The processes, practices, and consequences of international ceasefire monitoring

The processes, practices, and consequences of international ceasefire monitoring

Aly Verjee

SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

Doctoral Dissertation in Peace and Development Research
School of Global Studies
University of Gothenburg
October 2025

Cover layout: Sabrina M. Salis
Cover photo: OSCE/Athanasios Kaltsis
Printing: Stema, Borås, 2025
ISBN: 978-91-8115-330-9
http://hdl.handle.net/2077/89140

To the victims of conflict

"Very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements,
have often shameful and lamentable conclusions."
Edmund Burke, 1790

Abstract

Third-party ceasefire monitoring is a common conflict response intervention generally correlated with ceasefire durability. However, how ceasefire monitoring's routine practices contribute to ceasefire compliance and noncompliance is little understood. This dissertation aims to theorize and explain how third-party ceasefire monitoring influences, or seeks to influence, the behaviours of conflict parties in civil wars. Challenging the conventional view that ceasefire monitoring invariably promotes peace, this study develops a practice-orientated, mechanism-based approach to explain the effects of monitoring. Drawing on over 100 interviews, archival research, and document analysis from four different contexts—Kosovo, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine—this study examines monitors' practices of reporting, public speech, and remote sensing. The research takes a qualitative, abductive, and inductive approach, integrating insights from bounded rationalism, practice theory, discourse analysis, and surveillance studies.

Identifying a range of causal mechanisms, the study shows that ceasefire monitoring can both constrain and provoke conflict actors. These mechanisms—such as how ceasefire monitoring provides conflict parties with new signalling options, establishes expectations of conflict parties, and enables conflict party resistance to surveillance—recur across conflict contexts.

By nuancing understandings of how monitoring operates in practice, this study contributes to peace and conflict studies by showing how monitoring can produce both ceasefire compliance as well as ceasefire noncompliance. Going beyond the generally positive, sometimes idealized, understanding of monitoring interventions, the study shows that monitoring brings with it both risks and unintended consequences.

Keywords: Ceasefires, compliance, civil war, noncompliance, remote sensing, surveillance, Kosovo, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Ukraine

Contents

Figures and tables

Abbreviations and acronyms

ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
AU	African Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (South Sudan)
CTSAMVM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (South Sudan)
DCiP	OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague
JMEC	Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
MVM	Monitoring and Verification Mission (South Sudan)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RST	remote sensing technology
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission (Ukraine)
UAVs	uncrewed aerial vehicles
UN	United Nations
USIP	United States Institute of Peace

Acknowledgements

This study would not have been possible without the many people who agreed to share their experiences with me. They alas cannot be named here.

I am grateful for the cooperation and assistance of several institutions involved in ceasefire monitoring, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), particularly the OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague, the National Archives at Kew, London, the Templer Study Centre at the National Army Museum, London, the Swedish Government Archives, and the United States Institute of Peace.

Many thanks to Eleanor O'Gorman and Sarah Nouwen at the University of Cambridge for encouraging me to begin a PhD, somewhat later in life. I am grateful for the support of my friends in the academy throughout the world: Andreas Hirblinger, Cherry Leonardi, Chris Kwaja, Jacob Fodio Todd, Jamie Pring, John Ryle, Julia Palmiano Federer, Mareike Schomerus, Mehari Taddele Maru, Michel Thill, Sharath Srinivasan, and Terrence Lyons.

Special thanks to my serial co-author, Valerie Sticher, this dissertation's most insightful critic and the person without whom this dissertation would not have been completed. Thanks to my supporters in the wider community of peace and security scholars, including Åshild Kolas, Corinne Bara, Govinda Clayton, Jacqui Cho, Malin Åkebo, and Siri Aas Rustad, as well as all the editors and reviewers of the journals where my articles appeared.

At the School of Global Studies, I especially thank my supervisors Fredrik Söderbaum and Johan Karlsson Schaffer for their advice and input over the last four years. Alex Jung, Ana Carolina Rodrigues, Avyanthi Azis, Bryan Mabee, Camilla Orjuela, Fisseha Fantahun Tefera, Jan Bachmann, Joakim Berndtsson, and Kilian Spandler all engaged with my work and provided helpful critiques. I also thank Michael Schulz for sending me to represent the School at the Future of Peace Operations and Military Interventions symposium at the Swedish Defence University in November 2023.

Completing this thesis has been complicated by reasons beyond the university: a global pandemic, the outbreak of extreme violence in several countries close to my heart and featured in this study, protracted legal complications, various unforeseeable health issues, as well as the moments of sadness that come in life. Thank you to my parents and to my brother Riaz, and to Sabrina and Simba Salis, for their unquantifiable support. I also want to recognize all the friends and strangers who helped in confronting, if not always overcoming, these challenges.

I acknowledge my ecological debts. A very incomplete accounting records that my research and conference travels resulted in at least 3.1 tonnes of CO_2 emissions. My office printing, not including the printing of this book, resulted in an additional 15.7 kg of CO_2 emissions and at least 59kW of energy use.

Finally, I acknowledge financial support for my research and conference participation from the Christofer och Tora Myhres stipendiefond, the Adlerbert Foreign Student Hospitality Foundation, the Stiftelsen Siamon, the Adlerbertska Foundations, the Stiftelsen Lars Hiertas Minne, the Stiftelsen Karl Staaffs fond, the Herbert and Karin Jacobssons Stiftelse, and the Stiftelsen Henrik E Ahrenbergs studiefond. I also thank the United States Institute of Peace for funding the earlier research that provided the foundations for this study and regret the sad fate that has befallen the institute during the second Trump administration. May USIP rise again.

1
Introduction

This dissertation is about the work of ceasefire monitors and ceasefire monitoring. At least nominally, ceasefire monitoring is a type of political intervention that aims to maintain and improve compliance with ceasefire commitments, deter future ceasefire violations, and create credible information about ceasefire implementation. Ceasefire monitors are the agents of ceasefire monitoring. Today, ceasefires and their monitors come in different forms and have varying mandates and objectives, but the task of ceasefire monitoring underpinned the earliest United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and South Asia in the 1940s and 1950s. Ceasefire monitoring remains part of the conflict resolution toolkit in numerous contemporary conflicts. While not all ceasefires have ceasefire monitors, the presence of third-party ceasefire monitors is the factor most strongly correlated with overall ceasefire durability (Clayton, 2025). At the same time, as is painfully apparent, even with robust ceasefire monitoring missions, there are many violent conflicts that continue seemingly intractably.

Ceasefire monitoring is also an endeavour with which I am intimately familiar: I have lived its challenges firsthand. Between 2014 and 2018, I was implicated in the long running "peace" process in South Sudan. Initially, I was an advisor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, established after the outbreak of civil war in 2013. IGAD oversaw the first ceasefire monitoring mission in South Sudan, the Monitoring and Verification Mission (MVM). In that role, I witnessed firsthand the difficulties of initiating and operating the MVM, the debates over whether to publicize its findings, and how monitoring linked with the ongoing mediation. Shortly after the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was reached in August 2015, I helped establish the secretariat of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), the body with overall oversight of the ARCSS institutions, including a revamped MVM, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM). In this role, I would work closely with CTSAMM. From the intransigence of the conflict parties to allegations of misconduct, I experienced both the frustrations with and the potential of ceasefire monitoring.

As I have argued elsewhere, ceasefire monitoring's shortcomings in South Sudan ultimately contributed to a calamity in South Sudan and the collapse of the ARCSS in 2016 (Verjee, 2019a, 2021). I observed these developments from a distance, having been expelled from South Sudan by an inhospitable regime a few months prior. Over the next few years, my involvement in the South Sudan peace process was less formal, but both the promise and perils of ceasefire monitoring and wider peace agreement oversight remained of interest to me, both academically and as a practitioner. The experiences of MVM and CTSAMM led to an interest in the contemporaneous Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission (OSCE SMM) in Ukraine, and from there to other models and experiences of ceasefire monitoring, and to a desire to see monitoring evolve and improve in a new era of conflict (Verjee, 2019b). The escalation of conflict in Ukraine also focused attention on the nature of international intervention in that country after 2014.

In moving to the University of Gothenburg in 2021, my initial plan was not to conduct a study dedicated solely to ceasefire monitoring. However, disclosures from monitoring contacts in Ukraine motivated a re-orientation of my research agenda, and ultimately to this dissertation, which is in one sense a return to the concerns I had experienced years earlier.

What lies ahead in this work? A brief explanation of the dissertation's title may help guide the reader as to what to expect from this study, and how I position my work in relation to conventional expectations.

First, "processes" signals the dissertation's orientation towards mechanism-based explanations (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Pozzoni & Kaidesoja, 2021). My study traces the causal processes—the mechanisms and pathways—through which monitoring produces behavioural effects. These mechanisms include testing for audience costs, conflict party signalling, and resistance.

Second, "practices" indicates the dissertation's focus on what monitors actually do. Rather than focusing on formal mandates or institutional design, the study examines routine, everyday monitoring practices, such as how monitors report their findings, and how they use remote sensing technology, often expected to lead to a "paradigm shift" in monitoring practice (Apakan & Giardullo, 2020: 483). The dissertation probes how these practices are enacted, not just whether they are present.

Third, "consequences" draws attention to the study's theorizing and empirical findings that ceasefire monitoring can lead not only to compliance, as is generally expected, but also to noncompliance, in the form of new violence. The dissertation problematises the idea contained in much of the literature that monitoring is generally beneficial and at worst benign. It

investigates both intended and unintended consequences, including the potential for impact on future conflict trajectories.

1.1. The research problem

Ceasefire monitoring is widely expected to promote ceasefire compliance (Fortna, 2004; Buchanan et al., 2021), yet ceasefire violations—what I more broadly term ceasefire noncompliance—persist even when monitoring is present and credible. This tension generates this thesis's central research problem: understanding how monitoring influences conflict party behaviour, both towards compliance and noncompliance.

Although there are theorizations that third party ceasefire monitoring positively affects conflict party behaviour (Fortna, 2004; Joshi et al., 2017), explanations for precisely how this might occur are only partially developed. In violent conflicts eventually suspended by arrangements to interrupt violence, temporarily or permanently—what we call ceasefires—monitoring occurs when a third-party entity (a committee, commission, or formal international organization) monitors conflict party behaviour after a ceasefire is declared (Bara, Clayton & Rustad, 2021). As their name implies, ceasefire monitors spend much of their time observing the activities of conflict parties, who, at least conceptually, have accepted monitoring oversight as a form of agreement safeguard (Joshi et al., 2017).

As noted above, monitors generally aim to maintain and improve compliance with ceasefire commitments, deter future ceasefire violations, and create credible information about ceasefire implementation. But there is no prescribed way by which monitors go about these tasks. Monitors may, depending on their mandates and ambition, seek to defuse violence, enlarge the space for conflict resolution, and publicize their findings. Monitors may report frequently or rarely, engage visibly and publicly or primarily behind the scenes, focus on varying geographic or thematic areas of concern, or be assisted by technology, or not.

Yet it is not fully clear how ceasefire monitoring leads to and seeks to influence conflict parties to achieve its expected effects of more durable and better respected ceasefires. As Pinaud (2021: 471) points out, "we lack a clear understanding of why ceasefire monitoring mechanisms affect the behaviour of conflict parties." To Pinaud's observation, I add that an account of how ceasefire monitoring mechanisms affects conflict party behaviour is also absent from current understandings. As I have already noted, explanations for

precisely how ceasefire monitoring affects conflict party behaviour are not well developed.

There is no magic formula of what works in ceasefire monitoring, even as studies show that monitoring generally improves the durability of, and compliance with, ceasefires in both inter-state (Fortna, 2004) and intra-state conflicts (Clayton & Sticher, 2021). Like the early peacekeeping missions it gave rise to, the ideal of ceasefire monitoring invokes ideas of third-party neutrality and integrity to intermediate and interposition, physically and/or symbolically, between two (or more) distrustful conflict parties. Like monitoring regimes elsewhere in the international realm—in trade, human rights, nuclear proliferation, elections, and the environment—third-party ceasefire monitors are theorized to influence the behaviour of those being watched (Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013; Lesch, 2023). And in common with ideas of bargaining theory, credible information provision, and theories of imperfect and asymmetric information, ceasefire monitors are anticipated to help conflict parties, as well as other audiences, by creating trusted information that can help reduce suspicion about conflict parties' intentions, resolve, and actions (Fearon, 2005; Walter, 2009).

At the same time as scholars argue that monitoring is generally correlated with ceasefire compliance (Fortna, 2004; Clayton & Sticher, 2021), there are numerous examples of new violence, and even of ceasefire collapse, during declared ceasefires monitored by credible third-party entities. While there are numerous contextual factors for the trajectory of any given conflict, the general tendency towards compliance, amidst a litany of specific examples of noncompliance, offers a related, challenge for this thesis: explaining why ceasefire noncompliance occurs despite the presence and operation of credible ceasefire monitors.

While my dissertation is thus positioned to specifically address the phenomenon and practices of ceasefire monitoring, the work has wider implications. I touch on questions of concern to other domains, including in particular to international peacekeeping, which is also preoccupied with the question of what "works" (Fortna, 2008; Hultman et al., 2013; Howard, 2019). There are also links to the wider literature on third parties and compliance, which is largely focused on how and why states do or do not comply with their obligations (Börzel et al., 2010; Sczepanski & Börzel, 2022).

1.2. Research aim and research questions

Overall, my thesis offers a theoretically informed, empirically grounded, and practice-sensitive explanation of how ceasefire monitoring unfolds, what it consists of, and what effects it produces—sometimes intended, sometimes not. Specifically, I aim to theorize and explain how ceasefire monitoring practices shape conflict party behaviour, by identifying the mechanisms through which compliance and noncompliance are produced. In so doing, I seek to go beyond the generally positive, sometimes idealized, understanding of monitoring interventions.

I provide an account of the processual mechanisms by which ceasefire monitors' influence, or attempt to influence, conflict party behaviour. I am principally concerned with process rather than outcomes: that is, how monitors operate, and not necessarily whether they achieve their objectives. In seeking to consider the puzzle of noncompliance, I develop explanations for why even credible ceasefire monitoring efforts sometimes generate ceasefire noncompliance.

To pursue my aim, I look at the varied practices ceasefire monitors enact and implement, drawing on a variety of theoretical lenses and cases of conflict, to identify tendencies in monitoring's processes and intended and unintended consequences. I start from the perspective that monitoring interventions, through monitors' varied practices, can lead to new ceasefire noncompliance by conflict parties, as well as the more typical expectation that monitoring leads to better ceasefire compliance. To put it more starkly: the thesis argues that the introduction and operation of ceasefire monitoring and its embedded practices may, under certain conditions, motivate new violence. Consequently, this dissertation problematizes both the process and practices of ceasefire monitoring interventions.

The overall research questions that guide this dissertation are:

1. What are and how do the causal mechanisms of ceasefire monitoring influence conflict party behaviour?
2. How do specific monitoring practices incentivize ceasefire compliance and noncompliance?

These overarching questions are informed by more specific research questions in each of the articles, as set out in Table 1 and discussed further below.

At present, much established scholarship sees the implications of the first overall question as largely settled: whatever the causal mechanisms might be, ceasefire monitors do (positively) influence conflict party behaviour. In relation to the how, existing scholarship tends to argue that credible ceasefire monitoring has three core means to affect conflict parties. First, monitoring increases the costs of committing ceasefire violations. Second, monitoring helps distinguish between accidents and intentional violations, thus preventing escalations based on misapprehension (Fortna, 2004). Third, monitoring increases transparency, thus making it harder for conflict parties to cheat on their commitments (Fortna, 2004; Clayton & Sticher, 2021).

These answers have at least two limitations. First, they are all based on the assumption that more and credible information from monitors is helpful in overcoming mistrust and bargaining problems (Fearon, 1997; Walter, 2009; Mattes & Savun, 2010). However, as Lindley (2007) has argued, more information and greater transparency do not necessarily promote confidence between conflict actors. Second, these answers say little about how monitoring, beyond simply being deployed to a context of conflict where it generates and disseminates information, actually leads to effects on the ground.

Nor are these responses satisfactory in response to the second overall research question. The most common explanation for ceasefire noncompliance is that conflict parties lack commitment to a given ceasefire. While I accept this explanation may account for many incidents of violence, as I have suggested, there is also a possibility that monitoring itself, through its constitutive practices, produces effects in a conflict which can include both motivating ceasefire compliance and ceasefire noncompliance, the latter in the form of new violence. Article I of the thesis addresses how and why this monitoring-derived new violence might occur.

In the remainder of this thesis, I consider how ceasefire monitors' practices specifically affect conflict party behaviour and argue that different practices affect conflict party behaviour differently. Consequently, as summarised in Table 1 on page 13, in articles II-V of the thesis, I develop specific research questions in line with the three monitoring practices I study: monitors' reporting, public discourse, and use of remote sensing technology, principally through camera-equipped devices such as uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs).

My reasoning for focusing on these practices is as follows. Reporting is the most common ceasefire monitoring practice across all missions, and the one on which a primary rationalist argument for monitoring's effectiveness – that

of credible information provision – is based (Fearon, 1995; Fortna, 2004; Mattes & Savun, 2010; Joshi et al., 2017). Similarly, the focus on discourse is a constituent, but so far, underexamined, aspect of the information function of monitoring. Lastly, remote sensing technology is an emergent practice in ceasefire monitoring that is expected to become increasingly prevalent and impactful (Giardullo, Dorn & Stodilka, 2020; Grand-Clément, 2022) and also concerns the collection and synthesis of information. All three practices speak to the credible information provision function argued to be so important to monitoring's effects. Accordingly, the questions thesis articles II-V address are:

- Article II: How does ceasefire monitors' reporting influence conflict parties?
- Article III: How does ceasefire monitors' public speech influence conflict parties?
- Article IV: How does the use by monitors of remote sensing technologies aim to produce conflict party compliance?
- Article V: Why does the use by monitors of remote sensing technologies produce ceasefire noncompliance?

Table 1: Summary of the dissertation's specific research questions and corresponding articles

Article	Research question	Theoretical approach	Methods	Contexts	Main findings
I	Why might ceasefire noncompliance by conflict parties occur in the presence of, or be motivated by third-party monitoring?	Non compliance theory	Not applicable	Not applicable	Monitoring provides conflict parties with new signalling options in which violence has a communicative function; conflict parties' noncompliance can seek to influence how monitors operate, test monitors' detection capacities; and check for audience costs.
II	How does ceasefire monitors' reporting influence conflict parties?	Practice theory	Interviews, archival research	Kosovo, South Sudan	Reporting affects conflict parties by creating explicit opportunities for their compliance and noncompliance and revealing the limits of monitoring's reach.
III	How does ceasefire monitors' public speech influence conflict parties?	Practice theory; discourse theory	Critical discourse analysis	Kosovo, Sri Lanka	Beyond condemnation, monitors use a variety of discursive devices in their public speech to attempt to persuade conflict parties.
IV	How does the use by monitors of remote sensing technologies aim to produce conflict party compliance?	Compliance theory; imperfect information theory	Theory building process tracing	Ukraine	Remote sensing alters conflict parties' incentives, allows for the signalling of intent by accepting and not interfering with remote sensing systems, and by mitigating the risk of involuntary conflict escalation through information provision.
V	Why does the use by monitors of remote sensing technologies produce ceasefire noncompliance?	Surveillance theory	Theory building process tracing	Ukraine	Remote sensing technology provides conflict parties with new opportunities for resistance to monitoring.

1.3. Overall contributions of the research

This thesis contributes to the wider body of research on ceasefires and conflict interventions. Specifically, this thesis makes both theoretical, methodological, and empirical original contributions to knowledge.

In relation to theory, the thesis makes four principal contributions.

First, the thesis develops new theory for how ceasefire monitoring can lead to both ceasefire compliance and ceasefire noncompliance. In developing this theory, the thesis moves past the generally normative assumptions that much of the ceasefire literature relies on, in which monitoring produces non-violence and contributes to agreement compliance. This contribution is located in articles I and V, which focus on how monitoring can lead to noncompliance, while articles II and IV focus on how monitoring aims to lead to compliance.

Second, the thesis disaggregates existing theory on the informational effects of monitoring. Monitors produce different kinds of information by different means and practices, and this information affects, or is expected to affect, conflict parties differently (Dai, 2002). Consequently, it is not only the nature of the information asymmetries between conflict adversaries that monitoring affects (Choudhury, 2009), but rather monitoring by its introduction and operation changes the relational role of this information. This contribution is located in articles II, III, and IV.

Third, the thesis develops new theory in relation to remote sensing technology, an emerging area of both practice and research. In article IV, the thesis develops an analytical framework to assess when and how remote sensing technology can contribute to ceasefire compliance, while in article V, I develop theory for why the noncompliance effects of remote sensing in ceasefire monitoring are distinct from those in ceasefire monitoring more generally.

Fourth, the thesis integrates theoretical lenses from an eclectic variety of realms to the study of ceasefire monitoring. By conceiving of ceasefire monitoring as a means of surveillance, for example, the dissertation applies insights from wider critical scholarship to the practice of monitoring. By applying insights from noncompliance studies in business and international scholarship, I broaden understandings of how monitors affect the conflict theatre in which they are deployed.

Methodologically, the thesis makes three further contributions. **Article II** makes use of both closed access and open access archival material, in one of the few studies of the KVM to draw on these largely neglected primary materials. Most prior studies of the KVM have relied heavily on insider

accounts (Walker, 2000; Phillips, 2003) or have overlooked the KVM's source material almost entirely (Bellamy & Griffin, 2002; Weller, 2009; Tanner, 2021).

Article III is the first attempt to use monitoring press releases to analyse ceasefire monitoring. In this article, I apply the approach of Cornut and de Zamaróczy (2021) to use documents to speak about practice. And as I discuss in an article reflecting on conducting co-interviewing research remotely and during the Covid-19 pandemic (Verjee & Sticher 2024), Article IV is informed by interviews based on strategies and tactics I and my co-author Valerie Sticher developed for more effective online interviewing.

Empirically, the thesis makes further contributions by examining under-researched cases of monitoring from Kosovo and South Sudan; re-examining better known monitoring cases from Ukraine and Sri Lanka; developing one of the first in-depth assessments of the use of remote sensing technology in monitoring in the case of Ukraine; and assessing previously underexamined elements of monitoring missions, such as their public and private reports and press statements.

This dissertation both collects and generates novel data, including original interviews with nearly 100 former monitors, as well as archival work at four reference archives, in the Czech Republic, Sweden, and the UK, as well as reinterprets and analyses existing data on certain cases. Although not a formal comparative study in the variable-oriented tradition, I juxtapose contexts and cases not previously compared and analyse aspects of conflict contexts that have been previously overlooked. I apply a comparative logic across contexts at the level of mechanisms and practices to identify recurring patterns and context-specific divergences. My approach can be generally characterised as case-based, process-tracing orientated comparison (Beach & Pedersen, 2013), which focuses on within-case analysis of mechanisms (Collier, 1993; González-Ocantos, 2020) and selective cross-contextual comparison.

1.4. Limitations

Since this study builds on existing scholarship on ceasefires and ceasefire monitoring, I do not seek to reinterrogate earlier findings about ceasefire agreements (e.g. Åkebo, 2013; Wittke, 2021), the desired outcomes of ceasefires (e.g. Clayton & Sticher, 2021), or the conditions for ceasefire onset (Clayton et al., 2023b) and ceasefire success (e.g. Mahieu, 2007; Core, 2009; Clayton, Nathan & Wiehler, 2021; Nathan & Sethi, 2023).

My study is temporally limited. Although I draw on numerous and diverse cases, these all fall between the years 1998-2022. Earlier and later cases may suggest new directions for my research problems. Moreover, despite their common origins, I focus solely on ceasefire monitoring mechanisms rather than UN peacekeeping operations, which in the contemporary era are increasingly multi-dimensional, although some long running missions in frozen conflicts continue to have more classical monitoring mandates (e.g. Cyprus, Kashmir). I also do not consider monitoring efforts conducted by domestic actors, usually by civil society (e.g., Ross, 2017; Pinaud, 2021), where the power and relational dynamics are considerably different to those of international monitoring.

Methodologically, I recognise that in my focus on monitors, their actual practices may vary from what they record in written materials or convey in interviews. Consequently, I sought to triangulate and confirm findings through multiple and varied sources, including interviews, document analysis, and archival sources.

1.5. Outline of the thesis

The thesis is organised in a kappa of 5 chapters and 5 research articles. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides key definitions and further discusses the previous research on ceasefire monitoring, which sets the stage for the theoretical framework I use to inform and guide my research in Chapter 3. Following the theoretical discussion, in Chapter 4, I explain my research methodology and methods, my sources of empirical material, and the ethical considerations for my research. Chapter 5 provides an overall synthesis, conclusion, summary of findings, and suggestions for further research.

The texts of the five articles then follow. Articles I, II, and IV are published, Article V is accepted and in press, Article III has received a first decision, with the article now under author revision. The articles are:

I. Verjee, Aly (2025). Theorizing conflict opponent noncompliance from ceasefire monitoring. *Cooperation and Conflict*. OnlineFirst. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367241313306

II. Verjee, Aly (2024). Routine but consequential: How ceasefire monitors' reporting constructs opportunities for (non)compliance by conflict opponents. *International Peacekeeping* 31(4): 473–498. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2024.2342861

III. Verjee, Aly (2025). Pleading for peace: Sri Lanka, Kosovo, and the press releases of ceasefire monitors. Received first decision, under author revision.

IV. Sticher, Valerie, and Verjee, Aly (2023). Do eyes in the sky ensure peace on the ground? The uncertain contributions of remote sensing to ceasefire compliance. *International Studies Review* 25(3): viad039. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viad039

V. Verjee, Aly (2025). How surveillance motivates new violence: ceasefire monitoring, remote sensing technology, and noncompliance. In press at *Surveillance & Society*, assigned to issue 23(3).

To integrate what the articles contribute to the thesis overall, I provide in the conclusion a synthesis of five wider claims. In brief, these are first: the contingent and political nature of ceasefire monitoring, rather than necessarily being integrated, monolithic and technocratic. Second, that differing ceasefire monitoring practices combine to create interaction effects, suggesting that variation is not only about the wider conflict context but about the specific tools monitors use. Third, that the consequences of ceasefire monitoring are co-produced: conflict parties have agency and exercise that agency in relation to monitors' work. Fourth, that monitoring comprises iterative adaptation, because of the repeated cycles of interaction between monitor and monitored. Finally, fifth, I discuss how there is value in developing a practice-based framework for assessing ceasefire monitoring.

Lastly, the substantive appendices provide demographic data on the interviewees and an overview of the archival work that was conducted at the OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague (DCiP), Czech Republic, the United Kingdom's National Archives at Kew, London, the Templer Study Centre at the National Army Museum in London, and at the Swedish Government Office archives.

2
Key terms and prior research on ceasefire monitoring

To help orientate the reader, this chapter first defines some of the key terms relevant to the dissertation, before providing an overview of prior research on ceasefire monitoring.

2.1. Key definitions

Although I have offered brief definitions of both ceasefires and ceasefire monitoring in the introductory chapter, to assist with clarity, I now develop a discussion of the key terms: ceasefire and ceasefire monitoring, to assist in focusing my study and to avoid ambiguity.

What is a ceasefire?

In 2013 (20), Malin Åkebo observed that there was no "commonly recognized" definition of a ceasefire. Nearly a decade later, the same observation was being made (Clayton et al., 2023a). The conceptual ambiguity over what a ceasefire is arises for several reasons. Ceasefires vary in scope and ambition (Verjee, 2022). Some ceasefires are part of comprehensive peace agreements – and in some such agreements, the ceasefire may be its most important part. Other ceasefires are little more than hour or day long pauses in fighting. Ceasefires can be the outcome of a conflict (Kretz, 2010), merely a way station on the path of an intractable conflict, which may be revisited several times (Fortna, 2004; Åkebo, 2013) or constitute "the transition from the fighting to the non-fighting stage" of a conflict (Mohn, 1952: 53). Ceasefires also vary in temporal sequence: they can arise during pre-negotiations, be a condition of further negotiations, or be a later milestone in conflict resolution (Bell, 2000; Clayton & Sticher, 2021). In protracted conflicts, the ceasefires may be numerous; there

were at least 68 recorded ceasefires in Bosnia, for example, varying in scope and complexity (Bell & Badanjak, 2019).

There are also various linguistic conceptions of the term ceasefire. The word ceasefire is itself a relatively recent addition to the English language considering the history of violent conflict; the first recorded usage of the term in the meaning of a temporary suspension of hostilities only dates to 1918, while its functionalist military use, the command to cease active fighting, dates to 1844 (Oxford English Dictionary, 2021). The terms truce and armistice have a longer history; they generally connote similar parameters to the contemporary ceasefire, and are often used interchangeably (Bailey, 1977; Åkebo, 2013; Clayton et al., 2021). While armistice is now a largely antiquated term, the term truce remains a common synonym. While the United Nations (2022) considers a truce to have a degree of informality as compared to a formal ceasefire, in popular usage any difference may be less discernible. Another common term, the cessation of hostilities, is also sometimes defined as a temporary arrangement before a permanent ceasefire, although there are also examples of permanent cessations of hostilities (African Union, 2022).

While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to consider this issue in depth, it may be worthwhile to recognise that different languages encapsulate different ideas of the term ceasefire. In German, for instance, the idea of physical movement is invoked when ceasefire is translated as Waffenstillstand, a compound of the words weapon (Waffen) + standstill (Stillstand). In Islamic thought, the Arabic terms hudna and tahdi'a offer their own, non-secular conceptualisations of a ceasefire (Zayed, 2007; MacEoin, 2008; Milton-Edwards, 2017), that have largely been overlooked by the mainstream scholarship on conflict resolution.

For the purposes of this study, I focus on ceasefires that can be termed as non-definitive: that is, nondefinitive ceasefires are ceasefires that pertain to an identifiable geography with recognizable conflict parties but are not part of a comprehensive peace agreement that typically goes well beyond security matters. Not all non-definitive ceasefires are monitored; it is an evident condition for my study that the ceasefire must provide for some form of monitoring, usually prescribed in the agreement that establishes the ceasefire. Monitoring is not an uncommon occurrence: out of the 2,107 ceasefires reached worldwide between 1989 to 2018, roughly a third had formal provisions for monitoring (Palik, Rustad & Methi, 2020: 19), although monitoring efforts are not established in every case where monitoring is called for.

What is a ceasefire monitor? What is international ceasefire monitoring?

Much like the word ceasefire and its associated terms, different terms are used to describe the actors that oversee ceasefire arrangements. While I generally use the term monitor in this study, the analogous terms observer and verifier are also in common use (Boulden, 2000; Findlay, 2001). Two of the monitoring entities studied in this dissertation mention the term verification: the Kosovo Verification Mission and the Monitoring and Verification Mission in South Sudan and its various successor entities. Boulden (2000: 45) distinguishes between monitoring as the "process of gathering information about a particular activity" whereas verification is the "use of information to make a judgement about the compliance of parties with the terms of an agreement". Verification groups are also described by Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty (2017: 999) as "institutions for collecting and distributing information regarding the [agreement] implementation process". Monitors and verifiers are accordingly the agents that conduct monitoring and verification, respectively. The particular justification for the use of the term verification in the Kosovo case comes from the architect of the agreement to establish the mission, US envoy Richard Holbrooke, who perceived verification to be a more robust term than monitoring or observation (Greco, 1999), connoting greater intrusiveness. In other contexts, such as in election oversight, both practitioners and scholars distinguish between election observers and election monitors; observers are more passive, and do not interfere in the administration of an election; monitors may act in the event of irregularities (Bjornlund, 2004). However, whether in conflict or in elections or other realms, in practice, the roles and tasks of observer, monitor, and verifier generally overlap.

For this study, I prefer the term monitor, although occasionally use the other terms depending on context or case. I adapt the definition of monitor provided by Buchanan, Clayton and Ramsbotham (2021: 7): monitors are "the eyes and ears on the ground, who observe and report back on incidents that take place following an agreement." Monitors are usually organised and deployed collectively, although monitoring missions vary considerably in scope, size, and organisation (Buchanan, Clayton & Ramsbotham, 2021).

International ceasefire monitoring, therefore, is the process by which some organized entity, either organised through an existing institution like IGAD or the OSCE or established in a standalone manner like the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), comprising ceasefire monitors, observes conflict party behaviour subsequent to a ceasefire being declared (Bara, Clayton & Rustad, 2021: 330). Conceptually, ceasefire monitoring can be considered a form of

peace agreement safeguard, (Fortna, 2004; Joshi, Lee & Mac Ginty, 2017). Ceasefire monitoring of this kind is a third-party initiative, although some modalities of monitoring imply or require joint monitoring, in which the conflict parties have formal representatives involved in the monitoring efforts alongside non-conflict party monitors.

2.2. Prior research on ceasefire monitoring

I now turn to provide an overview of prior research on ceasefire monitoring, focused on third party international ceasefire monitoring, to help provide a common foundation for the study and to better contextualise the contributions and work of this dissertation.

Many studies of ceasefires and ceasefire monitoring depart from the foundational work of Virginia Page Fortna (2003, 2004). Because of its importance, I first detail Fortna's work on ceasefires, before offering a more critical reflection.

In her early work, Fortna set out the theory for why ceasefire provisions such as ceasefire monitoring affect ceasefire compliance. Fortna argued that there are three mechanisms by which ceasefire monitoring leads to compliance: first, by altering conflict parties' incentives to comply with an underlying agreement; second, by reducing belligerents' uncertainties about actions and intentions (echoed in Mattes & Savun, 2010: 516, who argued that monitoring can help address uncertainty in a given conflict context by helping with "asymmetric information"); and third, by preventing genuine accidents from becoming sources of escalation.

Fortna (2004) presented statistical evidence for her claims that ceasefire monitoring promotes ceasefire durability, focusing on interstate conflicts. In that work, she showed that the presence of ceasefire monitoring was correlated with ceasefire duration. About twenty years later, Clayton and Sticher (2021) showed that the same relationship exists in situations of civil war conflicts. Such evidence helps sustain the liberal, institutionalist peace argument that ceasefires benefit when they include provisions that monitors should observe, document, and report on ceasefire (non)compliance, independent of the conflict parties, in line with the wider institutionalist arguments made about other forms of monitoring regimes.

Fortna's first mechanism, altering incentives, refers to the costs conflict parties incur when violating a ceasefire. The higher the costs, the less desirable it is to incur them. Monitoring contributes to the imposition of costs by informing third party audiences of the conduct of the parties in relation to their

implicit or explicit obligations, such as those that may exist pursuant to a ceasefire agreement (Findlay, 2001; Fortna, 2003; Clayton & Sticher, 2021).

Regarding Fortna's second mechanism, reducing uncertainties, in a context where ceasefire compliance is intended, conflict parties may find it difficult to credibly communicate this intention. They may mistrust their (former) opponent(s) (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 2009), and this lack of trust and difficulties of communication can obstruct successful cooperation. To overcome these impediments, conflict parties can accept measures that make cheating more costly (Fearon, 1997). Monitoring provisions can thus make ceasefires more effective (and potentially more durable) by reducing uncertainties about opponent actions and intentions (Fortna, 2004; Park, 2023). By accepting compliance mechanisms that make it harder and more costly to cheat, conflict parties can signal their seriousness about compliance (Clayton & Sticher, 2021).

Lastly, Fortna theorizes that ceasefire monitoring may also increase compliance by preventing accidents from spiralling out of control. Monitoring missions may provide information about overall compliance, trends in compliance, and/or verify allegations of violations, allowing both conflict and third-party actors to distinguish between aggressive moves, accidents, and legitimate acts, and within the category of aggressive acts, better determine the significance and magnitude of such violations.

Fortna's arguments have considered peacekeeping, ceasefire monitoring, and demilitarized zones, among other interventions, as comparable but varying expressions of ceasefire provisions, and she has argued that the more of these provisions are present, the more effective a ceasefire is likely to be (Fortna, 2003). Fortna's arguments have been highly influential and are referenced in almost all of the subsequent ceasefire and ceasefire monitoring literature, including my own earlier work on ceasefire monitoring (e.g., Åkebo, 2013, 2020; Bara, Clayton & Rustad, 2021; Buchanan, Clayton & Ramsbotham, 2021; Clayton & Sticher, 2021; Pinaud, 2021; Wiehler, 2021; Verjee, 2022).

My perspective on Fortna's work is two-fold. It first must be said that Fortna's work is important to build from in any study of ceasefires or ceasefire monitoring. Her uncovering of the underlying mechanisms and correlations between monitoring and duration are vital. The implication of Fortna's work and the literature that has subsequently built on that work is that ceasefire monitoring, if present and well implemented, benefits conflict resolution and sustains wider ceasefire processes (Fortna, 2003). This position often implicitly relies on wider insights from bargaining, mediation, and communications theory about the utility of the transmission of trusted information by credible actors (e.g., Kydd, 2003; Mattes & Savun, 2010). In

short, there is greater credibility assigned to third parties considered impartial to convey information that is trusted by opposing parties to a conflict (Svensson, 2009). Policy-focused and practitioner work has thus argued for more effective ceasefire monitoring by virtue of more credible and impartial monitors if conflict resolution efforts are to be successful (e.g., Forster, 2019; Verjee, 2019b; Buchanan, Clayton & Ramsbotham, 2021).

On the other hand, there are also important limitations to Fortna's arguments, that I seek to go beyond in my study. In her main study on ceasefires, Fortna's approach is primarily quantitative, with only two in-depth inter-state case studies, both of which might be considered unrepresentative of many other conflicts (Israel-Syria and India-Pakistan). Fortna's main study (2004) focuses on ceasefires achieved between 1946 and 1998; this temporal focus may limit applicability to post-Cold War conflicts, where conflict has become both more fragmented and more hybrid, non-state actors play a larger role, and monitoring has moved away from the classical UN peacekeeping model. All my studied geographical contexts fall after Fortna's period of focus. The most important limitation of Fortna's work for my study is that Fortna treats monitoring as something of a black box. It is a key mechanism for ensuring compliance, an intervention that "works" if present. Fortna does not consider in much depth the question of monitoring variation, how monitors behave and operate, or how conflict parties react and adapt to being monitored. These factors are not captured in the quantitative analysis.

Following Fortna's original arguments, a considerable amount of the ceasefire literature has been concerned with what 'works': what is it that makes ceasefires more likely to hold (e.g. Karakus & Svensson, 2020; Clayton, Nathan & Wiehler, 2021). This has been of particular concern to scholars and practitioners because as measured by conflict recurrence, most ceasefires will fail (Sagård, 2019). In making successful outcome more likely, monitoring is usually discussed as an important contributor to ceasefire sustainability.

Given the focus on explanations of what works to sustain ceasefires, scholars have subsequently concerned themselves with examining different features of ceasefire monitoring's design and implementation, such as mandates, the composition and makeup of monitoring missions, and the financial, human, and technological resources made available to monitors to conduct their work. These factors are considered important and are grouped together because they are all, to some extent, choices made by the monitors or their mandating authorities, rather than necessarily fixed exogenously. They consequently vary from context to context.

With respect to mandates, some have argued that the best ceasefire monitoring mandates are explicit (Buchanan, Clayton & Ramsbotham, 2021).

Palik (2021) argues that ceasefire monitoring mandates that are not specific and comprehensive are more difficult to implement. In my own recent work on Ukraine, I show how competing understandings of the ceasefire monitoring mandate among monitors can lead to mission incoherence (Verjee, 2022). Meanwhile, Höglund and Wennerström (2015: 853) argue that "it is not so much what the mandate stipulates that matters, but rather that the conflict environment influences how the mission mandate is interpreted and operationalized." Clearly, the wider environment matters, but whatever the mandate, it can both constrain and empower (Nathan, 2018).

A second area of focus in studies of ceasefire monitoring design has been the composition and makeup of monitoring missions. This can be considered along two dimensions: that of the nature of international composition of a mission, and that of the extent of national inclusion and exclusion within the practice of ceasefire monitoring. In the first dimension, and like debates over international peacekeeping, much discussion has been on the gendered nature of monitoring, and to some extent, on the civilian versus military nature of monitoring missions (Buchanan, Clayton & Ramsbotham, 2021). Given that ceasefire monitoring grew out of militarized peacekeeping, it is not surprising that even in civilian ceasefire monitoring missions today, many personnel have a military or policing background. The appropriateness of this mission composition – which tends to thus have fewer women, and fewer civilians – has been questioned and is thought to reinforce narrow conceptions of security (Barsa, Holt-Ivry & Muehlenbeck, 2016).

Turning to the dimension of national inclusion-exclusion, which can be considered part of the wider 'local' turn in peace and conflict studies (Paffenholz, 2015), and normative arguments about more inclusive approaches to monitoring can be found. While some studies explicitly typologize the roles of local civil society in monitoring (Ross, 2017), others have focused on civilian or civil society led efforts to monitor (Puttick, 2017; Pinaud, 2021). Implicit in this work is an assertion common in the "local" peacebuilding debate – that those with a deeper understanding of the context and greater cultural competence are better placed to undertake interventions such as ceasefire monitoring. While this dissertation does not specifically address this concern, I recognise that the explanations and mechanisms I develop here may not necessarily apply to local monitoring efforts.

A third area of focus has been the question of matching appropriate resources to ceasefire monitoring. Many monitoring missions lack sufficient personnel and expertise (Potter, 2004). Those personnel may lack mobility, training, protection, and contextual appreciation. One approach to overcoming at least the logistical aspects of these limitations has been the increasing use of

technology in monitoring (Grand-Clément, 2022; Hug, 2024). In particular, the use of remote sensing technology such as acoustic sensors, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), satellites, and other cameras has been advocated as a form of mission force multiplier (Peško, 2017; Kemp, 2018).

A final area of focus can be termed the critical ceasefire monitoring case study literature. Kolås (2011) pointed to how deficient ceasefire monitoring in India led to a frozen conflict. Others have pointed to the weaknesses of ceasefire monitoring in Myanmar (Krause & Kamler, 2022; Tun, Anderson & Yamahata, 2022). Palik (2021) critiqued ceasefire monitoring in Yemen; Pinaud (2021) did so in Nepal. I have also contributed to this literature with a critique of ceasefire monitoring in South Sudan, and more recently in Ukraine (Verjee, 2019a, 2022). Sometimes, ceasefire monitoring is ineffectually implemented; sometimes, it makes the situation worse. Common to these critiques is that they are individually case-led and with limited generalizability beyond the studied context. However, they often imply or infer that more appropriate design of the factors discussed above: mandates, mission composition, and resources, would have improved monitoring and therefore the quality of ceasefire outcomes.

Beyond these deep case studies, there are wider critiques that are more generalizable, although these do not necessarily disaggregate ceasefires from ceasefire monitoring. For example, Sosnowski (2019, 2020a) has argued that ceasefires can be used as for coercive state building, because they allow a state party to violently reassert its authority. Others have argued that ceasefires can become tools of manipulation by which conflict parties seek to advance their ulterior objectives (Milton-Edwards, 2017; Clayton & Sticher, 2021).

There are at least two major shortcomings to the existing literature referenced here which motivate my project. These are, first, the depth of explanation advanced in these studies and the underdeveloped theorization of the mechanisms that underpin ceasefire monitoring; and, second, insufficient attention to the practices of ceasefire monitoring. Returning to Fortna, although the mechanisms of altering incentives and reducing uncertainty largely derive from the information produced by monitors, how individual informational practices might achieve such aims is not well elaborated.

Concerning the scholarship of ‘what works’ and that which is case study led, largely focuses on what I term first-order explanations for (normatively unsatisfactory) outcomes. That is, while poor implementation, a lack of resources, inadequate mandates, incompetent or inappropriately chosen monitors, or a combination of these factors, are certainly detrimental to the effectiveness of ceasefire monitoring, they say little about the underlying causal mechanisms of ceasefire monitoring. This motivates my study to both

examine the causality and effects of interventions, focusing on the significance of monitoring practices in achieving those effects.

3
Theoretical framework

This chapter discusses the theoretical perspectives that guide my approach to this dissertation. I begin by discussing my overall (meta)-theoretical foundations: the rationality of social actors and my understanding of mechanism-based explanations and causality, before moving on to the particular theories that guide different elements of the thesis.

My overall theoretical framework integrates somewhat disparate perspectives that, in conversation, have greater aggregative value. For instance, while much noncompliance theorization and scholarship focuses on the noncompliant behaviour of social actors like states and corporations, much recent surveillance scholarship tends to focus on individual noncompliance by subjects of surveillance, or in resistance to anticipated or expected surveillance by the state or private actors. My work seeks to draw on these varied theoretical lenses that have not generally been applied to the realm of ceasefire monitoring and connect the insights from different schools of thought. Overall, I take a theoretically pluralist approach to my subject.

In relation to the thesis articles, I more specifically draw on theory and concepts from four main areas: (1) compliance and noncompliance; (2) practice theory; (3) discourse theory; and (4) surveillance theory, each of which is the guiding framework for its respective article (see Table 1 for an overview on p. 8). Accordingly, this chapter is organised as follows. The first section offers a synthesis of the theoretical perspectives and explains their selection. I then go into greater depth to discuss my theoretical foundations and assumptions, followed by sections on each of the four aforementioned particular theoretical perspectives. I conclude the chapter by discussing the alternatives and how my choices are preferable and coherent.

The theoretical concepts used in this dissertation—particularly bounded rationalism, mechanism-based explanation, and the integration of practice, discourse, and surveillance theories—directly respond to the complexity and ambiguity of the empirical phenomenon under study: ceasefire monitoring. As noted in the introduction, traditional approaches in peace and conflict studies often rely on rationalist bargaining theory, which assumes that credible information reduces uncertainty and thereby fosters compliance (e.g., Fearon, 1995; Fortna, 2004). While valuable, such accounts tend to treat monitoring as

a homogenous and inherently beneficial process. They rarely interrogate the actual practices of monitoring or how these might produce varied or even counterproductive effects.

Rather than adopt a strictly rationalist or constructivist approach, I employ bounded rationalism as a middle ground that reflects the real-world constraints under which both monitors and conflict parties operate (Simon, 1964). This avoids the limitations of strong rationalist models that assume complete information and consistent preferences, while still enabling a mechanism-based analysis of monitoring action. At the same time, my approach to practice takes on board Bueger and Gadinger's (2018: 14–15) note that practice theory can work alongside many different theoretical approaches.

A driving reason for choosing a mechanism-based explanatory approach is its ability to explain how outcomes occur without necessarily assuming universality (Tilly, 2001; Abbott, 2007). Context still matters in mechanism-based explanation (Pozzoni & Kaidesoja, 2021). Unlike the largely quantitative studies of ceasefires and ceasefire monitoring (which dominate much of the ceasefire literature), a more open approach to mechanisms can allow for case-based, processual explanations that can identify causal patterns without claiming universal laws or absolute generalization (Andersen, 2017). This approach is particularly useful given the wide variation in monitoring contexts and practices.

The integration of practice theory allows for a focus on the operational aspects of monitoring. Many studies of monitoring reduce the intervention to the presence or absence of an institutional provision or mandate. Practice theory allows for attention to what monitors actually do: how they report, speak, and use technology, for instance. It then allows for considering how these doings shape the behaviour of others (Schatzki, 1996; Adler & Pouliot, 2011).

Surveillance theory helps explain resistance by conflict actors to remote sensing monitoring technologies. Remote sensing is increasingly used, yet existing theories as applied to ceasefire monitoring rarely consider how being watched might provoke rather than prevent violence. Surveillance theory brings in the considerable literature from other areas of surveillance (e.g. Marx, 2006, 2009; Monahan, 2006), which neither practice nor compliance theories fully offer on their own.

Discourse theory, particularly critical discourse analysis, helps address the circumstances of language and persuasion as practice, which I see as complementary to both rationalist and practice-based accounts. While rationalist theories often treat discourse as mere signalling (Müller, 2004), and practice theory may undertheorize communication, discourse theory

foregrounds how monitors construct compliance through narrative, legitimacy, and framing (van Hulst et al., 2025).

3.1. Theoretical foundations

3.1.1. Rationality

My theoretical starting point is that social actors (such as ceasefire monitors and conflict parties) generally operate rationally: that is, that social actors are guided by good reasons to do what they do (Broome, 2021).[1] For instance, monitors might act in a certain way because they reason that they are mandated to do so, or reason that their actions would enact that mandate. To be more specific about my understanding of rationality, my interpretation of social action can be variously termed as soft rationalist (Dascal, 2008); practically rationalist (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) and featuring bounded rationality (Simon, 1964). This constitutes a loose approach to construing rationality. A soft rationalist approach implies that actors consider, rather than rigidly compute, a balance of reasons, that are not always measurable or conclusive (Dascal, 2008). Soft rationality rejects the idea that everything falling short of a mathematical hard rationality is irrational. A conceptualization of soft rationality also corresponds to what can be termed a practical approach to rationality: the rationality of intentions, decisions, and choices that are directly executed in action (Wedgewood, 2021).[2]

I also invoke a bounded approach to rationality: "that real-world rational cognition is limited by bounds on time, computational power, foresight, and knowledge; it is also a theory of what it means to be rational given limited human cognition and an uncertain and complex world" (Hertwig & Kozyreva, 2021: 505). This approach acknowledges that actors do not hold all possible information (Simon, 1964) and is thus less problematic than assuming conflict parties act on the basis of perfect information.

Rationality thus runs through my overall theoretical approach. A rationalist understanding asserts that ceasefire monitoring interventions, through its varied mechanisms, change the relationship, interests, and costs and benefits for conflict parties. At the same time, I agree with Fearon and Wendt (2002) that rationalism and constructivism should be viewed pragmatically and as

[1] I accept Broome's admonition that focusing on reasons alone is a reductive approach to rationality, even if reasons are central to much study of rationality. See Broome (2021: 129–131).

[2] To be contrasted with theoretical rationality, "the rationality of beliefs and other belief-like or belief-involving phenomena (such as credences, inferences, and the like)." See Wedgewood (2021: 138).

potentially complementary analytical tools (see also Bruneau, 2022). In that respect, I employ a more interpretivist approach in relation to the evidence gathered in my research.

To operationalize my approach, I employ a logic based on "thinly rationalistic social mechanisms" (Bengtsson & Hertting, 2014: 707). While I will turn to discuss mechanisms in more detail below, for now I simply note that observations of mechanisms in one case can be expected to occur in "similar actor constellations in other contexts" (Bengtsson & Hertting, 2014: 708). Accordingly, the mechanisms embedded in ceasefire monitoring interventions produce both the intended consequences of ceasefire monitoring (i.e., ceasefire compliance) and the unintended consequences of monitoring (i.e., ceasefire noncompliance).

A rational understanding of monitoring can still incorporate the eventuality of unintended consequences (Elster, 2005). As Aoi, de Coning and Thakur (2007: 3) observe in their writing about peace support operations, "no intervention in a complex system such as a human society can have only one effect…Some of these reactions are intended, in the sense that the intervention was designed to bring about those changes. Others are unintended, in that those planning the intervention did not mean for these reactions to come about at all." However, unintended consequences may not necessarily be unanticipated consequences (Elster, 2005). While current understandings of unintended consequences are usually conceived of as undesired outcomes that result from deviant behaviour (e.g. Hull et al., 2009), as I show, unintended consequences may also occur because of the inherent relational change monitoring interventions precipitate.

3.1.2. Mechanism-based explanations and causality

I take a mechanism-based explanation approach to explaining ceasefire various monitoring's effects. Mechanisms are an intermediate approach to understanding processes, that do not go as far as to claim universality but go beyond mere description (Tilly, 2001; Abbott, 2007). While there are multiple definitions of a mechanism, I understand a mechanism as a sort of ensemble or concatenation: a mechanism for a phenomenon (in this study, the phenomenon is usually ceasefire noncompliance) consists "of entities and activities organized in such a way [as to be] responsible for the phenomenon" (Illari & Williamson, 2012: 120).

In this approach, identifying mechanisms provides a "how-possible explanation," outlining how the phenomenon could in principle be produced (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 52). Although my account of mechanism-based

explanation is not as stringent as some approaches (e.g. the invariant mechanisms of Waldner, 2015; see also Falleti & Lynch, 2008), I attempt to avoid the danger of what Hedström and Ylikoski (2010: 54) describe as "lazy mechanism-based storytelling", or what Waldner (2015: 242–243) terms an understanding of mechanisms as merely "intervening events", where mechanisms are passive and "do not do any work". Rather, I understand that mechanisms generate causal effects. This is a relatively straightforward understanding of causality: by introducing and/or conducting monitoring activity A, conflict party behaviour B may occur. My view of causality, in this sense, is contingent: the activity need not make conflict party behaviour inevitable, only possible.

While there are both strong and weak mechanisms (Waldner, 2015), my overall goal in using mechanisms is to disaggregate the pathways that lead to effects, while drawing on the tradition of generic social mechanisms of, for instance, aggregation, contagion, and constraint (Braumoeller, 2006) and of belief formation (Hedström & Swedberg, 1996).[3]

My theorization of mechanisms accepts equifinality, "where multiple causal pathways may lead to the same outcome [i.e. noncompliance]" (Checkel, 2014: 90). Since my focus is on how processes unfold rather than on the outcomes, my mechanisms need not lead to uniquely different outcomes: instead, I want to show the plurality of ways by which compliance and noncompliance can result, as shown in kappa Figure 1. This graphical depiction also is intended to suggest that mechanisms can be layered (Glennan, 2010): these can operate simultaneously and interactively. The outcome of compliance or noncompliance is not determined by a single factor (e.g. the presence of monitoring), but by how these mechanisms unfold. It is in this sense that I pursue a mechanism-based explanation. No single mechanism necessarily guarantees peace or causes breakdown; rather, monitoring practices may activate multiple, potentially contradictory mechanisms whose effects depend on the context, timing, and actors involved.

A full overview of all the mechanisms contained in the articles can be found in kappa Figure 1 on the following page (p. 28). The innermost columns in the Figure 1 group the mechanisms; the second, middle column specifies the mechanism itself; and the outermost column offers the implications of the operation of the mechanism.

[3] As defined by Hedström and Swedberg (1996: 296), the belief-formation mechanism "states that the number of individuals who perform a certain act signal to others the likely value or necessity of the act, and this signal will influence other individuals' choice of action."

Figure 1: Overview of mechanisms for compliance and noncompliance in ceasefire monitoring



3.2. Compliance and noncompliance theory

I now turn to discuss the theoretical perspectives that particularly inform and practically underpin the research articles. I begin with a discussion on compliance and noncompliance, which are themes that run through most of the articles, either explicitly or implicitly.

The literature on compliance and noncompliance in international studies is extensive. Why states comply, or do not, with their obligations is a key question in international relations (Keohane, 1984; Dai, 2005; Morrow, 2007). Similarly, why conflict parties which ostensibly commit to ending violence do comply, or do not, with their obligations is a key question in conflict studies (Fearon, 1995; Mattes & Savun, 2009).

What do international studies scholars usually mean by compliance? A simple definition comes from Young (1979: 104): "Compliance can be said to occur when the actual behaviour of a given subject conforms to prescribed behaviour." What might constitute such "prescribed behaviour" can be derived from discussions about the law: compliance is conformity with (legal) rules (Kingsbury, 1998). Another common, influential, definition of compliance comes from Chayes et al. (1998: 39): compliance is when state behaviour "conforms to an explicit rule of a treaty." Chayes and Chayes argue (1993: 176) that when states "enter into an international agreement of this kind, they alter their behaviour, their relationships, and their expectations of one another over time in accordance with its terms." Thus, for Chayes and Chayes, compliance is the manifestation of adhering to one's commitments and taking the steps necessary to ensure adherence.

This positions much of the foundational literature on compliance among states to be largely understood in binary terms. A state either conforms and is thus compliant, or it is not. Compliance is either absent, or present. Meanwhile, literature from organizational behaviour and sociology takes a more nuanced view. Oliver (1991), for example, conceived of compliance as a more graduated concept, in which there could be "degrees" of compliance. Wilson (2002, 2015) discusses the process of interpersonal persuasion through a persuader's attempts to "compliance-gain" a target subject, which generally occurs along a spectrum. Such understandings filter into international studies, in which "compliance itself happens along a continuum" (Haase, 2019: 95), and in which compliance happens at different "rates" (Hurd, 1999). More recently, Ahonen et al. (2022) has described compliance as being "fragmented", which can be understood as meaning compliance can be both partial and also non-contiguous across subject areas. Increasingly,

understanding difficulties in measuring compliance raises questions about what indicators may "successfully represent compliance" (Swed, 2023: 1).

As I have noted, the question of why states comply with their commitments is a key area of study. A significant international relations literature addresses why compliance can be expected, beginning from realist perspectives discussing compliance as a result of either coercion or self-interest (Bull, 1977). States prefer to comply and have the power and capacity to do so (Börzel et al., 2010). In a self-interested perspective, states are concerned about costs and benefits (Young, 1979; Keohane, 1984). A constructivist understanding argues for compliance as arising from what is deemed appropriate, legitimate, as well as broader socialization, and social norms (Franck, 1990; Klotz, 1995; Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

Many scholars have sought to broaden such understandings. Simmons (2000) argued that states care about their reputations for compliance, especially in their respective regions. Hurd (1999) argued that the legitimacy of the rules explained compliance, beyond understandings of self-interest. Checkel (2001) argued for the co-presence of both rationalist and constructivist explanations for compliance behaviour, a perspective which also fits well in my study. Dai (2005) argued that domestic constituencies influenced a state's national compliance, shifting the level of analysis from the international to the local. In a structuralist approach, Carcelli (2023) has also pointed to the impact of a bureaucratic implementation structure, even among similarly well-functioning systems, on overall rates of actor compliance.

Similar rationalist understandings tend to permeate conflict studies: like rational states, conflict actors enter into agreements to signal their resolve and intent, judging the benefits to exceed the costs (Clayton et al., 2023b).

A more critical perspective from some scholars (Downs et al., 1996) argues that states generally enter into agreements with which they are already largely compliant, meaning that the shift in behaviour described by Chayes and Chayes may not occur, or be much less significant, than they theorized. Martin (2012) has critiqued many applications of compliance in international scholarship as being overly legalistic. From the business world, Donovan (2021: 3) also points to a more critical understanding. In charting the rise of "creative compliance": that is, "compliance with the letter of the law in defeat of its spirit," corporate actors seek to undermine the intention of regulations while nominally complying.

International institutions are often also theorized to be important determiners of compliance, at least for those who believe they promote cooperation. Institutionalists argue that institutions reduce uncertainty and improve information among institution members (Keohane, 1984; Abbott &

Snidal, 1998). McLaughlin Mitchell and Hensel (2007) argue that active institutions increase the prospects for agreement compliance. Making this information public is expected to improve compliance (Mitchell, 1994; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). However, realist skeptics of institutions (Mearsheimer, 1995) argue that there is little evidence of cooperation between states that would not have occurred in the absence of institutions, presumably with the implication that institutions have no effect on compliance.

Whether institutions matter or not in promoting compliance, what explains noncompliance? As I discuss in Article I, some scholars allow that the motives for noncompliance are not necessarily the converse of those for compliance (Hurd, 1999; Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002; Dai, 2005; von Stein, 2005).

A basic explanation for noncompliance is a lack of capacity (Weiss & Jacobsen, 1999; Overman et al., 2014) or inefficiency (Börzel et al., 2010). More complex explanations for noncompliance are outright defiance (van den Bossche, 1996; Terman, 2017; Closa & Hernández, 2025); constituting a form of bargaining resistance (Crasnic, 2017), being a pretence at compliance by deception (Bluth, 2004), or being the result of agreement ambiguity (Haas, 2000). Such motives may not be mutually exclusive; plural or concurrent motives can also be theorized to be present (Carmona et al., 2010). More recently, Sczepanski & Börzel (2022) have pointed out that preference, power and capacity-based arguments are usually set as competing explanations for noncompliance, but a more sophisticated explanation is that all three dimensions may be explanatorily relevant.

The magnitude of noncompliance also matters, if compliance is theorized as occurring along a spectrum. Noncompliance is either "procedural" or "substantive" (e.g., Nash et al., 2021). Noncompliance can be justified as "principled", when, for example, a party acts in response to a legal system that has become deficient or outdated (Haase, 2019), as "involuntary" (Checkel, 2001: 576–77) or "inadvertent" (Chayes et al., 1998: 40), when a party is, for example, inattentive to implementation procedures.

In international relations, it is increasingly understood that not all noncompliance is created equally. Simmons (2000) argued that certain states commit to treaties disingenuously, with no intention to ever comply. Fuhrmann and Berejikian (2012) attempt to "disaggregate" state noncompliance in the case of nuclear proliferation. Jay and Killingsworth (2024: 2) discuss "collateral noncompliance": the idea that "noncompliance with one obligation [results] as a product of compliance with another."

This varied understanding of noncompliance is much more extensively developed in the literature on the behaviour of individual social actors. Insights from criminology suggest that noncompliance is often opportunity based

(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984). Jackson et al. (2012) demonstrate that noncompliance is related to ideas of procedural fairness. Concerning environmental regulation, Yan et al. (2017) point out that individual motivations for compliance and noncompliance among farmers can be both symmetrical and asymmetrical. The implication of this work is that some motivations, like respecting social norms, might be more contextually determinative under some conditions, but not others.

As I have already observed in relation to the ceasefire literature, much of the conflict studies literature does not dwell on the nuances of noncompliance. The typical focus is on compliance. Åkebo (2013), for instance, recounts compliance with a ceasefire as in need of being "overseen", "supervised", or "enforced."

As has been asserted earlier in this dissertation, my position that ceasefire compliance and noncompliance are not symmetrical in form or in motivation. Compliance and noncompliance are not mirror concepts, because conflict actors have agency in enacting their various motivations with specific behaviours. As Étienne (2010: 144) observes, there is a "multiplicity of causes" for noncompliance, which differ from motivations for compliance. Consequently, the process for understanding the mechanisms and process by which compliance and noncompliance are achieved might be different. While the parties that commit to a ceasefire have agency, this agency is variable. Parties choose to determine the extent to which they enact compliance and noncompliance with their ceasefire commitments. Part of what shapes this agency are interactions with other conflict actors and in the case of my study, by their interactions with monitors.

Bargaining theory is also relevant, implicitly, to this position. In this understanding, effects on (non)compliance occur as a result of changing the bargaining structure in which violence is or can be pursued (Walter, 2009; Sticher & Vuković, 2021). Following Sticher (2020), ceasefires can be bargaining instruments in intrastate conflicts. In this understanding, ceasefires are not outcomes of a process but are processes themselves in which bargaining occurs. I extend this understanding to include the presence and operation of ceasefire monitoring as another setting in which bargaining can and does occur, through manifestations of violence. This is another form of actor agency. Bargaining is normatively neutral; however, it need not necessarily confined to the reduction of violence, nor must it always be strategic in a strict rationalist sense. Bargaining, therefore, may similarly differ in relation to enacting compliance, versus enacting noncompliance.

3.3. Surveillance theory

Surveillance theory particularly informs Article V. While this scholarship can be linked to ideas of compliance and noncompliance from international studies, there have been few efforts to date to do so. My application of surveillance theory departs from Gary Marx's (2012: xxv) idea of "strategic" surveillance, which he defines as "the conscious strategy, often in an adversarial and inquisitorial context to gather information", using tools of "new surveillance", technical and automated means to produce, extract, and organise information. Surveillance studies conceives of surveillance agents—those that conduct the surveillance, the watchers —and surveillance subjects, concepts which are directly analogous to the monitors and the monitored of my study.

Moreover, ceasefire monitoring neatly fits into Bennett's (2008: 11-12) four cell typology of surveillance practices, in the category of "oversight": organizations (i.e., ceasefire monitoring missions) watching other organizations or organized groups (conflict actors, whether government armed forces or rebel groups). Surveillance activities can be viewed as "a dynamic process", where both the surveilled and the surveillants interact (Marx, 2009: 295). This characterisation applies equally to the realm of monitoring. However, that ceasefire monitoring can be definitionally considered a form of surveillance regime and features analogous behaviour are not the most important reasons for employing a surveillance studies approach. Rather, my interest in surveillance studies is motivated by the field's concern with the dynamics by which influence over surveillance subjects is brought to bear (Lyon, 2001; Fernandez & Huey, 2009), and the understandings of resistance and opposition to surveillance that have been developed.

Foucault (1975) famously argued that supervisory power itself generates resistance; I parallel his point to say that new monitoring technology—a weaker form of supervisory power—can also generate new forms of resistance. As Wells (2015) point out, resistance to surveillance can be rational and self-interested. Consequently, there are analytical benefits to using insights and theory from surveillance studies in this field. The technological systems of remote sensing surveillance used by ceasefire monitors have their own capacity to produce and alter social relations, inherent to the technology itself (Monahan, 2006). Gary Marx (2009: 296) has argued that "new [surveillance] technologies [such as remote sensing] … become enmeshed in complex, pre-existing systems." Such an understanding fits well with the complexity and uncertainty of violent conflict, where various factors contribute to a conflict's trajectory. Moreover, critical scholars of surveillance usefully problematize the

idea that the negative effects of surveillance are merely side effects. Monahan (2006: 11), for instance, notes that “when technologies create more problems, sometimes disastrous ones, they are labelled as "side effects" or "unintended consequences" rather than addressed as problems inherent in the design of technologies themselves.” While I continue to use the term unintended consequences (Aoi, de Coning & Thakur, 2007), I take Monahan’s deeper point about the inherent tendencies of monitoring technology to produce noncompliant behaviour and develop my claims accordingly.

3.4. Practice theory

Practices are doings, sayings, and things. I adopt Schatzki’s (2012: 13) definition of practices as social phenomenona that embrace multiple people and are composed of organised activities. The study of practice is central to my dissertation as a whole, both theoretically and empirically, and is particularly emphasized in Articles II, III, IV and V. Since practices help produce social life, and, in an organizational context, people’s actions through practices are central to organizational outcomes (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011), “practices are the basis of the social world, and it is through practices that people think, believe, act, interact, and assess intelligibility” (Schatzki, 1996: 131–32). Therefore, practices are of fundamental importance to my approach.

Although some understandings of practices suggest that practices are an ensemble (e.g. Arts et al., 2014), I suggest that the ensemble can be compartmentalized for the purposes of understanding social action and underlying mechanisms. In other words, practices can be disaggregated and studied individually, while recognizing that ultimately, they may have interactive effects. I conceive of these practices as having both complementary and distinct characteristics that are possible to analyse individually. In particular, the practices I study are complementary in that they all relate to information collection and analysis; they are distinct in that their pathways to trigger and effect vary. The specific approaches to how practices affect or enact change is meaningful to understand.

I hold that practices are central to producing order. While practice theory emerges from a primarily constructivist interpretation of the social world and is clearly complementary to discourse theory which I discuss below, the links to a rationalist approach may be less evident. I suggest at least two links, however. Following Bruneau (2022), I observe that the concept of bounded rationality and practice theory share assumptions about how agents process information. In a bounded rationality understanding of social action, there are

"constraints on the information-processing capacities of actors" (Simon, 1982: 162). Practice theory, meanwhile, relies on agents being limited by their "background knowledge" (Adler & Pouliot, 2011; Pouliot, 2013) and the idea that "agents act on the basis of a stock of practical knowledge they have acquired over time" (Bruneau, 2022: 96). As Bruneau (2022) points out, the ideas of limits in both theorizations are not so different, despite their different origins in rationalism and constructivism, respectively.

The second link follows the arguments of Ermakoff (2010). He points out that while again, rationalist approaches and practice approaches are often juxtaposed as opposed, when one focuses on processes of political and historical change, the differences become less pronounced. Processes of change cannot be understood "without exploring how actors collectively reconfigure the logic of their practice" (Ermakoff, 2010: 529). Concurrently, rationalist approaches and tools allow for different moments of these processes to be assessed (Ermakoff, 2010).

3.5. Discourse theory

Discourse theory is a huge field, and I apply but a fraction of it to my study; it informs Article II, and the critical discourse analysis variant is most explicitly applied in Article III, where I take a practice lens to the use and understanding of discourse. While pinning down the somewhat fuzzy idea of discourse is tricky, I understand discourse as having three main dimensions: how language is used, how ideas are communicated, and how social interactions in language, verbal and oral, take place (van Dijk, 1997). I take the position that language is a form of social practice (Chilton, 2004). In particular, I am interested in the concept of discursive practices as theorized by scholars of critical discourse analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Chilton, 2004; Wodak, 2006) rather than in the Foucauldian sense (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014), which connects with my wider interest in practice elsewhere in the thesis. In critical discourse analysis, discursive practices concern the "production, distribution and consumption of texts" (Fairclough, 1992: 73). Not all texts contain practices: "depending on what happens in it [text], there is or there is not [a practice]" (Latour, 2005: 69). The language used in discourse both "produces and constrains meaning" (Burman, 1991: 327).

My task in applying the insights of critical discourse analysis is to analyse the political and social import of text. Here, I return to the argument that rationalist and constructivist approaches (with which discourse analysis is most commonly associated) can be complementary analytical tools (Fearon & Wendt, 2002). Studying discourse offers a connection to rationality: among

other things, discourse can be a means to achieve certain rational and instrumental outcomes (Tracy and Coupland, 1990; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Mohammed, 2013). Discourses can be "productive (or reproductive) of things defined by the discourse…" (Milliken, 1999: 229). Discourses can also serve as "disciplining techniques and practices" (Milliken, 1999: 229). It is in these techniques and practices that I concentrate; the idea that discourse can also be understood in terms of its "mechanics" (Livesey, 2024: 908).

To do this, but to distinguish from my use of the term mechanism elsewhere in the thesis, I conceptualise and develop the idea of the "discursive device" (Whittle et al., 2008; Mueller & Whittle, 2011), and how it might help with the analysis of ceasefire monitoring practice. Discursive devices are "a lexicon or register of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events" (Potter & Wetherell in Whittle et al., 2008: 102). Devices "focuses on the actions that people perform with discourse, such as accusing, blaming, praising, justifying, and so forth" (Whittle et al., 2008: 102). Devices are instrumental and are part of plans of discursive practice to achieve particular social or political outcomes (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). They are therefore used purposively, although not always with clear intentionality. Devices can be used in multiple contexts and introduced into new ones (Lury & Wakeford, 2012). While discursive devices could form part of a broader causal mechanism, I do not use the same conceptual apparatus here because I do not uncover the concatenation of the entire discursive process. I do not explain how monitors' discourse necessarily leads to causation, but rather to persuasion. In the case of this practice, the framing of devices is more suitable both for reasons of scale and because of the nature of the units of analysis in monitoring discourse. The device is a more finite and limited term, even if no exhaustive list of discursive devices may exist (Allard-Poesi & Laroche, 2018).

3.6. Theoretical positions: Choices and alternatives

The theoretical positions adopted in this dissertation—bounded rationalism, mechanism-based reasoning, and the integration of practice, discourse, and surveillance theory—help address the dual concerns of the dissertation: how ceasefire monitors influence compliance, and why monitoring may paradoxically provoke noncompliance. That is not to say that there are not theoretical alternatives. I briefly discuss some of these alternatives and explain why I chose not to pursue them in depth.

A leading alternative would have been to adopt a formal rationalist bargaining model (as in the dissertation on ceasefires of my co-author Sticher, 2020). This is the dominant paradigm in much of the ceasefire literature,

especially in work building on Fearon (1995) and Fortna (2004), where compliance emerges from reduced uncertainty and credible commitment signals. However, such models do not sufficiently account for the dynamism of imperfect information, how preferences of actors may vary over time and circumstance (Kydd, 2007), and "says nothing about what actors value and what behaviours they believe will produce maximum benefit" (Jervis, 1998: 975–76). Formal rationalist bargaining is ill-equipped to account for how conflict parties interpret and respond to specific monitoring practices. Instead, the bounded rationalist approach used in this study allows for greater flexibility: parties may still engage in strategic reasoning but within constraints of limited information, ambiguity, and organizational complexity.

A second alternative could have been to more heavily rely on constructivist theory and focus on how actors co-constitute meaning, identities, and norms (Hay, 2002; Marsh, 2009). While this perspective would be well suited to exploring ideational dimensions of conflict, it would not be well suited to suggesting causality nor to explaining variation in both practices and outcomes. Since this dissertation seeks to uncover mechanisms suggestive of causality and thus required a framework that could accommodate causal inference while still being sensitive to meaning. A partial constructivist approach is nonetheless preserved through the use of discourse theory and practice theory, allowing interpretive insights to complement rather than replace causal reasoning.

Institutionalist theories could also have been used more prominently, given that they provide a foundation (as with Fortna) in this study. An institutionalist perspective argues that institutions shape behaviour by imposing constraints, reducing uncertainty, or promoting norm internalization (Keohane, 1984; Fortna, 2004). While these institutionalist effects of monitoring are clearly relevant, institutionalism tends to treat monitoring as a static variable, either present or absent, rather than as a dynamic set of practices, which this dissertation aims to interrogate in depth.

Another plausible theoretical framework would have been incorporated more of a design-based logic, to evaluate monitoring in terms of technical criteria: mandate clarity, composition, resources, and training (e.g. Buchanan, Clayton & Ramsbotham, 2021; Verjee, 2022). While such assessments are important for operational effectiveness, they largely reduce monitoring interventions to issues of implementation failure. They cannot fully account for how well-designed monitoring practices may still provoke resistance or manipulation. The framework adopted here focuses instead on the relational and strategic effects of monitoring practices, particularly their unintended consequences.

A critical peacebuilding perspective would interrogate the power asymmetries inherent in third-party interventions (Lemay-Hébert, 2013; Jabri & Richmond, 2021). Such perspectives rightly challenge the implicit assumptions of impartiality and neutrality that underpin monitoring interventions and again are implicit in my critique of monitoring. However, foregrounding critical peacebuilding would likely privilege structural critique over processual explanation. While this thesis is alert to issues of power, surveillance, and resistance (especially in Articles I and V), its primary task is to explain power in action (through mechanisms) rather than offer a critique of power structures.

Lastly, principal-agent theory could have offered insights into the internal relationship between mandating institutions (e.g., the IGAD, the OSCE) and the monitors they deploy (Coletta, 2013). While useful for analysing organizational accountability and delegation problems, principal-agent theory focuses primarily on intra-organizational dynamics. It offers little insight into how monitors influence (or are resisted by) conflict parties. Since this dissertation is principally concerned with interaction between monitors and conflict parties—not internal institutional coherence—principal-agent theory was judged to be of relatively limited utility. That said, innovations in principal-agent theory have recently begun to consider how agent-principal relations affect external parties (Zardkoohi, Harrison & Josefy, 2015).

To conclude this chapter, my ultimate theoretical framework was chosen for its alignment with the empirical aims of the dissertation: to trace the mechanisms through which monitoring practices produce behavioural effects in complex, contested, and often contradictory conflict settings. The framework enables an attempt at causal theorization and perhaps explanation without sacrificing interpretive nuance. It further allows for both general theorizing and practice-sensitive analysis grounded in the messy realities of ceasefire (monitoring) implementation.

4

Research design, methods, and ethics

This chapter addresses my research design: how methods, analysis, and ethics are connected in the dissertation. Research design concerns not just the methods used to gather data, but also how that data is found and analysed. I accept that theory informs methods, and consequently the data collected, and vice versa. Much like my pluralistic theoretical framework, my research design and methods are also multi-dimensional – I am a "wanderer" travelling into "far away disciplines [to] bring back concepts, ideas or tools" that offer new insights (Mutlu & Salter, 2014: 353). I agree with Wilcox (2016: 707): "social and political life is messy and thus demands methodological pluralism." At the same time, even a methodologically pluralist approach requires conscious reflection on the methods chosen and the way in which they are used (Badache et al., 2023: 4; Salter et al., 2023).

Following Ragin (1994), I understand research design as a plan for collecting and analysing evidence that helps to answer the question posed. I approach my research through a primarily qualitative approach, in which multiple methods are employed. Methods are chosen given their suitability to respond to the specific research needs, rather than by association with a specific ontology (Kaushik & Walsh, 2019).

In this dissertation, I employ both abductive and inductive theoretical logics. An abductive approach helps develop a "double story: one part empirical observations of a social world, the other part a set of theoretical propositions" (Tavvory & Timmermans, 2014: 2). Abduction allows for "recursively moving back and forth between a set of observations and a theoretical generalization" (Tavvory & Timmermans, 2014: 4). Abductive inferences do not "produce truths as a matter of course" but allow for the development of theory that is "plausible" (Haig, 2005: 377).

An abductive perspective helps respond to both of the overarching research questions of this dissertation: how ceasefire monitors influence conflict party

behaviour and how monitoring practices incentivize ceasefire compliance and noncompliance. From an abductive perspective, my observations of ceasefire monitoring's modes of influence and effects of practice are necessarily incomplete. I reason that that despite the incompleteness of these observations, it is possible to offer a best possible explanation for why monitoring has noncompliance effects, particularly through disaggregating practice. While it may not be possible to generalize to all expressions of ceasefire monitoring on the basis of my study, I attempt to reach the standard of "methodological goodness" in this research design (Gerring, 2011). To that end an abductive approach is key to the practice-based elements of my dissertation, in explaining why certain practices produce the outcomes they do, even while accepting that there is variation in outcomes.

Induction by contrast, is about collecting evidence before theorizing from the data collected. Inductive approaches are particularly relevant in the archival and interview research methods, where data collection came first. Since I could make the inductive observation that ceasefire noncompliance occurs in many conflicts where ceasefire monitoring is present, I approached my research from the view that ceasefire monitoring's repeating patterns can be treated inductively. This approach is more useful in responding to dimensions of the first overarching question of this dissertation: how monitoring influence over conflict party behaviour comes about. In inductive theorization, the conclusions I draw are likely, but not certain. Still, "inductive arguments are knowledge expanding, so that their conclusions contain more information than the premises combined" (Whicker, 1986: 202).

I operationalized both abductive and inductive logics as complementary methods, particularly to the study of mechanisms. I adopt these logics as "restrictive accounts of method that can be used to meet specific research goals" (Haig, 2005: 371), rather than an account of an overall world view.

As stated in Chapter 3, I employ a mechanism-based approach for most of my research, which responds to both research questions about influence and practice. To my earlier theorization of mechanism-based explanations, for the purposes of research approach and design, I note that a mechanism-based explanation describes the causal process selectively, rather than attempting an exhaustive account (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). My approach in uncovering mechanisms, as I discuss in relation to theory building below, is to simplify and focus on the areas of most interest in explaining the focal phenomenon" that is observable, but not sufficiently explained in existing work (Jaakkola, 2020: 19). As noted earlier, the phenomenon—ceasefire noncompliance—is the equifinal outcome of various mechanisms. Conceptualization and

appropriate description of the mechanisms thus focused on causal processes, or mechanisms as explanation (Falleti & Lynch, 2008).

In the remainder of the chapter, I turn to the specific methodological considerations relevant to theory building and process tracing, practice theory, and discourse analysis, which correspond to both the overarching and specific research questions. I then explain my case and context selection, discuss my sources, and conclude the chapter by reflecting on the ethical challenges and matters of my positionality.

4.1. Methodology in theory building and process tracing

Since my dissertation is in part an attempt to build, but not necessarily test, theory, I employ a specific research design in furtherance of this task. Accordingly, my overall research approach in building theory is to confront the "domain theory" which Lukka and Vinnari (2014: 1309) define as bounded knowledge on "a substantive topic area situated in a field or domain" in which the area of study is characterized by certain constructs, theories, and assumptions. The general domain theory is that monitoring assist compliance, and that any ceasefire noncompliance is merely a function of conflict parties' intent and resolve to defect from an agreement. In Article I, I confront this dominant view, to respond to the specific research question of why ceasefire noncompliance by conflict parties might occur despite third-party monitoring.

Monitoring, as has been pointed out, is expected to improve compliance, rather than generate noncompliance. To address the limitations of the domain theory and explain the focal phenomenon of ceasefire noncompliance, my approach combines elements of theory synthesis and theory adaptation (MacInnis, 2011; Jaakkola, 2020).

With theory synthesis, I build new theory by attempting theoretical integration across multiple theories and literatures. With theory adaptation, I amend existing theory by using other theories. To borrow from Jaakola (2020: 23), what I am attempting is "some reconfiguration or shift of perspective or scope…to better align the concept or theory to its purpose or to reconcile certain inconsistencies."

I approach Articles IV and V by using the theory building variant of process tracing. As Beach & Pedersen (2016: 314) explain, "theory-building process-tracing is utilized primarily when we know that there might be a relationship between [causes] and [outcome], but we are in the dark regarding potential mechanisms linking the two." The same authors (2011: 6) restate theory

building process tracing as having the ambition "to build a theoretical explanation from the empirical evidence of a particular case." To be clear, the tracing in question in this methodological approach is the tracing of the mechanism, rather than the outcome, which is already established.

In Article IV, a theory-centric qualitative assessment using process tracing underlines the approach (Bennett & George, 1997; Bennett & Elman, 2006; Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Alongside my co-author for Article IV, Valerie Sticher, the article seeks to offer a theoretical explanation generated from the particular case of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine. We first build theory to show how remote sensing technology could affect ceasefire compliance. We then move to show that theoretical explanation is borne out in the evidence from Ukraine. Process tracing is relevant to explaining these of ceasefire monitoring's mechanisms as it can help provide an "examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest" (Bennett & Checkel, 2014: 6). Although the goal was to understand the mechanisms through which a cause brings about an effect (George & Bennett, 2005), we were cognizant of Mahoney's (2015) interpretation of process tracing, in which the process tracing is about developing explanations of individual historical examples, rather than about overt generalization. In this regard, remembering the narrative of explanation that underpins explanation remains vital (Crasnow, 2017).

A similar approach is used in Article V, although because the audience for the article is located in surveillance studies, I do not extensively develop process tracing explanations. Here, I seek to offer a theoretical explanation generated from the same case, the SMM in Ukraine. Again, I seek to infer how the outcome of interests are generated by earlier, intermediate steps in the purported causal processes.

4.2. Methodology in studying practice

In studying practice, I am principally concerned with the second overarching research question of how monitoring practices incentivize ceasefire compliance and noncompliance. Here, my methodological approach varies from the theoretically led (in Article II) to the more specific discursive interrogation of speech practices (in Article III) to the practice of technological monitoring (in Article IV). Rather than begin from an observable focal phenomenon, however, I instead rely on practice theory to address a gap in current theorizations of the information function of monitors. My approach to

method thus "translates between theorizing and the practice studied" (Bueger, 2022: 63). For instance, if monitors are to play a credible information provision role, then it is reasonable to conclude that their information practices—how they collect, synthesize, and disseminate their information—should matter in the manifestation of this function.

I consider both reporting, discursive statements, and remote sensing use by ceasefire monitors as forms of practice, a "temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings" (Schatzki, 1996: 89).

To study the various monitoring practices, I borrow from the framework of Pouliot (2013), who divides the methodology of practice theory in three. According to Pouliot (2013: 48), access to practice is the first step, followed by a reconstruction of the dispositional logic of practice, and then followed by a construction of the positional logic of practices. In studying practice, I moreover emulate Pouliot (2014: 238) in attempting a loose form of "practice tracing", which allows "for dialogue between [strict] process tracing and interpretivism" as an abductive methodology.

To access practices, I rely on formal interviews, and archival material, to overcome the difficulties of not being able to "see" practices directly. My background as a practitioner also helps me visualize practices that are "talked about" or "read" (Pouliot 2013: 49). The dispositional logic that follows is about understanding interviewees' assumptions and know-how, followed by the positional logic of understanding the intersubjective context of practices and their meanings.

4.3. Methodology in studying discourse

Since I conceive of discourse as a practice, too, the methodology of studying discourse is informed by both practice and discursive methods. Specifically, I approach Article III, which conceptualizes monitors' public statements as discourse, by applying tools from critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992; Taylor, 2013), and studies of typologies and inventories (Elman, 2005; Collier et al., 2008). This relates to the overarching research question on practice. I develop two corpora, totalling 99 press releases, formed the source material for this study. Each press release received several rounds of manual coding. In the first round of coding, the primary audience, or receiver, was determined. Was the press release primarily directed towards one or more conflict actors, or primarily directed towards a wider public audience? Or was the press release perhaps internally focused, and mainly concerned with the internal workings and politics of a mission? Accordingly, the press releases were grouped based

on their primary target audience. Press releases that were solely internally focused (e.g., announcing the appointment of a new head of mission or the visit of a political dignitary to the mission) or purely informational (e.g. announcing the venue of a press conference) were excluded from the analysis.

In the second round of coding, the press releases with the primary audience of conflict actors or of a wider public audience were assessed for the presence of the two main devices outlined in the introductory anecdote to this article: condemnation, either generically, or of one or more conflict parties and commendation of one or more conflict parties.

In the third round of coding, press releases without the obvious devices of condemnation and commendation, including those that were primarily internally focused, were carefully assessed to identify what other discursive devices might be present (if any). While a range of concepts from discourse theory would have been possible to apply at this stage, an inductive approach was pursued to avoid confirmation bias in categorization. This iterative coding process aimed to identify specific instances of discursive devices, and consequently, a press release might be assessed multiple times.

The outlining of the sorts of discursive devices that occur in the public speech of ceasefire monitors is a step toward articulating a classificatory inventory, which can be informed by wider concepts from the discourse analysis literature, such as mythopoesis (narratives that reward legitimate actions) (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 92), or legitimization (Reyes, 2011). Methodologically, an inventory shares some common features with a typology, for instance, of mutually exclusive categories (Collier et al., 2008). However, an inventory is more flexible: there is no requirement for a celled, cross-tabulation of two or more dimensions (Collier et al., 2008), nor a strict focus on compression to reduce the number of variables included in a typology (Elman, 2005).

4.4. Contexts and cases

In this thesis, I use the terms both contexts and cases. I distinguish between cases—understood as behavioural patterns of monitoring practices embedded within a given monitoring mission (e.g., the case of ceasefire noncompliance in Kosovo, the case of remote sensing in Ukraine)—and contexts, which are the broader political and institutional environments in which these practices unfold. In using the concept of contexts, I draw on the historical tradition of the term as referring to circumstantia (Spicq, 1944), or, more contemporarily, what Burke calls the “wider situation”, “the phenomena that…are just out of

focus" (Burke, 2022: 31). A more reductive term for what context in this sense encompasses is "background", albeit with a wider frame of reference (Gerring, 2017). In this study, context comprises the geographic and historical circumstances of particular countries with a history of conflict. My contexts are countries, which in another study might well function as cases, observations, or populations (Gerring, 2017: 33). Here, contexts are deliberately part of the research design (Hartley, 2004: 323–24), and from within these contexts, as I will explain below, I develop my cases.

This dissertation studies monitoring experiences from four different contexts: Kosovo, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine. To justify my selection of contexts, I point to the cultural, geographical, and historical variety of conflicts, the organizational variety of monitoring mechanisms and mission durations, from different time periods (George & Bennett, 2005; Beach & Pedersen, 2016; González-Ocantos, 2020). I had considered including other contexts, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Sudan, but a lack of primary material, whether from archives or from interviews, made further pursuit of these cases implausible, at least in the present study.

From these contexts, I then construct cases for the sake of marking out certain features, and in particular the various practices of reporting, discourse, or the use of remote sensing technology. This approach allowing other features to recede in the background while centering on the specific feature of interest (Lund, 2014).

Although I juxtapose country contexts across the various articles, this dissertation is not a formal comparative study in the variable-oriented tradition. Rather, the dissertation applies a comparative logic across contexts at the level of mechanisms and practices to both identify recurring patterns and context-specific divergences (Pozzoni & Kaidesoja, 2021). My approach can be characterised as case-based, process-tracing orientated comparison (Beach & Pedersen, 2013), which focuses on within-case analysis of mechanisms (Collier, 1993) and selective cross-contextual comparison. I do not suggest these are necessarily representative contexts or cases. Indeed, following Flyvbjerg (2006: 229), it may be the "atypical" cases which may "reveal more information…and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied."

Thus, in response to the famous question of what this dissertation is a case of in the general sense, my answer is multifaceted, or perhaps, more tangibly, multi-scalar. I variously conceive of this dissertation as featuring cases of ceasefire compliance and noncompliance; cases of practice; and cases with varying temporal dimensions.

Case(s) of ceasefire compliance and noncompliance

All four contexts help demonstrate cases of compliance and noncompliance. In Articles II and III I draw on a dissimilar case logic to demonstrate that monitoring-motivated noncompliance is not limited to a particular institutional, geographic, historical, or temporal context. In articles IV and V, I draw on a single case study logic to mark out particular features of compliance and noncompliance.

Case(s) of ceasefire monitoring practice

Reporting

To examine ceasefire monitoring reporting, I draw on cases from Kosovo and South Sudan, selected based on a least similar case selection logic (Koivu & Hinze, 2017). Again, these dissimilar cases are selected to illustrate that monitoring-motivated compliance and noncompliance occurs across contexts in the midst of similar practices.

I compiled a large database of reporting material from monitoring missions in both Kosovo and South Sudan and sought to identify examples from this material to illustrate the theorized mechanisms in both cases.

Discourse

To examine how ceasefire monitoring discourse is constructed, I collated two corpora of public statements by ceasefire monitoring missions, from Sri Lanka and Kosovo. My justification for choosing these two cases was again based on a less similar case selection logic.

Remote sensing

To theorize ceasefire compliance and noncompliance generated by the specific use of remote sensing technology in ceasefire monitoring, I use the case of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, which is the monitoring mission which had advanced furthest in adopting remote sensing technology. As the ceasefire monitoring mission with the greatest use of remote sensing technology, the case of the SMM allows for refinement of the underlying theoretical arguments by which compliance and noncompliance takes place.

Cases with varying temporal dimensions

My cases can also be marked out in terms of their temporal dimensions. Kosovo was a short running mission; South Sudan and Ukraine relatively long running; Sri Lanka somewhere in the middle. In commenting on temporality,

the cases can be used to illustrate comparisons over time (whether in discourse or in reporting) and how monitoring accordingly constructs a particular vision of the conflict / monitoring context.

4.5. Sources and data

This thesis draws on data from original interviews, archival research, and document analysis. In the following subsections I explain my approach to these sources.

Interviews

Two sets of interviews inform this dissertation; the interview guides can be found in Appendix 2. In 2018-2019, I conducted more than 90 interviews focused on the experience of ceasefire monitoring in South Sudan, with a range of past and present monitors, support staff, combatants, politicians, civil society representatives, international diplomats, peacekeepers, and analysts, while a senior researcher at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Of these, 46 respondents were directly engaged in one or more iterations of ceasefire monitoring in South Sudan, which evolved over time. Pursuant to the intellectual property provisions of the USIP and the public benefit objective, I am able to use insights from this interview set so long as it remains for academic research and there is no commercial benefit.

From Gothenburg, I conducted a further 50 interviews, primarily with current and former ceasefire monitors and support staff involved in ceasefire monitoring missions in Georgia, Kosovo, and Ukraine. Another 9 respondents were unable or declined to be interviewed in person but instead provided written comments or reflections in response to my prompts and questions.

12 of the first 13 of the Gothenburg interviews were conducted jointly with Valerie Sticher, my co-author on Article IV. One interview was conducted by Dr Sticher alone in German, given her shared linguistic competence with the interviewee. She briefed me on this interview later and also provided interview notes from that encounter. The remainder of interviews I conducted solo.

In all cases, interviews were open ended. Although my interview guides provided a general framing for the interaction, I sought to ask respondents about their experiences and expectations of monitoring and then go into more depth about specific monitoring or mission experiences. Follow-up questions would be adjusted according to the direction a conversation might take, and the role fulfilled. For example, an interview with a senior mission leader (like a head of mission) would typically focus on the challenges of leadership and

the institutional politics of a monitoring mission, while an interview with a UAV operator would focus more on the technical process of monitoring. Some interviews spontaneously disclosed instances of negligence, incompetence, misconduct, and corruption, which prompted further pursuit of those lines of discussion. My flexibility acknowledges that interviews are necessarily variable (Brounéus, 2011; Fujii, 2018).

Most interviews were conducted remotely. This is because respondents were scattered across the world, in more than 30 countries, without there being a concentration of respondents in any particular locale. Although there are logistical and practical limitations to online interviews, given the normalization of remote methods since the Covid-19 pandemic, most online interviews were productive and insightful, and at the end of the interviews, many respondents expressed a feeling of relief at having been able to share their experience with me.

I also travelled to Kosovo to determine the feasibility of conducting interviews with former local staff of the KVM and conducted a few interviews on that scoping trip. As many of the local staff employed by the KVM were university students or recent graduates in 1998-99, I reasoned that many of them might still be traceable. Indeed, some are still employed by the OSCE today. However, given the passage of time, it was not possible to locate many willing interview respondents in the time I had available.

My interviews were mostly of organizational elites. Still, I took Glas's (2021) point that elites are not a static category, that there is not a uniform interview strategy to pursue, and that conceptions of power and position are dynamic. Elites in my area of study have often held several positions of responsibility and may have been interviewed in the past. They may also have appeared in the media, published articles, or dabbled in academia themselves. These experiences tend to condition interviewees towards certain expectations of the interview experience, which tend to make the interviewer's task more challenging.

I had to keep in mind that interviews were an opportunity for participants to seek meaning-making for themselves, irrespective of the interviewer's aims (Hiller & DiLuzio, 2004). Interviews can be "replete with moments of unpredictability" (Kostovicova & Knott, 2022: 58), and although I would not characterize my interviews as being "replete" with unpredictability, the extent of certain disclosures, including that of monitoring misconduct and ineptitude, were unpredictable. And as Lillie & Ayling (2021: 891) pithily state, "in elite studies, participants [rather than researchers] are the powerful." I was also occasionally confronted with "reluctant respondents" who despite having

agreed to be interviewed, were unwilling to be forthcoming (Adler & Adler, 2002), or resisted my interviewing approach (Roulston, 2011).

Archival research

I conducted archival research at four locations: the OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague (DCiP), Czech Republic, in April and May 2023; the United Kingdom's National Archives at Kew, London in February, March and April 2024; the Templer Study Centre at the National Army Museum in London in March 2024; and remotely at the Swedish Government Office archives in July 2023 and again from May 2024 to February 2025. I had also contemplated conducting research at the United Nations archives in New York but had to abandon those plans due to an indefinite closure of the UN's archive building for renovations.

While I had initially hoped to gain access to the OSCE's files on the SMM, given the recency of that mission and the ongoing political context of the Russia-Ukraine war, access to these files is entirely closed, indefinitely. Instead, I was able to access the OSCE's restricted files on the KVM from 1998-1999, once I had agreed to the terms of access set out by the OSCE.

The most important of these terms are that the OSCE limits what a researcher may do with restricted documents. In the OSCE's requirements: "the Researcher may be provided with documents classified as 'restricted'. The Researcher acknowledges that such documents cannot be copied, reproduced or disseminated in any way. Direct quoting of any parts of restricted documents is strictly prohibited."

Instead, the OSCE advises "Researchers…use their own wording while describing the "restricted" materials they were given access to so as to reflect their own interpretation and understanding of the information they have retrieved from a 'restricted' document," while researchers can "paraphrase restricted information with one's own words" (OSCE, n.d.)

The OSCE reserves the right to refuse providing access to classified documents or documents which, in the OSCE's sole discretion, may jeopardize the rights or interest of the OSCE, its officials and its participating States.

I received access to 173 KVM files. Access to 3 further files was not granted, as the archivist deemed that material to be outside of the scope of my research. Although I would have preferred to see all the material for myself, I did not judge this omission to make a material difference. The documents I consulted were effectively mediated by the archival staff, confirming that archives are "a means through which archivists enable, but also constrain, the interpretation of the past" (Hedstrom, 2002: 22).

More importantly, as I learned from the reflections of a previous researcher who spent time in Prague in 2006 (Hawkes, 2018), the archival holdings may well have changed since then. The present archivist was not able to indicate whether the archival holdings had changed. This raises the challenge of both implicit and explicit silences in this research; what is not written in formal texts may also be important. As Verschueren (1979) points out, silence can be about concealment and avoidance, as much as about absence, themes taken up by Schröter (2013) in her discussion of "meaningful silence" depending on an intention to conceal.

For Orlandi (1994: 62, cited in von Münchow, 2018: 219), silence can be constitutive: "we say "x" in order not to say "y" …that is how we silence the meanings we want to avoid…silence thus draws up the boundaries of discursive formations…" Such silences are among the reasons for not depending solely on archival material to understand past cases.

I also confronted challenges at two of my other archival sites. At the Swedish Government Offices Archives, there is no comprehensive database of recent historical materials that can be searched by external actors; rather, the researcher formulates a request to the relevant department for what records they think might exist and might be held in the archives. The Government Offices archives of the Government of Sweden holds records from 1997 onwards, including the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016), where I anticipated the bulk of material relevant to my interests would have originated.

My first request to the Swedish Government Offices Archives, in 2023, concerned Kosovo. On 19 July 2023, I requested all documents held in Swedish government archives that would have originated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1998 and 1999, relating to the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), sometimes known as the OSCE KVM, as well as the immediate forerunners to the KVM, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) and the EU Attaché Group (EUAG). This request was referred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The results were timely, but disappointing. On 26 July 2023, the responsible official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that a mere 14 pages of material had been identified for disclosure; other material had been withheld pursuant to the Public Access and Secrecy Act. The 14 pages disclosed were largely anodyne documents, mostly concerning the provisions for Sweden's identifying and seconding of personnel to the KVM, and did not ultimately contribute to my understanding of the Kosovo experience.

Although Sweden indicates that all Ministry files should be accessible to the public, in line with constitutional requirements to freedom of information,

no material from Sweden's OSCE Delegation in Vienna was included, suggesting that the Government Offices's search of material was not comprehensive.

A second request to the Government Office Archives in May 2024 was ultimately more productive, although at the time of publishing this kappa, it remains a request only partially satisfied, and none of the documents disclosed pursuant to this request directly informed this study.

My time at the UK National Archives at Kew was rather more productive than my time engaging with the Swedish Government Offices, albeit also offering its own challenges. The UK had declassified voluminous materials, running into the thousands of pages, about cases I was interested in: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, as well as the subjects of peacekeeping and conflict interventions more generally. Redactions and restricted files on these subjects were, by comparison to the OSCE at least, relatively few in number. Advantageously, material was not strictly mediated through an archivist: if the file is at the National Archives and has been opened, any registered reader may request the file, copy it, and take notes as they see fit, subject to rules concerning document preservation.

However, the sheer volume of the material, most of which had not been digitized, presented its own challenges for collection and analysis. As the file headings in Appendix 4 indicate, archival file titles do not always provide very much to go on as to what archival files contain. Subsumed under the Kew archives file heading of "Kosovo", for instance, might be a mere 500 pages of material, from interoffice memos to briefing notes to ministers to correspondence to concerned members of the public, covering a set time period in the British government's handling of the matter. These records were messy and eluded neat categorizations and chronological tracing of events, even as the records were presented in chronological order. Unlike my archival experiences where material had been pre-selected by archivists or was clearly bounded (i.e. at the Templer Study Centre), at Kew I was not sure what I was looking for, nor what I would find (Wilkinson, 2015).

Document analysis

In addition to my interviews and archival research, I also conducted document analysis—a systematic approach to reviewing primary documents (Bowen, 2009; Kutsyuruba, 2023)—of relevant open-source material, including:

1. Published reports of ceasefire monitoring missions, including incident and thematic reports and monitoring mission meeting minutes;
2. Press releases and public communications issued by ceasefire monitoring missions, including the speeches of mission leaders;

3. Memoirs and personal reflections of former monitors or individuals directly involved in the monitoring process (particularly in relation to Kosovo); and
4. Media reports of ceasefire implementation and monitoring activities, from both international and local press.

Documents of these types were examined for their relevance to the monitoring missions of interest and for their potential to illuminate both factual and interpretive dimensions of ceasefire monitoring practices. I sought to access original versions of the documents through official repositories, online archives, and publicly available databases.

In my study, documents functioned as both sources and as texts (Karppinen & Moe, 2012). Document analysis was both a complementary method—supporting the verification and interpretation of interview and archival data—and a primary data source for Article III on monitors' discourse. In this first, triangulative role, by examining information obtained from documents, I could verify factual claims, identify inconsistencies, and address gaps in interviewees' memories, as well as go beyond mere questions of content to equally consider how documents reflect, produce, or obscure power, identities, and norms (Prior, 2011). For example, when an interviewee described a contentious moment during the implementation of a ceasefire, I cross-checked their account against the official report and contemporaneous press coverage. This process helped identify where personal narratives aligned with or diverged from official accounts and allowed for greater insight into understanding how events were variously framed depending on the source.

Second, the documents served as a primary data set for discourse analysis, which I discussed more fully in section 4.3 above.

4.6. Ethical considerations and challenges

Like much research involving human subjects, the ethical considerations of my research were not insignificant. In conducting conflict research, sensitivities about violence and sometimes difficult lived experiences always needed to be heeded. Although less acute, as I will discuss below, archival research is also not without ethical challenges. While most of my research focused on historical examples, many interlocutors remained concerned about their responses being kept in confidence, maintaining their professional reputations, and being portrayed accurately.

Interviews

My research involved two different sets of interviews. Interviews conducted in 2018-19 while I was a researcher at the United States Institute of Peace generated foundational theoretical insights for my present work. Ethical approval was granted in accordance with the institutional policies then in force applicable to a federally funded US research institute. Consent obtained at the time for those interviews foresaw the potential further application of gathered data. While I largely chose not to include direct citations from this body of work, in cases where I did explicitly quote a respondent, I confirmed that they were happy for me to continue to use that material and in some cases conducted refresher interviews.

Interviews conducted since becoming associated with the University of Gothenburg also sought consent, which was obtained orally, except for respondents based in Sweden subject to the jurisdiction of the Ethical Research Authority, who were provided with a written consent form. In general, my respondents preferred to consent verbally rather than in writing: many respondents continue to serve in international organizations and may put their careers at risk, or feel that the risk exists, if a paper trail was established noting their participation in a research activity for which they had not sought explicit permission. Some respondents declined to participate in a formal interview because of the confidentiality requirements imposed by their seconding authorities or host institutions but did instead agree to provide thoughts in writing.

For all interviews, I explained the purpose of the research, why I was interested in respondents' experiences, provisions for confidentiality and withdrawal, and how respondents may follow up with concerns or insights that may arise post-interview. I considered consent to be an ongoing process, rather than a one-time event, requiring continuous respect for the rights and autonomy of respondents.

Several interview respondents admitted to ethical lapses, in some cases of serious misconduct, or being aware of others' lapses. Disclosures of wrongdoing raised questions about whether criminal offences were committed, as well as questions about complicity and collusion. As Myrttinen (2020) points out, to establish trust and empathy with respondents, it may be necessary to position oneself as understanding of a respondent's behaviour, even if that behaviour is morally or ethically dubious. I did not consider anything that was reported to me to require disclosure to the authorities, because I generally lacked specific enough information to make a credible complaint. In some cases, respondents told me that they had reported it to the authorities, or that

they were considering further action. It is possible that my interview prompted further action on the part of some respondents.

Archives

Archival research is not without ethical concerns (Horn, 1989). As McKee & Porter (2012) point out, researchers have ethical responsibilities to those represented in the archives, and to their descendants. Although the archives with which I engaged are more institutional than personal, the insight remains relevant: the ethics of representation – even institutional representation – must still be considered. A person, or people, indeed even institutions, are more than texts and documents.

I had to consider questions about the ethical interpretation of archival documents, especially when dealing with government archives. As Subotic (2021: 347) observes, the archival researcher may encounter documents "that are often completely decontextualized from the social or biographical context in which they were once embedded." This may lead to a "tendentious interpretation of past documents," (Subotic 2021: 342). Subotic (2021: 352) advises that "in interpreting archival material, we should make extra effort to contextualize the documents and investigate and report on the historical and political context in which this document was created, who created it, and for what purpose."

Given my subject matter, ideas about the purpose of why a document might have been created were less elusive, but I did have to address the difficulties of decontextualization. This was particularly a challenge with restricted documents, which I experienced in relation to the KVM and the DCiP, and to a more limited extent with the Swedish archives. In exchange for granting me access to the DCiP's material, I committed to not use direct extracts from KVM source materials, nor produce copies of records. Although I sought to establish authorial responsibility, to understand who within the institution created the documents of study, this was not always possible.

4.7. Reflections on positionality

As a former (and sometimes present) practitioner, my experiences inescapably inform my positionality and established thinking on the phenomena I have sought to study. As I noted in the introduction, my own experience in the field provided me with a strong foundation for pursuing the study. However, while my positionality and network opens doors, it also places me in "an ambiguous space between outsider and insider researcher" (Lillie & Ayling, 2021: 891)

and required me to continuously interrogate my own views and preconceptions on certain conceptual and methodological matters.

Deep embeddedness comes with drawbacks, too. There were practitioners who are critical of my (critical) work who were hesitant or did not wish to engage with me, in for example, interviews. While some of the methodological literature (e.g. Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 2014; Herr & Anderson, 2005; Lombard, 2022) discusses the multi-dimensionality of positionality in relation to various research participants, as well as the contextual shifting of the researcher's positionality, this is far from something the researcher alone controls and is in practice easier said than done. There are limits as to control how I was seen and perceived by my research subjects in interview contexts.

Albeit important, my professional past is only one dimension of my positionality, of course. There are the usual challenges of being a scholar based at an institution in the Global North who is conducting research on cases that are sometimes in the Global South (e.g. South Sudan), or else in contexts of the world in which I am less familiar (e.g. Kosovo). That said, as my topic is framed, I think the risks of being extractive and causing harm are fairly limited.

There are other potential difficulties, however. Although questions of race and racism are rarely mentioned in ceasefire monitoring, they may provide a subtext to some interventions, which may feature intervenors from the Global North working in the Global South. By family background and personal identity, I have a foot in both worlds, while being perceived by some interlocutors as being a representative or member of one, and by others as a representative or member of the other. The absence of discussion of structural racism from the field is of course particularly pertinent to studies of practice and is also affected by my own ethnic and national personalit(ies).

One further theme I encountered was the question of how gender is represented and discussed, especially in interviews where gender sensitive matters arose. As someone who identifies as male, my preconceptions of gender might limit my receptiveness to less orthodox interpretations, which again are highly salient to studies of power and intervention.

5
Conclusion

There are three components to this concluding chapter. First, I summarize the main findings and contributions of the five individual research articles. Second, I provide a synthesis of the overarching findings of the dissertation as a whole and position my work in relation to the wider literature. Finally, I identify some directions for further research.

5.1. Main findings and contributions: Articles

Article I responds to the specific research question: Why might ceasefire noncompliance by conflict parties occur in the presence of, or be motivated by third-party monitoring?

This article provides a key theoretical contribution by theorizing monitoring-motivated ceasefire noncompliance, directly relating to the main overarching research question on monitors' influence of conflict parties' behaviour. I theorize four mechanisms by which these forms of noncompliance may occur. First, monitoring provides conflict parties with new signalling options in which violence has a communicative function. Second, conflict parties' noncompliance is especially influential in shaping how monitors operate. Third, conflict parties' noncompliance is a strategy to test monitors' detection capacities. Fourth, conflict parties' noncompliance is a way for conflict parties to check for audience costs.

By conceiving of noncompliance as an inherent feature of third-party ceasefire monitoring, I draw attention to the very real consequences for monitoring, including in contemporary conflicts today. In expecting noncompliance and recognizing the mechanisms by which it may be generated, the possibility for greater attention to unanticipated or underrecognized implications of monitoring interventions could help the appreciation of the risks of monitoring.

Article II responds to the research question: How does ceasefire monitors' reporting influence conflict parties?

This article discusses the mechanisms that underpin the reporting of ceasefire monitors' reporting, one of monitors' central practices, and thus a subset of the second overarching research question, while also relating to the first overarching question on influence. The article finds that reporting affects conflict parties by creating explicit opportunities for their compliance and noncompliance and revealing the limits of monitoring's reach.

This article makes three principal contributions. First, it builds and develop theory for how reporting contributes to conflict opponent compliance and noncompliance with ceasefire commitments. Second, the article foregrounds everyday monitoring practice in the study of monitoring, which has received little attention in the emerging literature on ceasefires and ceasefire monitoring. Lastly, the article contributes to the ongoing debate about knowledge production in peace and conflict studies, and particularly to the epistemic and representational practices of conflict knowledge, by extending study of an everyday object, the report, in conflict interventions (Bliesemann De Guevara & Kostić, 2017).

Article III responds to the research question: How does ceasefire monitors' public speech influence conflict parties? This article again links to both overarching research questions. This article focuses on the press releases of two monitoring missions to widen the scope of discursive understandings beyond the well-known poles of condemnation and commendation. The article advances a methodology to develop the concept of discursive devices. The article finds that beyond condemnation, monitors use a variety of discursive devices in their public speech to attempt to persuade conflict parties. The article contributes to understandings of (attempted) influence by inventorying the varied discursive devices monitors use in their public speech.

Article IV responds to the research question: How does the use by monitors of remote sensing technologies aim to produce conflict party compliance?

Again linking to both overarching research questions, the article contributes to theory by integrating scholarship on the use of remote sensing in ceasefire monitoring with theories on the causal processes underlying ceasefire monitoring, to offer an analytical framework to assess the

contribution of remote sensing to ceasefire compliance. Remote sensing alters conflict parties' incentives, allows for the signalling of intent by accepting and not interfering with remote sensing systems, and by mitigating the risk of involuntary conflict escalation through information provision. It demonstrates the empirical application of this framework by examining the most technologically advanced ceasefire monitoring mission yet deployed, the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. Focusing on the period prior to the Russian invasion of 2022, the article finds that while the mission's observational power was expanded, remote sensing technologies ultimately had little effect on modifying conflict party behaviour or compliance. While in this case remote sensing technology minimally increased compliance, the study contributes to debates on the use of technology as a conflict management tool and provides an assessment framework for scholars and for policymakers considering adopting technology in other monitoring contexts.

Article V responds to the research question: Why does the use by monitors of remote sensing technologies produce ceasefire noncompliance?

Finally, Article V draws on insights from surveillance studies, and in particular from the logics of resistance to surveillance, to explain that remote sensing technology provides conflict parties with new opportunities for resistance to monitoring. It contributes to knowledge by identifying the mechanisms by which this occurs, responding to both overarching research question on monitors' influence and practices. In the article, I show that, first, the use of RST creates a new class of low-cost ceasefire violations. Second, the presence of third-party RST incentivizes conflict parties to test the sophistication of monitors' surveillance. Third, the use of RST by monitors can devalue classical, low-tech monitoring methods. Fourth, the use of RST may inadvertently improve conflict parties' military abilities. In a mirror of Article IV, Article V returns to the case of the SMM to demonstrate the presence of these mechanisms.

5.2. Positioning in the literature and overall synthesis of findings and contributions

This dissertation contributes to the study of ceasefire monitoring by adopting a practice-based, mechanism-focused approach to both complement and critique existing scholarship. While foundational work (Fortna, 2004) has demonstrated that ceasefire agreements and their institutional provisions, such

as monitoring, can improve the durability of a ceasefire, this thesis asks how such effects are generated in practice. In this sense, the dissertation is not a rejection of the argument in the literature (i.e. Fortna, 2004; Clayton & Sticher, 2021) that monitoring helps ceasefire durability. Instead, I position myself with a more nuanced extension of the claim, while also pointing out the counterproductive possibilities monitoring may generate. Where Fortna largely treats monitoring as a discrete institutional feature—either present or not—this study opens the black box of monitoring to examine its various dimensions. By doing so, it shows that the presence of monitoring is not sufficient: the practices of monitoring, and how these are received and responded to by conflict parties, are what ultimately shape outcomes.

The dissertation advances the literature on durability by theorizing the mechanisms through which monitoring practices influence conflict party behaviour. Durability of a ceasefire is of course contingent on the future actions of conflict parties, and their willingness to exercise restraint. Rather than assuming a linear relationship between monitoring and conflict party restraint, my findings are that compliance is produced through a range of contingent mechanisms (Braumoeller, 2006; Pozzoni & Kaidesoja, 2021; Bruneau, 2022). By contrasting the effects of reporting and remote sensing across different missions, the research demonstrates that ceasefire durability in monitored contexts cannot be explained only by monitoring's institutional design or by the presence of third-party observation itself (Fortna, 2004; Park, 2023). Instead, ceasefire durability is shaped by the dynamic interplay of how monitoring is performed and how conflict parties adapt to monitoring over time. These insights are especially relevant for understanding the limits of monitoring in low-cooperation environments, where institutional tools exist but are selectively engaged or strategically resisted.

In terms of ceasefire design, a synthesis of findings points to the need for greater attention to how monitoring's design provisions interact with monitoring's everyday, operational practices. While it has been long established that certain design features such as vague mandates can create room for conflicting interpretations (Palik, 2021; Verjee, 2022), thereby undermining compliance incentives, this thesis hints at the possibility of interaction effects between monitoring practices and monitoring mission design. Conversely, overly rigid or technologically aggressive monitoring designs (e.g., heavy reliance on intrusive remote surveillance) may provoke new violations by incentivizing conflict party resistance or altering the balance of power between conflict parties. Thus, effective ceasefire design requires not only tailoring to the circumstances of the conflict case but also sensitivity to

the performative and strategic effects of different monitoring modes in that conflict.

The dissertation also speaks to broader debates in strategic bargaining theory (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 2009; Sticher & Vuković, 2021; Sticher, 2020). In illustrating that compliance and noncompliance are not merely products of incentive structures or information asymmetries (Wiehler, 2021), I show that compliance and noncompliance are also shaped by how actors interpret, perform, and contest monitoring. Conflict parties may use and instrumentalize monitoring as a tool to influence how third parties perceive and report the conflict and the actions of the parties within it.

This dissertation also offers a challenge to the wider literature on peacekeeping, particularly by foregrounding the practices through which third parties exert influence and encounter resistance. As with the ceasefire literature, much of the peacekeeping literature has focused on the conditions under which third parties can reduce violence, monitor compliance, or support conflict resolution (e.g., Fortna, 2008; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013). However, such studies often treat peacekeeping as a form of presence or capacity, with analogous limitations to such studies of ceasefire monitoring. Increasingly, scholars study the specific practices through which peacekeepers operate, interpret their mandates, and interact with local actors (e.g. Willmot & Sheeran, 2013; Rosas Duarte & Souza, 2024; Kotajoki, 2025), many studies are still limited to examples of single peacekeeping missions and/or do not necessarily consider how peacekeeping *practices* produce actor noncompliance. This thesis examines ceasefire monitoring not only as an institutional function, but as a contested set of practices.

There are parallels in my work to recent critiques in peacekeeping studies that call for greater attention to the everyday politics of intervention (e.g. Autesserre, 2014), to the strategic interaction between peacekeepers and local actors (e.g. Howard, 2019), and to the logics of surveillance and resistance in international interventions (Karlsrud & Rosen, 2013; Boyle, 2020). By showing how monitors are themselves subject to contestation, instrumentalization, and operational adaptation, the dissertation challenges static views of third-party neutrality and effectiveness. The implication of my study for peacekeepers is that, like monitors, peacekeepers influence conflict dynamics not just through deterrence or reporting, as they are often mandated to do, but through repeated and dynamic engagements of practice that are likely to have a variety of outcomes. These practices and outcomes in turn likely shape and reshape intervention practices and the actions of social (conflict) parties.

To substantively conclude a discussion of the findings of my thesis, and what the articles offer to the dissertation as a whole, I offer a synthesis of five overarching findings first foreshadowed in the introduction. These five findings are that:

1. Ceasefire monitoring is not monolithic; its effects are contingent and political, not technocratic;
2. Differing ceasefire monitoring practices likely combine to create interaction effects;
3. The consequences of ceasefire monitoring are co-produced: conflict parties have agency;
4. Monitoring interventions lead to monitoring's iterative adaptation;
5. There is value in developing a practice-based framework for assessing ceasefire monitoring.

Ceasefire monitoring is not monolithic, with effects that are contingent and political, not technocratic

A key insight from this study is that ceasefire monitoring may be better understood as comprising varied layers of practices set in different contexts of conflict, rather than as a template-set monolithic intervention activity. For instance, Article II suggests reporting is a narrative-building practice with both constraining and enabling effects. Articles IV and V show that remote sensing reshapes the monitoring environment by introducing new technical and strategic considerations for conflict actors despite being generally framed as a positive or at worst neutral observational enhancement. Together, these practices show ceasefire monitoring is multi-faceted. This means that ceasefire monitoring cannot be assessed solely on whether it "works" but is better evaluated in terms of the practices which are operationalized and how these are enacted and performed.

In synthesizing my findings, we might understand ceasefire monitoring as an intervention that is both relational and contested. Monitoring practices construct meaning, generate narratives, alter possibilities, and provoke resistance. Ceasefire monitoring is a type of intervention where conflict may only be paused, ready to continue—in bureaucratic, discursive, or resistance-inflected form, as well as in more recognizable overt violence. From this study, I do not claim that I can make generalizable claims on the effects of monitoring on ceasefire durability overall. Indeed, I have no wish to refute the general correlations that have been established (Fortna, 2004; Clayton & Sticher, 2021). Rather, I wish to suggest that beyond coding whether monitoring is present and is perceived as credible, a deeper examination of whether

monitoring "works" requires much greater scrutiny of its practices and how these are received and responded to as contingent political acts.

In reconceiving of how ceasefire monitoring is understood, as a complex set of interactions between monitors' dynamic practices and relationships with conflict actors, we can better understand from the articles that ceasefire monitoring operates through multiple means and a variety of mechanisms, each of which allows for different possibilities for influence, resistance, and/or conflict transformation. For instance, Article IV shows that even highly sophisticated monitoring tools may have limited effect if third-party actors are unwilling or unable to act on violations. Similarly, Articles II and III show that reporting and public discussion of noncompliance may increase transparency but still be ignored, distorted, or weaponized in polarized political environments. The combined findings reject the notion that more monitoring—even better monitoring—necessarily leads to better compliance. Instead, my study suggests that monitoring can also lead to noncompliance, even when paired with credible enforcement structures, supported by legitimate actors, and when conflict parties generally perceive compliance to be in their strategic interest or where it may be possible for third parties to shift the perception of conflict parties to this position.

Differing ceasefire monitoring practices likely combine to create interaction effects

When different monitoring practices are performed concurrently, interaction effects may emerge. The articles imply that these effects could be complementary in producing compliance but may also have other negative consequences for conflict trajectories (Granovetter, 1985; George & Bennett, 2005; Johnson et al., 2009; Maxwell, 2013). For instance, remote sensing can augment traditional monitoring by corroborating observations and deterring contestation, lending additional weight to monitors' claims. On the other hand, the use of RST may undercut the perceived value of classical, human-centred monitoring by suggesting that imaged data is more credible than witnessed experience. This tension is particularly evident in Article V, where monitors' reliance on technology reshapes the monitoring relationship, potentially alienating parties who feel surveilled rather than engaged. Moreover, drawing on the silences and omissions in reporting discussed in Article II, if eyewitness reporting and RST are mismatched—for instance, when reports omit or interpret surveillance data in ways not accepted by conflict parties—distrust may deepen. These findings suggest that the layering of monitoring practices is not inherently beneficial; the effect of one practice may interact negatively on another, at least from the perspective of some of the monitored.

The consequences of ceasefire monitoring are co-produced: conflict parties have agency

Collectively, my study shows that conflict parties are not passive objects of monitoring but active agents who co-produce its consequences. Across the articles, conflict parties are shown to contest, reframe, and strategically respond to monitoring efforts. In Article I, a range of means by which ceasefire monitoring operationalizes noncompliance are set out. In Article II, conflict parties may leverage reporting gaps or silences to justify their own actions or delegitimize the opposing side. In Article V, conflict parties may interfere with, evade, or even learn from RST, turning monitors' tools into resources for their own advantage. The responses of conflict parties are not incidental and are shaped by questions of leverage, legitimacy, and the tactical and strategic value of being seen to comply, or not, by monitors. The implication is that monitoring outcomes do not only flow directly from what monitors do; they emerge from relational processes in which conflict actors assess, resist, appropriate, or adapt to monitoring practices in context-specific ways.

Monitoring interventions lead to monitoring's iterative adaptation

A synthesis of my findings further suggests that ceasefire monitoring likely leads to iterative adaptation (Andrews et al., 2013). Monitors do not only operate by rote; in time, monitors adjust their practices based on how conflict parties act, as in co-production, but also based on their own learnings from mission work and internal and external institutional considerations. For instance, as discussed in Article II, monitors may alter reporting practices when facing criticism from conflict parties or physical access restrictions, and in Article III, the variation of public discursive instruments also relates to experiential feedback from conflict parties and perhaps from mandating authorities and the wider public. In Article V, the introduction of RST changes not only what monitors can observe but also how they interpret and act on observations. Ceasefire monitoring seems to be reflexive, even if it is not so acknowledged. Rather than seeing monitoring as a means for the linear transmission of information or deterrence, it could be recognized as a dynamic and iterative, which may be why seemingly similar monitoring mechanisms can produce quite different outcomes across contexts or over time.

Toward a practice-based framework for evaluating ceasefire monitoring

Lastly, the combined findings point to the value of a practice-based approach for assessing and interpreting ceasefire monitoring. By integrating the study of these different practices, a more nuanced understanding of ceasefire monitoring emerges. Different practices shape different forms of action. Reporting and public speech practices shape discursive as well as conflict opportunities: these affect how parties speak about compliance, how they justify violations, and how they narrate their own roles in the conflict or at least widen their options among all of these choices. Surveillance practices, on the other hand, have a first order effect on the tactical and operational level: they influence when, where, and how actors choose to move, act, or resist. Different practices seem to generate different types of information asymmetries and thus may invite different types of contestations. As I point out in Article II, reporting can be challenged on the basis of what is said; in Article V, surveillance is challenged by what is done to it, such as resistance, destruction or manipulation (Marx, 2009).

Conventional, quantitative metrics such as the number of violations detected, reports published, or surveillance footage obtained, fail to illuminate the relational and political dimensions of monitoring. Instead, ceasefire monitoring is better assessed by its practices, how it is perceived by conflict parties, how it interacts and affects power dynamics, and how it evolves over a conflict's lifecycle. This interpretive and relational approach moves beyond technocratic assessments of effectiveness and toward a more grounded, context-sensitive understanding of how monitoring shapes, and is shaped by, the conflicts it seeks to contain.

To recap, therefore, this thesis provides an account of the processual mechanisms by which ceasefire monitors' influence, or attempt to influence, conflict party behaviour; explains why even credible ceasefire monitoring efforts sometimes generate ceasefire noncompliance and reveals that the mechanisms that lead to compliance are not necessarily the mirror of those to lead to noncompliance. My study adopted an approach of disaggregating the various practices and processes of monitoring. I was guided by an overall theoretical framework based on bounded, soft rationality and mechanism-based explanations to develop my key theoretical and empirical claims (Simon, 1982; Pozzoni & Kaidesoja, 2021; Bruneau, 2022). I focused on three common practices of ceasefire monitors: reporting, public speech, and remote sensing. In relation to each practice, I provide an account of the processual mechanisms that underpin the practice, in the aim of answering how monitors, and the specific practices they undertake, influence conflict parties. In considering the

potential effects of these mechanisms and finding evidence for the operation of these mechanisms, I explain why ceasefire noncompliance by conflict parties can be generated even by credible monitoring, as well as the more expected compliance.

Compliance is often encouraged through mechanisms that increase costs for violations, reduce uncertainty between parties, and enhance mutual trust. Noncompliance can arise through mechanisms of resistance, subversion, and manipulation. Parties may perceive that monitoring can be turned to their own advantage. The articles collectively caution against the assumption that improving monitoring in a technocratic sense will necessarily lead to more restraint or better adherence to agreements. Instead, monitoring's effects are contingent: shaped by political intent, the credibility of consequences, and the discursive and material affordances that different monitoring practices enable.

5.3. Directions for future research

To conclude this dissertation, I suggest two directions for future research, building on my overall approach and findings. The first suggestion pertains directly to the subject of the dissertation: ceasefire monitoring; the second has wider application to international studies beyond the field of conflict resolution.

First, as I suggest in Article I, conceiving of noncompliance as an inherent feature of third-party ceasefire monitoring establishes a new research agenda, in which establishing the prevalence and magnitude of monitoring-motivated or monitoring-derived noncompliance is one starting point. To help test for the presence and operation of the mechanisms of monitoring-motivated noncompliance across a variety of historical and contemporary cases, could allow for new explanations for ceasefire failure and conflict recurrence. In expecting noncompliance and being aware of the mechanisms by which it may be generated, I raise a concern that is not merely academic. There are real world implications for policy makers, architects of future monitoring missions, and monitors themselves, particularly for those concerned to do no harm.

My theoretical and empirical findings also draw attention to studying the informational effects of third parties in conflict settings, both in disaggregated and intersecting forms. That not all information is created equally nor valued equally is commonly understood; that monitoring's different informational activities have different effects on compliance perhaps less so. This also merits further study.

In quantitative approaches to conflict studies, conceiving of noncompliance as an intervening variable, rather than as only an output, could

nuance thinking beyond the general assumption that the presence of monitoring is always a constraint on future violence. As I argue in Article I, greater attention to these unanticipated or underrecognized implications of monitoring interventions could help advance more fine-grained thinking about the causes and consequences of conflict.

Second, for international studies more generally, my research speaks to the need for the better synthesis and integration of multiple theoretical and methodological perspectives. While not every study requires or would benefit from such pluralism in its approach (Aradau & Huysmans, 2014; Wilcox, 2016), an overly narrow focus might obscure, rather than illuminate. For instance, methodologically, in locating significance in the public reporting and speech of monitors, for instance, I offer an approach for the study of other institutions, well beyond conflict studies, that might bring new insights. With particular regard to theory, further research on the multiple manifestations and mechanisms of noncompliance might be productive for researchers that seek to understand a whole host of pressing questions in international affairs. Amid the continued erosion, if not yet collapse, of the international rules-based order, the need to understand noncompliance and how even well intended intervention may, in fact, enable it remains urgent.

Svensk sammanfattning

Avhandlingen syftar till att fördjupa förståelsen för hur övervakning av vapenvila genomförs i praktiken. Denna avhandling undersöker hur tredje parts övervakning av vapenvila påverkar konfliktparters beteende, särskilt när det gäller efterlevnad och brott mot avtal om vapenvila (eller vapenvileavtal). Trots att internationell övervakning ofta betraktas som ett positivt inslag i fredsprocesser – något som förväntas främja efterlevnad och avskräcka från våld – visar denna studie att övervakning också kan ge upphov till oavsiktliga och ibland kontraproduktiva effekter. Avhandlingen argumenterar för att övervakningens konkreta praktik – genom rapportering, publika uttalanden och användning av teknologi – kan skapa incitament för både efterlevnad och icke-efterlevnad.

Avhandlingen bygger på ett kvalitativt, abduktivt, induktivt och mekanismbaserat tillvägagångssätt. Datainsamlingen omfattar över 100 intervjuer med tidigare övervakare, omfattande arkivmaterial från fyra länder (Kosovo, Sydsudan, Sri Lanka och Ukraina) samt analyser av rapporter och publika uttalanden från övervakningsmissioner. Dessa fall har valts för att erbjuda variation i fråga om politisk kontext, teknikanvändning, mandat och konfliktintensitet. Fallstudierna används inte för att jämföra utfall på ett variabelbaserat sätt, utan för att spåra mekanismer – återkommande kausala processer – inom och mellan kontexter. På så vis möjliggörs både kontextkänslig förståelse och teoretisk generalisering. Genom att fokusera på praktikerna i sig snarare än enbart deras design eller formella mandat, ger studien nya insikter om hur övervakning fungerar i praktiken och under vilka omständigheter den påverkar konfliktparter.

Den teoretiska ramen är eklektisk men förankrad i en rationell förståelse av aktörer, kombinerad med teorier om praktiker, diskurs och övervakning. Centralt i analysen är mekanismer som länkar övervakningspraktiker till konfliktparters beteende. Studien visar att samma övervakningspraktik kan leda till olika resultat beroende på sammanhang, aktörernas strategier, och övervakarnas agerande.

Avhandlingens fem artiklar behandlar olika aspekter av detta tema och bygger tillsammans en kumulativ förklaring och sammanhängande

förklaringsmodell till hur övervakning fungerar – och ibland inte fungerar – i konfliktmiljöer.

Följande forskningsfrågor vägleder avhandlingen:

1. Vilka är och hur påverkar de kausala mekanismerna bakom övervakning av vapenvila parternas beteende i konflikten?
2. Under vilka omständigheter leder specifika övervakningspraktiker till efterlevnad eller överträdelse av vapenvila?

För att besvara dessa frågor har ett kvalitativt, abduktivt och mekanismbaserat angreppssätt använts. Det innebär att studien rör sig iterativt mellan empiri och teori i syfte att identifiera återkommande kausala processer (mekanismer) som kan förklara sambandet mellan övervakningspraktiker och beteendemässiga utfall. Mekanismerna förstås inte som allmängiltiga lagar, utan kontextberoende processer som återkommer under vissa omständigheter och i specifika miljöer.

Forskarens dubbla position – som tidigare praktiker inom fredsinsatser och som akademiker – har inneburit både möjligheter och begränsningar. ”Insiderskapet” har möjliggjort fördjupad tillgång till data och förståelse för praktikerna i fält, medan ”outsiderskapet” har bidragit till nödvändig analytisk distans. Denna position har hanterats genom transparent redovisning av metodval, återkoppling med kollegor och noggrann dokumentation i forskningsprocessen.

Genom att kombinera teoriutveckling med praktiknära empiri bidrar avhandlingen med nya insikter om hur internationell övervakning fungerar bortom policyformuleringar och mandattexter. I stället för att fråga om övervakning fungerar, ställer avhandlingen frågan hur och när den fungerar – och varför den ibland inte gör det.

Artikel I: Övervakning som drivkraft för icke-efterlevnad

Den första artikeln presenterar en teoretisk modell för hur tredje parts övervakning av vapenvila inte bara kan främja efterlevnad, utan även bidra till nya former av våld och icke-efterlevnad. Detta utmanar den dominerande bilden av övervakning som ett fredsfrämjande verktyg. Artikeln identifierar fyra mekanismer genom vilka icke-efterlevnad kan uppstå under övervakning (i övervakande kontexter):

1. Konfliktparter använder våld som ett medel för att signalera till övervakare.
2. Våld används för att försöka påverka övervakarnas beteende och rapportering.

3. Övervakningen testas – konfliktparter försöker ta reda på hur effektiv och genomträngande den är.
4. Parterna vill utvärdera om deras agerande medför kostnader i form av förlorad legitimitet inför externa åskådare.

Artikeln bidrar med en nyanserad förståelse för hur övervakning kan ha oavsiktliga, ibland destabiliserande, effekter i konfliktzoner.

Artikel II: Rapportering som möjlighet för efterlevnad och brott mot vapenvila

Den andra artikeln undersöker hur rapportering – den mest rutinmässiga praktiken inom vapenvila övervakning – påverkar konfliktaktörer. Genom intervjuer med övervakare och analys av arkivmaterial från Kosovo och Sydsudan utvecklas en teori för hur rapportering i sig skapar möjligheter för konfliktparter att antingen demonstrera efterlevnad eller medvetet bryta mot vapenvilan.

Rapporteringens struktur, tidssättning och offentlighet ger incitament till strategiskt agerande, där brott kan begås med syfte att synas, påverka eller testa reaktioner. Artikeln visar att även korrekt och objektiv rapportering kan ha oavsiktliga effekter, genom att skapa nya handlingsutrymmen (or strategiska möjligheter) för de parter som övervakas.

Artikel III: Offentligt tal som påverkansteknik

Den tredje artikeln fokuserar på hur övervakare använder sina offentliga uttalanden – pressmeddelanden, uttalanden och rapporter – för att försöka påverka konfliktparter. Genom en systematisk analys av pressmeddelanden från övervakningsmissionerna i Sri Lanka och Kosovo identifieras ett antal diskursiva verktyg (discursive devices) som övervakare använder, utöver den traditionella uppdelningen i fördömande och beröm.

Dessa verktyg inkluderar exempelvis moraliska uppmaningar, framhävande av internationella normer, användning av passivt språk för att tona ned ansvar, och användning av oprecisa kategoriseringar. Artikeln visar att övervakare är medvetna om att effekten av dessa verktyg är osäker, men att de ändå utgör ett sätt att navigera mellan konkurrerande krav från olika målgrupper: konfliktparter, civilsamhälle och internationella institutioner.

Artikel IV: Teknologi och dess begränsade påverkan på efterlevnad

Den fjärde artikeln analyserar användningen av fjärranalysteknik – såsom satellitbilder och drönare – i övervakning av vapenvileavtal. Genom att utgå från teorier om övervakningens kausala processer utvecklas en analytisk ram för att bedöma när och hur sådan teknik kan främja efterlevnad.

Artikeln använder fallstudien av OSSE:s Special Monitoring Mission i Ukraina, före den fullskaliga invasionen 2022, som det mest teknologiskt avancerade övervakningsuppdraget hittills. Resultaten visar att även om övervakningskapaciteten tekniskt sett förbättrades, hade teknologin mycket begränsad effekt på konfliktparternas beteende. Denna diskrepans förklaras av teknologins begränsade legitimitet, praktiska svagheter i datatillgång och konfliktparters anpassningsförmåga.

Artikel V: Övervakningsteknologi som en källa till nytt våld

Den femte artikeln bygger vidare på föregående analys och undersöker hur just teknologisk övervakning i sig kan generera icke-efterlevnad och nytt våld. Genom att tillämpa teorier från övervakningsstudier – särskilt kring motstånd mot att bli övervakad – identifierar artikeln fyra mekanismer genom vilka användningen av övervakningsteknologi kan provocera fram våld:

1. Tekniken skapar en ny kategori av lågkostnadsbrott mot vapenvila.
2. Närvaron av teknik föranleder konfliktparter att testa övervakarnas kapacitet.
3. Teknologin försvagar förtroendet för klassisk övervakning, vilket underminerar dess effektivitet.
4. Tekniken kan oavsiktligt hjälpa konfliktparter att förbättra sin militära förmåga genom att avslöja vilka aktiviteter som upptäcks.

Samlad slutsats

Avhandlingens huvudsakliga bidrag är att den omformulerar vår förståelse av hur övervakning fungerar i konfliktmiljöer. I stället för att utgå från en linjär modell där övervakning antas främja fredlig efterlevnad, visar studien att effekterna är kontextberoende, ofta komplexa och ibland kontraproduktiva. Genom att fokusera på praktik snarare än policy, på mekanismer snarare än utfall, och på aktörers strategier snarare än normativt önskvärda effekter, utvecklar avhandlingen ett nytt teoretiskt ramverk som bättre förklarar varför och hur övervakning påverkar konfliktdynamik. Resultaten har relevans inte bara för forskare inom freds- och konfliktstudier, utan också för praktiker och beslutsfattare som är verksamma inom utformning och implementering av övervakningsuppdrag.

Avhandlingens metodologiska bidrag ligger i hur den integrerar abduktion, mekanismbaserad förklaring och praktikfokuserad analys. Dess fallstudier ger ny empirisk kunskap om understuderade kontexter som Kosovo, Sri Lanka och Sydsudan, samt en fördjupad förståelse av teknikens roll i moderna övervakningsinsatser.

Kappa References

Abbott, Andrew. 2007. Mechanisms and relations. *Sociologica* 2: 1–22.

Abbott, Kenneth W. & Snidal, Duncan. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3–32.

Adler, Patricia A. & Adler, Peter. 2002. The reluctant respondent. In Gubrium, James & Holstein, Jaber A., eds. *Handbook of interview research: Context and method.* Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Adler, Emanuel & Pouliot, Vincent, eds. 2011. *International practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

African Union. 2022. *The African Union launches the African Union Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission in Mekelle, Tigray Region, Ethiopia.* https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/handle/123456789/1788

Ahonen, Hanna-Mari, Kessler, Juliana, Michaelowa, Axel, Espelage, Aglaja & Hoch, Stephan. 2022. Governance of fragmented compliance and voluntary carbon markets under the Paris Agreement. *Politics and Governance* 10(1): 235–245.

Åkebo, Malin. 2013. *The politics of ceasefires*. PhD dissertation. Umeå: Umeå University.

Allard-Poesi, Florence & Laroche, Hervé. 2018. "This is serious": enacting authority during managerial conversations. *M@n@gement* 21(1): 611–645.

Andersen, Holly K. 2017. Patterns, information, and causation. *Journal of Philosophy* 114(11): 592–662.

Andrews, Matt, Pritchett, Lant & Woolcock, Michael. 2013. Escaping capability traps through problem driven iterative adaptation (PDIA). *World Development* 51: 234–244.

Aoi, Chiyuki, de Coning, Cedric & Thakur, Ramesh. 2007. *Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Apakan, Ertuğrul & Giardullo, Cono. 2020. UAVs for the benefit of people: The use of unmanned aerial vehicles within the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. *Human Rights Quarterly* 42: 479–487.

Aradau, Claudia & Huysmans, Jef. 2014. Critical methods in international relations: The politics of techniques, devices and acts. *European Journal of International Relations* 20(3): 596–619.

Arts, Bas, Behagel, Jelle, Turnhout, Esther, de Koning, Jessica & van Bommel, Séverine. 2014. A practice based approach to forest governance. *Forest Policy and Economics* 49: 4–11.

Autesserre, Severine. 2014. *Peaceland: Conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Axyonova, Vera & Gawrich, Andrea. 2018. Regional organizations and secessionist entities: Analysing practices of the EU and the OSCE in post-Soviet protracted conflict areas. *Ethnopolitics* 17(4): 408–425.

Bacchi, Carol & Bonham, Jennifer. 2014. Reclaiming discursive practices as an analytic focus: Political implications. *Foucault Studies* 17: 173–192.

Badache, Fanny, Kimber, Leah R. & Maertens, Lucile, eds. 2023. *Rethinking methods of investigation and international organizations*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bailey, Sydney D. 1977. Cease-fires, truces, and armistices in the practice of the UN Security Council. *American Journal of International Law* 71(3): 461–473.

Bara, Corinne, Clayton, Govinda & Rustad, Siri Aas. 2021. Understanding ceasefires. *International Peacekeeping* 28(3): 329–340.

Barsa, Michelle, Holt-Ivry, Olivia & Muehlenbeck, Allison. 2016. *Inclusive ceasefires: Women, gender, and a sustainable end to violence*. Inclusive Security.

Bell, Christine. 2000. *Peace agreements and human rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bell, Christine & Badanjak, Sanja. 2019. Introducing PA-X: A new peace agreement database and dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 56(3): 452–466.

Beach, Derek & Pedersen, Rasmus Brun. 2011. *What is process tracing actually tracing? The three variants of process tracing methods and their uses and limitations*. American Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle.

Beach, Derek & Pedersen, Rasmus Brun. 2013. *Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Beach, Derek & Pedersen, Rasmus Brun. 2016. *Causal case study methods: Foundations and guidelines for comparing, matching and tracing*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bellamy, Alex & Griffin, Stuart. 2002. OSCE peacekeeping: Lessons from the Kosovo Verification Mission. *European Security* 11(1): 1–26.

Bengtsson, Bo & Hertting, Nils. 2014. Generalization by mechanism: Thin rationality and ideal-type analysis in case study research. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 44(6): 707–847.

Bennett, Andrew & Elman, Colin. 2006. Qualitative research: Recent developments in case study methods. *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 455–476.

Bennett, Andrew & George, Alexander L. 1997. Process tracing in case study research, in *MacArthur Foundation workshop on case study methods*. Cambridge, MA.

Bennett, Andrew & Checkel, Jeffrey. 2014. Process tracing: From philosophical roots to best practices. In Bennett, Andrew & Checkel, Jeffrey, eds., *Process tracing: From metaphor to analytic tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–38.

Bennett, Colin J. 2008. *The privacy advocates: resisting the spread of surveillance*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bjornlund, Eric C. 2004. *Beyond free and fair*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Bliesemann De Guevara, Berit & Kostić, Roland. 2017. Knowledge production in/about conflict and intervention: finding 'facts', telling 'truth'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 11(1): 1–20.

Bluth, Christoph. 2004. The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq. *International Affairs* 80(5): 871–892.

Boulden, Jane. 2000. The verification and monitoring of peace accords. *Disarmament Forum* 49: 45–52.

Börzel, Tanja A., Hofmann, Tobias, Panke, Diana & Sprungk, Carina. 2010. Obstinate and inefficient: why member states do not comply with European law. *Comparative Political Studies* 43(11): 1363–1390.

Bowen, Glenn A. 2009. Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal* 9(2): 27–40.

Boyle, Michael J. 2020. *The drone age: How drone technology will change war and peace*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Brantingham, Paul J. & Brantingham, Patricia L. 1984. *Patterns in crime*. New York: Macmillan.

Braumoeller, Bear F. 2006. Explaining variance; or, stuck in a moment we can't get out of. *Political Analysis* 14: 268–290.

Broome, John. 2021. Reasons and rationality. In Knauff, Markus & Spohn, Wolfgang, eds., *The handbook of rationality*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 129–136.

Brounéus, Karen. 2011. In-depth interviewing: The process, skill and ethics of interviews in peace research. In Höglund, Kristine & Öberg, Magnus, eds., *Understanding peace research: Methods and challenges*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bruneau, Quentin. 2022. Converging paths: bounded rationality, practice theory and the study of change in historical international relations. *International Theory* 14(1): 88–114.

Buchanan, Cate, Clayton, Govinda & Ramsbotham, Alexander. 2021. *Ceasefire monitoring: Developments and complexities*. London: Conciliation Resources.

Bueger, Christian. 2022. Styles of theorizing international practice. In Hellmann, Gunther & Steffek, Jens, eds., *Praxis as a perspective on international politics*. Bristol: Bristol University Press.

Bueger, Christian & Gadinger, Frank. 2018. *International practice theory*, 2nd edition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Burke, Edmund. 1790. *Reflections on the revolution in France*. Everyman's Library.

Burke, Peter. 2022. Context in context. *Common Knowledge* 28(1): 11–40.

Burman, Erica. 1991. What discourse is not. *Philosophical Psychology* 4(3): 325–342.

Carcelli, Shannon P. 2023. Bureaucratic structure and compliance with international agreements. *American Journal of Political Science* 68(1): 177–192.

Carnegie, Allison & Carson, Austin. 2018. The spotlight's harsh glare: Rethinking publicity and international order. *International Organization* 72(3): 627–657.

Chayes, Abram & Chayes, Antonia H. 1993. On compliance. *International Organization* 47(2): 175–205.

Chayes, Abram & Chayes, Antonia H. 1995. *The new sovereignty: compliance with international regulatory agreements*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Chayes, Abram, Chayes, Antonia H. & Mitchell, Ronald B. 1998. Managing compliance: A comparative perspective. In Brown Weiss, Edith & Jacobson, Harold, eds., *Engaging countries: Strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 39–62.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2001. Why comply? Social learning and European identity change. *International Organization* 55(3): 553–588.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2014. Mechanisms, process, and the study of international institutions. In Bennett, Andrew & Checkel, Jeffrey, eds., *Process tracing:*

From metaphor to analytic tool. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 74–97.
Chilton, Paul. 2004. *Analysing political discourse*. London: Routledge.
Choudhury, Saswati. 2009. *Information asymmetry and institutions: re-looking at autonomous councils in the hills district of Assam*. Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development.
Clark, Herbert & Brennan, Susan. 1991. Grounding in communication. In Resnick, Lauren, Levine, John & Teasley, Stephanie, eds., *Perspectives on socially shared cognition*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 127–149.
Clayton, Govinda, Nathan, Laurie & Wiehler, Claudia. 2021. Ceasefire success: A conceptual framework. *International Peacekeeping* 28(3): 341–365.
Clayton, Govinda & Sticher, Valerie. 2021. The logic of ceasefires in civil war. *International Studies Quarterly* 65(3): 633–646.
Clayton, Govinda, Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv, Rustad, Siri Aas, Strand, Håvard. 2023a. Ceasefires in civil conflict: A research agenda. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 67(7-8): 1279–1295.
Clayton, Govinda, Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv, Rustad, Siri Aas, Strand, Håvard. 2023b. Costs and cover: Explaining the onset of ceasefires in civil conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 67(7-8): 1296–1324.
Clayton, Govinda, Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv, Strand, Håvard, Rustad, Siri Aas, Wiehler, Claudia, Sagård, Tora, Landsverk, Peder, Ryland, Reidun, Sticher, Valerie, Wink, Emma & Bara, Corinne. 2023c. Introducing the ETH/PRIO civil conflict ceasefire dataset. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 67(7-8), 1430–1451.
Clayton, Govinda. 2025. *Pause for thought: contemporary ceasefire politics*. Oslo Forum Background Paper.
Closa, Carlos & Hernández, Gisela. 2024. Defining and operationalising defiant non-compliance in the EU: The rule of law case. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 63(3): 964–986.
Coghlan, David & Brydon-Miller, Mary. 2014. Positionality. In *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research*. London: SAGE.
Coletta, Nat. 2013. Principal-agent theory in complex operations. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24(2): 306–321.
Collier, David. 1993. The comparative method. In Finifter, Ada W., ed., *Political science: The state of the discipline II*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 105–119.
Collier, David, LaPorte, Jody & Seawright, Jason. 2008. Typologies: Forming concepts and creating categorical variables. In Box-Steffensmeier, Janet,

Brady, Henry & Collier, David, eds., *The Oxford handbook of political methodology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 152–173.

Core, Paul. 2009. Burma/Myanmar: Challenges of a ceasefire accord in Karen State. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 28(3): 95–10.

Cornut, Jérémie & de Zamaróczy, Nicolas. 2021. How can documents speak about practices? Practice tracing, the Wikileaks cables, and diplomatic culture. *Cooperation and Conflict* 56(3): 328–345.

Crasnic, Loriana. 2017. *Resistance in international relations: Offshore financial centers and the new tax and transparency regime*. PhD dissertation, Georgetown University.

Crasnow, Sharon. 2017. Process tracing in political science. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 62: 6–13.

Dai, Xinyuan. 2002. Information systems in treaty regimes. *World Politics* 54(4): 405–436.

Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism. *International Organization* 59(2): 363–398.

Dascal, Marcelo. 2008. Leibniz's two-pronged dialectic. In Dascal, Marcelo, ed., *Leibniz: What kind of rationalist?* Dordrecht: Springer, 37–72.

Donovan, Anna. 2021. *Reconceptualising corporate compliance*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

Downs, George, Rocke, David, & Barsoom, Peter. 1996. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? *International Organization* 50(3): 379–406.

Douglas, Mary. 1986. *How institutions think*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Elman, Colin. 2005. Explanatory typologies in qualitative studies of international politics. *International Organization* 59(2): 293–326.

Elster, Jon. 2015. Unintended consequences. In *Explaining social behavior: More nuts and bolts for the social sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 297–307.

Ermakoff, Ivan. 2010. Theory of practice, rational choice, and historical change. *Theory and Society* 39: 527–553.

Étienne, Julien. 2010. Compliance theories: A literature review. *Revue française de science politique* 60(3): 493–517.

Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and social change. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Falleti, Tulia G. & Lynch, Julia. 2008. From process to mechanism: varieties of disaggregation. *Qualitative Sociology* 31: 333–339

Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization* 49(3): 379–414.

Fearon, James D. 1997. Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1): 68–90.
Fearon, James D. & Wendt, Alexander. 2002. Rationalism v. constructivism: A skeptical view. In Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Simmons, Beth A., eds., *Handbook of International Relations*. London: SAGE.
Feldman, Martha S. & Orlikowski, Wanda J. 2011. Theorizing practice and practicing theory. *Organization Science* 22(5): 1240–53.
Fernandez, Luis A. & Huey, Laura. 2009. Is resistance futile? Some thoughts on resisting surveillance. *Surveillance & Society* 6(3): 198–202.
Findlay, Trevor. 2001. The role of monitoring and verification. *Contemporary Security Policy* 22(3): 169–182.
Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. International norm dynamics and political change. *International Organization* 52(4): 887–917.
Fisher, Ronald J. 2001. *Methods of third party intervention*. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof Foundation.
Flyvbjerg, Bent 2006. Five misunderstandings about case-study research. *Qualitative Inquiry* 12(2): 219–245.
Forster, Robert. 2019. *Ceasefire arrangements*. Edinburgh: Political Settlements Research Programme.
Fortna, Virginia P. 2003. Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace. *International Organization* 57(2): 337–372.
Fortna, Virginia P. 2004. *Peace time: Cease-fire agreements and the durability of peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fortna, Virginia P. 2008. *Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents' choices after civil war*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1975. *Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison*. Paris: Gallimard.
Franck, Thomas. 1990. *The power of legitimacy among nations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fujii, Lee Ann. 2018. *Interviewing in social science research: A relational approach*. New York: Routledge.
Furhmann, Matthew & Berejikian, Jeffrey D. 2012. Disaggregating noncompliance: abstention versus predation in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(3): 355–381.
Gaikwad, Nikhar & Herrera, Veronica. 2023. Transparency for text-based sources: From principles to practice. *Perspectives on Politics* 21(4): 1240–1257.
George, Alexander & Bennett, Andrew. 2005. *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gerring, John. 2011. How good is good enough? A multidimensional, best-possible standard for research design. *Political Research Quarterly* 64(3): 625–636.

Gerring, John. 2017. *Case study research: Principles and practices*, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Giardullo, Cono, Dorn, Walter & Stodilka, Danielle. 2020. Technological innovation in the OSCE: The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. In IFSH and IFSH, eds., *OSCE Yearbook 2019*. Nomos: Baden-Baden, 119–37.

Glas, Aarie. 2021. Positionality, power, and positions of power: Reflexivity in elite interviewing. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 54(3): 438–442.

Glennan, Stuart. 2010. Mechanisms, causes, and the layered model of the world. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 81(2): 362–381.

González-Ocantos, Ezequiel. 2020. Designing qualitative research projects: Notes on theory building, case selection and field research. In Curini, Luigi & Franzese, Robert, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations*. SAGE: London, 104–120.

Government of Sweden. 2016. *Government Offices archives*. https://www.government.se/the-government-offices/government-offices-archives/

Grand-Clément, Sarah. 2022. *Exploring the use of technology for remote ceasefire monitoring and verification*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Granovetter, Mark. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology* 91(3): 481–510.

Greco, Ettore. 1999. *The OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mechanism: A preliminary assessment*. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali.

Haas, Peter M. 2000. Choosing to comply: Theorizing from international relations and comparative politics. In Shelton, Dinah, ed., *Commitment and compliance: The role of non-binding norms in the international legal system*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Haase, Heather J. 2019. Principled noncompliance: Paving the way for cannabis regulation under the international drug control regime. *International Community Law Review* 21: 93–119.

Haig, Brian D. 2005. An abductive theory of scientific method. *Psychological Methods* 10(4): 371–388.

Harrould-Kolieb, Ellycia, van Asselt, Harro, Romain Weikmans, & Antto Vihma. 2023. Opening the black box of transparency: An analytical framework for exploring causal pathways from reporting and review to state behavior change. *International Studies Review* 25(4): viad038.

Hartley, Jean. 2004. Case study research. In Cassell, Catherine & Symon, Gillian, eds., *Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational research*. London: SAGE.
Haug, Hilde. 2016. The Minsk agreements and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. *Security and Human Rights* 27(3–4): 342–57.
Hawkes, Martine. 2018. *Archiving loss: Holding places for difficult memories*. Abingdon: Routledge.
Hay, Colin. 2002. *Political analysis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Hedstrom, Margaret. 2002. Archives, memory, and interfaces with the past. *Archival Science* 2: 21–43.
Hedström, Peter & Swedberg, Richard. 1996. Social mechanisms. *Acta Sociologica* 39: 281–308.
Hedström, Peter & Ylikoski, Petri. 2010. Causal mechanisms in the social sciences. *Annual Review of Sociology*: 3649–3667.
Herr, Kathryn & Anderson, Gary L. 2005. The continuum of positionality in action research. In *The Action research dissertation: A guide for students and faculty*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
Hertwig, Ralph & Kozyreva, Anastasia. 2021. Bounded rationality: A vision of rational choice in the real world. In Knauff, Markus & Spohn, Wolfgang, eds., *The handbook of rationality*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 505–516.
Hiller, Harry H. & Linda DiLuzio. 2004. The interviewee and the research interview: analysing a neglected dimension in research. *Canadian Review of Sociology* 41: 1–26.
Hirschheim, Rudy. 2008. Some guidelines for the critical reviewing of conceptual papers. *Journal of the Association for Information Systems* 9(8): 432–441.
Höglund, Kristine & Wennerström, Marcus. 2015. When the going gets tough...monitoring missions and a changing conflict environment in Sri Lanka, 2002–2008. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26(5): 836–860.
Horn, David E. 1989. The development of ethics in archival practice. *American Archivist* 52: 64–71.
Howard, Lise M. 2019. *Power in peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hug, Alexander. 2024. *Ceasefire monitoring and verification and the use of technology: Insights from Ukraine 2014-2022*. CSS Mediation Resources. Zurich: Center for Security Studies.
Hull, Cecilia, Eriksson, Mikael, MacDermott, Justin, Rudén, Fanny & Waleij, Annica. 2009. *Managing unintended consequences of peace support operations*. Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Hultman, Lisa, Kathman, Jacob D. & Shannon, Megan. 2013. United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4): 875–891.

Hurd, Ian. 1999. Legitimacy and authority in international politics. *International Organization* 53(2): 379–408.

Illari, Phyllis M. & Williamson, Jon. 2012. What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences. *European Journal for Philosophy of Science* 2: 119–135.

Jaakola, Elina. 2020. Designing conceptual articles: four approaches. *AMS Review* 10: 18–26.

Jabri, Vivienne & Richmond, Oliver P. 2021. Critical theory and the politics of peace. In Richmond, Oliver P. & Visoka, Gëzim, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 91–106.

Jackson, Jonathan, Bradford, Ben, Hough, Mike, Myhill, Andy, Quinton, Paul & Tyler, Tom R. 2012. Why do people comply with the law? Legitimacy and the influence of legal institutions. *British Journal of Criminology* 52: 1051–1071.

Jay, Zoë & Killingsworth, Matt. 2024. To arrest or not arrest? South Africa, the International Criminal Court, and new frameworks for assessing noncompliance. *International Studies Quarterly* 68: sqae005.

Jervis, Robert. 1998. Realism in the study of world politics. *International Organization* 52(4): 971–991.

Johnson, Russell E., Groff, Kyle W. & Taing, Meng U. 2009. Nature of the interactions among organizational commitments: Complementary, competitive or synergistic? *British Journal of Management* 20: 431–447.

Joshi, Madhav, Lee, SungYong & Mac Ginty, Roger. 2017. Built-in safeguards and the implementation of civil war peace accords. *International Interactions* 43(6): 994–1018.

Karakus, Dogukan Cansin & Svensson, Isak. 2020. Between the bombs: Exploring partial ceasefires in the Syrian civil war, 2011–2017. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32(4): 681–700.

Karlsrud, John & Rosén, Frederik. 2013. In the eye of the beholder? The UN and the use of drones to protect civilians. *Stability* 2(2): 1–10.

Karppinen, Kari & Moe, Hallvard. 2012. What we talk about when we talk about document analysis. In Puppis, Manuel & Just, Natascha, eds., *Trends in communication policy research: New theories, methods and subjects*. Bristol: Intellect.

Kaushik, Vibha & Walsh, Christine A. 2019. Pragmatism as a research paradigm and its implications for social work research. *Social Sciences* 8(9): 255.

Keck, Margaret & Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kemp, Walter. 2018. Civilians in a war zone: The OSCE in eastern Ukraine. In IFSH, ed., *OSCE Yearbook 2017*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 113–23.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kingsbury, Benedict. 1998. The concept of compliance as a function of competing conceptions of international law. *Michigan Journal of International Law* 19(2): 345–372.

Klotz, Audie. 1995. *Norms in international relations: The struggle against apartheid*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Koivu, Kendra, & Hinze, Annika Marlen. 2017. Cases of convenience? The divergence of theory from practice in case selection in qualitative and mixed-methods research. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 50(4): 1023–27.

Kolås, Ashild. 2011. Naga militancy and violent politics in the shadow of ceasefire. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(6): 781–92.

Kostovicova, Denisa & Knott, Eleanor. 2022. Harm, change and unpredictability: the ethics of interviews in conflict research. *Qualitative Research* 22(1): 56–73.

Kotajoki, Jenniina. 2025. United Nations peacekeepers' perceptions of the 'local': Evidence from military personnel in Mali. *International Peacekeeping* 32(3): 327–357.

Krause, Jana & Kamler, Erin. 2022. Ceasefires and civilian protection monitoring in Myanmar. *Global Studies Quarterly* 2(1): 1–12.

Kutsyuruba, Benjamin. 2023. Document analysis. In Okoko, Janet M., Tunison, Scott & Walker, Keith D., eds, *Varieties of qualitative research methods*. Cham: Springer.

Kydd, Andrew. 2003. Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 597–611.

Kydd, Andrew. 2007. *Trust and mistrust in international relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Labov, William. 1972. *Sociolinguistic patterns*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

Latour, Bruno. 2005. *Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas. 2013. Critical debates on liberal peacebuilding. *Civil Wars* 15(2): 242–252.

Lesch, Max. 2023. Contested facts: the politics and practice of international fact-finding missions. *International Studies Review* 25(3): viad034.

Lillie, Karen & Ayling, Pere. 2021. Revisiting the un/ethical: the complex ethics of elite studies research. *Qualitative Research* 21(6): 890–905.

Livesey, Michael. 2024. To look for another thing, and in another way: Revitalising criticality with multimodal methodologies. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 17(4): 903–929.

Lombard, Louisa. 2022. The interpretation of relationships: Fieldwork as boundary-negotiation. *Ethnography* 26(3): 582–602.

Lukka, Kari & Vinnari, Eija. 2014. Domain theory and method theory in management accounting research. *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal* 27(8): 1308–1338.

Lund, Christian. 2014. Of what is this a case?: Analytical movements in qualitative social science research. *Human Organization* 73(3): 224–34.

Lury, Celia & Wakeford, Nina. 2012. Introduction: A perpetual inventory. In Lury, Celia & Wakeford, Nina, eds., *Inventive methods: The happening of the social*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1–23.

Lyon, David. 2001. *Surveillance society: Monitoring everyday life*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

MacEoin, Denis. 2008. Tactical hudna and Islamist intolerance. *Middle East Quarterly* (Summer): 39–48.

Mahieu, Sylvie. 2007. When should mediators Interrupt a civil war? The best timing for a ceasefire. *International Negotiation* 12: 207–228.

Mahoney, James. 2015. Process tracing and historical explanation. *Security Studies* 24(2): 200–218.

Marsh, David. 2009. Keeping ideas in their place: In praise of thin constructivism. *Australian Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 679–696.

Martin, Lisa L. 2012. Against compliance. In Dunoff, Jeffrey L. & Pollack, Mark A., eds., *Interdisciplinary perspectives on international law and international relations: The state of the art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 591–610.

Marx, Gary T. 2009. A tack in the shoe and taking off the shoe: Neutralization and counter-neutralization dynamics. *Surveillance & Society* 6(3): 294–306.

Marx, Gary T. 2012. "Your papers please": personal and professional encounters with surveillance. In Ball, Kirstie, Haggerty, Kevin D., & Lyon, David, eds., *Routledge handbook of surveillance studies*. Abingdon: Routledge, xx – xxxi.

Mattes, Michaela & Savun, Burcu. 2009. Fostering peace after civil war: Commitment problems and agreement design. *International Studies Quarterly* 53(3): 737–759.
Mattes, Michaela & Savun, Burcu. 2010. Information, agreement design, and the durability of civil war settlements. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 511–524.
Maxwell, Joseph A. 2013. *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
McCourt, David M. 2016. Practice theory and relationalism as the new constructivism. *International Studies Quarterly* 60(3): 475–485.
McKee, Heidi A. & Porter, James E. 2012. The ethics of archival research. *College Composition and Communication* 64(1): 59–81.
McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara & Paul R. Hensel. 2007. International institutions and compliance with agreements. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 721–737.
Mearsheimer, John. 1995. The false promise of international institutions. *International Security* 19(3): 5–49.
Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 2017. The 'warriors break': Hamas and the limits of ceasefire beyond tactical pause. *International Peacekeeping* 24(2): 212–35.
Mitchell, Ronald. 1994. Regime design matters: Intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. *International Organization* 48(3): 425–58.
Mitchell, Ronald. 1996. Compliance theory: An overview. In Werksman, Jacob, Cameron, James, & Roderick, Peter, eds., *Improving compliance with international environmental law*. Routledge, 3–28.
Mohammed, Dima. 2013. Rationality of argumentation aimed at multiple goals. *OSSA Conference Archive* 115.
Mohn, Paul. 1952. Problems of truce supervision. *International Conciliation* 29: 51–102.
Monahan, Torin. 2006. Questioning surveillance and security. In Monahan, Torin, ed., *Surveillance and security: technological politics and power in everyday life*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1–26.
Morrow, James D. 2007. When do states follow the laws of war? *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 559–572.
Mueller, Frank & Whittle, Andrea. 2011. Translating management ideas: A discursive devices analysis. *Organization Studies* 32(2): 187–210.
Müller, Harald. 2004. Arguing, bargaining and all that: Communicative action, rationalist theory and the logic of appropriateness in international relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 10(3): 395–435.

Mutlu, Can E., and Salter, Mark B. 2014. Commensurability of research methods in critical security studies. *Critical Studies on Security* 2(3): 353–355.

Nash, Sarah L., Torney, Diarmuid, & Matti, Simon. 2021. Climate change acts: Origins, dynamics, and consequences. *Climate Policy* 21(9): 1111–1119.

Nathan, Laurie. 2018. The mandate effect: A typology and conceptualization of mediation mandates. *Peace & Change* 43(3): 318–343.

Nathan, Laurie & Sethi, Ajay. 2022. Reducing and managing risk: The dimensions of strong ceasefires in intra-state conflict. *International Studies Review* 25(1): viac065.

Neumann, Iver B. 2007. 'A speech that the entire ministry may stand for,' or: Why diplomats never produce anything new. *International Political Sociology* 1(2): 183–200.

Nickles, Thomas. 1981. What is a problem that we might solve it? *Synthese* 47(1): 85–118.

Nicolini, Davide. 2012. *Practice theory, work, and organization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nuñez-Mietz, Fernando G. 2016. Lawyering compliance with international law: Legal advisers in the 'War on Terror'. *European Journal of International Security* 1(2): 215–238.

Oliver, Christine. 1991. Strategic responses to institutional processes. *Academy of Management Review* 16(1): 145–179.

OSCE. *Recommendations for quoting OSCE documents and using restricted documents as primary sources for academic research on OSCE related subjects*. Prague: OSCE, n.d.

Overman, Sjors, van Thiel, Sandra, & Lafarge, François. 2014. Resisting governmental control: how semi-autonomous agencies use strategic resources to challenge state coordination. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 80(1): 172–192.

Oxford English Dictionary. 2021. ceasefire, n. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://www.oed.com/dictionary/ceasefire_n?tab=meaning_and_use#9905344

Paffenholz, Thania. 2015. Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda for future research. *Third World Quarterly* 36(5): 857–874.

Palik, Júlia, Rustad, Siri Aas & Methi, Fredrik. 2020. *Conflict trends: A global overview, 1946–2019*. Oslo: PRIO.

Palik, Júlia. 2021. Watchdogs of pause: The challenges of ceasefire monitoring in Yemen. *International Peacekeeping* 28(3): 444–469.

Park, Sunhee. 2023. Does flexibility promote the implementation of civil war cease-fire agreements? *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 24(4): 375–390.

Peško, Marcel. 2017. The OSCE's engagement in response to the crisis in Ukraine: Meeting new challenges with new solutions. In IFSH, ed., *OSCE Yearbook 2016*. Nomos: Baden-Baden, 23–32.

Phillips, Michael D. 2003. *Victory by accident: An assessment of the political and military dimensions in Kosovo*. Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Pinaud, Margaux. 2021. Home-grown peace: Civil society roles in ceasefire monitoring. *International Peacekeeping* 28(3): 470–495.

Pouliot, Vincent. 2013. Methodology: Putting practice theory into practice. In Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, ed., *Bourdieu in international relations*. Abingdon: Routledge, 45–58.

Pouliot, Vincent. 2014. Practice tracing. In Bennett, Andrew & Checkel, Jeffrey, eds., *Process tracing: From metaphor to analytic tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 237–259.

Pozzoni, Gianluca, & Kaidesoja, Tuukka. 2021. Context in mechanism-based explanation. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 51(6): 523–554.

Prior, Lindsay. 2011. *Using documents in social research*. London: SAGE.

Puttick, Miriam. 2017. *Eyes on the ground: Realizing the potential of civilian-led monitoring in armed conflict*. Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights.

Raustiala, Kal R., & Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2002. International law, international relations and compliance. In Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Simmons, Beth A., eds., *Handbook of international relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 538–558.

Reinsberg, Bernhard, Stubbs, Thomas, & Kentikelenis, Alexander. 2022. Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets. *Regulation & Governance* 16(4): 1022–1041.

Reisigl, Martin & Wodak, Ruth. 2009. *Methods of critical discourse analysis*. London: SAGE.

Reiss, Albert. 1984. Selecting strategies of social control over organizational life. In Hawkins, Keith & Thomas, John M., eds., *Enforcing regulation*. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 23–35.

Reyes, Antonio. 2011. Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions. *Discourse & Society* 22(6): 781–807.

Rosas Duarte, Geraldine & Souza, Matheus. 2024. Illiberal peacebuilding in UN stabilization peace operations and peace agreements in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *International Peacekeeping* 31(2): 157–185.

Ross, Nick. 2017. *Civil society's role in monitoring and verifying peace agreements: Seven lessons from international experiences*. Geneva: Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative.

Roulston, Kathryn. 2011. Working through challenges in doing interview research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 10(4): 348–366.

Sagård, Tora. 2019. *Causes of ceasefire failure: A survival analysis, 1989-2017*. Oslo: University of Oslo.

Salter, Mark B., Mutlu, Can E., & Frowd, Philippe M. 2023. *Research methods in critical security studies: An introduction*, 2nd edition. Abingdon: Routledge.

Sandberg, Jörgen & Tsoukas, Hardimos. 2011. Grasping the logic of practice: Theorizing through practical rationality. *The Academy of Management Review* 36(2): 338–360.

Sassoli de Bianchi, Massimiliano. 2013. The observer effect. *Foundations of Science* 18(2): 213¬–243.

Sassoli de Bianchi, Massimiliano. 2018. Observer effect. In *The SAGE Encyclopedia of educational research, measurement, and evaluation*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.

Saylor, Ryan. 2020. Why causal mechanisms and process tracing should alter case selection guidance. *Sociological Methods & Research* 49(4): 982–1017.

Schatzki, Theodore R. 1996. *Social practices: A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schatzki, Theodore R. 2012. A primer on practices. In Higgs, Joy, Barnett, Ronald, Billett, Stephen, Hutchings, Maggie & Trede, Franziska, eds., *Practice-based education: perspectives and strategies*. Rotterdam: SensePublishers, 13–26.

Schröter, Melani. 2013. *Silence and concealment in political discourse*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Schröter, Melani & Taylor, Charlotte, eds. 2018. *Exploring silence and absence in discourse empirical approaches*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sczepanski, Ronja & Börzel, Tanja. 2023. Two sides of the same coin? The effect of differentiation on noncompliance with European Union law. *European Union Politics* 24(1): 63–80.

Simmons, Beth A. 1998. Compliance with international agreements. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 75–93.

Simmons, Beth A. 2000. International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 819–835.

Simon, Herbert A. 1964. *Theories of bounded rationality*. CIP Working Paper, no. 66.
Simon, Herbert A. 1982. *Models of bounded rationality*, 3 vols. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sosnowski, Marika. 2019. Ceasefires as violent state-building: Local truce and reconciliation agreements in the Syrian civil war. *Conflict, Security & Development* 20(2): 273–292.
Sosnowski, Marika. 2020. Towards a typology of ceasefires: Order amid violence. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 74(5): 597–613.
Sosnowski, Marika. 2020. 'Not dead but sleeping': Expanding international law to better regulate the diverse effects of ceasefire agreements. *Leiden Journal of International Law* 33(3): 731–43.
Spicq, Ceslas. 1944. *Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen âge*. Paris: J. Vrin.
Sticher, Valerie. 2020. *Ceasefires as bargaining instruments in intrastate conflicts*. PhD dissertation. Leiden: Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden University.
Sticher, Valerie & Vuković, Siniša. 2021. Bargaining in intrastate conflicts: The shifting role of ceasefires. *Journal of Peace Research* 58(6): 1284–1299.
Sticher, Valerie & Verjee, Aly. 2023. Do eyes in the sky ensure peace on the ground? The uncertain contributions of remote sensing to ceasefire compliance. *International Studies Review* 25(3): viad039.
Subotic, Jelena. 2021. Ethics of archival research on political violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 58(3): 342–354.
Swed, Ori. 2023. Where the bombs fell: Measuring compliance with humanitarian treaties. *Social Science Research* 110: 102849.
Tanner, Fred. 2021. *The OSCE and peacekeeping: Track record and outlook*. OSCE Insights, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Centre for OSCE Research (CORE).
Tavvory, Iddo & Timmermans, Stefan. 2014. *Abductive analysis: theorising qualitative research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, Stephanie. 2013. *What is discourse analysis?* London: Bloomsbury.
Terman, Rochelle. 2017. *Rewarding resistance: Theorizing defiance to international norms*. Center for International Security & Cooperation, Stanford University.
Tilly, Charles. 2001. Mechanisms in political processes. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 21–41.

Tracy, Karen & Coupland, Nikolas. 1990. Multiple goals in discourse: An overview of issues. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 9(1-2): 1–13.

Trent, Allen & Cho, Jeasik. 2020. Interpretation in qualitative research: What, why, how. In Leavy, Patricia, ed., *The Oxford handbook of qualitative research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tun, Saw Chit Thet, Anderson, Bobby & Yamahata, Chosein. 2022. Myanmar's peace process and ceasefire monitoring mechanism: A post-mortem. In Yamahata, Chosein & Anderson, Bobby, eds., *Demystifying Myanmar's transition and political crisis*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

United Nations. 2022. *Guidance on the mediation of ceasefires*. New York: Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

van Hulst, Merlijn, Metze, Tamara, Dewulf, Art, de Vries, Jasper, van Bommel, Severine & van Ostaijen, Mark. 2025. Discourse, framing and narrative: three ways of doing critical, interpretive policy analysis. *Critical Policy Studies* 19(1): 74–96.

van Leeuwen, Theo. 2007. Legitimation in discourse and communication. *Discourse & Communication* 1(1): 91–112.

Verjee, Aly. 2019a. *Ceasefire monitoring in South Sudan: 2014-2019: 'A very ugly mission'*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Verjee, Aly. 2019b. *Monitoring ceasefires is getting harder: greater innovation is required*. Oslo Forum Peacewriter Prize 2019. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Verjee, Aly. 2021. Collapse in the capital: The evolution of security arrangements in Juba, South Sudan, 2014–16. *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 11(1): 104–118.

Verjee, Aly. 2022. Ceasefire monitoring under fire: The OSCE, technology, and the 2022 war in Ukraine. *Global Policy* 13(5): 808–817.

Verjee, Aly & Sticher, Valerie. 2024. Ambassador, you're on mute: Methods for co-interviewing elites online. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 23.

Verschueren, Jozef F. 1979. *What people say they do with words*. PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

van den Bossche, Peter. 1996. In search of remedies for non-compliance: the experience of the European Community. *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law* 3(4): 371–398.

van Dijjk, Teun. 1997. The study of discourse. In van Dijk, Teun, ed., *Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1–34.

von Münchow, Patricia. 2018. Theoretical and methodological challenges in identifying meaningful absences in discourse. In Schröter, Melani & Taylor, Charlotte, eds., *Exploring silence and absence in discourse empirical approaches*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 215–240.
von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611–622.
Waldner, David. 2015. Process tracing and qualitative causal inference. *Security Studies* 24(2): 239–250.
Walker, William G. 2000. OSCE verification experiences in Kosovo: November 1998 – June 1999. *The International Journal of Human Rights* 4(3-4): 127–142.
Walter, Barbara F. 2009. Bargaining failures and civil war. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(1): 243–61.
Wedgewood, Ralph. 2021. Practical and theoretical rationality. In Knauff, Markus & Spohn, Wolfgang, eds., *The handbook of rationality*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 137–146.
Weller, Marc. 2009. The Holbrooke agreement and the OSCE Verification Mission. In Weller, Marc, *Contested statehood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 95–106.
Whittle, Andrea, Mueller, Frank, & Mangan, Anita. 2008. 'In search of subtlety': Discursive devices and rhetorical competence. *Management Communication Quarterly* 22(1): 99–122.
Wiehler, Claudia. 2021. Deciding on the tit for the tat: decision-making in the wake of ceasefire violations. *International Peacekeeping* 28(3): 416–443.
Wilcox, Lauren. 2016. Securing methods, practicing critique: A review of methods and critical security studies. *International Studies Review* 18(4): 702–713.
Wilkinson, Cai. 2015. On not just finding what you (thought you) were looking for: reflections on fieldwork data and theory. In Yanow, Dvora & Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, eds., *Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretative turn*, 2nd edition. London: Routledge, 387–405.
Willmot, Haidi & Sheeran, Scott. 2013. The protection of civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping operations: reconciling protection concepts and practices. *International Review of the Red Cross* 95(891-892): 517–538.
Wilson, Steven R. 2002. *Seeking and resisting compliance: Why individuals say what they do when trying to influence others*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Wilson, Steven R. 2015. Compliance gaining/resisting strategies and principles. In Berger, Charles R., Roloff, Michael E., Wilson, Steven R.,

Dillard, James Price, Caughlin, John P. and Solomon, Denise H., eds., *The international encyclopedia of interpersonal communication*. Hoboken, NY: Wiley-Blackwell.

Wittke, Cindy. 2021. Between war and peace: Negotiating and implementing legitimate ceasefire agreements. In Krieger, Heike & Püschmann, Jonas, eds., *Law-making and legitimacy in international humanitarian law*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 335–356.

Wodak, Ruth. 2006. Blaming and denying: pragmatics. In Brown, Keith, ed., *Encyclopedia of language and linguistics*, 2nd edition. New York: Elsevier, 59–64.

Yan, Huiqi, van der Heijden, Jeroen & van Rooij, Benjamin. 2017. Symmetric and asymmetric motivations for compliance and violation: A crisp set qualitative comparative analysis of Chinese farmers. *Regulation & Governance* 11(1): 64–80.

Young, Oran. 1979. *Compliance and public authority*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Zardkoohi, Asghar, Harrison, Joseph S. & Josefy, Mathew A. 2015. Conflict and confluence: The multidimensionality of opportunism in principal–agent relationships. *Journal of Business Ethics* 146(2): 405–417.

Zayed, Marvin F. 2007. Reflections on the concepts of hudna and tahd'ia. *Palestine - Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture* 13(4): 101–103.

Appendix 1: Co-authorship statement for article IV

JOHNS HOPKINS
SCHOOL of ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

20 September 2023

Joint Publication in International Studies Review

To whom it may concern:

I am writing to confirm the role of Mr. Aly Verjee in the research and publication of the following article:

> Sticher, Valerie and Verjee, Aly. 2023. "Do Eyes in the Sky Ensure Peace on the Ground? The Uncertain Contributions of Remote Sensing to Ceasefire Compliance." *International Studies Review*, Vol. 25, No. 3, viad039, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viad039.

The article is based on original interviews carried out by the authors in 2021 and 2022, as well as a review of primary documentation and process tracing.

In addition to collaboratively collecting the data for this publication, Mr. Verjee contributed to the development of the theoretical framework, the case study, the data analysis, the process tracing, the writing of the paper, and the revision process. The analysis has been conducted, and the main arguments developed, jointly.

As noted in the Acknowledgments to the Article, the authors contributed jointly to the article and are listed in alphabetical order to reflect their equal contributions to this article.

Sincerely,

Dr Valerie Sticher
sticherv@ethz.ch

Appendix 2: Interview guides

Guide for interviews conducted between November 2018 – April 2019 about ceasefire monitoring in South Sudan

Interviews were flexible and adapted according to the experience of the research subject. Following an introduction and discussion of informed consent and research ethics, among the questions asked were:

1. Overall, how would you assess the performance of the MVM/CTSAMM?
2. Do you think the presence of the MVM/CTSAMM in South Sudan helped deter further violence and/or the escalation of conflict? Why and how or why not and how not?
3. Can you discuss the investigation of violations and how it worked in practice?
4. Can you discuss how reports of ceasefire violations were handled? Were there ever things left out of the reports? Why?
5. Did the reporting of CTSAMM deter violence?
6. How would you evaluate the mission leadership? Mission personnel? Composition and training? How relevant was the prior experience of monitors in other monitoring contexts? Were they able to adapt?
7. Can you comment on the dynamics between headquarters and field monitors?
8. Did you feel that personnel with a military background were able to build good relationships with the local community?
9. How would you evaluate the mission culture?
10. It's often noted that logistics, resources, and transport capacity limited MVM/CTSAMM's effectiveness. Do you agree?
11. How did the mission evolve over time?
12. If you could go back and change anything about the mission (design, organization, focus, mandate, overall approach, etc.), what would it be and why?
13. In your view, how important was ceasefire monitoring as part of the overall strategy towards South Sudan? How did it fit into the bigger picture in trying to find a solution in South Sudan?
14. Would you say that overall, the mission made a difference?

Guide for interviews conducted with Dr Valerie Sticher (Article IV)

Following an introduction and discussion of informed consent and research ethics, among the questions asked were:

1. From the time you joined the SMM in ___ to the time you left in ___, did you see any changes in the way the mission operated? Did you change the way you thought about the mission yourself over that time?
2. Many people point to the use of remote sensing tech in the SMM as positive. How do you feel about the use of such technology?
3. Is there anything you would change about the use of such technology?
4. As you know, the SMM aggregates all the monitoring information it receives and presents an overall picture of the state of the ceasefire. How do you feel this picture would look if remote sensing tech monitoring methods were not available to the mission?
5. Does the use of such tech change the types of violations that are emphasized?
6. Why, in your view, do the conflict parties resist the use of remote sensing technology? Is this resistance distinct from other forms of resistance to SMM monitoring?

7. Pathway questions

Pathway 1

Part a (monitoring mission)

1. How did remote sensing affect information collection?
2. What additional information was the mission able to collect, and to what extent was it able to process this information?
3. How did this reduce the mission's uncertainties about the origins and circumstances of an alleged violation?
4. To what extent was the mission willing and able to use this information to impose costs on ceasefire violations?

Part b (other third-party actors)

5. How was this information shared with other third parties?
6. To what extent did this information reduce third parties' uncertainties about the origins and circumstances of an alleged violation?

7. To what extent were these third parties able and willing to impose costs on ceasefire violations?

Pathway 2

8. To what extent have the conflict parties voluntarily agreed to the use of remote sensing?
9. To what extent have the conflict parties let the remote sensing system operate freely?
10. To what extent were conflict parties uncertain about each other's intent?

Pathway 3

11. To what extent does remote sensing allow the ceasefire monitoring mission to provide novel information and documentary evidence to the conflict parties?
12. To what extent are conflict parties willing to consider such information in their responses?
13. To what extent are the incidents that are reported on accidents or spoiling behavior (as opposed to violations ordered or sanctioned by the conflict party leadership)?

Guide for other interviews

Interview questions were flexible and were adapted according to the experience of the research subject and were responsive to the themes raised by the research subject.

Following an introduction and discussion of informed consent and research ethics, among the questions asked were:

1. Can you tell me about your background and how you became a ceasefire monitor? For how long did you serve in this role?
2. Could you tell us a bit more about your role at the ceasefire monitoring mission? What did you do?
3. From the time you joined the ceasefire monitoring mission to the time you left, did you see any changes in the way the mission operated? Did you change the way you thought about the mission yourself over that time?
4. The mission issued statements about its monitoring. How did these statements shape your own monitoring practice?

5. Do you think the mission's statements influenced the conflict parties? Why or why not? Can you give examples?
6. Thinking about the mission and its culture, what did you think of your colleagues in the mission? Did you find them professional? Were there areas of behaviour by monitors that concerned or upset you or which you found unprofessional?
7. Did you ever witness behaviour by monitors that fell short of expected standards of professional conduct, such as harassment or discrimination?
8. Did you ever witness behaviour by monitors that consisted of sexual abuse, exploitation, or misconduct?
9. Did you ever experience harassment or discrimination from other monitors?
10. Did you ever experience sexual abuse, exploitation, or misconduct from other monitors?

Appendix 3: Demographic data on interview respondents

Respondent metadata for MVM, CTSAMM, CTSAMVM interviews conducted between November 2018 and April 2019

Total respondents	Male	Female	Field-level monitoring role	Mid-level monitoring role	Senior management role
46	36	10	15	28	3

Respondent metadata for KVM and SMM interviews, conducted between January 2022 and September 2023

	Respondents	Male	Female	Field-level monitoring role	Mid-level monitoring role	Senior management role
Interviews	50	35	15	36	8	6
Written responses	9	8	1	6	1	2

Appendix 4: Files and documents consulted in archival research

OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague, Czech Republic

Document Reference	Document Date	Archive Document Header	Status
CIO.FR/2/1998/	24-Feb-98	Report of the Personal Representative of the CIO for Kosovo on his visit to Belgrade and Pristina	Restricted
CIO.FR/3/1998/	25-Mar-98	Report on the visit of representatives of the OSCE Troika Embassies in Belgrade (Poland, Norway) to Pristina (21 -23 March 1998)	Restricted
CIO.GAL/65/1998/	16-Oct-98	Agreement on the verification on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Belgrade signed by CIO Geremek and MFA Jovanovic	Restricted
CIO.GAL/65/1998/Corr.1	20-Oct-98	Agreement on the verification on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Belgrade signed by CIO Geremek and MFA Jovanovic	Restricted
CIO.GAL/66/1998/	20-Oct-98	Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) concept paper, reflecting current status	Restricted
CIO.GAL/73/1998/	29-Oct-98	Set of papers reflecting the current stage of planning activities for the operational aspects of Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)	Restricted
CIO.GAL/74/1998/	30-Oct-98	Executive summary, Kosovo Verification Mission, current status	Restricted
CIO.GAL/80/1998/	10-Nov-98	Non-paper of the FRY authorities, which was handed over to bilateral Amb. in Belgrade on 9 Nov 1998, outlining FRY authorities' views on some aspects of the establishment and functioning of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)	Restricted
SEC.FR/505/1998/	04-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Situation report, 4 November 1998	Restricted

SEC.FR/530/1998/	18-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 16 Nov 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/538/1998/	23-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 17 Nov 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/539/1998/	23-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 18 Nov 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/540/1998/	23-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 19 Nov 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/542/1998/	24-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report 20 - 22 Nov 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/544/1998/	25-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: interim report 23 Nov 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/549/1998/	26-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 24 Nov 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/553/1998/	27-Nov-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 25 Nov 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/554/1998/	01-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 26 November 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/556/1998/	01-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 27-28 November 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/557/1998/	02-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 29 November 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/560/1998/	03-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 30 November 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/564/1998/	03-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 1 December 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/566/1998/	04-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 2 December 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/570/1998/	08-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 3 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/571/1998/	08-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 4 - 5 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/572/1998/	08-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 6 December 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/576/1998/	10-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: interim report 7 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/582/1998/	11-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 8 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/584/1998/	11-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 9 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/588/1998/	14-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 10 December 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/589/1998/	14-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Interim Report, 11 December 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/593/1998/	15-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 12 and 13 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/596/1998/	17-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 14 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/597/1998/	17-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 15 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/604/1998/	21-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 16 Dec 1998	Restricted

SEC.FR/607/1998/	22-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 17 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/608/1998/	22-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 18 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/615/1998/	23-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: interim report 12 - 19 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/616/1998/	23-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: interim report 19 - 20 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.FR/617/1998/	23-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: interim report 21 Dec 1998	Restricted
SEC.GAL/106/1998/	19-Nov-98	199th PC: speaking points on KVM	Restricted
SEC.GAL/107/1998/	20-Nov-98	Kosovo Verification Mission: Personnel requirements	Restricted
SEC.GAL/108/1998/	20-Nov-98	Kosovo Verification Mission: concept of operations	Restricted
SEC.GAL/120/1998/	23-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: visits to the KVM area	Restricted
SEC.GAL/121/1998/	23-Dec-98	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: support unit, organigram - structure of the KVM support unit	Restricted
SEC.GAL/80/1998/	15-Oct-98	Summary of the preparatory meeting on the Kosovo Verification Mission	Restricted
SEC.GAL/88/1998/	29-Oct-98	194th PC: speaking notes on the Kosovo Verification Mission	Restricted
SEC.INF/453/1998/	18-Dec-98	Information on OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM): duty officer and telephone lines	Restricted

SEC.FR/1/1999/	05-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 2 and 3 January 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/2/1999/	06-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Human Rights Report until 26 December 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/4/1999/	06-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report 4 January 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/8/1999/	07-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 5 January 1999	Restricted
SEC.INF/4/1999/	07-Jan-99	Circulation of KVM Reports by E-mail	Restricted
SEC.FR/14/1999/	11-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report 10 January	Restricted
SEC.FR/20/1999/	13-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 12 Jan 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/22/1999/	15-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 13 Jan 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/34/1999/	21-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Human Right Report 10 - 17 Jan 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/47/1999/	28-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission report covering 27 Jan 1999	Restricted

SEC.FR/52/1999/	29-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission report covering 28 Jan 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/53/1999/	01-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Spot report: killing 1 police officer and 24 Kosovo Albanians	Restricted
SEC.FR/57/1999/	01-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 29 - 30 Jan 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/58/1999/	01-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 31 January 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/63/1999/	02-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 1 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/67/1999/	03-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Human Rights Report, 18-28 January 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/68/1999/	03-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 2 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/75/1999/	04-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 3 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/77/1999/	05-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Weekly report, 25 Jan - 2 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/79/1999/	05-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 4 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/80/1999/	08-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 5 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/83/1999/	08-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report 6-7 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/89/1999/	09-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report 8 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/90/1999/	10-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Bi-weekly, 24 Jan - 6 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/93/1999/	11-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Weekly Review No. 6, 3 - 9 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/94/1999/	11-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 9 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/96/1999/	11-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report 10 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/97/1999/	12-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity Report - 11 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/101/1999/	15-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission activity report - 12 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/102/1999/	15-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report 13-14 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/107/1999/	16-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity Report - 15 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/111/1999/	17-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity report - 16 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/114/1999/	18-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission activity report - 17 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/121/1999/	22-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity Report - 18 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/122/1999/	22-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity Report -19 February 1999	Restricted

SEC.FR/125/1999/	22-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity Report, 20-21 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/129/1999/	23-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity Report, 22 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/131/1999/	24-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Weekly Review, 10-21 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/136/1999/	24-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 23 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/138/1999/	25-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 24 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/139/1999/	25-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report of the democratization division, Dec 1998 - 20 Feb 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/144/1999/	26-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Human Rights Bi-weekly report, 7-20 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/147/1999/	26-Feb-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 25 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/150/1999/	01-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Special report, "The detension of OSCE Members and Vehicles...", 25-26 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/151/1999/	01-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 26 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/154/1999/	01-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Report, 27-28 February 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/161/1999/	02-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity report, 1 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/163/1999/	03-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission:Mission Activity report, 2 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/166/1999/	04-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Activity Report, 3 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/173/1999/	05-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission activity report, 4 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/175/1999/	05-Mar-99	OSCE Presence in Albania: Spot Report: Kosovo Negotiations: Tirana Dimension	Restricted
SEC.FR/176/1999/	05-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Weekly Report, 22 February - 2 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/177/1999/	08-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 5 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/189/1999/	09-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 6 - 7 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/193/1999/	09-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 8 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/197/1999/	10-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 9 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/201/1999/	11-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 10 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/208/1999/	12-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 11 March 1999	Restricted

SEC.FR/209/1999/	15-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 12 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/210/1999/	15-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Spot report: bombings in Podujevo and Mitrovica	Restricted
SEC.FR/212/1999/	15-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Human Rights Report, 21 Feb - 6 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/213/1999/	15-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 13-14 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/217/1999/	16-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Weekly Report, 5-12 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/221/1999/	17-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 15 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/226/1999/	17-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 16 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/231/1999/	18-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission; Activity Report, 17 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/237/1999/	22-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 18 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/242/1999/	22-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 20 and 21 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/246/1999/	23-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 22 March 1999	Restricted
CIO.GAL/33/1999/	24-Mar-99	Kosovo Verification Mission: monthly report	Restricted
SEC.FR/254/1999/	25-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 23 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/258/1999/	25-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 24 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/260/1999/	29-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 26 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/265/1999/	29-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, period covered 27 and 28 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/267/1999/	29-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 25 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/270/1999/	30-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 29 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.GAL/45/1999/	30-Mar-99	Drawdown of the Kosovo Verification Mission	Restricted
SEC.FR/273/1999/	31-Mar-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 30 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/280/1999/	01-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 31 March 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/286/1999/	06-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report covering the period 2 - 5 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/299/1999/	07-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 6 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/311/1999/	09-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 7 - 8 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/319/1999/	12-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 9 - 11 April 1999	Restricted

SEC.FR/320/1999/	12-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Spot report: mission status 10/11 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/331/1999/	14-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity Report, 12 - 13 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/344/1999/	20-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo verification mission: activity report, 14-18 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/355/1999/	22-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 19 - 20 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/364/1999/	23-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Mission Status Report, 22 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/366/1999/	27-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 22 - 25 April 1999	Restricted
CIO.GAL/44/1999/	27-Apr-99	Kosovo Verification Mission: monthly report on the situation in Kosovo pursuant to the requirement set out in the UN Security Council resolutions 1160 and 1203, mid-March to mid-April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/377/1999/	29-Apr-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 26 - 27 April 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/387/1999/	04-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 28 April - 2 May 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/400/1999/	06-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 3 - 4 May 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/417/1999/	10-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 5 - 9 May 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/429/1999/	14-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 10-11 May 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/437/1999/	17-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Progress report: OSCE/KVM Refugee Task Force (Albania)	Restricted
SEC.FR/443/1999/	18-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report 13 - 16 May 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/463/1999/	20-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report 17 - 19 May 1999	Restricted
PC.FR/14/1999/	25-May-99	Speaking notes of Amb. Gabriel Keller on the occasion of his address to the informal ad hoc meeting (Kosovo-Sandjak-Voijvodina) on 25 May 1999, The OSCE/KVM: autopsy of a mission	Restricted
SEC.FR/469/1999/	25-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission Activity report 20-24 May 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/478/1999/	27-May-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report 25 - 26 May 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/499/1999/	07-Jun-99	OSCE Presence in Albania: Border Monitoring report, 3 - 6 June 1999, KVM refugee task force sitrep, 3 - 6 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/505/1999/	09-Jun-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 1 - 5 June 1999	Restricted

SEC.GAL/63/1999/	10-Jun-99	KVM: cessation of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and establishment of a transitional OSCE task force for Kosovo	Restricted
SEC.FR/516/1999/	15-Jun-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Activity report, 6 - 12 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/521/1999/	16-Jun-99	OSCE Task Force on Kosovo: activity report, 14 - 15 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/526/1999/	17-Jun-99	OSCE Task Force on Kosovo: Activity report, 16 - 17 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/523/1999/	18-Jun-99	OSCE Task Force on Kosovo: Activity report, 15-16 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/531/1999/	21-Jun-99	OSCE Task Force on Kosovo: Weekly progress report, No.1, 13-19 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/532/1999/	21-Jun-99	OSCE Task Force on Kosovo: Activity Report, 18 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/538/1999/	22-Jun-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: activity report, 19 - 21 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/541/1999/	23-Jun-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Activity report, 23 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/544/1999/	24-Jun-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Activity report, 23 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/549/1999/	28-Jun-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Activity report, 24 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/551/1999/	28-Jun-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Spot report: shooting of former OSCE interpreter in Pristina	Restricted
SEC.FR/552/1999/	28-Jun-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Activity report 25 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/555/1999/	29-Jun-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Activity report, 26 - 27 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/561/1999/	30-Jun-99	OSCE Task Force for Kosovo: Weekly progess report No. 2, 20 - 26 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/565/1999/	01-Jul-99	The Assessment team to Kosovo: Activity report, 28 - 29 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/566/1999/	01-Jul-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Spot report: meeting of the executive board for RTV Pristina	Restricted
SEC.FR/571/1999/	02-Jul-99	OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Activity report, 30 June 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/573/1999/	05-Jul-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: activity report, 1 July 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/577/1999/	05-Jul-99	The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo: Activity report, 2 July 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/578/1999/	05-Jul-99	OSCE Task Force for Kosovo: Weekly progress report No. 3, 27 June - 3 July 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/1/1999/	05-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim report 2 and 3 January 1999	Restricted

SEC.FR/2/1999/	06-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Human Rights Report until 26 December 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/4/1999/	06-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report 4 January 1999	Restricted
SEC.FR/8/1999/	07-Jan-99	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission: Interim Report, 5 January 1999	Restricted

National Archives, Kew, London, UK

File Reference	File Date	Official Description	Status
Records from series DEFE 13 Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files (all Ministers'); DEFE 70 Ministry of Defence (Army): Registered Files and Branch Folders; WO 305 War Office and Ministry of Defence: Army Unit Historical Records and Reports			
DEFE 13/3385	14 - 16 Jun 1999	Serbia and Kosovo: general, Ministry of Defence	Opened for public access on 19 Jan 2022
DEFE 70/3180	14 May – 26 June 1998	Europe: former Yugoslavia	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3181	29 June – 30 Aug 1998	Europe: former Yugoslavia	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3182	1 Sept – 4 Dec 1998	Former Yugoslavia	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3183	4 Mar – 9 June 1998	Kosovo	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3184	9 June – 16 July 1998	Kosovo	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3185	22 July – 11 Aug 1998	Kosovo	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3186	13 Aug – 29 Sept 1998	Kosovo	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022

DEFE 70/3187	28 Sept – 16 Oct 1998	Kosovo	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3188/1	27 Oct – 16 Nov 1998	Operation Upminster (Kosovo): Kosovo extraction force.	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3188/2	27 Oct – 16 Nov 1998	Operation Upminster (Kosovo): Kosovo extraction force.	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3189	24 Nov – 4 Dec 1998	Operation Upminster (Kosovo): Kosovo extraction force.	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3341/1	28 Jan – 26 Feb 1999	Kosovo	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3341/2	28 Jan – 26 Feb 1999	Kosovo	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
DEFE 70/3357	14 Jun – 30 Nov 1999	Kosovo Lessons Learned	Opened for public access on 3 March 2022
WO 305/8916	1 Dec 1998 – 31 Mar 1999	Commanders Diary, Operation Upminster (Kosovo extraction force): 1st Battalion, The Kings Own Royal Border Regiment	Opened for public access on 28 May 2022
WO 305/9006	1 Dec 1998 – 31 Mar 1999	Commanders Diary, Operation Upminster (Kosovo extraction force): 1st Battalion, The Kings Own Royal Border Regiment	Opened for public access on 11 Nov 2022
Records from series PREM 49 Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1997-2010			
PREM 49/321	2 Feb – 27 Apr 1998	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 3	Opened for public access on 30 Dec 2021
PREM 49/322	1 May – 3 July 1998	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 4	Opened for public access on 30 Dec 2021
PREM 49/323	6 July – 24 Sept 1998	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 5	Opened for public access on 30 Dec 2021

PREM 49/324	25 Sept – 19 Oct 1998	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 6	Opened for public access on 4 Sept 2023
PREM 49/767	20 Oct 1998 – 25 Jan 1999	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 7	Opened for public access on 4 Sept 2023
PREM 49/768	26 Jan – 26 Feb 1999	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 8	Opened for public access on 4 Sept 2023
PREM 49/772	30 March 1999	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 12	Opened for public access on 11 Dec 2023
PREM 49/774	3 – 4 Apr 1999	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 14	Opened for public access on 4 Sept 2023
PREM 49/775	5 – 6 Apr 1999	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 15	Opened for public access on 4 Sept 2023
PREM 49/776	7 – 8 Apr 1999	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 16	Opened for public access on 19 July 2022
PREM 49/777	9 – 12 Apr 1999	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 17	Opened for public access on 11 Dec 2023
PREM 49/780	18 – 19 Apr 1999	FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. Internal situation: UK/Yugoslavia relations; part 20	Opened for public access on 4 Sept 2023

Templer Study Centre, National Army Museum, London, UK

Accession Reference	File Date	Description	Status
2020-05-2-1	13 Feb 2020	Oral history interview with Capt Gemma Morgan, Royal Logistics Corps, 13 Feb 2020; interview covers life before joining the army, Morgan's training at Sandhurst, time spent in Kosovo, suffering with PTSD, life after the army and work with charities; associated with Kosovo (1999-).	Open to public access

2020-02-22-1	None given	Collection of 14 digital photographs related to Capt Gemma Morgan, Royal Logistic Corps; associated with OSCE's (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), Kosovo, 1998-1999 and 2000-2001; acquired for use in the National Army Museum's exhibition, 'Road to Recovery'.	Open to public access
2014-02-16	15 July 2009	Oral history interview with Maj Alexander Turner, Irish Guards, 1998- ; interview conducted by Mairead O'Hara at Victoria Barracks, Windsor for the National Army Museum Conflicts of Interest gallery, 15 Jul 2009; interview covers his training and commissioning at Sandhurst, service in Kosovo 1999 and experiences with disputes between Albanians and Serbs, Iraq 2003 on Telic 1; digital audio file, duration: 1 hr 12 min 10 sec; associated with Kosovo (1999-2008) and Iraq (2003-2011).	Open to public access
2013-02-18	6 May 2009	Oral history interview with Col Simon Fordham, Royal Irish Regiment and Royal Irish Rangers, conducted by Mairead O'Hara, 30 Apr 2009 and 6 May 2009; interview covers his Army service 1973-2004, discussing his service in South America, Belize, Berlin, Northern Ireland, Uganda, Cyprus, the Gulf War, Rwanda, Kosovo and Sierra Leone; digital audio file, five files, duration: 3 hr 18 min 55 sec in total; associated with Cold War (1945-1991), Gulf War (1990-1991), Rwanda (1994), Northern Ireland (1969-2007), Kosovo (1999-), Sierra Leone (2000-2001).	Open to public access
2012-11-27	15 July 2009	Oral history interview with Capt Paul Fagin, Irish Guards, conducted by Mairead O'Hara at Victoria Barracks, Windsor, 15 Jul 2009; conducted for the National Army Museum Conflicts of Interest Exhibition (2009); digital audio file, two files, duration 29 min 40 sec and 1 hr 7 min 19 sec; associated with Northern Ireland (1969-2007), Kosovo (1999-) and Iraq (2003-2009).	Open to public access
2020-02-7-1	3 Feb 2020	Oral history interview with Cpl Ben Mead, Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and Royal Signals, 3 Feb 2020; interview covers Mead's	Open to public access

		service in the army, injuries he sustained whilst serving in Afghanistan, suffering from PTSD and impact on his mental health and Mead's involvement with Waterloo Uncovered.	

Government Offices, Sweden

File Reference	File Date	Description	Status
UD2023/10477	10 Nov 1998 – 24 Feb 1999	14 pages of documentation, mostly concerning the secondment of personnel to the KVM	Disclosed without specific conditions