Disrupting International Business Ecosystems: Central Bank Digital Currencies and the Future of Payment Infrastructure A qualitative case study of the Digital Euro GM0161 - Master's Degree Project in International Business and Trade Supervisor: Sarah Frantz Master Thesis in International Business and Trade Spring 2025 Graduate School, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg Sweden __________________________________________________________________________________ Students Ebba Magnusson Tim Nyh Abstract The accelerating digitalisation of the financial landscape presents strategic challenges for multinational corporations (MNCs). This study explores how central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) can disrupt international business ecosystems and how MNCs can strategically respond. Drawing on ecosystem theory, this study gain insights on how the digital euro may disrupt the European payment landscape by replacing fragmented, non-European dominated infrastructures with a unified, pan-European platform. This is done by presenting a single case study of the digital euro as an example of CBDCs, where Diebold Nixdorf serves as the main embedded subunit to further analyse how a MNC navigates this evolving context. The findings emphasise that the digital euro could mark a shift toward a structure- driven ecosystem logic and accentuates the importance of developing organisational ambidexterity as a dynamic capability to balance exploration of emerging opportunities with exploitation of existing strengths. MNCs are recommended to early engage with CBDC issuers and potential ecosystem participants to influence the design. However, early engagement in CBDCs involves risks, including misaligned investments and dependency on evolving regulatory frameworks. Finally, the study concludes by outlining important implications for managers and policy makers helping them to navigate the eminent shift of the European payment landscape Keywords: CBDC, digital euro, business ecosystems, Disruption, MNC strategy, ecosystem orchestration, public-private collaboration, digital payments, Eurozone 2 Acknowledgement We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the interviewees who generously shared their time, perspectives and insights. Their contributions were essential to the development of this thesis and their engagement significantly enriched the quality of our work. A special acknowledgement is extended to Helena Müller and René Lauxtermann at Diebold Nixdorf, whose support and expertise were instrumental throughout the process. Their guidance and encouragement helped shape the study and inspired us throughout the journey. Lastly, we would also like to thank our supervisor at the School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg, Sarah Frantz, for dedicated support, valuable feedback, and thoughtful reflections that helped us increase the quality of the study. Ebba Magnusson Tim Nyh 2025-0 5-26 2025-05-26 3 Table of Contents 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 8 1.1 Defining Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) .................................................................................... 9 1.2 Problem Discussion...................................................................................................................................... 10 1.2.1 Purpose and Research question............................................................................................................. 11 1.2.2 Delimitations ......................................................................................................................................... 11 1.3 Disposition of the Thesis ....................................................................................................................... 12 2. Literature Review ........................................................................................................................................ 13 2.1 Business ecosystem ....................................................................................................................................... 13 2.1.1 Collaboration and Competition in Ecosystems ..................................................................................... 14 2.1.2 The Multi-level dynamics of the Ecosystem ........................................................................................ 15 2.1.3 Internationalisation and International Business Ecosystems ................................................................ 17 2.2 Disruptive Change and Strategic Adoption ................................................................................................. 19 2.2.1 Strategic Adoption through Dynamic Capabilities ............................................................................... 19 2.2.2 Managing Disruptive Change: The Innovators Dilemma and Ambidexterity ...................................... 21 2.3 Previous research on CBDCs ...................................................................................................................... 23 2.4 Conceptual Theoretical Model ..................................................................................................................... 26 3. Research Design ................................................................................................................................................ 27 3.1 Research Approach ...................................................................................................................................... 27 3.2 Case Study Design ........................................................................................................................................ 28 3.2.1 Choice of Case ...................................................................................................................................... 28 3.2.2 Selection of MNC as Subunit: Diebold Nixdorf ................................................................................... 29 3.3 Research Process ......................................................................................................................................... 30 3.4 Data Collection ............................................................................................................................................ 31 3.4.1 Primary Data Collection ....................................................................................................................... 32 3.4.2 Secondary Data Collection ................................................................................................................... 35 4 3.5 Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................................... 35 3.6 Quality Assurance ........................................................................................................................................ 37 3.7 Method & Data: Limitations ........................................................................................................................ 39 4. Empirical Findings ........................................................................................................................................... 41 4.1 General understanding of the payment industry in Europe ......................................................................... 41 4.2 Digital Euros impact on the Payment Ecosystem ........................................................................................ 45 4.3 Opportunities and Challenges with Digital Euro ........................................................................................ 48 4.4 Business Ecosystem ...................................................................................................................................... 51 4.4.1 Complementary Innovations ................................................................................................................. 51 4.3.2 Collaboration and Competition ............................................................................................................. 54 4.5. Disruptive Change and Strategic Adoption ................................................................................................ 56 4.5.1 Strategic Adoption to Change ............................................................................................................... 56 5. Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................... 60 5.1 Business Ecosystem ...................................................................................................................................... 60 5.1.1 Collaboration and Competition ............................................................................................................. 60 5.1.2 Internationalisation ............................................................................................................................... 63 5.1.3 Multi-level Dynamics ........................................................................................................................... 66 5.1.4 Impact on the Payment Landscape ....................................................................................................... 68 5.2 Strategic Management.................................................................................................................................. 69 5.2.1 MNCs response to disruptive changes .................................................................................................. 69 5.2.2 Change Management and innovators Dilemma .................................................................................... 71 6. Conclusions........................................................................................................................................................ 74 6.1 Theoretical contributions ............................................................................................................................. 75 6.2 Managerial Implications .............................................................................................................................. 76 6.3 Implications for Policymakers ..................................................................................................................... 77 5 6.4 Further research .......................................................................................................................................... 78 6.5 Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................................................... 79 References: ............................................................................................................................................................ 80 Appendix: .............................................................................................................................................................. 89 List of Tables Table 1: List of Respondents ................................................................................................................. 34 Table 2: Summary of key actors in the EU Payment landscape........................................................... 44 Table 3: Summary of Empiric findings - Digital Euro’s Impact on the Payment Landscape ............... 47 Table 4: Summary of Empiric Findings - Opportunities and Challenges with the Digital Euro .......... 51 Table 5: Summary of Empiric Findings – Complementary Innovations .............................................. 53 Table 6: Summary of Empiric Findings - Collaboration and Competition ........................................... 56 Table 7: Summary of Empirical Findings - Strategic Adoption to Change .......................................... 59 List of Figures Figure 1: Ecosystem Role Matrix ......................................................................................................... 16 Figure 2: Theoretical Development of Internationalisation .................................................................. 18 Figure 3: Conceptual Theoretical Model: ............................................................................................. 26 Figure 4: Research Process ................................................................................................................... 31 Figure 5: Thematic Framework ............................................................................................................. 37 Figure 6: Actors involved in a Card Transaction .................................................................................. 43 Figure 7:The Payment Ecosystem before and after the digital euro ..................................................... 67 6 List of abbreviations CBDC: Central bank digital currency ECB: European Central Bank EU: European Union POS: Point of Sale PSP: Payment Service Provider MNC: Multinational Corporation AF: Alternative Finance AML: Anti-money Laundering KYC: Know Your Customer IB: International Business 7 1. Introduction This chapter introduces the context of digital transformation in the financial sector and its implications for international business. It outlines the emergence of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) as a disruptive force in global payment systems and highlights the need to understand their impact on international business ecosystems. The subsections present the background, problem discussion, purpose of the thesis, research questions, and delimitations. The global business environment is becoming more unpredictable. Geopolitical tensions, economic instability, and rapid technological development are forcing companies and policymakers to rethink how they navigate structural shifts in the global economy (Allen & Qian, 2024:43-61; Teece, 2025:9). Multinational corporations (MNCs), in particular, face challenges as the world moves away from global integration towards greater protectionism, changing regulations, and increased external uncertainties (Grant et al., 2024). Armed conflict in Europe, instability in the Middle East, tariff-based protectionism, and growing tensions between the United States and other global powers have raised concerns about the future of international cooperation (Elsner et al., 2025:6-32). Increased attention is being directed towards the extent to which MNCs can realistically maintain their global presence and whether existing structures and strategies must be reconfigured (Grant et al., 2024). One area where these challenges become especially visible is in the global payments landscape. Today’s payment systems are largely controlled by a small number of private actors. Visa and Mastercard currently handle over 90% of all card payments outside of China (Westberg, 2025), and their position gives them great influence over transaction costs and access to markets. Their dominance has also raised concerns about the lack of competition, high merchant fees, and strong control over how payments are processed (U.S. DOJ., 2025; Chee, 2025). These conditions may limit innovation and create risks for societies that rely on just a few actors for critical financial services. The European Union (EU), in particular, faces challenges in safeguarding its financial resilience and reducing external dependencies 8 (ECB, 2025a). The fragmented global payment system combined with the prospect of shifting global alliances complicates the ability of the EU to maintain control over its payment system (Lane, 2025). As economic resilience becomes a strategic priority, international businesses are forced to reassess their approaches to managing risks and maintaining stability in an uncertain external environment (Teece, 2025:44). Alternative finance has emerged as a crucial topic within international business and trade, emphasising the importance of flexible and resilient financial solutions that complement traditional banking structures (Allen & Qian, 2024:43-61). As market uncertainties increase, MNCs increasingly seek diverse strategies to mitigate exposure to economic and political volatility. One of the most promising innovations within the financial sector is the introduction of CBDCs, which are expected to transform traditional payment systems (Allen & Qian, 2024:43-61). A CBDC would be the safest digital asset available to the public, with no associated credit or liquidity risk as it is issued and backed by a central bank (Federal Reserve, 2024). 1.1 Defining Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) Today, the public has access to central bank money in two forms: physical cash issued by central banks and digital money provided by private institutions (ECB, 2024a). While central banks have long offered digital money for settlements between banks and financial institutions, they have not yet introduced a digital equivalent of cash that is directly accessible to the public (Waliczek & Nili, 2024). As a response to ongoing digitalisation and the emergence of alternative finance, central banks around the world have started exploring CBDCs as a new form of public money (Allen & Qian, 2024:43-61). CBDCs function as an electronic counterpart to physical cash that enables consumers to access central bank funds in digital form. Just like cash, a CBDC would be risk-free, widely accessible, easy to use, and free for basic usage (ECB, 2024b). CBDCs are typically issued in two forms, for retail- and wholesale purposes. Retail CBDCs aim to function as a digital equivalent to cash, making central bank money accessible to the public in digital form (Waliczek & Nili, 2024; Panetta, 2022; Schaaf, 2024). Wholesale CBDCs on the 9 other hand, are designed for interbank settlements (Deutche Bank, 2023). CBDCs are widely considered the most promising digital currency due to the trusted role of central banks (Allen & Qian, 2024:43-61). While CBDCs are frequently mistaken for cryptocurrencies, they differ significantly. Unlike cryptocurrencies such as stablecoins, Bitcoin or Ethereum, which are decentralized and not liabilities of any institution, CBDCs are centralized and constitute liabilities of the issuing central bank (Sveriges Riksbank, 2023). This distinction positions CBDCs as public money, whereas cryptocurrencies and commercial bank deposits fall under the category of private money. This study focuses specifically on CBDCs as a form of public digital money. Given their potential to transform the financial system outside traditional banking channels, CBDCs can also be considered a form of alternative finance. 1.2 Problem Discussion Digitalisation is transforming the global financial landscape. In recent years, the growth of e-commerce, the decline in cash usage, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have accelerated the shift toward digital payment solutions (Feyen et al., 2021:1). In this evolving environment, central banks are exploring the introduction of CBDCs, which have the potential to reshape the payment landscape (Hoang et al., 2023:18) and redefine roles within international business ecosystems. Business ecosystems are networks of interdependent actors that co-evolve capabilities and collaborate to co-create value beyond what any single firm could create in isolation (Moore, 1993:76, 2006:34; Adner, 2006:100). While research has examined how ecosystems function and evolve in technological and innovation-driven contexts, limited attention has been paid to how institutional initiatives, such as CBDCs, can disrupt international business ecosystems and redefine private sector coordination. Despite the growing importance of digital currencies, there is a lack of research within international business on how alternative finance, including CBDCs, may impact business ecosystems. While previous research on CBDCs has mainly focused on emerging economies (ex. Allen & Qian, 2024:43- 61), there is an increasing need to understand how alternative finance can influence more developed 10 economies as well. The research field examining whether a CBDC could impact MNCs remains limited (Hoang et al., 2023:1), leaving the potential impact still relatively unexplored. Further, most of the research conducted is primarily focused technical infrastructure and regulatory constraints (Bhaskar et al., 2022:2; Hoang, et al., 2023:1; Chen & Siklos, 2022:17), hence there is a gap in research exploring how businesses can better understand, navigate challenges and leverage opportunities of CBDCs. To the best of our comprehension, no prior research has examined the effect of CBDCs on business ecosystems in developed economies. This distinction places our study in a unique setting and addresses a critical gap in understanding how alternative finance intersects with international business theory in developed economies. Given the potential of CBDCs to reshape financial infrastructures and reconfigure interfirm relations, it is vital to investigate how companies can adapt to and leverage such changes. This study aims to address this gap by exploring how CBDCs can disrupt international business ecosystems and how MNCs can strategically respond to this change. 1.2.1 Purpose and Research question By presenting a case study of the digital euro, as an example of CBDCs, this thesis explores how CBDCs can disrupt international business ecosystems and how MNCs can strategically respond to this change. Given the limited research on CBDCs within international business, this study seeks to gain initial insights to guide subsequent research. To fulfil the purpose, the paper intends to answer the following research questions: - How do CBDCs disrupt international business ecosystems? - How can MNCs strategically adapt to these disruptions? 1.2.2 Delimitations This thesis presents the case of the digital euro as an example of a CBDC, excluding other CBDCs such as the eYen, digital dollar, and e-kronan, due to variation in payment infrastructures and regulatory environments across different currency areas. Further, this thesis focuses exclusively on the retail payments landscape, and particularly the retail digital euro, which are specifically designed for use by 11 the public (Waliczek & Nili, 2024) and is limited to payment transactions conducted within the Eurozone. The analysis is further limited to the perspective of the interviewed software provider, banks as customers and the European Central Bank as the issuing unit. The concept “business ecosystem” is differently defined in the literature, covering a wide range of actors, relationships, and activities (Moore, 1993:76; Adner, 2017:40–42). Because of this variation, this study does not aim to cover all aspects of ecosystem theory. Instead, it focuses on selected elements within specific market settings. At the same time, the term “payments landscape” includes several different aspects. In this study the payments landscape focuses solely on actors involved in card payments. This approach allows for a more detailed understanding of how ecosystem structures and interactions influence business strategies. 1.3 Disposition of the Thesis The disposition of this thesis is structured around six main sections: introduction, literature review, research design, empirical findings, discussion, and conclusion. The introduction outlines the study’s background, research problem, purpose, questions, and delimitations, and introduces CBDCs as a disruptive force in international business ecosystems. The literature review presents key theories including business ecosystem theory, dynamic capabilities, identifies a gap in existing CBDC research and develops a conceptual theoretical to guide the analysis. The research design explains the qualitative single-case study approach, focusing on the digital euro and Diebold Nixdorf as a subunit. It also explains the data collection, analysis, and quality considerations. Empirical findings present results from interviews and secondary sources to provide depth to the following discussion about the digital euro’s impact on the payment ecosystem. The Discussion analyses the findings considering the theoretical framework and explores strategic responses by MNCs as well as implications for ecosystem dynamics and internationalisation. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main findings, discusses theoretical and practical implications, and suggests directions for future research. 12 2. Literature Review In this section, a detailed review of prior research and relevant literature is provided to understand how the issuance of CBDCs affects actors within the payment landscape. The section begins by introducing the theory of business ecosystems and the concept of strategic adoption, which together form the foundation for understanding relationships and power dynamics among different actors in a changing environment. This is followed by a review of prior research on CBDCs. Finally, a research gap is identified concerning how MNCs strategically respond to the introduction of new financial innovation, such as CBDCs, in an international context. 2.1 Business ecosystem The concept of business ecosystems was first introduced by Moore (1993:76) and provides a perspective on business competition where firms interact dynamically with suppliers, customers, competitors, and regulators to shape a shared future through coordinated innovation. This perspective shifts the focus from firm-centric competition to a more systematic view of value co-creation, where innovation is not an isolated act, but a collaborative process shaped by inter dependencies within a network. Weill and Woerner (2013) expand and reined the ecosystem concept in scope an application and characterize ecosystems as coordinated networks of firms, technologies, and customers that collectively generate value. Hult et al. (2020:38) expand on the concept by introducing an international perspective, describing international business ecosystems as the organism of the business world that enables firms to co-evolve and adapt across borders. Business ecosystem theory implies that when functioning effectively, ecosystems enable participants to achieve outcomes that would be unattainable individually (Adner, 2006:100). Business ecosystems differ from value chains, a concept introduced by Porter (1985:36), as they are not linear or entirely controlled by a company focused solely on efficiency and consistency (Weill & Woerner, 2013). Instead, they are decentralized, interconnected networks that 13 promote innovation (Weill & Woerner, 2013). The theory argues that firms within a business ecosystem cooperate to jointly deliver a product or service to the customer (Moore, 1993:76). 2.1.1 Collaboration and Competition in Ecosystems The business ecosystem theory proposes that firms should not be viewed as isolated competitors, but as interdependent participants in a shared system (Moore 1993:75). Instead of competing solely for market share, companies collaborate by contributing complementary resources and competencies in a mutually dependent network. Iansiti and Levien (2004:69) compare this to biological ecosystems, where each company functions as a separate species whose performance is tied to the overall health and productivity of the network. Their analysis shows that companies who succeed are often those that do not focus solely on internal resources, but on strengthening the entire ecosystem. In contrast, companies with isolated strategies tend to fail when their success depends on the well-being of other actors. Iansiti and Levien (2004:69) emphasise that ecosystems are vulnerable to weak links, which highlights the importance of a functioning interaction. Moore (2006:33) also mentions this by noting that technological progress often relies on the development of complementary innovations within the ecosystem for the end consumer to benefit. The structure of the business ecosystem thus enables innovation by allowing companies to adjust their strategies in relation to other actors, rather than through a traditional competitive logic (Iansiti and Levien, 2004:70). A central part of the theory is the concept of co-evolution, which means that companies develop and innovate together with other actors in the ecosystem. Since no single actors possesses all the knowledge or resources, development occurs through continuous adaption to the environment and to other actors changes (Moore, 2006:32). This entails that strategies are designed based on the conditions of the ecosystem, where joint solutions are often required to deal with new challenges and opportunities. 14 Adner (2017:40) expands on the concept of business ecosystems, distinguishing between ecosystem-as- affiliation and ecosystem-as-structure. The ecosystem-as-affiliation builds on Moore’s (1993; 2006) ideas and defines ecosystems as groups of actors linked through networks and platform connections (Adner, 2017:40). In contrast, Adner's ecosystem-as-structure views them as arrangements of activities centred around a value proposition, where actors must collaborate for its realization. Adner (2017:42) further emphasises that ecosystems are multilateral, meaning they comprise numerous relations that cannot be simply analysed as an aggregation of bilateral relations. The relationship between actor A and B is influenced by the relationship between A and C and for an ecosystem to succeed, all members must align on their roles and flows, ultimately achieving a Pareto equilibrium. For example, the failure of one actor (e.g., a component provider or regulatory body) can undermine the entire value proposition, regardless of the focal firm’s efforts. This insight is particularly silent in international contexts where actors may not share the same goals, incentives or institutional frameworks. While Adner’s ecosystem- as-structure provides an understanding of coordinated value creation, it remains unclear how such coordination unfolds when institutions, not firms, act as the ecosystem orchestrators. In summary, Moore (1993:76; 2006:34) suggests that firms co-evolve in interdependent systems where innovation depends on joint development, Iansiti and Levien (2004:69-70) argue that success relies on the overall health of the ecosystem rather than isolated strategies. Adner (2017:40-42) adds that ecosystems involve coordinated, multilateral value creation, distinguishing between affiliation and structure. Together, this means ecosystem success requires aligned roles and flows. 2.1.2 The Multi-level dynamics of the Ecosystem Business ecosystems are not static structures but composed of actors occupying different roles that evolve over time (Iansiti & Levien, 2004:77). Weill and Woerner (2013) suggests that ecosystems consist of drivers who set the rules and participants who adapt to these rules and contribute to their development. Iansiti and Levien (2004:73) identifies three different roles in a business ecosystem: keystones, dominators and niche players, each playing a distinct function in shaping ecosystem performance and resilience. Keystone players are vital for business ecosystems as they strive to enhance 15 the ecosystem's well-being by delivering a robust and predictable bundle of mutual assets (Iansiti & Levien, 2004:73). For keystone strategies to be effective, they must both create and share value within the ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien, 2004:74). If a keystone player does not create value for its members, it will have difficulty attracting and retaining them. Likewise, if the value is not shared, the keystone may benefit in the short term, but risk losing members over time. Figure 1: Ecosystem Role Matrix Figure comment: The figure illustrates different roles within business ecosystems based their level of value creation/sharing as well as level of network control/ integration. Source: The model is based on Iansiti and Levien 2004:73-77. Compiled by the authors. Figure 1 illustrates different roles in the business ecosystem, as described by Iansiti and Levien (2004:73-77). Dominators in business ecosystems are typically categorized into physical dominators or value dominators (Iansiti & Levien, 2004:75). Physical dominators aim to integrate vertically or horizontally to enable ownership and management of a vast share of the network, while value dominators seek to maximize their returns from the ecosystem without necessarily contributing value to it. Both strategies commonly lead to the decline of the ecosystem's essential function. Niche players, on the other hand, seek to enhance the ecosystem by developing unique capabilities that are absent in other firms within the network, creating opportunities to leverage complementary resources from both keystone and other niche players (Iansiti & Levien, 2004:77). Niche players are typically the primary drivers of value 16 and innovation within a business ecosystem, but this requires a well-functioning network. Therefore, it is crucial to continuously assess the business ecosystem in which they operate. In an international context, organizations act as agents within global ecosystems. Hult et al. (2020:1) describe these international business ecosystems as dynamic structures comprising stakeholder, institutions and firms that interact across borders to create value and respond to global challenges. The author argues that each actor brings unique capabilities, such as knowledge, innovation capacity, or market access that shape interactions and outcomes. Importantly, not all actors in an ecosystem are directly involved in production or part of the traditional value chain. Iansiti and Levien (2004:70) also highlights that business ecosystems include numerous sets of actors, including financing institutions, regulatory agencies, media platforms, technology providers, and customers. These actors can influence product development, adoption, and strategic direction through both informal and formal mechanisms. In essence, business ecosystems evolve over time and consist of interdependent roles such as keystones, dominators and niche players, each playing a specific role in shaping ecosystem performance and resilience (Iansiti and Levien, 2004:73-77). Drivers set the rules while participants adapt and contribute (Weill and Woerner, 2013). Hult et al. (2020:1) broaden the concept to an international perspective, describing ecosystems as dynamic structures where actors interact across borders to create value and respond to global challenges. 2.1.3 Internationalisation and International Business Ecosystems Internationalisation has long been a central topic in international business research, with the Uppsala model standing out as one of the most influential frameworks for explaining firms’ international expansion. When the Uppsala model of international expansion was initially introduced by Johanson and Vahlne (1977:24-28), the concept built on gradual internationalisation based on psychic distance and experiential learning. Over time, it has faced considerable criticism, particularly for its limited applicability to rapid internationalisation processes such as born globals, joint ventures and similar 17 (Hult, 2020:39). The model was revised in 2009, shifting the focus from psychic distance to the concept of outsidership in relation to relevant networks (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009:1411). The updated version sees the business environment more as a web of relationships and puts greater emphasis on how these networks influence the way firms expand internationally. In Johanson and Vahlne’s 2017 revision, they reframe the concept of market commitment as commitment and performance, emphasizing that a firm’s position within the international business ecosystem is key to success in the marketplace (Johanson & Vahlne, 2017:1097). Hult et al. (2025) expand on the role of international business ecosystems and discuss how MNCs can leverage them to access global markets. The authors argues that the international marketplace is comparable to a business ecosystem that is dynamic and constantly evolving, where MNCs collaborate, compete, interact, and engage. The authors describe international business ecosystems as cogwheel-like systems where MNCs jointly foster growth, resilience, and adaptation of the ecosystem. By leveraging international business ecosystems, MNCs can gain access to international markets while also enhancing their resilience (Hult et al., 2025). In addition, MNCs can become better prepared for global shifts, while also capitalizing on market opportunities and reducing operational risks in the international business environment. Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical development over time, from gradual expansion described by Johansson and Vahlne (1977) to internationalisation through international business ecosystems (Hult et al., 2020). Figure 2: Theoretical Development of Internationalisation Figure comment: The figure illustrates the development from gradual internationalisation to internationalisation through business ecosystems. Source: Compiled by the authors. 18 Hult et al. (2025) also stress that countries and regions can act as both enablers and regulators of international business by setting legal frameworks, trade agreements, and policies that guide interactions within ecosystems. Hult et al. (2020, p. 44) argue that a firm’s competitiveness within the international business ecosystem is critical, not just within a network or based on commitment, but through how it positions itself and creates value across the ecosystem. The authors highlight that international business ecosystems can enable MNCs to strategically position themselves in an increasingly dynamic global environment (Hult et al., 2025). Finally, Hult et al. (2025) stress the importance of orchestrating the international business ecosystem and state that well-orchestrated ecosystems enhance both collaboration and competition. The dynamic between these factors helps balance short-term gains with long-term stability. In conclusion, the Uppsala model originally explained internationalisation as a gradual process based on psychic distance and experiential learning (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977:24–28) but was later revised to emphasise outsidership in networks (2009:1411) and ecosystem positioning (2017:1097). Building on this perspective, Hult et al. (2025) describe international business ecosystems as dynamic systems enabling MNCs to build resilience, access global markets, and balance collaboration and competition. 2.2 Disruptive Change and Strategic Adoption 2.2.1 Strategic Adoption through Dynamic Capabilities To explore how MNCs can strategically adapt to fast changing market conditions, the theory of dynamic capabilities can be used to explore the phenomenon. The theory was developed by Teece et al. (1997) as an extension of the resource-based view, which in its original form assumes that companies operate in relatively stable environments (Teece et al., 1997:509). As the international business landscape is characterised by increased technological development, digitalisation and geopolitical uncertainty, the need for strategic adaptability among MNCs has intensified (Teece, 2025:9). In this context, dynamic 19 capabilities are the company's ability to continuously build, integrate, mobilise, upgrade and protect critical resources to manage fast changing environments in different geographic but coordinated markets (Teece, 2025:9). Teece et al. (1997:515) believe that companies can achieve new forms of competitive advantage through dynamic capabilities. The term “dynamic” refers to the ability to renew competencies, while “capability” emphasises the role of strategic management. Teece (2025:16) highlights that traditional theories of multinational companies, such as the internalisation theory, often assume stability and predictability. In contrast, today's business logic requires companies to prioritize dynamic capabilities over ordinary capabilities, as these are what enable adaptation to complex and uncertain external conditions. Dynamically capable companies exhibit the ability to interpret signals, identify the need for change and mobilise resources for innovation and transformation at a global level (Teece, 2025:9). The development of these capabilities often occurs through the ability of management to identify opportunities and internal capability gaps, which forms the basis for organizational learning and strategic development (Teece, 2025:10). In its original form, the theory of dynamic capabilities focuses on how companies create and capture value in environments where technological change occurs at a rapid pace (Teece et al., 1997:509). The authors identify three central dimensions that influence a company's dynamic capabilities: processes, positions and paths (Teece et al., 1997:518). Processes describe how activities are carried out within the company, positions refer to the company's assets and resources, and paths constitute possible strategic development paths. Leadership is highlighted in this context as a critical component in driving change processes and creating internal consensus on strategic direction (Teece, 2025:11). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000:1106). also believe that dynamic capabilities in themselves do not necessarily lead to long-term competitive advantages, but that these depend on how resources are configured and utilized by the management. 20 Teece (2025:16–19) also emphasises that MNCs today operate in an environment characterized by deep uncertainty, where geopolitical shifts in particular make future forecasts difficult. In such a climate, long-term resilience becomes more important than short-term efficiency gains. The increased dependence on digital infrastructure also brings new vulnerabilities, such as cyber threats and systemic risks, which require that company management possess the ability to proactively manage crises. To succeed in this new reality, not only entrepreneurial leadership is required but also diplomatic skills, as MNEs must increasingly interact with both home and host countries to influence, rather than simply adapt to, the design of global regulatory frameworks (Teece, 2025:18). To conclude, the theory of dynamic capabilities was introduced as an extension of the resource-based view to explain how MNCs adapt strategically in rapidly changing environments (Teece et al., 1997:509). It emphasises the renewal of competencies through sensing, seising, and reconfiguring (Teece et al., 1997:518). As technological shifts and geopolitical uncertainty reshape global markets, Teece (2025:9) highlights the need for dynamic over ordinary capabilities to manage complexity and foster innovation. Building on this, he stresses leadership, organizational learning, and resilience as key factors for MNCs to thrive amid global disruptions and regulatory challenges (Teece, 2025:10–19). 2.2.2 Managing Disruptive Change: The Innovators Dilemma and Ambidexterity To make intelligent investment decisions, firms must understand how the industry they operate in is evolving (McGhan, 2004:87). According to Mcghan (2004:87) industries develop along four trajectories: radical/disruptive, progressive, creative, and intermediate. To succeed, a firm’s strategy for achieving a return on invested capital must align with the industry’s change trajectory (McGhan, 2004:88). In today’s business landscape the world is outpacing nearly every key business index, yet many organizations fail to perceive the urgency of adapting to these changes and remaining competitive (Kotter, 2014:1). While well-managed companies tend to excel at developing technologies aligned with customer needs, they often struggle to commercialize innovations that initially do not meet customer demand and that instead appeal only to niche or emerging markets (Bower & Christensen, 1995:44). At 21 the same time, financial, social, environmental, and political stakes are increasing which leaves businesses with the critical challenge of staying competitive and grow profitably (Kotter, 2014:1). Disruptive technologies often possess performance attributes that are undervalued by existing customers, but as the attributes improve, they eventually tend to penetrate mainstream markets and by then it is often too late for established firms to compete (Bower & Christensen, 1995:44). Kotter (2014:4) further emphasise this and states that firms reconsider their strategies only when they are forced to do so. Additionally, Bower and Christensen (1995:53) argue that disruptive technologies are a part of a natural business cycle as corporations consists of business units with finite lifespans. Companies that recognize this cycle can replace outdated business models, however the authors argue that established firms often struggle to manage disruptive changes within their mainstream operations, as these changes conflict with existing financial priorities (Bower & Christensen, 1995:53). Another conflicting factor is that innovation entails risks and management-driven hierarchies, commonly found in mature businesses, are designed to minimize risks and keep employees within set roles and structures (Kotter, 2014:14-15). Christensen (1997/2016) argues that adapting to disruptive changes presents significant challenges for firms, as they become caught in the innovator’s dilemma, meaning that they cannot simultaneously pursue exploitation of existing capabilities and exploration of new opportunities (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008:201). However, O’Reilly and Tushman (2008:185) propose that a way to address the innovator dilemma issue could be ambidexterity as a dynamic capability, which refers to refers to the ability of handling exploration and exploitation simultaneously. Exploration involves searching, discovering, autonomy, innovation, and embracing variation. In contrast, exploitation focuses on efficiency, productivity, control, certainty, and minimizing variation. The authors argue that managing ambidexterity successfully as a dynamic capability enables firms to adapt over time and reduce the risk of failure. Furthermore, they suggest that efficiency and innovation do not have to be strategic trade-offs, and they underscore the critical role of senior teams in building dynamic capabilities. O’Reilly and Tushman 22 (2008:202) highlights that being large and successful today, does not guarantee future success, states that long-lived companies often operate in different industries and technologies than they started in, showing how they have adapted to change over time. Taken together, firms must understand how industries evolve to make intelligent investment decisions and align strategy with one of four change trajectories (McGhan, 2004:87–88). Despite rapid global shifts, many organizations fail to act, struggling to commercialise disruptive innovations that begin in niche markets but later reshape industries (Bower & Christensen, 1995:44; Kotter, 2014:1). As disruptive change challenges established priorities and structures, firms face the innovator’s dilemma (Christensen, 1997/2016), to balance exploration of new opportunities, with exploitation of existing business models. O’Reilly and Tushman (2008:185) suggest ambidexterity as a dynamic capability to manage both exploration and exploitation, enabling long-term adaptability and reducing the risk of failure (2008:202). 2.3 Previous research on CBDCs Chen and Siklos (2022:2) explore the potential implications of introducing CBDCs, with a particular focus on their effects on the traditional banking sector and the transmission of monetary policy. The authors argue that CBDCs may alter the role of banks as financial intermediaries, potentially reducing their ability to provide credit and thereby disrupting the traditional monetary policy transmission mechanism. Additionally, Chen and Sikos (2022:2) highlight that CBDCs could function as a tool to overcome the zero lower bound on interest rates, providing central banks with new means to stimulate the economy during downturns. However, such a development may threaten central bank independence if CBDCs are used to distribute monetary stimulus directly. Therefore, the authors stress the importance of designing CBDCs in a way that preserves the long-term stability and profitability of commercial banks (Chen and Siklos, 2022:17). 23 Söderberg et al. (2023:3-5) examine how central banks should explore and develop CBDCs through a dynamic decision framework. Their findings support many of Chen and Siklos (2022:2-20) concerns regarding the risks to financial intermediation and stability of the banking system. Söderberg et al. (2023:12) discuss that the possibility of introducing a holding limit for CBDCs could restrict their attractiveness as a store of value and thereby address this risk. The study further highlights that the introduction of CBDCs can impact society through several mechanisms, including financial inclusion, competition in the payment system, the effectiveness of monetary policy, and the stability of the banking system (Söderberg et al. 2023:12). The results show that CBDCs can improve access to financial services in regions with limited banking infrastructure, while at the same time serving as a complement to cash in digital payment environments (Söderberg et al., 2023:9-10). Furthermore, the study finds that CBDCs can promote competition and innovation in the payment sector by reducing reliance on dominant private actors, which in turn is argued to potentially lead to lower transaction fees and a more resilient payment infrastructure (Söderberg et al, 2023:10). Allen and Qian (2024:43-61) offer a complementary perspective through examining alternative finance in international business and its role in expanding access to capital, particularly in economies with underdeveloped banking systems. The findings align with Söderberg et al. (2023) and Chen and Siklos (2022) and show that alternative finance can increase access to capital in economies with weakly developed banking systems, while challenging the dominant role of established financial institutions. This is also mentioned by Lee, Yang and Wang (2021: 52–66) who examine a global perspective of CBDCs, using benefits and challenges with the Peoples Bank of China’s CBDC. The results indicate that CBDCs can promote financial inclusion and integration as it is possible to conduct payments through eWallets without the need for identities, accounts and internet connection (Lee, Yang & Wang, 2021:58). This is further supported by Allen and Qian (2024:43-61) who demonstrates that alternative finance can serve as an alternative to conventional banking structures and be a parallel system that can enhance financial inclusion. Finally, there is a gap in terms of how alternative finance is used by MNCs 24 to optimize their financing strategies in a global market, as well as how technological advancements in fintech may impact the future development of alternative finance (Allen & Qian, 2024:43-61). In sum, Chen and Siklos (2022:2-17), Söderberg et al. (2023:3-43), and Allen and Qian (2024:43-61) all highlight the transformative potential of CBDCs and alternative finance to promote financial inclusion, particularly in economies with underdeveloped banking systems. Moreover, the studies demonstrate that these innovations may challenge the traditional role of commercial banks and raise concerns about financial stability and the effectiveness of monetary policy. Further, Chen and Siklos (2022), Söderberg et al. (2023), and Allen and Qian (2024) emphasise the capacity of CBDCs and alternative finance to stimulate competition and innovation within the financial system by reducing dependence on dominant private actors. However, it is crucial to gain a deeper understanding on the impact of CBDCs in international business, and especially in developed countries. 25 2.4 Conceptual Theoretical Model The conceptual theoretical model is developed to illustrate how CBDCs act as a disruptive force within international business ecosystems, and how MNCs can strategically respond. The model is grounded in ecosystem theory (Moore, 1993:75-86; 2006:31-74; Adner, 2017:39-58; Iansiti & Levien, 2004:68- 126), dynamic capabilities (Teece, 1997:209-533; 2025:7-22), and organisational ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008:185-206) and is shown in Figure 3 below. At the centre of the model lies CBDCs as a disruptive change, affecting both the strategic logic of MNCs and the structure of international business ecosystems. The left side of the model illustrates ow MNCs respond to disruption by using dynamic capabilities and organizational ambidexterity, while the right side captures how CBDCs disrupt existing roles and structures within the ecosystem. This change in roles and dynamics has implications for how MNCs formulate their strategies. The arrows between the two main branches show that as ecosystems evolve, they influence corporate strategy, and vice versa. Figure 3: Conceptual Theoretical Model: Figure comment: The conceptual theoretical model is developed to illustrates how CBDCs act as a disruptive force, influencing both international business ecosystems and MNCs' strategic responses. Source: Compiled by the authors. 26 3. Research Design This section describes the study’s research design, and the specific methods used to collect and analyse the empirical data. This thesis presents the case of the digital euro through conducting a qualitative multi-stakeholder ecosystem analysis. The study empirically investigates whether and how the payment landscape will be disrupted, as well as how actors can adapt to disruptive changes and potentially benefit economically from its future issuance. 3.1 Research Approach The study employs a qualitative case study approach in line with Yin (2018:18), where the overarching case is the digital euro. To fulfil the purpose of this study, the research aims to explore how the emergence of CBDCs may disrupt the existing business ecosystems and influence MNCs strategic practices. Given the under explored nature of the topic it requires an open and exploratory approach, making a qualitative research strategy highly suitable (Bell et al., 2019:356). The qualitative research method aligns well with case studies, that are particularly suitable when the objective is to investigate “how” and “why” research questions (Yin, 2018:13). Conducting a multi-stakeholder analysis allowed for direct observations and interactions while providing a holistic understanding of the digital euro by exploring the phenomenon from multiple perspectives, which makes it suitable for research areas that remain relatively unexplored (Ghauri 2004:109-112). To enable a more nuanced analysis, the study has been designed as a single-case study of the digital euro with Diebold Nixdorf as the main embedded sub-unit and further stakeholders in the ecosystem to ensure a holistic perspective. This research design is considered advantageous as logical sub-units can be defined within the digital euro case (Yin, 2018:51-52). Accordingly, the study applies an embedded single-case study design. Sub-units of analysis can offer significant insight for extensive analysis and enhance the contributions into the single case (Yin, 2018:54). In relation to the study’s research question, private actors operating in the payment ecosystem constitute a highly relevant subunit of analysis as 27 these firms are likely to be directly affected by the introduction of CBDCs. By exploring how such actors perceive, respond to, and strategically adapt to this potential disruption, the study can generate insights into how CBDCs may disrupt the existing business ecosystems and MNCs strategic practices. 3.2 Case Study Design 3.2.1 Choice of Case As CBDCs constitute relatively new phenomenon in international business research, the use of a case study approach is justified to facilitate an in-depth, context-sensitive understanding (Yin, 2018:14). According to Ghauri (2004:112) practical considerations such as data availability and accessibility often dictate the choice of case. In this thesis, the digital euro was selected as case since it represents a timely and relevant example of a cross-border CBDC initiative within an international monetary union. Currently, several CBDC projects are under development and according to Bank of International Settlements survey on central bank digital currencies and crypto (Di Lorio et al., 2024:3), 94% of the respondents stated that they were engaged in CBDC projects. Most CBDC initiatives have a national scope, and to better align the study with the field of international business, cross-border CBDC projects were considered more relevant. However, cross-border retail CBDC initiatives remain limited. One such initiative is the digital euro, which is intended for use across the euro area, making it a relevant case to explore in the context of this study. The Eurozone consists of 20 different countries, each of which will be directly impacted by the introduction of a digital euro, it offers a valuable opportunity to explore how digital currency strategies might be implemented across different monetary systems. Cash usage in the Eurozone remains relatively high despite a significant decline in recent decades (Canepa, 2024). The variation in cash reliance across Eurozone countries further strengthens the study’s scope and relevance. For instance, in Germany, 51% of total transactions are conducted in cash (Balz, 2024), while in the Netherlands, only 22% of payments are conducted in cash (DNB, 2025). This variability illustrates the diverse impact a digital euro could have across different economies within the Eurozone. Such diversity adds analytical richness to the case 28 and enhances its relevance for exploring implementation challenges in more complex multi-actor systems. In addition, the payment system in the Eurozone processes substantial volumes of transactions (ECB, 2025b), which further supports the relevance of examining this market. 3.2.2 Selection of MNC as Subunit: Diebold Nixdorf To investigation the potential implications of a digital euro for MNCs operating in the euro area’s payment ecosystem, this study incorporates an illustrative subunit of analysis in the form of a payment solution provider1. Diebold Nixdorf was selected as representative MNC to exemplify the strategic considerations of the digital euro for software providers within the payment ecosystem. The delimitation to a single software provider assumes that Diebold Nixdorf serves as an illustrative example (Bell et.al., 2019:63-68; Yin, 2018:54) of a MNC whose operational activities are likely to be affected by a future issuance of a digital euro. This assumption is based on the company’s central role in today’s payment landscape and its strong tradition of cash handling, which serves as a foundation for the study and its research questions. The choice of using Diebold Nixdorf as illustrative example was made due to the company's relevance, as well as access to primary data and correspondence to the variables under investigation (Ghauri 2004:112). CBDCs are likely to impact various actors in the payment ecosystem to varying degrees, particularly those that have a central role in the payment ecosystem, which makes Diebold Nixdorf a suitable sub-unit of investigation in relation to the research objective (Ghauri, 2004:114). Diebold Nixdorf, as multinational corporation that operates within financial and retail technology and has a primary focus on delivering IT solutions to retail banks and commercial institutions (Yahoo Finance, 2025). The company specializes in the design, manufacture, installation and servicing of self-service transaction systems, including ATMs, point-of-sales terminals, and related software and service 1 In section 3.7, a discussion is conducted regarding the implications of the study's delimitation. 29 offerings. Diebold Nixdorf’s portfolio supports a broad range of financial and retail operations across global markets with operations in more than 100 countries and approximately 35,000 employees (Diebold Nixdorf, 2025). The decision to focus on a single MNC as subunit allows for a context- sensitive examination of firm-level implications, however it also entails limitations regarding generalizability. Although, the objective of this study is not to produce statistically generalizable findings, but to generate analytical insights relevant to similar actors within the digital payment ecosystem (Yin, 2018:52-54). 3.3 Research Process The research followed an abductive reasoning that enables a continuous integration of theoretical insights and empirical observations. The research was initiated with an examination of existing theoretical frameworks and a review of theories related to the study’s focus, to identify gaps and establish a foundation for continued investigation (Bell et al., 2019:24). To identify relevant literature, keywords such as business ecosystem, internationalisation strategies, central bank digital currencies, MNCs, CBDCs, disruptive change, strategic management, and digital euro were used. Many of these were combined using Boolean operators like AND and OR to narrow the search. For example, combinations such as “business ecosystem” AND “internationalisation” or “CBDC” OR “digital euro” helped identify relevant literature." The pre-study involved an exploratory engagement with employees at Diebold Nixdorf to refine the research scope and guide the development of relevant research questions. As empirical data were collected and analysed, theoretical concepts were iteratively revisited, questioned and reinterpreted. (Bell et al., 2019:24). This iterative interplay between theory and data reflects the abductive logic and enabled both a critical examination of existing assumptions and the extension of theoretical understanding in the final stages of the study. As part of the final discussion, hypotheses were formulated based on patterns and tensions identified in the empirical findings and their relation to existing theory to guide future research. Additionally, in accordance with the university’s guidelines, generative AI was 30 used to improve language clarity and structure, without modifying the meaning or introducing new content. During the early stages of the research, AI tools were used to explore definitions and gain a preliminary understanding of relevant theoretical concepts. All analysis, argumentation, and literature selection were conducted independently by the authors. The research process is illustrated in figure 4 below. Figure 4: Research Process Figure comment: The figure illustrates the different steps conducted during the research process. Source: Compiled by the authors 3.4 Data Collection To facilitate the empirical investigation, key concepts were operationalized based on relevant theoretical frameworks (Bell et al., 2019:489). Operationalisation was conducted iteratively so that the concepts 31 could be refined as insights emerged from the data. The study relies on semi-structured interviews during the spring of 2025 with multiple stakeholders. The interview questions were designed based on theories of business ecosystems and strategic management to capture diverse perspectives on the potential strategic and operational implications of a digital euro. The concept of strategic adoption was operationalized by exploring how actors in the payment landscape respond to technological innovations, as well as challenges and opportunities when new innovations emerge. Similarly, the theory of business ecosystems was operationalised by analysing three key dimensions: collaboration and competition, complementary innovations and ecosystem dynamics. The data collection focused on actors operating within the euro area to ensure relevance in the analysis of the digital euro's implementation. This methodological approach enabled a deeper understanding of how firms can strategically navigate a changing payment landscape. Given the qualitative nature of this study, its objective was not to produce generalizable results but rather to attain a nuanced and in-depth understanding through purposeful sampling. This aimed at selecting a sample that contributes to the study’s overall purpose with informative answers (Bell et al., 2019:521). To capture a broad spectrum of perspectives the study also employs snowball sampling to develop information-rich explanations by drawing on diverse empirical data (Merriam, 1998:62-64). The primary objective of the interviews was to identify common themes and attributes while at the same time explore variations within the studied phenomenon and thereby contribute to the construction of a theoretically robust and analytical framework (Merriam, 1998:134). 3.4.1 Primary Data Collection Primary data collection was conducted through semi-structured interviews, allowing for follow-up questions to capture deeper insights. This qualitative approach was essential to gain a comprehensive understanding of the different perspectives (Bell et. al., 2019:397, 434). The method aimed to produce more complete and contextual insights from different organisations and explore complex dynamics within the business ecosystem (Bell et al., 2019:397,434; Ghauri, 2004:115). Interviews were conducted 32 with participants across different relevant departments within Diebold Nixdorf, as well as banks and industry experts, selected through purposeful or snowball sampling based on their expertise, position, and relevance to the research questions (Yin, 1994:285-290; Merriam, 1998:63; Ghauri, 2004:115). This structured data collection and sampling aimed to maximize the depth and variability of the sample to strengthen the robustness and richness of the analysis (Ghauri, 2004:115; Merriam, 1998:44-48). 3.4.1.1 Selection of respondents A purposive sampling technique was employed where the respondents were chosen based on their professional role and understanding of the payment landscape in Europe. To achieve data triangulation and enhance the validity of the findings, interviews were conducted with four distinct stakeholder groups: policymakers, banks, industry experts and representatives from Diebold Nixdorf. This allowed for a nuanced examination of the observed phenomenon and ensured a comprehensive collection of data (Ghauri, 2004:115). The interviews aimed to explore the respondents’ experiences, knowledge and insights about digital euro and the payment landscape. The selection process began with an initial assessment of key employees within Diebold Nixdorf that possesses knowledge relevant to the study, supported by the supervisors who facilitated access to interviewees. The respondents were selected based on their knowledge of the subject, to ensure that the collected data was concrete and rich, as well as aligned with the study’s themes (Yin, 2018:92). The selection process was further enhanced by snowball sampling (Merriam, 1998:63), where initial interviewees recommended other participants that could offer valuable insights into the research objectives (Bell et.al., 2019:396). As illustrated in table 1 the selection of respondents was made according to four distinct groups: Policymakers (P1), Industry Experts (IE1-5), Banks (P1-2), and Diebold Nixdorf (DN1-4). Industry experts represent professionals with high expertise of digital euro, Banks include the issuer (ECB), as well as the Swedish Central Bank and a representative from a multinational commercial bank. Two of the respondents are, or have previously been, members of the ECB’s Digital Euro Market Advisory Group, which brings together industry professionals to advise the Euro system on the design and distribution of the digital euro from an industry perspective (ECB, 2021). 33 Table 1: List of Respondents Respondent Title Institution Duration Date Type of Interview Member of the Digital Euro P1 European Central Bank 60 minutes 2/4-25 Microsoft Teams Project Team Head of Group Regulatory B1 Swedbank 60 minutes 21/3-25 Microsoft Teams Affairs Advisor Payment B2 Sveriges Riksbank 60 minutes 25/3-25 Microsoft Teams Infrastructure IE1 Business Developer Bankomat AB 45 minutes 18/3-25 Microsoft Teams Università della IE2 Professor 60 minutes 18/3-25 Microsoft Teams Svizzera Italiana IE3 Professor in Digital Finance ESMT Berlin 60 minutes 31/3-25 Microsoft Teams IE4 Managing Director Accenture 45 minutes 1/4-25 Microsoft Teams Technical Expert, Digital 60 IE5 Giesecke Devrient 25/3-25 Microsoft teams Currency Minutes Vice President Core Banking DN1 Diebold Nixdorf 60 minutes 21/3-25 Microsoft Teams Automation Solution Managing Director & VP Diebold Nixdorf DN2 60 minutes 27/3-25 Microsoft Teams Software & Payments Senior Director Business Diebold Nixdorf DN3 30 minutes 11/4-25 Microsoft Teams Finance Vice President EMEA DN4 Diebold Nixdorf 30 minutes 15/4-25 Microsoft Teams Banking 3.4.1.2 The Interviews To gain a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key individuals within Diebold Nixdorf and the industry to get multiple perspectives on the digital euro and its potential implications. The aim of the interviews was to obtain concrete and informative responses to gain a rich and clear understanding of the payment landscape and its different actors. As a result, follow-up questions were added or removed depending on the respondent’s answers. The 34 interview guide (See appendix) was designed to bridge empirical data collection with the theoretical frameworks accounted for in section 2. In total, 12 interviews were conducted and lasted between 30- 60 minutes. The interviews were conducted via Microsoft Teams. Bell et.al. (2019:441) highlights the importance of clarifying how the respondents’ contributions are used. 3.4.2 Secondary Data Collection To complement the primary data collection, secondary data has been used in the form of scientific articles, press releases, reports from international organizations, and documents from financial institutions related to CBDCs (Bell et al., 2019:12; Merriam, 1998:122). The secondary data contributes to providing a broader context and a deeper understanding of models explaining the development of CBDCs and their impact on businesses as well as the global economy. By analysing relevant research and official reports, it was possible to identify the most central issues and trends concerning CBDCs and their consequences for the payment landscape. In the selection of secondary data, source-critical principles have been applied to ensure the relevance, reliability, and topicality of the information (Bell et al, 2019:12). By combining primary and secondary data the study's validity is strengthened, and the ability to draw well-founded conclusions that align with reality is enhanced. One of the risks associated with data triangulation is the difficulty in assessing the accuracy of results when different sources are inconsistent or produce contradictory findings (Ghauri, 2004:116). However, even if perspectives diverge, this can contribute to a better and more nuanced understanding or lead to new questions that can be explored in future research. 3.5 Data Analysis The interview responses were recorded, transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis to identify recurring patterns (Bell et al., 2019:518-519). Thematic analysis was used to organize and interpret the data by identifying and categorizing patterns and themes grounded in the empirical material. The analysis was conducted iteratively, involving a continuous interplay between data collection and analysis to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon under study (Bell et al., 2019:519; Ghauri, 2004:117). The transcription was analysed, where initial coding formed the basis for further thematic 35 structuring of the data. Through a systematic review, recurring themes related to the impact of a digital euro on actors in the payment landscape were identified. The collected interview data was compared with secondary sources such as regulatory reports and industry studies to enhance the study’s validity and triangulate the empirical findings (Bell et al., 2019:296, 364, 438). To facilitate the thematic analysis, the initial step involved organizing the empirical data into thematic categories derived from the study’s research purpose and theoretical grounding. The thematic categories used to analyse the empirical data are as follows: collaboration and competition, multi-level dynamics, Internationalisation, strategic adoption to change, change management, impact on the payment landscape and opportunities and challenges. Within each category, keywords and key phrases from the empirical data were identified through open coding to gain an in-depth exploration of patterns, similarities, and differences among the respondents’ perspectives, which are presented in figure 1. 36 Figure 5: Thematic Framework Figure comment: The figure provides an overview of the thematic framework used when coding the empirical findings. It illustrates the theoretical conceptual framework, its dimensions, selected keywords and illustrative quotations. Source: Compiled by the authors. 3.6 Quality Assurance The quality concepts of reliability and validity are two essential criteria when assessing the quality of the study. To ensure the reliability of this study, the concepts of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability are also addressed (Bell et.al. 2019:48). These principles are particularly relevant in qualitative research, where the goal is to reflect on the complexity of a real-world phenomenon rather than to produce statistically generalisable results. Credibility was enhanced though data triangulation by using a combination of primary interviews with the issuer, industry experts, and employees at the selected MNC, as well as secondary sources such as industry reports and academic literature. This approach allowed for a nuanced perspective of how the digital euro may affect various stakeholders in the payment landscape. Respondent validation was also 37 employed by allowing participants to review and clarify the statements to ensure that their perspectives where accurately captured (Bell et al., 2019:296). While these steps improve the trustworthiness of the findings, it is acknowledged that many insights are forward-looking and thus subject to future developments. According to Bell et al. (2019:37), there are several stages in the research process where bias may arise. As this study is partly conducted in collaboration with Diebold Nixdorf, particular care was taken to address the risk of researcher bias. The company is used as an illustrative case rather than as the main unit of analysis, and research focus extends beyond the specific firm to broader conceptual implications. Triangulating sources beyond the company further reduces bias (Guba, 1981:87), and there was an explicit separation between the company’s involvement and the formulation of research questions, analysis, and conclusions. While generalisation is not the primary aim of qualitative research, attention was still given to transferability. Although transferability is limited by the study's regional and institutional focus, detailed contextual descriptions are provided to assist readers in evaluating whether the findings may apply in similar contexts (Merriam, 1998:198-199). The empirical chapters include detailed information about the payments landscape in Europe as well as overviews of the regulatory and technological environment. These descriptions are intended to support readers in assessing the potential applicability of findings to other settings. However, the study’s specific focus on the digital euro and one MNC inherently limits broader generalisation. To strengthen the dependability and confirmability of the study the research was carried out in a transparent and systematic manner. Methodological and theoretical decisions were clearly outlined and detailed descriptions of how data was collected, coded, and analysed are provided (Bell et al, 2019: 439). This allows for partial replication under similar conditions, acknowledging that qualitative findings are context-bound. Triangulation of data sources contributed to a more objective foundation for the findings as well as clear documentation of the research process and its coding procedures to ensure that findings were derived from empirical evidence rather than subjective interpretations (Bell et al., 2019:521). 38 Additionally, secondary data sources served to cross-validate the findings from primary data collection (Bell et al., 2019:296). The involvement of two researchers allowed for continuous dialogue and critical reflection helping to enhance analytical rigour. 3.7 Method & Data: Limitations The delimitation of analysing the digital euro without considering other CBDCs being developed globally infer that the study’s findings may be difficult to generalize to other contexts. While this focus enables amore context-specific analysis, it limits the external validity of the findings. As multiple countries are simultaneously exploring digital currencies, there may be interaction effects between different CBDCs that influence how market participants strategically adapt to the new payment infrastructure. By narrowing the analysis to a single CBDC within a specific region, broader international dynamics are excluded which reduces the study’s transferability to other monetary jurisdictions. Additionally, the study’s findings may be influenced by the fact that it does not account for specific regulations that may govern the implementation and uptake of the digital euro. Regulations concerning, for instance, data protection, transaction limits, or monetary policy could significantly impact how actors engage with the digital euro, and its business potential. As such regulatory aspects are still under development, this introduces uncertainty in the study’s conclusions as they are based on forward-looking assumptions and current ECB communications about the future design of the digital euro. Moreover, the digital euro is in a research phase when this study is conducted. As a result, the study is based on current conditions in the payment landscape and should be regarded as an indication of how the digital euro may disrupt the payment landscape rather than a definitive projection. As the findings rely on current assumptions about regulatory frameworks, technological advancements and market dynamics, all of which may evolve as the digital euro progresses toward issuance, it 39 introduces a degree of uncertainty. This limitation has implications for the study’s reliability and applicability. While interviews with researchers specializing in the digital euro, the ECB and national banks, as well as representatives from the case company provide valuable insights, their perspectives are shaped by expectations rather than empirical observations. Consequently, the dependability of the study is affected by the evolving nature of CBDC-related policies and technological developments, which may require a reassessment of the findings over time. The study further delimits its scope by focusing on the firm-level perspective of a multinational payment solutions provider. Thus, it does not consider the different roles of national central banks within the Euro system. While the ECB is leading the development of the digital euro, it is reasonable to base the analysis on its policy framework. Thus, this analysis excludes potential differences in implementation and application at national level. Each national central bank within the Euro system may have different priorities or regulatory interpretations, which could influence how firms in different member states are affected by the introduction of the digital euro. Furthermore, the analysis focuses on how a MNC is impacted, meaning that the perspectives of end consumers and merchants are not explored. Factors such as consumer acceptance, user behaviour, and potential concerns related to privacy as well as merchants’ incentives to adopt the digital euro as a means of payment are likely to play a critical role in the currency’s eventual uptake. By excluding these actors, the study provides a partial view of how the new form of money may affect the broader economic ecosystem. 40 4. Empirical Findings This section presents the empirical findings which examine themes from the theoretical framework and incorporates both primary data from the interviews as well as relevant secondary data. The section begins with an explanation of the payments landscape in Europe today and examines its implications on the current business ecosystem, before moving on to how the introduction of the digital euro is expected to influence collaboration, competition and strategic positioning. 4.1 General understanding of the payment industry in Europe Digitalisation and changes in consumer behaviour have driven changes in the European payments landscape beyond the traditional roles of central banks and commercial banks (Deloitte, 2024:10). The transition from cash-based transactions to digital payment solutions has resulted in the involvement of a more diverse set of stakeholders, extending beyond the traditional domains of central banks and commercial banks. Although many of these new actors are European, Europe has failed to establish sufficient resilience and is heavily dependent on non-European actors (P1). One of the most evident examples can be found among card schemes, where Europe relies extensively on Visa, Mastercard and American Express (DN1). According to P1, two thirds of all transactions at point of sales in the euro area are made through cards that are connected to non-europoean card schemes (P1). IE3 explains that Europe has become accustomed to the way the payment system functions today, and that the deficiency of the system is overlooked. DN1 stresses that the European payment landscape is very diverse, and the intensity of the use of cash varies significantly. DN1 elaborates and emphasises that despite the shift towards digital payment solutions, there is still a significant proportion of cash payments in the pament m. IE3 explains that the Eurozone is very fragmented, with numerous great island solutions in various member states, but that only functions domestically. Since there are limited solutions supporting the entire euro area, the 41 Eurozone must rely heavily on foreign payment providers, thereby weakening the overall resilience (IE3). P1 supplements this and says that: “While bank notes have united Europe and the euro area 25 years ago, by providing a means of payment that you can use everywhere, the same doesn't apply with digital means of payment. We have an integrated economic and monetary union, but at the moment, we don't have a digital means of payment that works everywhere in the euro area unless you rely on international card schemes.” -P1 Further, P1 argues that if the situation were reversed, if Americans depended on European companies to make everyday payments, it is unlikely that they would find this acceptable. This is an important rationale behind the digital euro project, to preserve strategic autonomy (P1). The European payment landscape is complex and consists of multiple different stakeholders (DN2). The European Commission is the highest authority and executive body of the EU and are responsible for proposing new laws and policies (European Commission, n.d.). The ECB is responsible for conducting monetary policy within the Eurozone. Its core functions include maintaining price stability, issuing euro banknotes, and ensuring the smooth functioning of the financial infrastructure (ECB, 2025c). In the case of the digital euro, the legislation provided by the European Commission needs to be in place before ECB can decide when and if they want to issue a digital euro (B1). Further, each country has its own national central bank that follows the ECBs guidelines. Alongside these institutions, the European payments landscape consists, at an aggregate level, of three core groups: commercial banks, payment service providers (PSPs), and networks (DN2). Commercial banks act as intermediaries and provide infrastructure that both businesses and consumers rely on (P1, DN2). Parts of this infrastructure are developed and operated by PSPs, which exist in various forms and 42 differ across countries in the euro area (DN2). Additionally, card schemes such as Visa and Mastercard provide networks that enable transactions and settlement between banks, merchants, and consumers. To provide a simplified view of the otherwise complex payments system in the euro area, figure 6 illustrates the actors involved in card-based transactions. In addition to card-transaction, payments can be made through other channels such as bank transfers, instant payments, Buy Now Pay Later (BNPL) services, and account-based solutions. However, in many cases this does not exclude Visa and Mastercard. For instance, with BNPL solutions, approximately 80 percent of the transactions are repaid using debit cards (Proud & Kwok, 2021). Figure 6: Actors involved in a Card Transaction Figure comment: The figure illustrates the main actors involved in a typical card transaction. Currently, are involved in steps 1, 2, and 6, emphasizing their central role in the current payment infrastructure. Source: Compiled by the authors. Consequently, in transactions made with cards, there are banks, networks, and PSPs involved, and for banks to build such infrastructure is challenging, as it requires systems that connect to all these groups to ensure that transactions function properly. This is where DNs solutions come into play (DN2). DN2 describes Diebold Nixdorf as a software and product provider, offering solutions designed to serve all key actors in the payment landscape. The company develops infrastructure that is sold to banks, PSPs, 43 and merchants to connect different actors across the payment landscape. DN2 clarifies that the payment landscape in the Eurozone is far more complex. Each group consists of multiple types of actors. For example, a single transaction can involve several PSPs, banks, and other intermediaries, each playing a specific role in the process. To exemplify this, DN2 provides an example from Austria, where a single organization is responsible for handling all international transactions within the country. However, this organization does not manage the processes independently, instead, it collaborates with additional PSPs, allowing them to operate as tenants on its infrastructure in exchange for a fee. This illustrates the complexity of mapping the European payment landscape as this is the solution adopted in only one country, while the Eurozone consists of 20 distinct nations, each with its own systems and structures. Table 2: Summary of key actors in the EU Payment landscape Category Role in the Payment Ecosystem Highest authority in the EU. Proposes new laws and policies, including European Commission legislation necessary for the issuance of a digital euro Responsible for monetary policy in the Eurozone. Ensures price stability, European Central Bank issues euro banknotes, and oversees financial infrastructure. Decides on issuing a digital euro. Implement ECB guidelines at the national level and help manage the National Central Banks monetary system in each EU member state. Act as intermediaries. Provide the infrastructure that consumers and Commercial Banks businesses depend on for everyday financial transactions. A legal entity that enables payments between users. It offers services Payment Service Providers such as issuing payment instruments, processing transactions, and (PSPs) authenticating users. Provide the network infrastructure enabling card-based transactions and Card Networks settlements between banks, merchants, and consumers. Software and Product Offers solutions to banks, PSPs, and merchants to connect different Providers actors in the payment ecosystem. 44 4.2 Digital Euros impact on the Payment Ecosystem The introduction of a digital euro is expected to bring disruption to the existing payment infrastructure (IE3). IE3 explains that it holds the potential to reshape the current landscape by shifting transactions away from the traditional payment systems. This is further emphasised by DN1, who believes that the digital euro could have a wide-reaching impact. IE3 expects that the traditional financial ecosystem is likely to diminish as the digital euro system emerges. The full extent of the digital euro’s disruption remains uncertain, experiences from other sectors such as e-commerce, suggest that payments systems may also undergo a similar transformation driven by digitalisation (IE3). While the traditional payment systems will remain, the introduction of a digital euro may create an innovators dilemma (IE3), as actors in the payment landscape must assess whether investments tied to the digital euro are justified. According to DN1, it remains unclear how companies generate profit from the digital euro. DN1 further explains that in today’s payment industry there is a clear business model, companies earn money from fees paid for processing card transactions, such as those with Visa, American Express or Mastercard. While opinions differ on whether this model is ideal, it does provide a reliable source of income, something that is not yet evident with the digital euro. In contrast to Visa and Mastercard, one of the main motivations for ECB is to make the digital euro cheap, if not free for consumers. P1 explains that the digital euro will come with a cap on the fees that merchants must pay for digital payment methods, so merchants will have a lower cost for accepting digital euro payments, than with for example Visa and Mastercard. DN1 points to the geopolitical landscape as a factor supporting the potential of a digital euro and foresees that it is likely that it will become more prevalent, depending on future geopolitical development. The digital euro involves not only technological innovation but also regulatory changes and infrastructural adoption across the ecosystem. The digital euro will standardize the system and provide a uniform European digital means of digital payment that can be used across the euro area (P1). The digital euro scheme rulebook will create a single set of rules, standards, and procedures that supervised 45 intermediaries must follow when distributing the digital euro (ECB, 2025d). Despite that the overarching framework will be harmonized at an EU level, B1 argues that the impact of a digital euro is likely to vary across national markets and depend on local conditions and regulatory interpretations. B1 and IE1 argue that it is important that a digital euro will have the same rules as the other digital payment options, with anti-money laundering policies, fraud, GDPR etc. As other digital payment options already have regulations in place, it is about trust and knowing that the same rules apply no matter which payment means the consumer is using (B1). When introducing a digital euro, the central bank will have a much more active role in terms of Anti-money laundering. IE2 explains: “So, with the AML and the KYC principal, central bank would have a big responsibility in that sense, which it doesn't have now because you interface with the Commercial bank and not with the Central Bank directly.” -IE2 IE2 also discusses the potential burden for the ECB if some strongly illegal flows go through the ECB, this could have a new kind of impact. IE2 further underscores that central bank’s reputation and credibility is essential because it allows them to influence market expectations with a minimal cost through relying on trust rather than forceful actions to guide economic outcomes. In contrast to banknotes and coins, the digital euro will need to be supported by a technological infrastructure for its distribution, this includes a governing authority as well as rules and standards applicable to all participants in the scheme (European Parliament, 2023:4). 46 Moreover, the digital euro could serve as a tool for increasing financial inclusion. IE5 emphasises its potential to reach unbanked populations across Europe. This could result in a broader uptake of digital payments and increase participation in the formal economy, particularly among marginalized groups without access to traditional banking. The introduction of the digital euro could further accelerate the digitalisation of the banking and financial system, as IE2 highlights, pushing both banks and non-bank actors to further integrate digital infrastructure and comply with emerging standards. Another frequently mentioned argument behind the digital euro is the preservation of central bank money as a monetary anchor in an increasingly digital financial system (IE1, P1). IE1 draws attention to its potential role as a stabilising instrument during crises, functioning as a reliable medium of exchange when trust between banks fails. Table 3: Summary of Empiric findings - Digital Euro’s Impact on the Payment Landscape Key Area Empirical Findings The digital euro will reshape traditional payment Disruption to existing infrastructure ecosystems by reducing reliance on non-European actors Actors need to assess the trade-offs involved in Innovators dilemma investing in digital euro solutions, along with the risk of innovating too late. The digital euro is stated to reduce the fees for Business Models consumers and merchants, however the business case is still unclear. The digital euro will standardise the payment Uniform Digital Means of Payment system with a single set of rules. However, it is still likely to vary across markets. Tool to reach unbanked populations, and increase Digitalisation of the banking system the role of central bank money as monetary anchor in a digitalised world 47 4.3 Opportunities and Challenges with Digital Euro The introduction of a digital euro presents both opportunities and challenges for actors in the European payment landscape. A digital euro may imply that a broader segment of the population transitions towards using digital payment solutions (IE5). This applies not only to those who predominantly are using cash today, but also those who are unbanked. IE5 means that if there are a larger group that can pay electronically, there will be higher sales potential for stakeholders, as there are more people included in the ecosystem (IE5). B1 implies that for certain stakeholders a digital euro could present business opportunities, while for others it may become a matter of adapting to new regulations. IE2 explains that digitalisation of such relevant payment method as cash could further push the banking and financial system to provide more efficient customer retail yield and tailored solutions. The digital euro differs from many other emerging payment solutions, as the digital euro is starting from a top-down approach, meaning that the ECB is the initiator, and private companies will have an opportunity to develop and improve it (IE2). This also means that the regulatory framework will be clear from the beginning. Several respondents highlighted the legal tender aspect. Legal tender requires that a means of payment must be accepted in a region, in this case in the European Union, and that it must be accessible for citizens and businesses (European Commission, 2023). Euro banknotes and coins were proposed by the European commission in 2023 to be established as a legal tender, with the purpose to preserve the position of cash. According to P1, the digital euro is proposed to be given legal tender status as well, meaning that all merchants that today accept digital means of payment in the Eurozone will also be required to accept payments in digital euro. This means merchants would need to update their technical systems and work with actors that can process this new means of payments. IE5 raises concerns about this and suggests that the ECB should avoid forcing merchants to put up new terminals and systems that can handle the digital euro. If the ECB instead ensures to offer a competitive cost model, acceptance among merchants could happen on its own, without needing to be enforced. P1 notes that merchants who currently do not accept digital means of payment will not be required to digitalize their operations, 48 they may continue to accept only cash if they choose to do so. When addressing the issue of merchants needing to update their payment terminals, P1 clarifies: “What we want to do is that by announcing quite well in advance how digital euro standards will look like before the eventual issuance, we give merchants the possibility to then integrate the digital euro standards in this, what we call, normal cycle of POS terminals replacement” - P1 DN1 shares IE5s view on enforcing the use of the digital euro and denotes that for the digital euro to be successful, there must be a clear economic model for all the participants. This will be an incentive for the users to adopt. However, DN1 indicates some uncertainty about whether a business case will be formed or not. Assuming there will be a business case, meeting the demand for merchants to upgrade their infrastructure is an opportunity for companies like Diebold Nixdorf. Banks and payment operators are often using legacy payment infrastructure that will require upgrades to meet a growing demand (DN1). DN1 believes that the digital euro could be a catalyst for upgrading this payment infrastructure, which could benefit present a revenue opportunity for private actors in the payment landscape. One of the challenges companies such as Diebold Nixdorf faces with the introduction of the digital euro is, to some extent, to ensure that customers recognize the substantial value the company can offer within this evolving market (DN2). The respondent notes that Diebold Nixdorf is still often perceived as a traditional company focused solely on ATMs. This perception is also mentioned by DN3, who adds that the company is frequently seen primarily as a hardware provider. However, DN2 emphasises that Diebold Nixdorf's portfolio extends far beyond hardware, and that the company is well-positioned to become a key partner in the digital euro ecosystem, just as it has been in the cash-based system. Both DN2 and B1 believes that the implementation of the digital euro will be a gradual, iterative process and suggests that the business model is likely to look entirely different in 20 years. It is anticipated that a 49 range of supplementary, value-added services will emerge alongside new business opportunities related to the digital euro, many of which are not yet fully understood. DN2 states that: “The million-dollar question is what will be the value-added services that go along with a digital euro.” – DN2 IE1 explains that with the current model presented by ECB, banks will face adverse disadvantages. According to ECBs proposal, banks will be required to offer digital euro accounts to their customers (B1), which would impose additional operational and compliance costs, while also excluding them from access to the associated deposit holdings. B2 mentions that with the CBDC project in Sweden, banks were critical from the start, primarily due to the potential loss of deposits. IE2 argues that although the ECB does not want a crowding out effect from the banking system it is likely that banks will face losses in deposits (IE2). To mitigate this, it is proposed that there will be a holding limit for users of the digital euro, which will restrain the potential of people transferring money to their digital euro wallets, especially in times of uncertainties (IE2, P1). IE2 suggests that there should be more inclusion of end-consumers to better understand what is demanded by the users and underscores that the main innovations and the large volumes will potentially come from consumers in daily payments. IE2 also highlights that it remains uncertain how users will respond to the digital euro. DN2 further states that every time there is a change in the market, new opportunities emerge and argues that it is the mindset to actively explore and embrace these opportunities is the determining factor for success. Moreover, IE5 suggest that the digital euro could entail opportunities for more traditional services as well, such as ATM providers and manufacturers. There will be an opportunity to do an exchange of cash and digital euro using ATMs. IE5 further highlights that cash will still be there and emphasises that it could be beneficial for these stakeholders to actively participate in the discussions and try to shape how the business model will look like. ATM 50 integration is a concept that the ECB (2023) similarly emphasises, highlighting that the service allowing users to exchange cash for digital euros will be embedded in ATMs. Table 4: Summary of Empiric Findings - Opportunities and Challenges with the Digital Euro Key Area Empirical Findings Digitalisation of cash can lead to a larger customer Sales Potential group and more efficient customer retailer yield. Biggest opportunities for private actors lie in value Value added Services added services. Digital euro is proposed to be given legal-tender status, meaning that all merchants accepting digital Legal Tender payments must also accept payments in digital euro. Many actors use technology that is not truly Scaling of Payment Infrastructure scalable, digital euro may force these actors to upgrade its infrastructure. 4.4 Business Ecosystem 4.4.1 Complementary Innovations The respondents agree that, from a business perspective, potential value-added services are among the biggest opportunities with the digital euro. Developing value-added services will require innovations, and the digital euro could be a catalyst for a new era of innovation in Europe (Bauer et al., 2024). IE5 uses an analogy to describe how the structure of the digital euro will look like and how the private sector can utilize it: “The setup of the digital euro can be compared to the railway system: the public sector builds and maintains the railways, and the private sector runs the trains. In the same way, the public will provide the basic infrastructure of the digital euro, and the private sector will be able to leverage it.” – IE5 51 IE5s depiction aligns with the ECB’s (Cipollone, 2025a) outline of the framework. The ECB will provide a platform for innovation, upon which private actors can develop value-added services. P1 denotes that banks will have to be innovative as well, not only due to the digital euro, but because the entire digitalization is pushing banks to be more innovative and rethink their portfolio. The digital euro will provide stakeholders with an opportunity to innovate in a smart way, by leveraging a pan-European solution (P1). According to P1, there has already been significant interest among actors to leverage this opportunity and contribute with their solutions: “We have published a call for application for private actors to think about innovative services, that could be developed around the digital euro. We have received more than 100 applications from private actors with their own ideas on things that can be done. So of course, I can see a value in which there is not just a single institution, but more a group of institutions that develop products around the digital Euro.” – P1 The applicants consist of various types of stakeholders such as banks, PSPs, and others (ECB, 2024c; 2025e). The diversity and creativity of the proposals from the private actors illustrates that the digital euro has potential to drive financial innovation and create new market opportunities (ECB, 2025f). Moreover, since the ECB will provide the platform, it will facilitate pan-European reach for private payment solutions (P1). These actors will be able to leverage the digital euro infrastructure to gain immediate access to markets beyond national borders, thereby addressing market fragmentation and promoting innovation and competition (ECB, 2025g). Financial solutions are often developed at a national level and are difficult to scale on a pan-European level, which is not ideal from an economic of scale point of view (P1). Europe has demonstrated considerable success in financial technology in the recent decade, with numerous industry-shaping solutions (ECB, 2025h). However, these innovations have largely remained confined within national borders. Although they hold significant potential to enhance people’s everyday life, structural barriers hinder their expansion to a pan-European scale (Cipollone, 2025b). P1 adds that engaging at a European level also entails significant costs. These factors 52 combined, limits the capacity to compete effectively with other international actors that can fully exploit economies of scale (Cipollone, 2025b). P1 explains that if one does not achieve the necessary scale, it is difficult to sustain innovation, which may ultimately result in being forced to exit the market. Furthermore, the lack of scale hinders the ability to make such services accessible across the entire Eurozone. B2 underscores the importance of ensuring that the digital euro functions uniformly across all Eurozone countries, stating that no such solution currently exists. The respondent explains that there have been attempts, such as a digital wallet initiative called Wero, which connects certain national payment solutions. However, it does not fully meet the objective of establishing a seamless, centralised solutions comparable to the American counterparts. P1 elaborates and implies that payments are an area where scale matters and emphasises the role of networks to achieve the necessary infrastructure to develop this. ECB suggests that the digital euro will enable actors in the payment landscape to reduce the costs in delivering their service on a European level (Cipollone, 2025b). The legislative proposal that the digital euro will receive legal tender status, which will also contribute to the establishment of a pan- European network and foster a more integrated European payments market (Cipollone, 2025b). Table 5: Summary of Empiric Findings – Complementary Innovations Key Area Empirical Findings The digital euro could be a catalyst for a new era Catalyst for Innovation of innovation in Europe. ECB will provide the basic infrastructure for private actors to leverage. The digital Euro will facilitate national payment solutions to reach beyond its national boarders and Facilitate Pan-European Reach achieve pan-European reach, thereby addressing market fragmentation and promote innovation and competition Payments are an area where scale matters, if one Scaling Financial Solutions does not achieve the necessary scale, it is difficult to sustain innovation 53 4.3.2 Collaboration and Competition The implementation of a digital euro depends on collaboration across institutional, national and technological boundaries (IE1). In Europe today, there are already several functional payments options, the way that a digital euro can complement these remains to be seen (DN1). IE1 highlights that collaboration across EU member states remains a persistent challenge. The digital euro must also involve commercial banks, PSPs, software and product providers, and merchants and thereby adding additional layers of complexity to coordination efforts. DN3 believes that the digital euro is something that will affect everyone, and that it will change the ecosystem. The respondent elaborates and implies that it will require collaboration between multiple different stakeholders and that it is unlikely that one actor will develop a solution that covers all elements. Different players will need to find ways for their solutions to interact with each other. Regarding Diebold Nixdorf’s collaboration today, DN3 explains that most of the time they are working independently when it comes to the actual solution since that can give them a competitive advantage. However, in Diebold Nixdorf’s development processes, they try to develop solutions that not only can be used with Diebold Nixdorf products, but also with the competitors’ products, to ensure that they are not limiting to their own addressable market. DN3 further highlights that collaboration with authorities and consumers during the development process will be fundamental. Collaboration with authorities is essential to ensure that their solutions are compliant with the guidelines. Furthermore, banks are among Diebold Nixdorf’s customers, and both DN3 and DN2 explains that banks are often very specific with their own ecosystems and have very rigid processes, particularly regarding security and what is permitted to interface with their operations. The respondent underscores that this can be very complicated and emphasises the importance of working together with these customers early on. DN3 further suggests that if they are developing a product in cooperation with a customer, it is much more likely that they will buy that from Diebold Nixdorf than from a competitor. DN3 adds that customers usually do not go into collaborations with all competitors simultaneously, they pick one. With collaborations as such, it is more likely that you meet those customers’ specific requirements, and if this is a big customer that has implications for their peers as 54 well. Thus, it is key that Diebold Nixdorf find these relationships and engages with the right party (DN3). DN2 shares this view and says that banks will still be there since they are vital instruments for this kind of transaction process that the digital euro will entail. The respondent further explains that one of Diebold Nixdorf’s key competitive advantages is that they have business relationships with every bank in the world, several at a larger scale and some at a minor level. DN2 elaborates and explains that to do business with banks, a so-called master agreement is needed, which sometimes takes years to get. The master agreement proves that you as a customer are trustworthy, and this is sometimes underestimated among players in the ecosystem (DN2). DN1 further elaborates and explains that Diebold Nixdorf is part of a network of collaborations with regulators and various industry constituents to create a shared environment to facilitate their operations. This collaborative ecosystem involves regulators, banks, PSPs, and card schemes, among others and in these forums the major players are contributing, generating, and collaborating (DN1). DN1 states that the larger players, like Visa, American Express and Mastercard, often create new environments, specifications and new ways to doing things. These players have formats and protocols on how to run a Mastercard or Visa transaction through the system (DN2). These are called mandates and are updated every six months and all actors in the ecosystem need to make sure they are compliant and certified against those mandates (DN2). The respondent further states that since they deal with financial assets, they need to be compliant with certain standards for security reasons, which are regulated from central bodies such as the ECB. “You want to make sure that it is a secure transaction and that no one is fishing up information in the middle and emptying the account after you finalised your transaction. That is why there is so many standards and security certifications, because if you don’t have those certifications, you simply cannot compete in the market. You are not allowed to offer your service” -DN2 55 DN2 states that the rules and security measures will be the same going forward, but that a new market is developing. Diebold Nixdorf has assumptions of who their new partners will be and what the collaborations will look like. DN2 further underscores that when making payments by card, you are transforming a lot of detailed and secure information of that wire that is connected to an account. Table 6: Summary of Empiric Findings - Collaboration and Competition Key Area Empirical Findings The digital euro will require collaboration across institutional, national, and technological boundaries. It must also involve commercial Cross-Sector Collaboration banks, PSPs, software and product providers, and merchants and thereby adding additional layers of complexity to coordination. Trust and relationships with commercial banks are Interface with commercial banks crucial for enabling collaboration within the payment landscape. Different players will need to find ways for their solutions to interact with each other. The current Interoperability ecosystem is heavily shaped by a limited set of powerful actors and the digital euro might disrupt this dominance. Meeting certification requirements will be Certifications necessary for competitiveness and participation in the digital euro ecosystem. 4.5. Disruptive Change and Strategic Adoption 4.5.1 Strategic Adoption to Change In terms of strategy, the digital euro complements what Diebold Nixdorf is currently focusing on (DN3). DN3 emphasises that in addition to manufacturing and delivering products, Diebold Nixdorf are strong in maintenance. The respondent elaborates and explains that to make their business more future proof, their strategy is to focus on software and value-added services, and not only on ATMs, which traditionally have been the company’s main service. DN3 stresses that software will be relevant in the industry in the future and the digital euro aligns with this. The digital euro complements what Diebold 56 Nixdorf already focuses on, and as a result DN3 states that they will not have to massively change their strategy due to the introduction of a digital euro. DN1 emphasises that Diebold Nixdorf have a distinct advantage compared to many other players in this market, as they can provide the entire lifecycle view of the payment, irrespective of whether cash will disappear, CBDCs will be introduced, or other disruptive changes will appear. DN1 elaborates and explains that Diebold Nixdorf has the capability to bring the customer on this journey no matter directions, which the respondent states make Diebold Nixdorf unique in terms of their capabilities. DN3 further notes that the budget for R&D usually not vary significantly from year to year. Nevertheless, the type of development projects varies, and the R&D teams continuously evaluates different proposals and conducts ROI analyses, which drives the priority of the projects. Regarding the digital euro, DN3 explains that due to the many uncertainties on how the business model will be formed, the amount of the R&D budget that goes into digital euro solutions are limited today. However, DN3 notes that the R&D teams constantly do market assessment analyses on the digital euro to make that they are prepared once the situation becomes clearer, then they will be quick to develop solutions that fits the requirements. DN4 explains that as new opportunities or challenges emerges, Diebold Nixdorf assigns expert groups that evaluate the potential effect on the company. The respondent underscores that there are a lot of trend analysis and evaluation on strategies for fostering the growth for Diebold Nixdorf. Furthermore, DN4 entails that it is crucial to consider the value that Diebold Nixdorf can deliver to the end consumers that will handle the digital euro, since they are driving the demand for the service. DN4 elaborates and implies that in the same manner they are considering the end consumers with cash, they must include the end consumers with the digital euro. The same applies to financial institutions, where they must understand the trends that are driving their end consumers. When a new business case is defined and it is clear what value it will bring to their customer, a budget is allocated to an expert group who evaluates the case. DN4 underscores the importance of being concrete in how they can deliver and handle the digital euro with their products and solutions, and more importantly prove how they can add value for their customers. The respondent elaborates and suggests that the core of the value-added 57 services primarily will stem from their software products and highlights the importance of being compliant with the regulations that comes with the digital euro. Furthermore, to avoid disrupting the balance between exploration and exploitation, DN3 entails that Diebold Nixdorf strives to develop products and services that do not only work as an entirely stand- alone solution, instead they must be complementary and part of their existing portfolio of the ecosystem that they already have. The respondent emphasises that developments related to the digital euro must be complementary as well, to not negatively affect the existing operations. DN4 emphasises that Diebold Nixdorf follows a very defined process in their product and solution development and explains that this process involves defining, analysing, testing, and pilots. This process does not differ depending on the specific case, it will be the same for the digital euro as with any other case. However, DN4 describes that they differentiate on whether there is a proposal from a client that are asking for a specific solution or if it is a development of solutions for the market. DN3 explains that Diebold Nixdorf have many types of software solutions, but they can all be clustered in groups. For example, there is a group of security software products, customer interface products and similar. DN3 explains that there are larger groups where the digital euro fits, and the R&D teams will ensure that the solutions they develop specifically for the digital euro fits well into that particular group as well. Finally, DN4 imply that the size of the company, and the assets they have enables the appointment of internal expert groups instead of employing external consultants and highlight this as a competitive advantage to other competitors. 58 Table 7: Summary of Empirical Findings - Strategic Adoption to Change Key Area Empirical Findings Transformation to a new digital infrastructure requires companies not only to integrate Organisational Adoption technically but also adapt their organizations business models and processes. To remain competitive, companies must continuously adapt their operations to industry Industry’s Change Pattern developments, even if that requires abandoning parts of their core business to adapt to the future. To avoid setbacks if a potential opportunity fails to materialize, a strategy could be to develop products and services that do not only work as an Product/services entirely stand-alone solution, instead they can be complementary to their portfolio and other parts of the ecosystem. 59 5. Discussion This section presents an analysis of the empirical findings through the lens of the conceptual framework to address the research questions. By comparing the empirical data to the literature review, the discussion explores how CBDCs may disrupt international business ecosystems and what strategic implications it has for multinational corporations. 5.1 Business Ecosystem The empirical findings illustrate that the introduction of the digital euro could play a central role in unifying the Eurozone’s payment landscape. Currently, the lack of a pan-European digital payments solution weakens Europe’s ecosystem resilience and strategic autonomy (P1). From a governance perspective this raises sovereignty concerns as Europe has left control of key payment infrastructure to non-European actors. The digital euro can thus be interpreted as an institutional response to this, aimed to reshape and unite the European payments landscape and enabling ECB to reclaim governance. By acting as unified digital tender across the eurozone and allowing private actors to leverage the digital euro infrastructure, ECB can address market fragmentation and promote innovation and competition within the ecosystem (ECB, 2025e). 5.1.1 Collaboration and Competition The findings suggest that developing the digital euro will require collaboration across national, institutional and technological boundaries (IE1, DN3). This is something that IE1 raises concerns about, not only because collaboration across EU member states has proven to be a persistent challenge, but also because it will require the involvement of commercial banks. What makes the involvement of commercial banks particularly challenging in this case is that their incentive to actively support the development of the digital euro is limited, as they are likely to face significant disadvantages from its introduction (IE1). At the same time, banks are likely to play a central role in the actual implementation of the digital euro (B1). Even though they do not formally decide on the design of the digital euro, the 60 results indicate that banks' voice will be significant because they are the ones who will bear the implementation burden. This indicates that overcoming this challenge cannot only be driven by the will to co-develop technical infrastructure, collaboration must also be driven by the interest in shaping regulatory standards and future market conditions, which is also emphasised by IE5. This reflects Teece (2025:18) argument that sustained competitive advantage is increasingly derived from network participation and the ability to influence the systems infrastructure. While collaboration is seen as a necessity for the development and implementation of a digital euro, the empirical findings also demonstrate that it will intensify competition and lead to a more integrated in payment landscape (DN1, IE1, IE3, P1). These findings are in line with Söderberg et al. (2023:10) and Allen and Qian (2024:43-61), who argue that CBDCs may restructure the competitive landscape by allowing new entrants and thereby reduce the market dominance of established non-European players. The assumption that the digital euro could create pressure on actors to strategically reposition themselves also resonates with Teece (2025:17) who states that firms must proactively adapt to institutional change and technological innovation to maintain competitiveness. So far, there has been high interest among private actors to contribute to the design and functions of the digital euro. P1 explains that ECB have announced a call for applications where private actors have been given the opportunity to express their interest in developing innovations around the digital euro (P1). These applicants differ in size and form, commercial banks, PSPs and other stakeholders (ECB, 2025e), each capable to contribute with different components and solutions. This illustrates the significant interest from the private sector in wanting to shape the infrastructure and becoming part of this emerging ecosystem. However, while the ECB aims to encourage European actors to participate, becoming a part of this new ecosystem in practice will require integration with the existing banking infrastructure. As mentioned, banks are likely to play a central role in the implementation of the digital euro. Banks are often very specific with their own ecosystems and have very rigid processes, particularly regarding security and what is permitted to interface with their operations (DN2). DN2 highlights that it can be 61 very complicated to do businesses with banks, which is sometimes underestimated among players in the ecosystem. This may lead to a misalignment between ECB and commercial banks, as ECB wants to promote European solutions and bring them into the ecosystem of the digital euro, and banks are highly selective and cautious with who they are willing to collaborate with. According to Adner (2017:42), the relationship between actor A and B is influenced by the relationship between A and C. Meaning that if there are tensions between central banks and commercial banks, other ecosystem actors are likely to also be affected, potentially weakening the performance of the ecosystem as a whole. This could be seen as a potential objection to the ECB’s notion that the digital euro will serve as a tool to create a less fragmented market that is not dominated by a few individual actors. Complexities such as these will place high demands on ECBs capacity to orchestrate the business ecosystem. Weill and Woerner (2013) describe how digitalization forces companies to reevaluate their partnerships to create value in the ecosystem. A new infrastructure such as the digital euro could constitute a new strategic interaction between different actors with potentially new value flows and dependencies in line with Weill and Woerner (2013). As the digital euro represents a digitalization of public money, in other words banknotes, existing ecosystems will likely need to reevaluate their partnerships to ensure they continue to generate value within the ecosystem. The empirical material emphasises that no actor alone can take a holistic approach to the digital euro solution. The empirical material shows that this interaction is also made more difficult since many actors will have different regulatory and operational conditions (B1), which plays on Adner's (2017:55) criticism that cooperation is often hindered by misalignment. Another aspect that may have implications for both cooperation and competition is the geopolitical uncertainties highlighted by several respondents. Although this is not emphasised in the theory, it can be argued that external pressures, for example linked to geopolitics or cybersecurity, can accelerate cooperation processes as it puts increased pressure on collective action. This suggests that ecosystem theories need to be complemented with a 62 more external perspective to provide insights into how external changes can trigger strategic adjustment and increased cooperation between actors. Adner (2017:42) suggests that ecosystems should be structured around a central value proposition, with multiple actors collaborating to realise its value. The realisation of the focal value proposition cannot be achieved by a single actor alone, as it requires the coordinated efforts of multiple interdependent actors within the ecosystem (Adner, 2017:43). This perspective is relevant in the case of the digital euro as well. It is not enough for the ECB to offer a value proposition to the end-users, realising it will require alignment and collaboration among various actors. It is therefore important for the ECB to clarify what potential ecosystem participants can benefit by contributing to the realization of the value proposition. This is something that DN1 raised concerns about and stress that is unclear how companies will be able to generate profit from the digital euro. According to Adner (2017:42-43), a fundamental prerequisite for developing a strong value proposition is to carefully analyse how end-users want an innovation to function. However, this aspect is, according to IE2, to some extent overlooked by the ECB in the design of the digital euro. In contrast, several representatives from Diebold Nixdorf emphasise that customer needs consistently serve as the starting point in their product development. If end-user preferences are not sufficiently prioritized in the design of the digital euro, it can potentially create an opportunity for private actors to fill this gap, by identifying consumer needs and developing value-adding complementary services accordingly. DN2, DN3, and DN4 agree that these services represent the greatest business potential for private actors with the introduction of a digital euro. 5.1.2 Internationalisation In the recent decade, Europe has demonstrated considerable success in financial technology, with numerous industry-shaping solutions (ECB, 2025h). Meaning that multiple great financial solutions already exist in different eurozone countries, but they have yet remained confined within national borders (P1; ECB, 2025h). One of the reasons these solutions have not reached beyond national borders is structural barriers that complicates international expansion (Cipollone, 2025b). Another reason is the high cost of engaging at a European level (P1). The ECB suggests that the digital euro could enable both 63 existing and new financial solutions to more easily achieve pan-European reach by providing a platform that private actors can leverage as well as a single rulebook for the entire eurozone (P1). P1 explains that a digital euro would standardize the system and facilitate scaling national financial solutions. According to the ECB, this will allow actors within the digital euro landscape to reduce the costs of delivering their services at a European level (Cipollone, 2025b). The findings suggest that scaling the successful financial solutions that European companies have and will develop is key to sustain innovation and increase competition in the payments landscape. If national financial solutions can achieve larger scale, it is likely that they will have a bigger chance of disrupting the entrenched international ecosystems that currently is dominated by non-European actors. The empirical results, however, point to certain objections to this. P1 argues that payments is an area where scale matters, and without reaching sufficient scale, it may be difficult to sustain innovation. The ECB suggests that the digital euro will help national firms achieve this scale. However, even if these firms can expand beyond national borders, the adoption rate and users’ response to the digital euro remain uncertain, which means that reaching sufficient scale may still be difficult (IE2). By introducing a single rulebook for the entire eurozone, structural barriers could be lowered (Cipollone, 2025b). However, the potential impact of the digital euro rulebook will probably not be unilateral, for some players it can serve as a catalyst for business opportunities, while others could face new regulatory requirements (B1). On the other hand, the digital euro ecosystem will differ from many other financial solutions that have emerged over the last years, as it will be developed from a top-down approach (IE5). This implies that potential actors in the business ecosystem will know from the start what they must comply with, in contrast to other digital currencies like bitcoin, where the innovation has entered the market first and the regulatory framework has evolved progressively. Another factor that the ECB suggests will promote internationalisation is the legislative proposal to grant the digital euro the status of legal tender. The ECB argues that this would help establish a pan-European network and contribute to a more integrated European payments market (Cipollone, 2025b). This perspective aligns with Hult 64 et al. (2025), who suggest that regions can act both as enablers of economic activity and as regulatory frameworks that shape market dynamics. Moreover, the legal tender proposal could also represent additional business opportunities for actors in the payments landscape, as banks and payment operators currently using, to a large extent, old payment infrastructure that is not truly scalable (DN1). However, this outcome is not guaranteed, B1 suggests that the impact of a digital euro is likely to vary across national markets and depend on local conditions and regulatory interpretations. While the overarching framework may be harmonized at the EU level, its implementation could differ between countries. This indicates that structural barriers may persist and potentially limiting private actors to achieve pan-European reach. Finally, the findings indicate a degree of scepticism regarding granting the digital euro with legal tender status. IE5 and DN1 emphasises that if the value proposition is strong enough, market forces will naturally lead merchants in that direction. However, P1 underlines that this will be a gradual process rather than something obligatory all at once. Overall, the empirical findings suggests that the ECB’s digital euro initiative could support internationalisation of national financial solutions by making it easier to operate across borders. Johanson and Vahlne (2009:1411) argues that being part of the right networks is essential for firms to succeed internationally, and the findings indicates that many companies offering financial services have found it difficult utilize this and expand beyond their home countries. By creating an international business ecosystem with a shared digital infrastructure and a unified rulebook, the digital euro may help reduce these barriers and make it easier for firms to build relationships and grow in new markets. Moreover, a positive implication with a successful international business ecosystem built around the digital euro, is that it would enhance resilience not only for the European Central Bank itself, but also for all stakeholders operating within this ecosystem (Hult et al., 2025), which would create a more robust financial infrastructure in the Eurozone. 65 5.1.3 Multi-level Dynamics Business ecosystem consists of keystone players and niche players that jointly creates shared value (Iansiti and Levien, 2004:73; Moore, 1993:76). Over the last decades, players like Visa and Mastercard have to a large extent determined the conditions in payment ecosystems and established themselves as keystone players or drivers (DN2; Iansiti & Levien, 2004:73; Weill & Warner, 2015). Both regarding extracting rents, as the revenue opportunities for niche players have been in the processing fees by these actors, and by determining the rules, by for example creating new mandates twice a year, that all other actors in the ecosystem must be compliant with (Weill & Warner, 2015; DN1; DN2). These ecosystems have been highly successful and Visa and Mastercard have managed to create value for the niche players and the ecosystem as a whole (DN2), in line with Iansiti and Leviens (2004:74) propositions. Meanwhile, niche players such as Diebold Nixdorf have been able to leverage complementary resources, by for example delivering ATMs, point of sales (POS) systems and software solutions to this ecosystem. However, the introduction of the digital euro is likely to disrupt the current business ecosystems in the European payments landscape, as one of ECBs key argument is to strengthen EUs resilience and reduce the reliance on non-European actors. IE3 reinforces this, and states that the traditional ecosystems in the payment landscape could diminish or disappear. The findings further implies that the digital euro will require a new central infrastructure and actors within the payment landscape will need to technically integrate into this new central infrastructure (IE4). The ECB will act as the infrastructure provider and institutional orchestrator of the digital euro ecosystem, in line with Hult et al. (2025), who describe orchestration as aligning diverse actors toward shared objectives. In today’s payment landscape, Visa and Mastercard can be seen as both orchestrators and keystone players simultaneously, which further demonstrates their dominance in the payments landscape and within business ecosystems. Furthermore, the current business ecosystems in the payments landscape, orchestrated by, for example, Visa and Mastercard, could be defined as ecosystems-as-affiliation, consisting of multiple actors linked through these firms networks and platforms (Adner, 2017:41). The digital euro has the potential to create 66 a shift toward more of an ecosystem-as-structure logic, as the ECB has proposed it as a value proposition aimed at providing a digital public means of payment that is valid throughout the eurozone. According to Adner (2017:41), materialising this value proposition will require collaboration among multiple actors, and the ECB will need to identify the set of actors that must interact for the proposition to materialize. The findings indicate that the ECB has recognized this need, as demonstrated by for example their calls for applications where private actors have had the opportunity to express their interest in the digital euro. Finally, since the ECB will provide the platform, the digital euro ecosystem may at first glance appear to become structured as an ecosystem-as-affiliation. However, the fact that the different actors in the ecosystem must coordinate and collaborate in order to realise the ECB’s value proposition, and that it is not simply a platform where actors operate independently, suggests that it will be more accurately characterized as a business ecosystem-as-structure (Adner, 2017:40-42). This shift from ecosystem-as-affiliation to ecosystem-as-structure is illustrated in figure 7. Figure 7:The Payment Ecosystem before and after the digital euro Figure comment: The figure illustrates the shift from ecosystem-as-affiliation to ecosystem-as-structure. It highlights how the ecosystem may change after the digital euro is introduced. Source: Compiled by the authors. Although the ECB will be the orchestrator and the focal firm behind the digital euro business ecosystem, they are not likely to interact directly with end users or create and share value in the way keystone players typically do, as described by Iansiti and Levien (2004:74). Instead, the keystone positions may 67 be taken on by private actors. The distribution of power within the ecosystem could therefore change with the introduction of a digital euro. Since non-European actors will be more or less excluded from the digital euro ecosystem, the roles within the ecosystem may shift, as actors such as Visa and Mastercard currently hold substantial roles in existing ecosystems. Further, for the digital euro ecosystem to function optimally, it is importance to avoid dominators. Both physical- and value dominators, since Iansiti and Levin (2004:75) argues that both strategies lead to a decline of the ecosystems function. P1 reveals that the ECB has received more than 100 applications from private actors with ideas of services to be developed. Among these, it is important to identify actors who seek to maximize its own returns without contributing value to the ecosystem, as well as those who pursue vertical or horizontal integration to gain ownership and control over a disproportionate share of the network, both of which pose challenges to the performance of the ecosystem. Once again, this place high demands on the ECB as the orchestrator of the digital euro ecosystem to establish frameworks that prevent dominators. 5.1.4 Impact on the Payment Landscape The respondents emphasise that a digital euro is not expected to replace existing payment methods but rather function as a complementary layer to the current ecosystem (DN1; IE2). This aligns with Söderberg et al. (2023:3-43), who argue that CBDCs can coexist with private payment solutions, thereby encouraging resilience and innovation. Allen and Qian (2024:43-61) suggest that fintech-oriented MNCs could monetize on the infrastructural demands of digital currencies. This is shown in the empirical material by e.g. DN1 and DN2 who highlight that Diebold Nixdorf can strengthen their strategic position by offering technology compatible with the digital euro. This is consistent with Teece et al. (1997:509) argument that firms can leverage dynamic capabilities to realign their offerings in response to institutional and technological change. However, the empirical findings also reveal tensions that are not fully addressed in the literature. While much of existing research tends to highlight the benefits such as improved financial inclusion, lower transaction costs, and greater stability (Lee, Yan & 68 Wang, 2021:52-66; Söderberg et al., 2023:3-43), several respondents express concerns regarding the operational and regulatory complexity involved in building systems across jurisdictions. This indicates that the transition towards a system of public digital- and physical money across the eurozone may be more fragmented than previous studies have suggested. At the same time, if central banks are becoming more active players in the payment system it can influence long-term relationships between actors and the role of public institutions as both collaborators and competitors (IE1; IE3). For example, the introduction of the digital euro poses potential conflicts between the ECB and commercial banks, as commercial banks fear that customers may exchange their deposits into digital euros. While such concerns may seem overstated given the absence of interest on digital euro holdings, the perception of central bank money as risk-free could still drive consumer preference, particularly in times of crisis (Bindseil et al., 2024). In this context, geopolitical uncertainties and disruptions such as the recent major power outage affecting Spain, large parts of Portugal, and certain regions of France leaving millions without electricity for several hours (Pinedo et al., 2025). This incident reveals the vulnerability of the existing infrastructure and may accelerate demand for more resilient public alternatives. Moreover, an increased demand from consumers to hold digital euros could potentially leave ECB in a dilemma, where the holding limit, and offline functionalities might have to be re-evaluated. 5.2 Strategic Management 5.2.1 MNCs response to disruptive changes The empirical findings indicate that Diebold Nixdorf is taking active steps to strategically position itself for future changes in the industry. The strategic preparedness is in line with Teece (2025:7) who emphasises thar MNCs in today’s business landscape are characterised by profound uncertainty where future forecasts are made more difficult by macroeconomic and geopolitical shifts. In this climate, long- term resilience becomes more important than short-term gains. The respondents mention that long-term 69 resilience is a central part of the company’s strategy. DN3 mentions that Diebold Nixdorf is actively seeking to future-proof its business model by focusing on software and value-added services, rather than relying solely on more traditional solutions such as ATMs, which historically has been the company’s main source of revenue. This corresponds to O’Reilly III and Tushman’s (2008:202) findings that long- lived successful companies often currently operate in different industries and technologies than they started in, showing how they have adapted to change over time. Similarly, the strategic shift from hardware to software-intensive solutions can be interpreted as an expression of the company’s attempt to build dynamic capabilities in line with Teece (2025:7-22), that is the ability to protect and mobilize critical resources in a rapidly changing environment. Although Diebold Nixdorf is aware of the need for this shift and is actively undergoing the transformation, a key challenge is ensuring that the market recognises their ability to bring value to the ecosystem and does not perceive Diebold Nixdorf as an actor offering outdated services. Diebold Nixdorf’s adaptability is further noticed in the management of uncertainties and changes. DN4 describes how Diebold Nixdorf organizes expert groups that continuously evaluate new threats or opportunities that may arise, for example in relation to digital currencies. This can be seen as an internal process of scanning and sense-making (Teece, 2025:7-22), which according to the theory is central to enabling strategic flexibility and early response to disruptive changes. A central problem currently is that Europe’s digital payment infrastructure is dependent on foreign players, in particular Visa and Mastercard. IE3 explains that this dependence is often overlooked even though it weakens the financial autonomy within the eurozone, which in itself justifies the project of the digital euro (IE3). This reflects Teece’s (2025:7) reasoning that companies and institutions today must build resilience against vulnerabilities and systemic risks. In this case, it is primarily Europe as a region that must strengthen its resilience, as the dependence on non-European actors dominating the market exposes its digital payment infrastructure to risks. While individual firms are also affected in the long run, the core vulnerability lies at the systemic level. The ECB is working proactively against this dependency and includes private players in the construction of new infrastructures; the digital euro 70 project represents a clear example of this. At the same time, a transformation to a new digital infrastructure like the one with the digital euro, could create risks, and as IE4 points out, companies must not only integrate technically but also adapt their organisation’s business models and processes (IE4). The question of whether a bank account will be required to access the digital euro remains unsolved. This leads to uncertainty regarding its potential to promote financial inclusion. If the digital euro were to require a traditional commercial bank account, it could limit the reach to already banked populations which undermines one of its frequently stated public policy goals. However, if central banks were to enable access through alternative distribution channels it could expand access to underserved groups as well. If the goal of increased financial inclusion is filled, it could lead to a broader user base for digital payment solutions. For actors in the payments landscape, such as Diebold Nixdorf, this may translate into an expanded addressable market and increased demand for hardware and software systems that have access to digital currencies. Furthermore, DN1 explains that the geopolitical landscape has become a factor that creates legitimacy for the digital euro. The future business potential of CBDCs is thus not only determined by market economic factors, but also by political and regulatory developments. In this context strategic adoption has an institutional dimension as well, since companies need to interpret and react to changing policy conditions rather than just customer or technology driven changes. This supports previous research within the field that institutional changes and technological disruption often interact in ecosystem changes and that companies are forced to take on new roles (Adner, 201739-58; Teece, 2025:7-22). 5.2.2 Change Management and innovators Dilemma The introduction of the digital euro represents a change pressure for actors in the payments landscape which places high demand on effective change leadership. The empirical findings suggests that the change might not only be technological but also institutional and strategical. Several respondents, 71 including DN1 and DN2 emphasise that the uncertainty surrounding the digital euro makes planning and implementation work more difficult. The ability to create commitment in the organization hence becomes central. As DN3 states, change initiatives often has a greater chance of success when they are carried out in close collaboration with customers and other actors in the ecosystem. The findings illustrate that Diebold Nixdorf appears to be adapting its strategy to a large extent in line with changes in the industry’s development trajectory, which is central according to McGahan (2004:88). McGahan (2004:88) further emphasises that a company’s ability to achieve return on invested capital depends on its ability to adapt its strategy to the pace of change in the industry, rather than trying to counteract it. The respondents confirm this by highlighting that digital solutions and software are central to the future payment infrastructure (DN3). DN3 underlines that software will remain relevant and that the digital euro naturally complements the company’s current focus, rather than requiring a big strategic restructuring. DN4 further emphasises that Diebold Nixdorf continuously works with trend analyses and evaluations of new business opportunities through assigning expert groups. This indicates a proactive approach to change and developments within the market. Value creation through software-based services is identified as the core of future offerings (DN4) which further emphasises the image that Diebold Nixdorf is not holding on to outdated business models but rather seeking growth opportunities in line with the industry’s change patterns. At the same time, the empirical findings illustrate that Diebold Nixdorf also confronts the challenges described by Bower and Christensen (1995:44), that established companies tend to fail at commercializing innovations that are not valued by their traditional customer base. This innovators dilemma becomes clear in Diebold Nixdorf’s strategy as DN4 explains the importance of understanding what value they can deliver to end users of the digital euro, since demand for new services is largely driven by these end users. To address this DN4 states that new business cases are created where a clear value proposition must be established before resources are allocated to development. 72 The empirics shows that Diebold Nixdorf has established internal structures that enable parallel work on innovation without disrupting their daily operations. DN4 describes how the company develops new products within separate product groups and that technical solutions related to the digital euro will also be reusable in other contexts if the project is not realized. This could illustrate a conscious work with what O’Reilly and Tushman (2008:185) describe as organizational ambidexterity as a dynamic capability, to balance between exploitation of existing business models and exploration of new ones. This structure also indicates an active approach to the innovator’s dilemma (Christensen, 1997/2016), where established players often fail to manage disruptive innovation because they prioritize existing businesses. By delimiting innovation work to specific groups, Diebold Nixdorf shows signs of managing this dilemma in a successful way. In this case, the company has established routines through its expert groups to identify opportunities (sensing), develop new solutions (seizing), and potentially restructure its operations, if necessary (transforming), in line with Teece et al. (1997:509-533). At the same time, the company's size and industry position must be seen as an enabling factor in this context. Their capacity to organize separate expert groups and run parallel innovation processes is a privilege that is not as available to smaller players, which can amplify differences in ability to handle disruptive change. 73 6. Conclusions This chapter presents the main conclusions of the study by answering the research questions and summarising the key findings. It discusses how the results contribute to the theoretical understanding of business ecosystems and strategic responses to disruptive changes and outlines practical implications. The chapter also reflects on the limitations of the recommendations and ends with suggestions for future research This study aimed to explore how CBDCs disrupt international business ecosystems and how MNCs can strategically respond to disruptive change. The analysis of the empirical material shows that the digital euro, as a form of CBDC, has the potential to disrupt European payment ecosystems. The current payment landscape is highly fragmented and heavily reliant on non-European actors such as Visa and Mastercard. To challenge this dominance, the digital euro aims to provide a pan-European digital infrastructure to enhance the strategic autonomy of Europe. The ECB’s strategy to orchestrate a pan- European ecosystem through a centralised value proposition signals a shift from ecosystem-as-affiliation to ecosystem-as-structure logic. While the ECB is the orchestrator of the ecosystem, private firms will remain central in developing and commercialising the digital euro. The development and implementation of the digital euro is, however, complex as it requires extensive international collaboration, as well as coordination between public and private actors. European financial solutions have not been able to scale and effectively compete with major international players in the European payment landscape or contribute to increased competition in international business ecosystems. The findings indicate that the digital euro has the potential to change this by offering a pan-European platform that private actors can leverage, along with a unified rulebook across the entire euro area. This is likely to reduce both the costs and structural barriers to international expansion, making it easier for firms to expand from national to multinational corporations. Nevertheless, the extent to which the digital euro can support internationalisation may be constrained 74 by how effectively a harmonised rulebook is implemented across member states, and by how the market responds in terms of adoption rates and users’ response. The findings show that for MNCs, strategic adaptation to CBDCs as a form of disruptive change, does not solely involve adjusting to new payment infrastructures but also demands internal capabilities to respond to institutional changes in the external environment. As business models surrounding the digital euro are still under development, private actors struggle to align their strategies and assess how much resources to be placed on CBDC investments. The lack of regulatory clarity complicates private actors’ efforts to anticipate market opportunities and hinders long-term strategic planning. The study found that this puts pressure on corporate managers to seek growth opportunities that reflect the direction of industry change. As a result, this thesis shows how the classic innovators dilemma and ability to balance the use of existing capabilities with the exploration of new ones appears in the context of CBDCs. Furthermore, the findings indicate that it may be beneficial for private actors to engage early with the emerging CBDC ecosystem, not only to better understand its development but also to help shape its direction and position themselves accordingly. 6.1 Theoretical contributions This study contributes to the literature on business ecosystem by analysing how CBDCs disrupt existing institutional arrangements and reshape inter-organisational dynamics within international business ecosystems. By focusing on the digital euro, the study extends current ecosystem theory by introducing CBDCs as a form of top-down institutional innovation, rather than firm driven technological innovation. This stands in contrast to the traditional ecosystem literature which has predominately focused on private orchestrators and market-based coordination mechanisms (Adner, 2017; Moore, 1993). The empirical material further highlights how the introduction of a CBDC triggers a structural transformation from ecosystems-as-affiliation to ecosystems-as-structure (Adner, 2017), where actors are no longer simply connected through platforms, but instead must coordinate their actions to realise a central value proposition defined by a public institution, in this case, the European Central Bank. This 75 reconceptualization broadens the orchestrator role to include state actors and thereby challenges the prevailing assumption that ecosystem coordination is primarily driven by private keystone players (Iansiti & Levien, 2004). Building on the work of Hult et al. (2020) and Johanson & Vahlne (2009), the study shows how regional institutions such as the ECB can help create international business ecosystems that reduce fragmentation and enable international expansion. By offering a unified platform and regulatory framework, public actors like the ECB can enable new growth paths, particularly for firms previously constrained by national boundaries. Moreover, the study contributes to the strategic management literature by exploring how firms respond to external uncertainties and disruptive innovation in the form of CBDCs. It explores how MNCs develop dynamic capabilities such as sensing emerging trends, seizing new opportunities and reconfiguring their business models to adapt. It also connects to the literature on the innovator’s dilemma (Christensen, 1997/2016) by showing how established firms attempt to balance existing capabilities with the need to explore new business opportunities in response to systemic change. This highlights the importance of organisational ambidexterity as a strategic response to disruption. Additionally, the study brings attention to the growing importance of institutional complexity, regulatory diversity, and geopolitical uncertainty in ecosystem participation. It shows that firms need capabilities not just for innovation and scaling, but also for interpreting and responding to shifting policy landscapes. This highlights the need for a more integrated theoretical approach that links internal strategic dynamics with external uncertainties. 6.2 Managerial Implications Based on the thesis results, several implications for business leaders can be identified. First, MNCs should actively engage in the emerging ecosystem around the digital euro, not just to adapt to technological changes, but to influence future rules, standards and collaboration models. This provides 76 an opportunity to shape the playing field rather than simply follow it. However, this involves a significant resource allocation at a stage where both technical specifications and regulatory frameworks are under development, which may be risky for actors with limited strategic resources. Second, companies need to balance their current business model while exploring new opportunities linked to CBDCs. Structures that enable parallel work, for example through independent product groups or expert teams, will be crucial to manage the disruptive change. Many companies, however, lack the capacity to be able to organize this, which risks reinforcing differences in the ability to handle disruptive change. Another important implication is the opportunity to differentiate through value-added service innovation. Since the ECB’s focus is on delivering the infrastructure, a gap is created around end-user needs. Companies that can develop these value-adding, complementary services, can create competitive advantages. However, more research is needed since the end-user demand is still unclear, and investments in such solutions will thus rely on uncertain business assumptions. Finally, the thesis suggests that the digital euro has the potential to facilitate internationalisation through a unified regulatory framework and a public infrastructure that private actors can leverage. To capitalize on this opportunity companies can adapt their products and processes for scalability across the Eurozone. However, while the ECB aims to create a unified rulebook, our findings suggest that the impact of the digital euro is likely to vary between countries and depend on local conditions and how each country interprets the rules, which could limit the effectiveness of pan-European expansion. 6.3 Implications for Policymakers The study highlights several policy considerations relevant to central banks and ad regulatory bodies involved in the development of CBDCs. The findings emphasise the importance of clearly articulating the value proposition of the digital euro, not only for end-users but for all ecosystem participants. If private actors such as banks, PSPs, and software providers do not perceive a viable business model, their engagement and incentive to support CBDC infrastructure is likely to be weak. Furthermore, 77 policymakers must balance regulation with innovation. While harmonisation and interoperability are key to enabling pan-European payments, overly rigid regulations may reduce innovation. In addition, the study suggests that if CBDCs are to be adopted at scale, implementation will depend on the ability to identify and address actual user needs. If the digital euro, or other CBDC projects, is perceived primarily as a tool for central banks to regain control over the payment system rather than a response to a market demand, end-user adoption may be limited. In line with this, we suggest that design processes should incorporate more user-oriented approaches and clearer engagement of consumers. For a CBDC to gain traction, it appears that the perceived value must be mutual and tangible for all stakeholders involved. 6.4 Further research While this study provides an initial exploration of how CBDCs disrupt international business ecosystems and how MNCs can respond strategically, further research is needed to deepen and refine these insights. Given that the digital euro remains in the design and pilot phase, longitudinal research could help uncover how ecosystems evolve during and after implementation. Particularly how roles are redefined, value is co-created, and institutional governance adapts over time. Such studies can contribute to the broader literature on ecosystem formation. While this study focused on the Eurozone with a single MNC as subunit, future research could adopt a comparative approach by examining how different CBDC initiatives, shaped by varying institutional logics and governance models, impact the configuration of business ecosystems. Such comparison could also test the applicability of the theoretical framework developed here across diverse regulatory and market contexts. In addition, the role of end-users and consumer adoption remains an underexplored but critical factor. Future research should investigate how privacy concerns, usability, and willingness to adopt digital currencies and how these in turn influence the incentives and strategies of private ecosystem participants. Moreover, this thesis suggests a need to further examine the orchestration capacity of public 78 institutions, especially central banks. How they balance innovation with control when leading complex, multi-actor ecosystems is essential for understanding the evolving role of state actors in digital financial infrastructure. Finally, given the increasing relevance of geopolitical risks and cyber threats, future research should examine how such external pressures impact trust among ecosystem participants, the ability to coordinate across sectors, and the long-term stability of CBDC ecosystems. This is particularly important as CBDCs operate in both of digital infrastructure and economic policy which makes them sensitive to both technological vulnerabilities and political dynamics. 6.5 Concluding Remarks The introduction of CBDCs, and specifically the digital euro, illustrates a transformation in the financial landscape of Europe. As this study shows, its impact extends beyond technical design into strategy, competition, cooperation, and governance. For MNCs, this means not only adapting to new infrastructures but also rethinking their roles within evolving ecosystems. For policymakers, the challenge lies in designing inclusive, innovation-friendly frameworks that align diverse interests. The findings suggest that if successfully implemented, the digital euro could become a catalyst for a more resilient, competitive and integrated European payment landscape. However, this outcome is far from guaranteed. 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What role do you see payment infrastructure and technology providers playing in the adoption and distribution of the digital euro? Business Ecosystem 7. What challenges and opportunities do you see in ecosystem collaboration when new business opportunities emerge? 8. The introduction of the digital euro requires complementary innovations for end customers to fully benefit. a. What complementary services do you believe are necessary? 89 Change Management 9. Have you encountered similar disruptive changes that drastically changed the payment landscape? a. What was key to success and why? 10. What new resources/competencies do you believe that payment infrastructure and technology providers need to develop to adapt to the digital euro? Infrastructure and Regulatory Environment 11. What security and cybersecurity challenges do you see associated with a digital euro? 12. What existing regulations in the Eurozone will be important to consider in the implementation of the digital euro? 13. How have current regulations influenced the digitalization of payments? a. Incentivized/restricted? Other 14. Are there any other aspects that we have not yet covered throughout the interview that you believe could be relevant to this research topic? 90