DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE SWEDISH CLIMATE POLITICS AS A CONSENSUAL ISSUE: Party Competition within Policy Agreement Axel Mård Essay/Thesis: 15 credits Program and/or course: Bachelor’s programme in Political Science/SK1523 Level: Bachelor/First cycle Semester/year: Spring/2025 Supervisor: Gard Olav Dietrichson Word count: 11817 Abstract This thesis examines whether climate policy functions as a consensual issue in the context of Swedish party competition. Drawing on the framework developed by Guinaudeau and Persico (2014), the study analyses party manifestos from 2006 and 2022, focusing on climate goals, policy means, and rhetorical framing. Through a two-level qualitative content analysis, the findings reveal partial consensus on overarching goals, particularly the goal of net-zero emissions. However, parties diverged significantly in their choice of instruments, justifications, and emphasis. While 2006 displayed signs of emerging alignment, the 2022 manifestos reflect deeper ideological narrative division. The analysis suggests that climate policy cannot be classified as a fully consensual issue, but rather as a strategically contested domain within shared outer boundaries. The study contributes to issue competition theory by highlighting how consensus may coexist with meaningful intra-issue variation in multi-party systems. 1 1. Introduction 1.1 Background and Relevance Theories of political competition have long relied on the distinction between position and valence issues to explain how parties compete over policy (Downs, 1957; Stokes, 1963). Position issues involve ideological divergence with competing solutions, and valence issues centre around shared objectives but differ in perceptions of competence. However, this classical distinction is increasingly challenged by contemporary issues such as climate change, public health, or national security where inter-party agreement on long-term goals is widespread. In these contexts, political contestation persists not through ideological disagreement or competence alone, but through strategic variations in issue emphasis. Guinaudeau and Persico (2014) have proposed the concept of consensual issues to account for this kind of intra-issue variation: policy areas where parties agree on both the problem and solution yet still compete by varying the level of emphasis they assign to the issue. Their framework represents an important development in the study of issue competition, but its empirical applicability remains undertested. In this study I will examine whether consensual issues constitute a useful analytical lens for understanding party competition in Swedish climate policy. The case is particularly relevant as climate goals have enjoyed long-standing multi-party support in Sweden (Karlsson, 2021), while significant rhetorical and strategic divergence remains visible. 1.2 Research Problem and Aim While the concept of consensual issues offers a promising refinement of traditional issue typologies, it has seen limited empirical application, particularly in contexts outside of those originally examined by Guinaudeau and Persico (2014). In multiparty systems such as Sweden’s where electoral competition is strong but consensus on certain policy goals such as climate neutrality is well established, the concept holds potential for further exploration. In this study, I aim to evaluate the analytical utility of consensual issues by applying the framework to climate policy in Sweden. By analysing how parties emphasize, frame, and prioritize climate goals within a shared objective structure, my aim is to shed light on intra- issue competition in this consensus-based policy area. My research question is therefore the following: Is climate politics in Sweden a consensual issue? 2 2. Theoretical Framework 2.1 Conceptualising Issue Competition Party competition takes place within constrained political arenas where parties seek to maximize electoral support and gain or retain political office (Strøm, 1990). Because parties are ultimately competing for office and influence, their choice of issues and how they frame them is shaped by the strategic need to differentiate themselves from competitors. Issue competition then, is not just a process of policy articulation, but an opportunity for political positioning. To succeed parties must differentiate themselves not only through policy proposals but by strategically dealing with the issues they emphasize. The emergence and competition over political issues is therefore a core mechanism of democratic representation (Carmines & Stimson, 1989). Carmines & Stimson (1989) argue that an issue in this tradition is not simply a policy area, but a site of political struggle shaped by media attention, salience, and partisan strategy. The process unfolds in a distinct sequence that begins with elite-led polarization, where political elites take divergent and visible positions on a new issue. This elite behaviour then turns into mass perception, meaning that the public starts to notice and identify differences between the parties on the issue. After this affective alignment occurs where voters develop emotional responses like dislike or trust toward parties based on their views. And ultimately, voter realignment where voters partisan identities shift in response to the issue. This theory of issue evolution highlights how elite behaviour initiates issue salience, suggesting that issues are not just discovered but are constructed through political interaction and strategic contestation. It is also especially relevant since it treats issues as evolving political constructs instead of static policy domains. This underlines the interpretive nature of my analysis since I do not only study what parties say about climate policy but also how they say it, I will describe this further in upcoming chapters. Parties need to allocate limited rhetorical and programmatic resources across numerous potential issues, making prioritization an important task. Traditional frameworks have explained this process primarily in terms of ideological divergence or competence signalling (Downs, 1957; Stokes, 1963). Across all typologies, the unifying logic is electoral competition. Whether parties differentiate themselves through policy proposals (position issues), competence signals (valence issues), or strategic emphasis (consensual issues), the 3 underlying motivation remains the same: to maximize voter appeal and gain office. Consequently, issue competition is not only about policy preferences, but about how parties navigate a competitive marketplace of political attention and public priorities. 2.2 Existing Models of Issue Competition The classical distinction between position and valence issues originates in Downs’ (1957) and Stokes’ (1963) foundational work. Position issues involve ideological divergence, where parties propose different solutions to a given problem. Valence issues, on the other hand, reflect shared goals and competition over competence, trustworthiness, or credibility. Salience theory (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Dennison, 2019) and issue ownership theory (Petrocik, 1996; Stubager, 2018) have further developed these models. Salience theory suggests that parties emphasize issues strategically depending on their core voters and perceived strengths (Budge & Farlie, 1983). Issue ownership theory complements this by highlighting how parties attempt to dominate issue domains over time (Petrocik, 1996). However, both theories primarily focus on inter-issue competition: how parties choose which issues to emphasize. They say little about how parties compete within a shared issue, especially if they agree on overarching goals but still seek differentiation. This is an important distinction, especially when investigating cases like climate policy where parties may share objectives but compete over emphasis. 2.3 Theoretical Gaps This reveals a conceptual gap where these models are better suited for explaining inter-issue competition than capturing how parties strategically emphasize within consensual issues. Traditional frameworks such as salience theory (Budge & Farlie, 1983) and issue ownership theory (Petrocik, 1996) offer limited conceptual tools for examining how parties emphasize different aspects of a shared issue when clear positional or competence differences are absent. These limitations highlight a theoretical blind sport: earlier existing models lack tools to capture strategic variation in intra-issue emphasis when position and competence are not the primary modes of contestation. Coming to terms with this requires a new tool, and it is precisely this blind spot that the concept of consensual issues seeks to address. 4 2.4 Consensual Issues Guinaudeau and Persico (2014) address these gaps through their typology that distinguishes between four types of issues: conflictual, consensual, proprietal, and blurred. This typology is based on two dimensions, the number of positions expressed by parties and the allocation of issue salience across the party system. Consensual issues are defined by low positional conflict but high salience. While their typology shares similarities with concepts such as issue ownership and valence issues (Stokes, 1963), it differs in several key aspects. For instance, consensual issues may seem similar to valence issues in that parties agree on desirable goals, but they differ in that consensual issues emphasize shared solutions and focus on variation in salience rather than competence. Similarly, proprietal issues resonate with the concept of issue ownership but in a more exclusive form where only one party addresses the issue. So, while related, Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2014) categories provide a more nuanced framework for analysing the dynamic interplay of party competition. Their aim is to classify issues not based on the strategies parties employ, but on the underlying structure of party agreement or disagreement over problems and solutions. This structural approach further differentiates their work from earlier models such as Stokes (1963), who classified issues primarily based on whether parties agreed on the goal (valence) or disagreed ideologically (position). Guinaudeau and Persico (2014) treat issue dynamics as relational, shaped by how parties position themselves in relation to each other rather than any fixed ideological content. Within their typology, consensual issues are defined as policy areas where multiple parties make an issue salient but express only one position on it. In such cases, parties do not compete through disagreement over goals or solutions but rather through variations in emphasis and rhetorical framing. For example, two parties may both support achieving net- zero carbon emissions, but one consistently opens its manifestos with climate messaging while the other downgrades it to a secondary concern behind issues like migration or economic growth. Their positions are aligned but the difference in prominence can signal contrasting political priorities and affect how voters perceive their level of commitment. Research by Carter et al. (2018) reinforces the relevance of this approach by showing how for example climate policy requires more fine-grained tools for measuring intra-issue competition. Their approach draws on Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2014) salience-based framework but adapts it to the unique characteristics of climate politics – where rhetorical emphasis, ambition, and agenda salience vary significantly across parties, even in the absence 5 of clear positional divides. This strengthens the case for applying the consensual issues concept to climate policy and underscores the value of testing its applicability in new contexts such as Sweden. 2.5 The Limits of Consensual Issues Despite its contributions, the consensual issues framework is not without its limitations. While it usefully captures intra-issue competition in contexts of agreement, it offers limited explanatory power for how such competition interacts within a broader political agenda. In particular, the framework does not account for how trade-offs between issues affect the salience of consensual ones or how parties prioritize a shared issue relative to others in a constrained agenda-setting environment. Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2014) framework also offers limited guidance on how parties operationalise emphasis within an issue, or how the salience of a consensual issue interacts with other topics on the agenda. Their framework focuses on how parties compete within an issue where consensus exists but offers limited guidance on how prioritizing a consensual issue might influence, or be influence by, trade- offs between issues. This reflects an important boundary of the concept’s applicability, particularly in contexts where issue salience is shaped by broader inter-issue dynamics. Additionally, the framework presumes that shared goals and solutions are both stable and publicly articulated, but in reality, parties often engage in strategic vagueness or selectively emphasize certain aspects of an issue (Rovny, 2012, 2013). This can complicate the empirical identification of true consensus. The framework also says little about the rhetorical strategies or narrative devices parties use to elevate or downplay issues which is a potentially crucial dimension of how emphasis is perceived and internalized by the electorate. 2.6 Conceptual Definitions Building on the above, clear definitions of position, valence, salience, consensual issues, and issue ownership are important since they form the analytical tools necessary for my empirical examination of consensual issue dynamics. See table 1 below. It is important to note that not all issues are suited to being classified as consensual in all contexts. While consensual issues are characterized by agreement on both goals and solutions, this form of issue structure is contingent on institutional context and political culture. Climate policy may therefore function as a consensual issue in some systems but remains polarized in 6 others. In the US for example climate change continues to function as a positional issue marked by strong ideological divides (Smith, Bognar & Mayer, 2024). Table 1 Conceptual definitions Term Definition Position An issue involving ideological divergence and competing policy solutions. Issue Valence An issue where parties agree on desirable goals but compete over who is Issue perceived as most capable of delivering them. Salience A measure of how much emphasis different parties place on an issue in their communication. It varies across issues and parties. Issue The degree to which voters perceive a party as the most competent actor to Ownership handle a specific issue. Consensual An issue characterized by agreement on both the problem and solution, yet Issue parties differentiate themselves by how prominently they emphasize it. 2.7 Theoretical Relevance and Contextual Variation Understanding issue competition under consensus is particularly relevant in consensus- oriented parliamentary systems like Sweden’s. Unlike in two-party systems such as the US, where ideological polarization often prevents agreement on long-term policy goals, multi- party systems with coalition governance and proportional representation often create conditions in which broad agreement on overarching goals can coexist with strategic variation in issue emphasis and framing (Bernaerts, Blanckaert & Caluwaerts, 2023). This dynamic has been particularly visible in Western European democracies where party competition has evolved from being largely positional to increasingly centered on issue salience and agenda control (Green-Pedersen, 2007). This study therefore highlights how party competition operates differently across institutional contexts. By focusing on Sweden, I examine a most-likely case where consensual issue 7 dynamics should be observable if the concept holds empirical value. In multiparty systems like Sweden, the prevalence of coalition governments and proportional representation creates incentives for parties to position themselves within rather than outside broad policy agreements (Lijphart, 1999). This makes it more advantageous to compete through differentiation in emphasis, urgency, or agenda placement, rather than outright opposition (Green-Pedersen, 2007). In contrast, majoritarian systems such as the United States incentivize sharper ideological polarization, making shared-goal competition less viable. As a result, consensual issues are more likely to emerge and hold analytical value in contexts where parties benefit from nuanced intra-issue competition rather than binary oppositional stances. Research confirms that consensus democracies display lower levels of both idea- based and identity-based polarization when compared to majoritarian counterparts (Bernaerts, Blanckaert & Caluwaerts, 2023). 3. Method1 3.1 Research Design In this study I employ a qualitative, interpretive research design aimed at assessing whether the framework of consensual issues is analytically applicable to the case of Swedish climate politics. A qualitative interpretive approach is well suited for capturing how political actors create meaning through narrative and language. Instead of quantifying the frequency of positions the method is more focused on how language is used to frame problems, signal ideological positioning, and justify solutions. It allows for close, contextualized analysis of party communication and framing strategies (Schreier, 2012; Mayring, 2014), which is relevant when studying party differentiation within policy agreement. My decision to employ a qualitative interpretive research design, in contrast to Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2014) use of quantitative manifesto data, is based on my belief that consensual issues are not only about how often parties mention a topic, but how they do so through framing, tone, positioning, and rhetorical emphasis. I will not simply examine what parties 1 During the process of designing this paper I have employed OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s NotebookLM as support for idea development and understanding the literature. The AI was used as a sounding board to clarify concepts and explain articles, as well as to discuss designs for tables and templates for structured comparison. All final decisions including interpretations and formulations were made independently by me, and no text in this paper has been generated by AI. 8 say, but how they say it. This will allow me to detect subtle forms of political variation also when official policy objectives overlap on the surface. While my focus is climate policy, I do not claim that climate-related issues are inherently consensual in other systems. As previously mentioned, in more adversarial context such as the United States climate change remains a deeply polarized positional issue (Smith, Bognar & Mayer, 2024). My aim is therefore not to generalize about climate-related issues universally, but to test whether they function as consensual in this specific empirical most-likely setting. The choice of Sweden as a most-likely case follows the logic outlines by George & Bennet (2005), who argue that if a theoretical proposition does not hold in the most favourable empirical setting, then its overall validity should be questioned. Sweden’s long-standing consensus on climate goals, the institutionalization of climate policy, and the relative absence of sharp ideological divides on climate policy (Karlsson, 2021) makes it a most-likely context for consensual issue dynamics to emerge. If intra-issue competition is not observable here it is unlikely to be observable in more adversarial or polarized contexts. Conversely, if the framework does hold the case offers strong support for the empirical relevance and conceptual utility of consensual issues as a category of analysis. 3.2 Case Selection To explore how consensual issues function in practice I will analyse four Swedish parties: the Social Democrats (S), the Moderates (M), the Centre Party (C), and the Green Party (MP). These parties were selected to capture variation in party type, size, and relationship to the climate issue. The Social Democrats and the Moderates represent Sweden’s dominant catch-all parties, each having alternated in government and shaped national policy over decades. Including them enables an assessment of how mainstream parties compete over climate salience despite sharing broad policy goals. The Centre Party adds historical and ideological diversity with agrarian roots and a market-oriented environmental profile. It provides insight into how an actor with agrarian roots and social-liberal affiliations positions itself in a consensual policy domain. Finally, the Green Party represents a niche actor with climate policy at its core identity. While its inclusion raises the potential concern that it may behave differently due to its strong ownership of the issue, this is analytically useful. If even a niche party like the Green Party competes through salience variation rather than pure ideological distinction it 9 strengthens the case that climate politics in Sweden operates as a consensual issue. This combination of mainstream, niche, and centrist parties ensures analytical weight, and it also allows for comparison across both electoral size and ideological families. Finally, the choice of the two election cycles 2006 and 2022 is guided by both analytical relevance and contrast. 2006 represents a formative moment in the climate policy discourse prior to the institutionalization of climate goals and before the Climate Act was introduced. In contrast, 2022 represents a policy landscape shaped by legally binding targets, rising political salience, and global climate commitments (Karlsson, 2021). This election also took place during a rise in energy prices, heightened party polarization, and geopolitical instability, making analysing climate policy in this election cycle extra interesting. Comparing these two elections allows for an examination of whether climate policy evolved into a consensual issue over time, or whether ideological and strategic differences persisted despite formal agreement on goals. 3.3 Data and Material The study draws on party manifestos from two national election cycles: 2006 and 2022. The manifestos are retrieved from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al., 2024), an established dataset that provides access to party programs across multiple countries and time periods. 3.4 Analytical Framework To determine whether Swedish climate policy functions as a consensual issue, my analysis follows a two-level framework. This two-level structure is tied to Guinaudeau and Persicos (2014) definition of consensual issues as shared goals and means with political competition occurring within the issue rather than between opposing positions. To assess whether this intra-issue competition exists it is therefore necessary to examine both how parties’ articulate climate policy individually, and then how their positions relate to each other in aggregate. I will employ several analytical dimensions: whether parties’ express similar goals, propose similar policy means, and whether there are patterns of rhetorical variation, including emphasis and framing strategy. Additionally, I categorize the goals and means based on their type and stated aim. 10 3.5 Operationalisation I follow Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2014) definition of consensual issues as policy areas where parties agree on both the problem and solution but still compete by emphasizing the issue to different degrees. However, instead of using their quantitative proximity measures, I will apply a qualitative interpretive approach grounded in their conceptual logic. This choice reflects the nature of my research question which centres not only on whether parties agree but how they communicate that agreement and how they differentiate themselves. This approach is possible through qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2012; Mayring, 2014), which is well suited for this purpose since it allows for systematic interpretation of manifestos while remaining sensitive to nuance and context. In this case, qualitative means engaging with the manifestos as meaning-making devices, interpreting how parties frame climate goals, how salience and emphasis vary over time, and which narratives they use. This will allow me to capture patterns of intra-issue variation that would most likely remain invisible in a quantitative design. 3.5.1 Intra-Party assessment (manifest-level) For each party manifesto, I will examine how climate goals and their corresponding policy solutions are articulated. The goal is to determine whether parties express clear and stable goals and solutions, which may indicate alignment with other parties. The following dimensions are systematically coded into an analysis table: a) “Climate goals present: Does the party articulate specific goals related to climate change mitigation or neutrality?” b) “Goal description: What is the stated aim (e.g., net-zero emissions, fossil-free society, meeting EU targets)?” c) “Goal type: How can the goal be categorized (e.g., reduction targets, international agreements, transformation goal)?” d) “Policy means present: Are concrete tools or strategies mentioned to achieve these goals?” e) “Means description: What instruments are proposed (e.g., carbon taxation, regulation, green innovation)?” f) “Means type: How can the instruments be typologized (e.g., market-based, regulatory, investment-led)?” 11 g) “Framing strategy: How is the issue framed rhetorically (e.g., as a moral obligation, economic opportunity, national interest)?” h) “Rhetorical emphasis: How central is the issue within the manifesto (e.g., low, medium, or high prominence)?” 3.5.2 Inter-party comparison (aggregate-level) In the second step I will compare manifestos across parties within each election year (2006 and 2022) to assess whether there is shared agreement on both the problem framing and the policy response. This cross-party comparison builds directly on the results of the intra-party analysis which are aggregated and compared to assess whether a consensual structure exists on an inter-party level. If I find broad agreement across multiple parties on both goals and means I will consider that election cycle a potential case of consensual structuring. To systematically capture this, I will construct a comparative table with the following dimensions: a) “Consensus on goals: Do multiple parties express climate goals that are essentially similar (e.g., shared targets, timelines, or international frameworks)?” b) “Shared goal characteristics: What are the common features of these goals (e.g., net- zero by 2045, climate neutrality)?” c) “Consensus on means: Are their policy instruments generally aligned (e.g., taxation, regulation, green innovation)?” d) “Shared means characteristics: What do their means have in common, do they propose shared policy routes?” e) “Variation in emphasis: How prominently is climate policy featured across the manifestos (e.g., length, placement, tone)?” f) “Narrative divergence: Are there clear differences in how the issue is framed (e.g., risk or opportunity, moral or economic growth)?” g) “Consensual issue: Based on the information above, does the data support classifying climate policy as a consensual issue in this election cycle?” This approach also allows a potential negative result. If divergence is found in either goals or means, or if some parties downplay the issue entirely, this framework allows for the 12 conclusion that climate policy does not function as a consensual issue in that election cycle. In this way the design opens for both affirmative and negative outcomes. 3.6 Limitations This study is subject to several limitations, both methodological and conceptual. First, the reliance on manifesto data restricts the analysis to formal party positions. Party manifestos are strategic documents (Eder, Jenny & Müller, 2017, p. 4) that may not be able to fully capture internal conflict, informal messaging, or shifts in tone that exist in media communication, debates, or coalition negotiations. Therefore, my findings will reflect how parties choose to be perceived in their manifestos, rather than the entirety of their policy behaviour. Second, while the structured coding scheme ensures transparency and consistency, the interpretive nature of qualitative content analysis introduces the potential of subjectivity. Assessing rhetorical emphasis and narrative framing requires analytical judgement, and to mitigate this I will use explicit coding categories that will guide me through the analysis. Third, the case selection constrains the generalisability. My aim is not to provide broad cross- national claims, but to assess the applicability of the consensual issues framework within a most-likely context. The results will therefore be shaped by specific contextual and temporal dynamics. Finally, in the 2006 election cycle the Moderate Party did not publish an individual manifesto but instead participated in a joint manifesto issued by the Alliance. As a result, the analysis for this year includes a collective document representing the Moderates, the Centre Party, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats. While the Centre Party did publish an additional party- specific manifesto, this asymmetry may limit the precision of my intra-party comparisons for that year regarding the Moderate party’s independent position. Nonetheless, given that the Moderates were considered to be the leader of the coalition, it is unlikely that any major positions were included against their will. 13 4. Analysis 4.1 Structure of the Analysis I will analyse each manifesto individually and then conduct a cross-party comparison for that election year. I will translate citations from the manifestos into English and indicate these with (own translation). 4.2 Manifesto Analysis: 2006 The Alliance (Moderate Party) The Alliance’s 2006 manifesto devotes a considerable section to environmental and climate policy, albeit approaching the end spanning mostly pages 25 to 28. In this section the Alliance explicitly acknowledges climate change as a major global challenge and frames sustainable development as a key responsibility for Sweden. Climate goals are present but formulated in broad and non-quantified terms, for instance “emissions from energy must be reduced for climate and health reasons […] EU countries should set clear targets to reduce the use of fossil fuels. Emissions trading should be expanded in terms of scope and substances” (Alliansen, 2006, p. 26, own translation). Additionally, the manifesto stresses that “global environmental challenges, especially climate change, are affecting living conditions worldwide and require greater attention. Emissions into air and water are some of the greatest threats facing humanity. We have a responsibility to future generations to manage natures resources in such a way that we can leave a world in balance for our children and grandchildren.” (Alliansen, 2006, p. 25, own translation). The policy means are clearly identified, favouring market-based solutions and technological development over regulatory intervention. Emissions trading and innovation support are highlighted as primary strategies, reinforcing the manifesto’s liberal-economic orientation. The framing of climate policy is pragmatic and optimistic, portraying environmental challenges as something that “can become an economic lever […] the need for technology with minimal environmental impact is great, which means great opportunities for increased exports of environmental technology.” (Alliansen, 2006, p. 25, own translation). This indicates that environmental challenges are primarily framed as potential economic opportunities rather than as existential threats requiring immediate intervention. 14 In terms of rhetorical emphasis, environmental issues receive a dedicated but non-central role in the manifesto. The sustainability and climate sections are developed but integrated within a broader political platform centered on economic growth and employment. See table 2 summarizing the findings for the Alliance in 2006: Table 2 Summarized analysis for the Alliance 2006 manifesto Dimensions Coding results Climate goals present Yes Goal description Reduce greenhouse gas emissions Goal type Broad, non-quantified Policy means present Yes Means description Emissions trading, technological innovation Means type Market-based, innovation-driven Framing strategy Economic opportunity, sustainable growth Rhetorical emphasis Medium The Centre Party The Centre Party’s independent 2006 manifesto presents a markedly strong and proactive stance on climate change and environmental policy. Global warming is described as “the greatest threat facing humanity” (Centerpartiet, 2006, p. 9, own translation), framing it not only as a technical problem but as a global existential challenge requiring immediate action. The party articulates clear and ambitious climate goals. It calls for a transition away from fossil fuels stating that all new cars sold in Sweden must be able to run on alternative fuels by 2015 and proposes integrating the transport sector into the EU’s emissions trading system. Policy means are concrete and multifaceted, proposing the promotion of alternative fuels, expanding the use of bioenergy, wind, solar, and wave-power, as well as providing tax incentives for green innovation. It also advocates for the phase-out of nuclear energy suggesting that a combination of technological innovation and market mechanisms can drive the transition towards a fossil-free economy. The framing of climate policy is both urgent and opportunity based. The party portrays environmental action not only as a moral imperative but also as an opportunity for rural development and job creation. As the manifesto puts it, “in a long-term and sustainable green 15 Sweden, Green industries contribute with food on the tables, fuel in the tanks, heat in the houses, better traffic environments in the cities, raw materials for industry […]” (Centerpartiet, 2006, p. 11, own translation). In terms of rhetorical emphasis, climate and environmental issues are given extensive coverage and strategic importance, although they are positioned towards the end of the manifesto rather than in the beginning. See table 3 summarizing the findings for the Centre Party in 2006: Table 3 Summarized analysis for the Centre Party 2006 manifesto Dimensions Coding results Climate goals present Yes Goal description Fossil-fuel transitions, rural development through green industries, alternative fuels 2015 Goal type Transformational goal, national and regional focus Policy means present Yes Means description Alternative fuels, emissions trading, rural development, green innovation Means type Market-based, investment-driven Framing strategy Urgent moral responsibility, economic opportunity Rhetorical emphasis High (positioned late) The Green Party The Green Party’s 2006 manifesto places climate change at the very centre of its political platform. Under the heading “Stop the Climate Catastrophe” (Miljöpartiet, 2006, p. 1, own translation) the party sets out specific strategies to address global warming and environmental sustainability is consistently framed as a fundamental political priority across sectors such as energy, welfare, transportation, and job creation. Clear and ambitious climate goals are expressed. The party states that “Sweden’s dependence on oil and other fossil fuels will be broken within 15 years. The need for transport must be reduced, goods moved to rail, and houses built in an energy-efficient way.” (Miljöpartiet, 16 2006, p. 1, own translation), setting a transformational and time-bound objective. This goal implies a vision of systematic change rather than adjustment. Policy means are comprehensive and largely investment- and regulation-driven. Specific proposals include expanding renewable energy production by at least 20TWh of wind power by 2015, installing solar panels on one in four rooftops by 2020, and implementing a green tax shift where environmental degradation is taxed rather than labour. The framing of climate action is largely pragmatic and solution oriented. While the manifesto acknowledges the severity of climate change, it emphasizes practical measures, economic opportunities, and societal benefits rather than relying on dramatic or moralistic appeals. Finally, in terms of rhetorical emphasis, climate and sustainability issues receive extensive treatment, but mostly confined to the first three pages. See table 4 summarizing the findings for the Green Party in 2006: Table 4 Summarized analysis for the Green Party 2006 manifesto Dimensions Coding results Climate goals present Yes Goal description Fossil fuel independence within 15 years. Large-scale renewable transition Goal type Transformation goal Policy means present Yes Means description Renewable energy expansion, green tax reform, sustainable transport policies, biological diversity Means type Regulatory, investment-driven Framing strategy Solution-oriented pragmatism Rhetorical emphasis High (early position) The Social Democratic Party The Social Democratic Party’s 2006 manifesto positions climate change and sustainability as significant elements of its broader political platform. Under the heading “Sweden – a role model in the green transition”, the party frames climate change as “our greatest global challenge” and emphasizes that in order to solve it, “national unity is required around two 17 comprehensive development programs – one for investments and one for science” (Socialdemokraterna, 2006, p. 2, own translation). The manifesto articulates clear climate-related goals. The most central one being the commitment to break Sweden’s oil dependency by 2020 through a transition to renewable energy sources and increased energy efficiency. Other related objectives include expanding wind power, promoting renewable energy technologies, enhancing energy efficiency in public and private sectors, and phasing out nuclear power in the long term. Policy means are concrete and diverse. The party proposes significant investment and research in renewable energy infrastructure, the use of public procurement to introduce more green technology, and legislative initiatives to improve building energy standards. Their climate policy can thereby be interpreted as not only a response to environmental challenges but also as an opportunity for economic growth, employment, and innovation, mentioned in the manifesto as for instance: “We want to launch a broad investment program aimed at increasing energy efficiency throughout society and increasing the production of renewable energy. New opportunities for entrepreneurship and rural development will be created” (Socialdemokraterna, 2006, p. 6, own translation). The framing of climate action is dual in the way that it is portrayed as both a national responsibility and a global leadership opportunity, as well as an economic opportunity. While the manifesto acknowledges the seriousness of the threat posed by climate change, including references to storms, floods, and glacial melting, it largely highlights proactive solutions portraying Sweden’s green transition as a means to ensure both international leadership and domestic prosperity. In terms of rhetorical emphasis, climate issues receive a dedicated and substantial section early in the manifesto. It is however largely contained within this section and is not consistently referenced across other policy areas, suggesting medium to high level of emphasis relative to the entire party platform. See table 5 summarizing the findings for the Social Democratic Party in 2006: Table 5 Summarized analysis for the Social Democratic Party 2006 manifesto Dimensions Coding results 18 Climate goals Yes present Goal description Break oil dependency 2020, expand renewable energy, promote energy efficiency Goal type Transformation goal (energy transition with social-economic framing) Policy means Yes present Means description Renewable energy investments, public sector leadership, green innovation promotion Means type Investment-driven, regulatory Framing strategy National leadership, economic modernization Rhetorical Medium to high (clear section, limited integration across other policy emphasis areas) 4.3 Cross-Party Comparison: 2006 Goals Beginning with analysing goal consensus, there is broad but uneven consensus among the analysed parties regarding the need to address climate change through national policy. All parties explicitly acknowledge the seriousness of climate change and articulate goals related to environmental sustainability or emissions reductions. However, the specifics and ambition of these goals vary considerably. The Green Party and the Centre Party articulate the most ambitious and transformational goals, such as breaking Sweden’s dependence on fossil fuels within a defined timeframe, 15 years for the Greens and alternative fuels by 2015 for the Centre Party. The Social Democrats also set a significant goal to break Sweden’s oil dependency by 2020, although framed more cautiously in relation to economic and social development. The Alliance recognizes sustainability as something important but formulates their goals in broader and less specific terms focusing more on balancing environmental concerns with economic growth. So, while all parties agree that climate change requires action the degree of commitment and level of specifics varies, suggesting partial consensus on goals. Now on to the goal characteristics and whether they are similar among the parties. Despite the differences in ambition and specificity, several common features emerge across the manifestos. All four parties support a transition away from fossil fuels. They also highlight the importance of increasing renewable energy production. Climate goals are consistently linked to broader societal benefits, such as economic growth, energy security, or rural 19 development, and there is an implicit or explicit support for international cooperation, through the EU or global institutions. These shared characteristics indicate that climate change was broadly framed as both an environmental and socioeconomic issue, even if the urgency and pathways toward the goals differed among the parties. Means The degree of consensus regarding policy means is notably weaker than the consensus on goals. While all parties acknowledge the need for action, the proposed methods vary significantly in terms of instruments, mechanisms, and the balance between state intervention and market reliance. The alliance prioritizes market-based solutions and technological innovation, emphasizing cost-efficiency and economic growth. Similarly, the Centre Party proposes green innovation and economic incentives but also supports more proactive shifts such as advocating for alternative fuels in transport. The Green Party, by contrast, advocates for regulatory measures and significant investment to drive the fossil-free transition, suggesting a clearly less market- reliant approach, but still market-based. The Social democrats occupy a midway position where they support large-scale public investments and legislative frameworks while still integrating innovation and market mechanisms. While there is some shared understanding that investments and incentives are important, the range and nature of the proposed means differ substantially. This suggests only partial consensus on means. Looking at means characteristics, there are several that are shared despite differences in balance and emphasis. All four parties support increasing investments in renewable energy in some form, and they recognize technological innovation as an essential part of the transition. There is also widespread support for policy frameworks that facilitate environmental modernization, whether through public procurement, legislation, or economic incentives. None of the parties propose a business as usual-approach or a purely state-controlled model, every one of them propose some combination of markets, regulation, and innovation. So even though the relative emphasis differs, there is a shared vision that addressing climate change requires coordinated action across all sectors combining policy intervention with economic modernization. Emphasis and Narrative Divergence 20 In terms of narrative framing the parties share common elements, but they also exhibit important differences. The Alliance frames environmental protection primarily as an economic opportunity, emphasizing economic growth, competitiveness, and technological innovation. The Centre Party combines an urgent climate narrative with a major focus on rural revitalization and green entrepreneurship, framing the transition as both necessary and beneficial. The Green Party’s framing is pragmatic and solution-oriented, portraying climate action as a motor of societal transformation, technological advancement and job creation. Finally, the Social Democrats frame climate action primarily as a national leadership opportunity and an economic modernization strategy, acknowledging the global nature of the climate problem but focusing their solutions and investments on national welfare, competitiveness, and growth. Thus, while there are overlaps there are clear differences in the main lenses through the parties’ present climate policy, indicating moderate narrative divergences across the manifestos. Conclusion Based on my cross-party comparison across the seven analytical dimension, climate policy in the 2006 election cycle exhibits partial, but incomplete characteristics of a consensual issue. There is broad agreement among the parties that climate change constitutes a serious problem requiring national action. All analysed manifestos also articulate the need for a transition away from fossil fuels, more investing in renewable energy, and efforts to promote sustainability. However, the specifics, timing, and ambition of these goals vary considerably with the Green Party and the Centre Party adopting the most ambitious targets, while the Alliance expresses more general objectives. Regarding policy means consensus is divided. All four parties support some combination of investments, policy instruments, and innovation, but the balance between market-driven, regulatory, and investment-led approaches differs significantly. The Alliance prioritizes market-based solutions, the Green Party emphasizes regulations and public investment, the Centre Party mix innovation incentives with structural shifts, and the Social Democrats propose a national investment-led modernization strategy. Variation in rhetorical emphasis and narrative divergence further challenge the classification of climate policy in Sweden as completely consensual. While the Centre Party and Green Party feature climate issues as central elements in their political platform the Alliance and the Social Democrats, even if they are supportive, integrate climate policy less into their broader 21 agendas. Framing also varies where the Alliance emphasizes economic growth, the Centre Party highlights rural opportunity, and the Social Democrats focus on national leadership and economic modernization. So, following Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2014) framework, while Swedish parties in 2006 widely acknowledged the climate challenge and shared a commitment to transition away from fossil fuels, the differences in goal specificity, policy means, and rhetorical emphasis suggest that climate policy constituted a partially consensual issue rather than a fully consensual one. To illustrate my findings more clearly, table 6 below summarizes the cross-party comparison based on the seven analytical dimensions outlined in my methodology. The table highlights both areas of agreement and divergence across the Alliance, the Centre Party, the Green Party, and the Social Democratic Party in the 2006 election cycle. Table 6 Summarized cross-party comparison 2006 election cycle Dimensions Assessment Consensus on goals Partial. All acknowledge need for action, varying ambition and specificity Shared goal Yes. All support long-term sustainability and fuel transition characteristics Consensus on means Partial. General alignment on innovation, differs in intervention levels Shared means Yes. All support renewable energy expansion and innovation characteristics Variation in emphasis Medium. Climate present in all manifestos, integration vary Narrative divergence Moderate. Common themes, divergent framings Consensual issue? Partially. Clear alignment on general direction, divergence on goals, means, and salience As shown in Table 6, while there was broad recognition across the parties of the need to address climate change and transition toward a more sustainable economy, important divergences remained regarding the specificity of goals, their preferred policy means, and rhetorical emphasis. These differences indicate that climate policy in Sweden during the 2006 22 election cycle did not fully meet the criteria for a consensual issue but showed many of its features. My findings thus highlight a political landscape characterized by partial consensus and growing but differentiated commitment to climate action. 4.4 Manifesto Analysis: 2022 This section applies the same two-level analytical framework as the 2006 analysis to assess whether climate policy in 2022 functioned as a consensual issue. The Moderate Party The Moderate Party’s 2022 manifesto presents climate and environmental issues as important even if they are primarily framed through the lenses of energy security, economic growth, and industrial competitiveness. The party addresses these themes both across policy areas and in a dedicated section titled “Getting control over the environment, climate, and energy”. Climate goals are explicitly present, and the party confirms its alignment with Sweden’s national targets: “We will as a country take full responsibility at home and reach net-zero emissions by 2045 at the latest” (Moderaterna, 2022, p. 16, own translation). This reflects a backing of long-term decarbonization objectives, although the goals are operationalised mainly through infrastructure and energy-policies rather than extensive climate frameworks. The goal description focuses on ensuring energy security, enabling green industrial transformation, and expanding fossil-free electricity production to meet a projected doubling of demand by 2045. While they embrace net-zero targets, the formulation of climate ambition is strongly embedded in sector-specific aims such as heavy industry, electricity, and transportation. The goal type is therefore best understood as sectoral transformation attached to development of the market and technology. Policy means are wide and central to the party’s climate platform. These include expansion of nuclear energy, investment in carbon capture and storage technology, accelerated process for permits to green industry, expansion of charging infrastructure, and also redirecting foreign aid to climate efforts abroad. I interpret these as mainly market-based and investment-driven, emphasizing deregulation, technology, and industrial competitiveness over regulatory enforcement. The manifesto also mentions that “the cost of reducing emissions through international climate efforts is often much lower than reducing them in Sweden” 23 (Moderaterna, 2022, p. 19, own translation), indicating a strong emphasis on cost-efficiency and international focus rather than a national one. The framing strategy is pragmatic and based in national interest. Climate action is also framed not as a moral obligation but more as a matter of energy security, economic resilience, and technological development. Finally, I estimate the rhetorical emphasis as medium to high. Climate and environmental issues receive an early dedicated thematic section and also return in chapters on infrastructure and innovation. However, they are typically secondary to economic narratives and the party’s discourse centres on climate as a functional component of broader modernization strategies rather than a transformative societal obligation. See table 7 summarizing the findings for the Moderate Party in 2022: Table 7 Summarized analysis for the Moderate Party 2022 manifesto Dimensions Coding results Climate goals Yes present Goal Net-zero 2045, securing fossil-free energy, decarbonize industry, transport description and infrastructure Goal type Sectoral transformation Policy means Yes present Means Nuclear expansion, carbon capture and storage, infrastructure, innovation, description offsetting, international climate funding Means type Market-based and investment-driven Framing Energy security, economic modernization, cost-efficiency strategy Rhetorical Medium to high, dedicated section and recurring references emphasis The Centre Party 24 The Centre Party’s 2022 manifesto places climate and environmental issues at the very core of their political platform. They frame the ecological transition as both urgent and opportunity-driven, emphasizing rural development, decentralization, and innovation. A dedicated and early section titled “The climate demands our power of action” (Centerpartiet, 2022, p. 7, own translation) summarizes the party’s overall vision integrating climate policy with agricultural, economic, and infrastructural reform. Climate goals are clearly mentioned, including a commitment to accelerate the green transition by doubling the production of emissions-free electricity production, strengthening Sweden’s role as a leader in international climate cooperation, and advancing electrified transport and industry. The Centre Party calls for a systematic transformation to a low-carbon society where climate ambition is not limited to a single sector but spread across energy, agriculture, and transport. The goal type is therefore best characterized as a systemic and sectoral transformation, combining overarching decarbonization goals with specific sector targets. Climate neutrality is not only a technical objective but also tied to independence, food security, regional growth, and energy. They do however not mention Sweden’s national goal of net-zero 2045. The policy means are extensive and varied such as major investments in renewable energy, strengthening and expanding the EU emissions trading system, green tax reforms, climate-smart agriculture, modern industry, and support for electrified transportation infrastructure. These instruments blend market mechanisms, public investment, as well as regulatory reform, implying a liberal-environmentalist-orientation that links market innovation with state support and rule-based structures. As the manifesto states, “Economic growth and ambitious environmental and climate work must in practice go hand in hand, and with the right political reforms it is possible to create jobs, increase prosperity and at the same time reduce emissions” (Centerpartiet, 2022, p. 7, own translation). The framing strategy can be described as pragmatic optimism, since climate action is portrayed as a driver of innovation, rural revitalization, and job creation. Rather than framing climate change as a catastrophe the Centre Party focuses on the opportunities that are natural in transformation, highlighting Sweden’s potential in forestry, bioeconomy, and clean energy. Rhetorical emphasis is high since climate policy appears early in the manifesto and recurs throughout the discussions on economic development, infrastructure, agriculture, and energy. It returns to climate goals as a fundamental need for other reforms, suggesting that climate policy is no isolated priority but a strategic base throughout the manifesto. As the manifesto 25 notes: “For the Centre Party, caring for the environment and the climate is a central part of politics, never a low priority or a vested interest. The well-being of the planet is a basic prerequisite for the rest of society” (Centerpartiet, 2022, p. 8, own translation). See table 8 summarizing the findings for the Centre Party in 2022: Table 8 Summarized analysis for the Centre Party 2022 manifesto Dimensions Coding results Climate goals Yes present Goal description Expand fossil-free electricity, lead in climate cooperation, promote transition across sectors Goal type Systemic transition goal, transformational Policy means Yes present Means Investment in renewable energy, green tax reform, emissions trading, description infrastructure upgrades Means type Investment-led, market-based, regulatory reform Framing strategy Pragmatic optimism, emphasizing innovation, economic growth, rural development Rhetorical High, dedicated early section and repeated throughout manifesto emphasis The Green Party The Green Party’s 2022 manifesto is entirely structured around climate and environmental transformation, positioning the climate crisis as the most important issue. Climate policy is not treated as a policy area among others, but as the ideological backbone of the party’s platform. From the introduction to the final policy sections, climate policy is used to frame basically all other political priorities. 26 Their climate goals are strongly articulated, including the aim to create a “fossil-free welfare state by 2030” (Miljöpartiet, 2022, p. 1, own translation), and the introduction of a binding emissions budget that ensures compliance with Swedish climate law. The manifesto calls for a complete phase-out of fossil fuels in all sectors, including transport, industry, and housing. The ambition goes beyond Sweden’s net-zero target for 2045 and proposes a deeper, faster, and justice-centered transition. The goal type is then clearly system transformation. The party envisions a zero-carbon society where climate neutrality is not just a technological goal but a social design with deep implications for democracy, equity, and global solidarity. The policy means are developed and broad in scope such as a green investment program, phasing out fossil fuels in industry, reforming the EU emissions trading system, supporting transition programs, and green tax reform aimed at both social and environmental equity. The party combines regulatory, investment-led, and redistributive policy instruments, emphasizing public responsibility and structural change. Their framing strategy is moral and systemic, since climate change is described as a threat to human dignity, democratic stability, and intergenerational equity. There are many references to planetary boundaries, responsibility of wealthy nations, and ecological collapse. I do however not interpret the manifests tone as alarmistic; it combines urgency with a vision of what they deem socially and politically possible. The framing is also justice-based, aiming to combine environmentalism with feminism, welfare policy, and global solidarity. The rhetorical emphasis is high, as the climate crisis is not only a recurring theme but the main principle of the manifesto. Almost every policy proposal is tied back to climate policy, and rather than isolating climate issues in a section of the manifesto the Green Party uses them to frame the overarching logic of the party’s political bid. See table 9 summarizing my findings for the Green Party in 2022: Table 9 Summarized analysis for the Green Party 2022 manifesto Dimensions Coding results Climate goals Yes present 27 Goal Fossil-free welfare state 2030, binding emissions budget, rapid and just description climate transition Goal type Systematic transformation, zero-carbon societal transition Policy means Yes present Means Green investment program, fossil phase-out, EU emissions trading description system reform, efficiency, taxation Means type Investment-led, regulatory, redistributive Framing Moral, systemic, justice-oriented, equity, intergenerational responsibility strategy Rhetorical High emphasis The Social Democratic Party The Social Democratic Party’s 2022 manifesto treats climate actions as a central, yet integrated component of its broader platform for economic development, social justice, and national security. Climate change is framed a “our time’s existential issue” (Socialdemokraterna, 2022, p. 21, own translation), and is directly tied to Sweden’s future economic and social resilience. Climate goals are clearly articulated with the manifesto confirming Sweden’s net-zero emissions target for 2045 and advocating for further acceleration of the green transition. One of their overarching ambitions is for Sweden to become the “world’s first fossil-free welfare nation” (Socialdemokraterna, 2022, p. 24, own translation), combining climate action with social solidarity and new jobs. Furthermore, the goal emphasizes leading the green transition by supporting industrial innovation, welfare security, and energy modernization. Climate neutrality is framed as a broader societal project of economic renewal, social justice, and national resilience against threats like extreme weather events. The goal type can therefore be categorized as systematic transformation, grounded in a fair transition model linking sustainability to economic and societal progress. The policy means are well developed and include large-scale public investments in green industrial transformation, expanding renewable energy production, doubling the number of charging stations for electric vehicles, developing new climate adaptation programs against 28 extreme weather, and promotion of energy efficiency. The framing strategy blends economic opportunity, social inclusion, and national responsibility. Climate mitigation is portrayed as a national modernization project which can deliver new industries, stronger welfare systems, and rural revitalization. The manifesto focuses on proactive solutions and collective benefits over catastrophe narratives. I interpret the rhetorical emphasis as medium to high considering that climate policy is granted a dedicated section early in the manifesto and recurs in later sections discussing policy areas such as international leadership. The climate agenda does however remain as one among several posts rather than dominating the entire platform. See table 10 summarizing my findings for the Social Democratic Party in 2022: Table 10 Summarized analysis for the Social Democratic Party 2022 manifesto Dimensions Coding results Climate goals Yes present Goal Net-zero 2045, fossil-free welfare nation, lead the green transition, description industrial modernization, welfare security Goal type Systematic transformation, fair transition Policy means Yes present Means Green public investment, renewable energy expansion, adaptation, description incentives Means type Investment-led, regulatory, international cooperation Framing Economic modernization, social equity, national responsibility strategy Rhetorical Medium to high, dedicated section, one among many policy areas emphasis 29 4.5 Cross-Party Comparison: 2022 Goals Across the four parties analysed there is a significant degree of consensus regarding the urgency and legitimacy of climate action. All parties acknowledge net-zero as a primary goal, though the Centre Party does not mention the official goal of 2045, and all acknowledge the need for transitioning to a fossil-free, or emissions-free economy. The level of ambition and time horizons does also vary. The Green Party proposes the most ambitious targets, including full phase-out of fossil-fuels by 2030 and a binding emissions budget. The Centre Party advocates for doubling fossil-free electricity and Sweden taking on climate leadership, while the Social Democrats reaffirm their commitment to a fossil-free welfare state by 2045. The Moderates also confirm the 2045 net-zero target but highlight flexibility and cost-efficiency, including international offsets. The goal alignment is therefore stronger in 2022 than it was in 2006, even if differences in ambition, framing, and timeline persists. Thus, the consensus on goals can be described as medium to strong. Looking at goal characteristics, there are several that are shared among the manifestos. Firstly, the commitment to net-zero, either explicitly or through alignment with Sweden’s climate law. Secondly, the strong support for a fossil-free electricity system as a pillar of decarbonization. Thirdly, the strong emphasis on sectoral transition in transport, energy, and industry. Finally, there is a shared narrative around the sentiment that climate action is necessary for economic resilience and national leadership. Notably, although the Green Party grounds its goals in justice and systemic transformation, and the Moderate Party highlights competitiveness and economic security, both frame climate targets as essential to Sweden’s long-term societal resilience even though there are distinct ideological aspects. As a whole, the goal characteristics are converging with strong features of ideology. Means While all parties agree that climate action requires active policymaking, there is significant variation in their preferred strategies and instruments. The Green Party proposes far-reaching public investment, redistribution, and strict regulation to achieve a rapid and just transition. The Social Democrats also rely on large-scale public investment and regulation but puts greater importance on compatibility with economic stability and welfare structures. The 30 Centre Party promotes a blend of public support and market mechanisms, particularly for rural development and renewable energy. The Moderates advocate for cost efficient and market-based approaches, including carbon capture, expanded nuclear power, and international offsets. So, while all four parties support the green transition, their means differ largely in scope, ideological orientation, and the degree of state intervention. I interpret this as a low to moderate consensus on means. Despite these differences though, certain common features can be observed. Firstly, all parties support increased investment in fossil-free energy infrastructure, and all manifestos reference innovation and electrification as critical tools. There is also a general support for climate- related investments in transport and industry, and most parties include international cooperation or climate aid in their manifestos. The weight placed on each type of instrument however, public or private, regulatory or incentive-based, does vary significantly. The Green Party and the Social Democrats lean toward state leadership while the Centre Party and the Moderates stress market flexibility. As such, shared characteristics exist but they are not enough to form full alignment. Emphasis and Narrative Divergence The parties differ significantly in how important climate policy is in their manifestos. The Green Party gives climate action the highest possible importance where it is not just a policy field but the central structuring logic guiding their platform. The Centre Party also treats climate issues as a strategic priority and incorporates them early on in the manifesto as well as throughout it, with a tone of opportunity and urgency. The Social Democrats place climate policy high on the agenda with a strong early section and recurring reference, but it is framed as one policy among others. Finally, the Moderates integrate climate policy into energy and economy, but without centering it as a central pillar. Consequently, the rhetorical emphasis in 2022 ranges from very high with the Green party to moderate with the Moderate Party. Looking at the narrative divergence, each party frames climate action through a different ideological lens. The Green Party employ a moral and systemic framing where the climate crisis is a justice issue closely tied to global solidarity, democracy, and intergenerational equity. The Centre Party utilizes a pragmatic opportunity framing focusing on rural development, innovation, and entrepreneurship. The Social Democrats emphasize modernization and social unity, integrating climate goals with employment, national 31 resilience and welfare. Finally, the Moderate Party highlights energy security, competitiveness, and cost-efficiency where they prioritize climate action that avoids excessive state interference and that supports industrial strength. So, despite some common themes like linking climate to innovation or modernization, the ideological and narrative divergence is significant. The variation across the four manifestos in tone, framing, and urgency underscores that the parties are not simply differing in degree, but in the underlying reasoning for climate policy. Conclusion The analysis of the 2022 election cycle reveals a political landscape where climate policy is widely recognized as something important but not structured as a fully consensual issue in the Guinaudeau and Persico (2014) sense. While all four parties acknowledge Sweden’s climate targets and propose measures to support green transformation, significant differences persist in multiple dimensions. While there is a moderate to strong consensus on climate goals, particularly regarding net-zero and sectoral transitions in primarily energy and industry, divergences in ambition, justification, and speed undermine the presence of a unified goal structure. The clearest break with a consensual issues pattern lies in the policy means. Parties differ markedly in their views on regulation, public investments, taxation, and market incentives. These differences are not just technical either but rooted in deep ideological differences regarding the role of the state, economic intervention, and equity. The narrative divergence further supports this conclusion. While some parties frame climate action as an opportunity for national leadership or rural renewal, others present it as a moral obligation or a challenge to market realism. The variation in emphasis such as between the Green Party’s overarching climate narrative and the Moderate Party’s compartmentalized approach further reveals these differing framings. Following Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2014) framework, consensual issues are characterized by shared goals and solutions with intra-issue competition occurring primarily through emphasis and salience. In the 2022 case, the Swedish party system exhibits partial convergence on goals but no clear agreement on solutions or framing. I will therefore conclude that climate policy in the 2022 election cycle cannot be classified as a fully consensual issue. Rather, it represents a case of ideologically fractured consensus, where agreement on the existence of a problem covers deep divisions in who should lead, how to 32 solve it, and what the policy means should be. To illustrate my findings more clearly, table 11 below summarizes the cross-party comparison based on the seven analytical dimensions outlines in my methodology. The table highlights both areas of agreement and divergence across the Moderate Party, the Centre Party, the Green Party, and the Social Democratic Party in the 2022 election cycle. Table 11 Summarized cross-party comparison 2022 election cycle Dimensions Assessment Consensus on goals Medium to strong. All parties support net-zero, differing ambition, timeline, justification Shared goal Yes. All support net-zero, fossil-free electricity, sectoral transition characteristics Consensus on means Low to moderate. Different instruments, varying degrees of intervention and market reliance Shared means Partial. Electrification and financial incentives common, otherwise characteristics diverse Variation in Medium to high. From full integration to peripheral emphasis Narrative divergence High. Distinct ideological lenses Consensual issue? No. Shared recognition of problem but fragmentation in means, framing, and rhetorical emphasis 5. Discussion 5.1 Summary of Main Findings My findings suggest a complex and dynamic landscape of partial convergence, strategic differentiation, and ideological conflict. In 2006, climate policy showed early signs of becoming a consensual issue, but the 2022 election cycle revealed a more fragmented picture. 33 This suggests that climate policy in Sweden has not matured into a fully consensual issue in the theoretical sense. Rather, I interpret it as a contested policy space with shared outer goals but differing inner logics, a hybrid zone of partial alignment and strategic distinction. 5.2 Reflections My findings raise some important questions about the precision and applicability of Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2014) framework in multi-party parliamentary systems. According to their typology, consensual issues are characterized by shared problem definitions and solutions with intra-issue competition occurring primarily through emphasis and salience rather than positional divergence. This framework does offer a valuable conceptual tool, but I believe that its empirical application to Swedish climate policy reveals some limitations. First, the results demonstrate that partial consensus on goals is non-sufficient to classify an issue as consensual. In both 2006 and 2022 all parties agreed on the need for climate action and endorsed overarching objectives such as net-zero emissions and fossil-free energy. The variation in timelines, policy instruments, and underlying justification does however point to the persistence of deep-rooted ideological differences. This could suggest that shared outer goals may cover significant inner conflict, especially where parties use similar goals to signal different strategic, moral, or economic commitments. Second, I believe that my findings highlight the importance of issue framing as a dimension of competition that may go beyond what Guinaudeau and Persico (2014) originally emphasized. In 2022, parties diverged not just in how often they talked about climate policy but in how they constructed its meaning, as an economic opportunity, moral responsibility, or technological challenge. These different framing strategies shape both emphasis and policy content which complicates the assumption that emphasis variation necessarily signals intra- issue competition within a consensual space. Third, the Swedish case underlines that consensual issue dynamics could be more fragile or conditional in multi-party systems than in two-party systems. Coalition politics, strategic vagueness, and party branding could all lead to situations where agreement on goals coexist with meaningful and functional differentiation in policy design and rhetoric. One such challenge appeared in the 2006 cycle where the Moderate Party did not publish an individual manifesto and instead participated in a shared Alliance manifesto. While the Moderates were considered the leading force within the Alliance, this arrangement complicates whether the 34 manifesto reflected their views or those of a negotiation. This is however not a failure of the research design but rather a limitation of the available data that highlights the need to interpret findings within their context. Fourth, the results raise broader implications for the theoretical framework and case selection strategy. I selected Sweden as a most-likely case based on its long-standing consensus on climate goals, the institutionalization of climate policy, and the relative absence of sharp ideological divides on climate policy. The fact that my analysis yielded a negative result suggest that institutional consensus is not enough on its own and could indicate either that Sweden does not perform as a most-likely case in practice, or that the threshold for identifying a consensual issue needs to be more nuanced. Rather than viewing this as a flaw in my framework, I argue that it points to the need for theoretical refinement. Specifically, consensual issues may require more than agreement on issue and solution, they may require rhetorical and ideological alignment as well. In this light, I believe that my findings support a reconceptualization of consensus, not as a static state but as a discursively constructed and dynamic phenomenon. This is clear in the shift between 2006 and 2022, where 2006 resembled early-stage consensus but 2022 revealed a more fractured policy landscape. Climate action was supported in principle, but the parties diverged in how they framed it and how the problem was emphasized. This suggests that even institutionalized consensus can involve political conflict, and that the category of consensual issues should account for discursive and symbolic politics, not just policy proximity. A qualitative interpretive approach was in this context very suitable since it allowed me to see how parties agreeing on the surface strategically diverged beneath it. Future research might build on this by applying the consensual issues framework to other multi-dimensional and complex policy areas to see whether the patterns observed here hold in other contexts. Finally, an important observation beyond limitations is the vagueness in how climate policy goals are articulated, since the actual problem definitions are often abstract and implied rather than specified. Goals like breaking oil dependency or taking global responsibility are rhetorically and symbolically powerful but they do not clarify the nature or scope of what that entails in concrete policy terms. I interpret this shared goal language as strategic vagueness to conceal important variation in how the problem is prioritized. 35 5.3 Conclusion In this study I set out to examine whether Swedish climate policy functions as a consensual issue, as defined by Guinaudeau and Persico (2014), by analysing party competition through a two-level qualitative framework. Drawing on party manifestos from the 2006 and 2022 election cycles I assessed intra- and inter-party variation in climate goals, rhetorical framing, and policy means among four Swedish parties. My findings suggest that while climate policy has become increasingly salient and institutionally rooted, it does not meet the criteria for a fully consensual issue. In 2006 broad agreement on goals and relatively low ideological divergence suggested an emerging consensus with parties competing primarily through variation in emphasis. By 2022 however party positions had become more differentiated. Although all parties continued to endorse climate action they diverged in their proposed instruments and temporal ambitions. The climate issue had evolved into a space of strategic contestation shaped by ideological logics. The study contributes to existing literature by demonstrating how issue competition under consensus conditions may still involve meaningful political differentiation, particularly in multi-party systems with coalition dynamics. It also illustrates how qualitative analysis can capture the discursive complexity of party positioning beyond what is typically accessible through proximity-oriented models. While my analysis is limited by the focus on manifesto data and selection of parties and election cycles, it offers a useful empirical test of the consensual issues framework and suggests several avenues for future research. For instance, further refinement of the consensual typology, more attention to issue framing, and expanded cross-national comparisons of climate policy competition. Ultimately, the case of Swedish climate policy shows that even in policy areas where high- level consensus appears to exist, party competition can remain both active and meaningful, unfolding not through open conflict but through interpretation, emphasis, and strategic differentiation within shared goals. 36 References: Alliansen (2006). Valmanifest 2006. 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