DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES (CES) CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES (CES) Gender Identity and the Cultural Cleavage: How Traditional, Authoritarian, and Nationalist Political Groups Oppose Transgender and Gender Non-conforming Rights in the European Parliament Luis Leandro Ortega Master’s thesis: 30 credits Programme: Master’s Programme in European Studies Level: Second Cycle Semester year: Spring 2025 Supervisor: Katarzyna Wojnicka Abstract This thesis examines how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the Traditional, Authoritarian, and Nationalist (TAN) groups European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) as well as Identity and Democracy (ID), opposed Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming (TGNC) rights during plenary debates in the 9th European Parliament (EP) 2019–2024, and how this opposition was perceived by former and current MEPs. Based on neo-cleavage theory, with complementary insights from homonationalism and trans-exclusionary radical feminism, three comparative abductive thematic analyses were conducted using plenary debate and interview data. The analysis revealed that both the ECR and ID groups align in consistently opposing TGNC rights. These findings are presented in six themes, characterizing TGNC inclusion as ideological imposition, minimizing their relevance, opposing EU-level action for national sovereignty, framing TGNC education as indoctrination and a threat to children, framing TGNC existence as threatening, and, in ID’s case, linking TGNC rights to anti-immigration narratives. ECR MEPs framed their opposition through more structured arguments, while ID MEPs used more populist and xenophobic language. Interviews with former and current MEPs confirm these findings, revealing that this opposition is shaped by a cultural cleavage. Some interviewed MEPs pointed to a growing influence of TAN groups within the EP. Concerns were also raised about the potential cooperation between such groups and the European People’s Party (EPP), especially after the 2024 European Union (EU) elections. Overall, this study provides empirical insights into how TGNC rights are contested within the EU and offers findings that support neo-cleavage theory. Keywords: Neo-Cleavage Theory, Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist, European Parliament, European Conservatives and Reformists, Identity and Democracy, Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming, Gender Identity Master’s thesis: 30 credits Programme: Master’s Programme in European Studies Level: Second Cycle Semester year: Spring 2025 Supervisor: Katarzyna Wojnicka Word count: 21 383 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Legal Developments and Persistent Discrimination .................................................. 1 1.2 TAN Parties and the Challenges to TGNC Rights ..................................................... 3 1.3 An EU-level Perspective ............................................................................................ 6 1.4 Aim ............................................................................................................................. 8 1.5 Research Questions .................................................................................................... 8 2. Theory................................................................................................................................ 9 2.1 Primary Theoretical Framework ................................................................................ 9 2.1.1 Introducing Neo-Cleavage Theory ......................................................................... 9 2.1.2 Emergence of the Transnational Cleavage ........................................................... 10 2.1.3 The Cultural Divide in Neo-Cleavage Theory ..................................................... 10 2.1.4 Relevancy ............................................................................................................. 12 2.2 Complementary Concepts ........................................................................................ 12 2.2.1 Homonationalism ................................................................................................. 12 2.2.2 Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminism ................................................................ 13 3. Previous Research .......................................................................................................... 14 3.1 Theory Specific Research ......................................................................................... 14 3.1.1 Research on the GAL-TAN Divide ...................................................................... 14 3.1.2 Right-Wing Mobilization Against LGBTIQ+ Issues ........................................... 15 3.1.3 Research on Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminism............................................ 16 3.1.4 Research on Homonationalism ............................................................................. 17 3.2 Research from an EU-Level Perspective.................................................................. 18 3.2.1 Research on the European Parliament .................................................................. 18 3.2.2 Research on the European Conservatives and Reformists Group ........................ 20 3.2.3 Research on the Identity and Democracy Group.................................................. 21 4. Methodology.................................................................................................................... 22 4.1 Material .................................................................................................................... 22 4.1.1 Plenary Debates .................................................................................................... 22 4.1.2 Interviews with MEPs .......................................................................................... 26 4.2 Method of Analysis .................................................................................................. 28 4.3 Reliability ................................................................................................................. 30 4.4 Validity ..................................................................................................................... 31 4.5 Ethical Framework ................................................................................................... 32 4.5.1 Considerations and Application ........................................................................... 32 5. Results.............................................................................................................................. 33 5.1 Theme 1 – Framing TGNC Rights as Ideological Imposition ................................. 33 5.1.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group .................................................. 33 5.1.2 Identity and Democracy Group ............................................................................ 34 5.1.3 Analysis from the Interviews ............................................................................... 35 5.2 Theme 2 – Minimizing the Relevance of TGNC Rights .......................................... 36 5.2.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group .................................................. 36 5.2.2 Identity and Democracy Group ............................................................................ 37 5.2.3 Analysis from the Interviews ............................................................................... 38 5.3 Theme 3 – National Sovereignty over EU Action ................................................... 39 5.3.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group .................................................. 39 5.3.2 Identity and Democracy Group ............................................................................ 40 5.3.3 Analysis from the Interviews ............................................................................... 41 5.4 Theme 4 –TGNC Education as Indoctrination and a Threat to Children ................. 42 5.4.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group .................................................. 42 5.4.2 Identity and Democracy Group ............................................................................ 43 5.4.3 Analysis from the Interviews ............................................................................... 44 5.5 Theme 5 – TGNC Existence as a Threat .................................................................. 45 5.5.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group .................................................. 45 5.5.2 Identity and Democracy Group ............................................................................ 46 5.5.3 Interview Perspectives .......................................................................................... 48 5.6 Theme 6 – TGNC Rights and an Anti-Immigration Opposition .............................. 48 5.6.1 Identity and Democracy Group ............................................................................ 48 5.6.2 Analysis from the Interviews ............................................................................... 49 5.7 Interview Perspectives on Future Developments – A New Landscape.................... 49 6. Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 51 6.1 Comparing ECR and ID through a Theoretical Lens ............................................... 51 6.2 Academic Contributions ........................................................................................... 55 7. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 57 8. References ....................................................................................................................... 59 9. Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 72 List of Abbreviations AfD - Alternative for Germany AI - Artificial Intelligence ALDE - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe ALLEA - All European Academics code of conduct AUR - Alliance for the Unity of Romanians CSO - Civil Society Organisation Ddl Zan - Disegno di Legge Zan EC - European Commission ECR - European Conservatives and Reformists ELAM - National People’s Front EP - European Parliament EPF - European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights EPP - European People’s Party ESN - European Sovereign Nations EU - European Union FRA - European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights FdI - Brothers of Italy GAL - Green, Alternative, and Libertarian GDPR - European General Data Protection Regulation GNC- Gender Non-Conforming GRA - Gender Recognition Act GREENS/EFA - Greens/European Free Alliance GUE/NGL - European United Left/Nordic Green Left ID - Identity and Democracy ILGA-Europe - International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association in Europe LGBTIQ+ - Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer and others MEP - Member of the European Parliament MS - Member States NI - Non-attached NGO - Non-governmental Organization PfE - Patriots for Europe PiS - Law and Justice PVV - Party for Freedom RN - National Rally S&D - Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats SD - Sweden Democrats SNP - Scottish Nationalist Party SPD - Freedom and Direct Democracy SRHR - Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights STEM - Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics TAN - Traditional, Authoritarian, and Nationalist TERF - Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminism TGEU - Transgender Europe TGNC - Transgender and Gender Non-conforming Tories - British conservatives UK – United Kingdom USA - United States of America 1. Introduction 1.1 Legal Developments and Persistent Discrimination Over the past decade, the salience of transgender rights in Europe has grown exponentially (Vallier & Carron, 2020, p. 4). According to data from the non-governmental organization (NGO) Transgender Europe (TGEU) the number of European Union (EU) countries with proper legal gender recognition has increased from 18 in 2014 to 25 in 2024. Additionally, even though five EU countries still demanded sterilization as a requirement for legal gender recognition in 2024, it still shows a sharp decline from 14 in 2014. Protections against hate crimes targeting transgender individuals have also expanded, with 14 EU countries offering national legal measures in 2024, up from seven in 2014. In a similar way, employment protections for transgender people existed in 21 EU countries in 2024, compared to just 11 in 2014. These developments indicate a notable shift in how EU countries recognize and protect transgender rights. Nonetheless, these steps primarily showcase de jure progress. There are still a multitude of challenges that the transgender community continues to face in day-to-day life (Transgender Europe, n.d.; Transgender Europe, 2014, pp. 1–2). Only a comparison of transgender rights was done in this paragraph as data for various gender non-conforming (GNC)1 identities remains limited for historical comparison. A general analysis of existing EU data can more accurately describe the situation of transgender and gender non-conforming (TGNC) rights.2 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has during several years produced data highlighting the lived experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex,3 Queer and others (LGBTIQ+) individuals. FRA data from 2012 showed that around 55% of lesbian women and 45% of gay men reported experiencing discrimination based on their sexual orientation. By 2023, these had gone down to 42% and 36%, respectively, signaling a decrease in reported discrimination. However, the picture changes when considering the important distinction between sexual orientation and 1 Gender non-conforming (GNC) individuals are those whose gender expression and/or identity do not align with the societal expectations of the gender they were assigned at birth. Some GNC individuals may identify as transgender, and some may not (American Psychological Association, 2015, p. 862). 2 Transgender and gender non-conforming (TGNC) individuals are those whose gender identity does not fully or partially align with the gender assigned to them at birth. This includes transgender individuals, who identify with a gender role and/or identity different from their assigned gender. TGNC additionally encompass GNC individuals (American Psychological Association, 2015, pp. 832, 862–863). 3 Intersex people are those born with biological sex characteristics that do not align with established definitions of male or female (American Psychological Association, 2015, p. 861). 1 gender identity4 introduced in later FRA reports. A comparison of data regarding transgender individuals from 2012 and 2023 reveals that discrimination against this community has actually worsened. In 2012, 46% of transgender individuals reported experiencing discrimination in the year before the survey was conducted. By 2023, this number had increased to around 64%. Although non-binary5 individuals were not included as a separate category in the 2012 data, in 2023, 51% reported experiencing discrimination in the past year (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014, pp. 26; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2024, pp. 36). To better understand these differences, it is useful to compare the reported experiences of TGNC individuals with those of lesbian women and gay men across several indicators. Table 1 presents relevant data from the 2024 FRA report on LGBTIQ+ equality, highlighting the disproportionate challenges faced by TGNC people. Table 1. Compared Experiences of LGBTIQ+ groups in the EU. Reported Experiences Lesbian Gay Non- Trans Trans Women Men binary Women Men Suicidal thoughts (often/always, past year) 11% 8% 22% 24% 28% Experienced conversion therapy 27% 25% 34% 47% 48% Housing difficulties (staying with friends 12,4% 11,4% 18,2% 17,2% 15,6% and relatives temporarily) Harassment due to being LGBTIQ+ 59% 55% 66% 77% 72% Employment discrimination (past year) 20% 20% 32% 43% 35% Physical/sexual attacks (past 5 years) 12% 16% – 20% 20% 4 Gender identity is as a person’s deeply felt personal sense of being male, female, both, or existing outside the established gender binary. This may not align with a person’s assigned sex at birth. As gender identity is personal and internal, it might also not be visually noticeable (American Psychological Association, 2015, p. 862). 5 Non-binary individuals are often included under the broader GNC umbrella. However, not all non-binary people may describe themselves as GNC, just as not all GNC individuals identify as non-binary. This means that some individuals may express themselves in ways that challenge traditional norms of what is considered masculine or feminine, but still see themselves as a man or a woman. Vice versa, some non-binary individuals may appear to follow gender norms but still identify outside the binary of man and woman (American Psychological Association, 2015, pp. 834–835, 861–862; Hegarty, Ansara, & Barker, 2018, p. 55). 2 Table note: Survey data from 2023 presented in report by European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2024, pp. 40, 56, 71, 92, 95, 97). A sole dash represents data that was not available in the source. These reported experiences of TGNC individuals highlight the importance in understanding the de facto realities of their daily lives. Significant progress has indeed been made in advancing inclusive legal protections, however, these developments have failed to properly translate into meaningful improvements in well-being for the TGNC community. At the same time, it is important to recognize that discrimination remains alarmingly high for both sexual orientation and gender identity minorities. The purpose of the table comparison is not to minimize experiences, but instead to emphasize that within the LGBTIQ+ community, TGNC individuals continue to experience deeper marginalization in the face of a persistently intolerant society (Transgender Europe, n.d.; Transgender Europe, 2014, pp. 1–2; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2024, p. 36). 1.2 TAN Parties and the Challenges to TGNC Rights Throughout this thesis, the umbrella term traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist (TAN) will be used to describe parties that oppose LGBTIQ+ rights. These parties are positioned on the anti-LGBTIQ+ side of the current cultural divide in Europe, as conceptualized by neo-cleavage theory. This terminology is based on the green, alternative, and libertarian (GAL) and TAN framework introduced by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002), aiming at conceptualizing the non-economic dimension of political conflict centered on cultural issues. This is based on the understanding that the historical left versus right political divide has mostly focused on economic issues. Parties on the TAN end of the scale often express opposition to immigration, defense of national identity, and the preservation of established cultural and religious norms (pp. 966, 974, 976–977; Marks et al. 2021, p.177). Several journalists and political commentators from established media channels, including The Guardian, Euractiv, and Politico, have explicitly identified gender identity rights as part of Europe’s broader cultural conflicts (Hinsliff, 2022; Fox, 2023; Gerstein, 2024). Accordingly, this thesis focuses on TAN parties, as they are especially relevant to political contestation. The specific parties discussed in this section are classified as TAN based on their affiliation with the European Parliament 3 (EP)6 groups European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID). As highlighted in the works of Ahrens and Kantola (2023, pp. 820, 825) and Ahrens, Gaweda, and Kantola (2022, pp. 810), these groups align with TAN positions in the EP. In addition, some of the parties analyzed in this thesis are often labeled as far-right, however, this study intentionally uses the term TAN to maintain conceptual and theoretical consistency. As work by Vachudova (2021) points out, the term far-right refers to a specific party family that is often associated with authoritarian populism, and in some cases anti-democratic ideologies. In contrast, TAN is a term that includes a broader range of culturally conservative positions that may also be found within some mainstream conservative parties. Far-right parties typically adhere to TAN positions, particularly in their position on LGBTIQ+ communities. Some parties may express TAN views on cultural issues without embracing all the characteristics typically linked to the far-right, such as criticism against democratic institutions. This difference is especially relevant for this study, given that LGBTIQ+ rights and particularly those concerning gender identity, are central to the cultural divide that defines TAN political positioning (pp. 473–475, 477–478, 482, 489–490). Further discussion on similar classifications will be presented in the previous research and theoretical sections of this thesis. For now, this overview provides the necessary conceptual background to continue with the introduction. In order to properly grasp the discrimination faced by TGNC individuals, it is central to consider recent political developments within the EU. Therefore, this section will explore political contexts in EU member states (MS) where opposition towards TGNC rights has occurred in recent years. The term TAN will be used for these national parties based on their affiliation with the ECR and ID groups in the EP. The purpose here is to reveal the realities of such opposition and set the stage for understanding the broader EU-level dynamics that this study aims to explore. The growing influence of TAN parties has raised significant concerns among human rights organizations regarding the continued protection of LGBTIQ+ rights in the EU. For instance, in its 2024 annual report on the state of LGBTIQ+ rights in Europe, the NGO International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association in Europe (ILGA-Europe) reported on 6 In this study, the EP refers to the single EU institution that conducts plenary sessions in both Strasbourg and Brussels (European Parliament d, n.d.). 4 the anti-LGBTIQ+ actions of several national parties. In 2023, the Cypriot party National People’s Front (ELAM) voiced opposition to a legislative ban on conversion therapy. The party was unsuccessful in blocking the legislation, but it managed to mobilize on this anti–LGBTIQ+ view and gained seats in the 2024 EP elections joining the ECR group (Shkurko, 2023; European Parliament, 2024d; ILGA-Europe, 2024, p. 51). In Poland, the ECR member Law and Justice (PiS) party has in multiple occasions clashed with the LGBTIQ+ community. In 2023, PiS politician Łukasz Mejza went so far as to describe the LGBTIQ+ movement as an infectious epidemic, reinforcing the party’s oppositional stance (Polsat News, 2023). During PiS governance, Poland experienced the implementation of so- called LGBT-free zones. These were non-legally binding declarations that symbolically targeted LGBTIQ+ individuals, including those from gender identity minorities. As the name suggests, the aim was to emphasize the opposition against the LGBTIQ+ community by Polish municipalities (Picheta & Kottasová, 2020; Dunin-Wąsowicz, 2023; European Parliament, 2024d). Furthermore, the Greek party Spartans expressed strong opposition towards pride parades in 2023. The party used ridiculing language and attempted to interrupt a pride event in Crete with a planned counteraction protest (Pressenza Athens, 2023; ILGA-Europe, 2024, p. 73). The Spartans received 12% of the vote in the 2023 national elections and planned to participate in the 2024 EU elections, however, it was banned by Greece’s supreme court because of the party’s ties to the banned Neo-nazi party Golden Dawn (Maltezou, 2024). In Romania two national parliamentarians, Evdochia Aelenei and Dănuț Aelenei, proposed a law that would essentially ban the representation of LGBTIQ+ identities in media. The idea behind the proposal was to minimize the visibility of the community with the pretext of child protection. Both of these parliamentarians were part of the party Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), a member of the ECR (MozaiQ LGBT, 2023; European Parliament, 2024d). Furthermore, the German party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has in recent years undermined TGNC rights. The party used to be a member of the ID group. The ILGA-Europe annual report of 2024 reports multiple instances where the AfD directly targeted the TGNC community (ILGA-Europe, 2024, pp. 70–71; European Parliament a, n.d.). For instance, AfD representative Stefan Marzischewski-Drewes publicly accused transgender people of undermining national identity through excessive media representation, while simultaneously claiming that transgender people do not exist (Queer.de b, 2023). Despite the statements’ contradiction, Marzischewski-Drewes’s opinion properly illustrates the views of the AfD. Stephan Brandner, 5 another member of the party, intentionally misgendered Tessa Ganserer by intentionally using her pre-transition name. She is a transgender woman who was a former member of the German parliament (Queer.de a, 2023). Similarly, in the Czech Republic the former ID member Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party opposed a bill that aimed at legalizing marriage equality (ILGA-Europe, 2024, p. 55; European Parliament a, n.d.). The SPD’s stance primarily focused on sexual orientation, but the party has also explicitly opposed TGNC rights. This has been shown, for instance, in the party’s advocacy for a ban on LGBTIQ+ education in schools with a particular focus on eliminating content related to gender identity (ParlamentníListy.cz, 2024). This analysis could continue with many more examples, but the trend remains consistent across the EU. The anti-LGBTIQ+ opposition by TAN parties have meant a growing political threat to TGNC rights. Recent developments outside the EU further highlight the vulnerability of TGNC rights in the global north. Several steps to dismantle protections for transgender individuals took place in the early months of President Donald Trump’s second administration in the United States of America (USA). These included, eliminating the right of transgender people to serve in the military, restricting access to gender-affirming healthcare in federal institutions, and revoking anti-discrimination protections in education, housing, and immigration (Thoreson, 2025). Although the institutional structures of the EU and the USA differ in many ways, this example further emphasizes the speed in which inclusive policies can be eliminated when majoritarian political power shifts (Howse & Nicolaidis, 2001, pp. 5, 7). 1.3 An EU-level Perspective Understanding the policy context for TGNC rights at the EU level is an additional relevant foundation for this study. In 2020, the European Commission (EC), being one of the main institutions of the EU, introduced a policy plan called the LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy 2020- 2025. The strategy had several goals related to gender identity rights. These included improving legal gender recognition based on self-determination, expanding anti-discrimination protections to include gender identity, developing support for TGNC asylum seekers, as well as combating hate speech and violence against the TGNC community (European Commission, 2024, pp. 5, 7–9, 11). Despite the strategy’s promising appeal, the effective implementation of these goals has remained uncertain. This has been particularly apparent considering the aforementioned surge in TAN opposition. 6 Moreover, even with the great amount of reporting on national TAN opposition to TGNC rights, there is still a lack of comprehensive analyses from an EU-level perspective. The discussed ILGA-Europe report does include a section on the EU, but it does not in depth analyze how TAN parties mobilize at an EU level (ILGA-Europe, 2024, pp. 12–15). However, other reports have addressed similar opposition in the EU. For instance, the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights (EPF) published a report in 2021 on the anti-gender movement. This movement actively challenges LGBTIQ+ rights, reproductive freedoms, inclusive sexuality, gender education in schools, and even the concept of gender itself. In the report, the EP is presented both as an institution where anti-gender narratives are given space and as a funding economic source for anti-TGNC efforts (Datta, 2021, pp. 36, 63; Radačić & Facio, 2023, p. 8). In this context, the EP is a central institution where both opposition to and support for TGNC rights meet. TAN Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have criticized the attention given to TGNC rights in several debates. Some have argued that this topic is unnecessary and emphasize the need to focus on other matters instead. Simultaneously, other MEPs in the same debates are quick to oppose such TAN positions. This illustrates how the EP is a platform for political contestation as well as an institution where EU values are formed (European Parliament, 2020d; European Parliament, 2024b). In recent years, the EP has experienced a surge of TAN groups, composed of organized national TAN parties from different MS. The ECR constituted 9.78% of the EP during its 9th cycle (2019–2024), while ID made up 6.95% during the same period. Together, they represented a significant opposition in the EP (European Parliament f, n.d.). For a detailed overview, see Appendix 1. An example of the impact these groups have had can be seen in their voting strategies. The website HowTheyVote.eu, partly funded by the German government, has documented several EP votes. When analyzing how party groups voted on the implementation of the LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy 2020–2025, it is clear that both the ECR and ID groups were overwhelmingly opposed. All ID MEPs voted against the report, and a large majority of ECR MEPs did the same (HowTheyVote.eu, 2024). 7 1.4 Aim The presence of multiple political groups within the EP is a given. What remains largely overlooked, however, is a clear understanding of how TAN groups leverage on their influence to oppose TGNC rights at an EU-level. This gap in research regarding TAN dynamics in relation to the TGNC community, raises questions about whether such groups share a common agenda when targeting gender identity minorities in the EP. These are important considerations to address if the development of successful, inclusive gender identity policies and an accurate understanding of the opposition by TAN parties against TGNC rights is to be achieved. Based on this introduction, the purpose of this thesis can be divided into two parts. Firstly, the primary aim of the study is to examine how MEPs from the ECR and ID groups framed TGNC rights in plenary debates during the EP’s 9th parliamentary cycle (2019–2024). This builds on the previous discussion highlighting these TAN groups as significant political actors opposing TGNC rights. Thereby acknowledging the lack of attention given to how this opposition looks like at the EU level. Through comparative thematic analyses, this study explores how, in what contexts, and to what extent ECR and ID narratives align or differ. This analysis seeks at contributing to a broader understanding of how TGNC rights are opposed by TAN groups within the cultural debate shaping contemporary EU politics. Secondly, this study aims to examine how current and former MEPs perceive the opposition of TAN actors in relation to TGNC rights. Solely focusing on the narratives of the ECR and ID groups would have created a simplistic overview of political contestation. It was therefore deemed necessary to incorporate the perspectives of other MEPs to better understand how TAN narratives are understood, challenged, and acted upon. This was achieved through an additional thematic analysis based on semi-structured interviews with current and former MEPs, with particular attention given to the EP’s developing political dynamics following the 2024 EU elections. 1.5 Research Questions • How do Members of the European Parliament from the European Conservatives and Reformists as well as Identity and Democracy groups oppose Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming rights in plenary debates during the 9th European Parliament term 2019–2024, and to what extent do their narratives align or differ? 8 • How do current and former Members of the European Parliament perceive the opposition of the European Conservatives and Reformists, Identity and Democracy, and similar Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist groups surrounding Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming rights? 2. Theory 2.1 Primary Theoretical Framework 2.1.1 Introducing Neo-Cleavage Theory Neo-cleavage theory was used as the main theoretical framework in this study. The theory builds on the classic ideas of the political scientists Lipset and Rokkan (1967). They argued that political divisions were influenced by historic conflicts over issues relating to religion, social class, and government building. These religious and socioeconomic conflicts helped explain how people voted, how party systems developed and how political contestation shaped different countries’ party systems (pp. 13–23). However, the influence of traditional identities and institutions, like churches and labor unions, has weakened over time. This has made it difficult for the classical theory to properly explain the changes in political behavior of today (Marks & Wilson, 2000, pp. 433–434; Marks et al., 2021, pp. 174–175). Professors Hooghe and Marks (2018) further developed classical cleavage theory by examining European integration since the 1990s and the crises that have emerged since the 2010s, thereby developing neo-cleavage theory. They argue that the Euro and immigration crises disrupted political systems across Europe. Mainstream parties have been constrained by long-term voter commitment, decentralized decision-making, grassroots activism, leaders from homogeneous social groups, and clear ideological positions. These structures encouraged parties to follow strategies that have historically provided electoral success within their traditional support bases. When confronted with new disruptive issues, some mainstream parties may try to integrate these topics into existing frameworks, incorporate ambiguous positions, or ignore them altogether. Having this structural inflexibility has meant that political change is often driven by shifts among the electorate instead of from mainstream parties themselves. As a result, new parties without the same rigid commitments can better align with emerging crises and attract disillusioned voters. Hooghe and Marks underscore that this dynamic does not mean that new cleavages replace older ones. The interaction between old and new cleavages shapes how 9 parties manage challenges. This is a central difference between classical and neo-cleavage theory, the former arguing for fixed cleavages. This effect is visible in multiparty systems, such as the EP, where the success of new parties can challenge the positions of mainstream ones (pp. 112–113, 116; Marks et al., 2021, pp. 173, 179; European Parliament, 2024d). 2.1.2 Emergence of the Transnational Cleavage In the last three decades, European decision-makers have fostered efforts for the integration of the EU. This integration meant that national identity weakened while a common European identity was built. This was often done through ideas of economic cooperation and free mobility under a single EU citizenship, something that was supported by mainstream parties from both the left and the right. Opening up European societies created frictions, as migration facilitated the coexistence of different identities. Voters who were unable to succeed in this transnational environment, often because of limited economic means and skills, turned their frustration against the perceived decision-making elite (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 113–115; Marks et al. (2021, p. 173). During the Euro crisis, mainstream parties struggled to continue promoting European integration. Central political actors, such as Germany, first reacted by using an approach based on the idea of each country for itself, with limited EU cooperation. Eventually, decision-makers and government leaders shifted toward collaborative technocratic economic solutions, often without much public influence. These decisions reinforced the idea that EU processes were undemocratic. The crisis, later followed by the migration crisis, led to the development of a deeper new cleavage. This cleavage was titled to be transnational, as it focused on the positions of national actors that aimed at defending their country’s political and socioeconomic way of life against external European and economic integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 110, 113– 114, 116–117; Marks et al., 2021, p. 176). 2.1.3 The Cultural Divide in Neo-Cleavage Theory GAL and TAN political parties are found at the center of this transnational cleavage. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the GAL-TAN spectrum describes the cultural dimension of political contestation. GAL parties often support environmentalism, individual freedom, and alternative lifestyles, while TAN parties often support traditional social norms, authority, and national identity. GAL voters are generally younger, urban, more educated, and women. TAN 10 voters are instead often older, rural, less educated, and men. Many religious voters support TAN views, but church attendance still influences commitment to Christian parties. Both of these identities are socially structured and shape voters’ as well as parties’ values and ways of participating in the political debate. Similar changes have not happened across the political spectrum, mainstream parties have experienced a less defined development in voter composition (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, p. 123; Marks et al., 2021, pp. 174–175, 178, 180–182, 190; European Parliament, 2024d). What distinguishes the transnational cleavage is the way in which different issues, such as immigration, are integrated into a structured political framework by GAL and TAN actors. Mainstream parties often try to treat these issues by themselves, but GAL and TAN parties maintain more consistency and polarization. This gives them significant salience in the politics surrounding issues related to their distinct characteristics (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 123–125). Unlike the economic political left-right spectrum, GAL-TAN issues are not based on economics but on values, identity, and cultural norms. Materialist values have typically focused on economic and physical security. Individuals with such values often support traditional social structures and oppose cultural change, particularly when such change challenges established norms, correlating with TAN parties. In contrast, post-materialist values tend to develop in societies where economic stability and security needs are largely met, often correlating with GAL parties. As Inglehart and Norris argue, under stable conditions, value priorities shift toward individual freedoms, social equality, and the recognition of marginalized groups (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002, p. 967; Inglehart & Norris, 2017, pp. 443–444; Marks et al., 2021, pp. 175, 176–177). A growing body of research has demonstrated that LGBTIQ+ rights are best understood as part of the GAL-TAN cultural divide, instead of the left-right spectrum. As such, TGNC rights based within EU frameworks like the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy, are also likely to be contested along this cultural divide (European Commission, 2020, pp. 3; Siegel & Wang, 2018, pp. 380–382). Marks et al. (2021) further support this understanding by underscoring that a favorable view of transnationalism aligns with positive attitudes toward transgender rights (p. 178). 11 2.1.4 Relevancy Neo-cleavage theory acknowledges the changes in voter preference and simultaneously emphasizes the role of political parties in shaping the transnational cleavage. This provides a relevant framework for understanding how cultural positions, such as TGNC inclusion, have been politicized by TAN parties at an EU level. In the EP, political parties that support transnationalism often integrate TGNC rights into their policy agendas. On the other hand, those that oppose these values may leverage on TGNC rights to express opposition against cultural change and European integration, which is the dynamic this study aims to explore (LGBTIQ+ Intergroup, n.d.; Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 110; HowTheyVote.eu, 2024). Furthermore, interviews with MEPs allow for a firsthand exploration of how this cleavage appears in political interactions and decision-making processes. This study thereby employed neo-cleavage theory to further understand how this divide is applied and challenged, analyzing how current and former MEPs perceive the positions of TAN groups. 2.2 Complementary Concepts 2.2.1 Homonationalism In addition to neo-cleavage theory, homonationalism was applied were relevant. According to Puar (2013), homonationalism is a way to understand how nations use the acceptance of gay and lesbian minorities to show their modernity and legitimacy in an international setting. The concept describes the ways in which LGBTIQ+ rights are instrumentally incorporated in national identity, often framed as supporting state control, capitalism, and global politics through a western perspective. It does not entirely focus on prejudice or political positions but also on the broader international system. Some LGBTIQ+ identities may gain rights whereas others are excluded, Paur especially points to the exclusion of racialized groups. Including some identities can justify the political marginalization of others, as often seen in nationalism (pp. 336–338). As argued by Turnbull-Dugarte and López Ortega (2024), some parties associate the full spectrum of LGBTIQ+ rights to ideas of progress, western civilization, and national values. Others instead only include sexual orientation and not gender identity minorities in their definitions of who forms part of the national ingroup (pp. 1361–1363). 12 2.2.2 Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminism The concept of trans-exclusionary radical feminism (TERF) was also applied where relevant. The term does not represent a formal theoretical framework, TERF instead refers to feminists that oppose the inclusion of TGNC individuals within feminist movements. Often linked to second-wave feminism, these positions directly differ from third-wave feminism and its broader understanding of gender that includes TGNC identities (Hines, 2020, pp. 705, 710, 712). TERFs typically argue that cisgender women’s rights are threatened by the introduction of legal recognitions surrounding gender self-identification. As an example, these arguments were used in the United Kingdom (UK) during the backlash against proposed reforms to the country’s Gender Recognition Act (GRA). Groups such as A Woman’s Place UK positioned self- identification as a threat to single-sex spaces. These organizations often framed transgender women as biological males and therefore as a violent danger to cisgender women (Pearce, Erikainen, & Vincent, 2020, pp. 678–681). TERF arguments underscore that sex is an unchangeable biological fact and that gender is instead an ideological construct. TGNC individuals are described as invalid or threatening, especially when their identities challenge traditional definitions of being a woman. TERFs have increasingly adopted the term gender ideology to express their opposition to TGNC rights, TGNC inclusive educational policies, and the appearance of transgender individuals in media. The term was introduced through conservative religious movements, especially within the Catholic Church. It was initially developed as a term to frame feminist and LGBTIQ+ progress as dangerous to established moral and social norms. Over the past decade, the term has been commonly used by TAN political movements globally. What is meant by gender ideology is not clearly defined within these narratives. It instead functions as a flexible description that can be applied to anything perceived as morally or socially unacceptable (Pearce, Erikainen, & Vincent, 2020, pp. 679, 680–681, 682; Indelicato & Lopes, 2024, pp. 7–10; Lamble, 2024, p. 511). 13 3. Previous Research Research done on this topic is minimal in comparison to studies about sexual orientation minorities, such as gays and lesbians. This further illustrates the broader trend where certain LGBTIQ+ identities receive more attention than others. Nonetheless, this section explores relevant literature in order to examine how this topic has been addressed in academia. 3.1 Theory Specific Research 3.1.1 Research on the GAL-TAN Divide A study conducted by Wallaschek, Verbalyte, and Eigmüller (2024) examined how political parties in Germany positioned themselves on issues related to gender equality and LGBTIQ+ rights. The main objective was to determine whether these positions were better explained by the GAL-TAN cultural divide instead of the traditional economic focused left-right scale. The researchers based their analysis on survey data collected in 2021 from 361 political science experts. These experts rated their understanding of party positions on several gender-related topics. Among the topics relevant to this thesis were the reduction of traditional gender roles and the support for gender-inclusive language. The study found that the aforementioned and main German TAN party AfD, had a clear traditionalist and nationalist stance on cultural issues. It scored the lowest for support surrounding the mentioned topics, further revealing their opposition to TGNC rights. Economic preferences had a minimal effect in shaping these views. Instead, the cultural GAL-TAN divide offered a better explanation of the party’s position (pp. 809–810, 815–819). Some scholars have not explicitly focused on TGNC rights in regard to TAN parties, but they have acknowledged that sexual orientation issues are telling of how parties classify in the GAL- TAN spectrum. For instance, Campbell and Erzeel (2018) point out that opposition against marriage equality is a stance often taken by TAN parties (p. 91). Similarly, Inglehart and Norris (2003) provide comparable conclusions. They argue that the rise of post-materialist values has included greater tolerance toward sexual minorities. This shift became particularly present following the establishment of stability as well as security after the world wars and since the sexual liberation movements of the 1960s (p. 62; 2017, pp. 443, 445). Taken together, these insights suggest that a similar situation may apply to TGNC rights. 14 Another related study published by Siegel and Wang (2018), found that support for marriage equality for gays and lesbians was more closely aligned with the GAL–TAN cultural divide than with the traditional left-right scale. The study examined the timing of same-sex union and marriage legalization across 34 European countries between 1970 and the early 2010s. The authors included variables to assess the ideological orientation of governments, including a measure for a GAL–TAN score. The study found that governments positioned on the GAL side of the spectrum were significantly more likely to introduce legal steps for same-sex marriage. Ten out of the thirteen governments that introduced such reforms had a high GAL score. Relevant to this study, governments that banned such unions typically scored higher on the TAN side of the spectrum. Overall, the study further illustrates that a government’s stance on post-materialist social values, instead of its economic ideology, is central in shaping decisions regarding minority rights (pp. 377–379, 381–383, 385–387, 389). 3.1.2 Right-Wing Mobilization Against LGBTIQ+ Issues TAN parties tend to express strong authoritarian and traditionalist positions, aligning closely with the concept of right-wing authoritarianism (Marks et al., 2021, pp. 175, 182). Using data from the UK and Belgium, a study by Makwana et al. (2018) examined whether individuals with a strong preference for structured and hierarchical social orders were more likely to express transphobic views. The researchers found that this relationship was indeed mediated by beliefs in traditional gender roles. In the British sample of 231 respondents, higher levels of right-wing ideology were closely associated with binary understandings of gender and opposition to transgender identities. Similarly, the findings from Flanders in Belgium, where 175 respondents participated, further supported this notion (pp. 206, 208, 210–213). Together, these results show empirical support for the understanding that resistance to TGNC rights is grounded in ideological commitments to social conformity and the preservation of heteronormative gender roles. A similar study conducted by Prusaczyk and Hodson (2020) explored the relationship between political values and attitudes toward gender non-conformity. They specifically examined how support for right-leaning values influenced views on individuals who do not conform to traditional gender norms. This was particularly apparent in values related to definitions of gender, including attitudes toward transgender people. Using a nationally representative sample of 2281 respondents from the USA, the researchers found a strong connection between political 15 conservatism and the belief in binary gender categories. Such views were additionally linked to increased prejudice against individuals who challenged such norms. Specifically, binary gender beliefs significantly mediated the relationship between conservatism and negative perceptions of transgender individuals, accounting for approximately 20% of the effect among men and 25% among women (pp. 438–439, 442). These findings further contribute an empirical foundation for understanding how values shape opposition to TGNC rights. 3.1.3 Research on Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminism A case study by Turnbull-Dugarte and McMillan (2023) on the UK’s GRA with a focus on Scotland, provides insights into the TERF debate. In 2016, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) proposed to reform the GRA, allowing individuals to self-identify their gender and removing many of the barriers involved in the process. One central opposing actor was the British LGB Alliance, a broader movement that challenges the inclusion of TGNC people in the LGBTIQ+ community. The group argued that combining gender identity issues with the broader movement for sexual minority rights undermines societal acceptance for gays and lesbians (pp. 630, 633, 634, 649). Turnbull-Dugarte and McMillan (2023) further highlight that a position often used by TERF groups is the need to protect cisgender women and girls. TERFs argue that self-identification laws might be exploited by men pretending to be transgender women in order to gain access to female-only spaces. The authors explored if these safety arguments actually influenced public support for self-identification laws. Using survey data from 1736 respondents, they analyzed several factors that could affect public opinion. The study concluded that opposition to such laws increased among cisgender women when safety arguments were put forward by TERFs. This effect was significant among voters that had TAN values. The authors suggest that these voters may feel motivated to hold anti-transgender views when these are expressed in more socially acceptable ways, such as the protection of cisgender women (pp. 635–637, 639–641, 646–647, 649). As an additional example, Indelicato and Lopes (2024) explored how Giorgia Meloni navigates being a woman while embracing traditional and heteronormative ideas of womanhood. Meloni is Italy’s first female prime minister and the leader of Brothers of Italy (FdI), a member party of the ECR group (pp. 7–8; European Parliament, 2024d). Similar to the aforementioned study, 16 Indelicato and Lopes (2024) showed that Meloni firmly opposes gender self-identification. She framed self-identification as a threat to cisgender women during a speech in 2021, arguing that it could allow men to claim to be women and take advantage of gender quotas. However, Meloni contradicted herself in the same speech, expressing opposition to the idea of gender quotas all together. Such inconsistency illustrates how TAN actors can selectively use feminist arguments to position themselves as protectors of cisgender women and simultaneously oppose policies aimed at gender equality (pp. 9–10, 13). 3.1.4 Research on Homonationalism A study by Turnbull-Dugarte and López Ortega (2024) investigated why individuals with nativist attitudes express support for LGBTIQ+ rights. The study explored how ingroup support for LGBTIQ+ rights can be shaped by opposition from outgroups, especially when these outgroups are framed as challenging national values. The authors analyzed survey data from the UK and Spain, each based on a sample of 1200 respondents. Their findings showed that nativists individuals, those with negative views toward immigrants, are more likely to support LGBTIQ+ rights. This occurs when there is a belief that such rights are being challenged by immigrant communities. Interestingly, when opposition towards LGBTIQ+ rights comes from the national ingroup, support among such individuals decreases. In the UK sample, respondents with lower support for immigration were approximately 8% more likely to support LGBTIQ+ education in schools when Muslims opposed it. This increased to 15% for those expressing the strongest anti-immigration stance. In Spain, the effect was even more noticeable. Proposed Muslim opposition to LGBTIQ+ rights led to increased support across the political spectrum. Spanish nativist individuals experienced a 10% increase in support and non-nativist respondents an 11% increase (Turnbull-Dugarte & López Ortega, 2024, pp. 1361, 1363–1364, 1369, 1372, 1374). In a similar study, Duina and Carson (2020) conducted an in-depth analysis of populist party narratives. Specifically, how these combine progressive values with conservative agendas. Such parties are often aligned with TAN values, as seen with the National Rally (RN) in France. Analyzing a variety of qualitative data, the authors mapped moments where parties strategically defended progressive values, particularly regarding gender and sexuality. Duina and Carson focused on three parties, Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, the French RN, and the Sweden Democrats (SD) (pp. 4–6, 8; Vachudova, 2021, p. 486). 17 PVV’s leader Geert Wilders described Muslims as having incompatible values vis-à-vis Western tolerance, underscoring the need for protection against homophobic immigrants. This homonationalist argument thus included gay rights as part of Dutch identity. However, such inclusion often excluded gender identity minorities and primarily focuses on gay men. Similarly, the RN has characterized Islam as incompatible with the rights of minorities, including LGBTIQ+ individuals. Marine Le Pen, the party’s leader, has claimed that Muslim communities are dangerous to homosexuals. Thus, positioning herself and the RN as alleged protectors of sexual minorities. The authors underscore that the RN has been characterized for having a significant number of openly gay leaders, although, this inclusivity again excludes TGNC individuals. The SD have used similar language, positioning Islam as a threat to LGBTIQ+ rights. One illustrative example involved the party organizing a Pride march through a predominantly Muslim neighborhood in Stockholm. The organizers claimed that the event was meant to promote tolerance. However, LGBTIQ+ organizations in the city criticized the event as a provocation (Duina & Carson, 2020, pp. 8–10, 11–12, 14). This study does not explicitly address TGNC rights, but it provides evidence of how TAN actors often engage with LGBTIQ+ issues for strategic purposes. 3.2 Research from an EU-Level Perspective 3.2.1 Research on the European Parliament In light of this study’s aim, it is central to explore EU-based research. A study by Ruzza (2021) examined how the growing influence of populist parties has reshaped the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) within the EU’s institutional framework. Historically, CSOs have been advocates for minority groups, contributing to the EU’s democratic legitimacy across MS. However, Ruzza argues that this relationship has changed in recent years. Populist and radical right actors, characteristics associated with TAN values, have increasingly questioned the credibility of civil society. Such skepticism has been seen in certain EU institutions, particularly parts of the EP. At the same time, institutions like the EC have remained relatively shieled from this contestation. This is largely based on the fact that the EC is not directly influenced by voters (pp. 567–570; Vachudova, 2021, p. 489). Ruzza’s (2021) research involved the analysis of 260 texts from EU-level CSOs, including LGBTIQ+ ones, and aimed at exploring these organizations interpretation of opposition by the populist radical right. The study found that a multitude of organizations were concerned about opposition within the EP. These CSOs pointed 18 to an increased difficulty in introducing inclusive legislation surrounding LGBTIQ+ rights because of pushback from populist actors. Such opposition was relatively small at the time of the study, but its existence reveals the struggles present within the EP. On the other hand, some CSOs pointed to the EP as an ally that could pressure the EC to defend inclusive values. In this way, the EP serves both as an institution for support and opposition (pp. 573–574, 579, 584– 585). Relevant to this thesis, the aforementioned study by Ahrens, Gaweda, and Kantola (2022) explored how political groups within the EP interpreted and contested the meaning of human rights. The study particularly explored the contexts surrounding gender equality, and LGBTIQ+ rights. Using parliamentary debates and 130 interviews from MEPs in the EP’s 8th and 9th cycles, the researchers found three general groupings. First were the ones that defended existing rights, secondly those seeking to change them, and thirdly those having an unclear position on the matter. Among those seeking to change the meaning of human rights were the TAN groupings ECR and ID. These different political positions highlight the tensions within and across political groups, challenging the understanding of a unified EU commitment to inclusive human rights. The authors additionally pointed out that conservative and TAN actors have strategically used human rights language to oppose LGBTIQ+ rights. They framed their arguments based on concepts like child protection or family values, exploiting EU norms and the broad language of human rights to legitimize their views. Plenary debates have become central moments where affiliation is revealed. TAN MEPs use the EP to influence ideas on sexuality rights, often describing such rights as imposed by elites that threaten traditional values. That said, Ahrens, Gaweda, and Kantola mostly combine LGBTIQ+ rights as a broad category (pp. 804–807, 810–811). These findings shed light on how the ECR and ID position themselves on LGBTIQ+ rights more broadly but they leave a gap in understanding how TGNC rights are specifically framed and contested within the EP. Ahrens, Gaweda and Kantola (2022) additionally point to 9th EP parliament cycle and emphasize that political competition within the parliament can be divided along a GAL–TAN scale when it comes to LGBTIQ+ issues. Often on the GAL side were the political groups Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), The Left - European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and Renew Europe (formerly ALDE, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe). By contrast, groups often found on the TAN side are the ECR, and ID groups. Simultaneously, The European 19 People’s Party (EPP) is described as being ambiguous. The party has internal disputes and inconsistent positions on LGBTIQ+ rights issues, thus being moderately on the TAN side but not as extreme as the ECR or ID groups (pp. 808, 810, 813–814). 3.2.2 Research on the European Conservatives and Reformists Group Building on the broader picture of contested LGBTIQ+ rights within the EP, it is particularly relevant to examine the role of the ECR as a TAN actor. A study by Gaweda, Siddi, and Miller (2023) explored how the ECR constructs a conservative ideology through its political statements. The analysis covered the years 2014 to 2022, using official party documents and 13 interviews with ECR MEPs and staff from national delegations, including the British conservatives (Tories), PiS, and FdI (pp. 829–830, 833–834). Important to this context is that the Tories exited the ECR following Brexit (European Parliament a, n.d.). The study found that the ECR used binary understandings of gender roles and linked these to broader themes of nationalism, and social conservatism to shape its priorities and political identity. The exit of the more centrist Tories created space for less liberal actors, like PiS and FdI, to have greater influence. As a result, the ECR has adopted positions more strongly associated with TAN values, including exclusionary nationalism and the framing of LGBTIQ+ rights as ideological threats. This shift is especially noticeable in the group’s arguments that connect family policy to sexual orientation. Their position frame traditional and heteronormative family structures as the foundation of national identity. Such arguments are often based on biologically essentialist views that marginalizes transgender and non-heterosexual identities. Some Tory MEPs previously voiced concerns over this more conservative ideological change but such frictions mostly disappeared after Brexit (Gaweda, Siddi, & Miller, 2023, pp. 836–838). This analysis is further confirmed by the mentioned study from Ahrens, Gaweda, and Kantola (2022). The authors emphasized that in particular Polish ECR MEPs, excluded LGBTIQ+ rights as legitimate human rights. They instead frame them as part of a broader ideological agenda. In EP plenary debates, such as those concerning the aforementioned LGBT-free zones, Polish ECR members characterized their country as tolerant. They insisted that the discussion should shift to the protection of traditional family values instead (pp. 810–813). Lastly, as this study includes interviews with current MEPs, it is important to acknowledge the changes that have taken place within the ECR group. Specifically, since the end of the previous 9th EP term (2019– 2024) and the current 10th term (2024–2029). Italy’s FdI grew from 10 to 24 seats, Poland’s PiS 20 dropped from 25 to 18 seats, and Romania’s AUR joined with 5 seats. Several smaller parties also joined the group, making it more diverse (European Parliament a, n.d.; European Parliament, 2024d). For a more detailed overview of the groups in the EP’s 10th term, see Appendix 2. 3.2.3 Research on the Identity and Democracy Group Ahrens, Gaweda, and Kantola (2022) often combined the ID group together with the ECR and mentioned it fewer than ten times in their article. Nevertheless, their study remains an important academic source, especially given the limited attention paid to the ID group in the context of LGBTIQ+ rights. The authors found that the group frequently used populist and xenophobic arguments in their oppositional stance against LGBTIQ+ rights. ID’s opposition was based on a more nationalist framing of human rights, where sexual and gender diversity were described as part of a moral decline. In addition, ID MEPs often used the idea of protecting national culture from demographic change to justify their views, pointing to a belief that European identities are superior (pp. 811–812). As mentioned, few academics have specifically examined the ID group in relation to LGBTIQ+ rights. One notable exception is a master’s thesis by Stijn Ottenhof (2023). In it, Ottenhof discussed the ID group within the broader context of LGBTIQ+ rights in the EP. The thesis provides a general overview, focusing on the years 2019–2023 and briefly exploring the rights of TGNC individuals. The author underscores that some ID MEPs use arguments that frame the EU as an already safe place for LGBTIQ+ individuals, arguing that no further protections are needed. Ottenhof also suggests that some ID MEPs align with homonationalist narratives. However, it is important to note that Ottenhof’s thesis combines the positions of both the ECR and ID groups in multiple occasions. His aim additionally fundamentally differs from the one in this thesis. His research offers a broader analysis of LGBTIQ+ rights in the EP instead of the ECR and ID groups’ position on TGNC rights specifically (pp. 5–7, 34, 41–43, 46). The ID group was dismantled after the 2024 EU elections. However, a large amount of its former members joined the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group. PfE grew considerably from 49 seats under ID to 84 seats. It now accounts for around 12% of the EP, slightly surpassing the ECR and becoming the third largest group. The most notable shift has been the exclusion of Germany’s AfD and the membership of several smaller parties, including Spain’s Vox, 21 Hungary’s Fidesz, and Portugal’s Chega. Other former members instead joined another TAN group, the European Sovereign Nations (ESN) group (European Parliament a, n.d.; European Parliament, 2024d). As previously mentioned, see Appendix 2 for a more detailed overview of the EP’s 10th term. 4. Methodology 4.1 Material 4.1.1 Plenary Debates The primary data used to answer the first research question was attained from parliamentary debates from the EP’s 9th cycle. Plenary debates were selected as the data source as they provide a platform for MEPs to shape their narratives and express their positions on a variety of issues. Plenary debates are recognized by the EP itself as a central forum for political discussion, as a space where resolutions are discussed, legislative measures are voted on, and where policy positions are publicly stated (European Parliament d, n.d.). The debates chosen for this study specifically involved MEPs from the ECR and ID groups, the most central TAN groupings within the EP during this period. It is important to emphasize that these two groups differ in a variety of issues. Both share a nationalist and anti-migration stance. However, the ECR has maintained a more strategic and moderate position within the EP, whereas ID has been more fragmented, isolated, and radical (European Parliament a, n.d.; Noyan, 2024; Peters & Schlußmeier, 2024, pp. 15–16). A comparative analysis was thereby useful to gain proper insights into these groups political strategies surrounding TGNC rights. Moreover, the 9th cycle was selected for analysis because it is the most recently completed EP term. It offers access to English-translated video recordings of debates, providing accurate up- to-date information. The debates explored in this study were accessed through the EP plenary website’s search engine. Two search functions are available on the plenary website to retrieve relevant debate statements. One feature searches through debate titles, and another can search within the text corpus of transcribed debates. Both features were used for this study, relying on a set of carefully selected keywords.7 This approach was found to be the most effective as it 7 The identified keywords were Cisgender, Intersex, Gender-affirming, Gender binary, Gender dysphoria, Gender expression, Gender identity, Gender non-conforming, Transgender and gender non-conforming (TGNC), Trans- affirmative, Transgender, Transsexual, and Gender Ideology. 22 allowed for the direct identification of relevant content (European Parliament b, n.d.). The chosen keywords were based on and informed by relevant academic texts. These included the American Psychological Association’s (2015) guidelines for practice in psychology concerning the TGNC community (p. 832), discussions from a roundtable talk on anti-gender movements and transgender specific healthcare in Europe, published in the European Journal of Public Health (van der Star, 2023, pp. ii269–ii270), as well as the landscape analysis report by the aforementioned NGO TGEU (Rowlands, 2023, pp. 1–8, 17, 27, 35). The plenary website’s search engine lacks the capability to translate specific keywords, as the transcribed versions of the debates are in the original language spoken by the MEP. The keywords were therefore translated using artificial intelligence (AI)8 into all 24 official languages used in the EP (European Parliament b, n.d.). The AI used for these translations was ChatGPT’s version GPT-4. This is a large language model that, according to its developer company, has outperformed the translation quality of previous versions (OpenAI, 2023). Several recent academic studies suggest that AI-based translation using ChatGPT can be reliable for translating direct single words or literal language. However, authors emphasize that relying on these tools for full sentences involving idiomatic statements or cultural meanings can lead to inaccurate results (Škobo & Petričević, 2023, pp. 332– 333; Chan & Tang, 2024, pp. 5–6; El-Saadany, 2024, pp. 46–47; Ferrag & Bentounsi, 2024, pp.187–189). For an overview of the prompt used in this process, see Appendix 3. To address these limitations, the DeepL translation tool was additionally used to translate the keywords. Both versions were considered and searched for when differences between DeepL and the AI-generated translations were found. Several studies have confirmed DeepL’s relatively strong and accurate translation performance (Li, 2024, pp. 714–716; Gutiérrez Rubio, 2024, pp. 82–83; Bunga & Katemba, 2024, pp. 1168–1169). It is, however, important to acknowledge that the languages Gaeilge (Irish), Hrvatski (Croatian), and Malti (Maltese) were only available for translation in ChatGPT. Each keyword was individually searched across all 24 languages. When a match was found from an ECR or ID MEP, the debate was considered relevant. The researcher then analyzed 8 This study used AI exclusively for translation purposes, complying with the guidelines on the use of AI provided by both universities involved in this double degree program. The translation process was carried out in accordance with the University of Gothenburg’s recommendations for AI use in academia, as well as guidelines provided by the thesis course and administrator (University of Gothenburg, n.d.). Likewise, the approach taken follows the University of North Carolina’s principles for the responsible and ethical use of AI tools in research (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, n.d.). 23 these debates, specifically identifying further statements by MEPs from either the ECR or ID group. Only instances where TGNC topics were directly or indirectly mentioned in a relevant way by an MEP from ECR or ID were selected for analysis. This was done regardless of whether they were framed positively or negatively to ensure objectivity. A brief contextual mentioning of the topic being discussed in each debate is provided in the results section in order to avoid misrepresentation. The debate data was organized in two different documents, with the first containing statements from ID MEPs and the second containing statements from ECR MEPs. This was done to facilitate an effective comparison of narratives over time and across different debates. The quotes were grouped according to the debate title, date, relevant content, and with a link attached to access the full debate. ChatGPT’s GPT-4 translation tool was again used to translate the identified quotes, as the transcribed text versions of the quotes remained in the original language. For an overview of the prompt used in this process, see Appendix 4. This time, however, the AI-generated translations were verified with the available human performed live- translated video English versions of the debates in the plenary website. This step was considered necessary as the mentioned studies on ChatGPT highlighted its limitations to certain contexts (Škobo & Petričević, 2023, pp. 332– 333; Chan & Tang, 2024, pp. 5–6; El-Saadany, 2024, pp. 46–47; Ferrag & Bentounsi, 2024, pp.187–189). The EP has itself previously used live AI translation systems that included human feedback. Similarly, the EC has gradually implemented automatic AI translations to make communication more accessible in all official EU languages (Translated, 2020; Sorgi, 2023). Nonetheless, the EP has acknowledged that live human translation may sometimes miss important context (European Parliament e, n.d.). To address this, the aforementioned DeepL translation tool was again used when live translations were incomplete or when unclear pronunciation from interpreters made parts of the content difficult to understand. Table 2 presents the identified ECR MEPs, the country they are from and a current update of their role in relation to the EP following the 2024 EU elections. During the 9th EP cycle, 16 ECR MEPs from 9 different MS were identified addressing TGNC issues in 27 separate debates. These included four debates in 2019, five in 2020, six in 2021, three in 2022, four in 2023, and five in 2024. 24 Table 2. ECR MEPs Information Name Country Status Angel Dzhambazki Bulgaria No longer MEP Andrey Slabakov Bulgaria No longer MEP Ladislav Ilčić Croatia No longer MEP Emmanouil Fragkos Greece Current ECR MEP Nicola Procaccini Italy Current ECR MEP Raffaele Stancanelli Italy Now part of PfE Vincenzo Sofo Italy No longer MEP Beata Kempa Poland No longer MEP Jadwiga Wiśniewska Poland Current ECR MEP Patryk Jaki Poland Current ECR MEP Ryszard Antoni Legutko Poland No longer MEP Cristian Terheş Romania Current ECR MEP Jorge Buxadé Villalba Spain Now part of PfE Margarita de la Pisa Carrión Spain Now part of PfE Charlie Weimers Sweden Current ECR MEP Geoffrey Van Orden United Kingdom No longer MEP Table 3. ID MEPs Information Name Country Status Filip De Man Belgium No longer MEP Jaak Madison Estonia Now ECR Annika Bruna France No longer MEP Aurélia Beigneux France No longer MEP Mathilde Androuët France Now PfE Nicolas Bay France Now ECR Patricia Chagnon France No longer MEP Alessandra Basso Italy No longer MEP Danilo Oscar Lancini Italy No longer MEP Isabella Tovaglieri Italy Now PfE Simona Baldassarre Italy No longer MEP Christine Anderson Germany Now ESN Maximilian Krah Germany No longer MEP Nicolaus Fest Germany No longer MEP Table 3 highlights the identified ID MEPs, with the same categories found in Table 2. During the 9th EP cycle, 18 ID MEPs from five different MS were identified addressing TGNC issues 25 in 18 separate debates. These included two debates in 2019, three in 2020, six in 2021, one in 2022, three in 2023, and three in 2024. 4.1.2 Interviews with MEPs To effectively address the second research question, semi-structured interviews were conducted with current and former MEPs as a complement to the analysis of plenary debates. Such debates do provide valuable insights into how TGNC rights are publicly framed by the ECR and ID groups. However, they do not entirely capture the broader political dynamics behind these narratives or the practical opposition by these groups within the EP. Interviews were therefore considered necessary to attain firsthand perspectives on how these narratives are perceived by MEPs from other political groups, and to better comprehend the extent to which TAN groups oppose TGNC rights. In addition, interviewing MEPs allowed for contemporary insights into how the discussion surrounding TGNC rights has developed since the 2024 EU elections. The interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide to ensure both consistency and flexibility. For a detailed presentation of the interview guide, see Appendix 5. Bryman (2018) explains that qualitative interviews, particularly semi-structured ones, encourage participants to express their perspectives freely without being limited by structured categories (p. 561). Furthermore, almost all interviews were conducted through visual online platforms. These were Zoom and Webex, the latter sometimes used by EU institutions (European Parliament c, n.d.; European Data Protection Supervisor, 2023). Bryman (2018) points out that online interviews are very similar to in person interviews. However, a limitation is that interviewees tend to give shorter or less developed responses. This particularly happens when interviews are not conducted in real time or without visual interaction. This study addressed this by conducting all interviews live and with video support. The only exception was one interview conducted over the phone without video, however, the interviewee still provided detailed responses. Nonetheless, conducting online interviews with video offered several advantages. For instance, it addressed the issue of traveling costs given that the researcher is based in Sweden and most interviewees did not (pp. 590–593). The interview guide was sent beforehand to the participants, as some required access to it. This approach was maintained throughout the rest of the interviews to ensure consistency. Such a step has had potential implications for the data collected, as it allowed interviewees to reflect 26 on their experiences in advance (Knox & Burkard, 2009, pp. 572–573). A recent study by Haukås and Tishakov (2024) found somewhat mixed results regarding the consequences of sharing an interview guide with participants before an interview. A considerable drawback is that spontaneity can be reduced when this step is taken. However, the researchers concluded that there are several benefits in sharing the interview guide beforehand. For instance, it allows interviewees to better prepare by reflecting on their knowledge and experiences related to the topic of the interview. Additionally, this step creates a level of trust, as participants can feel more confident that their responses accurately reflect their personal perspectives (pp. 58–59, 63, 65–66). Thus, the sharing of the interview guide ensured that the participants could provide more thoughtful and confident responses. In addition, the interview guide was developed in line with Bryman’s (2018) recommendations for semi-structured interviews. The questions were designed to avoid being suggestive as well as to allow the participants to express their views freely. They were also partly thematically structured, ensuring a step-by-step approach. Moreover, the guide was flexible, enabling the inclusion of both spontaneous and prepared potential follow-up questions. To provide contextual information, basic details about each interviewee were collected, however, this was mostly limited to their professional role within the EP. Furthermore, interviews were conducted in settings where the participants could speak without the risk of being overheard or interrupted to ensure confidentiality (pp. 563, 565–567). Two interviews were conducted in a non-English language spoken by the researcher and were later translated into English by the researcher himself. In total, eight interviews were conducted with current and former MEPs. Several MEPs from the EPP, Renew Europe, ECR, PfE, and Non-attached (NI) groups were asked to participate but either did not respond or were unavailable. It is important to acknowledge that this may have resulted in a sample that is more supportive of TGNC rights. Table 4 presents the information of these MEPs, the country they are from and their relationship to the EP. 27 Table 4. Interviews Information Name Country Affiliation to the EP Marianne Vind Denmark MEP in S&D both 9th and 10th EP cycles. Rasmus Nordqvist Denmark Current MEP in the Greens/EFA since 10th EP cycle. Jussi Saramo Finland Current MEP in The Left since 10th EP cycle. Merja Kyllönen Finland Current MEP in The Left both 8th and 10th EP cycles. Lukas Sieper Germany Current MEP, NI since 10th EP cycle. Nacho Sánchez Amor Spain Current MEP in S&D both 9th and 10th EP cycles. Johan Nissinen Sweden Former MEP in ECR in the 9th EP cycle. Anonymous - Current MEP, not in ECR, ID, PfE or ESN. Table note: Without accounting for MEP Anonymous, all remaining interviewees, besides MEP Sánchez and MEP Nissinen, are currently part of the LGBTIQ+ Intergroup in the EP (LGBTIQ+ Intergroup, n.d.). 4.2 Method of Analysis Selecting a suitable analytical approach was central for ensuring that the study effectively addressed the research aim and questions. Several methods were considered, however, an abductive thematic analysis was ultimately deemed the most suitable approach. This method allows for a systematic exploration of patterns in narratives while allowing theoretical flexibility. Thematic analyses, as described by Kiger and Varpio (2020), are particularly useful for identifying contextual and collective meanings in data. Thus, a thematic analysis is relevant for exploring the position of the ECR and ID groups as well as to understand their narratives. Nonetheless, thematic analyses are robust methodological tools, but they are not meant to develop new theories. They instead serve as an analytical method that allow researchers to apply and develop existing theoretical frameworks while interpreting data (pp. 847–848, 853). Since this study involves three distinct datasets, parliamentary debates involving ECR as well as ID MEPs, and interviews, each was analyzed separately using the same abductive thematic framework. 28 In this study, both an inductive and a deductive approach were disregarded in the developing of the thematic analysis. This decision was made for several reasons. As Braun and Clarke (2006) explain, an exclusively inductive and data-based approach can limit the ability to use established theoretical insights when identifying themes within the data (pp. 83–84). This was considered to be an obstacle as the researcher recognized that previous theoretical research is highly relevant for this study. In contrast, deductive reasoning bases its assumptions on theory. It focuses on analyzing data through a predetermined theoretical framework instead of allowing themes to freely emerge from the data. A deductive approach is thereby not designed to provide a broad description of an entire dataset. It instead focuses on specific theoretical factors or themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006, pp. 83–84; Kiger & Varpio, 2020, p. 853). A deductive approach was not considered suitable as this study aims to provide a comprehensive overview. Thereby, the middle ground of abductive reasoning was deemed most relevant. In academia, abductive reasoning is often described as the median point between inductive and deductive reasoning. Okoli (2023) explains that abductive theory begins with an incomplete but informed theoretical framework, which is then developed through engagement with the data. This process allows the researcher to combine existing theories while remaining open to new insights that emerge from the data (pp. 308, 311). Hurley, Dietrich, and Rundle-Thiele (2021) underscore that an abductive approach in a thematic analysis is particularly effective when analyzing large amounts of individual perspectives. In this way, it helps to identify shared positions within groups. They exemplify this by pointing to analyses of social media commentary. This is applicable to parliamentary debates as, similar to social media, it involves exploring diverse perspectives. In addition, an abductive approach is well suited for novel insights within research that can then be used to develop existing theories (p. 68). This points to another advantage in applying abductive reasoning, considering the contemporary nature of this study’s topic. This study follows the provided guide by Thompson (2022) on abductive thematic analyses. He presents eight steps to an abductive thematic analysis. As suggested, Thompson highlights that an abductive approach should include a theoretical background to provide structure but still maintain flexibility for new insights. Neo-cleavage theory is the primary theoretical framework in this study. Moreover, the first step in an abductive thematic analysis is familiarizing and transcribing. Here the audio data is meant to be transferred into transcribed text. The second step involves the start of the coding process. Thompson points out that this entails grouping 29 together parts of the dataset based on the connection that statements have to each other. This is an important step where the researcher often repeats the search for connections between narratives and sentences. Throughout the repeated rounds, the researcher is expected to explore potential meaning behind the words and constantly edit based on the similarity, difference, or insignificance of statements (pp. 1412–1413). Thirdly, and during the last coding round, Thompson (2022) points to the creation of a codebook. Three codebooks were developed as this study used three different datasets. For a detailed overview, see Appendices 6, 7 and 8. Such a tool is beneficial as it organizes the statements in different ways. It provides a guideline based on code titles developed from the data, specifying when to and when not to apply each code, and creating definitions to provide clarity. Given that the statements of ECR and ID MEPs were selected from debates on a variety of topics, there was a risk that their relevancy to TGNC rights could be overshadowed by the broader contexts. To address this, thematic mapping was used to track recurring narratives across debates. Additionally, a brief contextual mentioning of debate titles was also provided. The development of proper themes was conducted after finalizing the codebooks, following the fourth step in Thompson’s guide. Themes are a group of codes that are clustered together if there is a clear way in which these can explain a certain context in the data. Thompson explains in the fifth step that the researcher should not in a rigid way apply the theoretical framework, as it should allow space for additional theoretical perspectives. Theory is instead seen as a means to guide the findings of the analyzed data. In this study, homonationalism and TERF perspectives were integrated as concepts based on the patterns that emerged from the data. The sixth step was central for determining whether ECR and ID shared similarities or differences on the topic. It involves comparing the datasets to determine if certain themes appear in one group but not in the other, and whether themes are expressed differently. The seventh step involved visualizing the findings, something that was not deemed necessary in this study. The final step presents the findings structured by the found themes which are reinforced with the help of contextual details (pp. 1415–1418). 4.3 Reliability In social science research, reliability refers to the extent to which a study’s results can be consistently replicated. Bryman (2018) emphasizes that reliability is particularly relevant in quantitative studies, as these often require a high degree of trust in the consistency of the 30 findings. Qualitative research, in contrast, prioritizes the depth of data interpretation over the replication of results. Bryman differentiates between internal and external reliability. He explains that an internal type of reliability aims at achieving consensus among researchers in their analyses. However, as this study is conducted by one researcher, internal validity is not considered highly applicable (pp. 72, 465). Bryman (2018) additionally highlights that external reliability refers to how much external conditions influence the subjects being studied. External factors are challenging to replicate when studying social environments as these are often impossible to control (p. 465). In regard to the first dataset, with plenary debates, it can be argued that external reliability remains high as the statements have been officially published and are very unlikely to change. However, the social context surrounding the TGNC community is anticipated to shift over time (ILGA- Europe, 2023). This is a factor that cannot be controlled but should still be acknowledged. The second dataset, based on interviews, also has lower external reliability. Factors such as mood, political beliefs, and confirmation bias can influence participants’ responses, making external reliability difficult to achieve (Dickinson, 2025, pp. 191–192, 200–201). Nevertheless, given the difficulty of controlling external reliability and its less central role in qualitative research, it was considered an acceptable limitation in this study. 4.4 Validity Another important concept in social science research is validity. Bryman (2018) points out that just as with reliability, validity can be examined from both an external and an internal perspective. Firstly, external validity refers to the extent to which a study’s results can be applied to other societal contexts. Bryman explicitly explains that this type of validity is often difficult to achieve in qualitative research, as the data gathered is usually context-dependent. This is particularly relevant to this study, as the situation being investigated applies solely within an EU context. Moreover, and as previously mentioned, the relevance of the results is highly dependent on constantly evolving developments. Despite these limitations, the findings still provide an academic contribution to the contemporary understandings surrounding the opposition to TGNC rights. Secondly, Bryman explains that internal validity is the extent to which a study accurately describes the relationship between data and theoretical claims. A study with high internal validity ensures that the found patterns genuinely emerge from the material analyzed (pp. 81, 465, 467). Internal validity plays a central role in abductive research, as theory 31 and data are expected to influence one another (Thompson, 2022, p. 1411). In this study, internal validity was addressed by ensuring that themes emerged directly from the statements of ECR and ID MEPs as well as from the interview responses. 4.5 Ethical Framework 4.5.1 Considerations and Application The All European Academics (ALLEA) code of conduct, is the primary ethical framework in this study. This choice aligns with the recommendations provided within the thesis writing course and ensures consistency with ethical standards developed for European research. The guidelines are built upon four fundamental principles. Firstly, reliability emphasizes the need for high-quality research practices. This was ensured through a commitment to the chosen methodology. Including, conducting data collection, analysis, and interpretation in a consistent manner. Secondly, honesty promotes transparency and objectivity throughout the research process. This was maintained by ensuring transparency with participants using clear communication about the study’s aim, voluntary participation and by explicitly mentioning its timeframe. Thirdly, respect ensures consideration for individuals, communities, and the broader societal context. This was achieved through the application of an academic approach when discussing TGNC rights. Finally, accountability holds researchers responsible for all aspects of their study, from the early stage and supervision to potential consequences after publication. This was maintained by ensuring that all findings presented in the study were based on the researcher’s own analysis, with proper citations and acknowledgment of sources. The ALLEA guidelines emphasize that consent must be informed, specific, explicit, reversable, and documented. This requires clear communication of potential risks, as well as a transparent explanation of how personal data will be handled. Moreover, participants should not be exposed to pressure or incentives that could compromise their voluntary participation. In this study, the interviewees were required to provide explicit consent through a two-step process involving a signed consent form and verbal confirmation before and after the recording of the interviews. The full consent form can be found in Appendix 9 (Vetenskapsrådet, 2024, pp. 11, 59, 62–63, 65, 66–67). Moreover, this study complies with the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which establishes clear guidelines for the ethical handling of personal data. This was achieved by maintaining the interview recordings in password-protected devices with access limited to 32 the researcher and thesis supervisor. To further protect participant anonymity, pseudonyms were used whenever requested (Vetenskapsrådet, 2024, pp. 11, 66–67). Additionally, this study follows the EP’s own guidelines surrounding the use of debate data. This was ensured by providing proper citation, complying with intellectual property rights, ensuring the reproduction of relevant content where appropriate, and the use of disclaimers for the translation process. However, it is important to note that full reproduction of the debates, such as transcribing entire discussions, was limited. This decision was necessary due to the considerable amount of time it would have taken to translate all the multilingual plenary debates identified in this study (European Parliament e, n.d.). 5. Results As aforementioned, three separate thematic analyses were conducted. The first two focused on the TAN groups ECR and ID, based on 22 and 17 pages of debate data respectively, and aimed to answer the first research question. The third analysis, based on interviews with current and former MEPs, addressed the second research question. In accordance with Thompson (2022), this chapter presents the findings organized theme by theme (p. 1418). Each part begins with debate data from the two groups and concludes with insights from the interviews. 5.1 Theme 1 – Framing TGNC Rights as Ideological Imposition 5.1.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group In ten different debates, eight ECR MEPs from six MS raised concerns about what they viewed as an ideological imposition for TGNC-inclusive policies. Across the identified debates, these MEPs consistently framed gender inclusive measures, LGBTIQ+ recognition, and equality initiatives as top-down demands. They framed TGNC discussions as being forced into spaces traditionally designated to protecting cisgender women. Spanish MEP Pisa Carrión expressed this position in a 2021 debate on gender perspectives in the digital economy during the Covid-19 pandemic. She questioned: “What does gender equality mean within the framework of gender ideology and the gender perspective? Well, it is unclear because it is inconsistent, sometimes the concept of gender is used to refer to women, of course as victims. Other times, it is used to dissociate biological sex 33 from the person, inventing as many categories as there are ways to feel. It is an emotivist theory, without any scientific basis and against nature” (Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, ECR, European Parliament, 2021a). This statement illustrates a central concern among these ECR MEPs. In their view, gender inclusive frameworks in the EU are not grounded in objective and biological realities but on a subjective and ideologically based political ideas. A similar argument was reinforced by Romanian MEP Terheş during a 2023 debate on the EU’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention, a treaty that aimed at combating violence against women and domestic violence (Council of Europe, n.d.). Terheş stated: “…They call it the Istanbul Convention, it should have been about women in biology, not gender ideology. We as a society have the duty to prevent and combat any kind of violence against women. But what is a woman? Apparently, this Parliament cannot define the term anymore. A woman, regardless of the age, is not a matter of feeling or the decision of a political majority, nor a social construct, as this Convention claims, but an ontological, biological and genetical reality that is clearly different than a man” (Cristian Terheş, ECR, European Parliament, 2023a) Both MEPs, Pisa Carrión and Terheş, thus opposed the idea of gender as an individual experience, emphasizing biological determinism instead. 5.1.2 Identity and Democracy Group A similar concern surrounding ideological imposition was raised among ID MEPs, although with a different tone. In five debates, five ID MEPs from three MS expressed this position, often using populist narratives, pointing to societal degradation and aggressiveness. French MEP Bruna, speaking during the same 2021 debate on gender perspectives as MEP Pisa Carrión, stated: “...For you, any difference between men and women is merely a stereotype that must be corrected. Your ideology is even becoming authoritarian. Nations or NGOs that do not share 34 your objectives or your gender theories or intersectionality are denounced…” (Annika Bruna, ID, European Parliament, 2021a). The statement accuses of an authoritarian imposition, illustrating how these ID MEPs frame inclusive gender identity initiatives as both coercive and undemocratic. French MEP Bay reinforced this narrative in a 2021 debate on European Council conclusions, criticizing EU reactions to Hungary’s anti-LGBTIQ+ law: “...I must mention the outrageous trial against Hungary regarding its so-called anti-pedophilia law. Accusations of discrimination and homophobia are pure disinformation, as anyone can see who spends two minutes reading the actual text. Hungary seeks to protect its children from the delusions of gender ideology and trans identity. The hysteria surrounding this case shows that Budapest is right to limit the propaganda of an increasingly aggressive and demanding LGBT community” (Nicolas Bay, ID, European Parliament, 2021d). Bay’s statement frames support for TGNC rights as irrational and dangerous, pointing to EU criticism against Hungary as hysterical disinformation. This additionally highlights a more populist language used by ID MEPs. 5.1.3 Analysis from the Interviews The narratives found in ECR and ID debates are reflected in the interview data. Three MEPs highlighted that the tolerance towards TGNC rights is conditional. Former Swedish ECR MEP Nissinen reinforced the deterministic views of ECR MEPs Pisa Carrión and Terheş, highlighting that TGNC identities are rarely discussed, as they are not seen as real, or only addressed negatively: “…In general, it’s a topic that they [ECR] don’t really want to talk about except if it’s very negative. So that’s why the group really doesn’t talk about transgender rights in general, because according to most parties in ECR, transgender doesn’t exist at all.” This statement further highlights how the issue is addressed as ideological imposition. Moreover, seven MEPs identified the contestation of TGNC rights as part of an ongoing culture 35 war. German MEP Sieper emphasized this by highlighting how TAN groups, particularly PfE and ESN but excluding ECR, explicitly frame TGNC rights as ideological threats: ”…PfE and the ESN who are straight up waging a culture war against the idea of tolerance…who claim to be in a fight against the woke or trans ideology all the time, and who are actively pushing for discriminatory legislation, even though without success I have to say...” His position underscores the statements by ID MEPs Bruna and Bay, who framed TGNC rights as forced by a misinformed and authoritarian EU. Spanish MEP Sánchez supported the culture war reference, describing how TAN actors lump ideologies together: ”…I suppose they [TAN groups] lump all policies of respect and protection under the woke ideology, and well, everything fits under the woke ideology...” 5.2 Theme 2 – Minimizing the Relevance of TGNC Rights 5.2.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group In seven debates, four ECR MEPs from four MS questioned the priority given to TGNC rights. Some acknowledged the importance of standing against violence and respecting all people, but simultaneously minimized the relevance of TGNC identities. Italian MEP Procaccini, speaking during a 2020 debate on the EU’s LGBTIQ Equality Strategy, used a sharp tone and mocked the expansion of LGBTIQ+ categories: “I believe that, regardless of sex, gender or sexual orientation, all European citizens should be guaranteed the same rights and legal protection. Now, I wonder if the statement I just made is racist. On the contrary, I believe it is racist to divide people into an endless series of sexual categories and subcategories, as this report does: L, G, B, T, Q, I, A, P, K, if we want to update the list to 5:05 PM today. We’ve reached nine, not counting the old categories of male and female...” (Nicola Procaccini, ECR, European Parliament, 2020d). His comment thus ridiculed the recognition of diverse identities and minimized TGNC rights at the EU level. MEP Procaccini, who’s currently still part of the ECR, further expressed 36 skepticism about targeted protections during a 2020 debate on COVID-19’s impact on democracy and fundamental rights: “...Instead, we find ourselves with a list of those who would supposedly be more affected by the pandemic by their very nature. Namely, illegal immigrants, certain ethnic minorities, gays, lesbians, bisexuals, transsexuals, and intersexuals…I’m sorry, but this obsession with creating lists of supposed victims of discrimination is, in fact, an unacceptable form of discrimination itself. All citizens are affected, regardless of ethnic origin or sexual orientation...” (Nicola Procaccini, ECR, European Parliament, 2020c). He argued that focusing on vulnerable groups created unfair distinctions, reinforcing the view that TGNC identities should not be given particular attention. During a 2024 debate on increased anti-LGBTIQ speech and violence in Greece, Bulgarian MEP Dzhambazki recognized the existence of intersex individuals. He, however, insisted that the biological dichotomy of male and female remained the only valid way to understand gender (European Parliament, 2024c). Pre-Brexit, British MEP Van Orden was the only identified ECR MEP who defended TGNC rights during the EP’s 9th cycle, mentioning the discrimination faced by transgender people during a 2019 debate on the Asian region of Kashmir (European Parliament, 2019a). 5.2.2 Identity and Democracy Group A similar narrative appeared among ID MEPs. In seven debates, five MEPs from three MS discussed the importance of TGNC issues at an EU level, often suggesting that discrimination was no longer a serious problem. Speaking during a 2019 debate on the EU’s horizontal anti-discrimination directive, German MEP Fest cited Eurobarometer data: “…According to the Eurobarometer 2015… 2% of respondents felt discriminated against because of their sexual orientation, and 1% because of transsexuality. Scientifically, values of 1 to 2% are at the borderline of what can be statistically validated. Contrary to all the talk of discrimination, we must therefore conclude, sexual discrimination was no longer an issue in 37 Europe in 2015, and anyone who has ever experienced the Christopher Street Day or the Love Parade will agree. This is a great development...” (Nicolaus Fest, ID, European Parliament, 2019b). MEP Fest dismissed the disproportionate amount of discrimination experienced by TGNC individuals in implying that it had become statistically irrelevant. During the same 2020 debate on the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy as ECR MEP Procaccini, Italian MEP Baldassarre made a similar statement criticizing the EC: “…It is truly shocking that, in the midst of a pandemic, the Commission once again chooses ideologically to discuss the new LGBT equality strategy…There is no need for this. According to all reports from the European Institute for Gender Equality, Eurobarometer, and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the EU is one of the most LGBT-friendly regions in the world. It is absurd to create ad-personam measures to protect certain categories instead of others, leading to reverse discrimination. We, instead, want a Parliament that protects all citizens…” (Simona Baldassarre, ID, European Parliament, 2020d). Thus, framing special protections for LGBTIQ+ individuals as unnecessary and divisive. During the same 2024 debate on anti-LGBTIQ+ violence in Greece as ECR MEP Dzhambazki, French MEP Androuët acknowledged that transgender people should be protected. She then, however, shifted the blame to alleged abuses against Riley Gaines by transgender activists. Gaines is an American critic of transgender individuals’ participation in women’s sports (Associated Press, 2024; European Parliament, 2024c). 5.2.3 Analysis from the Interviews Five MEPs stated that TAN groups in the EP often minimize the relevance of TGNC rights by prioritizing other policy topics, as reflected in the statements by ECR MEP Procaccini and ID MEP Baldassarre. MEP Nordqvist offered a counterpoint when asked about how TAN parties disregard TGNC issues: ” That’s always a bit interesting, that people think they can only do one thing at a time. I mean, we are 720 Members here and there’s lots of people working in both Commission and Council, so I think we can do more than one thing at a time…when we see the economy as it is right 38 now…minority groups are the first people who are pressured… that’s why we should keep the whole intersectional dimension of it alive.” He thereby challenges the narrative that addressing minority rights is a distraction from other policy concerns, emphasizing that TGNC individuals often face increased vulnerability during times of crisis. Furthermore, three MEPs argued that TAN actors frequently use scapegoat arguments. As explained by MEP Anonymous: ” What I perceive is that these extreme groups…in the EP, often raise other issues instead of economic policy. Because they’re not accountable to the people, so to speak. They’d rather talk about transgender people at libraries and drag queen story hours than about why it’s getting harder for young people to go to the dentist.” This view differs from the idea that TGNC rights are seldom debated but it aligns with ECR and ID narratives that position TGNC individuals as antagonists, delegitimizing their rights. 5.3 Theme 3 – National Sovereignty over EU Action 5.3.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group In ten debates, seven ECR MEPs from four different MS expressed explicit concerns about EU competencies regarding TGNC rights. They framed EU involvement as overstepping sovereignty, presenting national measures as fundamental to the Union’s integrity. During the 2021 debate on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) in the EU, MEP Terheş criticized the Matić report. Matić being the surname of the report’s author (European Parliament, 2021c). MEP Terheş stated: “…The debate over the Matić report is not about right or left issues. The debate is about what is right and what is wrong. Do you want in the EU a culture of life and prosperity, or a culture of death?...To report also in this claim that men can give birth and they should, and I quote, ‘benefit from measures of pregnancy and birth-related care’, period. Making such a claim makes the EU a laughingstock across the world…” (Cristian Terheş, ECR, European Parliament, 2021c). 39 By framing the debate in cultural rather than left-right political terms, MEP Terheş emphasized the symbolic part of EU legislation regarding gender issues in an international stage. Furthermore, during the 2022 debate on protecting rainbow families through free movement rights, Italian MEP Sofo expanded on this concern: “...The aim, in fact, is to ensure that favorable legislation in some member state on topics dear to the LGBT agenda, such as…gender identity changes without operations, and so on, can be imposed automatically on other States with legislation not to the left’s liking, under the pretext of the Schengen Area, thus denying them regulatory sovereignty. In short, a true legal fraud against our democracies, and I wonder how such a thing could be accepted by a Parliament that claims to fly the flag of democracy” (Vincenzo Sofo, ECR, European Parliament, 2022). MEP Sofo directly linked gender identity inclusion to what he described as an erosion of democracy and national decision-making powers. 5.3.2 Identity and Democracy Group In six debates, seven ID MEPs from four MS expressed similar arguments, stressing that decisions regarding LGBTIQ+ rights should remain under national control. During the 2020 debate on the illegality of LGBTI-free zones in Poland, German MEP Krah argued for national sovereignty: “…I can only applaud the Polish people to have a policy which is focused on families with daddy, mummy and children, and not on different minorities. Opposing the gender theory does not mean to suppress gay and LGBTI people, it just means that we don’t want those theories taught in schools and universities and made the principle of politics. Poland and Hungary have decided to follow a conservative line, which is a sovereign decision of the people, and so do people have the right to follow that policy, and it is not an oppression of the treaties. I can only address my Polish friends, follow your way, you are right” (Maximilian Krah, ID, European Parliament, 2020a). 40 MEP Krah’s focus was broader than specifically TGNC rights, but the clustering of gender identity and sexual orientation issues was observed in several other debates as well. Nonetheless, his statement praised Poland and Hungary for resisting EU pressure and maintaining traditional social structures. Similarly, during the 2021 debate on fighting gender- based cyberviolence, Italian MEP Tovaglieri criticized efforts to push legislation at the EU level: “…What we cannot accept, however, is the progressive majority in this chamber using the issue of gender-based violence to advance its own political agenda, reintroducing at the European level the contents of the Ddl Zan, that was rejected by the Italian Parliament, and calling to order as many as fifteen countries, most member states, that are disliked by Brussels simply because they do not include the definition of gender identity in their legislation...” (Isabella Tovaglieri, ID, European Parliament, 2021f). Tovaglieri’s comment framed the rejection by the Italian parliament of the Disegno di Legge Zan (DdI Zan) bill, a LGBTIQ+ protection bill, as an expression of national sovereignty (Tondo, 2021). Further suggesting that EU initiatives disregarded democratic decisions. 5.3.3 Analysis from the Interviews Six MEPs highlighted that the progress done in terms of TGNC rights is mostly based on the efforts of MS. This is well illustrated by MEP Saramo when asked if the EU’s LGBTIQ equality strategy has been successfully implemented: “…I think it’s very important that the EU keeps doing [work] and that these issues, human rights issues, are in the core and not just something nice to have, but something we must have. My answer would be that we have not been doing enough in the EU, but also that there are a lot of things that EU can’t decide, and we need more powerful structures to push the member states on these issues.” This statement goes clearly against ECR and ID MEPs, who emphasize national sovereignty to oppose EU action. Four MEPs highlighted the role of the EC. Some warned that the EC is now more right-wing than ever before, others acknowledge that the EC is still willing to tackle this issue. MEP Nordqvist puts it best: 41 ”We’re not talking about the most people, so the pressure is also not that firm on the Commission to do something, I think we have seen some bold steps from them, but every time we talk about TGNC people, it’s a small group of people. And therefore, it’s very easy to just say, ‘OK, yes, we’ve done something, we’ve done a strategy’. And then we just push aside the actual need for action when you then see a huge pressure coming from conservative and far- right people.” This underscores the current situation. Another central argument expressed by seven MEPs is the position of the EPP. These MEPs viewed it as a central actor and sometimes as a potential political partner for TAN groups, even while such groups continue to criticize EU overreach. MEP Sánchez explains: “We must pay close attention to the movements of the EPP…We’ve always generally seen that the EPP often moves dangerously close to far-right logic, it happens in migration, and in some other areas…The influence of the far-right is real…The EPP may feel that this space is being taken from them and that, to some extent, they need to move closer to their logic…To see the influence of the far right, the best thermometer is the EPP.” This suggests that the EPP is in electoral competition with TAN groups. 5.4 Theme 4 –TGNC Education as Indoctrination and a Threat to Children 5.4.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group In eleven debates, nine ECR MEPs from six different MS raised concerns about what they described as an educational indoctrination and a loss of the traditional family. They repeatedly framed TGNC inclusion as a threat to children, pointing to the need for an oppositional stance. During the 2019 debate on children’s rights commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Convention on the rights of the child, Italian MEP Stancanelli stressed: “Nowadays, children are increasingly the object of ideological claims, the result of adult selfishness. As also enshrined in the framework of the Convention [of the rights of the child], the European Union must commit more to valuing the family…We must defend the rights of children to have a father and a mother, not a Parent 1 and a Parent 2, and above all, we must 42 oppose harmful practices such as the teaching of gender theory in schools” (Raffaele Stancanelli, ID, European Parliament, 2019c). MEP Stancanelli thus linked gender identity education directly to manipulation and framed the traditional family as essential. Other MEPs instead combined this narrative with religious values. During the 2021 debate on breaches of EU law and of the rights of LGBTIQ citizens in Poland and Hungary, Polish MEP Wiśniewska linked religious values with biological arguments: “…What it is really about is that we believe there are two genders, while you believe there are 250 or so. Biology is on our side. You think that’s scandalous. We want to ban suggesting to children the possibility of changing gender. You want to promote it. Finally, we do not want early sexualization of children in schools, because for Catholics, true love is much more than sexuality. There are many lonely people, and sexual violence. Exactly according to what Marx and Engels said: to build a new reality, traditional values and the traditional family must be destroyed. You are following the same path that led to tragedy in Europe” (Jadwiga Wiśniewska, ECR, European Parliament, 2021e). MEP Wiśniewska’s speech exacerbated this narrative by associating gender education with both religious moral decline and communist historical downfall. Furthermore, during the 2024 debate on the implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy report, Greek MEP Fragkos echoed the defense of a family model based on religious values, rejecting any alternatives to the traditional father and mother foundation (European Parliament, 2024b). 5.4.2 Identity and Democracy Group In nine different debates, eight ID MEPs from four different MS also pointed out the need to protect the traditional family as well as to halt gender identity education. In the same 2021 debate as ECR MEP Terheş spoke surrounding the SRHR of women in the EU, Italian MEP Baldassarre mentioned the same argument as her ECR equivalent, but with an additional focus on education: 43 “…We are facing a text that proposes unthinkable things, such as that men can give birth or that gender should be introduced in all European schools…” (Simona Baldassarre, ID, European Parliament, 2021c). Promoting not only the minimization of transgender men’s experiences but also taking the opportunity to point out that schools should not teach about gender, suggesting a connection between the two examples. In addition, during the 2024 debate on extending the list of EU crimes to include hate speech and hate crime, French MEP Chagnon framed her oppositional stance as child protection: “…When I say, for example, that I don’t want minors to be subjected to hormone treatments and other medical interventions, this is not a hate speech against transgender people, but a declaration of love for children…” (Patricia Chagnon, ID, European Parliament, 2024a). Her framing reinforced the idea that TGNC identities pose a risk to minors. During the 2024 debate on the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy implementation, Italian MEP Lancini further developed this narrative by using an alarmist tone: “…In preschools and schools, the imposition of gender ideology is rampant, which claims that the difference between male and female is merely a cultural construct that must be deconstructed. You are the ones who want to pollute the pure minds of our children. I will not be complicit. You cannot infringe on my right as a parent to educate my child…Enough with mandatory LGBT courses for everyone. You see the traditional family as an obstacle. The true family is made up of a father and a mother. It is healthy. It is the one that has children and moves the world forward. You propose a monstrosity that has no future and will lead the world to no future…” (Danilo Oscar Lancini, ID, European Parliament, 2024b). MEP Lancini framed LGBTIQ+ education not only as harmful but as a civilizational threat, suggesting catastrophic consequences if it continues. 5.4.3 Analysis from the Interviews While the traditional family was not discussed in depth, three MEPs identified religion as a central factor influencing opposition to TGNC rights. In particular, they pointed to Christianity 44 as especially significant for the ECR group. According to these MEPs, religious values are influential in shaping individual opinions as well as political positioning. MEP Sieper explains: “The ECR views itself as a conservative group, first and foremost. They are not in line with discrimination, that’s not what they want to achieve…. For them traditional understanding of Christian values is very important and you can see that they bring in Christian values at many points on legislation, not only the issue that we are talking about, but basically every issue. I have the feeling that even though they do not say it explicitly, the understanding of full tolerance for LGBTIQA+ people, for trans people, stands in opposition to their understanding of Christian values, and that’s why they are at least reluctant when it comes to politics like that.” This further explains the mentioning by ECR MEPs Wiśniewska and Fragkos regarding religion. However, MEP Sieper also noted that the association of religious values and TGNC rights does not include all Christian political actors. He pointed out that EPP members are mostly supportive of LGBTIQ+ rights, showing that religion does not define inclusivity. In this context, MEP Sánchez’s suggestion that the EPP is in competition with TAN actors for votes, highlights an ideological approximation to TAN values. These contrasting views serve as a reminder of the complex dynamics within the EP, where ideological positioning is constantly shaped by different developing contexts. 5.5 Theme 5 – TGNC Existence as a Threat 5.5.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group This theme was the most prominent among ECR MEPs, appearing in 15 debates and mentioned by 11 MEPs from seven different MS. These MEPs characterized gender identity as a contradictory concept, a threat to cisgender women, and as a surreal idea. In a 2020 debate on gender equality in the EU’s foreign and security policy, Swedish MEP Weimers emphasized the contradictions in inclusive gender identity policies, highlighting a perceived incompatibility between gender equality and gender identity: “…The irony is, of course, that you can’t have your woke, gender mainstreaming cake and eat it too. What’s the point of quotas anyway if gender is a fluid concept? If you, like I do, believe that merit, not identity politics, should be at the heart of recruitment policy, then vote against this report” (Charlie Weimers, ECR, European Parliament, 2020b). 45 Italian MEP Sofo expanded on this narrative during a 2021 debate promoting gender equality in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) education and careers: “…If you say that we need gender quotas to favor women over men, you are admitting that women and men exist. However, at the same time, if you promote LGBT gender theories, you claim that being a man or a woman is merely a matter of personal choice. So, applying your theories, if I tell you tomorrow that I feel like a woman, I automatically gain the right to be included in a gender quota. I lose that right if I go back to feeling like a man, but regain it if I feel like a woman again, and so on. Not to mention transgender, all gender, pangender, and the thousands of other invented identities. Will you propose a quota specifically for each one of them? Because if so, I warn you, this will end up creating more quotas than jobs, and in the end, in this grotesque logical short-circuit you’ve gotten yourselves into, it will be women who pay the price” (Vincenzo Sofo, ECR, European Parliament, 2021b). This narrative frames TGNC identities as both bureaucratically overcomplicated and as a direct threat to cisgender women, delegitimizing gender identity. Similarly, Bulgarian MEP Dzhambazki emphasized the alleged harm to cisgender women’s rights in a 2023 debate on the spread of anti-LGBTIQ propaganda bills by European parties and governments: “…By the way, those who insult women are precisely those who allow men to compete in women’s sports. Those who insult and violate women’s rights are precisely those who allow men to win women’s beauty contests. This is an insult to women…” (Angel Dzhambazki, ECR, European Parliament, 2023b). This statement reinforces the narrative among ECR MEPs that transgender identities are either inexistent or a fundamentally threatening. 5.5.2 Identity and Democracy Group This theme appeared in six debates, and was mentioned by five MEPs from four different MS. The underlying narrative followed that of the ECR, but ID MEPs often used a more mocking language. In a 2020 debate on the proposal for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality, German MEP Fest used ridiculing statements when discussing TGNC identities: 46 “Madam President, you’ll be pleased, today I’m speaking to you as a woman. While shaving this morning, I felt like switching gender, so I extended the shave to my legs…If gender, as the gender activists claim, is merely a social construct, then the demand for equality is inherently contradictory. Because you don’t need to be equalized in terms of gender, you can simply become whatever you want. Dear women, lesbians, transsexuals, or whatever else, just become men, or whatever you want. You can decide that yourself, just do it. Then, according to your own ideology, all gender equality issues are instantly solved. And since they’re solved, we no longer need a permanent Council forum on gender equality…None of this is needed, because everyone can self-equalize. So just do it. Then you’ll have time to deal with the real problems people face in times of corona, instead of this nonsense” (Nicolaus Fest, ID, European Parliament, 2020e). By expressing to self-identify as a woman for mocking purposes, MEP Fest framed TGNC identities as both absurd and invalid. Additionally, a direct TERF perspective was found in narratives from ID MEPs, particularly from the aforementioned French MEP Androuët. During a 2023 debate on women’s activism and human rights defenders in SRHR, she argued for the alleged need of protecting cisgender women: “This quote by Simone de Beauvoir, ‘One is not born a woman, one becomes one,’ has long guided feminist activism. However, it is a delusion that is exposed by the violence inflicted upon women who refuse to be mimicked or denied…Which lawyer can plead for a rapist in transition to be placed in a women’s prison? Which athlete can celebrate the victories of transsexuals sweeping away all chances of female competitors? Which adolescent can fail to laugh at the mention of menstruation and pregnancies of men? The fractures in activism are deep and many. And worse, they are now generating death threats, such as those against J.K. Rowling or Dora Moutot. So yes, let’s say it again, one is a woman, and one accepts it, or not” (Mathilde Androuët, ID, European Parliament, 2023c). Here, the narrative shifts against feminist movements that include TGNC individuals, emphasizing that their inclusion undermines the safety and rights of cisgender women. Both Joanne Kathleen (J.K.) Rowling and Dora Moutot are associated with the TERF movement (Ground News, 2024). 47 5.5.3 Interview Perspectives The narratives expressed by ECR MEPs Weimers and Sofo, along with ID MEP Fest, were reflected in several interviews. As previously discussed, seven MEPs pointed to an ongoing culture war, where progressive values are framed as threatening the social order. This framing was clearly expressed by MEP Kyllönen, who described how left-leaning groups are depicted by TAN actors: “There is kind of a campaigning going ahead, saying that we in the left side or we in the S&D, even and greens and part of the Renew, we are the ‘woke lovers’. That we want to ‘open everything’ and we want to ‘give people space to be whatever they want’…they say that we are the crazy politicians who want to change everything…We are trying to get people to be what they really are. No one needs to hide, no one needs to be haunted for that whatever they are.” Her statement challenges the framing of inclusion as ideological and instead explains it as a commitment to individual freedom. This perspective also resonates with the claims made by MEPs Weimers and Sofo, further supporting MEP Nissinen’s comment that many in the ECR do not recognize TGNC identities. MEPs Nordqvist and Anonymous additionally pointed to the rise of the anti-gender movement, described as increasingly influential in shaping anti-TGNC efforts. MEP Nordqvist summarized this development: ”We’re seeing something we haven’t seen before…I think it’s the Patriots [for Europe] who are doing a meeting on trans rights here in the Parliament, anti-trans rights, they call it trans rights but it is the whole anti-gender movement. So, they are more organized than they were before.” 5.6 Theme 6 – TGNC Rights and an Anti-Immigration Opposition 5.6.1 Identity and Democracy Group A final theme, found only among ID MEPs, focused on opposition to immigration. This narrative appeared in three debates and was raised by three MEPs from two different MS. Multiculturalism was often framed as a threat to European society. In a 2019 debate on discrimination and hate speech against LGBTI people, including the establishment of LGBTI- 48 free zones, French MEP Beigneux linked immigration and religious fundamentalism to the oppression of LGBTI individuals: “We are now seeing the consequences of your policies. Unfortunately, your naivety regarding migration policy is diverting you from the real issues at hand. While homosexuality is punishable by death in many Sub-Saharan African countries, a German study published in 2015 revealed what many of us already knew, namely, the link between religious fundamentalism and homophobia. It explained the strong rejection of homosexuals and transgender people in what left-wing ideologues call ‘neighbourhoods,’ but which are in fact territories taken over by a political-religious ideology. What has changed since then is the massive importation, through an unreasonable and uncontrolled migratory flow, of populations from countries where religious dogma is the supreme norm” (Aurelia Beigneux, ID, European Parliament, 2019d). This narrative further positions Europe as superior in its policies towards minorities, implying that immigration imports religious stigmas and intolerance toward LGBTIQ+ people. 5.6.2 Analysis from the Interviews Four MEPs stated that migration remains one of the most consistently raised topics by TAN actors, often regardless of the specific issue being debated. MEP Sieper mentioned this when asked why other issues are framed as more pressing than TGNC rights: “This [TGNC rights] is about the very foundation of our union, of our democracy. While it may not be one of the most pressing issues, it’s always an issue…We are not the ones bringing it up all the time… I would say right now it can be found in nearly every debate, the same as migration, in nearly every debate…at some point it gets mentioned.” MEP Sieper’s comment highlights how migration, like TGNC rights, is consistently politicized as part of a broader cultural struggle. 5.7 Interview Perspectives on Future Developments – A New Landscape To conclude this chapter, it’s important to understand how the interviewed MEPs viewed the future development of TGNC rights in the EU. As aforementioned, several interviewees 49 expressed concerns for the potential cooperation between the EPP and current TAN groups. Former ECR MEP Nissinen brought some clarity about the likelihood of such a coalition: “I would say that the EPP has been more open to talk…so they might be able to come to some common ground, but I’m not sure if they will be on the common ground when it come to this subject actually, that’s too divided…Now in the Parliament you have the ECR group and then ID, it changed now it’s called PfE, and then you have the other group [ESN] there you have the German AfD, so we have a very big spectrum. And there will never be one group, I don't believe it. Parties on the right cannot agree.” MEP Nissinen thus suggests that differing values hinder the formation of a unified right-wing political supergroup. Nonetheless, the prospect of increased cooperation remains. This is particularly relevant when acknowledging the surge in electoral support for TAN parties after the 2024 EU elections. MEP Vind explained the implications of this political shift: “In the EP the size of the group is power, and in the last mandate and mandates before we have EPP as the largest, after that S&D and then the liberals Renew and so on. Now we have the EPP, S&D and then you have two right wing groups [PfE and ECR]. When we have a negotiation on some topic, the head of the negotiations starts the round at the size [of the groups] …Now the liberals have to listen to EPP, two right wing groups and then deliver their opinion about something. It’s a huge change in influence setup.” This highlights a fundamental shift in power dynamics within the EP, where TAN parties now have significant influence over negotiations. This was further emphasized by MEP Kyllönen, who expressed concern over the EP’s increasing unpredictability on this issue compared to the EC: “What worries me is that in Commission level, there are still people and there are still willingness to take these issues ahead, but I don’t think the same willingness is common in the Parliament anymore.” Her statement thus reinforces the perception of a changing and more right-leaning EP. Additionally, four MEPs pointed to the increasing impact of USA politics on European debates. 50 MEP Anonymous noted that Trump policies restrict progressive work in relation to TGNC rights: “Looking at the U.S., with one madness after another, there’s also a risk, I think, that the focus in the resistance becomes somewhat fragmented. So even though resistance to the far-right’s proposals on transgender issues hasn’t weakened, there are many other urgent issues too that also need to be addressed.” This final statement highlights how opposition to TAN narratives may be undermined by a fragmented political agenda, increasingly shaped by external factors. 6. Discussion 6.1 Comparing ECR and ID through a Theoretical Lens This section discusses the findings theme by theme, comparing the positions of the ECR and ID groups and interpreting them through the theoretical framework. The first theme centered on how TGNC rights were framed as a form of ideological imposition. Both ECR and ID MEPs framed these rights as externally enforced. However, ECR MEPs emphasized biological reality and societal stability through more structured ideological arguments. ID MEPs, instead, used a more populist and emotionally based language to delegitimize TGNC rights, emphasizing threats to common sense and morality. Using neo-cleavage theory, the statements by ECR and ID MEPs suggest that issues of gender identity are increasingly framed within a broader cultural context and no longer around the traditional left-right class conflict. The framing by both ECR and ID MEPs of ideological or aggressive impositions highlights the political contestation described by neo-cleavage theory. In particular, around national identity, and the legitimacy of supranational authority in defining cultural norms. TGNC rights thus become a symbolic issue within a broader conflict over post- materialist values and transnationalism (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 114, 123; Marks et al., 2021, pp. 174–175). This ideological framing overlaps significantly with TERF arguments. TERF discourse is characterized by a rejection of gender self-identification and the classification of TGNC rights as fundamentally unscientific. ECR MEPs Carrión and Terheş, framed gender identity as a threat to the stability of categories like woman, positioning TGNC inclusion as going against biological sex. This shows a broader pattern where TGNC rights are 51 seen as compromising sex-based protections and incompatible with what is perceived to be the natural social order (Pearce, Erikainen, & Vincent, 2020, pp. 679, 681). The second theme involved the relevance minimization of TGNC rights. Here, both ECR and ID MEPs dismissed the need for specific protections. ECR MEP Procaccini used more universalist arguments, expressing that all citizens should be treated equally. ID MEPs instead argued that current protections were sufficient, and that attention should shift to other issues. Within the neo-cleavage framework, the emphasis on universal equality by ECR and ID MEPs reflects a materialist worldview in which values are rooted in stable social structures. These narratives frame TGNC protections as forms of special treatment, directly opposing the post- materialist policies promoted by the EU. Instead of denying the existence of TGNC individuals, these ECR and ID MEPs minimized their significance by pointing to statistics or claiming that general protections are enough. In neo-cleavage terms, such statements further position TGNC rights within a broader cultural divide between the EP’s TAN and mainstream groups. Importantly, the theory emphasizes that shifts in party systems are less likely to happen through ideological change within mainstream parties, and is more often a result of the emergence of new political challengers (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 112–113; Marks et al., 2021, pp. 178). This is visible in how TAN groups, like ECR and ID, mobilize around cultural issues such as TGNC rights. As mainstream parties stick with certain strategies, TAN actors capitalize in new lines of conflict centered on identity. In doing so, they redefine the political landscape by positioning TGNC rights as another symbol of the struggle over who determines accepted social norms. The third theme focused on a preference for national sovereignty over EU-level action. Both ECR and ID MEPs explicitly went against the legitimacy of EU initiatives. ECR MEPs emphasized cultural values and national democracy, framing EU efforts as illegitimate. ID MEPs followed a similar line but placed greater focus on defending traditional family structures and opposing what they believed to be an overreach from the EU. However, the core message from both groups remained consistent, TGNC rights should not be dictated at the EU level. Neo-cleavage theory highlights how TAN actors frame cultural inclusion efforts as challenges to national identity. In this context, ECR and ID MEPs’ framing of TGNC rights as evidence of EU overreach into policies traditionally decided upon by national governments exemplifies 52 such TAN behavior. The argument that policies are implemented without proper democratic participation, emphasizes an alleged disregarding of national sovereignty and thus public will. This aligns with neo-cleavage theory’s argument that cultural issues became politicized under the transnational cleavage when EU policy-making appeared disconnected from electorates. The theory explains how recent crises, such as the Euro crisis, enabled EU actors to implement policies through technocratic decision-making, often perceived as lacking transparency (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 114–117; Marks et al., 2021, p. 190). These conditions have created opportunities for TAN parties to mobilize public dissatisfaction by framing the EU as an enforcer of agendas. References to national legal developments, such as MEP Tovaglieri’s mentioning of Italy’s rejection of the Ddl Zan bill or MEP Krah’s mentioning of Poland’s adherence to traditional family values, underscore such opposition. The fourth theme addressed the framing of TGNC education as indoctrination and a threat to children. Both ECR and ID MEPs used the protection of children as a central argument against TGNC inclusion. ECR MEPs often combined biological arguments with religious values, framing gender education as an ideological attack against traditional families. ID MEPs reinforced these concerns, using alarmist language, particularly emphasizing the alleged harm to both children and society if gender diversity was normalized. Both ECR and ID MEPs underscored that the existence of TGNC identities should not be introduced to children. This follows TERF arguments, which suggest that teaching about TGNC identities in schools promotes concepts associated with gender ideology (Pearce, Erikainen, & Vincent, 2020, p. 679–680). Seen through a neo-cleavage lens, the statements in this theme illustrate how older cleavages continue to interact with emerging ones. This was particularly apparent in the religious statements by MEPs Wiśniewska and Fragkos, further supported by three interviewed MEPs. These insights emphasized the perceived incompatibility between religion and TGNC rights. Neo-cleavage theory acknowledges that historical cleavages, such as religiosity, continue to influence contemporary party systems. Hence, combining arguments about protecting children against TGNC identities with religious values reveals that the interaction between older and newer cleavages remains an active process in the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 111, 113; Marks et al., 2021, pp. 178, 181). In the fifth theme, both ECR and ID MEPs framed TGNC individuals as either threating, ridiculous or as incompatible with cisgender women’s rights. However, ECR MEPs often 53 framed their opposition through policy-based arguments, focusing on the supposed contradiction between gender equality and gender identity initiatives. In contrast, ID MEPs combined similar arguments with direct mocking, framing TGNC identities as absurd, non- existent, and dangerous to cisgender women. The statements by MEPs Weimers and Sofo framed gender identity as threatening the legal and social category of woman. They questioned the relevance of policies like gender quotas when TGNC identities are simultaneously protected. This narrative reflects central arguments found in the TERF movement, framing sex as biologically fixed, and gender identity as threatening the rights and safety of cisgender women (Pearce, Erikainen, & Vincent, 2020, p. 681). Furthermore, MEP Fest’s dismissal of TGNC inclusion as a distraction from more pressing socio-economic issues during the COVID-19 pandemic, exemplifies how crises are strategically exploited by TAN actors. As previously mentioned, neo-cleavage theory explains that TAN parties can gain support in situations where supranational institutions appear distant from voters. TAN parties can in such contexts position themselves favorably by highlighting that the technocratic nature of the EU focuses on the wrong priorities. Such arguments have the potential to attract disillusioned voters who feel that EU policies are not properly addressing their needs (Marks et al., 2021, pp. 177–179; Hooghe & Marks, 2018, pp. 110–111, 117). The sixth and final theme explored the connection between TGNC rights and narratives against immigration. The statement by MEP Beigneux showed how homonationalist views are used to justify exclusionary policies. Instead of expressing genuine concern for TGNC rights, her framing instrumentalized TGNC inclusion to position the idea of a progressive Europe against fundamentalist religious migrants. Linking immigration to the oppression of LGBTIQ+ people and framing immigrants as threats to these identities (Puar, 2013, pp. 336–338). In this way, TGNC rights are utilized as a tool to reinforce a nationalist identity and oppose multiculturalism. This thus confirms that TGNC rights, not just gay and lesbian rights, have been mobilized through a homonationalist lens within the EP. Simultaneously, the use of religious arguments by ECR MEPs, as seen in theme four, demonstrates how religion can be instrumentalized as a political tool to either exclude or include certain social groups. 54 6.2 Academic Contributions The findings in this study clearly show that TGNC rights are directly opposed by TAN actors in the EP. This thus broadens the conclusions made by Campbell and Erzeel (2018) as well as Siegel and Wang (2018) surrounding the opposition of TAN parties towards sexual orientation minorities to also include TGNC rights. It additionally supports the dynamics explained by Inglehart and Norris (2003; 2017) of how post-materialist values, including individual freedoms, are challenged. Moreover, the findings align with the work by Wallaschek, Verbalyte, and Eigmüller (2024) who found that LGBTIQ+ issues are framed within cultural debates surrounding the GAL–TAN divide, instead of being framed as an economic topic (pp. 818–820). This was particularly clear in the third theme, where MEP Terheş explicitly placed the recognition of transgender men as part of the cultural death in the EU. Additionally, MEP Krah instead suggested that the entire LGBTIQ+ community is a threat to traditional values. Likewise, MEP Fest dismissed TGNC rights in the second theme by claiming that cultural events were already sufficient indicators of full rights protection. Such findings are also consistent with the observations made by Ottenhof (2023), who suggested that ID MEPs often claim that the EU already provides enough protection for LGBTIQ+ individuals (pp. 34–35). Furthermore, the findings of this study support the research by Makwana et al. (2018), Marks et al. (2021), Prusaczyk and Hodson (2020), as well as Vachudova (2021). Connecting far-right ideology to strong views of gender conformity and an anti-democratic stance. In the first theme, former ECR MEP Pisa Carrión, now with PfE, argued that gender identity debates undermined traditional understandings of men and women. In the third theme, ECR MEP Sofo described gender-inclusive policies as a danger to democratic societies. These examples thus demonstrate the evident connection between TAN values and far-right ideology. However, as MEP Sieper explained in the first theme, PfE and ESN take an even more extreme stance in their opposition to TGNC rights. Furthermore, the findings in this study contribute to a deeper understanding of the use of TERF arguments, as demonstrated by Turnbull-Dugarte and McMillan (2023) and Indelicato and Lopes (2024). MEPs from both the ECR and ID groups used biologically essentialist arguments. The term gender ideology was also repeated by several MEPs, particularly in the first and fifth themes. In the fifth theme, ID MEP Androuët defended several TERF activist. ECR MEP Weimers framed gender identity as incompatible with gender equality, suggesting that the inclusion of protections towards TGNC rights dismisses cisgender women’s rights. Such type 55 of arguments align with those identified by Turnbull-Dugarte and McMillan (2023), underscoring that TERF actors often oppose TGNC rights by framing them as incompatible with gender equality. The sixth theme of this study, which focused on homonationalist anti-immigration narratives, align with the findings by Turnbull-Dugarte and López Ortega (2024) and Duina and Carson (2020). French MEP Bruna’s homonationalist argument illustrates how such narratives are mobilized by political parties, particularly through language that targets Muslim communities and frames Europe as culturally superior. This aligns with Duina and Carson’s (2020) conclusions regarding similar strategies used in France, the Netherlands, and Sweden (pp. 9, 11–12, 14). However, this study demonstrates that some TAN MEPs explicitly incorporate TGNC individuals into their homonationalist arguments. Furthermore, themes one through five illustrate the continued use and greater acceptance for anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives when expressed by ingroup actors, in line with the findings by Turnbull-Dugarte and López Ortega (2024). The interviews with MEPs provided new insights into the development of opposition towards TGNC rights since the 2024 EU elections. As Ruzza (2021) found, CSOs reported increasing difficulty in passing LGBTIQ+ legislation in the EP, but they still viewed the institution as a relatively stable ally for LGBTIQ+ rights (p. 584). MEP Vind highlighted how the growing influence of PfE and ECR has reduced the capabilities of centrist voices to shape debates. Similarly, MEP Kyllönen explained that the EC continues to support LGBTIQ+ rights, but that the EP is moving in a different direction. Taken together, these statements suggest that the idea of the EP as a reliable supporter for LGBTIQ+ rights appears increasingly outdated. MEP Nordqvist, additionally added in the third theme that increasing pressure from TAN groups is making it more challenging for the EC itself to include TGNC rights in policies. Furthermore, the findings of this study build upon the work by Ahrens, Gaweda, and Kantola (2022). The authors identified the ECR and ID groups as central actors working to change the meaning of human rights within the EP. They found that these groups used arguments centered around family values and child protection. This was particularly apparent in the fourth theme of this study, where MEPs from both groups claimed that TGNC education either harms children or threatens the traditional family structure. These statements thus support the authors’ argument that human rights language is used to defend certain societal groups by excluding 56 others, including TGNC individuals. In the first theme, ID MEPs Bruna and Bay raised concerns about the EU imposing values, reflecting the populist and nationalist position that the authors associated with ID MEPs (pp. 803–804, 810–812). This was further exemplified in the sixth theme as ID MEPs framed Europe as culturally superior to Muslim countries. The developing role of the EPP, which Ahrens, Gaweda, and Kantola (2022) also addressed, was reflected in this study as well (p. 813). In the third theme, MEP Sánchez pointed out that the EPP increasingly aligns with TAN views. MEP Sieper instead underscored that many EPP members continue to support LGBTIQ+ rights. Several interviewees identified the EPP as the central group in the EP for determining the potential future influence of TAN actors. However, according to MEP Nissinen, cooperation between the EPP and TAN parties remains unlikely for now. Lastly, this study supports the findings by Gaweda, Siddi, and Miller (2023), who argued that the ECR group has become increasingly conservative post-Brexit (p. 830). The only identified explicit support for TGNC rights came from former UK ECR MEP Van Orden, highlighting this shift. 7. Conclusion This thesis has examined how MEPs from the ECR and ID groups framed TGNC rights during the 9th EP cycle (2019–2024), and how these narratives were perceived by current and former MEPs. The study revealed several insights into how TAN opposition against TGNC rights manifests at an EU level and provided empirical support for neo-cleavage theory. Regarding the first research question, there was a clear alignment between the ECR and ID groups in their opposition to TGNC rights. Both groups framed their arguments similarly across nearly all identified themes, highlighting ideological imposition, minimizing the relevance of TGNC rights, opposing EU-level actions, framing TGNC education as indoctrination and pointing to the existence of TGNC as threatening. As shown in table three, some former ID MEPs joined the ECR after the 2024 elections, indicating a continued political overlap. Nonetheless, the ECR group generally used more structured and ideological arguments. In contrast, the ID group used more populist, alarmist, and emotional arguments. Still, the alignment in the narratives of the two groups suggests that anti-TGNC opposition is a deliberate part of broader political strategies. The comparative nature of this study further revealed that TGNC rights were often clustered together with sexual orientation rights. This underscores that 57 the minimization of TGNC experiences, especially those of non-binary individuals, continues. Overall, TGNC rights were consistently treated as either non-existent, ideologically dangerous, or socially irrelevant by both ECR and ID MEPs. In terms of theoretical contributions, the findings offer empirical perspectives into neo-cleavage theory. TGNC rights were framed within a broader cultural conflict. ECR and ID MEPs often opposed EU-level policymaking using cultural arguments, aligning with the transnational cleavage that positions TAN parties against European integration. The study further shows how TAN parties actively mobilize around TGNC issues to oppose EU action, promote national sovereignty, and appeal to those who feel alienated by post-materialist policies. Answering the second research question, the interviews revealed that many MEPs outside TAN groups perceive this opposition as ideologically driven and frequently used to distract from other political issues. The study also underscored the interviewees’ growing concerns surrounding the rising influence of TAN values. Some interviewees pointed to the shifting position of TAN parties and the potential cooperation with mainstream groups, particularly the EPP. Future research should thereby examine the relationship between the EPP and TAN groups like the ECR, PfE, and ESN, as this may significantly shape the future of TGNC and LGBTIQ+ rights in the EU. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the identified ECR and ID MEPs were a minority within their groups. This suggests that the vast majority of TAN MEPs either deny the existence of TGNC individuals or view them as irrelevant. That said, all interviewed MEPs agreed that TGNC rights are still a highly contested issue in the EU. Taken together, these insights reveal a growing cultural cleavage within the EP, underscoring the need for continued scholarly and political attention to TGNC recognition in the EU. 58 8. 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Note: Theme 1, Framing TGNC Rights as Ideological Imposition was composed of the codes; Anti-Gender Ideology, Anti-Ideological Framing and Anti-LGBTIQ Ideology Specific. Theme 2, Minimizing the Relevance of TGNC Rights was composed of the codes; Conditional Tolerance, Pro-TGNC, and Unimportant or Better Issues. Theme 3, National Sovereignty over EU Action was composed of the codes; Anti-EU Framing, Legal Argumentation, and West– East Divide. Theme 4, Education as Indoctrination and a Threat to Children was composed of the codes; Anti-Education, Alleged Child Protection, and Traditional Family. Theme 5, TGNC Existence as a Threat was composed of the codes; TERF-Aligned Arguments, and Denial of TGNC Existence. The codes Anti-LGBTIQ Ideology Specific, Pro-TGNC, Legal Argumentation and West–East Divide were unique to the ECR group. 78 Appendix 7 – Codebook for ID debate data. Note: Theme 1, Framing TGNC Rights as Ideological Imposition was composed of the codes; Anti-Gender Ideology and Anti-Ideological Framing. Theme 2, Minimizing the Relevance of TGNC Rights was composed of the codes; Conditional Tolerance and Unimportant or Better Issues. Theme 3, National Sovereignty over EU Action was composed of the code; Anti-EU Framing. Theme 4, Education as Indoctrination and a Threat to Children was composed of the codes; Anti-Education, Alleged Child Protection, and Traditional Family. Theme 5, TGNC Existence as a Threat was composed of the codes; TERF-Aligned Arguments, Denial of TGNC Existence, and Mockery of TGNC Identity. Theme 6, TGNC Rights and an Anti-Immigration Opposition was composed of the codes; Anti-Immigration Arguments and Anti-Islam. The codes Mockery of TGNC Identity, Anti-Immigration Arguments and Anti-Islam were unique to the ID group. 79 Appendix 8 – Codebook for interview data. 80 Appendix 9 - Interview consent form. 81