DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREDICTING THE FUTURE: THE SWEDISH 
ARMED FORCES ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA  
 
 
 
Gabriel Forsberg  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis: 30 credits 
Programme: Master’s Programme in Political Science 
Date: 2025-05-26 
Supervisor: Jonas Hinnfors 
Words: 15 259 
 
Abstract  
This thesis examines why the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) failed to foresee Russia’s 
military actions, culminating in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This study shows 
that a combination of theories concerning cognitive bias and organisational problems can 
explain the continued failure. The cognitive bias theory, being the rational theory, helps 
explain how the SAF analysed Russia, assuming Russia would act rationally and avoid 
military actions because of high costs, such as economic consequences and damaged relations 
with the West. This belief persisted despite Russia’s actions in Georgia and Crimea, indicating 
a failure to recognise Russia’s willingness to accept significant costs for strategic goals. The 
theory concerning organisational problems, being the organisational theory, explains why this 
belief continued over time. There was a groupthink mentality in the SAF, leading analysts to 
not challenge the previous analysis. Because of this, reports often repeated earlier conclusions 
and alternative perspectives were not presented to political decision-makers. This groupthink, 
centred around the rational theory, made it difficult to question the thought that Russia would 
act rationally, even when evidence contradicted it. 
The thesis thereby concludes that the SAF’s failure to understand Russia was caused by both 
cognitive and organisational issues. The rational theory explains how the SAF viewed Russia 
and the organisational theory explains why this belief continued over time. Together, these 
two theories explain the repeated underestimation of Russia, acknowledging the importance 
of viewing both cognitive and organisational aspects to improve future intelligence work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Foresight analysis, The Swedish Armed Forces, Intelligence service, Russia, 
Threat.  
 
 
 
 
 
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Table of Content  
 
1. Introduction 4 
1.1 Research Problem 7 
1.2 Relevance 7 
1.3 Aim and Research Question 8 
1.4 Disposition 8 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 9 
2.1 Cognitive Bias Theories 11 
2.1.1 The Rational Theory 11 
2.1.2 Strategic Culture 12 
2.1.3 Using Own Values 13 
2.2 The Organisational Theory 14 
2.3 Reflections 15 
3. Methodological Framework 16 
3.1 Document Analysis 17 
3.2 Selection of Cases 19 
3.3 Operationalisation 20 
3.3.1 The Rational Theory 21 
3.3.2 Strategic Culture 21 
3.3.3 Using Own Values 23 
3.3.4 The Organisational Theory 23 
3.4 Validity and Reliability 26 
4. Result 27 
4.1 Cognitive Bias Theories 28 
4.1.1 The Rational Theory 28 
4.1.2 Strategic Culture 30 
4.1.3 Using Own Values 32 
4.2 The Organisational Theory 33 
5. Analysis 36 
5.1 Cognitive Bias Theories 36 
5.1.1 The Rational Theory 36 
5.1.2 Strategic Culture 37 
5.1.3 Using Own Values 38 
5.2 The Organisational Theory 39 
5.3 Discussion 40 
6. Conclusions 41 
Bibliography 44 
 
 
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1. Introduction  
Leading up to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), 
with the intelligence services in it, have continuously misjudged Russia's intentions and 
actions. The intelligence service is part of the SAF and is the same organisation that aims to 
view developments before they occur (Agrell, 1998). The SAF's responsibility is to warn the 
politicians before a military attack. Thereby, the politicians should receive timely information 
that they can use to make essential decisions on handling threats (Dagens Nyheter, 2022., b). 
A major misjudgment of Russia's intentions and actions was demonstrated when the SAF told 
the Swedish politicians that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was unlikely (Dagens Nyheter, 
2022., b). Instead, other countries' intelligence services, like the US, the UK and the Baltic 
countries, were sure that an invasion would happen and informed their country's politicians 
(Gustafson et al., 2024: 400-401). Moreover, the US warned Sweden about Russia's 
intentions, and NATO also issued warnings regarding the potential invasion (Dagens Nyheter, 
2022, b). Despite these warnings, the SAF failed to foresee that Russia would invade Ukraine. 
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia represents the largest misjudgment by the SAF. Still, it is 
not an isolated incident, as the SAF has continuously underestimated Russia's intentions and 
actions. 
 
The repeated failures of the SAF were evident when they underestimated Russia's military 
actions in Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, as stated, the 
most significant misjudgment occurred when the SAF, having received warnings from the US 
and its allies about Russia's plans prior to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, still concluded that 
a Russian invasion was unlikely. The SAF were confident in their understanding of Russia 
and communicated to the US and other nations their belief that an invasion would not happen; 
however, after realising that they had made a misjudgement of Russia's intentions and actions 
(Dagens Nyheter, 2022., b). Because of this, the politicians are currently suggesting 
reorganising the SAF and the intelligence service (Dagens Nyheter, 2025). Also, the security 
situation for Sweden and Europe is considered worse than during the Cold War (MUST, 2022: 
22). 
 
Viewing the past, during the Second World War, Sweden had a position of neutrality. The 
Cold War with the Soviet Union caused the Swedish military to expand significantly, resulting 
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in the largest military organisation in the country’s history (Aselius, 2005: 29). Sweden 
perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to its security, leading to an emphasis on defence 
planning against a potential invasion (Aselius, 2005: 39). In 1993, however, the SAF shifted 
their perspective, believing that Russia was no longer a threat (Dagens Nyheter, 2022., b). 
Therefore, the SAF was disarmed and redirected its focus toward international operations, 
such as peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan. In 2008, the Georgia and Russia conflict 
occurred (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2010: 103). Still, the SAF 
focused more on international operations, and it was not until the Russian annexation of 
Crimea in 2014 that the SAF began to refocus on national defence again. Nevertheless, they 
still did not consider Russia a significant threat at that time (IISS, 2010: 117). In 2022, Russia 
invaded Ukraine, causing the SAF to shift its focus entirely to national defence. Sweden has 
been part of NATO since 2024 and now needs to invest heavily in their defence, which will 
take a long time because of many years of reducing it. This situation raises questions about 
why the threat posed by Russia was not acknowledged earlier. Historically, Russia has been a 
security concern for Sweden, particularly during the Cold War. It is questionable that the SAF 
did not view Russia as a threat despite Russia's aggressive actions during the Georgia conflict 
in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The SAF should have concluded, like other 
countries, that Russia would be able to invade Ukraine and constitute a significant threat to 
Europe. 
 
Why have the SAF continuously misjudged Russia's intentions and actions when other 
countries have succeeded? The academic discussion of why intelligence services fail to 
analyse the actions of other countries has led to different theories and explanations. What 
theories can explain the SAF's failures? Can one theory explain these failures, or is there a 
need for several theories to explain this? The theories used to understand past failures in 
foresight and intelligence from countries like the US and the UK have been applied to 
understand the reasons behind the failure by the SAF. Given that there have been studies on 
the intelligence services of both the UK and the US, they serve as valuable examples for this 
study. While previous literature has relied on one theory to explain these failures, this study 
argues that it is essential to consider two different theories together to understand the 
continued underestimation of Russia by the SAF. Each of these two theories offers an 
important reason for the misjudgment of Russia. In total, this study explores four theories: 
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two that specifically views the continued misjudgment of Russia, and two additional theories 
that, while not directly explaining this continued misjudgment, will support the leading two 
theories. 
 
The four theories used in this study are what is referred to as the rational theory, strategic 
culture, using own values and the organisational theory. These four are the most prominent 
theories within this academic discipline. Three theories argue that failings occur because of 
cognitive bias, and one is instead centred on organisational problems. The three theories 
revolving cognitive bias are the rational theory, the strategic culture and using own values. 
The rational theory states that a failure can be caused by the actor thinking of another country 
as a rational actor who makes calculated decisions (Agrell, 2015). Strategic culture argues that 
countries have specific cultures because of their experiences, and that affects the country's 
analysis and actions (Longhurst, 2016). Using own values when analysing argues that if an 
analyst applies their values, there can be a failure because they do not understand the other 
country's values (Fowler, 2024). The organisational theory instead emphasises that 
organisations fail to analyse another country's actions because of, for example, group thinking 
(Marrin, 2004; Davies & P. H. J, 2004). 
 
This thesis argues that one theory is insufficient to understand the continued failed analysis. 
One theory alone cannot explain the failed analysis because it is viewed as narrow in its 
explanation. This is because the SAF views Russia as a rational actor, but to understand how 
the SAF makes its analysis, the organisational theory is needed. The theories of using own 
values and strategic culture show that the SAF adjusted their view of Russia in 2010 based on 
its actions, supporting the findings of the two leading theories. This is because it shows that 
groupthink, centred on the rational theory, was the reason for the continued failure. 
The rational theory can thereby explain what the SAF have misunderstood in their 
assessments of Russia. In contrast, the organisational theory helps explain why this 
misunderstanding has continued over time, and the rational theory is thereby not sufficient on 
its own. The organisational theory needs to be considered to understand why this thought of 
Russia as rational remained within the organisation and how it shaped the information coming 
to political decision-makers. This is because a groupthink mentality exists within the SAF. 
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This group thinking has made it difficult for analysts to challenge this established view, which 
has led to continued support for the perception that Russia acts as a rational actor. This made 
the understanding of Russia as a rational actor unchallenged within the organisation. 
However, the theory does not fully explain why this groupthink was grounded in the belief 
that Russia acts as a rational actor. The SAF's continued belief that Russia prioritised 
economic stability reflects an analytical process that goes beyond what organisational theory 
alone can explain. 
1.1 Research Problem  
The research problem concerns why the SAF failed to foresee Russia's actions when other 
countries were successful in doing so. Why have the SAF continuously misjudged Russia's 
intentions and actions?  
The research problem thereby concerns the debate in the academic field about what theories 
can explain these types of failures. The idea is to use the theories to increase knowledge 
regarding the subject and why the SAF failed, not to create a new theory. However, this study 
shows not only how we can explain this particular case but also how the combination of 
theories is essential and can be used to analyse other similar cases. Contributing to increased 
knowledge about gaps in understanding intelligence failures and how threats are 
underestimated. These areas are essential to covering and contributing to increased knowledge 
regarding the academic fields of intelligence and foresight failures, as well as security studies. 
This study will also contribute to the research on intelligence failure by examining what has 
caused a smaller state like Sweden to fail in an analysis. Understanding failures in smaller 
states like Sweden is essential to enhance the theoretical understanding and to view a smaller 
state's ability to analyse threats. By viewing the SAF through an extended period, this study 
examines how the SAF evolved and reacted to security developments, thus contributing to 
research on how intelligence services adapt.  
1.2 Relevance  
It is relevant to study this topic as the SAF affects politicians' decisions regarding 
international security. The SAF's task is to protect the country in the case of a changed 
security situation. Therefore, the SAF must be organised appropriately to solve this task. It is 
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relevant to view their ability to analyse other countries and thereby make an organisation 
appropriate for the future security situation based on the analysis of other countries. Learning 
why the SAF failed can be used to enhance Sweden's and other countries' analysis of Russia. 
Therefore, this study decreases the gap between the intelligence community and academic 
research. Increasing and contributing valuable knowledge concerning intelligence failures, 
thereby increasing the possibility of reliable intelligence analysis and policymakers' 
knowledge on how to avoid failures. 
1.3 Aim and Research Question  
This study examines why the SAF continuously failed to anticipate Russia's actions when 
other countries were successful. It argues that the failed analysis is explained through the 
rational and organisational theory, thereby demonstrating the failures through cognitive and 
structural problems. This will contribute to the increased understanding of intelligence 
failures, bringing knowledge on smaller states like Sweden, not only significant powers such 
as the US and the UK. 
This study also aims to reduce the gap between academic research and intelligence work. 
Aiming to increase the understanding of intelligence failure, which will enhance knowledge 
in academic research and within the intelligence service. 
The research question: 
Why did the Swedish Armed Forces continuously fail to foresee how Russia would act? 
1.4 Disposition  
The first chapter started with an introduction that presented the research problem and a short 
introduction to the thesis. This is followed by the second chapter, the literature review and 
theoretical framework, which brings up the existing literature regarding the topic and the 
theories that aim to understand the research problem. The third chapter is the method chapter, 
which describes the method used when conducting the research. The fourth chapter presents 
the result, the fifth chapter presents the analysis, and the concluding summary of the thesis is 
presented in the sixth chapter. 
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2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework  
 
In security studies, there is a subfield that concerns intelligence studies and strategic surprise. 
It is interested in intelligence failures, military surprise attacks and how related organisations 
are working with them (Marrin, 2004: 658). In the context of foresight, there are different 
positions regarding how to view the possibility of doing an accurate analysis. Researchers 
have distinguished different worldviews regarding viewing reality (Piirainen & Gonzalez, 
2015). As there are different realities, there is a concern regarding the objective observation of 
the world and individuals' emotions (Piirainen & Gonzalez, 2015). There is also a debate 
regarding the possibility of making predictions, where some researchers believe it is 
impossible to foresee the future, as the future has to become real first to view if it is correct. 
However, researchers argue that it is possible to make predictions with some degree of 
certainty if theories and data are used (Piirainen & Gonzalez, 2015). 
 
Regarding research on the intelligence services, researchers have viewed what their objectives 
are and that their work aims to understand and inform decision-makers and politicians before 
a conflict starts (Gustafson et al., 2024: 400; Dahl & Strachan-Morris, 2024: 424). The 
intelligence services can collect information with personnel on the ground and information 
through the digital world (Pastorello & Testa, 2017: 52). It also describes how the intelligence 
service works, how this relates to science and that there can be methods that follow a fixed 
template. Following a fixed framework means that the analyst studies, for example, Russia 
based on a fixed method or template (Agrell, 1998). However, it is also clear that it is difficult 
to describe a fixed framework that the intelligence service uses when conducting an analysis. 
This is because if the analyst only uses a fixed template, the analyst risks missing important 
details or events that do not follow the given template and thus being surprised (Agrell, 2015). 
It also acknowledged that assessing a country's intentions is more challenging than 
determining its capabilities (Agrell, 2015). The intelligence service's expertise, however, is to 
give information to politicians so they can decide how to plan the defence organisation and 
warn them if there are threats (Agrell, 2015). 
 
Research has also viewed what constitutes an intelligence failure and what can be considered 
intelligence success (Jensen, 2012: 263). It is viewed that a failure is caused when a surprise 
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has occurred, and there has not been an action towards the surprise (Gentry, 2008: 247-248). 
This means that the politicians have not been able to respond to the threat that occurred 
(Gentry, 2008: 249). Failures were, for example, the Pearl Harbour, the Cuba crisis and the 
9/11 attack (Dahl & Strachan-Morris, 2024: 424). However, there has also been research on 
success; one prominent example was the analysis before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This 
is because countries like the US, the United Kingdom and the Baltic countries successfully 
anticipated Russia's invasion in advance (Gustafson et al., 2024: 400-401). For the analysis to 
be considered a success, the information needs to be delivered on time and supported with 
facts. This is important so politicians can make decisions based on this information and act 
against the threat (Gustafson et al., 2024: 400-401). The information needs to be delivered to 
the politicians, even if they disagree with the information. This means that the intelligence 
services should bring information even though politicians have other political or personal 
thoughts (Gentry, 2008: 252). 
 
This thesis will not focus on explaining why the US, UK and the Baltic countries were 
accurate. However, what could have contributed to the success still needs to be mentioned; 
they were correct, and the SAF was not. Previous research has covered how the US and the 
UK have experienced Russia's actions. During the Cold War, the US and the UK needed to 
understand Russia. Previous crises caused them to understand how the Russian leadership was 
thinking and that the Russian worldview was different (Shelton, 2011: 644-645). The US and 
the Soviet Union were the two great powers that fought for power in the world, thereby what 
worldview would be the most prominent in the world (Goldgeier & McFaul, 2003). Even 
though the US and their intelligence service did start to focus on the terrorism threat after the 
Cold War ended, they still did view Russia a potential threat in the late 1990s (Goldgeier & 
McFaul, 2003). The US also did not dismantle their military bases in the vicinity of Russia 
after the Cold War (Jackson, 2002: 375). Instead, the intelligence service in Sweden, by 1990, 
thought that Russia was not a threat and that Russia had collapsed (MUST, 2013: 10). 
 
Some scholars believe that the theory's explanations of failure concerns whether there is 
cognitive bias when analysing information, while others instead state that the organisation is 
contributing to the failure (Pastorello & Testa, 2017). The most common theory of the 
theories used in this study is the rational theory; it is a analysis method that is common in the 
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analysis work and it is the most common in the academic world (Agrell, 2015: 60; 66). It is 
uncomplicated to use because it states something that can be viewed as rational for the actor 
(Agrell, 2015: 66). The using own values is another common theory used in the academic 
world and within the intelligence service, thereby using the actors own values when viewing 
another actor that might have completely different values (Agrell, 2015: 127).  
2.1 Cognitive Bias Theories 
2.1.1 The Rational Theory  
The rational theory states that a failure can be caused by the actor thinking of another country 
as a rational actor who makes calculated decisions (Allison, 1969). The theory of the rational 
actor was used to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis and why the US analysts failed to foresee 
Russia's actions there (Allison, 1969: 690). The analysis can be carried out by looking at an 
actor, calculating the advantages of their possible action, and valuing the negative aspects that 
can be caused (Allison, 1969: 693). Actors decide what is most suitable for their security and 
most beneficial for their objectives. Thereby rationally thinking of the potential cost of the 
alternative versus what they can win (Allison, 1969: 694). The argument is that governments 
will not take action when there is a significant cost to this (Driedger & Polianskii, 2023: 546). 
This is because the government sees that there will be a costly war that will be hard to win, 
and there could also be negative actions toward them, as an economic downfall (Driedger & 
Polianskii, 2023: 546-547). 
 
Actors can thereby make the wrong predictions if they think of other actors as rational 
(Agrell, 2015: 67). This analysis method is uncomplicated to use; thereby, one reason this 
method of analysing other countries is dangerous is that the analysis can be made without 
objective facts to support it. Both amateurs and experts can use this theory, and it is difficult 
to say whether the analysis has been carefully carried out (Agrell, 2015:66). When presenting 
this type of analysis, it also has the risk that it sounds very reasonable because one country 
can think of it as rational. However, the country that is being analysed might not act rationally 
from their point of view (Agrell, 2015:66). The analysis can also be made because of an 
analyst's gut feeling (Agrell, 2015: 67). It can also lack the important understanding of 
another country's leadership. It is difficult to assess how another country is going to act when 
using your thoughts of what is rational and not the other country's thoughts (Agrell, 2015: 71). 
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It can thereby be a risk of thinking of what is rational from your point of view, this is because 
it can lead to that analyst are very sure of their analysis. This was the case with the Cuban 
crisis. The analysts were sure that the Soviet Union would not put missiles in Cuba. Thereby, 
the analysis can wrongly be seen as truth, and the truth is based on facts (Agrell, 2015: 72; 
75). However, it thereby neglected facts, pointing out that the Soviet Union would not have 
acted this way. It is argued that it would be more useful in the initial phase of the analysis to 
view what the analysis could focus on. After that, facts are used to determine whether the 
analysis is correct (Agrell, 2015: 74). 
2.1.2 Strategic Culture 
The theory of strategic culture believes that shared experiences and accepted narratives are the 
reason for a community's security and defence identity, expressed through preferences and 
behavioural norms (Biehl et al., 2013). Also, strategic culture is the use of force inherited in 
beliefs, practices, and attitudes. This process emerges over time, and it is also a unique 
process. A country's strategic culture can change over time and is, therefore, not a permanent 
culture. A significant event or experience can also change the strategic culture and it can 
change it to a lesser or greater extent (Longhurst, 2016). 
 
The views of the strategic culture will be used in the analysis to see how Sweden's strategic 
culture has affected its analysis. Regarding Sweden's strategic culture, neutrality is essential, 
and Sweden views itself as neutral regarding state conflicts. Thereby, Sweden has a public 
opinion and image that leads to a moral posture. However, joining the EU and international 
politics has challenged this perspective (Biehl et al., 2013: 343). That is, the meaning of 
neutrality can change over time. International peace and security are important for Sweden's 
foreign policy. Sweden is not passive regarding severe human rights violations and views 
international cooperation as necessary. Therefore, the UN is important for Sweden to maintain 
their neutrality and political solutions are more appropriate than military actions.  Sweden has 
also acted as a mediator and contributed troops to UN peacekeeping missions (Biehl et al., 
2013: 343). 
 
Regarding national self-defence and security, international cooperation is important (Biehl et 
al., 2013: 345). Sweden cooperates with international actors such as the EU and the UN. Even 
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though it is argued that Sweden preferred the EU as the international cooperation actor, 
Sweden cooperates with the UN through peace-enforcement operations (Biehl et al., 2013: 
349). However, it was argued that joining NATO was not in question in the short to medium 
term. The reason for this was believed to be Sweden's view of itself as a neutral country, 
which has not been at war for 200 years. There is a difference between organisations and how 
Sweden views it as neutral to still be a part of the EU and the UN. However, there is a belief 
that being part of NATO is not neutral. The difference is that the UN is for peacekeeping, but 
NATO is in contrast to Russia, and Russia also views NATO as negative (Biehl et al., 2013: 
349-50). 
In summary, neutrality was the most prominent parts of Sweden's strategic culture (Biehl et 
al., 2013: 354). In 2024, Sweden joined NATO and thereby was no longer neutral. However, 
when the failings occurred, they were not a member of NATO. 
2.1.3 Using Own Values 
The using own values state that there is the risk that an analyst can be affected by their value 
system when conducting an analysis. Thereby applying the analyst's values and thinking of 
the enemy and thereby not using the enemy country's values system (Fowler, 2024: 509). A 
value system can affect how a country acts, and an authoritarian country like Russia has value 
systems other than those of Western countries (Fowler, 2024: 509). Not understanding Russia 
can lead to wrong assumptions about how Russia will act (Fowler, 2024: 510). The US and 
UK's success in foreseeing Russia's invasion is argued to partly be because of the UK and the 
US's experiences during the Cold War (Huminski, 2023: 22). The Cold War increased the US 
and the UK's awareness and increased their understanding of Russia (Omand, 2024: 391-392; 
395). The values and intentions must be understood to understand and counter Russia's 
actions (Omand, 2024: 392). Previously, they were aware of Russia's capabilities but lacked 
an understanding of their intentions (Gates, 1973: 39). This led to the need to understand 
Russia and not think of Russia as having the same value system as the Western countries 
(Gates, 1973: 39). To understand Russia's intentions there was the need to understand further 
the Russian leadership (Omand, 2024: 395). 
 
Leadership and values are important, as a change of president can cause different intentions. 
However, external situations can also cause a change in intentions (Gates, 1973: 41-42). 
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Therefore, the US could create reference points for how Russia could act, and through this, 
Russian values were important (Wirtz, 2013: 555). By understanding the leadership and their 
values, the US could anticipate Russia's behaviour (Wirtz, 2013: 553). Russia's actions before 
the full-scale invasion of Ukraine are argued to have been understood by the US through 
Russia's values and objectives seen during the Cold War. Also acknowledging Russia's recent 
actions, for example, the conflict in Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 
(Omand, 2024: 389). 
2.2 The Organisational Theory 
Another cause of intelligence failure can be problems concerning the organisation (Marrin, 
2004: 661). The organisational theory believes it is possible to analyse how a country will act. 
However, if it fails, it is because of organisational problems (Pastorello & Testa, 2017: 55). 
Groupthink can explain a failed analysis because the organisations do not question each 
other's analysis (Davies & P. H. J, 2004: 499). It can be because they want to make a career, 
and questioning others may be negative (Shelton, 2011: 638). Also, the previous knowledge 
regarding a country is set, and the intelligence service does not want to question this 
knowledge (Shelton, 2011: 640). Also, managers may not want their analysts to think 
differently (Shelton, 2011: 640). In the previous intelligence failure, if the Iraqi forces had 
weapons of mass destruction, there was an institutional problem. Finding further proof of 
weapons of mass destruction was the major assignment for the intelligence services (Agrell, 
2015: 195). Also, the working methods in the intelligence service did not encourage the 
analyst to question already existing knowledge. Therefore, it was difficult to come up with 
alternative explanations. The groupthink mentality was present and halted the intelligence 
service (Agrell, 2015: 195). 
 
There can also be issues that different countries organisations do not share information 
(Pastorello & Testa, 2017: 64). There can be legal issues in concerning sharing information 
between different countries as well as countries being reluctant to share information 
(Pastorello & Testa, 2017: 66). Problems may also exist in that the information cannot be 
shared with other related organisations in the country, this can cause the analyst to miss 
information that could have pointed to an outcome. For the analyst's the information should 
be accessible (Marrin, 2004: 662). Barriers can also affect the cooperation between important 
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organisations in the country (Marrin, 2004: 666). A problem can exist when the organisations 
focus on their objectives and the information is not shared (Pastorello & Testa, 2017: 57-58). 
It can be that the different organisations have a rivalry between them (Pastorello & Testa, 
2017: 55). However, there can also be legal issues that prevent the organisations from sharing 
information (Pastorello & Testa, 2017: 60). A concern can also be in the organisation itself, 
when the information is not distributed (Pastorello & Testa, 2017: 66). Therefore, analysts are 
missing information that could have been important in their analysis (Marrin, 2004: 662). 
2.3 Reflections  
To summarise, this study will use four of the most prominent theories in this field. Three of 
these theories have focused on the cognitive bias and one on organisational problems as the 
cause of intelligence failure. These theories will be used to understand why the SAF 
continued to misjudge Russia. It is thereby important to understand how these four theories 
will be used to answer the research question. Therefore, each theory will be discussed based 
on how it can answer it and which will eventually, in the method chapter, become the 
operationalisation. 
 
The rational theory emphasises that actors calculate and base their decisions on benefits and 
consequences. Thereby trying to maximise their benefits and avoid negative consequences. 
Negative consequences can be wars that are likely to fail or consequences that can cause an 
economic downfall. However, there can be risks when viewing an actor as rational because it 
can cause a simplified understanding of the actor. There are thereby questions that need to be 
answered about whether the rational theory was the reason for the continued failed analysis of 
Russia. The questions revolve around whether there were assumptions that Russia would act 
rationally based on avoiding negative consequences, and whether the SAF believed that other 
countries are as rational as they are themselves. It is also stated that there is a need to have 
facts to prove the analyst's case, thereby viewing whether the SAF did not view and 
understand the facts.  
 
The strategic culture theory views historical experiences, beliefs and national culture as 
important. The identity of the country affects the analysis and how countries make decisions. 
The Swedish strategic culture is characterised by neutrality and international cooperation, 
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which affects its military. The strategic culture could have shaped Sweden's threat perception 
and caused the SAF to be naive about Russia's actions, as they believe themselves to be 
neutral and think of other actors as the same. There are questions that need to be answered 
about whether the strategic culture of Sweden was the reason for the failed analysis of Russia. 
The questions is whether a lack of recent military actions contributed to an underestimation of 
Russia's actions. Also, did they rely on international organisations like the EU and the UN 
when assessing Russia as a threat? 
 
The theory using own values states that Western countries can use their own values when 
assessing another country's actions, thereby using their ideological thoughts on the other 
country, which is argued to lead to wrong assessments. Analysts can thereby use their own 
Western values on Russia, which can lead to misunderstandings and wrong predictions of 
Russian behaviour. There are questions that need to be answered if using own values was the 
reason for the failed analysis of Russia. The questions revolve around whether the SAF 
assumed that Russia would act based on democratic principles and did the SAF not 
understand Russia's values and their focus on increased power? 
 
The organisational theory instead emphasises that organisations are the reason for failing to 
analyse another country's actions. Organisational problems can include groupthink, rivalries 
between organisations, and information not being shared. For the SAF, these organisational 
issues could have led to a wrong assessment of Russia's actions. There are questions that need 
to be answered about whether the organisational theory was the reason for the failed analysis 
of Russia. The questions revolve around whether there was groupthink, no questioning of 
analysis because of negative effects on the career and whether managers affected the analyst 
not to think differently? Also, viewing if other countries did not share information with the 
SAF, was there no information shared between organisations in Sweden, were there rivalries 
between them, and was the information not distributed within the SAF? 
3. Methodological Framework  
This study will use a qualitative method, which means using and emphasising words 
(Bryman, 2016: 375). As this study will examine and collect information from reports, 
academic materials, and other sources, the qualitative method is suitable for this purpose, as 
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text sources are used. A qualitative method is also appropriate when the aim is to understand 
how an actor views the world around them to gain knowledge of the social world. As this 
study will be viewing the SAF, the aim is to understand how this actor views the world 
(Bryman, 2016: 375). It is essential to gain knowledge concerning experience and the 
perspective of the SAF. Knowledge can be gained through distributed information, which 
differs from other methods because the information is not measured or counted. Sources that 
can be used are, for example, government reports (Hammarberg et al., 2016: 499). However, 
to gain knowledge, qualitative methods must still systematically collect and describe 
information (Hammarberg et al., 2016: 499). The design for this study will be a case study 
because it will focus on and give an extensive analysis of the SAF. The research question 
revolve around the SAF, thereby this study will look closer at one specific actor to gain 
insight into this matter (Bryman, 2016: 60). A case study is a suitable design as it provides the 
means to do a comprehensive analysis of, for example, an organisation (Bryman, 2016: 
60-61).  
 
The study will use the theories to give answers to the research problem and thereby answer 
the research question. The theoretical framework and operationalisation will guide the 
analysis by establishing clear questions and indicators for each theory. Next, the material will 
be sorted according to these questions, leading to the creation of the result chapter. Finally, the 
analyses will explain how the theories account for the SAF's misjudgment of Russia's actions. 
Also, the material is the focus of this study. Therefore, the theories will be used as a 
framework to bring knowledge from the information concerning why the SAF failed. The idea 
is to use the theories to increase knowledge regarding the subject and why the SAF failed, not 
to create a new theory. However, as stated earlier, this approach shows not only how we can 
explain this case, but also how the combination of theories is important and can be used to 
analyse other similar cases. 
3.1 Document Analysis  
The qualitative method used for analysing the material in this study will be a document 
analysis. This entails systematically studying documents to answer the research question 
(Gross, 2018). It is used to understand policy, organisations, and past events (Gross, 2018). 
There are various examples of documents that can be used. However, some examples are 
17 
  
reports and journal articles. There is an important distinction between primary and secondary 
data (Gross, 2018). Primary data consists of first-hand information; this can, for example, be 
photos, personal letters and interviews. These data will not be used in this study; instead, 
secondary data will be used. The information used is different in that the information consists 
of an analysis of primary data. Secondary data often aims to spread information; examples of 
this data are research articles (Gross, 2018). 
 
When choosing the documents that will be used, what is of importance is what documents can 
answer the research question most suitably. As there are many documents, preliminary 
research can also be used to view important information. To be able to do this, there is a need 
to briefly go over the materials to get a review of the information (Gross, 2018). When 
viewing the relevant information that can be used to answer the research questions most 
suitably, the sources consist of reports from the SAF and academic sources. There are reports 
from the SAF that analyse how the world will look in the future and these reports state how 
Russia will act. The SAF has published two reports stating how Russia will act in the future; 
one was published in 2001, and the other was published in 2010. These reports are not 
primarily used for the SAF. Instead, they act as reports to the politicians when they decide 
how the defence should be shaped. There have been almost ten years between these two 
reports, making it interesting to see how the SAF have viewed Russia. There are also reports 
by the intelligence services, which are published annually and presented to the public. These 
reports explain what has occurred during the recent year and also make statements about what 
could occur in the future. One academic material that is of interest in this study is that of 
Gunilla Eriksson, a researcher who has examined how the Swedish intelligence service works. 
The material from Eriksson was published in 2018, before the full-scale invasion by Russia of 
Ukraine. Eriksson's study does not research failed analysis but instead how the intelligence 
service works. This will complement the reports from the SAF to understand why they failed 
to foresee Russia's actions. 
 
As noted before, the researcher must be systematic. Knowing what methods and sources have 
been used is valuable if and when another researcher conducts similar research. Two aspects 
that should be noted are what is referred to as inclusionary criteria and exclusionary criteria 
(Gross, 2018). Inclusionary criteria are important to avoid analysing irrelevant information. 
18 
  
This can be done by viewing a specific period and only including documents from a specific 
source. This study's period is extensive, as this topic will be more interesting and relevant 
when viewed over a more extended period. However, it is still an analysis that does not go 
back to World War 2 or the Cold War. The other way to limit the sources used is to narrow 
down the sources to government documents (Gross, 2018). Because this study is interested in 
the SAF and its organisation, document sources from the SAF will be used. However, 
regarding source criticism, this study will also use other materials to address this matter. 
Therefore, providing a detailed understanding because the SAFs themselves might not 
acknowledge their problems. Exclusionary criteria are used to view the chosen material more 
extensively than the inclusionary criteria; this is conducted to be able to get a final sample. 
The aim is to get representative and relevant information on the topic (Gross, 2018). 
 
A systematic approach is also needed to organise the documents (Gross, 2018). In this study, 
the most important thing is understanding why they failed to foresee Russia's actions. 
Thereby, it is highly relevant to organise where there are statements regarding Russia and 
where they state how Russia will act. It is necessary to understand the period and categorise 
the information based on the period when the failings occurred. This study will start by 
viewing the SAF from 2001 and continue until the invasion in 2022. There are various ways 
of conducting the coding and analysis of the documents (Gross, 2018). This study will use the 
framework in the theory chapter to conduct the result and analysis. One limitation of this 
method is that the information can be regarded as biased because the researcher's view of the 
matter can affect the analysis (Gross, 2018). Using the most prominent theories when 
conducting the analysis will prevent this limitation.  
3.2 Selection of Cases  
The reason for choosing to view Russia is that they are essential to Sweden's security. Russia 
has long been a security concern for Sweden, especially during the Cold War, but today it also 
presents a significant security concern for Sweden (Åkerström, 2008). Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine in 2022 changed Sweden's views of security and led to Sweden joining NATO. 
Sweden can be considered close to Russia in terms of geography, thereby being more of a 
military threat than China. China is also viewed as a threat, but not to the extent that Russia is; 
Russia is the primary security concern when viewing the situation, especially regarding a 
19 
  
military attack on Sweden (MUST, 2023: 8). This study's generalisability is not in focus, as it 
is conducted as a case study. However, it is possible to view which theories explain SAF's 
failed analysis of Russia and which can be used to understand other actors further. Thereby, 
this study not only helps explain this specific case but also highlights the importance of 
combining theories to analyse other similar situations. 
3.3 Operationalisation 
This study has concrete questions that need to be answered with the empirical material to state 
which theories are the cause for the continued failure. The questions are based on the theories 
in the theoretical framework. In order to demonstrate that the theories account for the failings, 
they must effectively explain the failure and thereby not be contradicted between the years. 
By carefully examining the information through these theoretical frameworks, the study aims 
to give a clear understanding of the reasons behind the failure. 
 
When analysing the empirical material, each main question is divided into subquestions that 
serve as indicators of the theory. The subquestions are thereby more detailed questions and 
further developed, as to what to look for in the material. These subquestions help make the 
theories more concrete, thereby identifying whether there were signs in the empirical material 
that supported or contradicted the theory. It is not required for all questions to be fully 
supported to argue that a theory contributes to explaining the failure. Instead, the presence of 
key indicators, even if some are missing, can demonstrate that the theory played an important 
role in the intelligence failure. 
For example, regarding the organisational theory, even if specific organisational problems like 
information sharing between countries is not visible, viewing important issues such as 
groupthink can still contribute to that theory was the reason for the failed analysis. This 
approach allows for a more nuanced conclusion that views the complexity of intelligence 
analysis, avoiding an all-or-nothing based conclusion. This study will thereby answer whether 
the indicators were present and what theory is closest to explain the continued failure. 
20 
  
3.3.1 The Rational Theory  
The rational theory emphasises that actors calculate and base their decisions on benefits and 
consequences. Thereby trying to maximise their benefits and avoid consequences. Thereby, 
the operationalisation is as follows: 
 
Questions Main Questions Subquestions 
Did the SAF assume that 
Russia was rational and 
Did the SAF make assumptions about Russia's calculated? Did the SAF Q1 rationality? assume Russia would prioritise stability over risk 
in matters such as the 
economy? 
Were there facts or warning 
Q2 Were there objective facts that should have been viewed signs that the SAF may by the SAF that signalled Russia’s military actions? have missed or failed to 
understand fully? 
 
Regarding Q1, the question comes from the theoretical framework which emphasises that 
actors calculate and base their decisions on benefits and consequences. This way of thinking 
can lead to misjudgments when analysts project their view of what is rational onto other 
states. It is thereby important to view whether the SAF viewed Russia as a rational actor and 
assumed that Russia would act rationally. Regarding the subquestions, it is thereby important 
to view whether the SAF saw Russia as calculated and rational, and whether they believed 
Russia would prioritise stability over risk, for example, avoiding economic consequences. 
Thereby instead chose to cooperate with the Western countries. 
 
Regarding Q2, the questions are based on the theoretical framework, which points out that 
failures can occur when analysts neglect facts that could indicate a state's intentions. It is, 
therefore, relevant to examine whether there were objective facts that could have signalled 
Russia's military actions. Viewing whether the SAF missed facts or warning signs. 
3.3.2 Strategic Culture  
The strategic culture theory views historical experiences, beliefs and identity in the country. 
Swedish strategic culture is characterised by neutrality and international cooperation, which 
affects its military. The material will be viewed to see Sweden's historical neutrality and 
21 
  
international cooperation and how it affected the perception of Russia as a military threat. 
Thereby, the operationalisation is as follows: 
 
Questions Main Questions Subquestions 
Did the SAF assume 
conflict was unlikely due to 
Has Sweden's strategic culture and the lack of recent their lack of recent warfare 
Q1 military conflict led to an underestimation of aggressive experience? Is there an 
military strategies? emphasis on political 
solutions over military 
actions? 
Did the SAF lean on 
international organisations 
for collective defence? Did 
Q2 Did the SAF rely on international organisations when the SAF assume that assessing Russia as a threat? international organisations 
would act as deterrents 
against Russian 
aggression? 
 
Regarding Q1, the question is based on the theoretical framework which emphasises that a 
country’s experiences and beliefs shape how it thinks about security. In Sweden’s case, a long 
tradition of neutrality and involvement in international cooperation has made them prefer 
political solutions over military action. This may have contributed to an underestimation of 
aggressive military strategies. The subquestions are therefore used to examine whether a long 
period of peace led to assumptions of stability and whether the SAF viewed conflict as 
unlikely due to the lack of recent warfare experience. It also becomes relevant to look at 
whether the SAF emphasised political solutions rather than military actions. 
 
Regarding Q2, the questions are based on the theoretical framework, which considers whether 
the SAF relied on international organisations like the EU and UN when assessing Russia as a 
threat. The subquestions focus on examining whether the SAF depended on these 
organisations for collective defence and whether they believed that international cooperation 
would deter Russian aggression. 
22 
  
3.3.3 Using Own Values  
The theory states that Western countries use their own values when analysing another 
country's actions, thereby using their own ideological thoughts on the other country, which is 
argued to lead to wrong assessments. Democratic values can cause Western countries not to 
understand Russia. Thereby, the operationalisation is as follows: 
 
Questions Main Questions Subquestions 
Did the SAF expect Russia 
to stick to democratic and 
Q1 Did the SAF assume Russia would act according to democratic values? Western values? Did they assume that Russia valued 
cooperation? 
Q2 Did the SAF fail to understand Russia’s authoritarian 
Were authoritarian priorities 
values and focus on power? like power projection underestimated? 
 
Regarding Q1, the question is based on the theoretical framework that analysts risk projecting 
their own value systems onto the country they analyse, rather than understanding the other 
country’s values and believing that Russia would act according to democratic values. Failure 
to understand these differences can lead to wrong assumptions about Russia’s actions. The 
subquestions will thereby be used to explore whether the SAF expected Russia to act 
according to democratic and Western values, and whether they assumed Russia valued 
cooperation. 
Regarding Q2, the question is based on the theoretical framework that failing to understand 
authoritarian values can lead to misjudgments. Russia’s focus on power is different from 
Western democratic values, and if the SAF failed to understand these authoritarian goals, it 
can explain why they misjudged Russia’s actions. The subquestions will thereby be used to 
view whether the SAF underestimated authoritarian values like power projection. 
3.3.4 The Organisational Theory  
The organisational theory emphasises that organisations are responsible for the failure to 
analyse other countries' actions. Organisational problems can include group thinking, rivalries 
between organisations in the country and information not being shared. Information may not 
be shared with other countries or within the organisation itself, causing the analyst to miss 
23 
  
important information that would increase the possibility of foreseeing actions. This is 
different from the other theories in that it does not mention a specific cognitive bias reason for 
the failure. Instead, the groupthink can centre on all the cognitive bias theories. The material 
will be viewed to see if organisational problems were the reason for the failed analysis. 
Thereby, the operationalisation is as follows: 
 
Questions Main Questions Subquestions 
Did analysts conform to the 
dominant views without 
Q1 Was there a groupthink mentality and flawed 
challenging these 
questioning of the analysis? assumptions? Were the opinions of Russia set? Was 
critical reflection lacking in the 
analytical process? 
Were analysts unwilling to 
Q2 Was questioning the set view of Russia seen as challenge the set view of negative due to career ambitions? Russia because of fear of 
damaging their careers? 
Did managers prevent analysts from thinking Did managers prevent Q3 differently? alternative views or critical thinking? 
Were there signs that the SAF 
lacked access to information 
Q4 Did other countries withhold intelligence from the SAF? from allies? Were laws or 
national policies mentioned as 
obstacles to cooperation? 
Were there legal barriers to 
Was the information accessible between organisations cooperating and sharing Q5 in Sweden? information? Was there a rivalry between the 
organisations?  
Did structural issues stop 
Q6 Was information not effectively shared within the SAF? useful information from reaching analysts or 
decision-makers? 
 
Regarding Q1, the question is based on the theoretical framework that highlights problems, 
such as groupthink, as a cause for intelligence failure. When analysts only use set ideas and 
avoid challenging existing thoughts, failings can occur. The subquestions are, therefore, 
aimed at identifying whether analysts followed dominant views, whether the image of Russia 
24 
  
was already set, and whether there was a lack of critical thinking regarding the analytical 
process. 
Regarding Q2, the questions come from the theoretical framework that highlights how group 
thinking may be reinforced if analysts do not question set views due to career concerns. The 
subquestion, therefore, examines whether analysts were hesitant to question the set view of 
Russia out of concern for their careers. 
Regarding Q3, the question is based on the idea that managers prevented analysts from 
thinking differently. This can limit alternative thoughts and increase a groupthink mentality. 
The subquestion is, therefore, used to examine whether SAF managers prevented critical 
thinking or alternative views. 
 
Regarding Q4, the questions comes from that countries can withhold intelligence because of 
legal constraints, national policies, or a reluctance to cooperate. Such limitations can prevent 
analysts from gaining information. The subquestions are, therefore, used to examine whether 
Sweden lacked access to intelligence from other countries and whether obstacles to 
cooperation, such as laws, were mentioned. 
Regarding Q5, the question is based on the fact that when information is not shared or 
distributed properly between organisations in Sweden, analysts may miss important 
information. The subquestion is, therefore, used to examine whether legal barriers were 
mentioned that made cooperation and information sharing difficult, and if there was rivalry 
between the organisations. 
Regarding Q6, the questions is based on that important information may not be shared 
properly within the organisation, preventing analysts or decision-makers from accessing what 
they need. The subquestion is, therefore, used to examine whether there were structural issues 
within the SAF that stopped relevant information from reaching people. 
As stated before, to determine which theory explains the failure, it is necessary to look at 
which key indicators are supported by the empirical material. It is not only about counting 
which theory has the most indicators, but instead if the indicators played an important part. 
Even if not all indicators are present, a theory can still be seen as important if it shows clear 
25 
  
signs of contributing to the failure. They must effectively explain the failure and not be 
contradicted between the years to be able to conclude that they are the reason for continued 
failure. 
It is also relevant to consider how the theories may be connected and not only viewed as 
separate. For example, the organisational theory can help explain why certain assumptions 
from the other theories, like seeing Russia as a rational actor or relying on international 
cooperation, remained over time. If groupthink existed, it could have made it harder for 
analysts to change their perception, even when new information appeared. In this way, 
organisational problems might have supported or reinforced parts of the other theoretical 
explanations. By viewing how the theories may interact, the analysis can better reflect the 
complexity behind the failed analysis, without assuming that one theory alone is the reason 
for the failed analysis. 
3.4 Validity and Reliability 
Good validity is given by measuring what the researcher has set out and intends to measure 
(Boréus & Bergström, 2018: 38). Concerning validity, this study will use the most common 
theories of why states fail to analyse other countries' actions in the academic world. This will 
be accomplished using theories that examine cognitive bias and organisational reasons for 
failure. The validity is high as this study will use reports from the SAF and academic 
trustworthy sources. 
 
A study is more reliable if independent studies arrive at similar results (Boréus & Bergström, 
2018: 40). Regarding the reliability, there is the potential that another study that is performed 
with the same reports uses different theories for viewing why the SAF failed, however, by 
using the most prominent theories for explaining failings, the theories are reliable. However, it 
is important to consider the researcher's interpretation of the information analysed to be 
objective (Bryman, 2016). The materials have been viewed multiple times to avoid being 
biased when stating which theories explain the failure and when interpreting the information, 
use well-established theories. 
26 
  
4. Result  
In the 2001 report, the SAF made assumptions about how countries would act in the future, 
but it did not view Russia as a military threat. This can be seen through the following citation 
from the report: 
The current and future security situation in Europe is perceived by European 
countries, including Russia, in such a way that they believe they need smaller and 
more versatile defence forces with a new focus. The security situation is perceived to 
contain more fundamental requirements than resisting an attack on their territory or 
the common territory of their alliance. (The SAF, 2001: 36-37) 
 
It is thereby visible that the SAF believed that a new focus was needed and that Russia would 
have the same focus. This new focus was concentrated on being able to conduct peacekeeping 
operations (The SAF, 2001: 36-37). 
 
In the 2010 report, the SAF continued to underestimate Russia, as the SAF stated in their 
report that it was not likely that there would be a war or an armed conflict in Europe. This can 
be seen through the following citation: 
 
Conditions in Europe will remain stable and peaceful. (The SAF, 2010: 132) 
 
This was an optimistic analysis of Russia as it did not estimate that Russia would act with 
their military. To misjudge that there would be no war in Europe is a severe misjudgment, as 
the SAF could not predict the Ukraine conflict. 
 
Viewing the months and weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the 
intelligence service continued to argue that it was unlikely that Russia would carry out their 
invasion (Dagens Nyheter, 2022., b; Dagens Nyheter, 2022., a). This can be seen through the 
following citation: 
 
Would one be prepared to throw everything away when it came to relations with the 
West? And also at such a costly price in the form of human lives, and so on. The 
27 
  
assessment at the time was that he would not do it because it was reckless. (SVT, 
2023) 
 
The cost of not making the correct analysis of Russia's actions was that the politicians did not 
apply for NATO membership before the invasion (Dagens Nyheter, 2022.,b). Thereby, not 
gaining security from NATO in the same way as if they were a member. This contributed to 
the fact that the prime minister was not satisfied with the analysis after the invasion, and the 
intelligence service did not complete their objective of warning the politicians in time 
(Dagens Nyheter, 2022.,b). 
4.1 Cognitive Bias Theories 
4.1.1 The Rational Theory  
 
The report in 2001 emphasised that the market economy would act as a stabilising factor for 
Russia. This is visible through the following citations in the report: 
 
A vital issue for Russia is the capacity to develop the Russian economy. There is a 
Russian understanding that this requires integration with the West. The focus on 
improving the economy means that Russia is keen on good cooperation with the EU 
and the G8 countries. (The SAF, 2001: 20) 
 
Q1: This implies that Russia was a rational actor that would prioritise economic cooperation 
with the West. Russia needed to act rational and calculated not to risk this cooperation, 
thereby not acting aggressively with their military. Also prioritising stability over risk in 
regard to the economy. 
 
Q2: The SAF neglected objective facts and warning signs for Russia's military actions. For 
example, before 2001, Russia focused on its military readiness because it showed discontent 
with the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia (IISS, 1999: 104). Russia also did not cooperate with 
NATO; instead, it increased collaboration with countries like Syria, Iran, China, India, and the 
Middle East, which is a sign that there was increased tension with Western countries (IISS, 
1999: 108).  
28 
  
 
In the 2010 report, it is argued that the SAF still assumed that Russia would act rational and 
calculated. The SAF stated the following: 
 
The Russian economy is largely dependent on the export of raw materials such as oil, 
gas and timber. The high world market prices for raw materials in recent years have 
thus contributed to a sharp increase in Russian economic growth, which has 
contributed to growing Russian prosperity. (The SAF, 2010: 7-9) 
 
Russia is also investing in tying the European market closer to itself through long-term 
bilateral agreements and the construction of new fixed infrastructure in the form of 
gas and oil pipelines. (The SAF, 2010: 59) 
 
The Russian Security Strategy from 2009, covering the period until 2020, emphasises 
that national security is directly dependent on the country's economic development. 
(The SAF, 2010: 55) 
 
Q1: The 2010 report thereby stated that Russia's economy was important for its growing 
prosperity and security, implying that this would affect Russia so that it would not risk its 
growing economy and would not want to challenge its economic ties with the West. The SAF 
thereby assumed that Russia would act rationally and calculated, also prioritising stability.  
 
Q2: This analysis, however, neglected facts that contradicted the SAF's analysis. Pointing to 
this outcome was that the military operation in Georgia was highly positively seen by the 
Russian population; one argument is that the SAF should have seen that something similar 
could occur, as Putin wanted to increase his popularity (IISS, 2009: 207). Also, it showed 
Russia's willingness to prioritise its goals over its relationship with the West. Russia also 
viewed Georgia getting closer to NATO as highly negative (IISS, 2008: 205-206). Therefore, 
they should have understood that Russia could act the same towards Ukraine (IISS, 2009: 
210). There was also a change in how Russia could deploy its forces in other countries, as it 
was easier for Russia to deploy troops overseas (IISS, 2010: 104).  
 
29 
  
Viewing the months and weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the intelligence 
service continued to argue that Russia would not risk the relations with the West:  
 
Would one be prepared to throw everything away when it came to relations with the 
West? And also at such a costly price in the form of human lives, and so on. The 
assessment at the time was that he would not do it because it was reckless. (SVT, 
2023) 
 
Q1: The intelligence service argued that Russia would want to avoid an invasion because they 
did not want to challenge the collaboration with the West (Dagens Nyheter, 2022.,b). The 
intelligence service also presented its analysis of security at an open conference. There, it was 
stated that Russia would not want to start an invasion because that would be very costly for 
Russia, something that Russia was not going to risk (Dagens Nyheter, 2022.,b). Therefore, 
Russia is again viewed as calculated and rational, as well as prioritising stability. 
 
Q2: There were signs that Russia would invade Ukraine, as Russia had major military 
exercises next to Ukraine a year before. Also, military equipment was left next to Ukraine 
(Dagens Nyheter, 2022.,b). Putin also made public that he did not believe Ukraine had the 
right to be an independent state before the invasion (Dagens Nyheter, 2022., b).  
4.1.2 Strategic Culture 
In the report from 2001, the SAF underestimated Russia's military strategies and instead 
emphasised political solutions, and there was a reliance on international organisations. It is 
visible through the following citations: 
 
Democracy, globalisation, and the market economy form the foundation for the 
development of an increasingly peaceful and integrated world. How the major global 
actors interact and how they balance different security policy instruments nationally 
and multinationally will continue to be decisive in the future. The USA will continue to 
be the only global superpower. An increasingly important security policy actor in the 
international arena is the EU. (The SAF, 2001: 14) 
 
30 
  
In addition to the ability to safeguard and protect their own country's territory, 
European states wish to be able to jointly implement stabilising measures, which 
include, among other things, an international crisis management capability. (The 
SAF, 2001: 36) 
 
Q1: There are signs that a long period of peace contributed to the belief that there was 
stability in the world. Also, political solutions have been viewed as more appropriate than 
military actions. This is because it showed a belief that there would be a peaceful and 
integrated world. Projecting Swedish strategic culture on Russia and failing to understand 
Russia. Russia's aggressive actions in Georgia showed their goals and that Russia was 
characterised by achieving its once large and powerful status again, and this influences their 
aggressive intentions and actions (Casier, 2023: 18).  
 
Q2: International organisations were essential for Sweden's foreign policy. The EU was an 
increasingly important organisation that would contribute to security.  
 
Even though the strategic culture could explain in some way why the SAF failed to 
understand Russia in 2001, it is argued that this was not the case in 2010. As can be seen 
through the following citation from the 2010 report: 
 
The extensive investments being made in the military sector are aimed, among other 
things, at ensuring the cohesion of the Russian Federation but also at strengthening 
the country's position as a great power. (The SAF, 2010: 54) 
 
For the EU and NATO, including the US, it became clear after the war (Georgian 
war) that Russia had lowered the threshold for the use of military force and that the 
country was striving for great power status as an independent actor in world politics. 
(The SAF, 2010: 51) 
 
Q1: The SAF stated that Russia had lowered the threshold for the use of military force, 
thereby not assuming peace, neutrality and stability in the world. Russia was viewed as a 
great power with aspirations of increasing its power. 
31 
  
 
Q2: The SAF stated that they needed to increase cooperation with new countries, not relying 
on ongoing collaborations and organisations as previously (The SAF, 2010: 51). 
4.1.3 Using Own Values 
In the 2001 report, the SAF assumed that Russia would follow democratic and Western 
values. 
This is visible through the following citations in the report: 
 
Democracy, globalisation, and the market economy form the foundation for the 
development of an increasingly peaceful and integrated world. How the major global 
actors interact and how they balance different security policy instruments nationally 
and multinationally will continue to be decisive in the future. The USA will continue to 
be the only global superpower. An increasingly important security policy actor in the 
international arena is the EU. (The SAF, 2001: 14) 
 
To a large extent, the various values o f the Western world have come to be dominant 
worldwide (The SAF, 2001: 14) 
 
The world is largely characterised by globalisation, which is brought about by 
increasingly widespread democratisation and market economies. This leads to 
increased interdependence between various actors. (The SAF, 2001: 42) 
 
Q1: This reflected Western and Swedish values, emphasising democracy and cooperation. 
Because the SAF used Western and Swedish values on Russia, it caused misjudgment and an 
underestimation of Russia.  
 
Q2: The focus on democracy and Western values caused Sweden not to acknowledge Russia's 
goals, especially as Putin increased and improved the armed forces (IIISS, 2000: 109). Thus, 
Sweden did not understand Russian authoritarian values and their aim for power.  
 
32 
  
In the report from 2010 there was an understanding of Russia's goals and values, thereby not 
analysing Russia through the eyes of Western and democratic values. 
It is seen from the following citations: 
 
The Swedish region borders Russia with an increasingly clear ambition to regain its 
great power status. (The SAF, 2010: 7; 49) 
 
The intelligence service in their report from 2014 also described Russia's new priorities: 
 
The overarching ambition of the Russian security policy is to strengthen its great 
power role and limit the West's, and NATO's, influence in Russia's immediate vicinity, 
primarily the former Soviet Union. (MUST, 2014: 11) 
 
Q1: This increased the understanding of Russia and its priorities, acknowledging that Russia 
would not act according to democratic and Western values.  
 
Q2: This also showed that the SAF did not underestimate Russian authoritarian values; 
instead, the SAF understood Russian authoritarianism as wanting increased power. 
4.2 The Organisational Theory  
There was groupthink, and it is stated that there was not enough questioning of the analysis. 
It can be seen through the following citation: 
 
The analysts repeatedly referred to the explicit ambition of making sure that newer 
assessments remained within ‘the same line of argument’ as the previously written 
ones, allowing little room for appreciation or awareness of the possible downsides of 
relying heavily on ‘in-house information’. (Eriksson, 2018: 67) 
 
Q1: The information produced thereby risked being a copy of already existing knowledge and 
not being critical to new information (Eriksson, 2018: 67). The analyst was acknowledged to 
stick with intelligence service's previous view of the matter (Eriksson, 2018: 70). It can 
thereby be the case that product is just a copy of previous assessment (Eriksson, 2018: 72). 
33 
  
When making a similar analysis as before, there is the risk that the analysis is missing 
important new information and that they are instead acknowledging a narrow view of 
information (Eriksson, 2018: 75). It was viewed that the groupthink mentality existed when a 
product was to be viewed by a colleague. This is because the criticism about the product 
concerns the text and not the idea if it was within the established norm (Eriksson, 2018: 81). 
This groupthink mentality affected the organisation so that the analysts felt that they were not 
allowed to have a bold analysis (Eriksson, 2018: 77). It is not that the believed correct thought 
of how to think was explicitly written down, but instead there was a norm within the 
organisation (Eriksson, 2018: 77). The analyst knows however, what is the acceptable thought 
of the matter. It is hard to get support for an analysis that is not within the set norm (Eriksson, 
2018: 78).  
 
What was also important to colleagues when viewing the analysis was that the intelligence 
service was consistent with the analysis presented before, because politicians could be 
confused if the analysis contradicted previous information. 
This can be seen from the following citation:  
 
The norm seems to be to write the assessment without being controversial, preferably 
not to evoke change, and in such a manner that it does not contradict assessments and 
conclusions made within other parts of the organisation. (Eriksson, 2018: 75-76)  
 
The politicians thereby received the same information over time, which would affect their 
views and how they made decisions (Eriksson, 2018: 209).  
 
Q2: It also affected their career if they thought outside the established norm of the subject. As 
this could cause the analyst to have less credibility (Eriksson, 2018: 80).  
 
Q3: Managers did prevent analysts from thinking differently, as the analysts stated that they 
needed to have a consensus of other colleagues when publishing their products, colleagues 
being other analysts as well as the managers (Eriksson, 2018: 75-76). 
 
34 
  
Q4: Regarding whether other countries withhold information from the SAF, this was not the 
case. Instead, it can be viewed that other countries shared intelligence with the SAF before the 
invasion of Ukraine. The US publicly informed that Russia would invade Ukraine before the 
invasion. Also, the US informed Sweden specifically (Dagens Nyheter, 2022., b). Thereby, 
there were no legal or policy issues in sharing this information. 
 
Q5: The intelligence service states that there was cooperation with different organisations in 
Sweden. This can be seen from the following citation: 
 
There is national cooperation between Must, the Swedish Security Service (Säpo), the 
Swedish Defence Radio Agency (FRA), the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration 
(FMV) and the Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOI). (The Swedish Armed 
Forces, 2024). 
 
Therefore, there were no legal issues in cooperating and sharing information between 
organisations. However, the intelligence services mostly used information that existed within 
the organisation (Eriksson, 2018: 66). Therefore, it can be argued that they should have used 
more information from other organisations. However, there is also information that states 
there was rivalry and group thinking between the organisations; this was because analysts 
have stated that they should not think differently if one organisation already has information 
about a subject. 
This can be seen from the following citation: 
 
“Sometimes it was very clear. I received a direct order that I wasn’t allowed to think 
differently from SÄPO [Swedish Security Police] on a specific issue. It was clearly 
stated. I can’t remember now if this happened several times or if this was only the 
time. (. . .) Their argument was that they [SÄPO] had the lead on this issue and they 
were the ones entitled to have an opinion.” (Eriksson, 2018: 80). 
 
Q6: When viewing whether the information was effectively shared within the organisation, it 
has been stated that analysts use old reports and information that have been produced before. 
They also talk to people who also work within this subject to learn (Eriksson, 2018: 66). 
35 
  
Thereby, the information is available and accessible within the organisation. However, this 
can also be affected by groupthink because the analyst is mainly viewing old information on 
the subject.  
5. Analysis  
The SAF failed to foresee how Russia would act and did not predict Russia's actions, such as 
the Georgian conflict in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of 
Ukraine in 2022. Actions that have significantly affected European and Swedish security, and 
where other countries were able to anticipate. This chapter will return to the operationalisation 
and further argue which theories are the reason for the failed analysis.  
As previously stated in the operationalisation, this study was based on concrete questions that 
needed to be answered through the empirical material in order to identify which theories 
explain the continued failure. To show that a theory accounts for the failure, it was stated that 
the theories must effectively explain the failure and thereby not be contradicted between the 
years. It was not necessary for all questions to be fully supported in order to argue that a 
theory contributes to the explanation. However, if key indicators were present, even if some 
were missing, they could still show that the theory played an important role in the failure. The 
analysis chapter will thereby conclude which theory came closest to explaining the continued 
failure, and also view how these theories have interacted. Mainly answering the main question 
in the operationalisation, as well as using information from the subquestions. 
5.1 Cognitive Bias Theories 
5.1.1 The Rational Theory  
 
Q1: Did the SAF make assumptions about Russia's rationality? 
Russia was seen as a rational and calculated actor that would prioritise economic cooperation 
with the West, as it was viewed that economic growth was important for Russia. It was 
expected that Russia would act in a rational way to avoid risking this cooperation, and 
therefore would not behave aggressively with its military. Stability was viewed to be more 
important than taking economic risks.  
 
36 
  
Q2: Were there objective facts that should have been viewed by the SAF that signalled 
Russia’s military actions? 
There were objective facts that should have signalled Russia's military actions. For example, 
increased military readiness and increased cooperation with countries outside the West 
indicated increasing tensions with the West. Later actions, such as conflicts in Georgia and the 
annexation of Crimea, showed Russia's willingness to use military force. Before the invasion 
of Ukraine, there were military exercises near the border, and Putin also made public that he 
did not believe Ukraine had the right to be an independent state. 
 
In summary, the rational theory thereby explains the repeated underestimation of Russia's 
military intentions and actions. From 2001 to 2022, the SAF viewed Russia as rational and 
calculated. Assuming that Russia was a rational actor that based its decisions on benefits and 
consequences, it would not risk its relationship with the West, and it would prevent them from 
taking military action. Also, the past actions, such as the conflict in Georgia and the Crimean 
annexation, were not acknowledged as much as needed, thereby underestimating Russia. All 
questions in the operationalisation were displayed, thereby the thought of Russia as a rational 
actor continuously affected the SAF's analysis and explains the continued failure to predict 
Russia. Thereby, the rational theory meets this study's criteria for explaining the continued 
intelligence failure. 
5.1.2 Strategic Culture 
 
Q1: Has Sweden's strategic culture and the lack of recent military conflict led to an 
underestimation of aggressive military strategies? 
Regarding the strategic culture, in 2001, there were signs that a long period of peace 
contributed to the thought that there was stability in the world. It assumed that military 
conflict was unlikely and that countries would prioritise political solutions. Thereby 
underestimating Russia's military goals. However, in 2010, the SAF understood that Russia 
had lowered the threshold for using its military and was instead focused on increasing its 
great power status. This shows that the lack of recent conflict can explain early failure, but not 
the continued failure. 
 
Q2: Did the SAF rely on international organisations when assessing Russia as a threat? 
37 
  
In the early 2000s, the SAF viewed international organisations, especially the EU, as essential 
for Sweden. In 2010, this view changed, and the SAF acknowledged that new cooperation 
was important for security. 
 
In summary, strategic culture explains parts of the failed analysis in 2001 as the SAF viewed 
the world as peaceful and relied on international organisations. This led to an underestimation 
of Russia’s military intentions. However, this view changed in the 2010 report, where the SAF 
identified Russia’s increased military ambitions and lowered threshold for using force. From 
that point, the SAF no longer believed that there would be peace and neutrality, neither only 
relying on previous international organisations to deter Russian aggression. Since this study 
aims to explain the continued failure, and the indicators for strategic culture are not visible in 
the 2010 report, this theory cannot explain the failed analysis. Therefore, strategic culture 
does not meet the criteria for explaining the continued failure. 
5.1.3 Using Own Values 
 
Q1: Did the SAF assume Russia would act according to democratic values? 
In the 2001 report, the SAF projected Western democratic values onto Russia. The SAF 
assumed that Russia would act according to democratic and Western values, not 
acknowledging its authoritarian values and Russia's pursuit of power. Instead, it described that 
the world was shaped by democratisation and globalisation. This reflected Western values and 
contributed to an underestimation of Russia's military intentions. In 2010, the SAF's analysis 
had changed and the SAF no longer assumed that Russia would act according to democratic 
and Western values. 
 
Q2: Did the SAF fail to understand Russia’s authoritarian values and focus on power? 
The focus on democracy and Western values led Sweden not to acknowledge Russia's goals in 
2001. These authoritarian goals were not recognised in the 2001 report, contributing to a 
misjudgment of Russia. However, in the 2010 report, the SAF acknowledged Russia's 
ambition to regain its great power status. This indicates an understanding of Russia as an actor 
with authoritarian goals and a focus on power projection. 
 
38 
  
In summary, using own values can explain parts of why the SAF misjudged Russia in 2001. It 
was believed that Russia would act according to Western values, leading to a failed analysis 
of Russia. However, this explanation is not correct for later years. From 2010, the SAF 
acknowledged Russia's authoritarian goals. The theory can explain the early misjudgment, but 
it cannot account for the continued failure in analysis. Therefore, this theory does not meet the 
criteria for explaining the continued failure. 
5.2 The Organisational Theory  
 
Q1: Was there a groupthink mentality and flawed questioning of the analysis? 
The material shows that there was groupthink within the organisation. It was expected that the 
analysts' assessments would follow the same thoughts as previous analyses. This led to a 
situation where new analysis became a copy of previous information and did not acknowledge 
new developments. When viewing others' work, the focus was not on the ideas but on whether 
they were within the set norm. It was also considered important not to contradict earlier 
assessments to avoid confusing politicians. 
 
Q2: Was questioning the set view of Russia seen as negative due to career ambitions? 
It was shown that challenging the set view could be seen as damaging to their career, making 
them less credible. 
 
Q3: Did managers prevent analysts from thinking differently? 
Analysts viewed the importance of consensus from managers when publishing an analysis and 
this prevented new thinking. 
 
Q4: Did other countries withhold intelligence from the SAF? 
There is no support for other countries withholding information from the SAF. Instead, 
Sweden received early warnings about Russia’s actions from other countries. Thus, there were 
no legal or political barriers that prevented intelligence sharing. 
 
Q5: Was the information accessible between organisations in Sweden? 
39 
  
While formal cooperation existed between different organisations in Sweden, analysts mainly 
used information that existed within their organisation. In some cases, they were even told not 
to think differently from what other organisations had stated. There were instead rivalry and 
groupthink, which affected the analysis of Russia. 
 
Q6: Was information not effectively shared within the SAF? 
Information was effectively shared within the SAF. Analysts used old reports and talked with 
colleagues. However, this also reinforced the groupthink problem, as the same views were 
continuously repeated and not coming to new conclusions. 
 
In summary, the organisational theory can explain the failure to analyse Russia. Groupthink 
and not changing set views limited the ability to make an accurate analysis of Russia. Despite 
formal cooperation with other organisations in Sweden and available information in the SAF, 
the SAF could not come to new conclusions. These problems were consistent and contributed 
to Russia's continued underestimation. Thereby, organisational theory meets this study's 
criteria for explaining the continued intelligence failure. 
5.3 Discussion   
The organisational theory and the rational theory need to be brought forward because they are 
both the reason for the failed analysis. The rational theory is helpful in understanding what the 
SAF has failed to understand about Russia, and the organisational theory is used to understand 
why the SAF continued not to understand Russia. Before the Georgian conflict, the 
annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion, the SAF believed that Russia would not risk 
the negative consequences. However, to understand how the SAF comes to this conclusion 
and which information is reaching the politicians, the organisational theory explains this part. 
This is because there is a groupthink problem in the SAF, which prevents them from coming 
to new conclusions. The groupthink mentality affected not only the organisation but also the 
politicians who received the analysis. This is because the politicians received information 
repeatedly and made decisions based on the same information; this is because the SAF did not 
want to confuse the politicians. Thus, underestimating Russia as a threat. Even though this 
thesis argues that groupthink is centred on the rational theory, the organisational theory does 
not explain why it was centred on the rational theory itself. This is explained by the rational 
40 
  
theory, which highlights rationality when making an analysis. However, the rational theory 
alone is insufficient as it only focuses on the cognitive and analytical aspects of the failings. 
The continued view that Russia would be rational shows that organisational theory is 
important in increasing these assumptions.  
 
The theories using own values and strategic culture suggest that the SAF changed their 
perception of Russia because of their actions, thereby supporting the findings of the two 
leading theories. This is because the two supporting theories showed that the SAF could 
change their analysis of Russia in 2010. Even though the SAF improved the analysis, shows 
that groupthinking was centred on the rational theory. Groupthink within the SAF prevented 
alternative analysis, ensuring that the rational theory was not challenged. It is argued that the 
rational and organisational theory show that these factors were so deeply rooted in the SAF 
that they did not change their view of Russia. Therefore, the two theories that explain the 
continued analysis failure are the rational theory and the organisational theory, as group 
thinking was centred on the view that Russia was a rational actor. 
6. Conclusions  
This thesis has examined why the SAF continuously failed to foresee Russia’s military 
actions, culminating in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The study has shown that 
the failure is explained by combining the rational theory and the organisational theory. These 
two theories together explain not only what the SAF misunderstood about Russia but also 
why this misunderstanding continued over time. The study also showed that the theories of 
strategic culture and using own values helped explain the failures until 2010. Still, it was not 
relevant in the later years. Although this change in 2010 showed some increased 
understanding of Russia, it did not lead to more accurate predictions about Russia’s future 
actions, which supports the findings of the two leading theories. This is because even though 
the SAF improved its analysis in relation to these two theories, it shows that group thinking 
was centred on the rational theory and was therefore the reason for the continued failure. The 
rational theory helps explain how the SAF analysed Russia’s actions. The SAF assumed that 
Russia would act rationally, avoiding military actions due to the high costs, such as economic 
downfall and damaged relations with the West. This shows a failure to acknowledge Russia’s 
willingness to accept costs in exchange for achieving its goals. The organisational theory 
41 
  
helps explain why this belief continued because a groupthink mentality existed, which led 
analysts to avoid challenging their previous assessments. Also, the organisation did not want 
to confuse decision-makers with new information. The groupthink within the SAF is argued 
to have been centred on the rational theory, meaning the belief that Russia would act 
rationally became deeply implanted and difficult to question. 
 
To understand and anticipate Russia, the organisations must understand the Russian 
worldview. Otherwise, there is the risk of underestimating Russia. As described in the 
literature review, countries like the US continued to focus on Russia after the Cold War. Their 
intelligence services kept viewing Russia and adjusted their analysis when Russia’s actions 
changed. Instead Sweden changed its focus to international peacekeeping missions and 
reduced its national defence. Thereby, the SAF failed to warn the politicians and did not 
respond to the actions. This meant that important measures, like applying for NATO or 
enhancing the armed forces, were delayed. 
 
One important point from this study is that the Swedish case is different from other 
intelligence failures. In other countries, like the US, failures such as Pearl Harbour and the 
Cuban crisis have been explained by either cognitive bias problems or problems within the 
organisation. However, both of these factors occurred together over an extended period in the 
case of the SAF. This thesis shows that the failure was not a mistake that happened one time, 
instead it was a long-term problem and caused by the belief that Russia would act rationally. 
This belief influenced how the SAF worked, how it carried out its analysis, and how it 
communicated. Because of this, the failure continued for many years and became more severe 
than many of the intelligence failures in other countries. 
 
In conclusion, this study has shown that the SAF's failure to understand Russia was caused by 
a combination of cognitive and organisational problems. The rational theory explains what the 
SAF believed about Russia, and the organisational theory explains why that belief continued 
over time. Together, these theories explain the repeated underestimation of Russia. 
Understanding this is important for improving intelligence work and avoiding similar failures 
in the future. The SAF's organisation is not appropriately designed for today's security 
situation. The organisation previously focused on international operations but now needs to 
42 
  
shift the focus back to increasing its armed forces for national defence. This will take a long 
time and be costly. As a result, the consequences of the failed analysis significantly impact 
Sweden today. 
 
A possible topic for future research is to study how cognitive bias and organisational 
problems, such as the rational theory and the organisational theory, have influenced 
intelligence assessments in other Western countries. By comparing similar long-term 
intelligence failures in, for example, the US and the UK or smaller states, it would be possible 
to better understand how cognitive and organisational factors together can lead to repeated 
underestimation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
  
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