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Abstract

Does women's work abroad improve gender equality at home? We investigate the impact of female labor migration (FLM) from low- and middle-income countries on gender equality in female migrants' countries of origin or 'source countries'. We estimate this impact using annual variations in oil prices as a source of exogenous change in demand for female labor from countries with high levels of FLM to Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). We find that FLM is a mixed blessing for gender equality in female labor migrants' source countries. While FLM correlates with lower gender gaps in primary and secondary education, it is also associated with less support for gender equality, especially among women, and lower female political representation in source country democracies. We suspect that FLM drains source countries of women with more gender egalitarian attitudes, thus undermining women's representation. At the same time, FLM incentivizes source country households to invest in their female members' education, reducing gender gaps in human capital.

Key words: Gender equality, labor migration, low- and middle-income countries

1. Introduction

More than 135 million women in 2020 were international migrants, representing half of the world's migration population (United Nations 2020). Many of these migrants are workers; roughly three-quarters of international migrants are of working age[1] (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2019). Academics, policymakers, and development practitioners have long heralded paid work as a catalyst for women's empowerment (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Moghadam 2003). But can women's work abroad advance gender equality at home?

Scholars disagree whether female labor migration (FLM) is a blessing or curse for gender equality in migrants' country of origin or 'source country'. Optimists argue opportunities abroad can improve politics and welfare at home (Burgess 2014; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Peters and Miller 2022; Miller and Peters 2020). FLM could promote gender equality in source countries by giving more women more resources, skills, and financial autonomy. Female labor migrants can channel those benefits back home through remittances or upon their return to improve gender equality.

Pessimists warn that FLM can drain source countries of the women needed to mobilize for gender equality (Kapur 2010; Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Hiskey and Cordova 2012). Female migrants tend to be better educated than those who stay (Dumont et al. 2007), and their exit may weaken local efforts to push for gender

[1]This is between the ages of twenty and sixty.

equality in parliament, at work, or in the household. It is also unclear whether female labor migrants would necessarily reinvest their earnings and greater human capital into bolstering gender equality back home; they may be gone for good.

Gender equality, however, is multi-dimensional. Remittances from FLM could lessen source country gender disparities in some domains, like healthcare or education. At the same time, FLM could exacerbate gender inequality in other realms, such as political representation, by distancing working women from the political arena. Yet, most scholarship on migration and gender equality either employs a gender equality index, combining gender equality markers in household, political and economic realms (Ferrant and Tuccio 2015; Nejad and Young 2014), or zeros in on one specific component of gender equality (Lodigiani and Salomone 2020). Adopting an index- or issue- specific gender equality metric risks missing the complex and countervailing ways FLM can shape source country gender equality.

We explore the multiple ways FLM can affect source country gender equality by adopting both aggregate and issue-specific measures. We examine FLM's effect on low- and middle-income source countries' female political representation, gender inclusive economic policies, and girls' access to education. We pair these issue-specific measures of gender equality with a country-level index, assessesing gender equality based on political, economic, and health outcomes.

Estimating the impact of FLM on gender equality in female labor migrants' source countries is difficult. The relationship between FLM and source country gender equality is endogenous. High source country gender inequality can fuel high levels of FLM (Bang and Mitra 2011; Nejad and Young 2014; Ferrant

and Tuccio 2015) and female brain drain (Nejad and Young 2014). Numerous confounding factors can influence *both* FLM and source country gender equality. The relationship between FLM and gender equality may also be spurious; global gains in gender equality have coincided with growing FLM (See Supplementary Information (SI) Figure 4).

To mitigate these measurement concerns, we use oil prices as a source of exogenous variation in demand for female labor from source countries with high levels of FLM to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). We rely on international migration data from the United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) to measure source country levels of FLM across time and identify source countries with high levels of FLM to OPEC states, which we call *OPEC Migrant* source countries (United Nations Population Division 2019a). We interact global oil prices with source countries' *OPEC Migrant* status to estimate the relationship between FLM and source country gender equality.

We find that FLM is a mixed blessing for gender equality in low- and middle-income source countries in the short-term. On the one hand, greater FLM correlates with substantial reductions in gender gaps in primary and secondary schooling in source countries over a five year period. Our models estimate that a ten USD dollar increase in the price of oil correlates with an almost one percentage point decrease in the gender gap in secondary school enrollment in *OPEC Migrant* source countries. This improvement is large enough to offset the gender gap in secondary school enrollment for the average source country in our analysis. We

suspect that FLM incentivizes households to invest in their girls' education so as to obtain economic opportunities abroad.

At the same time, greater FLM correlates with lower female political representation in source country democracies and weaker public support for gender equality in all source countries, especially among women. FLM is also negatively associated with public participation in civil society organizations (CSOs). FLM may deprive source countries of women most likely to vote for female representatives, participate in CSOs and hold gender egalitarian attitudes.

Our work contributes to several strands of scholarship. Most broadly, it speaks to a robust literature on migration politics. Much of this research examines the political consequences of migration on host countries (Dancygier and Laitin 2014; Dancygier 2010; Shin 2017; Peters 2017; Menon 2023). We tap into a growing vein of scholarship that explores these dynamics in source countries (Meseguer and Burgess 2014; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Peters and Miller 2022; Miller and Peters 2020).

We also strengthen a growing research agenda on the ramifications of migration for source countries' gender equality (Ferrant and Tuccio 2015; Tuccio and Wahba 2018; Lodigiani and Salomone 2020; Dumont et al. 2007; Wampler et al. 2009; Jones-Correa 1998). Much of this scholarship examines South-North migration, especially to the United States (Burgess 2014, p.18) or Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Dumont et al. 2007). Yet South-South migration, which makes up more than a third of the world's total migrant stock (World Bank 2016, p.11), remains understudied. The source

country political ramifications of female migration to high income, democracies where migrants have pathways to citizenship likely differ from the ramifications of South-South migration. In examining both South-North and South-South migration, our analysis presents a global assessment of FLM's impact on source country gender equality.

2. FLM: A blessing or curse for source country gender equality?

Existing scholarship presents opposing expectations of the effects of FLM on gender equality in migrants' source countries. These expectations center on two mechanisms by which FLM can influence source country gender equality: Exit and remittances.

In terms of exit, scholars warn that migration can deplete source countries of their most skilled and politically assertive citizens (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Meseguer and Burgess 2014)."Emigration can thus rob the country of influential voices for reform," concludes migration scholar Kapur (2010, p.27). This can create a political brain drain (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Hiskey and Cordova 2012). Exit also complicates collective action (Sellars 2019). The possibility of income abroad raises the opportunity costs of staying and collectively mobilizing. Knowing that others may migrate dampens expectations that collective action will work. Indeed, Peters and Miller (2022) find that emigration reduces non-violent forms of political contestation by flushing aggrieved citizens out of the country. Exit lowers voice,

muzzling it in the long run (Hirschman 1970, p.43).

In the context of gender equality, FLM may deprive women movements and politicians of their most ardent supporters. Women's movements are powerful catalysts for gender policy reform (Htun and Weldon 2012) and female labor migrants are likely to be core supporters of these movements. Gender inequality is a powerful driver of FLM ((Bang and Mitra 2011), (Nejad and Young 2014), (Parreñas 2015, p.61)). Many of the women leaving for work abroad may be those most opposed to their country's existing inequalities. These women are also likely to be educated; a higher share of educated women migrate than men, making women disproportionately represented in a country's brain drain (Dumont et al. 2007; Benería et al. 2012; Docquier et al. 2009).[2] The poorer the source country, the greater the number of highly skilled women emigrating (Dumont et al. 2007). Even migrant women employed in low-skilled occupations tend to have higher educational qualifications than their male counterparts (Dumont et al. 2007). FLM may, therefore, deprive women's movements of key allies: educated women who support gender equality.

On the other hand, FLM can challenge gendered hierarchies and divisions of labor at home and at work (Bach 2010, p.136). Households are loci of gender inequality (Prillaman 2023). In becoming a household's main breadwinner from abroad, female labor migrants escape the parenting and household labor that disproportionately falls upon girls and women (Parreñas 2015, p.63). FLM mush

[2]However, in a more recent article, Docquier et al. (2012) argue that once accounting for interdependencies between migrant couples, skilled women are not more internationally migratory than skilled men.

push male household members to carry more of these traditionally gendered responsibilities. The opportunity to work abroad could also lessen women's reliance on male breadwinners, bolstering their influence in household decision making. Similar dynamics could extend to the work place; the option to work abroad might help female employees bargain for more inclusive workplace policies.

At the same time, women's defiance of traditional gender roles at home through labor migration could spark a backlash among those who stay and want traditional gender roles to persist (Parreñas 2015; Ally 2015, p.144). Far from embracing traditionally gendered household responsibilities like cleaning or childcare, the men who stay behind might deflect these responsibilities to hired help or other female household members (Parreñas 2015, p.73). Indeed, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find that living in a migrant household in Mexico is associated with lower education among high school-aged girls due to increased housework.

Remittances are a second channel through which FLM could influence source country gender equality. Remittances come in many forms: monetary, political, and social. Monetary remittances from FLM may improve source country women's health, educational, and professional outcomes; Money earned abroad could help women back home access public services (Adida and Girod 2011). Remittances also correlate with higher levels of girls' educational attainment in some countries (Acosta et al. 2007, p.87) and greater female entrepreneurship (Bedi et al. 2023). If women remit to a larger network of source country recipients than men (Orozco et al. 2006), FLM may be especially conducive for source country women's welfare. The potential to earn abroad might also incentivize parents to invest in

their daughters' education. Recent work from the Philippines supports this intuition. Using the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as a shock to international migrant income, Khanna et al. (2022) show that areas with greater exposure to migration experienced greater domestic investment in education.

However, it's unclear whether the recipients of female labor migrants' remittances would use this foreign-earned income to bridge gender gaps. Dumont et al. (2007, p.19) demonstrate that higher rates of female brain drain relative to male brain drain correlate with lower levels of female secondary school enrollment and higher rates of infant and under-5 mortality in source countries. Remittances could reinforce existing priorities and expenditures – monetary remittances might even amplify source country gender inequalities. By providing an alternative source of income and reducing their dependence on the state, monetary remittances may dampen women's political engagement and demands for accountability (Ahmed 2020; Goodman and Hiskey 2008). Remittances could also disincentivize women's labor force participation. Some scholars have found a negative association between remittances and women's employment (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006). Women's withdrawal from the labor force might diminish their influence at home and in politics.

Political remittances are another channel through which FLM can shape source country gender equality. Some migrants are active and influential in their source countries' politics (Ahmadov and Sasse 2016). A majority of states provide non-resident citizens voting rights, especially states with large diaspora populations (Wellman et al. 2023; Burgess 2014). Host countries may give migrants greater

space and resources to organize and lobby than their source countries, particularly if their source countries are autocratic. Migrant women could leverage their host country's political processes to raise awareness and pressure their host country's government to push for gender reform in their country of origin. Migrants could also use their earnings to fund parties and civil society organizations (Ahmadov and Sasse 2016) and remit their host countries' political practices and norms. Emigration to democracies, for example, increases the likelihood of non-violent protest in autocratic source countries (Peters and Miller 2022). Much work on migrants' political activism, however, suggests migrant men are more active in their source countries' politics than women ((Ahmadov and Sasse 2016, p.103); (Burgess 2014, p.18)). Some argue that female migrants have stronger desires to stay in their host country (Wampler et al. 2009, p.97) and are more interested in their host country's politics (Jones-Correa 1998, p.326).

Finally, female labor migrants can remit their host country's gender norms, for better or worse. These "social remittances" (Levitt 2001, p.11) stem from interactions between the migrant and her networks back home while she is abroad and upon her return.[3] Social remittances can inspire citizens in migrant sending countries to challenge patriarchal norms (Levitt 2001; Lodigiani and Salomone 2020). Ferrant and Tuccio (2015), for example, demonstrate that source countries' gender equality improves when migrants move to more gender egalitarian countries.

However, they also warn that gender equality worsens when migrants move to less gender egalitarian countries. Likewise, Tuccio and Wahba (2018) note that Jor-

[3]Kapur (2010, p.38) calls this the *return* channel.

danian women with a returnee migrant family member espouse more conservative views towards gender. Returnees from more conservative Arab countries drive these results, suggesting a transfer of patriarchal gender norms. In Mali, communities with higher migration to gender egalitarian countries have lower support for female genital mutilation (Diabata and Mesplé-Somps 2019). Others, however, argue that because FLM is in itself a rupture of traditional gender norms (Parreñas 2015, p.73), female migrants who return may have stronger desires for autonomy (Ghosh 2009, p.63), irrespective of the gender norms of their host country.

In sum, existing scholarship presents diverging expectations about the relationship between FLM and source country gender equality. These diverging expectations extend to the underpinning mechanisms of whether exit and remittances help or hinder gender equality in female labor migrants' source countries. Core to these conflicting expectations are the diverse ways scholars measure gender equality. Existing work either applies a gender equality index or focuses on one dimension of gender equality. Neither approach considers whether FLM has a greater influence on some dimensions of source country gender equality over others.

We expect FLM to undermine source country gender equality in politics. This is because FLM erodes source country support for women's movements and gender equality. It also complicates collective action (Sellars 2019). While monetary remittances and opportunities to vote from abroad may help gender egalitarian causes, they are no substitute for the "on the ground" activism needed to empower female representatives and pass gender inclusive policies.

H1: Greater FLM *reduces* source country gender equality in politics.

Conversely, we expect FLM to improve source country gender equality in human capital. Monetary remittances lower financial barriers to women's education and professional development. The opportunity to earn abroad incentivizes households to invest in their female members' human capital.

H2: Greater FLM *increases* source country gender equality in human capital.

Both of these are short-term expectations are in the short-term. The long-term implications of FLM on source country gender equality are less clear and harder to measure. Female labor migrants' return to their home countries could strengthen local advocacy for gender equality, assuming they do, in fact, return. Likewise, the long-term ramifications of greater gender equality in human capital could translate into greater gender equality in politics. But these gains in human capital could also enable even more FLM, to the detriment of gender equality in politics. Thus, as a first step in this investigation and, as will be discussed, due to data constraints, we assess the short-term consequences of FLM on source country gender equality.

3. Data, Variables and Identification Strategy

We study the effect of FLM on gender equality in low- and middle-income source countries (LMICs). We define LMICs as countries with a GDP per capita below USD 15,000. We focus on LMICs for two reasons. First, nearly three quarters of international migrants come from the Global South (United Nations Population Division 2019b, p.3). Second, by limiting our analysis to low- and middle-income source countries, we imperfectly control for the economic "type" of female labor migrant. The vast majority of FLM from LMICs consists of "low skill" migrants.

We first examine the relationship between FLM and gender equality with the United Nation's Gender Inequality Index (GII). The GII covers 162 countries from 1990 to 2020, making it one of the most comprehensive cross-national gender inequality indices. The GII is a composite index that captures the disadvantages experienced by women relative to men across three dimensions: health, empowerment, and the labor market (United Nations 2023a).[4] The index ranges from zero to one, with zero signifying equality between men and women and one representing the most significant level of inequality. For ease of reading, we reverse the GII index so that a higher number signifies more *Gender Equality*. We then multiply the scale by one hundred. A country with a *Gender Equality* score of 100 has perfect gender equality.

We expect FLM to undermine source country gender equality in politics (H1) but improve it in human capital (H2). We assess gender equality in politics through

[4]See the SI Section B for more information about the components of the GII index.

two dimensions: representation and policy. We measure political gender equality by the share of elected female representatives in a country's legislative assembly (V-Dem Institute 2024). Mindful of the important differences between symbolic and substantive female representation, we use the Varieties of Democracy *Gender Power Distribution* variable (V-Dem Institute 2024) in robustness checks. This variable is an expert-based assessment of differences in political power between men and women. [5]

Our main measure of gender equality in policy is the World Bank's Women, Business and the Law (WBL) score. The WBL captures legal differences between women's and men's access to economic opportunities. It spans 190 economies from 1971 to 2023. Higher scores indicate greater equality between the sexes (Hyland et al. 2020). We complement this measure with V-Dem's *Gender Equality in Civil Liberties* score (V-Dem Institute 2024). This annual score assesses whether women enjoy the same civil liberties as men, where civil liberties include access to justice, private property, freedom of movement and freedom from coerced labor. [6]

With regards to human capital, we measure gender disparities in access to education. Gendered differences in secondary school enrollment rates are our main measure of gender inequality in human capital. Enrollment rates capture the number of female (or male) students enrolled at an education level, divided

[5]This is labeled as v2pepwrgen in the V-Dem manual. This is a converted ordinal measure where at the highest value men and women have roughly equal political power, and at the lowest value men have a near monopoly of political power. This is an annual measure at the country level.

[6]This is labeled as v2clgencl in the V-Dem manual. This variable is a converted ordinal measure where the highest value indicates women enjoy the same civil liberties of men. The lowest value indicates that women have much fewer civil liberties than men. This is an annual measure at the country level.

by the size of the population age group corresponding to that level of education in each year. Secondary education is an engine for human capital. It is also more costly - especially in opportunity cost - than primary education. Smaller differences in boys and girls' enrollment rates indicate greater gender equality in human capital. We examine primary and tertiary school enrollment rates in robustness checks.

Female labor migration (FLM) is the independent variable. We measure a country's FLM with the United Nations Population Divisions (UNPD)'s 2019 Migrant Stock dataset (United Nations Population Division 2019a). This dataset compiles and harmonizes national statistics and censuses from over 200 countries to estimate international migrant populations in five year intervals, beginning in 1990. The Migrant Stock dataset disaggregates migrant populations by sex, age, and country of origin. This allows us to identify "source" or home countries' aggregate levels of female migration across time. The Migrant Stock dataset also discloses the "host" or destinations of source countries' female migration. We log the FLM variable because of its rightward skew.

The 2019 Migrant Stock dataset calculates international *migrant* populations. The UN defines international migrants as anyone who has moved across international borders away from their habitual place of residence regardless of their legal status or whether their move was voluntary (United Nations 2023b). Though three quarters of international migrants in 2019 were of working age (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2019), and could, therefore, be considered a source of labor, many migrants are refugees and asylum seekers. The UN

estimates there were roughly 85 million displaced persons in 2019 (Natarajan et al. 2022), constituting almost a third of the total global migrant population.

While a standard dataset in the cross-national study of migration (Buettner 2022, p.16), the UNPD's Migrant Stock dataset has three limitations. First, because it is stock data, it does not disclose whether changes in migrant levels stem from migrants returning to their source country or becoming naturalized. It also cannot infer whether the *same* migrants are abroad across time or whether new migrants are replacing them. Second, because the dataset only spans three decades in five-year intervals, it is unable to expose the long-term consequences of FLM on source-country gender equality. Lastly, the dataset does not disclose the different types of migration - i.e labor migration versus migration to escape conflict or natural disaster.

Data constraints prevent us from addressing the first two limitations, and while we are unable to assess the long-term implications of FLM, short-term implications are still important. Short-term effects may be harder to measure and might foreshadow even bigger changes in the long-term. To mitigate the third limitation, we measure FLM by excluding migrant source countries in years where these countries were involved in civil conflicts with over 1000 deaths (Davies et al. 2022), and in years when source countries are listed as one of the world's ten most fragile states by the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (The Fund for Peace 2020).[7] This produces a dataset of 744 country-year observations, representing 138 countries.[8]

[7]Note that, because this index began in 2006, we can only exclude observations from 2010, 2015 and 2019.

[8]This number includes our exclusion of OPEC states, which we will discuss shortly.

Numerous confounders can influence a source country's level of FLM and gender equality. We control for a source country's economic wealth, as measured by its logged GDP per capita (World Bank 2020) (*GDP per capita*). Regime type and gender equality may also impact a migrant's ability and willingness to leave. We control for regime type with V-Dem's *Electoral Democracy* index.[9] This variable is an integer that ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates that suffrage is extensive, civil society operates freely, there is freedom of expression, and elections are clean.

Additionally, oil production is negatively associated with gender equality (Ross 2008). Furthermore, as we will discuss, because we will use global oil prices as an exogenous driver of FLM, controlling for a source country's oil production can help account for the diverging effects of high oil prices on source countries' economies and gender equality. Our models thus control for oil rents as a percentage of GDP (World Bank 2020) (*Oil Rents*). We log this variable because of its skew. Lastly, all our models apply country- and year-fixed effects to account for both spatial and temporal determinants of gender equality. Please see Table 7 for an overview of the analysis' main variables.

3.1. Identification Strategy: Oil Prices and FLM

However, even with these controls, unobservable factors may still confound the relationship between FLM and source country gender equality. There could also be reverse causality. Gender equality (or lack thereof) may determine levels

[9]This variable is labeled as v2x_polyarchy in the V-Dem manual.

of FLM (Bang and Mitra 2011; Nejad and Young 2014).

We confront these endogeneity concerns by harnessing changes in global oil prices as an exogenous source of variation in FLM from source countries with high levels of FLM to oil exporting economies. We restrict our analysis to source countries with little control over global oil prices. We then demonstrate that oil prices strongly correlate with subsequent FLM in source countries with already high levels of FLM to OPEC states. Our analysis estimates how exogenous, oil price-induced changes in FLM correlate with source country gender equality while accounting for the alternative ways oil prices can influence source country gender equality.

Though high oil prices are likely to amplify demands for foreign labor in oil exporting economies, they may congruently depress demands for foreign labor in non-oil exporting economies. Higher oil prices could reduce oil consumption and the production of goods and services where oil is a major input. Reduced production may dampen demands for labor, thus depressing employment opportunities and migration flows into non-oil exporting host countries. Alternatively, rising oil prices might reflect a growing global economy's thirst for oil, thereby signalling mounting FLM. Simply using oil prices to estimate the effects of FLM on source country gender equality would incorporate both effects, muting the magnitude of the estimate irrespective of its sign.

A better measure of oil prices' effect on FLM demand would interact oil prices with source countries with existing high levels of FLM to oil exporting economies. The interaction of the two terms restricts the measure of the effect of oil prices on

FLM to countries with already substantial FLM flows to oil exporting countries. These countries have networks and a migration infrastructure to OPEC states that lubricate the ebb and flow of FLM in response to changing oil prices. As such, this interaction term helps isolate the effect of the positive association between oil prices and demand for FLM in oil exporting host countries from the opposite relationship we suspect is present in oil importing host countries. It also helps control for the global effects of oil prices, and the economic trends these prices represent, on source country gender equality.

Oil price is the first variable in this interaction term. We use average annual West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices to measure global oil prices (U.S Energy Information Administration 2023). WTI oil prices are a common benchmark in oil markets. Figure 1 illustrates WTI oil prices from 1990 to 2019. Because we have FLM data at five year intervals, our main analysis applies the WTI crude oil price in the year of the source country observation. This generates seven WTI crude price observations, marked with dotted vertical lines in Figure 1.

Figure 1: WTI Annual Average Oil Prices (1990 - 2019)



The second variable in the interaction term, *OPEC Migrant* source country, is a dummy variable equal to one if one of a source country's three largest FLM destinations is a state that belongs to OPEC. We categorize a state an OPEC member if it belonged to OPEC continuously from 1990 to 2019. These states are: Algeria,

Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Qatar.[10] All of these states' economies are highly dependent on oil, and some have the highest number of international migrants in the world (Natarajan et al. 2022). Saudi Arabia received the third highest number of international migrants in 2020 and the UAE was the sixth (Natarajan et al. 2022). OPEC states' demand for foreign female labor is likely to be highly sensitive global oil price fluctuations.

A source country is an *OPEC Migrant* source country if an OPEC member represented at least one of a source country's top three female migrant destination countries in a given year. We exclude OPEC states as source countries because they are price makers in oil markets. Global oil prices are *not* exogenous to local conditions in OPEC states.

This produces 106 source country-year observations of *OPEC Migrant* source countries. This is roughly fifteen percent of the total observations in our main analysis. Twenty-three countries were *OPEC Migrant* source countries in at least one year of our analysis. *OPEC Migrant* states are present in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These include the Philippines, India, Egypt and Colombia. Almost one in three female migrants in our analysis comes from an *OPEC Migrant* state. In robustness checks, we substitute the *OPEC Migrant* variable with an estimate of a source country's share of FLM to OPEC Destinations (*OPEC Migrant share*).[11] Figure 2 shades the *OPEC Migrant* source countries in our analysis. Table 8 lists

[10]Note that Qatar left OPEC on January 1st 2019.

[11]This is the sum of FLM to OPEC countries among the top three FLM destination countries divided by a source country's total FLM in a particular year.

the *OPEC Migrant* states, their average rates of FLM (in millions), gender equality score, OPEC Migrant share, and survey year observations.

Figure 2: Map of OPEC Migrant States



Figure 3 plots the relationship between WTI oil prices (x-axis) and FLM (y-axis) between *OPEC* and *Non-OPEC Migrant* source countries. There is a positive relationship between oil prices and FLM levels among *OPEC Migrant* states (red circles). There is no clear relationship between oil prices and FLM levels among *Non-OPEC Migrant* states (purple triangles).

Figure 3: Female Labor Migration and Oil Prices (OPEC vs. Non-OPEC Migrant Source Countries)



Table 1 examines the relationship between oil prices and FLM in *OPEC* and *Non-OPEC Migrant* countries with an Ordinary-Least Squares (OLS) regression. The outcome, FLM, is logged in Models 1 and 2 because of its skew. *WTI*OPEC Migrant* state is the interaction term of interest.

Crucially, our FLM measure captures the stock of a source country's female labor migrants. The female labor migrants in our analysis have, therefore, already emigrated when their source country's FLM is counted. Thus, our models' dependent (gender equality) and independent (FLM) variables are measured at the same time unit. Therefore, we lag our models' interaction term variables in order to measure ensuing FLM flows. We lag all control variables to the preceding country-year observations as well. This produces a five-year differential between the dependent and independent variables for all observations in models with the oil price and OPEC migration interaction term. Each model also applies country- and year-fixed effects.

As expected, FLM from *OPEC Migrant* states *increases* after oil prices rise. Model 3 of Table 1 estimates that, all else equal, a thirty-dollar increase in the price of oil - roughly one standard deviation in oil prices from 1990 to 2019 - correlates with an additional 150,000 female labor migrants from *OPEC Migrant* states over the next five years. The magnitude of the *WTI*OPEC Migrant* interaction term is substantial given that the median size of a source country's female labor migrant population in this analysis is a quarter million.

Table 1: Oil Prices, OPEC Migrant Countries, and Female Labor Migration (FLM)

	Dependent variable:		
	FLM (log)		FLM (Millions)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
WTI* OPEC Migr.	0.002**	0.002*	0.005**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
WTI Spot	0.009***	0.010***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
OPEC Migr.	-0.354***	-0.350***	-0.316***
	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.099)
GDPpc (log)		-0.062	0.073*
		(0.053)	(0.044)
Elec. Democracy		0.156	0.008
		(0.150)	(0.157)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.010	-0.097**
		(0.033)	(0.043)
DV Mean	12.43	12.51	0.64
Countries	128	123	123
Observations	594	561	561
R^2	0.593	0.609	0.346
F Statistic	95.569***	66.747***	22.675***
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

High oil prices could influence gender equality in source countries in ways outside FLM. For example, high oil prices could increase costs of living. This risks amplifying gender inequalities if female household members offset these costs with more household labor and less time in school.

We account for these alternative pathways in two ways. First, many of these channels likely extend to *Non-OPEC Migrant* states as well. In comparing OPEC and *Non-OPEC Migrant* source countries, our models' interaction term helps account for the global effects of oil prices on gender equality. Second, our models apply country-specific controls, like GDP per capita (*GDPpc*), political openness (*Elec. Democracy*) and country- and year-fixed effects to best isolate oil price's effect on source country gender equality through FLM. Nevertheless, because this is an observational study, we cannot rule out all observable and non-observable confounders that may bias our estimates.

4. Women's Work Abroad: A Mixed Blessing For Source Country Gender Equality

We begin with a "naive" Ordinary-Least Squares (OLS) regression model that does not account for unobservable factors that could influence *FLM* and source country *Gender Equality* (Table 2). All explanatory variables in this model are lagged, except *FLM*. Under these specifications, *FLM* is negatively correlated with the *Gender Equality* index. This negative correlation is statistically significant at the five percent level when controls are added (Model 2). Model 2 of Table 2 estimates that, holding all else equal, a one percent increase in *FLM* correlates with a two point decrease in a source country's *Gender Equality* score. The *FLM* coefficient is not statistically significant when *Gender Equality* is disaggregated in terms of politics (Models 3 and 4) and human capital (Model 5). Overall, these

more "naive" estimations cast *FLM* as negatively correlated with source country gender equality when measured as an index, and having no statistically significant association with domain-specific facets of gender equality.

Table 2: Female Labor Migration (FLM) and Source Country Gender Equality (Naive)

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
FLM (log)	-1.940*	-2.152**	-4.733	2.748	0.868
	(1.089)	(1.055)	(3.184)	(2.618)	(1.998)
GDPpc (log)		0.020	-2.732***	1.021	1.610*
		(0.767)	(0.959)	(0.899)	(0.896)
Elec. Democracy		-4.662***	-6.093	6.276*	-1.639
		(1.724)	(3.715)	(3.349)	(3.064)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.705	-0.884	0.533	1.501
		(0.584)	(0.866)	(1.066)	(1.222)
DV Mean	52.52	53.49	17.05	66.11	0.37
Countries	137	126	117	124	116
Observations	729	575	538	564	386
R^2	0.731	0.729	0.584	0.668	0.087
F Statistic	227.543***	131.196***	64.237***	96.569***	2.747***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged except FLM.

Table 3 interacts the *Oil Price* and *OPEC Migrant* variable to estimate the effect of an exogenous source of variation in FLM on source country gender equality. Unlike the *FLM* coefficient in Table 2, the interaction term coefficient in Table 3 is not statistically significant when gender equality is measured in an aggregate index (Models 1 and 2). Disaggregating gender equality, however, reveals that the benefits of FLM for source country gender equality are concentrated in human capital (Model 5). There is no statistically significant relationship between the *WTI Spot*OPEC Migrant* term and women's political representation (Model 3) or gender inclusive economic policies (Model 4).

Table 3: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Equality in Source Countries

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.003	0.001	-0.04	-0.02	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
WTI Spot	0.22***	0.22***	0.30***	0.27***	-0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
OPEC Migr.	-4.00**	-3.67**	-5.17	-3.79	5.35**
	(1.87)	(1.81)	(3.64)	(2.84)	(2.26)
GDPpc (log)		0.10	-2.46**	1.08	1.82**
		(0.75)	(1.00)	(0.88)	(0.84)
Elec. Democracy		-4.54**	-5.48	8.33**	-1.66
		(1.81)	(3.64)	(3.37)	(2.83)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.42	-0.65	0.54	1.22
		(0.59)	(0.87)	(1.13)	(1.13)
DV Mean	53.94	53.85	17.09	66.17	0.33
Countries	128	123	116	121	113
Observations	594	561	533	550	379
R^2	0.71	0.73	0.58	0.67	0.13
F Statistic	160.39***	115.34***	56.40***	83.83***	3.94***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

These patterns hold when applying the share of FLM to OPEC countries as an alternative measure to *OPEC Migrant* (Table 9), using Brent oil prices (Table 10), and different measures of gender equality in policy (Table 11). FLM, however, is negatively associated with women's political representation when representation is measured in terms of political power (Table 12). In contradiction to H1, we

find mixed evidence at best of FLM weakening source country gender equality in politics.

FLM might only affect female representation in source countries with open political systems and competitive elections. Table 15 confirms this implication. When subsetting our analysis to countries in years that score above 0.5 on V-Dem's Electoral Democracy score, the *WTI Spot*OPEC Migrant* interaction term is negatively associated with female representation. A thirty dollar increase in the price of oil is associated with a roughly 2 percentage point decrease in the share of female legislators in *OPEC Migrant* countries. This finding holds when applying alternative measures of gender equality in politics (Table 18) and after controlling for whether source countries allow for voting from abroad (Table 19).

Meanwhile, in support of H2, the secondary school enrollment gender gap is negatively associated with higher oil prices in *OPEC Migrant* source countries (Table 3, Model 5). The negative coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant at the five percent level. Model 5 estimates that a ten dollar increase in the price of oil correlates with a 0.8 percentage point decrease in the gender gap in secondary school enrollment. This decrease is large enough to close the secondary school enrollment gender gap for the average source country in this analysis.

Table 13 probes the relationship between FLM and gender equality in human capital by estimating its effect on different gender gaps in educational attainment. While the *WTI Spot*OPEC Migrant* interaction term is negatively associated with gender education gaps in primary school (Model 3), it correlates with an *increase* in the gender education gap in tertiary education (Model 4). The increase in

the higher education gender disparity could represent an exit of university-aged women from source countries because of economic opportunities abroad. By foregoing full-time employment, the opportunity costs of a tertiary education are much greater than secondary education in the short term. Work overseas, facilitated because women of tertiary education age are adults so migration is legally easier, amplifies the opportunity costs of a tertiary education. Indeed, women's aggregate tertiary enrollment rates in OPEC Migrant countries decline while men's stay the same (Table 14).

A more pessimistic interpretation is that FLM causes younger female household members to abandon higher education to do more household labor. This would support McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) work in Mexico. They find that have a migrant family member correlates with lower levels of education among young female adults, who may leave school to do household work to cover for the loss in household labor from female labor migrants.

To better understand these findings, we explore how FLM correlates with source country attitudes toward gender equality. We use three questions from the World Values Survey (WVS) to measure support for gender equality (Inglehart et al. 2022). The WVS is a cross-national, longitudinal study of values over time. We apply data from Waves 2 to 7, which span from 1990 to 2022. This produces a dataset of roughly 420,000 respondent observations across thirty years and 108 countries.

Our first measure of support for gender equality pertains to education. The WVS asks respondents whether they they agree with the statement "*University is*

more important for a boy than for a girl', where one equals "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" and zero equals "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree". The second is about jobs: "*Men should have more right to a job than women*", where one equals "Agree" and zero equals "Disagree" or "Neither". Our last measure is on political representation: "*Men make better political leaders than women do*", where one equals "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" and zero equals "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree". Agreement (i.e., values of one) with any of these three statements indicates *less* support for gender equality.

We aggregate respondents' answers to generate unweighted, country-year estimates of the percentage of WVS respondents who agree with these statements. We also estimate male and female respondents' attitudes toward these statements. Because WVS coverage varies across countries and years, we apply each country-year estimate across a five-year period. We average these estimates in cases where two WVS occurred within a five-year period. However, even when employing these five-year windows, there are many missing WVS country-year observations. For example, between 1990 and 2020, there are only 146 country-year WVS observations for attitudes towards boys and girls' access to university education. We use the same model specifications as before to assess the relationship between FLM and source country gender egalitarian attitudes.

FLM, as measured as an interaction term between *WTI Sport* and *OPEC Migrant* source country, is positively associated with gender inegalitarian attitudes in education (Model 1), employment (Model 2), and political representation (Model 3) across a source country's total population (Table 4). That FLM is associated with

a widening of the tertiary education gender gap in source countries (Table 13) corroborates Model 1's finding of greater public support for the statement that university education is more important for boys than girls. In terms of attitudes toward political gender equality, Model 3 estimates that a ten dollar increase in the global price of oil correlates with a two percentage point increase in respondents who agree with the statement that men make better political leaders than women. The magnitude and statistical significance of the FLM interaction term increases in source country democracies (Table 22). Considering that female migrants represent less than three percent of a median source country's total population, the impact of FLM on public support for gender equality is substantial.

When we parse these estimates across source countries' female (Models 4 to 6) and male (Models 7 to 9) populations, FLM is associated with a greater decline in support for gender equality among source country women than men. The magnitude of the *WTI Spot*OPEC Migr* interaction term is consistently bigger, and its statistical significance greater, among source country women than men. Women in source countries, with a lower baseline level of support for gender inequality are, on average, less supportive of gender equality following higher levels of FLM.

Table 4: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Inegalitarian Attitudes in Source Countries

	Dependent variable:								
	Edu	Emp	Pol	Edu (F)	Emp (F)	Pol (F)	Edu (M)	Emp (M)	Pol (M)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.002*	0.002***	0.002**	0.002**	0.003***	0.003***	0.002*	0.002***	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
WTI Spot	-0.001	-0.002***	-0.002**	-0.0005	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.001**	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDPpc (log)	-0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.001	-0.04	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Elect. Dem	-0.02	0.05	-0.03	-0.03	0.11*	0.06	-0.08	0.11**	-0.05
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Oil Rents (log)	-0.07	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.08	-0.03	-0.06	-0.04	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
DV Mean	0.26	0.43	0.52	0.22	0.37	0.45	0.30	0.48	0.58
Countries	64	64	64	62	62	62	62	62	62
Observations	141	143	141	109	115	109	109	115	109
R^2	0.20	0.32	0.44	0.21	0.38	0.51	0.24	0.33	0.43
F Statistic	1.83*	3.59***	6.02***	1.33	3.52***	5.09***	1.50	2.79**	3.61***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged. Models 1, 4, and 7 pertain to the percent of respondents who agree that university education is more important for boys than girls. Models 2, 5, and 8 pertain to the percent of respondents who agree that men have more right to a job than women. Models 3, 6, and 9 pertain to the percent of respondents who agree that men make better political leaders than women. Models 1 to 3 estimate a source country's total population, Models 4 to 6 a source country's female population, and Models 7 to 9 a source country's male population.

5. Mechanism: Exit, Not Remittances

There are two primary explanations as to why FLM might improve educational gender gaps but depress support for gender equality in source countries, and decrease female political representation in source country democracies. The first explanation focuses on remittances. Existing work finds that migrants' economic and social remittances can shape socio-economic preferences and outcomes in migrant sending countries (Ahmed 2020; Adida and Girod 2011; Levitt 2001; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; López García et al. 2024; Doyle 2015; Germano 2018; Tybursky 2023).

OPEC states have had, on average, lower levels of gender equality over the past three decades than non-OPEC states - though these differences are narrowing (Figure 5). Migrants can transfer their host countries' gender norms (i.e., social remittances) back to their home countries, for better or worse (Ferrant and Tuccio 2015; Lodigiani and Salomone 2020; Tuccio and Wahba 2018; Gaikwad et al. 2024). This might explain why FLM correlates with lower source country support for gender equality in education, employment, and politics (Table 4). With regards to women's gains in primary and secondary education, economic remittances may lower financial barriers to girls' access to education.

To explore the remittance mechanism, we re-run our analysis, controlling for host countries' gender equality. We measure *Host Country Gender Equality* as the average gender equality score of a source country's top three FLM destinations. Higher *Host Country Gender Equality* indicates greater gender equality. We also re-

run our analysis controlling for monetary remittances (*Remittances*) (World Bank 2020). This measure is an aggregate; it does not distinguish the gender of the remitter. We log the remittance variable because of its rightward skew. As possible mediators, neither remittance variable is lagged as they occur *after* women's labor migration.

We find no evidence of social or economic remittances influencing source country gender equality. FLM remains negatively correlated with source country public support for gender equality (Tables 25, 21), and positively associated with reductions in gender education gaps (Table 24). These patterns hold after subsetting the analysis to source countries whose gender equality score is lower than the average gender equality score of that country's three largest host countries for female migration (Table 26). There is little evidence of gender egalitarian norms being transferred back to female labor migrants' source countries. The negative coefficient estimate of the FLM interaction term and the gender gap in secondary education loses statistical significance at the five percent level after controlling for economic remittances (Table 25). This offers suggestive, albeit inconclusive, evidence that economic remittances might minimize the education gender gap in source countries.

Less support for source country gender equality in the wake of FLM could reflect a second mechanism: exit. Perhaps source country citizens with the strongest support for gender equality are also the most likely to migrate. Their exit weakens source country public support for gender equality. This may explain why public support for gender equality decreases in *OPEC Migrant* states in the wake of

higher oil prices, especially among women. These patterns hold after controlling for social and economic remittances (Table 20).

Female labor migrants' exit may shape source country political participation. Migration is associated with less formal political participation (Goodman and Hiskey 2008) and greater political cynicism in migrant sending communities (Crow and Pérez-Armendáriz 2018). Though our migrant stock data does not disclose *who* is migrating, if FLM drains source countries of activists (Peters and Miller 2022; Miller and Peters 2020) and hampers collective action (Sellars 2019), it could also depress source country political participation.

We investigate this implication by examining three types of source country political participation: electoral turnout, mass mobilization, and civil society membership. We use V-Dem Institute (2024) data for each of these outcomes. We measure electoral turnout both as the percentage of all registered voters that voted[12] and the percentage of the voting-age-population (VAP) that voted in a source country's last national election.[13] Both measures derive from official results. Neither measure is perfect; in assessing electoral participation among *registered* voters, the first measure ignores unregistered voting citizens. Meanwhile, turnout as a share of VAP risks underestimating turnout rates by including foreigners as a part of a country's voting-age population. Finally, many countries allow for extraterritorial voting for citizens living abroad. We control for this with a binomial variable equal to one if non-resident citizens of a source country voted in that country's last

[12]This is labeled as v2eltrnout in the V-Dem manual.
[13]This is labeled as v2elvaptrn in the V-Dem manual.

national elections (Wellman et al. 2023).[14] Almost half of the source country-year observations in our analysis had overseas voters in their last national election.

We gauge mass mobilization based on V-Dem's *Mass Mobilization* variable (V-Dem Institute 2024). This is an annual measure of expert accounts on the frequency of demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins in a country. This measure ranges from 0 - "there have been virtually no events" to 4 - "there have been many large-scale and small-scale events". Both state and non-state actors can organize these events.[15].

Finally, we assess the strength of a source country's civil society with V-Dem's *Engagement in Independent Political Associations* variable. This variable is based on expert accounts of public participation in independent political associations.[16] Independent associations are voluntary organizations whose purpose is to change a policy or practice at the state or national level. These organizations exclude political parties and trade unions. Experts were asked to estimate the percentage of a country's population that participated in independent associations on a 0 to 4 scale where 0 represented "Virtually no one" and 4 "A large percentage of the population (26 % percent or more)."

Unfortunately, this variable does not specify participation in independent associations dedicated to gender equality. Nevertheless, it still captures experts' perceptions of national levels of participation in CSOs, including women's rights organizations. We calculate five-year averages for each of the political participation outcomes.

[14]This is variable evrr_defacto in the EVRR dataset.

[15]This variable is labeled as v2cagenmob in the V-Dem manual. This is a converted ordinal measure.

[16]This is labeled as v2capolit in the V-Dem manual. It is an ordinal converted measure.

There is no evidence of FLM decreasing source country electoral turnout. Table 5 estimates that FLM is *positively* associated with electoral participation among registered voters. This pattern endures across all low- and middle-income (Models 1 and 2), and democratic source countries (Model 3). A ten dollar increase in the global price of oil correlates with a 1.6 percentage point decrease in the five year average electoral turnout among registered voters in *OPEC Migrant* source countries (Model 2). There is no statistically significant relationship between FLM and electoral participation when participation is measured in relation to all voting age adults in a source country (Models 4 to 6). These results hold when we subset the analysis to source countries where there was no voting from abroad in their last national election (Table 27).

Table 5: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Electoral Turnout

	Dependent variable:					
	Turnout (Registered)			Turnout (VAP)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.15***	0.13***	0.18***	0.06	0.03	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
WTI Spot	-0.12***	-0.03	0.07	-0.07**	-0.05	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)
OPEC Migr.	-8.33	-6.43	-5.16	-8.51	-7.54	-6.90
	(7.81)	(7.30)	(7.89)	(8.78)	(7.99)	(8.55)
GDPpc (log)		-1.37	-6.65***		1.03	-4.34
		(1.70)	(2.02)		(2.03)	(2.77)
Elec. Democracy		-6.90	-9.73		-1.62	-5.52
		(6.13)	(6.79)		(5.86)	(8.41)
Oil Rents (log)		1.03	-1.50		3.70*	2.11
		(1.85)	(2.27)		(1.94)	(2.93)
Voting Abroad (De Facto)		0.13	-0.12		-0.85	-0.07
		(1.65)	(2.01)		(1.98)	(2.33)
Host Country Gender Equality		-0.01	0.10		0.15	0.21*
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.11)	(0.11)
Remittances (log)		-0.20	-0.57**		-0.02	-0.50**
		(0.20)	(0.28)		(0.18)	(0.24)
DV Mean	69.13	68.69	67.87	63.08	62.32	63.91
Countries	121	115	78	120	114	78
Observations	550	487	266	550	487	267
R^2	0.11	0.09	0.16	0.03	0.04	0.11
F Statistic	7.39***	2.80***	2.55***	2.05**	1.20	1.71*

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Host Country Gender Equality* and *Remittances (log)*. Models 3 and 6 subset the analysis to democratic source countries.

Why might FLM *increase* source country voter participation among registered

voters? Less politically engaged women who are registered to vote but opt not to may be exiting their country's electoral arena via labor migration. Congruently, the registered voters who stay may be more politically active and hold less gender egalitarian views (Table 4). This could explain why FLM correlates with less female political representation in democratic source countries. However, given the absence of a statistically significant relationship between FLM and turnout, as measured as the share of a source country's voting age population (Models 4 to 6), these findings are inconclusive.

Turning to non-electoral forms of source country political participation, there is no statistically significant relationship between FLM and mass mobilization (Table 6). Higher FLM does correlate with decreased participation in CSOs (Table 6, Models 4 to 6); this negative association is statistically significant at the one percent level in all model specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient increases in source country democracies. Combined with evidence of less support for gender equality among source country women, lower civil society participation, and less female representation, these results suggests that FLM may be draining source countries of politically assertive women who support gender equality.

Table 6: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Non-Electoral Political Participation

	Dependent variable:					
	Mass Mobilization			Civil Society Participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.004	-0.01	-0.004	-0.004**	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
WTI Spot	0.01***	0.01*	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
OPEC Migr.	0.37	0.49	0.53	-0.17	-0.20	-0.03
	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.10)
GDPpc (log)		-0.09	0.03		0.02	-0.01
		(0.16)	(0.11)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Elec. Democracy		-0.14	-1.24***		0.53**	0.15
		(0.45)	(0.27)		(0.22)	(0.14)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.07	-0.05		-0.04	-0.01
		(0.08)	(0.12)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Host Country Gender Equality		0.01	-0.0005		0.002	0.01*
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.004)	(0.003)
Remittances (log)		-0.01	0.01		0.005	0.003
		(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)
DV Mean	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.48	0.54	0.84
Countries	123	121	79	123	121	79
Observations	574	528	277	574	528	277
R^2	0.10	0.14	0.26	0.33	0.37	0.46
F Statistic	6.89***	5.33***	5.32***	31.11***	19.12***	13.46***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Host Country Gender Equality* and *Remittances (log)*. Models 3 and 6 subset the analysis to democratic source countries.

6. Discussion: The Costs of Exit

FLM is a mixed blessing for gender equality in low- and middle-income source countries, at least in the short-term. Leveraging fluctuations in oil prices as exogenous shocks in demand for female labor from countries with high levels of female migration to oil exporting economies, our models estimate a positive association between FLM and source country gender equality in secondary education. However, FLM also correlates with decreased female representation in democratic source countries and a worsening of gender egalitarian attitudes across all source countries, especially among women.

Social and economic remittances do not explain these outcomes. Instead, we infer instead that female labor migrants' exit encourages households to invest in girls' education by lowering the relative costs of education and incentivizing education as a means to benefit from FLM in the future. We also suspect that FLM empties source countries of women with gender equalitarian views who are likely to mobilize for gender policy reform. This might explain why FLM correlates with lower public support for gender equality among source country women and less participation in civil society. Our analysis thus cautions more optimistic views of FLM as a force for source country gender equality (Levitt 2001; Lodigiani and Salomone 2020; Ferrant and Tuccio 2015).

Some may wonder whether these results are capturing the effect of FLM or migration writ large on source country gender equality. High oil prices may also encourage men to migrate from *OPEC Migrant* countries. Unfortunately, male

labor migration (MLM) and FLM are highly collinear in our data (0.933) (Figure 6). The median share of female migrants of a source country's total migrant population is also roughly half. We are, therefore, unable to discern whether FLM or total migration shapes source country gender equality.

Nevertheless, we expect and find similar patterns between MLM and FLM on source country gender equality. As with FLM, MLM could lower the financial barriers to women's education through remittances. At the same time, MLM might also drain the electorate of citizens most likely to participate in politics (Goodman and Hiskey 2008). Male migrants are generally younger than non-migrants (Kaestner and Malamud 2014). Younger men may hold more gender egalitarian attitudes than their older peers (Inglehart and Norris 2003).[17] Thus, like FLM, MLM could weaken women's movements and female candidates of support.

We re-run our analysis using OPEC Migration and the oil price interaction term. *OPEC Migration (Men)* is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one of a source country's top labor migrant destinations is an OPEC member. The *WTI Spot*OPEC Migration (Men)* interaction term is a strong predictor of MLM flows (Table 16). MLM, like FLM, narrows gender inequalities in secondary education (Table 17). It has no statistically significant relationship on other facets of source country gender equality.

Our findings beckon many future avenues of research. Our research design confines our measure of FLM to migration to OPEC states. This is an important

[17]Though this pattern no longer holds for Millennials and Gen Z (Ipsos 2023).

vein of scholarship in its own right. OPEC states host some of the largest migrant populations in the world. *OPEC Migrant* states, like India, the Philippines and Indonesia have some of the largest female labor migrant populations in the world. Nevertheless, though OPEC states span income levels and continents, the political and socio-economic consequences of migrating to these types of host countries differs from migrating to other types of states, such as high income democracies. Host countries' pathways to citizenship also likely shape whether and how female labor migrants politically and economically engage with their country of origin. Future work can investigate how host country differences impact the relationship between FLM and source country gender equality.

More granular, individual-level data could help adjudicate competing mechanisms connecting FLM with gender equality gains in human capital and losses in political representation. Observational and experimental surveys could decipher whether knowledge of women's work opportunities abroad encourages heads of households to support female household members' primary and secondary education. Surveys and focus groups of female labor migrants could spotlight how migration influences their political participation back home. Though these in-depth analyses would lack the global breadth of our study, they could help clarify the mechanisms underpinning our findings.

Our analysis does not adjudicate whether the *type* of female labor migrant, as measured by their human capital, has diverging effects on source country gender equality. In centering our analysis on low- and middle-income source countries, our analysis likely disproportionately captures "low skill" FLM. We suspect, but

do not test, that "high skill" FLM would be even more deleterious for female political representation in source countries.

Lastly, our findings focus on the short term. This is a function of data availability. The impact of girls' increased education on gender equality may take decades to bear fruit. Future work can explore the long durée effects of FLM on source country gender equality.

For these reasons, suppressing FLM is *not* a cogent policy implication of this analysis. This would deprive source countries of important gains in gender equality in human capital, especially among girls. It would also rob source countries of possible long-term benefits of FLM on gender equality. Instead, it is wiser for policymakers and development practitioners to help offset FLM's short-term costs in public support for gender equality and female representation with greater financial and political support for women's groups and gender egalitarian policies. Welcoming the human capital gains of FLM while mitigating its political costs is the best strategy for policymakers and development practitioners to harness FLM for the benefit of female migrants' countries of origin.

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The Costs of Exit: Supplementary Information

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A. Descriptive Statistics

Table 7: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
FLM	729	571,061.12	953,114.92	472.00	7,146,818.00
OPEC Migration	594	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
WTI Spot	642	50.61	28.17	18.43	93.17
GDPpc	599	3006.36	3105.27	95.19	17400.42
Elec. Democracy	585	0.48	0.23	0.07	0.91
Oil Rents	597	2.44	6.99	0.00	54.15
Gender Equality	729	52.52	15.81	18.90	89.70
Fem Legis	648	15.72	11.05	0.00	63.75
WBL Index	716	64.09	15.58	22.50	97.50
Sec Enroll Gap	486	0.59	7.77	-21.58	31.79

Table 8: OPEC Migration Source Countries

Country	FLM (mill, mean)	Gender Equality (mean)	OPEC Share FLM (mean)	Survey Waves
Afghanistan	1.76	25.2	0.92	(2005)
Bangladesh	2.38	36.2	0.85	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 2015, 2019)
Benin	0.21	34.97	0.74	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Chad	0.10	25.5	0.85	(2005)
Colombia	1.12	52.78	0.80	(1990, 1995, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Ecuador	0.17	43.03	0.81	(1990, 1995, 2000)
Egypt	0.79	41.71	0.53	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Ethiopia	0.39	46.9	0.52	(2015, 2019)
Ghana	0.31	41.27	0.54	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
India	4.59	41.58	0.52	(1990, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Indonesia	1.32	46.87	0.57	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Jordan	0.19	45.31	0.57	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Lebanon	0.34	56.8	0.44	(2019)
Mali	0.45	33.46	0.69	(2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Nepal	0.58	40.58	0.86	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Niger	0.11	27.66	0.72	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Pakistan	1.57	29.44	0.72	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2019)
Philippines	2.18	52.66	0.62	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Sri Lanka	0.61	58.12	0.44	(1990, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Sudan	0.54	35.3	0.69	(2005)
Syria	0.32	49.74	0.65	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010)
Togo	0.19	34.61	0.69	(1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2019)
Yemen	0.23	19.93	0.77	(2000, 2005)

B. The Global Inequality Index (GII)

The UN's Gender Inequality Index is a composite index that measures gender inequality across three domains: health, empowerment, and the labor market (United Nations 2023a).

The health dimension primarily measures the reproductive health of women and girls through maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates. Maternal mortality captures the level of importance society places on women during childbirth which, in turn, reflects women's status within society (World Health Organization 2023). On the other hand, adolescent pregnancies reflect women's potential capabilities within society. As adolescent pregnancies often hinder girls from attaining higher levels of education and limit opportunities, a greater prevalence of youth pregnancies indicates greater disadvantages faced by women relative to men (World Health Organization 2023).

The empowerment dimension is derived from two primary indicators: the share of parliamentary seats held by women and the share of women with secondary and tertiary levels of education relative to men (World Health Organization 2023). Women's share of parliamentary seats captures the level of visibility within the political arena, the level of representation they receive in government, and the general capabilities possessed by women needed to attain higher office. Similarly, education attainment captures individuals' access to information and capabilities to make lead changes to their individual circumstances and broader society (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 2011).

Finally, the labor market dimension compares female and male labor force participation rates (World Health Organization 2023). Labor force participation reflects each gender's willingness to work in each society, perception of work opportunities available to them, and gender roles within the household and broader society.

Figure 4: Global Mean Gender Equality (1990 - 2019)



Source: World Bank, Global Inequality Index. The index has been reversed and multiplied by one hundred. Higher numbers signify greater gender equality.

Figure 5: Gender Equality in OPEC and Non-OPEC Countries



Source: World Bank, Global Inequality Index. Index has been reversed and multiplied by one hundred. Higher numbers signify greater gender equality.

C. Robustness Checks

Table 9: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration Share of FLM, and Gender Equality in Source Countries

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr. (Share FLM)	-0.01	-0.003	-0.07	-0.02	-0.11*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
WTI Spot	0.22***	0.22***	0.30***	0.27***	-0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
OPEC Migr. (Share FLM)	-7.27***	-6.94***	-8.38*	-4.14	9.92**
	(2.56)	(2.61)	(4.54)	(3.41)	(3.88)
GDPpc (log)		0.07	-2.53**	1.05	1.83**
		(0.75)	(1.00)	(0.88)	(0.83)
Elec. Democracy		-4.32**	-5.32	8.21**	-2.10
		(1.79)	(3.67)	(3.37)	(2.81)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.42	-0.68	0.49	1.26
		(0.59)	(0.87)	(1.13)	(1.14)
DV Mean	53.94	53.85	17.09	66.17	0.33
Countries	128	123	116	121	113
Observations	594	561	533	550	379
R^2	0.71	0.73	0.58	0.67	0.15
F Statistic	162.96***	117.48***	56.75***	83.36***	4.35***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

Table 10: Brent Oil Prices, OPEC Migration Share of FLM, and Gender Equality in Source Countries

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Brent Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.003	0.001	-0.04	-0.02	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Brent Spot	0.20***	0.20***	0.27***	0.24***	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
OPEC Migr.	-4.03**	-3.69**	-5.30	-3.91	5.06**
	(1.84)	(1.77)	(3.59)	(2.75)	(2.16)
GDPpc (log)		0.10	-2.45**	1.08	1.84**
		(0.75)	(1.00)	(0.88)	(0.84)
Elec. Democracy		-4.54**	-5.47	8.33**	-1.67
		(1.81)	(3.64)	(3.37)	(2.82)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.42	-0.64	0.55	1.25
		(0.59)	(0.87)	(1.14)	(1.13)
DV Mean	53.94	53.85	17.09	66.17	0.33
Countries	128	123	116	121	113
Observations	594	561	533	550	379
R^2	0.71	0.73	0.58	0.67	0.13
F Statistic	160.39***	115.35***	56.40***	83.80***	3.92***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

Table 11: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Equality Policies in Source Countries

	Dependent variable:			
	WBL Index		Civil Rights	State Contracts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.02	-0.02	-0.004	0.004
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.12)
WTI Spot	0.31***	0.27***	0.57***	0.44***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.10)
OPEC Migr.	-2.87	-3.79	-35.01**	-30.48***
	(2.88)	(2.84)	(16.35)	(6.14)
GDPpc (log)		1.08	-4.23	0.16
		(0.88)	(4.03)	(3.69)
Elec. Democracy		8.33**	11.05	14.97
		(3.37)	(14.58)	(11.50)
Oil Rents (log)		0.54	-11.84**	-5.60
		(1.13)	(4.60)	(3.51)
DV Mean	66.12	66.17	140.99	96.94
Countries	126	121	123	123
Observations	583	550	561	561
R^2	0.66	0.67	0.35	0.31
F Statistic	126.67***	83.83***	22.60***	19.52***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged. Note that the Civil Rights and State Contracts variables are multiplied by 100 for ease of reading. The State Contracts variable (Model 4) stems from V-Dem. This is labeled as v2peasbgen in the V-Dem manual. This is a converted ordinal integer, where the lowest value indicates that at least three-quarters of women lack access to state business opportunities despite their qualifications. At the highest value, men and women have equal opportunities to access state-business opportunities.

Table 12: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Equality in Political Representation in Source Countries

	Dependent variable:		
	Female Rep		Gender Power Equality
	(1)	(2)	(3)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.04	-0.04	-0.003**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.002)
WTI Spot	0.24***	0.30***	0.01***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.001)
OPEC Migr.	-5.76	-5.17	0.0001
	(3.68)	(3.64)	(0.21)
GDPpc (log)		-2.46**	-0.08
		(1.00)	(0.07)
Elec. Democracy		-5.48	0.08
		(3.64)	(0.21)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.65	-0.08
		(0.87)	(0.06)
DV Mean	16.96	17.09	0.89
Countries	119	118	125
Observations	546	533	561
R^2	0.57	0.58	0.21
F Statistic	79.34***	56.40***	11.13***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

Table 13: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Equality in Source Countries' Human Capital

	Dependent variable:			
	Sec Enroll Gap		Prim Enroll Gap	Ter Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.12**	0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)
WTI Spot	-0.01	-0.06**	-0.08***	-0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
OPEC Migr.	5.63***	5.35**	4.95*	3.24**
	(1.97)	(2.26)	(2.99)	(1.62)
GDPpc (log)		1.82**	1.81*	-0.77
		(0.84)	(0.95)	(1.14)
Elec. Demoracy		-1.66	-0.72	-0.84
		(2.83)	(3.61)	(2.89)
Oil Rents (log)		1.22	0.80	-1.16
		(1.13)	(0.81)	(1.55)
DV Mean	0.04	0.33	3.68	-5.77
Countries	117	113	119	111
Observations	405	379	476	366
R^2	0.09	0.13	0.26	0.28
F Statistic	3.87***	3.94***	12.12***	9.50***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

Table 14: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Levels of School Enrollment

	Dependent variable:				
	Sec Enroll		Prim Enroll	Ter Enroll	Tern Enroll (Male)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.10	0.07	0.22**	-0.14***	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.04)
WTI Spot	0.38***	0.41***	0.21***	0.40***	0.29***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)
OPEC Migr.	-13.59*	-12.43	2.52	-7.99**	-4.74
	(8.13)	(8.19)	(5.20)	(3.35)	(7.38)
GDPpc (log)		0.12	-4.76*	3.18	2.41
		(2.20)	(2.57)	(2.31)	(1.83)
Elec. Democracy		5.15	-2.12	-8.50	-9.35*
		(5.66)	(7.03)	(8.84)	(5.46)
Oil Rents (log)		-1.22	-0.89	1.64	0.47
		(1.97)	(2.52)	(2.98)	(2.02)
DV Mean	72.26	71.36	100.73	32.95	27.18
Countries	117	113	119	111	109
Observations	405	379	476	366	366
R^2	0.60	0.64	0.24	0.49	0.48
F Statistic	61.44***	45.07***	10.93***	23.19***	22.54***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

Table 15: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Equality in Democratic Source Countries

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
WTI Spot	0.22***	0.21***	0.29***	0.24***	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
OPEC Migr.	-4.63***	-4.19***	-8.05**	-2.30	5.30***
	(1.40)	(1.44)	(3.92)	(3.13)	(2.02)
GDPpc (log)		0.46	-2.31*	3.01*	1.36
		(0.78)	(1.39)	(1.58)	(1.07)
Elec. Demoracy		-4.08**	-4.87	11.70***	-1.82
		(1.76)	(3.74)	(4.16)	(3.68)
Oil Rents (log)		-1.12*	-1.38	-0.01	0.47
		(0.62)	(0.89)	(1.27)	(2.25)
DV Mean	57.29	57.07	16.95	71.32	-1.54
Countries	80	80	76	80	70
Observations	294	287	277	287	214
R^2	0.80	0.82	0.59	0.70	0.07
F Statistic	120.21***	87.10***	27.65***	45.42***	1.02

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

D. Male Labor Migration and Source Country Gender Equality

Table 16: Oil Prices and OPEC Male Migration

	Dependent variable:		
	MLM (log)		MLM (Millions)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
WTI*OPEC Migr. (Male)	0.004***	0.004***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
WTI Spot	0.01***	0.01***	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
OPEC Migr. (Male)	-0.37***	-0.36***	-0.60***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.23)
GDPpc (log)		-0.08*	0.06
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Elec. Democracy		0.03	-0.26
		(0.13)	(0.30)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.01	-0.12**
		(0.03)	(0.06)
DV Mean	12.46	12.54	0.68
Country	128	123	123
Observations	594	561	561
R^2	0.61	0.62	0.32
F Statistic	101.11***	69.44***	20.25***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

Figure 6: Male and Female Migration (1990 - 2020)



Table 17: Oil Prices, OPEC Male Migration, and Gender Equality in Source Countries

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr. (Men)	-0.01	-0.002	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
WTI Spot	0.22***	0.22***	0.30***	0.27***	-0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
OPEC Migr. (Men)	-1.82	-2.15	-3.69	-0.79	4.29**
	(1.82)	(1.63)	(2.78)	(2.43)	(2.04)
GDPpc (log)		0.11	-2.40**	1.03	1.79**
		(0.75)	(0.97)	(0.88)	(0.83)
Elec. Democracy		-4.95***	-6.24*	7.91**	-0.86
		(1.77)	(3.55)	(3.46)	(2.92)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.51	-0.87	0.44	1.22
		(0.59)	(0.92)	(1.13)	(1.14)
DV Mean	53.94	53.85	17.09	66.17	0.33
Country	128	123	116	121	113
Observations	594	561	533	550	379
R^2	0.71	0.73	0.58	0.67	0.13
F Statistic	158.87***	114.71***	56.56***	83.37***	3.85***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

E. FLM, Gender Equality, and Regime Type

Table 18: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration and Political Gender Equality in Democratic Source Countries

	Dependent variable:		
	Female Rep		Gender Power Equality
	(1)	(2)	(3)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.01**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.002)
WTI Spot	0.24***	0.28***	0.01***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.002)
OPEC Migr.	-8.40*	-8.63**	-0.13
	(4.38)	(4.15)	(0.18)
GDPpc (log)		-2.39*	-0.15
		(1.39)	(0.14)
Oil Rents (log)		-1.30	-0.08
		(0.93)	(0.06)
DV Mean	16.83	16.95	1.22
Countries	76	76	80
Observations	284	278	288
R^2	0.57	0.59	0.21
F Statistic	37.36***	30.46***	5.80***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

Table 19: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Political Gender Equality in Democratic Source Countries (Controlling for Voting from Abroad)

	Dependent variable:		
	Female Rep		Gender Power Equality
	(1)	(2)	(3)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr	-0.06**	-0.07**	-0.01**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.002)
WTI Spot	0.21***	0.25***	0.01***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.002)
OPEC Migr	-7.06*	-7.04**	-0.08
	(3.81)	(3.54)	(0.16)
Voting Abroad (De Facto)	3.40**	3.76**	0.10
	(1.38)	(1.49)	(0.06)
GDPpc (log)		-2.14	-0.13
		(1.34)	(0.15)
Oil Rents		-2.02*	-0.11*
		(1.08)	(0.07)
DV Mean	16.96	17.08	1.22
Countries	76	76	80
Observations	277	271	281
R^2	0.58	0.60	0.22
F Statistic	32.86***	27.57***	5.50***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged.

F. Mechanism: Exit, Not Remittances

Table 20: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Inegalitarian Attitudes in Source Countries Across Genders (Controlling for Remittances)

	Dependent variable:					
	MaleEdu(F)	MaleEmpl(F)	MalePol(F)	MaleEdu(M)	MaleEmpl(M)	MalePol(M)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
WTI Spot	0.002	-0.001	0.0004	0.001	-0.0004	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDPpc (log)	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Elect. Democracy	-0.01	0.10*	0.08	-0.06	0.11***	-0.04
	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.12)
Oil Rents (log)	-0.05	-0.08	-0.05	-0.07	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Host Country Gender Equality	-0.004**	-0.002	-0.004**	-0.005**	-0.003**	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Remittances (log)	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.001	0.002	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
DV Mean	0.23	0.38	0.45	0.30	0.48	0.58
Countries	61	61	61	61	61	61
Observations	107	112	107	107	112	107
R^2	0.28	0.39	0.56	0.30	0.36	0.49
F Statistic	1.42	2.60**	4.59***	1.56	2.32**	3.49***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Host Country Gender Equality* and *Remittances (log)*. Columns 1 to 3 pertain to female respondents, 4 to 6 pertain to male respondents.

Table 21: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Inegalitarian Attitudes in Democratic Source Countries (Controlling for Remittances)

	Dependent variable:		
	Male Education	Male Employment	Male Politics
	(1)	(2)	(3)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.003***	0.002	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
WTI Spot	0.0000	-0.003**	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
GDPpc (log)	-0.07	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Oil Rents (log)	-0.08	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Host Country Gender Equality	-0.0000	0.005	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Remittances (log)	-0.01	0.001	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
DV Mean	0.23	0.35	0.46
Countries	38	38	38
Observations	76	78	76
R^2	0.48	0.53	0.69
F Statistic	2.58**	3.41***	6.31***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. Greater coefficient values indicate greater support for gender inegalitarian attitudes.

Table 22: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Inegalitarian Attitudes in Democratic Source Countries

	Dependent variable:		
	Male Education	Male Employment	Male Politics
	(1)	(2)	(3)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
WTI Spot	-0.0003	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDPpc (log)	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Elect. Democracy	-0.03	-0.02	-0.11
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Oil Rents (log)	-0.08*	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
DV Mean	0.23	0.35	0.46
Countries	39	39	39
Observations	78	80	78
R^2	0.47	0.50	0.67
F Statistic	3.00**	3.62***	6.76***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. Greater coefficient values indicate greater support for gender inegalitarian attitudes. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Host Country Gender Equality* and *Remittances (log)*.

Table 23: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Inegalitarian Attitudes (Controlling for Remittances)

	Dependent variable:		
	Male Education	Male Employment	Male Politics
	(1)	(2)	(3)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.003***	0.002***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
WTI Spot	0.001	-0.002**	-0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDPpc (log)	-0.02	0.05	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Elect. Democracy	-0.02	0.06	-0.03
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Oil Rents (log)	-0.08	0.01	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Host Country Gender Equality	-0.004***	-0.001	-0.004***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Remittances (log)	-0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
DV Mean	0.26	0.43	0.52
Countries	63	63	63
Observations	139	141	139
R^2	0.25	0.33	0.49
F Statistic	1.97**	2.94***	5.70***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. Greater coefficient values indicate greater support for gender inegalitarian attitudes. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Host Country Gender Equality* and *Remittances(log)*.

Table 24: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Equality in Source Countries (Controlling for Host Country Gender Equality)

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	-0.003	0.001	-0.04	-0.02	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
WTI Spot	0.21***	0.21***	0.30***	0.27***	-0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
OPEC Migr.	-4.00**	-3.68**	-5.16	-3.77	5.36**
	(1.91)	(1.83)	(3.66)	(2.81)	(2.30)
Host Country Gender Equality	0.04	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.003
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
GDPpc (log)		0.11	-2.46**	1.07	1.82**
		(0.75)	(1.00)	(0.88)	(0.84)
Elec. Democracy		-4.37**	-5.54	8.19**	-1.69
		(1.92)	(3.78)	(3.58)	(2.96)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.40	-0.66	0.53	1.22
		(0.59)	(0.89)	(1.15)	(1.14)
DV Mean	53.94	53.85	17.09	66.17	0.33
Countries	128	123	116	121	131
Observations	594	561	533	550	379
R^2	0.71	0.73	0.58	0.67	0.13
F Statistic	140.81***	104.74***	51.15***	76.05***	3.57***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Host Country Gender Equality*.

Table 25: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Equality in Source Countries (Controlling for Remittances)

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.002	0.005	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
WTI Spot	0.21***	0.20***	0.30***	0.27***	-0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
OPEC Migr.	-4.39**	-3.95**	-5.23	-3.51	5.37**
	(1.77)	(1.72)	(3.69)	(2.94)	(2.41)
Remittances (log)	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.12	0.12
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.14)
GDPpc (log)		0.52	-2.52**	1.08	2.19**
		(0.74)	(1.18)	(1.03)	(0.95)
Elec. Democracy		-4.48**	-5.86	8.84**	-3.04
		(1.80)	(3.80)	(3.60)	(2.66)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.27	-0.72	0.76	0.61
		(0.59)	(0.83)	(1.16)	(0.92)
DV Mean	54.08	53.95	17.11	66.28	0.38
Countries	125	121	114	120	110
Observations	556	528	502	525	359
R^2	0.69	0.72	0.56	0.67	0.17
F Statistic	119.50***	91.56***	44.51***	71.66***	4.42***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Remittances (log)*.

Table 26: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Gender Equality in Source Countries, Subsetting to Host Countries with Higher Gender Equality Scores

	Dependent variable:				
	Gender Equality		Fem Legis	WBL Index	Sec Enroll Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
WTI Spot	0.21***	0.21***	0.27***	0.26***	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
OPEC Migr.	-2.29	-1.73	-6.23	-1.54	3.26*
	(1.46)	(1.51)	(4.90)	(3.34)	(1.95)
Host Country Gender Equality	0.06*	0.03	-0.01	-0.003	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
GDPpc (log)		0.29	-1.87*	1.53	1.77*
		(0.86)	(1.08)	(0.96)	(1.03)
Elec. Democracy		-4.32**	-5.22	7.85**	-2.89
		(2.06)	(3.86)	(3.79)	(3.17)
Oil Rents (log)		-0.79	-0.62	0.37	1.87
		(0.57)	(0.92)	(1.05)	(1.26)
DV Mean	52.41	52.27	16.54	65.72	0.39
Countries	119	113	106	111	102
Observations	510	480	454	473	317
R^2	0.71	0.74	0.60	0.67	0.17
F Statistic	119.90***	90.41***	46.50***	64.30***	3.75***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. Analysis subsets observations to all countries where the average gender equality score of their three largest host countries for female migration is greater than the source country's gender equality score. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Host Country Gender Equality*.

Table 27: Oil Prices, OPEC Migration, and Electoral Turnout in Source Countries without Voting Abroad

	Dependent variable:					
	Turnout (Registered)			Turnout (VAP)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WTI Spot*OPEC Migr.	0.16***	0.17***	0.16**	0.06	0.04	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)
WTI Spot	-0.13***	0.01	0.02	-0.06	-0.03	0.13
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
OPEC Migr.	-12.24***	-12.28**		-2.56	-4.41	
	(4.73)	(5.16)		(5.56)	(5.92)	
GDPpc (log)		-3.76	-7.15**		2.00	-4.21
		(2.41)	(2.98)		(2.57)	(4.21)
Elec. Democracy		0.78	9.28		-4.69	-2.05
		(8.30)	(9.64)		(7.70)	(11.13)
Oil Rents (log)		0.23	-4.71**		10.80***	6.81**
		(2.89)	(1.92)		(2.30)	(2.97)
Host Country Gender Equality		-0.23**	-0.06		-0.04	0.01
		(0.09)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.09)
Remittances (log)		-0.09	-0.33*		0.12	-0.29
		(0.24)	(0.19)		(0.25)	(0.26)
DV Mean	69.68	68.99	70.12	63.52	62.62	65.81
Countries	84	79	50	83	78	50
Observations	287	255	133	286	254	133
R^2	0.12	0.15	0.15	0.03	0.12	0.14
F Statistic	3.71***	2.45***	1.19	0.94	1.80*	1.10

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models use country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. All explanatory variables are lagged except *Host Country Gender Equality* and *Remittances (log)*. Models 3 and 6 subset the analysis to democracies.