence to threats during the fresh resolving the crisis crisis. perspective with the blockading amid criticisms countries by of the latter’s peaceful diplomatic -Expanded credibility means and through economic mediation and partnership with constructive China, deepening unconditional energy dialogue.” (Ministry cooperation and of Foreign A airs - attracting Chinese Qatar, 2020) 169 investment to These statements diversify Qatar’s indicate Qatar’s international consistent alliances and diplomatic stance economic throughout the Gulf resilience. 166 Daily Sabah. (2021, December 7). Turkey, Qatar strengthen bilateral ties with 15 new deals. https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-qatar-strengthen-bilateral-ties-with-15-new-deals 168 Amiri Diwan. (2017, September 19). Speech by His Highness the Emir at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. https://www.diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2017/september/19/sp_unitednations72 169 Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Qatar. (2020, July 23). Qatar reiterates adherence to resolving crisis with blockading countries by peaceful means. https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/1441/12/02/qatar-reiterates- adherence-to-resolving-crisis-with-blockading-countries-by-peaceful-means 134 crisis—emphasizing peaceful resolution, unconditional -Initiated defense dialogue, and and diplomatic compromise, while engagement with also turning to Russia, including international high-level military organizations and agreements and legal frameworks to coordination on challenge the regional security blockade and a irm forums. its sovereignty, with the clear condition that negotiations -Alignment with could not proceed Islamist actors under coercive continued, as pressure. Qatar maintained political space for the Muslim Brotherhood and hosted a iliated figures despite regional pressure. (Al Jazeera , 2017170; Albawaba , n.d171.; Al Jazeera , 2018172) These alliances were taken allowing Qatar to counter regional isolation and reinforce its global standing. 2019 The 19 years (mediation) “Qatar welcomes -Deepened American war on the agreement strategic Taliban in between the United alignment with the Afghanistan Mediation e ort States and the United States, as led to America's Taliban, which was Qatar’s mediation 170 Al Jazeera. (2017, June 18). Analysis: The implications of the Qatar-Turkey alliance. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/6/18/analysis-the-implications-of-the-qatar-turkey-alliance 171 Albawaba. (n.d.). Qatar’s new foreign policy: How massive defense spending, pivot East, and assertive diplomacy are bolstering Doha’s influence. Albawaba. https://www.albawaba.com/news/qatars-new-foreign-policy-how-massive-defense- spending-pivot-east-and-assertive-diplomacy-are-b 172 Al Jazeera. (2018, February 18). Qatar’s blockade in 2017: Day-by-day developments. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/18/qatars-blockade-in-2017-day-by-day-developments 135 talks with the signed in Doha… role reinforced its Taliban to get out The State of Qatar status as a key of Afghanistan rea irms its regional security (Aljazeera, commitment to partner and 2022)173. support all trusted diplomatic international e orts channel. This mediation that aim to bring Further lasting peace to di erentiated Afghanistan.” Qatar from other -Maintained (Ministry of Foreign Gulf countries, balanced A airs – Qatar, especially the diplomatic 2019)174 UAE and Saudi engagement with Arabia, which the Taliban, were excluded positioning Qatar from the U.S.– as the primary Taliban conduit for negotiation dialogue between process and it the group and Strengthened Western Qatar’s governments. reputation as a . (Ulrichsen, mediator with 2020)175 non-state actors, enhancing its global credibility in conflict resolution diplomacy. 2021 Gaza war as part (mediation) -No statements -Reinforced of the were found. alignment with Palestinian/Israeli Hamas and conflict Mediation e ort Palestinian led to A truce factions in Gaza, between the through sustained Palestinian mediation e orts, factions and the political Israeli engagement, and occupation financial support. (Aljazeera, 2022)176. 173 Previous reference 174 Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Qatar. (2019, February 25). Qatar welcomes peace talks between U.S. and Taliban in Doha. https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/statement/detail/2019/02/25/qatar-welcomes-peace-talks-between-us-and-taliban-in- doha 175 Previous reference 176 Previous reference 136 -Maintained limited coordination with Israel, specifically on humanitarian and reconstruction channels, without formal diplomatic relations. -Continued divergence from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which remained wary of Hamas and skeptical of Qatar’s engagement with Islamist actors. (Gause, 2014)177 2021 Dispute between (mediation) Qatar’s Ministry of -Strengthened Kenya and Foreign A airs bilateral ties with Somalia issued an o icial Somalia, Negotiations statement rea irming Qatar’s between Kenya confirming that its role as a trusted and Somalia led Special Envoy of the diplomatic ally to end of dispute Foreign Minister for through and return of Counterterrorism successful conflict relationship and Mediation in de-escalation (Aljazeera, Conflict Resolution, e orts. 2022)178. Dr. Mutlaq bin Majed Al-Qahtani, mediated between -Enhanced Kenya and Somalia. diplomatic The statement engagement with emphasized that Kenya, as Qatar’s Qatar “welcomes mediation led to the decision of the the restoration of Republic of Somalia diplomatic relations and 177 Previous reference 178 Previous reference 137 and the Republic of improved its Kenya to restore influence in East diplomatic Africa. relations,” and a irmed that this step was achieved -Bolstered through Qatari alignment with diplomatic e orts. African Union (Ministry of Foreign diplomacy and A airs – Qatar., international 2021)179 conflict-resolution This mediation frameworks, di erentiated Qatar gaining credibility from regional rivals as a stabilizing like the UAE, which force over had fluctuating economic relations with competition- Somalia at the time. driven actors. To add, it expanded regional soft power, positioning Qatar as -Expanded a credible third- strategic presence party actor in Horn in the Horn of of Africa disputes Africa, rea irming and non-Arab Qatar’s regional diplomatic crises. outreach and soft power consolidation following the 2017 Gulf crisis. (al Jazeera, 2021) 2022 The failure and (mediation) Then Emir said in an -Strengthened the desire to interview in 2011 diplomatic reopen the 2015 regarding Iran that alignment with the Iran nuclear Indirect “as far as I know United States, by agreement with mediation e ort they are trying to acting as a trusted the US to reopen the build a peaceful Gulf intermediary negotiations on nuclear” showing capable of the 2015 Iranian his positive stance facilitating indirect nuclear deal towards Iran and its dialogue with Iran 179 Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Qatar. (2021, May 6). Qatar Welcomes Decision of Somalia and Kenya to Restore Diplomatic Relations. https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/statement/detail/1442/09/24/qatar-welcomes-decision-of-somalia-and-kenya-to- restore-diplomatic-relations 138 (Aljazeera, nuclear project. He on sensitive 2022)180. added regarding his nuclear and relation with both regional issues. This mediation the U.S and Iran “if further you look to Qatar we distinguished are a small country Qatar’s foreign -Expanded and we have to policy from that political defend the interest of Saudi Arabia, engagement with of Qatar… it doesn’t the UAE, and Iran, reinforcing mean if we have a Israel, who bilateral ties good relation, remained through military relation, or skeptical or constructive economic relation opposed to the diplomacy and with the united JCPOA. It also economic states we forget the reinforced dialogue, while others, no we are Qatar’s identity maintaining open for all others… as a bridge- credibility in both of them have to builder in Tehran as a non-accept our policy… regional hostile Gulf actor. this is our policy, we diplomacy, are open for all the especially post- countries and we 2017. -Enhanced will defend our (Ulrichsen, alignment with the interest and see 2024)181 European Union, where is our interest which welcomed but of course will Qatar’s mediation not be sided with and recognized its country against role in sustaining another.” (Al Thani, diplomatic 2011)182 channels between This statement Washington and indicates Qatar’s Tehran. long-standing . (Ulrichsen, strategic balancing 2024)184 approach, maintaining cordial relations with both Iran and the United States while emphasizing an independent, interest-driven foreign policy. The 180 Previous reference 181 Ulrichsen, K. C. (2024). Centers of power in the Arab Gulf states. Oxford University Press. 182 Previous reference 184 Previous reference 139 Emir’s framing reflects Qatar’s commitment to neutrality, regional diplomacy, and non- alignment, especially in sensitive issues such as Iran’s nuclear program. Then-Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al- Thani stated that Qatar supports a peaceful resolution and a return to the nuclear agreement, emphasizing Qatar’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between all parties. “Qatar welcomes the U.S.–Iran dialogue and a irms the importance of continuing negotiations to revive the nuclear deal in a manner that enhances regional and international peace.” (Ministry of Foreign A airs – Qatar, 2022)183 183 Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Qatar. (2022, June 28). Qatar Welcomes Indirect U.S.–Iran Talks in Doha to Revive Nuclear Agreement. https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/statement/detail/1443/11/29/qatar-welcomes-indirect-us-iran-talks-in-doha-to- revive-nuclear-agreement 140 2022 national dispute (mediation) The Ministry -Strengthened between the announced: bilateral alignment transitional “The signing of the with Chad, authorities in Mediation e ort Doha Peace positioning Qatar Chad and led to Peace Agreement is an as a trusted opposition groups agreement for important step in external mediator reconciliation in paving the way for during Chad (Aljazeera, comprehensive negotiations 2022)185. national between the reconciliation in transitional This mediation Chad.” (Ministry of government and Showcased Foreign A airs – armed opposition Qatar’s post- Qatar, 2022)186 groups. Gulf-crisis pivot toward African partnerships, -Enhanced independent alignment with from Gulf bloc African Union politics. diplomacy, It also consolidating distinguished Qatar’s long-term Qatar’s strategy strategic outreach from that of in Central, Sahel, regional rivals and Horn of Africa like the UAE, peace processes. which was less (Ulrichsen, directly engaged 2020)187 in this reconciliation process. 2023 Iran-US tension (mediation) The Ministry -Strengthened declared: strategic “The success of the alignment with the Mediation e ort mediation reflects United States, by led to an Qatar's securing American agreement to commitment to trust to oversee exchange supporting peace sensitive prisoners and security and negotiations and between the US resolving conflicts manage the and Iran, in through diplomatic financial addition to lifting means.” (Ministry of 185 Previous reference 186 Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Qatar. (2022, August 8). Qatar hosts signing of peace agreement between transitional government of Chad and political and armed opposition groups. https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/statement/detail/1444/01/10/qatar-hosts-signing-of-peace-agreement-between- transitional-government-of-chad-and-political-and-armed-opposition-groups 187 Previous reference 141 the ban on $6 Foreign A airs – component of the billion of Qatar, 2023)188 agreement. Tehran’s funds. (Ulrichsen , 2024) -Deepened This mediation diplomatic did not just engagement with Further Iran, through direct di erentiate coordination on Qatar from Gulf the release of neighbors, detainees and especially Saudi facilitation of the Arabia and the $6 billion fund UAE, who transfer. remained (Ulrichsen , 2024) cautious or critical of renewed U.S.– Iran engagement and Qatar’s intermediary role, but also enhanced Qatar’s standing in financial diplomacy, by safely managing the frozen assets transaction, showcasing its reliability in high- stakes economic negotiations. (Ulrichsen, 2024) 2024 7th October Gaza (mediation) In a televised -Reinforced war as part of the speech on October strategic Palestinian/Israeli 17, 2023, Emir coordination with conflict in the context of Sheikh Tamim bin the United States the 2024 Hamad Al Thani and Egypt, through 188 Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Qatar. (2023, September 18). Qatar Welcomes Completion of Prisoner Exchange between Iran and the US. https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/statement/detail/2023/09/18/qatar-welcomes-completion-of-prisoner-exchange- between-iran-and-the-us 142 escalation in publicly condemned joint mediation Gaza following the Israeli bombing e orts focused on the events of of Gaza, stating: temporary October 7, Qatar ceasefires, has played a “It is not acceptable humanitarian critical and for Israel to be given corridors, and active mediating an unconditional hostage-prisoner role. Working green light and free exchanges. alongside Egypt license to kill, nor is and the United it acceptable to States, Qatar continue ignoring -Sustained has facilitated the reality of alignment with negotiations occupation, siege, and settlement.” Hamas, as Qatar aimed at 190 maintained reaching (Al Jazeera, 2023) political dialogue temporary He also called for: and humanitarian ceasefires, An immediate support despite coordinating ceasefire, international humanitarian Protection of scrutiny. pauses, and civilians, and securing Unimpeded hostage- humanitarian -Increased prisoner access. diplomatic tension exchanges This speech with Israel, driven between Israel by Qatar’s ongoing and Hamas. a irmed Qatar’s relationship with Qatar’s unique diplomatic stance: positioning— supporting Hamas and its maintaining Palestinian rights refusal to shut open lines of while maintaining its down political communication position as a channels with the with both regional mediator. group. Hamas and The Emir also Western rea irmed Qatar’s governments— coordination with -Elevated key international alignment with has allowed it to European and UN act as a central actors to end actors, who intermediary in hostilities and deliver aid. recognized Qatar’s the conflict. central mediating Doha has also role and provided humanitarian substantial diplomacy in humanitarian aid Gaza. to Gaza and used its 190 Al Jazeera. (2023, October 17). Qatar’s Emir condemns Israel’s bombing of Gaza in televised speech. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07xEzBy8S10&ab_channel=AlJazeeraEnglish 143 diplomatic -Continued leverage to divergence from pressure for the UAE and increased aid Bahrain, which access. Despite maintained international normalized ties criticism with Israel and regarding its ties avoided with Hamas, engagement in Qatar has Hamas-related reiterated that diplomacy. its mediation is (Ulrichsen, 2024) rooted in humanitarian principles and the pursuit of regional de- escalation. These e orts underscore Qatar’s broader foreign policy strategy of diplomatic engagement, pragmatic neutrality, and high-stakes negotiation on regional crises. (EIU, 2025)189 189 EIU. (2025). Qatar plays key role in Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal. EIU. https://www.eiu.com/n/qatar-plays-key-role-in- israel-hamas-ceasefire-deal/ 144