DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE PROCESS TRACING OF POP CULTURE, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND SOFT POWER A comparative study between Korea and Japan Linnéa Mossberg Master’s Thesis: 30 credits Programme: Master’s Programme in Political Science Date: 2025-01-07 Supervisor: Monika de Silva and Ann-Marie Ekengren Words: 15 884 Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to test under what conditions pop culture can be used for soft power creation. The scientific background to this research problem is rooted in that the evidence from previous research is inconsistent, since some results point out that governmental efforts could do more harm than good for a country’s pop cultural soft power generation, while some results instead support state-led pop cultural promoting efforts. This is problematic since it can make it complicated for states to shape efficient public diplomacy efforts. While current theoretical framework and previous research highlights the importance of several factors in soft power generation and public diplomacy efforts aimed at foreign publics, such as voluntary actions, attraction, dialogue-styled communication efforts, sincere messages, and an active civil society, it is difficult to see how these different mechanisms could lead to pop cultural soft power generation, and under which conditions these mechanisms have a positive effect on pop culture soft power. Therefore, this study combines the insights from previous research with current theoretical framework to create a new analytical framework. The framework is aimed at testing under what conditions three public diplomacy mechanisms; contents and messages, civic virtue and civil society, and financial investments and supportive policies, can increase pop cultural soft power generation. By comparing the cases of Korea and Japan, the results from this investigation suggest that the conditions under which the three public diplomacy mechanisms function are important for pop culture soft power generation. Keywords: Pop culture, Public diplomacy, Soft power, Korea, Japan. NOTE: To whom it may concern: This thesis is partially based on my research proposal that I previously submitted during course SF2323 the autumn semester 2023. 2 Table of Contents: 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 4 2. Literature review ....................................................................................................... 8 2.1. Definition of soft power ....................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Contents and messages ....................................................................................................... 10 2.3. Civic virtue and civil society ........................................................................................ 13 2.4. Financial investments and supportive policies ............................................................. 15 3. Theoretical approach ............................................................................................... 18 3.1. Summary of insights from current theory and literature review ...................................... 18 3.2. Analytical framework: Public diplomacy mechanisms and conditions for pop cultural soft power generation ..................................................................................................................... 19 4. Research design and methods for gathering and analyzing data ............................ 20 4.1. Case selection and expectations ......................................................................................... 20 4.2. Comparative process tracing method ................................................................................ 22 4.3. Material selection and data analysis ............................................................................ 22 4.4 Limitations and overall quality of the study ....................................................................... 23 5. Results ..................................................................................................................... 24 5.1. The Korean case ................................................................................................................ 24 5.2. Summary of mechanisms and conditions in the Korean case ............................................ 30 5.3. The Japanese case .............................................................................................................. 30 5.4. Summary of mechanisms and conditions in the Japanese case ......................................... 35 6. Concluding discussion ............................................................................................. 36 7. Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 40 3 1. Introduction Soft power is becoming an increasingly important element in international relations because of the evolving interconnected and globalised world order of modern society. A consequence of this interconnected development is also that the world also is becoming more insecure and unstable, with fewer possibilities to predict the behaviour and actions of states, private actors, and ordinary people since we now all depend on each other in a more complex global landscape, and power is no longer measurable in just clear terms like the size of military fleets or economic growth. Instead, with the rapid development of information technologies and media and communication forums, the importance of promoting and sending the right contents and messages to the right receivers has become a key aspect in international relations when the goal for the governments is to share a positive and favourable view of the country (CJPMC, 2014; Korea Foundation, 2024). The nature of power in international relations has changed, and hard power like the size of the military fleet or economic growth are no longer the only given indicators of power. Power is universal, everyone depends on it and aims to predict, analyse and describe power (Nye, 2004). In addition, power is always context-dependent and cannot exist in a vacuum. Power is easier to experience than to define, but in general power is the ability to get the results or outcomes that one aims to get, and to influence others to give you the result that you seek. Again, power is always relational, and it is defined by the context within which it exists (Nye, 2004). If hard power can be seen in terms of military size or economic prosperity, soft power is more difficult to define, harness and identify. In opposite to hard power, which is based on force, threats, payment and/or coerciveness, soft power can be defined as the ability to attract others that voluntarily can give you what you want, rather than to force them to give this to you. It is about getting others to want the same as you want, and to shape their preferences according to these interests (Chitty, 2017; Nye, 2004). Soft power can be generated through three main resources, which are foreign policies, domestic and international values, and culture. The cultural dimension can be divided into high culture (art, literature, education) and pop culture (music, food, TV-series, films, games, characters) (Nye, 2004). Furthermore, Chitty theorises that the attractiveness of soft power can be built upon three qualities, which are beauty/charisma, competence/brilliance, and benignity/kindness. These different qualities can act as soft power generators and generate 4 different types of soft power, through inspiration, admiration, and gratitude and sympathy (Chitty, 2017). See overview of the soft power model in figure 1 below: Figure 1: Types of soft power resources, qualities, and types of generated soft power: As illustrated by the large arrow below, the sender can use the three soft power resources and shape them into content and messages which hopefully will be seen as attractive to the receiver. The attractive qualities are theorised to be beauty/charisma, competence/brilliance, and kindness/benignity. Each of these three qualities do then generate three different types of soft power in the minds of the receivers: Inspiration, admiration or sympathy and gratitude. Types of soft power resources: Culture, divided into: • High Domestic and culture Foreign international • Pop Policies political values Culture Communication from resource sender to receiver, receiver will see attractive qualities in the content Qualities: Type of generated soft power in the minds of the receivers: Beauty/Charisma Inspiration Competence/Brilliance Admiration Kindness/Benignity Sympathy and gratitude 5 This thesis aims to shed light on how governments can use the resource pop culture as a possible foundation in order to increase the country’s soft power. A couple of examples of this kind of efforts are active promotion of films through state-sponsored film screenings, or arranging friendship concerts with governmental support. However, previous research presents inconsistent results on when, how, and even if a state can and should make use of pop culture as a governmental tool for soft power generation. In addition, the current theoretical framework does not seem to be able to fully explain for these different results (Ahn & Lim, 2023; Bae & Lee, 2020; Biltekin, 2020; Chitty, 2017; Iwabuchi, 2015; Jung, Choi, Lee, Jeh, Jung, 2023; Kim, 2024; Lien, Tang, Zuloaga, 2022; Nye, 2004; Otmazgin, 2021; Yeo, Lee, Eschbach, 2024; Yoon, 2023; Yun & Vibber, 2012). In some cases, state-led efforts could do more harm than good, for example as shown by Otmazgin (2021), Iwabuchi (2015), and Jung et al (2023). But in other cases, it seems like the government has been able to use pop culture as a soft power generating resource, for instance as an element in successful public diplomacy efforts, as shown by Ahn & Lim (2023) and Lien, Tang & Zuloaga (2022). This conflicting evidence is troublesome since pop culture is one potential source for soft power generation, and the levels of soft power could create large differences for a country’s development and influence in the international community. Pop cultural soft power has the potential to contribute to economic growth, increased tourism, and an increase in the overall awareness and interest in a country’s society, welfare, culture and language. However, if the attempts to use pop culture as a soft power resource instead are perceived as illegitimate or come close to propaganda, the country might have spent both money and time on efforts that lead to a loss of credibility and influence, thereby turning potential soft power-resources into potential weaknesses (Chitty, 2017; Nye, 2004). Therefore, it would be beneficial to try and identify potential conditions that could contribute to an increased understanding of how pop culture and soft power can be linked together (Bryman, 2016; Gerring, 2017). A better understanding of these conditions can hopefully also lead to more efficient and effective soft power generating efforts, for instance such as better public diplomacy, efficient governmental support for the cultural sector, and mutually beneficial international exchanges. In order to make an attempt and try and investigate under which conditions pop culture can generate soft power, this thesis aims to conduct a comparative process tracing investigation, in which important conditions hopefully can be identified (Beach, 2017; Collier, 2011; 6 Gerring, 2017; Trampusch & Palier, 2017). The new analytical framework for this thesis is based on both the current theoretical points of departure, and findings from previous research on pop cultural soft power (Ahn & Lim, 2023; Bae & Lee, 2020; Beach, 2017; Biltekin, 2020; Chitty, 2017; Iwabuchi, 2015; Jung, Choi, Lee, Jeh, Jung, 2023; Kim, 2024; Lien, Tang, Zuloaga, 2022; Nye, 2004; Otmazgin, 2021; Trampusch & Palier, 2016; Yeo, Lee, Eschbach, 2024; Yoon, 2023; Yun & Vibber, 2012). The selected cases for this study are South Korea (Korea hereinafter) and Japan. The reason for this case selection is that Korea and Japan are similar in many ways. Both countries are located in Eastern Asia, their cultures are fairly similar, and they are both democratic OECD- countries with high economic growth, strong industries and high export dependency. As two middle power-states, soft power can be an important element to use in order to get better opportunities for global cooperation, catch international attention and build sustainable and mutually beneficial relationships. Since the goal for both Japan and Korea is to create a good foundation for such as international influence, global cooperation, trade, investment and exchange opportunities, tourism, and increase the spread of overall positive views on the country, as well as become a strong voice in the international community, soft power could be a helpful component in order to achieve this (CJPMC, 2014; CJPMC 2018; Korea Foundation, 2024). However, it is important to keep in mind that it is not possible to measure pop cultural soft power simply in numbers. While numbers on export value and commercial success are possible indicators of soft power, it is still important to remember that soft power is produced in the minds of the receivers. Therefore, important indicators of pop cultural soft power are also such as favourable mentions in international media, global acknowledgements of language and culture, and collaborations with internationally acclaimed organisations and companies. Because of their many similarities, it would be reasonable to assume that their pop cultural soft power also would be generated in similar ways, and based on similar resources. However, in recent years, Korean pop culture has become widely popular worldwide and is acknowledged as a soft power-generating resource, while Japan not seem to be quite as successful. In previous research and in current theoretical frameworks, there seems to be a number of potential explanations that could help to explain why this difference exists, and according to literature and theory, some potential conditions that are beneficial for pop 7 cultural soft power generation are such as private and governmental interest in cultural creation and promotion, and effective and appropriate communication and public diplomacy. Therefore, the general aim of this thesis is to make an attempt to present a possible explanation regarding why the success of pop cultural soft power sometimes is unclear and conflicting, and to illustrate how certain conditions can be beneficial in pop cultural soft power generation (Beach, 2017; Bryman, 2016; Collier, 2011; Geddes, 1990; Gerring, 2007; Gerring, 2017; Trampusch & Palier, 2016). With this in mind, the specific research question for this thesis is “Under what conditions can pop culture be used for soft power creation?” Figure 2: Potential link between the variables X and Y: Independent variable, X: Dependent variable, Y: Pop culture public Soft power diplomacy The structure of this thesis is the following: The next section contains a literature review, where the theoretical points of departure and results from previous research are presented. In the third section, the insights from the literature review are discussed, and the new analytical framework that can help to identify beneficial conditions are presented. The fourth section is the methodological section, before the results of the study are presented in the following fifth section. Finally, the results are summarized and discussed in a concluding sixth section. 2. Literature review In this section, an overview of the theoretical model of soft power, as mentioned in the introduction (see figure 1) is presented. Then the results from previous research on possible important public diplomacy mechanisms regarding pop cultural soft power creation follow. 2.1. Definition of soft power The theoretical model of soft power for this thesis is based on the thoughts of Nye (2004) and Chitty (2017), who suggest several possible conditions for successful soft power generation. 8 It is important to remember that the admiration and attraction must be real and legitimate, soft power should not be tricking anyone into believing in false messages that could harm the real resources that holds the soft power (Nye, 2004). Soft power was coined by Joseph Nye and has become a well-known concept, especially in Eastern Asia, even though Nye’s concept of soft power was developed in an American context (Nye, 2004). Nye’s definition of soft power is that it is the ability to attract others that voluntarily can give you what you want, rather than to force them to give this to you. It is about getting others to want the same as you want, and to shape their preferences accordingly. Soft power does not involve force, threats, or payments, and the source of soft power is based on the state’s attractive (in the eyes of the receiver) resources. According to Nye, there are three main resources of soft power that a country can use, and these are legitimate foreign policies, domestically and internationally acknowledged political values, and attractive cultural elements. Culture can be divided into high culture and pop culture. High culture includes art, literature, and education, while pop culture includes music, food, TV-series and films just to name a few. Since pop cultural soft power is the main interest of this investigation, the majority of this text will focus on the pop cultural resources (Nye, 2004). Soft power is receiver-dependent, in the sense that the receiver themselves play an active part in understanding and interpreting the messages. It is very important to note that, in democratic, liberal states and societies, no government can, shall or should try to control pop culture. The policies need to support the resources, not decrease their potential soft power (Nye, 2004). In addition to Nye’s thoughts, Chitty theorises that the attractiveness of soft power can be built upon three factors, which are beauty/charisma, competence/brilliance, and benignity/kindness. These different qualities can induce soft power in the minds of the receivers and generate soft power in different ways, through admiration, inspiration, and gratitude, sympathy and empathy. The qualities can therefore be constructed as soft power assets and packaged into conveyable messages and communication. For pop culture, Chitty theorises that pop culture can be resources for soft power since it can be both brilliant and beautiful, and therefore it can generate both admiration and inspiration (Chitty, 2017). 9 When reading Nye’s and Chitty’s thoughts and reviewing previous literature, I would say that there seems to be three main mechanisms within public diplomacy, where governmental efforts can be of use to create beneficial conditions for the generation of pop cultural soft power. These three public diplomacy mechanisms are: • Contents and messages • Civic virtue and civil society • Financial investments and supportive policies 2.2 Contents and messages According to Nye, soft power is about building long-term mutually beneficial relationships between the government of one country and foreign publics, and public diplomacy is an important tool that governments can use in order to establish these relationships (Nye, 2004). Public diplomacy can be seen as a three-dimensional tool, consisting of daily communications (such as news and information about the country), strategic communications (such as campaigns and events), and different kinds of meetings and exchanges (such as scholarships and conferences) Public diplomacy cannot be too self-serving, they have to be mutually beneficial for both sender and receiver of the messages. Since public diplomacy involves both listening as well as talking, it is important to understand the audience to which the messages are directed to (Chitty, 2017; Nye, 2004). The purpose of public diplomacy is to build and establish relationships that are mutually beneficial and that can create, strengthen and promote shared interests and mutual positive attitudes. Chitty argues that the receivers of public diplomacy not are passive targets. Instead, they are the ones who actually produce the soft power through their own perceptions about the sender. Attraction is constructed actively in the minds of the receivers (Chitty, 2017). Results from previous research support the theoretical claim of the importance of adequate public diplomacy messages and contents as a condition for pop cultural soft power generation, but the results also highlight that all kinds of public diplomacy messages not are beneficial. On one hand, public diplomacy seems to be able to have a positive effect on pop cultural soft power, as shown by both Ahn & Lim (2023), and Lien, Tang and Zuloaga (2022). The general interest in and positive attitudes toward pop cultural content can create a demand for an increased supply of culture, which then also creates a reinforcing cycle. Pop culture can create 10 and increase positive views and attraction, which then are reinforced by the increased engagement in culture through state-led cultural organizations such as the Korean King Sejong Institute (KSI). KSIs are language and cultural schools, and an important part of Korea’s public diplomacy and soft power creation. It is shown that pop culture can create, and increase, the publics interests in and positive views on the country of origin, and this attraction is then reinforced by the state-led KSI, which also seem to increase the positive effects of pop culture public diplomacy on important economic factors such as tourism and trade (Lien, Tang, Zuloaga, 2022). Furthermore, it is shown that the presence of KSIs in foreign countries seem to lead to a higher likelihood of that the foreign country will align their votes with Korea when voting in the UN, which also can be seen as a soft power indicator (Ahn & Lim, 2023). Two mechanisms are theorised to be at play here, one where the exposure to language and culture is thought to create a positive view on Korea among the foreign publics, and a second one where experts, scholars and domestically powerful people, such as politicians, can form networks with the KSIs and later have an impact on the policies and politics in their country and influence the politics to align with Korea’s interests. These two mechanisms can also become increasingly intertwined, as members of the foreign publics, such as students, first can belong to the first mechanism, and later move on to become a part of an expert network or similar, and work to improve the connections between the own country and Korea (Ahn & Lim, 2023). The pop cultural soft power that is generated through KSIs might help to also generate support for core interests, such as security and peace on the Korean peninsula. The results show that the KSIs could be useful elements of Korea’s public diplomacy, and that countries where KSIs were established tended to vote more frequently in a way that was beneficial for Koreas national interests (Ahn & Lim, 2023). On the other hand, the use of public diplomacy is not always a way to create favourable conditions for pop cultural soft power generation. In East Asia, where governments spend large sums of money on cultural diplomacy and educational programs, public diplomacy has a very central role in the diplomatic strategies (Otmazgin, 2021). However, compared to Europe or the US, the public diplomacy in East Asia tends to be more driven by state-led initiatives and official institutions, the governments often have close ties to the private sector in a way that is different from in the West. In East Asia, the public diplomacy is driven more by government to people-efforts, compared to people to people-interaction. Of course, there are also differences even between Asian countries, and public diplomacy looks different in a democracy like Japan or Korea, compared to the much more authoritarian China. As an 11 authoritarian state, China has a strong media censorship and limited individual rights, and their public diplomacy is much more controlled and state-regulated. The state has invested much in media broadcasting in order to foster a positive image of the country, but since censorship and state control is strong, these public diplomacy efforts may come across as being closer to propaganda than to soft power. China has strived to be seen as peaceful, but their messages and domestic practices are too far from each other, making Chinese cultural public diplomacy perceived as less genuine (Otmazgin, 2021). In comparison, the democracies Japan and Korea do not face the issue of state censorship, their markets are free, and their civil societies are strong. However, even if there are differences between democratic and authoritarian countries, findings suggest that the governments in general have a tendency to shape their cultural public diplomacy in a government-centric way, with little room for interaction and dialogues between sender and receiver of soft power. Social media is integrated, but the efforts are not based on common conversations and engagement (Otmazgin, 2021). After World War II, Japan’s cultural diplomacy became a way to improve the international perceptions about Japan, particularly in Southeast Asia. Later, politicians became increasingly interested in cultural diplomacy, and as mentioned, the “Cool Japan”- campaign was launched. However, the general conclusion is that Japanese pop-culture diplomacy largely has been shaped as a projection of a selected image of the country’s pop culture (Iwabuchi, 2015). To the Japanese government, it seems clear that pop culture can be an important soft power resource for public diplomacy efforts, but they do not use it in an efficient way. The shape of the public diplomacy as a simple projection does not offer any opportunities for international cultural exchanges, and there seem to be little mutual interests. Instead, it would perhaps be beneficial to both promote a more multi-facetted domestic cultural image, shape the pop culture public diplomacy to become more action-based and engage with the publics (Iwabuchi, 2015). While Japan launched their “Cool Japan”- campaign as an attempt to make the perceptions of the country more positive after the second World War, Korea followed later through the spread of Hallyu, which means the Korean Wave of pop culture (Iwabuchi, 2015; Otmazgin, 2021). Even though Hallyu has been supported through various government investments, it is valuable to note that several studies show that Hallyu not is the result of policy, but that policies are the result of Hallyu (Otmazgin, 2021). 12 2.3. Civic virtue and civil society Chitty has attempted to develop Nye’s theory on soft power and public diplomacy by adding the element of civic virtue. Listening to and engaging in political participation are seen as important civic virtue features, and cooperation between governments and the domestic public is an element of good governance, which later can be a foundation for soft power efforts and promotion (Chitty, 2017). Civic virtue can motivate the public in a country to engage in civil diplomacy and help to send messages regarding cultural heritage and pop culture to foreign publics in other countries. This means that it is necessary for the domestic civil society to engage both with their own government and with foreign civil societies, which are the foreign publics in other countries, in order to establish relationships that can be mutually beneficial for both the sender and the receivers. In a similar vein, it can also be this civic virtue that actually makes ordinary citizens interested in cultural production and cultural promotion, since they are striving to do something that could be beneficial both for themselves and for their country (Chitty, 2017). Hence, civil society, consisting of both individual citizens and private businesses, can act as an important element in soft power creation through civic virtue (Kim, 2024). Kim investigates the Korean case through the lens of civic virtue, and even if pop culture factors such as music, films and series, food, sports and more have been promoted by the government through various institutions like the Korea Foundation, different ministries, and the Public Diplomacy Act which was passed in 2016, the author argues that civic virtue has played a crucial role to lay the foundation for these promoting efforts. Citizens and the government can generate soft power individually or together, and in the Korean case, the period between the 1990s and the early 2000s seems to display civic virtue soft power based on liberal values, democratic development, and a stronger civil society, which later was the foundation for a free market, creation of pop culture, and both internal (domestic) and external (international) soft power (Kim, 2024). During the next period, between the mid 2000s and the early 2010s, Korea became increasingly engaged in cultural diplomacy and public engagement, and the focus on external soft power increased. The last period from the late 2010s to now has seen the emergence of an active civil society, which is aware of international matters, and which actively embodies liberal values and democratic engagement. In other words, through the lens of civic virtue soft power theory, the internal soft power, consisting of good governance and quality of government, seemed to have been a necessary precondition in order for the external soft power to increase (Kim, 2024). 13 Another example of how important civil society can be is shown in an investigation where Chinese students who came to Korea after being attracted to Hallyu-content actually seemed to dislike Korea when they finally went there. In a survey, it is shown that 40 % of Chinese students who are studying in Korea, and who previously were attracted to Korean pop culture, now have negative views of Korea after being there. Hence, the difference between opinions about pop culture and real-life experiences seem to vary largely, and direct contact between people seem to have the potential to make or break a country’s soft power (Yun & Vibber, 2012). When travelling to the country of origin, foreign publics will come in contact with culture, values, people, organisations and institutions, and these experiences can be crucial in shaping a person’s attitude towards the country in comparison with expectations from pop culture. This is not a problem that seem to be unique to Korea, since earlier studies also show a similar pattern when Korean students came to Japan, and their view on Japan became increasingly negative. They stayed for about a year, and their views only become worse and worse when staying longer and learning more and more Japanese language. Discrimination and prejudice were the main reasons for this increasingly negative experience (Yun & Vibber, 2012). However, this seem to vary depending on how long foreign students stay in their host country, after a certain time, the attitude seems to become increasingly positive again. In addition, Chinese students who went to Japan had negative views on the country while they were there, but after returning home, the attitude towards Japan become more positive again. In the current survey, the two major reasons for the increase in negative views on Korea was the Koreans discrimination of the Chinese while in Korea, and that the Korean media portrayed Chinese matters in incorrect ways. The Chinese students became an active public, transferring their negative views onto the population home in China through communication technology. In conclusion, even if the fact that foreign students decide to come to a country and study might be an indicator of soft power, there is little time for rest if the soft power shall persist in the long run. Soft power creation is an ongoing process, and if the soft power that is generated from pop culture shall stay impactful, it is necessary to keep up the efforts also on home soil (Yun & Vibber, 2012). The impact of voluntary citizen engagement on soft power generation is also displayed through an investigation on Swedish Women Education Organisation, SWEA. It is a non-state network organised by Swedish women who live abroad and the aim of this network is to increase the interest for Swedish culture abroad, in this case in America (Biltekin, 2020). The women become unofficial ambassadors for Sweden and Swedish culture through their unpaid 14 and regular activates. Cultural diplomacy includes an exchange between states’ and peoples’ cultural ideas, practices, information, or art in order to create mutually beneficial relationships and increase the understanding for each other. The members of SWEA did actively seek out a stable relationship with Swedish state-officials in order to increase the contacts, and make SWEA a more representative organisation. In return, the state was given a network of unpaid ambassadors which worked to promote Swedish culture, creating a reinforcing relationship here as well. Hence, even if Swedish women in another country, in this case the US, might seem to have little to do with diplomatic ties at first sight, it is shown that they instead can become very important parts of cultural soft power generation and these activities (Biltekin, 2020). 2.4. Financial investments and supportive policies While the two conditions discussed above, adequate public diplomacy and an active civil society, are both theorised and supported in research as impactful conditions, there is not as much theoretical reasoning regarding the third condition which is financial support and supportive policies. Nye (2004) mentions that governmental policies need to support the soft power resources and not decrease their potential soft power, but the importance of this support is discussed more in previous research. As mentioned above in the public diplomacy- section, both Japan and Korea have invested much in the creative industries, but in different ways. For the Korean case, it is argued that the success of Hallyu not is the result of policies, but that policies instead are shaped by Hallyu (Otmazgin, 2021). By contrast, Japan has also invested heavily in creating more pop cultural soft power, but their efforts are still perceived to be more of a one-way projection (Iwabuchi, 2015). These results indicate that the pop cultural industries indeed need appropriate governmental support through investment and supportive policies, but that the governmental actors should keep their distance in the actual creative production and instead take on a promoting and monitoring role. A few studies support this suggestion, and emphasize the importance of voluntary attraction and reinforcing mechanisms where national and international acknowledgement strengthens each other and increase the soft power generation. A central feature of soft power is the emphasize on voluntary attraction and changes of behaviour and perception, it is therefore argued that soft power can be investigated through measuring the positive voluntary actions/behaviour. The indirect experiences, such as consuming pop culture, seem to generate larger positive interests than the direct experience, 15 which is visiting the country (Yeo, Lee, Eschbach, 2023). Furthermore, a general interest in the resource country seem to make the effect of both indirect and direct experiences less impactful. By operationalising soft power as voluntary positive actions and positive megaphoning, which means the sharing of positive narratives and views about the country, the authors make an attempt to investigate soft power (Yeo, Lee, Eschbach, 2023). The indirect experiences used to be thought to be of less importance since they were seen as more passive, but now the foreign publics are also able to voluntarily seek out more indirect experiences, thanks to better internet access and information flow. Using statistical analysis based on the results from a survey conducted in Indonesia, the results show that the indirect voluntary, spontaneous experiences, like watching a TV-series from a country, can increase the interest for that country, and also increase the likelihood for positive megaphoning. However, a high level of general interest in a country reduces the impact of the experiences, as the perception already is positive (Yeo, Lee, Eschbach, 2023). A potential take-away from this study is therefore that the state ought to invest more in order to create opportunities where foreign publics can come in contact with pop culture through voluntary and spontaneous actions, since these actions can be just as soft power producing as the direct experiences. Furthermore, the interest in Korean pop culture among foreign publics does not necessarily mean that these publics also will support important political matters. As an investigation by Jung et al (2023) shows, culture seems to have less impact on the quest for unification and peace on the Korean peninsula. Through a survey with foreign publics in Korea’s neighbouring countries and a following analysis, the results here show that foreign publics that have been positively influenced by Korean pop culture also tend to become interested in other aspects such as Korean politics, economics, and history. However, the interest and engagement for Korean unification and inter-Korean peace still seems to be little among these foreign publics. Hence, pop culture generates soft power through voluntary attraction and positive images of Korea as a country, but this does not extend to peace and unification on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, the government should refrain from using pop cultural soft power for peace and unification-purposes. Pop cultural soft power should remain as it is, not forced be converted into governmental messages in political agendas. Pop culture has its own value and the best the government can do is to create conditions for the pop culture to grow and spread both domestically and internationally without any additional goals (Jung et al, 2023). 16 The importance of national and international acknowledgement is also highlighted in different ways by both Yoon (2023) and Bae & Lee (2020). In a discourse analysis where Korean pop culture is the focus, Yoon examines how pop culture is discussed in both mainstream newspapers and in user-driven social media. In the mainstream newspapers, Korean pop culture is mentioned as a soft power resource after times where the successful cultural exports have won different international prizes or awards. Hence, it seems that the international popularity of these cultural exports came first, and they were seen as soft power assets first after that they actually have gathered international praise of some kind. Similarly, in the user-driven social media, the content and comments do also mention Korean pop culture as a soft power resource. Hence, the results seem to point towards the presence of some kind of reinforcing mechanism, where both national and international acknowledgement and identification are important features (Yoon, 2023). The results from this study point towards that pop culture has a better chance at becoming a soft power generating resource if the pop culture content is allowed to spread on its own in the international scene, rather than promoting it too much. As mentioned earlier, the voluntary and spontaneous contacts and experiences are an important part in pop cultural soft power generation. In a similar vein, Bae & Lee attempts to present an analytical framework where a reinforcing mechanism is the key concept (Bae & Lee, 2020). Even though the case in Bae & Lee’s investigation not regards pop culture but foreign aid, it can still be valuable in order to understand favourable conditions for soft power creation in general. Their framework is based on a dual process of both national self-identification and international recognition. The framework emphasizes voluntary choice, and soft power is seen as a productive power, where the sender/country of origin and the receiver/foreign publics interact in order for the soft power to actually become created. Since soft power only can be created in the minds of the receivers, the foreign publics need to develop their own attraction to, positive views on, and interests in the senders’ resources. In this case, the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) was not the main element in Korea’s foreign aid policy before a few developing countries actually expressed their approval of it, with the aim to learn from the Program (Bae & Lee, 2020). Before the Program became popular among the international audience, the awareness of the Program was low. It was a model used by Korea, as a part of their national self-identification, and when it became popular and received international recognition, it reinforced the national self-identification. Hence, the dual process of national and international identification and recognition seems to be at play here (Bae & Lee, 2020). 17 3. Theoretical approach In this section, the purpose is to present the theoretical foundation for this thesis. However, it is first necessary to summarize the insights from current theory and from the literature review. 3.1. Summary of insights from current theory and literature review The theoretical reasoning suggested by Nye and Chitty is supported by scientific evidence in several cases. Together, their theoretical arguments on public diplomacy and soft power creation emphasize elements such as voluntary attraction, autonomy of the creative industries, adequately shaped messages and contents, and the importance of encouraging and motivating citizens through civic virtue. As mentioned above, all these conditions are supported by scientific findings. Voluntary attraction is highlighted by Yeo, Lee and Eschbach (2023). The importance of the autonomy of the pop cultural industry is discussed in Iwabuchi (2015), Jung et al (2023), and Otmazgin (2021). The positive effect of adequate supporting state-led efforts, such as public diplomacy is shown by Ahn & Lim (2023) and Lien, Tang & Zuolaga (2022). Civic virtue and the important role of ordinary citizens is demonstrated by Biltekin (2020), Kim (2024), and Yun & Vibber (2012). In addition to these conditions for pop cultural public diplomacy and soft power generation, which are rooted in theoretical reasoning, previous research do also show that it is important to let pop culture be the driver of pop cultural public diplomacy efforts and soft power policies and to allow a reinforcing mechanism of domestic and international recognition to be at play instead of promoting potential soft power generating resources too much (Bae & Lee, 2020; Iwabuchi, 2015; Otmazgin, 2021: Yoon, 2023) Since the aim of this thesis is to investigate under which conditions pop culture public diplomacy can be used as a resource for soft power creation, an analytical framework that can help to identify these conditions is necessary. While the current theoretical thoughts presented by Nye and Chitty seem to be fairly accurate since many of their suggested elements for soft power generation also are supported by scientific findings, theory does still not give a broader explanation for how different public diplomacy mechanisms can interact with each other, and how these mechanisms can function under different conditions. For instance, current theory does not explain if a public diplomacy mechanism such as an active civil society also affects the possibility for the government to create adequately shaped public diplomacy messages, or if these mechanisms can function independently of each other. This is problematic because the theoretical foundation does not give a full image of how a government can act in order to 18 create pop cultural soft power. In addition, findings from previous research do confirm many parts of the theoretical framework, but these supportive results are found in several separate studies, which makes it difficult to get a complete understanding of how different conditions that can affect pop cultural public diplomacy and soft power generation. By reviewing current theoretical reasoning and insights from previous research, I would say that there are three main public diplomacy mechanisms that the government can use to create conditions under which pop cultural soft power can be generated. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, these three are: • Contents and messages • Civic virtue and civil society • Financial investments and supportive policies However, as pointed out in both theory and previous research, these mechanisms need to be shaped and used appropriately if they shall help the soft power creation. In the new analytical framework below, the conditions under which these three mechanisms can become helpful in pop cultural soft power creation is described more in detail, as suggested by both theory and research: 3.2. Analytical framework: Public diplomacy mechanisms and conditions for pop cultural soft power generation Conditions for Contents and messages: There are several conditions that affect if public diplomacy efforts can become a helpful mechanism for soft power creation. The public diplomacy communication should be dialogue-styled, and not too self-serving like a one-way projection. The messages shall be based on genuine content in order to encourage mutual exchanges and create opportunities to build long-term relationships based on common interests. When the government has become aware of the international interest for their pop culture, they can use state-led efforts in order to further increase this interest, but the initial promotion should not be too excessive before the pop cultural content has received both domestic and international acknowledgement and appreciation on its own. Pop culture should be the driver of the public diplomacy messages and contents. 19 Conditions for Civic virtue and civil society: The government should motivate citizens to engage in activities which can help to spread positive images of their country. In this specific context, the government should create conditions which makes it possible for citizens to create and promote their pop culture. The people shall be encouraged to do something good for both themselves and their country. Hence, both individual citizens and private businesses are important actors in pop cultural public diplomacy and soft power generation. It is therefore important to note that the citizens’ demand for internal soft power, such as democracy and free markets, are core conditions for external pop cultural soft power. Conditions for Financial investments and supportive policies: Governmental policies should encourage autonomous creative industries. The state should not interfere in the creation of pop culture, they should not try to control it or steer the production towards certain content. However, the state still ought to support and monitor the international success of their pop cultural resources. Since voluntary attraction is key in pop cultural public diplomacy and soft power generation, and positive indirect experiences have proven to be just as soft power generating as direct experiences, the state should aim to make investments that can help to increase the production of these kinds of pop cultural content. It is also important to keep the reinforcing process of domestic and international acknowledgements in mind, and content should not be labelled as an “international success” or similar before it actually has received this kind of recognition. 4. Research design and methods for gathering and analyzing data 4.1. Case selection and expectations As stated above, the research question for this thesis is “Under what conditions can pop culture be used for soft power creation?” The aim of the thesis is to try to clarify how pop culture can become a soft power generating resource, and the thesis will do so by investigating how the independent variable “pop cultural public diplomacy” (X) affects the dependent variable “soft power” (Y), and under which conditions X can have a positive effect on Y. The independent variable is operationalised through three different public diplomacy mechanisms which, under certain conditions, are hypothesized to increase pop cultural soft power creation. As mentioned above, these three public diplomacy mechanisms are: 20 • Contents and messages • Civic virtue and civil society • Financial investments and supportive policies As laid out in the analytical framework above, the hypothesis of this thesis is that there are conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for the three public diplomacy mechanisms to actually help the pop cultural soft power creation. This hypothesis will be tested through a most-similar case studies approach and comparative process tracing analysis. The selected cases are, as mentioned earlier, Korea and Japan. The reasons for this case selection have been explained earlier in this thesis, but not in relationship to expected outcomes in this study, which is an important part to clarify. As mentioned in the introduction, Korea and Japan share many similarities, but drawing on the findings from the literature review, they seem to have different approaches to pop culture public diplomacy. Korea’s pop culture public diplomacy is shown to be Hallyu-driven and based on mutual exchanges, while Japan seem to struggle to actually make their public diplomacy efforts dialogue-styled and based on shared interests (Ahn & Lim, 2023; Bryman, 2016; Geddes, 1990; Iwabuchi, 2015; Lien, Tang, Zuloaga, 2022; Otmazgin, 2021; Yoon, 2023). Based on the findings from the literature review, an expected result is therefore that the Korean case will lead to more soft power generation since their public diplomacy efforts are shaped in a way that fosters dialogues and mutually beneficial exchanges, compared to Japan’s potential inclination to one-way projection (Ahn & Lim, 2023; Bryman, 2016; Geddes, 1990; Gerring, 2007; Iwabuchi, 2015, Lien, Tang, Zuloaga, 2022; Otmazgin, 2021; Yoon, 2023). By choosing Korea and Japan as the two cases for this comparison, the aim is to test whether or not the new theorised framework regarding conditions can be confirmed, and if so, to what extent. As mentioned in the literature review, it is repeatedly brought up that the Korean pop culture has been the driver of supporting policies while Japan has received critique for not using their resources in an adequate way, resulting in less-than-optimal soft power generation. Based on these findings in previous research, the expected result of this investigation is that the Korean case will confirm the theorised framework on conditions to a larger extent than the Japanese case will, thereby hopefully adding to previous theory and research that certain conditions can be of importance in order for pop cultural public diplomacy to generate soft power. 21 4.2. Comparative process tracing method In order to conduct this investigation, the chosen method is comparative process tracing, where the material for both the independent and dependent variable consists of different kinds of texts. But before the material selection is discussed more in detail, a brief summary of process tracing method is necessary. Process tracing is a suitable method for this thesis for several reasons. Overall, process tracing is a method where both time and cause are central aspects, and the purpose is to examine conditions within specific contexts and in action (Beach, 2017; Crasnow, 2017; Gerring, 2007; Gerring, 2017; Trampusch & Palier, 2016). In a process tracing analysis, it is common to use various texts as research material, such as official documents, interviews, and different literature-resources. It is a holistic approach, where mechanisms, events and results all are studied together (Beach, 2017; Gerring, 2007; Gerring, 2017; Trampusch & Palier, 2016). The type of process tracing that will be employed in this thesis is the counterfactual- based view, where if a certain mechanism not is present in a case, this will also mean that the outcome will be absent. This view is also linked to the kind of process tracing that is based on controlled cross-case comparison, where the differences between two cases become the focus of the process tracing investigation, and where the absence of a certain mechanism or condition becomes the suggested evidence that could support a specific causal process. Naturally, it is very beneficial for the study if the two selected cases are as similar as possible, minus the specific condition(s) that one wishes to investigate and show as important for the explanation that one aims to prove (Beach, 2017; Trampusch & Palier, 2016). 4.3. Material selection and data analysis As mentioned above, common material in process tracing investigations are various kinds of documents, interviews, or other types of text, and this study is no exception to that principle. For the independent variable, material for each of the three public diplomacy mechanisms is gathered in the respective cases. Different kinds of texts have been selected as research material, with the purpose to illustrate how these public diplomacy mechanisms can contribute to pop cultural soft power when used under certain conditions. For the mechanism Contents and messages, the crucial thing is to identify what kind of pop cultural public diplomacy efforts that the government has arranged, what kind of communicational efforts they have taken part in, and what kind of policies and strategies that 22 has been established in order to shape pop cultural public diplomacy activities. Therefore, material such as governmental annual reports from the two important public diplomacy institutions Korea Foundation and Japan Foundation and policy documents and strategy proposals are also included to show state-led determination and intention for pop cultural public diplomacy and soft power generation. For the mechanisms Civic virtue and civil society and Financial investments and supportive policies, the main focus is to analyse the role of the citizens, how they have interacted with the government and if the government has acted in a way that can help to encourage the creation and spread of pop culture. Historical accounts that can be beneficial in order to identify the origin of the pop culture elements, under which circumstances they came to be, and what role the government has played in this development are also important material. Selected chapters from The Oxford Handbook of South Korean politics and scientific articles will be of importance, as well as newspapers articles that can help to map out how civic virtue and civil society can affect the generation of pop cultural soft power. For the dependent variable Soft power, qualitative material that allows for the identification of international popularity, widespread appreciation, and attraction for the pop cultural assets, which also are reflected and spread to the country of origin in general, are used as analysis material. Newspaper articles from both local and global online newspapers such as The Korea Herald, The Japan Times, The Guardian, and CNN are also key assets, as well as various governmental resources such as export reports and statistics, and website posts that show global influence and popularity are also used. 4.4 Limitations and overall quality of the study Regarding the overall quality of the investigation, the material has been chosen with the aim to bring strong validity to this investigation by being appropriate for each of the three mechanisms in order to investigate the hypothesised conditions under which these public diplomacy mechanisms can help to generate pop cultural soft power. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a qualitative analysis, and soft power cannot be measured in numbers alone since soft power is produced in the minds of the receivers and power always is relational. Therefore, pop cultural soft power indicators such as favourable mentions in international media, global acknowledgements of language and culture, and collaborations 23 with internationally acclaimed organisations and companies are all important ways to identify soft power. It is more difficult to assess the reliability of this qualitative investigation, which could be somewhat weak since different people could have different perceptions and interpretations regarding both the new analytical framework and the analysis material (Richards & Morse, 2013). But by trying to explain the analytical framework as clearly as possible, and by aiming to be as transparent as possible regarding the material that has been included and what I have been looking for in the material, the risk of misunderstandings or unclear analytical processes will hopefully decrease (Richards & Morse, 2013). Regarding the ethical aspects of this thesis, all of the analysis material is collected from open online resources that are easy to access, therefore there are not any ethical concerns to take into account in this investigation (Aluwihare-Samaranayake, 2012). Since the key feature of process tracing is the strong focus on circumstances and context, it is no surprise that the possibility to draw general conclusions from the results of this kind of investigations often are low. But while generalizability not is the main aim with this research, the results will of course be analysed in more broader terms, and the implications regarding conditions for successful pop cultural soft power generation will be discussed (Beach, 2017). 5. Results The results will be presented in a structure where the public diplomacy efforts from each case are identified. Using the analytical framework presented above, it will be possible to point out under what conditions the three public diplomacy mechanisms have been used, and if these conditions are the same as what is expected in the framework. In addition, the identified indicators on soft power generation follows. Since the method here is process tracing, a summary of the causal findings is presented after each of the two cases, before the results are discussed more in the concluding section. 5.1. The Korean case Contents and messages The state-led Korea Foundation was established after the democratic shift in 1992 with the aim to increase the global understanding of Korea, as well as to foster good international relationships between Korea and foreign countries through various cultural activates (Korea 24 Foundation, 2024). Since the early 1990s, it is clear that Korea was very eager to engage with the international community. Already from the start of this process, Korea made significant efforts to communicate and interact with foreign publics through public diplomacy efforts such as the promotion of academic studies, language studies, exchange programs, bilateral forums, and various efforts to promote traditional culture at museums worldwide, and at different festivals, meetings and performances (Korea Foundation, 2024). However, pop culture has been promoted much less. During the period of 1995-2015, the only recorded pop culture promotion efforts seem to be the support for a few K-dramas and film festivals in different areas across Asia and the rest of the world, as well as to include pop culture as an element in Korea-themed workshops. When Hallyu first is mentioned in the material in 2005, little promotion has been done prior to this, and two years later, Hallyu is regarded to be the driving force of Korean public diplomacy and the country’s increasing popularity among the international community, even though few Hallyu-related public diplomacy efforts have been recorded in the annual reports (Korea Foundation, 2024). In 2012, the global support for Hallyu had grown big enough for the Foundation to publish annual reports on the topic, but the popularity is not reflected by widespread promoting efforts in the annual reports, which indicates that the pop culture content was able to reach its widespread popularity with little government interference (Korea Foundation, 2024). In addition, the Act also emphasizes the inclusion of the Korean people in the public diplomacy efforts (MOFA, 2016). This aim is also reflected in the government’s Diplomatic White Papers, where a chapter is dedicated to “Diplomacy Together with the People”, where various public diplomacy activities which include the active participation of Korean citizens and foreign publics. The global support and interest for Korea and various Korean public diplomacy increased significantly during 1995-2015, and in 2016, the government decided to adopt the Public Diplomacy Act, and give the Korea Foundation the main responsibility for implementing the Act and fulfil the aims. In the Act, it is stated that the aim is to pursue public diplomacy efforts that reflect human values and the Korean characteristics However, throughout the Diplomatic White Papers that are published after the passing of the Public Diplomacy Act, there are still little efforts made to promote pop culture, and the same is evident in Korea Foundation’s annual reports for 2016-2023. A few supporting efforts such as Korea Week is mentioned where pop cultural elements such as K-pop parties, Korean food events and movies are included, along with lectures on Buddhist culture, taekwondo, and traditional music (MOFA, 2018; MOFA, 2019). Furthermore, during the COVID-19 25 pandemic in 2020, various Korean film festivals were organized, and after the Korean film “Parasite” won several Oscars in 2020, online events in the US were organized in order to seize the moment and meet the increasing interest for Korean pop culture in the US (MOFA, 2021). In 2022, Korea Week included various public diplomacy elements and showcased export products such as cars and food, traditional fashion, K-beauty cosmetics and K-pop concerts, and tourism and study abroad-options were also promoted during these Korea Week events. The public cultural diplomacy efforts online also increased through different platforms and campaigns (MOFA, 2022). Financial investments and supportive policies In 1987, Korea became a democracy, which later also lead up to the abolishment of “The Film Act” in 1996, when it was replaced by “The Film Promotion Act” instead (Lee, 2023). When freedom of expression no longer was under censorship, it was now possible to make movies in which historical events and previous governments could be critically viewed and criticized. Under the previous military regime and the presidency of Park Chung-hee (1963-1978) film censorship had been implemented, in a way that resembled the film policies during the period when Korea was under Japanese occupation, in 1910 until the end of World War II (Lee, 2023; Lynn, 2023). In addition, the democratic transition also led to the introduction of a new commercial broadcaster, since the government no longer aimed to regulate the press. Hence, it was now possible to broadcast television programs for commercial purposes, not for governmental propaganda, and democratisation and the commercial broadcasting made it possible to export content to the international market, and in 1997, the Korean drama “What Is Love” was aired in China by the Chinese state broadcasting company CCTV, where it became the second most viewed imported television content (KCCUK, 2024; Lee, 2023). After this, the term “Hallyu” was soon coined and the Korean government did already from the start understand the importance of pop culture’s autonomy and independence, the policy was that the government should provide support and remain at an arm’s length distance from pop culture (Lee, 2023). Meanwhile, the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 forced the previously manufacturing-based Korean economy and workforce to seek out new areas of production and jobs, and many found themselves in IT-related businesses, while the emphasis on skills and knowledge also increased. This development, combined with the recent democratic transition and new creative freedom, lead to a point where pop culture could grow and spread, both domestically and later on also internationally (Lee, 2023; V&A Museum, 2024). After the finance crisis in 1997, the interest in pop culture as a possible export asset grew, and the drive 26 to beat former colonial power Japan further spurred the interest to create Korean dramas, movies and music (Adams, 2022). In addition, the Korean Creative Content Agency was founded in 2009, which is a government agency that aims to help promote and export Korean cultural content. The agency provides support in areas such as games, broadcasting, animation, comic books, music, and fashion. (KOCCA, 2023). Civic virtue and civil society Combining influences from many different music genres, K-pop emerged in mid 1990s. Up until this point, Korean pop music consisted of a mix of various genres of both domestic productions and imported content. After democratisation, the influence from America grew larger, and genres such as rap and hip-hop was introduced in 1992 on TV. In addition, the overall access to such as MTV and the increased globalisation, as well as that many Koreans who had studied abroad in the United States also came back to Korea with a new awareness of the current American trends, such as the founder of one of Korea’s largest music agencies SM Entertainment, Lee Soo-man, influenced the development in Korea (Adams, 2022; Lie, 2023). Lee Soo-man’s SM Entertainment is not the only agency that was founded in the mid- 1990s, YG Entertainment and JYP Entertainment were also founded in the same period, when governmental support for a less concentrated economic power and the increased focus on export possibilities was high. Hence, the key focus of the content and the music was that it should be exportable, since the domestic market was thought to be too small. As with the export success of television series and movies, the music industry was also able to rely on the new IT-systems and digitalisation, which made export easier. Since Korean music at this point also was influenced by Japanese pop, which still was popular in the 1990s in eastern Asia, K-pop was first a kind of Korean J-pop. But the Japanese had little interest in exporting their music and instead, the international interest in K-pop grew (Lie, 2023). K-pop did not stem from a specific state-led plan, instead the entrepreneur-minded, export-orientated companies and agencies created something that both domestic and foreign publics could appreciate, which later made the governments very interested in promoting and supporting both K-pop and other various pop cultural assets (Lie, 2023). Soft power generation The Korea Foundation have published annual statistics on Global Hallyu fans from 2012, measuring the interest for pop culture elements such as K-pop and K-dramas but also such as 27 Korean language, traditional culture, food, and Korean studies. In total, the number of members have increased from 9 264 220 in 2012 to 224 974 073 in 2023 (Korea Foundation, 2023). The decision to start the measures in 2012 is likely to be connected to the huge success of the song “Gangnam Style” which was released this year. The song was the first video to reach 1 billion views on YouTube, and the success is considered an important milestone for the global success of Korean pop culture (Kang & Sit, 2022; V&A Museum, 2022). The government’s decision to keep some distance to the pop culture industries and act as promotors, not creators, seems to be a successful strategy since the international popularity of Hallyu has been acknowledged in several ways. The founder of SM Entertainment, Lee Soo- man, do also mention that the economic success of Korean pop culture is an effect, not a cause. Previously, powerful states like the USA and the UK were able to promote their pop culture abroad since they had the economic means to do so, and their culture became popular because of this powerful capability. However, in the Korean case, culture preceded economic strength, and is indeed a part of the actual economic success. Korea had little interest and intention in promoting their pop culture outside of Asia, and especially not to the US, but after the huge success of Gangnam Style in 2012, the ambition arose (Adams, 2022). K-dramas and K-pop are the two main pillars of Hallyu, and these two elements have since the start of Hallyu in the late 1990s been closely linked to the technological advancements, a development that continues on today as well. With help from the technological advancements and platforms such as social media, streaming services and YouTube, the popularity also spread to include Korean traditional culture, literature, food and language during the 2010s and 2020s (KCCUK, 2024). In addition, during the 2010s, the global popularity of K-dramas increased further, and in 2019, Netflix produced their first original K-drama. Netflix has played a crucial role in popularizing K-dramas, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic (KCCUK, 2024). The international spread of Korean film and TV-series is also reflected in that the movie Parasite won four Academy Awards in 2020, which created a natural possibility to present and promote Korean movies to a new global audience. The success of the Netflix series Squid Game, which became the most watched series on Netflix ever, also paved the way for an increased export of Korean pop culture (Adams, 2022; KCCUK, 2024; The Guardian, 2022). Netflix has also decided to invest 2.5 billion dollars in new Korean projects over the next four years, and Korea has been called the new centre of the creative world (McCurry, 2024). The total export value of broadcasting programs in 2022 was more than 869 million dollars, an increase from 718 million dollars in 2021 (KOFICE, 2024). The 28 overall export value of Hallyu-related content was about 14 billion dollars in 2022, but it was not music or TV-series that was responsible for the main share of this value. Instead, the biggest export value comes from games (KOFICE, 2024; Park, 2024). The widespread international appreciation for Korean dramas and K-pop has also spread to other elements, even outside of the pop cultural sphere, such as literature, language, traditional food and cooking, but K-dramas and K-pop are still the drivers (Adams, 2022; KCCUK, 2024; McCurry, 2024; The Guardian, 2022). The commercial success of K-pop groups such as BTS, BLACKPINK and SEVENTEEN include winning numerous international music awards at, among others, the Billboard Music Awards, and regularly topping both American and British music charts. More than 100 million physical K-pop albums were sold in 2023, almost twice as much as 2021 (KCCUK, 2024; McCurry, 2024; KOFICE, 2024). In addition, the boy group BTS is estimated to be worth more than 3.5 billion dollars in export value, consumption and tourism every year, and since 2019, K-pop has become a specific category at the international music award show MTV Video Music Awards (KCCUK, 2024; KOFICE, 2024; McCurry, 2024). The international impact of K-pop is also visible in the increase of English words in a genre that traditionally is based on mostly Korean lyrics, and in 2023, the K-pop export to the US was doubled, while the export to China was cut to half of the previous value (KOFICE, 2024). However, the increase in English lyrics is also accompanied by a global interest in Korean language, the Oxford dictionary recently included 26 Korean words, and the number of state-led Korean KSI language schools also increased from 90 in 2012 to 248 in 2023 (Korea.net, 2023; McCurry, 2024; The Guardian, 2022). Several K-pop groups have also become international ambassadors and advocates for global organizations such as UNICEF, UNESCO and the climate meeting COP26. The girl group BLACKPINK become advocates for the COP26 meeting in Glasgow in 2021, an ambassadorship that also awarded them with honorary MBEs from King Charles III in 2023 (The Korea Herald, 2021; The Royal Household, 2023). BTS started their cooperation with UNICEF already in 2017, and the collaboration has been very successful. The aims of their LOVE MYSELF campaigns are to help children and young people around the world, striving to end abuse and violence, work against bullying, and promote better mental health, well-being and lives for children and young people. As of March 2024, the collaboration had collected about 6.6 million dollars through the BTS members themselves, their agency Bighit Music, and their international fans (UNICEF, 2021; UNICEF, 2024.) In addition, another K-pop group, SEVENTEEN, became the first UNESCO 29 Good-will ambassador with the aim to empower young people and work for positive changes (UNESCO, 2024). 5.2. Summary of mechanisms and conditions in the Korean case In conclusion, the three hypothesized conditions for pop cultural soft power generation is largely confirmed by the findings in the Korean case. Civic virtue has been an important mechanism in Korea pop cultural soft power generation. Already from the star, since the demand for democratization also led to the abolishment of censorship, which was a crucial event in order for pop culture to grow and spread both domestically and internationally. In addition, government investments and supportive policies have also had a positive impact on the pop cultural soft power generation. While an active civil society led to democratization, the government was also eager to support the production and spread of pop culture, which is reflected in the supporting policies that encouraged a less concentrated economic power and focused on export possibilities. These efforts further helped to strengthen the entrepreneur- mindedness of the ordinary citizens, who were eager to create something appealing to both domestic and foreign audiences, which reflects the importance of civic virtue in soft power generation. The government did also early on understand the importance of creating a healthy distance between themselves and pop cultural industries, as seen in the “arm’s length distance”-policy. Instead of trying to control the creation of pop culture too much, the government has focused on monitoring and supporting efforts, such as the establishment of the Korean Creative Content Agency. In addition, favourable contents and messages have been communicated with foreign publics since The Korea Foundation was established almost immediately after the democratization took place. This allowed Korea to establish public diplomacy connections early on and become a part of the international community through friendly cultural exchanges, and later on, Korea Foundation was also given the task to implement the Public Diplomacy Act. In sum, all three mechanisms have been at play in the Korean case, and the findings do to a large extent confirm the conditions that are hypothesized in the analytical framework. 5.3. The Japanese case Contents and messages The history of Japan’s pop culture public diplomacy starts about 50 years earlier than Korea’s, at the end of World War II. After Japan’s defeat in the war, the government was 30 eager to soften and improve the international views on Japan through cultural public diplomacy, and in 1972, the Japan Foundation was founded. The Japan Foundation is just like its Korean counterpart, a state-led agency with the primary aim to promote Japanese culture through public diplomacy and friendly exchanges. Even if the Japanese preference for cuteness and kawaii emerged in the early 20th century, it was a conscious choice to use this foundation and further promote the Japanese cuteness and softness after the second world war, to counterbalance the negative international views on Japan. Out of this aim, characters such as Hello Kitty, which was invented in 1974, has now become a global icon and is estimated to bring in over 80 billion dollars to the Japanese company Sanrio (Dale, 2024). However, it has been unclear whether Hello Kitty actually is Japanese. When the creator of the character was asked about Hello Kitty’s nationality, the answer was that Hello Kitty was created as an English character, with the aim to attract the Japanese people who rarely was able to travel abroad. But simultaneously, the designer also claims that the character is Japanese, and therefore attracts foreigners (McGray, 2002). During the 50-year long history of Hello Kitty, there has been attempts to customize the character into different nationalities, such as American or Taiwanese, which caused different designs of Hello Kitty depending on if the aim was to sell on the domestic or the foreign markets. However, nowadays there is only one design of the character, and the logic is that Hello Kitty is Japanese enough to sell abroad, but also foreign enough to be popular on the domestic market. The identity is therefore sort of fluid, and the same principle seem to have laid the foundation for the international success of Japanese technology and game brands such as Sony and Nintendo (McGray, 2002). In addition, Kawaii and cuteness have also strongly influenced the manga- and anime-creation, which also became increasingly popular after the war, and during the 1990s, Japanese TV-series, J-pop music, and Kawaii aesthetics with anime and manga as key elements were very popular in East and South-east Asia (Dale, 2024; Iwabuchi, 2015;). The characters with distinctive large eyes and expressive faces also caused the creation of the emoji-symbols, which today are standard equipment in every smartphone, and is an example of the globalization of kawaii culture. In a similar vein, the technological development has helped to spread kawaii elements such as J-pop, fashion and food to the international audiences (Dale, 2024). In addition, Japanese games and series such as Pokémon, Nintendo and Sony PlayStation are also inspired by manga and anime, and even though these products and brands have reached widespread international success, the aim does not seem to have been to attract foreign publics (McGray, 2002). 31 As stated in Iwabuchi’s investigation, public diplomacy was first mentioned in Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook in 2004, and in 2006, a pop culture diplomacy-policy was first adopted (Iwabuchi, 2015). But in 2014, the current cultural public diplomacy strategy was deemed to be insufficient, and a new Cool Japan Proposal was presented by the state-led Cool Japan Movement Promotion Council (2014). The cultural public diplomacy efforts that are recorded in the Japan Foundation Annual reports in 2004 and 2014 are fairly similar. In 2004, Japanese pop music was the foundation of a friendship concert, and Japan Foundation organized international tours for 35 different music groups with the aim to promote Japanese music such as pop and rock (Japan Foundation, 2004). In addition, various exhibitions were arranged in museums across the world, and several international forums and meetings were held, including with the US and in the Middle East. Japan Foundation also focused on language learning, and during the last five years prior to 2004, a 12%-increase in Japanese language learners had been observed, which is thought to be because of the rise of Japanese pop culture, making the total number of learners 2.3 million people. In addition, Japan Foundation’s different international offices arranged various activates, such as movie screenings, showing animated movies, hosting pop shows and several film festivals. The activities did also include much high cultural elements, like theatre, literature and language promotion (Japan Foundation, 2004). Ten years later, the activities that are recorded in the annual report from 2014 include various exhibitions, film screenings of different genres such as dramas and documentaries, as well as broadcasting of anime, dramas and documentaries on local TV. Japan Foundation also participated at international book fairs, art exhibitions and architectural exhibitions. In addition, the Foundation arranged a travelling exhibition, which went around the world and showcased both pop culture and traditional culture and Japanese sports. Some examples of activities from the Foundation’s local offices include picture book readings, kimono exhibitions, workshops on traditional culture such as origami, meetings with anime film directors, presentations on the history of Japan’s performing arts, food testing, showcasing of various Japanese objects and products, and the demonstration and participation of traditional sports (Japan Foundation, 2014). In 2022, the Foundation showed Japanese films in 69 countries, drawing a public of estimated 140 000 people. In addition, online streaming and the broadcasting of different Japanese television programs, such as anime, dramas, and documentaries was arranged in 93 countries, with a total 714 programs. The number of Japanese language students are now almost 4 million people. The local Japan Foundation 32 offices in other countries have hosted several promotional activities such as local film festivals, events where food testing was combined with language learning, film screenings, and events regarding architecture, traditional dance and fashion. The Foundation also took part in a large anime festival and showed animated films (Japan Foundation, 2022). Financial investments and supportive policies During the ten years that passed from 2004, when Japan first mentioned public diplomacy, and 2014, when Japan decided to introduce a new Cool Japan Proposal, expensive efforts had been made. But as reflected by the perceived need for a new Proposal, the efforts and investments that was done during these ten years were insufficient according to the Japanese themselves. In the annual Japan Foundation report from 2014, the last one before the new Cool Japan Proposal was presented, the pop cultural public diplomacy efforts were fairly similar to the efforts in 2004. During the ten years between 2004 and 2014, several major governmental investments and efforts had been made under the Koizumi government 2001- 2006, and the government became increasingly interested in the possibilities to use pop culture such as film, fashion and anime for cultural diplomacy purposes (Iwabuchi, 2015; Japan Foundation, 2014). The Cool Japan promotion office was established in 2010, and the aim was not only to promote pop culture, but also to include such as traditional culture and crafts, art, philosophy and Japanese way of life and thought in the promotion of Cool Japan (Iwabuchi, 2015). But in 2014, Japan decided to further increase their public diplomacy and soft power strategies. The aim of the new Cool Japan Proposal was for Japan to win the world’s sympathy. It is argued that since Japan and Tokyo have been named the world’s most creative country and city, respectively, by Adobe Systems Inc. in 2012, Japan ought to use their creativity better and fulfill their full potential as “Cool Japan” (CJPMC, 2014). Japan was inspired by the Cool Britannia Policy, and the Cool Japan aim and strategy was presented about ten years ago in 2004, which have been implemented until 2014, but it seems to be ineffective and inadequate according to this council. In this new proposal, pop cultural assets such as manga and anime are referred to as “subculture”, not pop culture, and it is mentioned that the inclusion of both traditional culture and subculture makes it more difficult for foreign audiences to fully grasp the concept of Cool Japan, instead leading to criticism and misunderstandings which in turn decrease the sympathy for Japan (CJPMC, 2014). 33 Civic virtue and civil society When Japanese cultural workers were asked about the popularity of Japanese pop culture in the early 2000s, they were not especially interested in foreign publics. Rather, there seems to be a Japan for the Japanese and a Japan for foreigners, and the Japanese themselves does not always seem to know which is which (Iwabuchi, 2015; McGray, 2002; Stanislaus, 2018). As noted in McGray’s article from 2002, Japan seems to have a large resource of potential pop cultural public diplomacy assets, but in the early 2000s, Japan also seemed to be fairly reluctant to actually interact with the world (Iwabuchi 2015). However, Japan seems eager to change this attitude. According to the new Cool Japan Proposal, the Japanese people are encouraged to engage in voluntary creative and innovative international activities. The aim is to demonstrate how valuable Japan is and can become to the world, and the hope is to bring new solutions to common and shared international problems. The council proposes a long list of suggested efforts which could help Japan to reach this goal. The strategy is based on three steps, which are promoting domestic growth, connecting Japan and other countries, and becoming Japan that helps the world (CJPMC, 2014). In addition to this proposal, there is also a report on human resource development for Cool Japan. In this document, pop cultural elements such as anime and manga and fashion are mentioned, and the strategy aims to create better opportunities where both foreign and Japanese skills and talents can work to enhance the international influence of Cool Japan, and increase tourism (CJPMC, 2018). Soft power generation Japanese pop culture has been successful, and there are several examples of this success. At the Berlin Film Festival 2002, the Japanese anime movie Spirited Away became the first animated movie to win a top prize, and even though it at first glance might seem like Japanese pop culture mostly is popular outside of America or that it has been unable to reach the American market, game consoles like Nintendo and Sony PlayStation are popular, and Hollywood films and American TV-series have gathered inspiration from Japanese anime and manga (McGray, 2002). Anime series were also frequently broadcasted on American cable channels on afternoons and weekends, and Pokémon was broadcasted in 65 countries and translated into more than 30 languages. The game was even featured on the cover on Time magazine (McGray, 2002). 34 However, there are also indicators on that Japan’s pop cultural soft power not is fulfilling its full potential. One of the key parts of Japan’s public diplomacy strategy is the Japan House, which in 2018 was established in London, Sao Paulo and Los Angeles. The Japan Houses focuses on the cultural elements of Japan, but instead of showcasing popular parts like anime and manga, the content is instead high culture, aimed towards the elite foreign publics who are rich business people and interested in fine dining, art and high culture (Stanislaus, 2018). The idea is that if these people become attracted to these Japanese cultural elements, then this approval will lead to increased support for Japanese interests in different international forums and in various agenda-setting organizations. Very little, if any, pop culture is displayed at these Houses. Japan seems eager to project the right image of the country to the right people, but this might not be the most successful cultural public diplomacy strategy. Instead of creating opportunities for dialogue-based public diplomacy, Japan seems to focus on sending particular images to the identified key audiences (Stanislaus, 2018). The interest for cultural exchange and promotion of pop culture seems to be low, and the main focus does instead seem to be to project the desired image of Japan to foreigners, thus creating a separation of “us” from “them” (Iwabuchi, 2015). Even though the global success of Japanese pop culture such as the game consoles Nintendo and Sony PlayStation, characters like Hello Kitty and Pokémon, and aesthetics like manga, anime and Kawaii is evident, the pop culture public diplomacy does not seem to be as successful as it has potential to become, and the Japanese themselves seem to become increasingly aware of this fact. It is reported that Japan now aims to increase the support for export of pop cultural elements, such as anime, manga, games, and music. This content industry had an export value of about 30 billion dollars in 2022, indicating that the interest for Japanese pop culture still is very high. As an attempt to increase this value and help boost content-related tourism, the government will seek to collaborate closer with private sector companies and the content agency. The goal is to create a strategy that will allow for successful governmental and private cooperation (Miciano, 2024; The Japan Times, 2024). 5.4. Summary of mechanisms and conditions in the Japanese case Regarding the mechanism of contents and messages, the Japanese government had already from the start decided on the pop cultural content. Because of the negative impact on Japan’s international reputation after the second World War, the Japanese government aimed to create a more positive and benign image of Japan, resulting in the creation of pop cultural content 35 based on cuteness. This cute content, consisting of such as the Hello Kitty character and Kawaii aesthetics, did also create the foundation for the spread of anime, manga and different games. Together, this pop cultural content has been very appreciated and successful worldwide, resulting in an export value of 30 billion dollars in 2022. However, while these pop cultural assets have been included in promoting efforts, they have not been the main content in Japan’s public diplomacy efforts, which instead has focused on high culture and language. Since the international audience seems to associate Japan more with content such as games and characters, it could be beneficial for Japan to build their public diplomacy efforts this and listen to the foreign publics better. Meanwhile, the Japanese government has made large financial investments and suggested several policies in order to increase Japan’s soft power. The Cool Japan Proposals are key mechanisms here, since they reflect Japan’s ambition to become a stronger voice in the international community through more soft power. This is also related to the mechanism of civic virtue and an active civil society. From the start, the Japanese pop cultural public diplomacy seems to have been driven by the government, and the Japanese people now being encouraged to play an active role in this diplomacy, which they perhaps not have done before. As reflected in the new Cool Japan Proposal and the human resource development report, Japan aims to use the mechanism of civic virtue to a larger extent. In sum, the three hypothesized mechanisms are not at play in the Japanese case. While the mechanism of content and messages indeed can be identified, the conditions under which this mechanism operates are not as theorized in the analytical framework. The content is not shaped according to the preferences of foreign publics, and the messages are more styled as one-dimensional projections rather than dialogues and mutual exchanges. The mechanism of civic virtue and civil society is not very evident either. However, the third mechanism regarding financial investments and supportive policies is very much visible. The Japanese government has made significant efforts in order to increase the country’s soft power, which reflects an ambitious mindset and a will to strive for improved cultural public diplomacy. 6. Concluding discussion In order to provide an answer to the research question “Under what conditions can pop culture be used for soft power creation?” it is necessary to take several findings from this investigation into account. In previous research, the main answer to this question was that the 36 evidence was inconsistent, since some studies found support for the positive effect of governmental pop cultural public diplomacy efforts on soft power generation, while other investigations indicated on a negative effect, instead supporting the importance of the autonomy of the creative industries. Drawing on relevant theoretical points of departure and scientific findings, a new analytical framework was developed. This framework included three key mechanisms for pop cultural soft power generation (contents and messages, civic virtue and civil society, and financial investments and supportive policies) and conditions under which these mechanisms actually could generate pop cultural soft power. By testing this new framework regarding conditions for pop cultural public diplomacy on two cases, Korea and Japan, the aim was to see if these hypothesized public diplomacy mechanisms and conditions could be confirmed in a process tracing investigation. As presented in the results-section above, the Korean case does to a large extent confirm the hypothesized mechanisms and conditions. The three mechanisms content and messages, civic virtue and civil society, and financial investments and supportive policies are all identified, and they do to a large extent operate under the hypothesized conditions, as presented in the summary of the Korean case in the results-section. These mechanisms have all been important for the creation and spread of Korea’s pop culture, which today enjoys worldwide success, as portrayed in the section regarding Soft power-outcomes above in the results-section. The test does also show that the mechanisms not work under the hypothesized conditions in the Japanese case to the same extent as in the Korean case. The mechanism of civic virtue and civil society is more difficult to identify in the Japanese case. Japan’s messages and contents have been limited to fit the interest of softening negative perceptions, and their public diplomacy efforts can at times be seen as more based on the image Japan wishes to project (high culture), rather than based on the cultural content that foreign publics actually know and appreciate (pop culture, such as manga and anime). However, the mechanism of, and financial investments and supportive policies is very present, and the government seems eager to increase Japan’s pop cultural soft power and fulfil the full potential of pop cultural resources. In addition, there is an interesting finding that emerges when the Korean and Japanese cases are compared to each other. In both cases, commercial success in terms of export value does not seem to be the main explanation of pop cultural soft power. If this would have been the case, then the main pop cultural resource in the Korean case would have been games, which 37 are responsible for 64 percent of the export value of Korean pop culture. But instead, pop music and TV-series and films are the main drivers of Hallyu, and Hallyu celebrities are appointed as ambassadors and advocates for major global organizations, such as UNICEF and UNESCO. In a similar vein, the Japanese do not think that they are fulfilling their full potential for pop cultural soft power generation, which is repeatedly reflected both by the Japanese ambition to adopt new strategies, policies, and proposals, and by the lack of international media recognition. But Japan’s export value is twice the size of Korea’s value. If commercial success and export value was equal to pop cultural soft power. In order to make an attempt and give a potential explanation for this finding, I would like to connect this result to the full model of soft power, as shown in Figure 1 in the Introduction. The three hypothesized public diplomacy mechanisms and the conditions under which they operate are, according to the results from this thesis, of importance for turning pop culture into soft power. But, theorized by Chitty, there are different kinds of soft power: admiration, inspiration, and sympathy and gratitude (Chitty, 2017). Based on the findings presented in this thesis, I would like to suggest that pop cultural soft power also could generate soft power based on kindness/benignity, which then would generate sympathy and gratitude. Nye theorised that soft power can be generated by intangible factors, such as personality, and he also theorises that the aim with public diplomacy is to achieve long-term, mutually beneficial relationships and exchanges (Nye, 2004). Public diplomacy is based on a dynamic between receivers and senders, and as Chitty theorises, soft power can be based on different qualities. But while Chitty argues that pop culture mainly can generate soft power through beauty, charisma and competence, and thereby generate admiration and inspiration, I would like suggest that the results from this investigation could indicate that pop culture also has the capacity to generate soft power through kindness, which thereby generates sympathy and gratitude (Chitty, 2017; Nye, 2004). I would also like to argue that this suggestion is supported by the fact that the aim of the new Cool Japan-strategy was exactly to win the world’s sympathy, and that commercial success and export value, which arguably are two common indicators of the popularity of pop culture, not seem to be automatically equal to soft power generation. As briefly discussed in the Results-section above, Japan’s pop cultural export value is twice as big as Korea’s, and Korea’s main export, measured in dollars, is 38 gaming. But since it still is K-pop, and Korean TV-series and films that drives the success of Hallyu, there ought to be something more than just commercial sales and export value at play. An additional indication on that this suggested explanation might be accurate is that in the introduction of almost every official annual Japan or Korea Foundation report, it is stated that the purpose of public diplomacy is to bring people from all over the world together, to promote cooperation, to get a better understanding for people from different countries and with different backgrounds, to enhance global friendship, to foster mutual trust, empathy and goodwill, and to work together internationally through people-to-people interaction to achieve prosperity and peace. Since Korea’s pop culture assets can be considered to be more people- driven than Japan’s anime and character-heavy export, the impact of pop cultural soft power based on kindness and sympathy might be bigger than both what is theorised and expected. This could be a potential explanation for why Korean pop culture is considered to be more successful than Japan’s, despite the fact that the Japanese export value shows that Japan’s pop culture is twice as successful as Korea’s in terms of money. With this in mind, it is clear that Japan’s pop cultural exports are well-appreciated and successful worldwide. But the product- focus, rather than people-focus, in the exports could be a potential explanation for why Japan’s pop culture soft power not gets the same attention as Korea. Moving forward, it could be interesting to investigate this potential explanation further. To see if people-driven pop cultural public diplomacy might be more soft power generating than product- or character-driven public diplomacy, a suggestion could be to conduct survey studies or interviews within this field. 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