DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MANDATE ADJUSTMENT AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS An Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Operations in Eastern DRC Bizimungu M. Ombeni Master’s Thesis: 30 credits Programme: Master’s Programme in International Administration and Global Governance Date: September 17, 2025 Supervisor: Leonie Reicheneder and Fabio Angiolillo Words: 21563 2 Acknowledgements I start by thanking God for getting me this far. My heartfelt gratitude goes to my supervisors, Leonie Reicheneder and Fabio Angiolillo, for their patience, professional guidance and motivation. Many thanks go to the love of my life, Nsimire, for her encouragement and support. 3 Abstract Civilians are frequently victims of targeted violence during civil wars. As a response, the UNSC at times adapts the mandate of a UNPKO to explicitly include the protection of civilians. Despite this, it remains uncertain whether these targeted mandate adjustments result in better protection of civilians. To fill this gap, this thesis examines the influence of mandate adjustment to include the protection of civilians from physical violence on the protection of civilians in an ongoing civil war. The thesis argues that mandate adjustment influences the protection of civilians via organisational change. The inclusion of the protection of civilians as a task to be implemented triggers changes in the structure of the mission, which in turn necessitates internal and external coordination, hence improving the operational approaches of UN peacekeepers to demands for the protection of civilians from physical violence. To test this argument, I qualitatively analysed the case of UNPKO in the eastern DRC from 2000 to 2014 using theory-testing process tracing. While the findings suggest that mandate adjustment is likely to lead to a proactive operational approach by UN troops to the demand for the protection of civilians, the presence of a large, well-trained and well–equipped UN troop contingent does not necessarily deter belligerents from either continuing hostilities or targeting civilians. These findings, in addition to contributing to the existing literature on peacekeeping, challenge previous findings on the deterrence effect of the presence of a large, well-trained and well–equipped UN troop contingent on belligerents´ decisions to continue with hostilities and or target civilians. Keywords: Mandate adjustment, protection of civilians, peacekeeping, organisational change, physical violence, civil war, process tracing 4 Table of Contents List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 5 List of Tables and Figures.......................................................................................................... 7 Mandate Adjustment and the Protection of Civilians: An Analysis of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Eastern DRC ........................................................................... 8 Literature Review..................................................................................................................... 11 The Concepts of UNPKOs, Mandates and Protection of Civilians...................................... 11 Violence Against Civilians................................................................................................... 12 The Effectiveness of UNPKO to Protect Civilians from Physical Violence ....................... 14 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................ 17 From Mandate Adjustment to the Protection of Civilians ................................................... 19 Structural Adaptation ........................................................................................................... 20 Coordination and Operational Approaches .......................................................................... 21 Alternative Explanation: The Deterrent Effect of a Large, Diversely Constituted, Well– Trained and Well–Equipped UN Military Contingent. ........................................................ 26 Research Design....................................................................................................................... 28 Case Selection ...................................................................................................................... 29 Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 30 Locating the Empirical Fingerprints .................................................................................... 32 Data Sources ......................................................................................................................... 34 Results and Analysis ................................................................................................................ 35 Background to the Case of UNPKO in the DRC ................................................................. 35 UNPKO in the DRC: Enters MONUC ................................................................................. 42 Mandate Adjustment: Protection of Civilians included but not Prioritised...................... 42 Mandate Adjustment: Protection of Civilians Prioritised ................................................. 48 Evidence for the Main Hypothesis (H1) ........................................................................... 52 Evidence for the Alternative Hypothesis (H2) ................................................................. 54 Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 56 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 59 References ................................................................................................................................ 61 Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 78 5 List of Abbreviations ADFL Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo CAR Central African Republic CNDP The National Congress for the Defence of the People DPKO Department of Peace Operations FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo FDRL Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda FIB Force Intervention Brigade HRL Human Rights Law IEMF Interim Emergency Multinational Force IHL International Humanitarian Law JMC Joint Military Commission JPT Joint Protection Teams JPWG Joint Protection Working Group LCA Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement LRA Lord´s Resistance Army MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali MLC Movement for the Liberation of the Congo MONUC United Nations Organisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 6 MONUSCO United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo M23 March 23 Movement OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi PCC Police Contributing Countries RCD Congolese Rally for Democracy RDF Rwandan Defence Force RREWC Rapid Response and Early Warning Cell SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General TCC Troops Contributing Countries UN United Nations UNAMID United Nations Mission in Darfur UNAMSIL United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in the Central Africa UNOCI United Nations Operations in the Ivory Coast UNS United Nations Secretariat UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSG United Nations Secretary General UDF Ugandan Defence Force 7 List of Tables and Figures Table 1: Evidence Needed to Test the Hypotheses………………………………………………… 33 Table 2: Timeline of Events and Their Connection to The Protection of Civilians…………………36 Table 3: Indicators of the Variables................................................................................................... 40 Table 4: List of Troops and Police Contributing Countries to MONUC and MONUSCO……...... 78 Figure 1: Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………………….. 19 Figure 2: Progression From Mandate Adjustment to the Protection of Civilians…………………. 25 8 Mandate Adjustment and the Protection of Civilians: An Analysis of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Eastern DRC There has been a proliferation of intrastate armed conflicts since the end of World War II (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020). A key feature of this phenomenon has been the deliberate massacres of almost one million civilians (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020). One of the countries that has been the unfortunate theatre of this phenomenon is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In August 1998, angered by President Joseph Desire Kabila´s demand for the withdrawal of foreign armies from the territories of the DRC, Rwandan and Ugandan forces backed the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) respectively to attack the eastern part of the DRC (Amnesty International [AI], 2000a, 2000b; Human Rights Watch [HRW], 1999, 2002; International Crisis Group[ICG], 1999). Within no time, this conflict drew in forces from Angola, Namibia, Zambia, Libya, Chad, Sudan and other local militias (AI, 2000a, 2000b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). The climax of mediation efforts that were ongoing as the conflict evolved was the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (LCA) on July 9, 1999 (AI, 2000a, 2000b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), responding to the request by the LCA to deploy a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) in the eastern part of the DRC with the mandate to supervise its implementation and monitor its potential violation, deployed the United Nations Organisation Mission (MONUC) in November 1999 (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 1999b). When the conflict dynamics changed on the ground, this posed a threat to the physical integrity of civilians. As an attempt to address this, the UNSC modified MONUC´s mandate to include the protection of civilians from physical violence as one of the tasks to be implemented (UNSC, 2000a), but neither made it the mission´s priority nor advised the mission on how it should sequence the different tasks it was mandated to implement. When physical violence against civilians increased, the UNSC decided in December 2008 to make protection of civilians the mission´s top priority (UNSC, 2008b). 9 The success of UNPKOs in protecting civilians from physical violence during civil wars varies and is contingent on factors such as the size of UN troops (Hultman et al., 2013), composition of the troops (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Haas & Ansorg, 2018), the use of military force by UN troops (Kjeksrud, 2023b), divergence in mandate interpretation (Bode & Kalrsrud, 2019; Rietjens & Ruffa, 2023) and troop contributing countries' (TCC) conflict of interests (Giray, 2023). However, whether adjusting the mandate of an already deployed mission to include the protection of civilians leads to positive outcomes for civilians remains uncertain. This omission is particularly surprising given that the UNSC sometimes adapts the mandate of an already deployed UNPKO to respond to the demand for protection of civilians in an ongoing civil war (Ribeiro & Pires, 2023). Considering this background, this thesis seeks to fill the gap by examining the influence of mandate adjustment on the protection of civilians. Specifically, the thesis addresses the following research question: How does the adjustment of the mandate of an already deployed UNPKO to include protection of civilians as a task to be implemented and its subsequent prioritisation influence the protection of civilians from physical violence in an ongoing civil war? Answering this question has theoretical and policy relevance. Theoretically, it deepens our understanding of the influence of mandates on the effectiveness of UNPKO to protect civilians from physical violence. Policy-wise, answering this question can provide useful insights that could enable policymakers involved in UNPKOs to design protection of civilian mandates that address the demand for civilian protection. The main argument of this thesis is that mandate adjustment influences the protection of civilians via the organisational change within a UNPKO. Accordingly, when the UNSC adjusts the mandate of a UNPKO to include the protection of civilians from physical violence, this structurally reorients the mission to be able to respond to this new task. This structural adaptation necessitates coordination, which in turn results in the mission adapting its operational approaches to protect civilians from physical violence. I also present an alternative explanation based on rational deterrence theory. According to this explanation, the presence of a large, heterogeneous, well–trained and well – equipped UN military contingent can protect civilians by deterring belligerents from continuing with the conflict and or deliberately targeting civilians by altering their potential cost–benefit analysis 10 (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Carnergie & Mikulaschek, 2020; Fjelde et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2013; Phayal & Prins, 2018). However, as I will demonstrate below, these two arguments are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Zaks, 2017) as they both rely on each other. To examine these two arguments, I analyse the case of the UNPKOs in eastern DRC from 2000 to 2014 and qualitatively evaluate the evidence for and against them using a theory-testing process tracing approach (Collier, 2011). I find that although mandate adjustment influences the protection of civilians through organisational change by shaping how UN troops respond to calls for protection, the presence of a large UN military contingent does not automatically guarantee civilian protection via deterrence. These findings, apart from highlighting the impact of mandate adjustment on the effectiveness of UNPKOs in protecting civilians, also add nuance to previous conclusions on the link between the presence of UN troops and civilian protection. This thesis makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the peacekeeping literature. Theoretically, I contribute to a deepened understanding of why we see variation in civilian protection, as previous studies provide an incomplete explanation. Second, I develop a new framework based on organisational change that could be used to explain variation in civilian protection. By studying the organisational change that results from mandate adjustments, I take the dynamic nature of mandates into account. This differs from most previous research (see Di Salvatore et al., 2022 for an exception) that treats the mandate to protect civilians as a fixed variable. Empirically, I show the utility of this framework by applying it to the case of UNPKOs in the DRC, hence deepening our understanding of UNPKOs in the DRC. Moreover, I show that the presence of the UN troop argument used in previous research does not apply to every case. The remaining part of the thesis is structured as follows: The literature review section presents the state of the art to situate the thesis within the existing body of knowledge on violence against civilians and UN peacekeeping. This is followed by the theoretical framework that will guide the analysis. After is the research design and the case of UNPKO in the DRC. The results and analysis section presents and tests the evidence for and against the hypotheses. The discussion section presents 11 the findings and reflects on the study´s limitations. Finally, the thesis concludes by revisiting the research question, summarising the findings and offering suggestions for further research. Literature Review This section presents a review of previous research on UNPKO, violence against civilians and the determinants of the effectiveness of UNPKO to protect civilians, to identify the state of the art and situate this thesis within the extant research on violence against civilians and the effectiveness of UNPKOs to protect civilians from physical violence. The Concepts of UNPKOs, Mandates and Protection of Civilians UNKOs are an umbrella term used to refer to missions deployed in zones affected by armed conflicts to promote international peace and security. The decision to deploy UNPKOs is made by the UNSC, the UN body vested with the authority and responsibility to maintain international peace and security, through the adoption of a resolution on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the dynamics of the conflict among other pertinent factors (United Nations [UN], 2008). Before any resolution is adopted, discussions are held between Member States of the UNSC, the United Nations Secretariat (UNS), potential contributing countries, the disputants, regional and international actors, culminating in a UNSC resolution authorising the deployment of a UNPKO to implement mandates with the consent of at least the main belligerent (UN, 2008). Once on the ground, UNPKOs are expected to implement mandates. These mandates, a product of intense and complex negotiations between the above-mentioned stakeholders (Di Salvatore et al., 2022, p.925), are generally a framework for UNPKOs on the ground (Di Salvatore et al., 2022). Mandates play several functions: First, they inform the tasks to be implemented by UN peacekeepers and how they are to be implemented (Di Salvatore et al., 2022, p.925; UN, 2008, p.16). Second, they serve as a source of legitimacy for the activities of UN peacekeepers (Di Salvatore et al., 2022, p.927). Finally, they determine the resources to be availed to a UNPKO, the type of support and guarantees to be given to belligerents and civilians, and how UNPKOs are to relate with other humanitarian agencies on the ground (Di Salvatore et al., 2022, p.928). While the mandates are 12 determined before UNPKOs are deployed, they can be adjusted by the UNSC if needed, even after the deployment of a UNPKO (UN, 2008). While a UNPKO can be mandated to implement various tasks, this thesis focuses on the protection of civilians from physical violence. A civilian is here understood to refer to any individual who is unarmed and does not do any work related to the military activity (Balcells 2017, p.20 cited in Balcells & Stanton, 2020, p.47). While there are broad and narrow conceptualisations of violence against civilians (see Balcells & Stanton, 2020), I conceptualise it narrowly to refer to the deliberate use of lethal force against civilians. While protection of civilians is a contested concept that has evolved over the years (Guéhenno, 2016; Mamiya, 2016; Sheeran & Kent, 2016), this thesis understands the protection of civilians as “..the act of protecting civilians from violence and minimising harm toward those not directly participating in hostilities, in conflict situations” (Willmot et al., 2016, p.431). This definition, in addition to identifying civilians as non-combatants, also acknowledges the near impossibility of civilians facing zero harm. It is with this in mind that the effectiveness of UNPKOs is understood in this thesis. Violence Against Civilians While violence against civilians can and does occur in different conflict contexts (Balcells & Stanton, 2020), the focus in this thesis is on violence that occurs in intrastate armed conflict. Intrastate armed conflicts (internal armed conflict) are “a contested incompatibility involving the use of armed force between two parties – at least one government and one opposition group – resulting in at least 25 battle–related deaths in one year (Gleditsch et al., 2002, cited in Balcells & Stanton, 2020, p.46). Research on violence against civilians has analysed several covariates of violence against civilians. Focusing on why rebel groups and government forces target civilians, some scholars argue that rebel groups and government forces indiscriminately target civilians to coerce them into cooperating, extract resources, punish them for cooperating with the side considered the enemy, and to improve their bargaining position (Downes, 2011; Wood, 2016). 13 Another strand has analysed the influence of external support on rebel forces´ targeting of civilians. For example, Hovil and Werker (2005) find that civilian targeting is used by rebel forces to indicate to their foreign supporter how committed they are to the fighting. In a similar vein, Salehyan et al. (2014) find an association between external support to rebel groups and increased targeting of civilians. This correlation, however, is contingent upon the democratic status of the supporter. Supporters who are democratic are less likely to throw their weight behind a rebel group violating international humanitarian law (Salehyan et al., 2014). Moving to the role of international actors, research has analysed the impact of diplomatic support and condemnation on the targeting of civilians. For example, a case study analysis of violence and restraint by belligerents toward civilians by Stanton (2016) finds that belligerents who are weak domestically and who see potential benefits from international diplomatic support are less likely to target civilians. Research assessing the role of military capabilities presents contradictory arguments. While some scholars argue that relatively weak belligerents target civilians to gain their cooperation (Wood, 2016), others contend that only belligerents with greater military capability can carry out crimes such as ethnic cleansing (Stanton, 2016). On the relationship between belligerents and local populations, evidence suggests that while belligerents are more likely to target civilians from their opponent´s ethnicity (Fjelde & Hultman, 2014), government forces are less likely to target civilians from ethnic communities to which rebel groups belong when they rely on political support from a large domestic constituency (Stanton, 2016). These studies, while only a small sample of the literature on violence against civilians, enhance our understanding of the covariates of violence against civilians, implying that any international attempts to protect civilians from physical violence would have to address these covariates. Next, I review research on the effectiveness of UNPKOs to protect civilians to map out the current knowledge on the relationship between UNPKOs and the protection of civilians from physical violence. 14 The Effectiveness of UNPKO to Protect Civilians from Physical Violence Recognising that there is “no single, universally accepted way” (Howard, 2019, p.9) to measure the effectiveness of UNPKOs, research on the efficacy of UNPKOs to protect civilians from physical violence has analysed various covariates of civilian protection. Research analysing mission characteristics such as the capacity and type of peacekeepers finds that troop size is inversely and statistically significantly associated with the number of civilians killed during civil wars (Carnergie & Mikulaschek, 2020; Hultman et al., 2013, 2019) and after the civil war (Kathman & Wood, 2016). Similarly, researchers also find that the subnational deployment (Fjelde et al., 2019; Kathman & Wood, 2016; Phayal & Prins, 2019) of diversely constituted, highly trained, well-equipped and diplomatically supported UN troops can lead to the protection of civilians from physical violence (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Haass & Ansorg, 2018). To explain how these mission characteristics contribute to civilian protection, some scholars argue that the presence of a large, diversely constituted, well – trained and well – equipped UN military contingent deters belligerents from continuing with hostilities and or targeting civilians by making it militarily and politically costly for them to do so (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Carnergie & Mikulaschek, 2020; Fjelde et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2013; Phayal & Prins, 2018). However, this deterrence is only effective against rebel forces (Fjelde et al., 2019). This finding is contradicted by Kjeksrud (2023a), who suggests that the deterrence effect of the presence of UN peacekeepers on rebel forces is not universal. These studies, while increasing our understanding of the influence of mission characteristics on the efficacy of UNPKOs to protect civilians, assume that UNPKOs implement their mandate and that belligerents´ decisions on the battlefield are guided by cost–benefit considerations. As it became apparent that not all UNPKOs implement their mandates, a new strand emerged in the literature on peacekeeping. The focus of scholars in this strand has been to examine the conditions under which UNPKOs implement their mandates (Blair et al., 2022), how divergence in mandate interpretation between the UNS and the Force Commanders (Bode & Karlsrud, 2019) and between 15 different military contingents within UNPKOs (Rietjens & Ruffa, 2023) impacts the effectiveness of UNPKOs to protect civilians from physical violence. Moreover, scholars have also analysed the impact of TCCs on mandate implementation. For example, Giray (2023) finds that when TCC are committed to UN peacekeeping, UN troops can shorten the duration of conflict and protect civilians from victimisation. The author argues that variation of interests between TCCs negatively impacts the implementation of mandates by reducing TCCs´ “ideational commitment to UN peacekeeping” (Giray, 2023, p.372). Following an increasing deployment of UNPKOs with permission to use force, another strand in peacekeeping literature using analytical lenses from military, legal and organisational studies has emerged. In this strand, the analysis has focused on the legal implications of the use of force to protect civilians (Whittle, 2015), the conditions under which force may succeed in protecting civilians (Bellamy & Hunt, 2021; Blyth & Cammaert, 2016; Kjeksrud, 2023a), factors which influence UN peacekeepers´ use of military force ( Podder & Roy, 2024) and the short and long term effects of the use of force on civilian protection (Karlsrud, 2015). The consensus in this strand is that despite some legal ambiguity that still overshadows the use of force to protect civilians, when troops are given better training and equipment, and match the belligerents´ level of violence against civilians, the use of force is likely to result in civilian protection (Bellamy & Hunt, 2021; Blyth & Cammaert, 2016; Kjeksrud, 2023a). Nevertheless, the use of force has been connected to unintended consequences such as shifting conflicts to other locations and increased targeting of civilians and UN peacekeepers and other humanitarian workers in the field (Bellamy & Hunt, 2021; Hunt, 2017; Tull, 2018). While these studies complement previous research on other characteristics of UNPKOs and increase our general understanding of the use of force by UNPKOs, we do not know whether mandate adjustments to include the protection of civilians using military force result in better outcomes for civilians. More recently, peacekeeping literature has begun to pay attention to the relevance of mandates as a determinant of the efficacy of UNPKOs to protect civilians. While some scholars have examined the political process within the UNSC that leads to the increasing supply of missions with robust mandates to protect civilians (Howard & Dayal, 2019), others have investigated factors informing the 16 adjustments of mandates for already deployed missions (Ribeiro & Pires, 2023). In similar vein, some scholars have turned to the analysis of mandate modality – whether protection of civilian is requested or suggested (Di Salvatore et al., 2022) - and divergence in the interpretation of mandates to protect civilians between the UNS and the field commanders on one side (Bode & Karlsrud, 2019) and between different troops contingents on the other side (Ruffa & Rietjens, 2023). While these studies have enhanced our understanding of mandates as an important element in the efficacy of UNPKOs to protect civilians, mandate adjustment has not, to the best of my knowledge, been extensively studied (apart from the one example cited here). This is despite mandate adjustment being a common feature of recent UNPKOs. Moving away from mission specific features Di – Salvatore (2020) analyses the influence of local sources of violence on the effectiveness of UNPKOs to protect civilians from physical violence using the case of Siera Leone between 1997 – 2001 and finds that the ability of UN troops to protect civilians against one- sided violence is dependent on the relative balance of power between the belligerents (Di- Salvatore, 2020, p.1089). She also cautions that merely increasing the size of UN peacekeepers does not automatically reduce violence (Di-Salvatore, 2020, p.1090). While this study enhances our understanding of how the domestic environment impacts UN peacekeepers´ capacity to protect civilians from physical violence, it does not tell us if these local dynamics would impact a mission whose mandate has been adjusted to either include protection of civilians as a mandated task or the prioritisation of protection of civilians given that mandate adjustments are sometimes aimed at responding to the domestic environment. Specific to the case of UNPKOs in the DRC, research has focused on the challenges of using military force to protect civilians in ongoing armed civil war (Berdal,2018), the potential implications of using such a force for future UNPKOs (Kearney, 2016), the extent to which this approach contributed to civilian protection (Russo, 2021) and the effects of the subnational UNPKOs´ presence on the subnational level of violence (Peitz & Riesch, 2019). The overall conclusion is that the local presence of UN peacekeepers and their use of military force resulted in mixed results. While at times the presence of UN peacekeepers and their use of military force did repel rebel forces and hence 17 potentially saved lives by reducing local level of violence (Berdal, 2018; Peitz & Riesch, 2019; Russo, 2021), their presence and use of military force signalled to rebel forces and other armed militias that UN peacekeepers were no longer impartial and consequently started targeting peacekeepers and civilians more (Tull, 2018). Moreover, where rebel forces and other militias were forced to retreat, this only relocated the violence to other areas, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian targeting in those areas (Berdal, 2018; Peitz & Riesch, 2019; Russo, 2021; Tull, 2018). While these studies illuminate our understanding of UN peacekeeping as a tool of third-party international intervention in ongoing civil war, we do not know the impact of mandate adjustment on the variation of civilian protection. This is particularly surprising given that UNPKOs in the DRC faced mandate adjustments on several occasions, ostensibly seeking to improve the protection of civilians. In doing so, this thesis will make several theoretical and empirical contributions to the peacekeeping literature. Theoretically, I contribute to a deepened understanding of why we see variation in civilian protection. Second, I develop a new framework based on organisational change that could be used to explain variation in civilian protection. By studying the organisational change that results from mandate adjustments, I take the dynamic nature of mandates into account. This is different from most previous research (see Di Salvatore et al., 2022, for an exception) that treated the mandate to protect civilians as a fixed variable. Empirically, I show the utility of this framework by applying it to the case of UNPKOs in the DRC, hence deepening our understanding of UNPKOs in the DRC. Moreover, I show that previous theorisation that a large, diversely constituted, well–trained and well–equipped UN military contingent will deter belligerents from continuing with hostilities and or target civilians does not apply to every case. In the next section, I develop my argument and analytical framework, together with a competing but not mutually exclusive argument based on the logic of the deterrent effect of the presence of UN troops. Theoretical Framework In this section, I will explain why the adjustment of the mandate of an already deployed UNPKO to either include the protection of civilians from physical violence as one of the tasks to be implemented or to prioritise the protection of civilians is a significant covariate of the protection of 18 civilians outcome in ongoing civil wars. To do so, I draw on contingency theory, which is based on the notion that the link between two variables, in this case mandate adjustment and the protection of civilians, can be explained by an intervening variable, in this case organisational change (Donaldson, 2001). To conceptualise organisational change, I draw on organisation theory, which “is the study of the structure, functioning and performance of organisations and the behaviour of groups and individuals within them” (Pough, 2007, xiii). The core argument of this thesis is that when the UNSC adjusts the mandate of an already deployed UNPKO without a mandate to protect civilians from physical violence in ongoing civil war to include the protection of civilians from physical violence, this triggers organisational change within the UNPKO, consequently resulting in the protection of civilians from physical violence. Whereas organisational change has different conceptualisations, this thesis understands it to refer to “the rational coordination of activities of several people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose or goal, through the division of labour and function, and through a hierarchy of authority and responsibility” (Schein, 1980, p.15). The impact on the protection of civilians, however, will depend, ceteris paribus, on whether the mandate adjustment prioritises civilian protection or not. This is because, as elaborated below, these two mandate adjustments nuance organisational change that takes place within a UNPKO, hence impacting the protection of civilians relatively differently. The aim here is not to invalidate previous theorisations of how UNPKOs protect civilians but to complement them. I further argue that those accounts, while useful, do not fully explain variation in the protection of civilian outcomes in all cases of UNPKOs because they ignore mandate dynamics within which they are expected to operate. Therefore, unpacking the organisational changes that follow mandate adjustment as relates to the protection of civilians from physical violence might strengthen those accounts. 19 Figure 1 Theoretical Framework The UNSC can adjust mandates in response to the demand for the protection of civilians on the ground (Ribeiro & Pires, 2024, pp. 186 – 187; UN, 2008), the political interest of the permanent members of the Council (Howard & Dayal, 2018), or the achievement of key milestones by the mission among others (UN, 2008). When such an adjustment occurs, I argue, it results in organisational change within the UNPKO, consequently impacting the protection of civilians from physical violence. From Mandate Adjustment to the Protection of Civilians Whereas the mandate of an already deployed mission can be adjusted to impact different aspects of the mission, the focus of this thesis is on mandate adjustment that incorporates the protection of civilians from physical violence in the set of objectives – list of tasks - to be implemented by the mission and that which makes the protection of civilians the mission´s top priority. It is worth pointing out that the move from including the protection of civilians to making it the mission´s top priority may be progressive (Holt et al, 2009). This means strengthening the mandate of the protection of civilians may pass through other stages where the language progressively indicates its prioritisation (Holt et al., 2009). The focus on these two processes is motivated by the intuition that they nuance the explanatory ability of organisational change on the effectiveness of UN troops to protect civilians. Moreover, while organisational change can encompass different dimensions, this thesis focuses mainly on structural adaptations, coordination, and operational approaches because, as will be shown below, these are the dimensions of organisational change that most likely link mandate adjustment to the protection of civilian outcomes. 20 Structural Adaptation In this thesis, structural adaptation refers to the creation of new command and control structures, mission components, coordination mechanisms and objectives of a UNPKO with a view to improving the effectiveness of the mission. The adjustment of the mandate of an already deployed UNPKO to include protection of civilian from physical violence structurally reorient the mission by introducing complexity - several interrelated and interdependent components within a UNPKO (Williams, 1999), uncertainty – variance between the intelligence at the disposal of the UNPKO and that required to implement the mandated tasks (Daft & Lengel, 1986) - and a new hierarchy of command and control. A mission´s components are the different units of a UNPKO. They include the military, civilian, and police (UN, 2008). These components, while each has its function and its head of unit, fall under a common direct authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who operates as the Head of the Mission (HOM) (UN, 2008, p.70). As for the military component, contingent commanders and personnel operate under the command of the Force Commander and thus their military response should not be influenced by their countries (UN, 2008, p.67). These different components have national and professional “significant cultural differences, within and between them” (UN, 2008, p.70) that need to be addressed if they are to contribute to the achievement of the mission´s mandate. To facilitate their working together, certain structural adaptations have been made. First, there is a Joint Operation Centre (JOC) whose roles are coordination and improving the mission´s situational awareness by providing intelligence on the current situation (UN, 2008, p.70). Second, there is a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), which supports the mission´s assessment of the medium and long–term risks to its mandate (UN, 2008, p.70). Third, there is an Integrated Support Service (ISS) whose function is to bring together all the mission´s logistical resources (UN, 2008, p.70). Finally, there is the Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC), which coordinates the delivery of logistical support in line with the wishes of the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) (UN, 2008, p.70). Following the logic of neorealists and neoliberals who assume that structures inform the behaviour of actors (Howard, 2008, p.14), I argue that these structural adaptations trigger the need for coordination 21 within a UNPKO which in turn influences the operational approaches - the different activities undertaken by UN peacekeepers to meet the demand for the protection of civilians from physical violence - thus enhancing the contribution of the different components towards the achievement of overall mission coherence and hence the protection of civilians from physical violence (Metcalfe et al., 2012). Coordination and Operational Approaches Whilst coordination is a multifaceted concept, this thesis understands it as the interconnection of different but highly dependent components within UNPKOs to achieve a common objective (Hage et al., 1971; Van de Ven et al., 1976). This coordination is even more pertinent in ongoing civil wars or environments where threats to civilians´ physical integrity are high (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019). Adapting Debarre and Di Razza´s (2019) categorisation of coordination, this thesis categorises coordination broadly into internal and external coordination. Internal coordination is within mission coordination. Here, we have coordination between the civilian and the military components, the military and the police components, civilian, military and the police and coordination between the different military contingents (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019; Raffa & Rietjens, 2022). Coordination between the civilian and the military components enables these components to leverage each other´s comparative advantages by sharing intelligence analysis and carrying out joint planning of protection activities (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019). For example, the civilian component can share its analysis of the dynamics in the political, social and security domains with the military component. This, in turn, enhances this component´s comprehension of the “protection needs and hotspots and contribute to the design of appropriate protection plans and responses” (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019), p.3). Moreover, jointly planning their activities has the potential to maximise the solution set to the risks of violence against civilians (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019). For instance, evidence from several studies underlines the significance of the civil–military coordination in a mission´s ability to protect civilians from physical violence: First, there is the 2018 study by Namie Di Razza. According to the study, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), in a bid to boost the ability of the military and civilian components to identify priority areas and thus combine civilian and 22 military responses, established a Joint Effects Working Group in 2018 (Di Razza, 2018). Second, a study of the UN Operations in the Ivory Coast (UNOCI) shows that coordination between the civilian and the military components of UNOCI through the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) enabled joint planning and coordinated approaches to the protection of civilians (Björn & MacDermott, 2010 cited in Debarre & Di Rizza, 2019). In contrast, the absence of civilian staff in the United Nations´ Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in the areas where civilians were threatened is argued to have limited the military´s interaction with the local population and hence undermined its ability to comprehend the local context and protection needs of the people that could have informed their tactical plans (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019). Still on internal coordination, troop heterogeneity within the military components of a UNPKO (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016) demands coordination if there is to be a common understanding of the concept of operations, rules of engagement and a common interpretation of the protection of civilian mandate (Rietjens & Ruffa, 2019; Ruffa & Rietjens, 2023; Sims, 2024). Concept of operations is a document that defines the military strategy to be used by UN troops (UN, 2008). Rules of engagement are rules that define when and how military force is to be used by UN troops (UN, 2008). This coordination, I argue, is likely to lead to operational coherence as the different contingents apply a common military strategy and consistently respond to threats to civilians in their areas of deployment. Different studies have found that a lack of coordination within the military component of a UNPKO can potentially lead to incoherence and significantly hinder the efficacy of the military to respond to threats to civilians. For example, in their studies of the MINUSMA, Rietjens and Ruffa (2019) and Sims (2024) note that incoherence within the military component undermined the efficacy of the mission to protect civilians. Another important internal coordination is that between the military and the police components. At times, the police and the military need to carry out joint operations (UN, 2020). This coordination enables them to have a clear chain of command and thus avoids misunderstanding, leading to operational effectiveness (UN, 2020). Collectively, this internal coordination, I argue, is more likely to be effective when the mandate adjustment prioritises civilian protection than when it does not. This is because, when the 23 mandate adjustment does not prioritise civilian protection, this implies that saving the civilian population´s lives is just one of the many tasks the mission should work towards achieving and not its main aim (Blair et al., 2022; Holt & Berkman, 2006). Given that the UNSC rarely stipulates the sequence in which mandated tasks should be implemented (Blair et al., 2022), this additional task results in fragmented mandates – mandates with many tasks that are not closely related to each other (Blair et al., 2022) - consequently increasing and perpetuating coordination problem among the different components especially between the civilian and military units (Blair et al., 2022) that arose partly because of cultural contestation – opposing values and principles between the civilian and the military about what should be prioritised (Blair et al., 2022, p.6; Di Coning & Friis, 2011, p.252; Ruffa & Rietjens, 2019). This makes it difficult for these components to agree on what tasks to prioritise and how resources should be allocated, potentially negatively impacting the overall mandate implementation (Blair et al., 2022). In this context, where the mandate does not prioritise protection of civilians, coordination would be expected to progressively shape how tasks are prioritised (Howard, 2008, p.17). If this results in a unified agreement by the different components of a mission to give priority to civilian protection, then one would expect that UN peacekeepers would actively seek to protect civilians. If, on the other hand, it continues to be difficult to agree on what tasks to prioritise because the mandate has not stipulated the sequence of task implementation, I would expect UN peacekeepers not to actively seek to protect civilians. This may, in turn, signal to the perpetrators that targeting civilians would not necessarily trigger a response from UN troops on the ground, likely leading to more cases of civilian targeting and killings. In contrast, if the mandate adjustment stipulates that the protection of civilians is the priority of the mission, saving the civilian population´s lives becomes the priority of the mission (Holt & Berkman, 2006, p.37). This prioritisation of the protection of civilians from physical violence removes the ambiguity inherent in fragmented mandates (Blair et al., 2022), gives priority to civilian protection when making decisions about resource allocation, and improves coordination between the different components of the mission (Blair et al., 2022; Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Ruffa & Rietjens, 2019) resulting in greater mission coherence - the unity of all actors in terms 24 of what needs to be prioritised and which resources are to be used (De Coning & Friis, 2011; Ruffa & Rietjens, 2019) - which results in collective action as it contributes to increased motivation, trust and accountability within the mission (De Coning & Friis, 2011, p.256; Debarre & Di Razza, 2019). If this is the case, I would expect UN peacekeepers to actively seek to protect civilians and less civilian victimisation and killings. This is because increased coordination leads to enhanced intelligence sharing and analysis between the different components of the mission (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019), thus increasing the likelihood of rapid responses to threats to civilian physical integrity and early warnings to civilians of impeding attacks (Holt et al., 2009). Turning to external coordination, UNPKOs work in an environment that includes the belligerents, humanitarian agencies and the local population (UN, 2008). To effectively implement their mandates, coordination between UNPKOs and these actors is pertinent (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019). UNPKOs coordinate with belligerents to gain political permission to move around in the areas they occupy (UN, 2008). They also coordinate joint military operations with government forces against rebel and other armed militias (Holt et al., 2009). This coordination has at least two potential impacts on the protection of civilians from physical violence. First, when UN peacekeepers coordinate with government forces by for example sharing intelligence, jointly planning attacks on rebel and other armed groups, and disarmament and integration of armed groups that have agreed to lay down arms, this serves as an accountability mechanism that increases the potential costs of government forces deliberately targeting civilians. As a result, government forces would refrain from doing so for fear of jeopardising their partnership. Second, coordination between UN peacekeepers and government forces against rebel and other armed forces, when successful, repels the rebels and or armed militias, thus creating an environment where civilians of such an area are unlikely to be victimised (Holt et al., 2009). For example, the coordination between the Ivorian government forces and UNOCI was credited with the protection of civilians in May 2005 (Björn & MacDermott, 2010, p.54 cited in Debarre & Di Razza, 2019). However, coordination of military activities between UNPKOs and government forces may increase civilian targeting, especially when the rebels or armed militias suffer losses because of these joint 25 military activities (Kilroy et al., 2024). Another external coordination relevant to UNPKOs' ability to protect civilians is coordination between UNPKOs and other humanitarian agencies (Debarre & Di Razza, 2019). This coordination facilitates the exchange of intelligence on potential threats to civilian physical integrity, identification and prioritisation of hot spots to inform deployment and intervention approaches and to provide early warning to civilians (Holt et al., 2009; Hultman et al., 2014; Sims, 2024). According to the Cammaert report on the crisis in Juba of July 2016 and the Amoussou report of 2017 on MINUSCA´s response to the demand for civilian protection in southeastern Central African Republic (CAR), insufficient joint planning and the tendency to work alone were identified as pertinent covariates for the failures to protect civilians ( Debarre & Di Razza, 2019, p.8). Taken together, I would expect coordination with government forces and civilians to likely lead to increased civilian targeting, while coordinating with humanitarian agencies to likely lead to proactive responses to demand for civilian protection. Figure 2 Progression from Mandate Adjustment to the Protection of Civilian outcome From the above reasoning, the following hypothesis will be tested. H1: The adjustment of the mandate to include the protection of civilians from physical violence is likely to lead to more proactive approaches to the protection of civilians and consequently increase the mission´s effectiveness to protect civilians. 26 Alternative Explanation: The Deterrent Effect of a Large, Diversely Constituted, Well– Trained and Well–Equipped UN Military Contingent. According to the logic of deterrence by presence, the presence of a large well well-trained and well–equipped contingent of UN troops in locations where the threat of physical violence against civilians is high leads to the protection of civilians directly by deterring belligerents from targeting civilians and indirectly by deterring belligerents from continuing with hostilities (Fjelde et al., 2019). This explanation draws from rationalistic and game-theoretic thinking (Dayal, 2021). Proponents of this perspective perceive belligerents to be rational individuals whose decision-making process is guided by cost–benefit computations (Dayal, 2021). In other words, belligerents´ decisions of what action to take in a civil war context are informed by a careful consideration of the potential benefits to be derived from a certain action against the potential costs to them of taking such an action, and should the potential costs be higher than the potential benefits, they will not take that action. To protect civilians, therefore, UN troops by their presence seek to raise the potential costs relative to the potential benefits, hence discouraging belligerents from continuing the conflict and or targeting civilians (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Carnergie & Mikulaschek, 2020; Fjelde et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2013; Phayal & Prins, 2018). How does this deterrence through presence work? UN troops´ visibility in locations where civilians face potential threats to their physical integrity is mainly achieved through patrols (Fjelde et al., 2019). Their presence in such places signals their commitment to use military force against belligerents, especially rebel groups and armed militias (Fjelde et al., 2019). These armed groups would then consider engaging with UN troops militarily as costly relative to the potential benefits they might accrue from continuing with hostilities and or targeting civilians and thus choosing not to indulge in such activities (Fjelde et al., 2019). Another way in which such cost–benefit calculations are shifted is by monitoring the behaviours of the belligerents (Fjelde et al., 2019). Through this mechanism, UN troops can appeal to the rebel group´s demand for international, regional and local legitimacy by threatening to name and shame them when they do not commit to the agreed peace agreement or when they target civilians (Carnergie & Mikulaschek, 2020; Fjelde et al., 2019). This 27 presence argument, while plausible, makes several assumptions. First, it makes the implicit assumption that belligerents, especially rebel groups, cannot target UN troops. Second, it assumes that rebel groups are relatively weaker militarily than the UN troops or that they care about how they are perceived by the international community. A look at UN peacekeeping in Sierra Leone nuances this argument. It shows that this is not always the case. Between 1999 – 2005, the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) had a robust mandate which allowed UN peacekeepers to use military force beyond self-defence to protect civilians (Jakobsen, 2021, p.340). However, around May 2000, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel group fighting the government, abducted 500 UN soldiers despite having previously agreed to disarm (Jakobsen, 2021, p.340). The situation was dealt with only after the UK, USA, and France actively got involved (Jakobsen, 2021, p.340). What this case illustrates is that robust mandates and the size of UN troops do not always have a deterrent effect on belligerents, especially rebel forces (Kjeksrud, 2023a). Moreover, the presence theory assumes that there is within - mission coherence. That is, it assumes that all the different military contingents agree on their military strategy and collectively are willing to use military force against rebel forces who either choose to continue fighting or start targeting civilians. As discussed in the literature review section above and will demonstrate with the case of UNPKOs in the DRC, this is not always the case. If there is no coherence in mandate interpretation and implementation among the different military contingents because of a lack of coordination within the mission and between military contingents, UN troops are unlikely to credibly signal their willingness to use military force against rebel groups and hence offer deterrence against continuing hostilities and or targeting of civilians. In fact, the presence of UN troops has been associated with increased civilian targeting (Hultman, 2010) and may even shift the perceived balance of power in favour of the government, prompting rebel forces and other armed groups to increase civilian targeting (Di Salvatore, 2020). As will be shown below, this presence theory while relevant, I argue, does not have an independent explanatory power outside the organisational change that results from mandate adjustment. This is because the capacity, training and equipment of UN troops within a mission is partly conditional on the importance attached to civilian protection which varies depending 28 on whether the mandate conceives civilian protection as just one of the tasks to be implemented or the top priority of the mission operationally and in decision making about resource allocation. Nevertheless, if this theory is correct, I would expect belligerents to be deterred by the presence of a sizeable number of well – trained and well – equipped UN troops in an area where civilians potentially face threats to their physical integrity. That is, I expect civilians not to be targeted or hostilities between belligerents not to continue when a sizeable contingent of UN troops from different countries and who are equipped with military equipment, are present in a certain location. From this alternative explanation, the following hypothesis will be tested: H2: The more highly trained, diversely constituted, and well-equipped UN troops there are, the more likely belligerents are to be deterred from continuing hostilities or targeting civilians. Research Design The objective of this study is to gain an in-depth understanding of mandate adjustment as a covariate of the protection of civilians from physical violence. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the mechanism through which the adjustment of the mandate of an already deployed UNPKO to include protection of civilians from physical violence as a task to be implemented explains the variation in the protection of civilians in ongoing civil war. I identify how mandate adjustment leads to organisational change, and how this change explains variation in civilian protection outcomes. The research strategy – understood as a description of how to answer a research question (Reisman, 1988) - employed in this thesis is deductive as it applies a theoretical framework to an empirical case (Reisman, 1988). This strategy was inspired by the research question (Yin, 1994). That is, how does the adjustment of the mandate of an already deployed UNPKO to include protection of civilians as a task to be implemented and its subsequent prioritisation influence protection of civilians from physical violence in an ongoing civil war? To test the two broad arguments in the theoretical framework, this thesis uses a case study research design. While according to Yin (1994), one could choose between a survey, case study or archival analysis to answer such a research question I chose a case study, “an extensive study of a 29 single or a small number of cases that promises to shed light on a larger population of cases” (Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016, p.394), because of the following reasons: First, a research based on a survey in contrast to a case study is both expensive and time consuming (Hakim, 2012), resources that I did not have. Second, given that my causal explanation, instead of relying on correlation, relies on identifying causal mechanisms, a case study is the design most likely to capture the causal mechanisms through which mandate adjustment influences protection of civilians from physical violence in ongoing civil war (Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016). In this thesis, a causal mechanism “refers to a series of events connecting two variables to each other” (Little, 1991, p.15). Case Selection According to Gerring and Cojocaru (2016), case selection – the method for choosing a case to be analysed – is a process that should be guided by the purpose for which the case is to be used. While different criteria have been advanced for selecting a case (Seawright & Gerring, 2008; Yin, 1994), my selection of the UNPKOs in the DRC from 2000 – 2014 was strategic (Di Vaus, 2001, pp.238 - 239). This means that I selected the case because it provides “valid and challenging tests” (Di Vaus, 2001, p. 240) of my theory for the period under analysis. This is because during this period, the mandate of UNPKOs in the DRC underwent through several adjustments with a view to address the worrying state of civilian victimisation. To determine whether this was the only case that could test my theory, the following criteria were applied against other potential candidate cases. First, has the case experienced variation in the independent variable during the period of study? That is, did the UNPKO start without a mandate to protect civilians and then had its mandate adjusted to include civilian protection as a mandated task? The case of UNPKOs in the DRC passes this criterion. It was deployed in November 1999 without a mandate to protect civilians and protection of civilians was later included in February 2000. Second, did the protection of civilians evolve to become the mission´s priority during the period of study? The case of UNPKOs in the DRC passes this criterion as its mandate was progressively adjusted until December 2008 when protection of civilians was made the mission´s priority. While I could have used variation in the outcome of interest as one of the selection criteria to address selection bias, I did not use it as unlike quantitative oriented studies which are 30 guided by the intuition of regression, my focus is on the mechanisms linking the mandate adjustment to protection of civilian outcome. Of the missions that were active from 2000 - 2014, only UNPKOs in the DRC met all the above criteria. The study of this time is motivated by the following reasons. First, this period enables me to capture the full evolution of the protection of civilians from becoming one of the tasks to be implemented in 2000 to becoming the mission´s top priority in 2008. This is particularly relevant because it highlights the adaptability needed for UNPKO to protect civilians. Second, this period enables me to avoid potential confounders that arose after 2014, such as the scaling down of the mission. Third, this period aligns with major policy changes within the DPKO, such as the Capstone Doctrine of 2010 (UN, 2008), which was informed by organisational learning of UNPKOs in the DRC (Holt et al., 2009). Methodology Empirically, I use theory testing process tracing (Beach, 2016; Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Collier, 2011) to describe the within-case variation in the variable of interest (Gerring, 2006, p.724). Process tracing “is an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence” (Collier, 2011, p.824). It seeks to trace the causal mechanisms through which the independent variable explains the variation in the dependent variable (Beach, 2016, p.463; Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Collier, 2011). According to Beach (2016, p.468), a researcher can only draw an inference of causality when the hypothesised observable implication is matched by the actual evidence at every step of the mechanism. In theory testing process tracing, Beach (2016, p.469) states that the evidence must be evaluated in three steps: First, the researcher predicts the “empirical fingerprints” that would be left by each step of the mechanism and then evaluates the theoretical certainty of the predicted evidence. Second, the researcher assesses whether the hypothesised evidence was found in the collected evidence. Third, the researcher evaluates if the evidence can be trusted. 31 Process tracing is relevant as the analytical methodology for analysing the case in this thesis because it facilitates the assessment of new causal claims, acquisition of in–depth understanding of the mechanism connecting the variables of interest and assessing alternative hypotheses (Collier, 2011, p.824). To test the evidence for each argument, I draw on Collier´s (2011) four process tracing tests. These tests are based on two criteria – necessity and sufficiency. The criterion of necessity tests whether the evidence found is necessary to establish a link between the independent and the dependent variables. While the existence of a certain hypothesised piece of evidence implies that the hypothesised cause may be relevant to explaining the outcome, its absence suggests that it may not have played a role in bringing about the outcome and hence is not necessary. However, the mere presence of a certain piece of evidence does not automatically indicate that it caused the outcome. For this to be true, the criterion of sufficiency must be met. In other words, the evidence should point to the fact that the hypothesised cause influenced the outcome (Collier, 2011). The four tests are the straw in the wind test, the hoop test, the smoking gun test and the doubly decisive test (Collier, 2011, p.824). In the straw in the wind test, the presence of the explanatory variable, that is, mandate adjustment neither includes nor excludes it. The fact that a hypothesis passes this test is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for supporting or rejecting a hypothesis and has no bearing on alternative hypotheses. The hoop test, on the other hand, can be used to exclude some hypotheses. However, while the presence of evidence of mandate adjustment is not indicative of its influence on bringing about variation in the protection of civilians, the absence of evidence of mandate adjustment potentially undermines the hypothesised relationship between mandate adjustment and protection of civilians (Collier, 2011). The third test is a smoking gun test. This test can be used to confirm a hypothesised connection between mandate adjustment and the protection of civilians. The presence of evidence that mandate adjustment influenced the protection of civilians via organisational change is considered sufficient for establishing some causal connection between mandate adjustment and the protection of civilians but not ruling out other possible explanations. However, the failure of this hypothesised relationship to pass this test is not 32 necessarily indicative that mandate adjustment does not influence the protection of civilians in some way (Collier, 2011). The only test that can both confirm a hypothesised relationship between mandate adjustment and the protection of civilians and simultaneously rule out any other possible explanations is the doubly decisive test. For this test to hold, there must be evidence suggesting that only the mandate adjustment or the alternative explanatory variable influenced the protection of the civilian outcome (Collier, 2011). Locating the Empirical Fingerprints To locate evidence of the independent variable, I relied on UNSC resolutions. I went through the relevant resolutions to trace adjustments to the mandates. While many resolutions were adopted during the period of study that adjusted the mission´s mandate, the focus was on resolutions that specifically included the language of protection of civilians from physical violence and how this varied across resolutions. To trace organisational change, I went through UNSC resolutions, UNSG reports, the mission reports, and reports commissioned by the UNSG. The focus here was on specific organisational adaptations that followed the initial mandate adjustment that introduced protection of civilians from physical violence in 2000 and those which followed the mandate adjustment to prioritise protection of civilians in 2008. To identify evidence of variation in the protection of civilians from physical violence, I went through the UNSG reports focusing on the language used to describe the conditions on the ground and mentions of specific numbers of civilian casualties and how UN peacekeepers responded. I repeated the same procedure using field reports from the Human Rights Watch, the Amnesty International, the Refugees International, the International Crisis Group, and international newspaper reports and triangulated the data among them to cross–reference the evidence. This triangulation enabled me to determine the veracity of the evidence found, thus guarding against the possibility of misinforming potential readers (Lamont, 2021, p.105). Where there was variation in the number of civilian casualties between reports, I cited the range between the smallest and the largest numbers. To trace evidence for the alternative explanation, I reviewed the UNSC resolutions, UNSG reports, and mission reports to identify variation in troop size, diversity, deployment, equipment and 33 response to demand for protection of civilians. Similar procedures used to identify variation in civilian protection from physical violence for the main argument above were repeated for the alternative explanation. Table 1 Evidence Needed to Test the Hypotheses Test Main Hypothesis Rival Hypothesis The adjustment of the mandate to The presence of a large well – include the protection of civilians trained and well - equipped UN from physical violence is likely to troop deterred belligerents from lead to more proactive continuing hostilities and approaches to the protection of targeting civilians. civilians and consequently increase the mission´s effectiveness to protect civilians Straw – in – the wind Mandate adjustment can UN peacekeepers can influence influence the protection of the protection of civilian civilians. outcome. Hoops Mandate adjustment and UN troops´ size and equipment organisational change took place increased before a decline in before a decline in civilian civilian casualties. casualties. Smoking Gun Mandate adjustment via UN troops´ presence was able to organisational change led to a deter belligerents from 34 more proactive civilian protection continuing hostilities and or approach. target civilians. Doubly Decisive (A)Mandate adjustment via (A)UN troops´ presence linked organisational change linked to a to a decline in civilian decline in civilian casualties. casualties. (B)Belligerents were not deterred (B) Mandate adjustment via by the increased presence of UN organisational change not linked troops. to a decline in civilian casualties. Data Sources The material relied upon for this analysis comes from UNSC resolutions, UNSG reports, non– UN international reports (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International Crisis Group and the Refugees International), international newspapers and academic publications, including books and book chapters. The reliance on solely international sources for my evidence is because of two main reasons: First, I could not find local newspaper articles related to the case. The most probable reason is the low freedom of the media in the DRC during the period under study (AI, 2003). There was harassment of local journalists and civil rights defenders by both sets of disputants, who did not want revelations of the atrocities they had committed on the local populations (AI, 2003). As for regional sources, especially the countries neighbouring the DRC, most of these countries had by 2003 been heavily drawn into the conflict (HRW, 1999), implying that they too would likely not have permitted free publishing of the atrocities civilians underwent, as this would have implicated them. However, the data is reliable because it is from different respectable institutions with long experience in collecting data on human rights violations in conflict-prone areas. Moreover, most of the academic 35 resources used are from highly cited scholars, some of whom have worked in UN peacekeeping in different countries. Results and Analysis In this chapter, I present the findings. My theoretical argument holds that adjusting the mandate of an already deployed UNPKO to include the protection of civilians as a task to be implemented triggers organisational change, which then influences the protection of civilians from physical violence. I begin by presenting the background to the deployment of the UNPKO in the DRC, then describe the case of UNPKO before evaluating the two hypotheses presented in the theoretical framework. Background to the Case of UNPKO in the DRC The DRC has been plagued by armed civil conflicts that later escalated into civil wars for decades. The 1996 – 1997 civil war pitted the late Kabila´s Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) with the backing of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda against the then Zairian government forces (AI, 200a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). After deposing the late dictator Mobutu, Kabila became president and integrated most of the rebel forces, some of which owed allegiance to Rwanda and Uganda, in the country´s armed forces (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). However, after a few months, the relationship between President Kabila and his former allies deteriorated (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). In a reversal of alliances, Kabila, wanting to diminish the perception among the public and some opposing politicians that his government was heavily influenced by Rwanda, called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of the DRC in 1998 (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). On their part, Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi soldiers who had been integrated into the Congolese Armed Forces (CAF) complained that Kabila had failed to honour his promise of recognising Tutsi found in the territories of the DRC as Congolese (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). Angered by what they considered a betrayal by a leader whom they had helped install into power, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi backed armed groups with the objective of toppling Kabila (AI, 2000a, 200b; 36 HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). In August 1998, Rwandan soldiers, in collaboration with Wamba Dia Wamba´s Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) attacked the provincial capital of north Kivu, Goma (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). While the fighting was ongoing, Uganda armed forces also joined the conflict in collaboration with Jean – Pierre Bemba´s Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) by targeting the northern province of the DRC in February 1999 (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). Within a short period, the conflict had escalated into a civil war and quickly dragged in Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to support government forces (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). The war escalated further, drawing in Libya, Chad, South Sudan and other local militias (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). The mediation efforts that were ongoing as the conflict evolved reached a climax with the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (LCA) between the DRC, rebel movements, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe on July 9, 1999 (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002;, ICG, 1999). According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2025), this war had by the end of 2004 claimed more than 3 million lives. Despite signing the LCA, the war continued unabated with catastrophic consequences for civilians throughout the territory of the DRC, but specifically in the North and South Kivus, Orientale Province, Katanga, Equateur and Bas – Congo (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 2002; ICG, 1999). It should also be noted that after the Sun City Agreement of 2002, RCD and MLC became political parties and their fighters were integrated into the Congolese armed forces (AI, 2000a, 200b; HRW, 1999, 2002; ICG, 1999). Table 2 Timeline of Events and Their Connection to The Protection of Civilians When Event Connection to The Protection of Civilians 37 1999 • The LCA is signed and requests the • The LCA fails to halt the deployment of a UNPKO with a fighting. Chapter VII mandate. • No mandate to protect civilians. • The UNSC deploys MONUC to The DRC with a Chapter VI mandate. 2000 • MONUC´s mandate is adjusted to • Civilian protection is not an include the protection of civilians but obligation – no active civilian not prioritised. protection posture. • UNSC authorises the deployment of • Fighting continues and 700 5500 troops to monitor the ceasefire. civilians are killed. • Rwandan and Ugandan forces fight each other for 6 days in Kisangani. 2001-2002 • President Laurent Kabila is • The fighting results in the death assassinated and is succeeded by of civilians. Joseph Kabila. • The withdrawal of foreign troops • DRC, Rwanda and Uganda sign peace is meant to de-militarise eastern agreements in which Rwanda and DRC and hence create a safe Uganda agree to withdraw their forces environment for civilians. from the DRC. • 3000 civilians are massacred. • The DRC and main rebel groups sign a peace agreement, and an interim government is created. 38 • Rival militias clash in Nyakundi district of Ituri. • UNSC authorises an increase in troops to 8600 2003 • Uganda withdraws its forces and • Civilians become victims of rival leaves a space that is exploited by rival armed groups seeking to take the armed groups. territory. • UNSC permits the use of force to • Civilian protection by removal of protect civilians but does not prioritise the threat but shifts the threat to civilian protection. other regions. • UNSC deploys an IEMF to stabilise • Fighting and civilian targeting Ituri and protect the airport. does not stop. • The IEMF is replaced by an Ituri Brigade • UNSC authorises a troop level to 10800. 2004 • MONUC requested to ensure the • Protection of civilians becomes protection of civilians and collaborate an obligation but still not a with government. priority of the mission • MONUC is requested to collaborate • Prevention of border crossing of with the UN mission in Burundi combatants may decrease civilian victimisation but does nothing • Laurent Nkunda takes Bukavu, but diplomatic pressure forces him to withdraw four days later. 39 • UNSC authorises an additional 5900 • The increase is meant to boost troops bringing the total to 16431. MONUC´s capacity to protect civilians. 2006 • MONUC moves some resources to • Reduced the pool of resources for secure the election in Kinshasa. protecting civilians. • Joseph Kabila is elected president and • This aims at addressing some of includes leaders from the Tutsi the rebels´ grievances but does community that formed the rebel not help stop the conflict and movement. civilian victimisation. • Laurent Nkunda launches a new rebel • New attacks on civilians. movement – the CNDP. 2008 • The DRC government signs a peace • Protection of civilians becomes deal with 22 armed groups including the mission priority. CNDP. • Actively involved in proactive • MONUC to ensure civilian protection civilian protection but civilians + carry out joint patrols with face retaliatory attacks for government police + coordinate example from LRA rebels (more operations with FARD in eastern than 960 are killed and 300 DRC. children are abducted). • CNDP withdraws from the agreement • 150 civilians are massacred by and continues fighting. CNDP rebels in Kiwanja. • UNSC authorises an additional 3000 troops to bring MONUC´s capacity to 40 20000 but no country supplies the, troops. 2009 • Community Alert Networks launched • Early warning to civilians on + Joint Protection Teams for impending threats + preventive intelligence gathering protection of civilians • Joint military operations with FARDC • FDRL retaliates by killing against FDRL. hundreds of civilians. • The DRC government signs a deal with • Fighting stops in Goma the CNDP, and the group is to be transformed into a political party. 2010 MONUC becomes MONUSCO + further Collective implementation of civilian integration of civilian and military protection. components. 2013 UNSC creates the Force Intervention Brigade Intended to indirectly protect civilians by (FIB) and mandates it use offensive military getting rid of the threat but leads to force against rebels and other armed groups. civilian targeting. 2014 MONUSCO establishes the Integrated More early warning + collection of real community coordination, such as community time threat intelligence for early liaison assistants (CLA). response. Table 3 Indicators of the variables Variables 2000 – 2007 2008 – 2014 41 Mandate Protection of Civilian included Protection of Civilian Prioritised Adjustment (February 2000) (December 2008) Structural o Civilian, Military and o Creation of the Force Changes Police components Intervention Brigade(2013) o New Command and o Rapid Response and Early Control(2000) Warning Cell(2009) o Creation of the Ituri Brigade(2003) o North and South Kivu Brigades(2004) Coordination o Joint Concept for Civilian o Joint Protection Teams(2009) Protection(2005) o Community Liaison o Joint Civil – Military Network(2014) Contingency Plan(2005) o Community Alert o Joint Protection Working Network(2009) Group o Protection Clusters(2006) Operational o Border Control(2004) o Joint Military Operations Approaches o Passive Approach(2000 – o Joint Patrols 2003) o Early warning to civilians o Joint Military o Preventive Approaches Operations(2007) o Offensive Approaches o Cordon and Search(2005) o Proactive Approaches o Use of attack helicopters 42 Protection of 7450 – 7750 civilians massacred 1533 civilians massacred Civilian Outcome UNPKO in the DRC: Enters MONUC At the request of the LCA, the UNSC, through resolution 1258 of August 6, 1999, authorised the deployment of 90 United Nations Military liaison personnel, civilian, political, humanitarian and administrative staff to the different capitals of the signatories to the LCA (UNSC, 1999a, para.8). Through resolution 1273 of November 30, 1999, the UNSC decided that the above personnel “ including a multidisciplinary staff of personnel in the fields of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, medical support, child protection, political affairs and administrative support, which will assist the Special Representative, shall constitute the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)...” (UNSC, 1999b, para.4). Under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and in cooperation with the Joint Military Commission (JMC) established by the LCA, MONUC was mandated to supervise the implementation of the LCA and report on potential violations of the agreement (UNSC, 1999b). At this point, MONUC had no mandate to protect civilians from physical violence (Holt et al., 2013; Murphy, 2016; Schütte, 2015). Mandate Adjustment: Protection of Civilians included but not Prioritised In a response to the violations of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (HRL) in North Kivu, South Kivu and the northeastern DRC, the UNSC, through resolution 1291 of February 24, 2000, mandated MONUC to protect civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSC, 2000a). Given that MONUC was deployed at a time when there was “limited presence and legitimacy of the Congolese state” (Boutellis, 2013, p.4), there was a general expectation among the public that the arrival of blue helmets would protect them from the belligerents 43 and other armed groups. As a result, the mandate placed a higher burden on UN troops to protect civilians (Boutellis, 2013, p.4). Specifically, this resolution stated that “MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to[...] protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (UNSC, 2000a, para.8) (my emphasis). It also paved the way for the structural reconfiguration of MONUC by introducing the need for the creation of the military and civilian units within MONUC (UNSC, 2000a, para.4). Despite this mandate, protection of civilians did not immediately become part of the mission planning or military strategy. To justify this, the UNSG in his report to the UNSC argued that UN forces “would not have the capacity to protect civilian population from armed attack” (UNSC, 2000b, para. 67). This sentiment was further reiterated in the sixth UNSG report to the UNSC in which he stated that UN forces would “not be able to extract other United Nations personnel at risk, or accompany humanitarian convoys, nor will they be able to extend protection to the local population” (UNSC, 2001, para. 77). Consequently, by the end of the year, protection of civilians had neither been included in the mission´s strategic planning nor become a military task to be conducted by the military contingent of the mission (Holt et al., 2009, p.246; Schütte, 2015, p.187). This lack of urgency with the protection of civilians only serves to emphasise that it was not a key task to be implemented by MONUC (Roessler & Prendergast, 2006). The first major test of MONUC´s protection of civilian capabilities came in June 2000 in Kisangani. During a six - day battle between the RPA and the UPDF, between 760 - 1200 civilians were killed (AI, 2002, p.1; HRW, 2002, p.5; UNSC, 2000b, p.7). Two years later, the Rwanda- supported Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma) deliberately targeted civilians in the same city of Kisangani (Bernath & Edgerton, 2003, p.2). Despite the presence of between 1000 – 1200 UN troops from Morocco and Uruguay, the rebels were not deterred from killing between 100 - 200 civilians (AI, 2002, p.1; HRW, 2002). More telling was the fact that these contingents observed the arrival of the rebels, saw gunfires in the city, and allegedly had advance intelligence on the impending attacks on civilians but chose not to act proactively to protect civilians (Holt et al., 2009, p.248). To justify their inability to proactively act to protect civilians, the SRSG Amos Ngongi stated that 44 “MONUC did what it could at the time” and that “MONUC was not created to ensure the security of the population” (Holt et al., 2009, p.250) (my emphasis). Furthermore, Refugee International´s analysts note that from the perspective of MONUC, “...neither the Moroccans nor the Uruguayans are infantry units. Therefore, its leaders did not ‘deem it within [their] capability’ to protect these civilians, even though the civilians were certainly under ‘imminent threat of physical violence” (Bernath & Edgerton, 2003, p. 2). This sad development prompted the UNSG in his June 2002 report to the UNSC to call for the strengthening of MONUC “...with a view to reconfiguring and re- equipping the contingents considerably to permit them to intervene more actively” (UNSC, 2002, para.72). However, the UNSC did not immediately act (Holt et al., 2009). These barbaric attacks on civilians were also taking place in the northeastern part of the DRC. According to research carried out by Human Rights Watch between February 2003 – June 2003, an estimated 5000 civilians were massacred in Ituri between July 2002 and March 2003 by armed groups supported by Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC governments (AI, 2003; HRW, 2003, p.1). During this period, the presence of MONUC peacekeepers was barely made up of a “small team of fewer than ten observers covering [a] volatile area of some 4.2 million people” (HRW, 2003, p.2). Recognising the importance of a significant MONUC presence in the region, the UNSC requested MONUC to deploy resources in Ituri (AI, 2003; HRW, 2003). The situation continued being volatile and escalated in May 2003 when the reluctant withdrawal of a UDF contingent of 7000 soldiers from Bunia in line with the 2002 Peace Agreement between the DRC and Ugandan governments, left the multiple armed groups jostling for control of the region (AI, 2003; Berdal, 2018; Murphy, 2016; Holt et al, 2009; Ulriksen, 2004). Once again, the presence of 700 MONUC troops (Murphy, 2016) did not provide any deterrence effect on these militias as they slaughtered between 420 - 500 civilians in a space of two weeks (AI, 2003; HRW, 2003; ICG, 2003; Ulriksen, 2004; UNSC, 2003c). The MONUC base nevertheless provided shelter to civilians who sought protection there (AI, 2003; HRW, 2003; ICG, 2003; Ulriksen, 2004; UNSC, 2003c). According to Amnesty International, between May 2003 and September 2003, more than 1000 civilians had already been massacred (AI, 2003, p.3). Explaining the lack of civilian protection in the May incident, the mission´s first commander commented that “[the 45 contingent] refused to react by opening fire after proper challenge and in accordance with the mandate to protect the population and in accordance with quite unambiguous rules of engagement. Instead, they persisted in only firing in the air, declaring that they could only act under Chapter VII and engage in combat with prior authority of [their parliament]” (Murphy, 2016, p.217). With the security situation increasingly worsening and protection of civilians becoming a challenge to MONUC, the UN shifted its focus to the “military and political stabilisation of Ituri,” (UNSC, 2003c, para.3) prompting the UNSG to request the UNSC to deploy “ a highly trained and well equipped multinational force to secure vital installations and protect civilian populations” (UNSC, 2003c, para.4). The UNSC through resolution 1484 of May 30, 2003, authorised the deployment of a French led European Union (EU) Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) nicknamed Operation Artemis at the end of May 2003 with an expectation that it would withdraw by September 2003 (UNSC, 2003a). A military contingent of 1000 troops drawn from France, Canada, Sweden, South Africa, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Cyprus, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland deployed to Bunia (UNSC, 2003a, para.6). This highly skilled force equipped with high-quality military equipment and diplomatically supported quickly demonstrated how the quality of troops can achieve deterrence. Operation Artemis credibly deterred the armed groups and forced them to retreat, and as a result, protected civilians within their zone of deployment (Berdal, 2018; Boutellis, 2013; Schütte, 2015; Murphy, 2016). With their objective seemingly achieved, the IEMF left in September, paving the way for the creation of special division within MONUC called the Ituri Brigade, composed of 4800 troops backed by attack helicopters and armoured personnel carriers and mandated to use force to protect civilians (UNSC, 2003a, para.7). The initial 2400 troops from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Uruguay and Pakistan took up their positions in Bunia from the IEMF on September 1 (Berdal, 2018; Boutellis, 2013; Schütte, 2015; Murphy, 2016). By the end of October 2003, MONUC had a military strength of 10415, of which 9686 were troops and 99 civilian police (Berdal, 2018; Boutellis, 2013; Schütte, 2015; Murphy, 2016) (see Table 4 in the Appendix for a complete list of TCCs and PCCs). 46 MONUC´s struggles to end the military hostilities continued in June 2004. Despite a robust mandate and the backing of attack helicopters, the presence of 1000 MONUC troops in Southern Kivu did not do much to stop the fighting and prevent the fall of Bukavu into the hands of Laurent Nkunda´s National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) in June 2004 (Boutellis, 2013; Murphy, 2016). These peacekeepers could only protect their compound and some 4000 internally displaced persons who had sought shelter in their compound, sparking mass protests by the public against UN peacekeepers for having failed to live up to the expectation their presence created (Murphy, 2016). On October 1, 2004, after the above and other failures to protect civilians, the UNSC, through resolution 1565, strengthened the protection of civilian language. Specifically, MONUC was mandated “to ensure the protection of civilians [...]under imminent threat from physical violence” (UNSC, 2004, para.4b) using all means necessary (UNSC, 2004, para.4b) (my emphasis). In addition, with this new mandate, MONUC troops started coordinating with the Congolese armed forces and jointly carrying out disarmament of rebel groups (Boutellis, 2013). While the mere presence of a large military contingent backed by attack helicopters did not in itself have a deterrence effect on Laurent Nkunda´s rebel movement, the decisive use of this capability against this rebel movement was effective in facilitating the Congolese armed forces to retake positions that had been captured by the rebel movement (HRW, 2009a). However, some reporting claims that Nkunda´s rebel movement retreated because of more diplomatic pressure (HRW, 2009a). This new mandate also enabled MONUC to use military strategies and reproduce the brigade formations applied in Bunia in the South and North Kivus, hence improving MONUC´s military cohesiveness, which led to improvements in the protection of civilians in Sake and Goma (Schütte, 2015; Murphy, 2016). From this mandate adjustment, there was more coordination between MONUC troops and Congolese armed forces and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) to monitor and discourage “cross - border movements of combatants between the two countries” (UNSC, 2004, para.4e). In 2005, through resolution 1592, the UNSC went further and permitted MONU to engage in coercive tactics to protect civilians. Specifically, the resolution stated that “...MONUC may use cordon and search tactics to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the military capability of illegal 47 armed groups that continue to use violence in the areas” (UNSC, 2005, para.7). In the same year, MONUC started implementing the joint concept for the protection of civilians (Holt & Berkman, 2006, p.173). This civil-military framework was used to coordinate protection efforts on the ground (Holt & Berkman, 2006, p.173). Furthermore, MONUC developed a joint civil-military contingency plan to enhance its civilian protection response in addition to facilitating humanitarian response (Holt & Berkman, 2006). In addition, MONUC coordinated its operations with other UN agencies and humanitarian organisations through the Joint Protection Working Groups (JPWG) (Holt & Berkman, 2006, p.174). The design of this JPWG, in addition to facilitating task specialisation, also ensured that all the participating parties realised how their protection activities fit within the larger protection of civilians from physical violence (Holt & Berkman, 2006, pp.173 - 174), consequently enhancing mission cohesiveness (Holt & Berkman, 2006). At the beginning of 2006, a Protection Cluster was established. The objective of this cluster was to enhance the international community´s response to civilians´ protection concerns (Murthy, 2007). This protection cluster analysed protection needs, addressed protection priorities and identified gaps in protection responses (Murthy, 2007). In addition to including some of the international organisations on the ground at the time, the protection cluster included personnel from both the military and civilian units of MONUC (Murthy, 2007). This protection cluster provided a mechanism through which coordination between MONUC and humanitarian agencies established conditions for coordination, developed a comprehension and familiarisation of their different approaches to protection of civilians, resulting in a comprehensive approach (Macdermott & Hanssen, 2010, p.41). In fact, “humanitarian agencies and their partners[...] were able to influence the ways that MONUSCO prioritised its military and political capabilities in support of protection of civilians in parts of eastern DRC” (Metcalfe et al., 2012, p.35). This was achieved through a categorisation of protection threats in three areas to inform MONUC´s deployment of the military: (1) must protect areas – high threat and therefore troops must be physically present; (2) should protect areas – relatively high threat and troops should be deployed only if capacity allows; (3) could protect areas – low level of threats but UN peacekeepers could patrol the areas (Holt et al., 2009). 48 MONUC´s incapacity to meet the expectations that come with a robust mandate to protect civilians was again made visible in the abduction of 1700 civilians by the Lord´s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel movement that relocated from Uganda and South Sudan to northern DRC in 2006, in Northern DRC in September 2008 (HRW, 2009a, 2010) and the massacre that took place in Kiwanja, North Kivu, in October 2008 where CNDP rebel forces under the command of Bosco Ntaganda massacred 150 civilians despite the presence of UN peacekeeping troops within the vicinity (AI, 2008; HRW, 2008, p.1). Instead of moving out of their compound and protecting civilians, the troops decided to selectively extract expatriates and statically defend their compound, sparking the Bukavu-like protests (Berdal, 2018; Murphy, 2016; Schütte, 2015). This once again demonstrated that the mere presence of UN peacekeepers does not always lead to deterrence and hence protection of civilians. Furthermore, the LRA responded to the joint Uganda – DRC forces´ operations against them with the logistical support of MONUC peacekeepers by indiscriminately killing over 1033 civilians whom they considered to have collaborated with the joint forces from December 2008 to September 2009 in Doruma, Dura, and Faradje areas of Haut – Uele districts of Northern DRC (HRW, 2009a, 2010). According to a MONUC official interviewed by Human Rights Watch, MONUC´s ability to redeploy troops and equipment to locations where the LRA was constrained by instructions from the UNSC to prioritise the Kivu region (HRW, 2009a; UNSC, 2010a). Moreover, despite a request by the UNSG for an additional troop size of 3000 to boost the already deployed 17000, no country had committed to supplying troops by the end of 2008 (HRW, 2009a). Mandate Adjustment: Protection of Civilians Prioritised Realising that the lack of prioritisation of the protection of civilians may be hindering the efficacy of MONUC to respond to the increasing demand for protection of civilians, the UNSC through resolution 1856 of 22 December 2008 made the protection of civilians MONUCO´s top priority (UNSC, 2008, para.3a). Specifically, MONUC was mandated to “ensure the protection of civilians[...] under imminent threat of physical violence[...] from any parties engaged in the conflict” (UNSC, 2008, para.3a). To emphasise the top priority given to protection of civilians, the resolution further stated that “the protection of civilians[...]must be given priority in decisions about the use of 49 available capacity and resources” (UNSC, 2008, para.6). Moreover, MONUC was mandated to jointly with DRC national police and security forces carry out patrols to enhance security (UNSC, 2008, para.3e) and “coordinate operations with the FARDC integrated brigades deployed in the eastern part of the DRC” (UNSC, 2008, para.3g). With this resolution, there was increased coordination between the military, civilian, and police units. As a result, there was a shift in MONUC´s strategy and focus. It moved from a more passive to a proactive posture (Holt et al.,2009). MONUC resorted to Mobile Operation Bases in the North and South Kivus that enabled the visibility of its presence through monitoring and patrolling (UNSC, 2009, paras. 29 – 30), thus enabling UN peacekeeping forces to protect civilians from physical violence (UNSC, 2009). It also started fighting actively alongside the government forces and using attack helicopters with a view to dismantle armed groups from the region (Schütte, 2015; Murphy, 2016). While the above mobile bases enabled UN troops to be present in difficult to reach areas and hence potentially protected civilians (UNSC, 2009), fighting alongside government forces is said to have contributed to civilian targeting in the Kivu region, as in Ituri as rebel groups no longer considered MONUC forces impartial (Murphy, 2016; Schütte, 2015; Tull, 2018) and also shifted the violence to other areas where civilians faced possible victimisation (Peitz & Riesch, 2019). A further development in MONUC´s coordinated approach to civilian protection, was the establishment of Joint Protection Teams (JPT) in the beginning of 2009 (Kjeksrud & Ravndal, 2011; UNSC, 2010b). JPT are composed of experts from the civil affairs, political affairs, human rights and child protection under the coordination of the civil affairs unit (Kjeksrud & Ravndal, 2011; UNSC, 2010b). Their main objective is to critically assess how MONUC can improve its protection of civilians (Kjeksrud & Ravndal, 2011; UNSC, 2010b). This is made possible through networking between MONUC and the local population, and development of a better comprehension of the political, social and conflict dynamics in an area. JPT also serve as a mechanism through which civilians are provided with early warning. Furthermore, the JPT provide advice to the military officers on issues pertinent to protection of civilian in addition to deliberating on potential protection issues whenever there are attacks (HRW, 2009b). By mid-2010, MONUC had deployed 188 JPTs in the 50 eastern provinces of the DRC with initial evidence pointing to their significant impact on MONUC´s protection of civilians (Kjeksrud & Ravndal, 2011). For example, MONUC troops were able to protect 4000 civilians by evacuating them from the villages of Nyabiondo, Kashebere and Kibati on the advice of the civilian members of the JPT team on February 2009 when the operation against FDLR intensified (ICG, 2009, p.9). According to Alan Doss, a former Special Representative of the UNSG to the DRC, these JPT enhanced MONUC´s understanding of the operational environment and improved working within the mission´s military contingents, between the civilian and military components and between the mission and other external actors (Doss, 2010, p.100). In the same year, MONUC established a Rapid Response and Early Warnings Cell- (RREWC) to enhance their ability to anticipate threats to civilians and hence improve their protection of civilians (Kjeksrud & Ravndal, 2011). The objective of RREWC is to furnish MONUC´s top leadership with intelligence that can be used to improve reaction to demands for protection of civilians (UNSC, 2010b). RREWC reported to the Senior Management Group on Protection – made up of personnel from MONUC, OCHA and the UNHCR (UNSC, 2010b, p.16). Furthermore, MONUC carried out joint military operations with the FARDC in North Kivu and South Kivu on 26 February and 25 February respectively (UNSC, 2010b). In addition, MONUC and FARDC increased their joint gathering and assessment of intelligence on possible attacks on civilians in the province of Haut – and Bas – Uele and supplemented this by conducting joint patrols in the region (UNSC, 2010b). With the relationship between the DRC government and the UN at its lowest point and in recognition of the dynamics on the ground, the UNSC through resolution 1925 of May 28, 2010 converted MONUC to MONUSCO – United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo-and mandated it to among others use “Ensure the effective protection of civilians[...]under imminent threat of physical violence” (UNSC, 2010a, para.12a). The resolution also concentrated the 20,573 troops and police to the east of the DRC while at the same time creating a reserve unit that could quickly be deployed to other parts of the country should the need arise (UNSC, 2010a). Furthermore, the resolution in response to the request by the Congolese government for a “gradual withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping force” (Whittle, 2015, p.843) reduced the military 51 contingent by 2000 (UNSC, 2010a, para.3). This, in addition to a further reduction in its military utility, attack and observation helicopters meant that the protection of civilians would be significantly impacted (Murphy, 2016). Several years later, M23, a rebel movement that was dissatisfied by the failure of the government to honour the agreement between CNDP and the government on March 23, 2009 took Goma (Kjeksrud, 2023b) prompting the UNSC through resolution 2098 of March 28, 2013 to establish a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO under “the direct command of MONUSCO Force Commander” (UNSC, 2013, para.9). This FIB consisted of 3000 troops drawn from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi (Schutte, 2015) was given an offensive mandate within international law to “carry out targeted offensive operations ....to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralise these groups, and to disarm them” (UNSC, 2013, para.12b). This mandate was motivated by the desire by the UNSC “to reduce the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security” (UNSC, 2013, para.12b). It is important to note that unlike some troops within MONUSCO, these troops in addition to expecting violent risks were also willing to accept the risks in the execution of their mandate (Murphy, 2016; Kjeksrud, 2023b) partly due to the strained political relationship between the TCCs and Rwanda, a factor that could be argued to have made it possible for them to execute the more robust mandate they had been given. Following a successful joint operation between the FIB and FARDC, the M23 was forced to retreat from Goma and finally acknowledged defeat on November 5, 2013 (Boutellis, 2013; Schütte, 2015). While this retreat may have saved civilian lives, the threat posed by other rebel groups still existed (Boutellis, 2013; Kjeksrud, 2023a). According to Kjeksrud (2023a), this success was possible because the FIB and the FARDC matched the level of violence that M23 was willing to use (Kjeksrud, 2023b). However, others view this retreat as having been the result of international diplomatic pressures (Hunt, 2017) that forced Rwanda to withdraw its support of M23 in addition to the leadership conflict that ensued between Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda (Boutellis, 2013; Schütte, 2015). In addition, similar joint operations are credited to have diminished the capacity of other armed groups, thus restoring the much-needed state authority in northeastern DRC (Boutellis, 52 2013; Schütte, 2015). Nevertheless, the adoption of this offensive strategy within the MONUSCO structures effectively risked the lives of MONUSCO and other UN personnel in addition to risking civilians´ lives (Boutellis, 2013; Hunt, 2017; Whittle, 2015). MONUSCO's inconsistent performance in civilian protection was visible again in June 2014. Despite having received early intelligence on a potential mass killing of civilians in Muratule, MONUSCO leadership advised UN peacekeepers to collect information that would be used later to provide clarifications rather than protect civilians (Murphy, 2016). This level of inaction, Murphy argues, “reflects the broader culture of a lack of commitment and even indifference displayed by military contingents’ part of the Force” (Murphy, 2016, p.230). This was evidenced by the attitude of a Pakistani major who commented that “after seeing so many deaths in Kashmir, the DRC was a holiday” (Murphy, 2016, p.230). In a nutshell, the case of UNPKOs in the DRC shows how the mission struggled to adapt to the demand for protection of civilians as the mission was significantly transformed. But as protection of civilians progressively became the mission´s top priority, the mission improved in its coordination and operational approaches to civilian protection, but still faced challenges that constrained its effectiveness to fully implement its mandate to protect civilians. Evidence for the Main Hypothesis (H1) The main hypothesis focuses on the influence of mandate adjustment via organisational change. If the variation in protection of civilian outcome in the eastern DRC between 2000 – 2014 is because of this institutional - centred argument, then we need proof that mandate adjustment was necessary. Table 1 outlines the different types of evidence that can help us validate or falsify this hypothesis. First, any evidence that points to the fact that mandate adjustment and organisational change are pertinent elements of UNPKOs in the eastern DRC would be viewed as strong - in – the wind evidence. While UNPKOs in the eastern DRC were characterised by frequent adjustments to their mandate, the most relevant to this thesis are those that introduced protection of civilians as a task to be implemented in February 2000 (UNSC, 2000) and those that made protection of civilians the 53 mission´s top priority in December 2008 (UNSC, 2008). While this piece of evidence informs us that mandate adjustment can be significant, it does not tell us that these specific mandate adjustments were. For them to be relevant, we need hoops evidence that these mandate adjustments took place before a decline in protection of civilian outcome. Information from UNSC resolutions and UNSG reports show that protection of civilian from physical violence was adopted by the Security Council in February 2000 at a time when civilian casualties were increasing and was made the mission´s priority in December 2008 after civilian casualty figures as a result of attacks by rebel forces and other armed groups was in the range of 7450 – 7750 (compiled by the author). It was after this prioritisation that civilian casualty figures declined to 1533. While the hoops evidence above does show that mandate adjustments happened before a decline in civilian casualties, it does not prove that mandate adjustments influenced this variation. To prove this, we need smoking gun evidence. That is, we need to prove that the organisational change resulting from the mandate adjustments above was sufficient for the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians. That is, we need evidence that links mandate adjustment via organisational change to a change in UN peacekeepers´ approaches to the demand for the protection of civilians. The first clue is counterfactual. Without adopting protection of civilians as a task to be implemented, it is unlikely, given the history of UN peacekeeping in Bosnia and Rwanda in 1995 and 1994, respectively, that the initial military observers would have done more than monitor events as they evolved. Second, there is evidence that increased coordination between 2000 and 2007, when protection of civilians was not prioritised, helped MONUC prioritise civilian protection. Moreover, evidence shows that UN troops carried out border controls between Burundi and the DRC to prevent cross - border movements of armed groups in 2004, carried out cordon and searches to identify armed militias and potentially disarm them in 2005 and began joint military operations with the FARDC to destroy armed militias in 2007. These proactive approaches continued and were enhanced after the prioritisation of civilian protection in December 2008. UN troops jointly with the FARDC, used attack helicopters against rebel forces and armed militias, carried out joint patrols in areas where 54 civilians were highly threatened, provided early warnings to civilians when there was intelligence of impending attacks against them and used mobile operating bases to increase their visibility in areas identified as hotspots. All these were made possible because of the close coordination between MONUC and the government and between MONUC and other humanitarian agencies. While the smoking gun evidence shows a link between mandate adjustment via organisational change and UN peacekeepers´ change of operational approaches in favour of protecting civilians from physical violence, to rule out any other covariates of protection of civilians, we need evidence that mandate adjustment via organisational change was both necessary and sufficient for the variation in the protection of civilians. That is, we need doubly decisive evidence. While there is no direct evidence pointing to the link between mandate adjustment and decreased civilian casualties via organisational change, implied evidence suggests that coordination improved the operational efficiency of the mission, which might have contributed to saving civilian lives. Moreover, there is evidence that belligerents, especially rebel forces and other armed militias, were not deterred from attacking civilians and continued hostilities. However, it could not have been possible to implement the new operational approaches without a large, well-trained and well-equipped UN troop size. Therefore, while we have information on the influential role of mandate adjustment, putting together these pieces of evidence does not amount to doubly decisive evidence. Consequently, there is no evidence to falsify the main hypothesis nor to exclude the rival hypothesis. Evidence for the Alternative Hypothesis (H2) Next, we consider the rival hypothesis. Can UN peacekeepers influence the protection of civilians? To answer this question, we need straw – in – the wind evidence. One way to prove this is to find information referring to the deployment of UN peacekeepers and linked to either ending hostilities or protecting civilians. Evidence from UNSC resolutions suggests that UN peacekeepers can help protect civilians indirectly by seeing to it that belligerents do not breach a ceasefire agreement, and that they neutralise all armed groups. Directly, UN peacekeepers can protect civilians by preventing belligerents and or other armed militias from targeting civilians. However, this does not prove that UN peacekeepers in this case influenced the protection of the civilian outcome. In fact, 55 according to UNSG, UN troops in the DRC were considered not to have “...the capacity to protect civilian population from armed attack” (UNSC, 2000b, para.67). This was further reiterated in his sixth report of February 12, 2001, when he stated that UN forces would not “...be able to extend protection to local population” (UNSC, 2001, para.77) To be able to prove this, we need hoops evidence indicating that there was an increase in the number of well-trained and well-equipped UN troops before a noticeable decrease in civilian casualties because of being targeted by the belligerents and or armed militias. In this case, we see that before 2000, MONUC had 90 military observers (UNSC, 1999). This number significantly increased to about 5537 by the end of 2000, progressively increased to 10415 by the end of 2003, 17000 by the end of 2008 and 19815 by the end of 2013. Sub – nationally, the troop size in Ituri increased from 10 military observers to 4800 by the end of 2003. This evidence, while on its own does not validate the rival hypothesis, it does ensure that we do not exclude it from the explanation. Had the decline in civilian casualties happened before an increase in UN peacekeepers, then we would have concluded that troop size cannot explain the variation in protection of civilians. To test this hypothesis further, we need smoking gun evidence that the presence of UN peacekeepers was able to deter belligerents from continuing hostilities and targeting civilians. Evidence shows that from 2000 – 2007, the presence of UN peacekeepers was unable to deter Laurent Nkunda´s RCD from continuing with hostilities and eventually capturing Bukavu in 2004. Furthermore, the presence of UN troops in Kisangani, Kiwanja, Ituri and Muratula could not deter rebel forces and armed militias from collectively killing between 7450 – 7750 civilians. However, UN troops are credited with protecting about 4000 civilians who had sought shelter in their compound in Bukavu in 2004 and some civilians in Sake in 2009. There is also implied evidence that by working with the FARDC, UN troops may have protected civilians from being targeted by rogue government forces. Other instances where UN troops contributed to civilian protection include when they carried out joint military operations with FARDC to neutralise non–state armed groups in eastern DRC. Given that FARDC could not unilaterally deal with armed militias and rebel groups, it was the presence of UN troops and their logistics that contributed to the retreat of M23 rebel forces in 2013, 56 thus creating an environment where the threat to civilian physical integrity was reduced. This variation in the deterrent capability of the presence of UN troops provides a challenge to the smoking gun evidence that is needed. Overall, there is no evidence that strongly validates the hypothesis. On the contrary, right from the comments of the UNSG above, there was no expectation within the UN leadership that the presence of UN troops was expected to protect civilians from physical violence. The absence of strong smoking gun evidence in favour of the rival hypothesis implies that there would not be doubly decisive evidence. Given the lack of doubly decisive evidence for either explanation, we can only infer causality. This leaves us with these two hypotheses. While competing, they are not mutually exclusive (Zaks, 2017). To be effective, a mandate to protect civilians requires troops that are well - trained and equipped if they are to implement the change in operational approaches. This means that while the logic of deterrence by presence has not been supported by the evidence presented, from our knowledge of UN peacekeeping, we know that implementation of mandates requires UN peacekeepers. Discussion This thesis has made two important findings. First, I find that mandate adjustments to include protection of civilians from physical violence and subsequently make it the mission´s top priority enhances the efficacy of UNPKOs to protect civilians from being targeted by rebel groups and other armed militias. Second, the thesis finds that the presence of a large UN troop contingent in areas where civilians are likely to be targeted has no deterrence effect on the decision by rebel forces and other armed militias of whether to continue with hostilities and or target civilians. These findings offer several insights. In view of the mandate adjustment, the evidence supports the intuitive expectation that mandate adjustment triggers within mission organisational change. This organisational change increases the mission´s situational awareness, coherence and adoption of proactive approaches to the demand for the protection of civilians from physical violence. However, it is not clear whether the adoption of proactive approaches and the subsequent decline in civilian casualties from deliberate targeting is something more than just correlation. We also observe that the 57 impact of mandate adjustment on the operational approaches is more pronounced after the prioritisation of the protection of civilians. This is in line with previous research that shows the importance of a clear and robust mandate to the protection of civilians (Hultman, 2010; Salvatore et al., 2022). Relating to the alternative explanation, the finding is that the presence of a large, diversely constituted, well–trained and well–equipped UN troop contingent in areas where civilians are likely to face physical violence does not necessarily deter belligerents from continuing hostilities and or targeting civilians. This contradicts previous quantitative research that found evidence in support of the hypothesis (Fjelde et al., 2019). One possible reason for this difference could be attributed to the fact that the previous finding was based on average estimates from regression analysis. and a sample that might have included outliers. The discussion above points to the importance of mandate adjustments on the protection of civilians from physical violence. However, to better understand the influence of mandate adjustment, the following limitations need to be considered. First, the theory posits that the direction of causality is from mandate adjustment to protection of civilians via organisational change. However, the demand for the protection of civilians may have necessitated the adoption of the protection of civilians in 2000 and subsequently to its prioritisation in December 2008. To address this possible reverse causality, a regression analysis is one of the analytical tools that can be used. Second, the way protection of civilians from physical violence is operationalised here does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the protection of civilians. It does not capture other relevant dimensions of physical violence, such as rape, abductions, torture, among others. This was done because of the limited availability of such data for the period under analysis. This could be improved by developing a composite index of protection of civilians from physical violence that includes other indicators of physical violence. Third, the difficulty of collecting civilian casualty data, coupled with the political sensitivity inherent in such data (Seybolt et al., 2013), may contribute to potential reporting bias, hence affecting the validity and reliability of the data. The data might be inflated or deflated to reach a certain objective. To address this, I triangulated the data sources, and where different casualty figures 58 were given, I used the range of the two statistics. Fourth, the fact that the findings are based on a single case study may hinder generalisability. Fifth, the absence of doubly decisive evidence may be attributed to the fact that the thesis did not rely on personal interviews, which could have helped to categorically connect organisational change to the protection of civilians. This leaves us to infer causality that may not necessarily be present. This limitation can be addressed by conducting interviews with former staff of MONUC and MONUSCO, FARDC soldiers and even former members of the rebel forces. Moreover, given the difficulty of collecting casualty data in an ongoing civil war, the figures used in this thesis might have either underestimated or overestimated civilian deaths. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that any changes would have significantly changed the trend recorded above. Finally, the existence of other potential explanations for the variation in the protection of civilians’ outcome that have not been discussed, such as variation in TCCs' appetite for a robust mandate, which may explain why some contingents did not use force when they should have, cannot be analysed outside the mandate of a UNPKO, despite the nuances they present. At a personal level, two important points are worth noting. First, the analytical approach used here was new to me and thus posed some initial challenges, such as identifying and presenting evidence. However, with time, I was able, within the constraints I had, to familiarise myself with the most important elements of process tracing that made it possible for me to analyse the data. Second, before the research, I had preconceived ideas about the performance of MONUC and MONUCSCO concerning protecting Congolese populations and eventually ridding the eastern part of the DRC of militias. This had the potential danger of me attaching “particular significance to an item that supports [my] pre – existing or favoured interpretations and, conversely”, to downplay the significance of an item that challenges it” (George & Bennet, 2005, p.99). To address this, I tried to the best of my ability to be guided by the theoretical framework and considered “who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances” (George & Bennet, 2005, p.100) (emphasis in original). Despite the limitations cited above, this thesis makes important contributions to the literature on peacekeeping. First, it develops a theory of civilian protection based on mandate adjustment via organisational change. Second, by testing a previous hypothesis, this thesis challenges previous 59 findings and shows that the hypothesised relationship between UN troop presence and protection of civilians does not apply to all cases of UN peacekeeping. Conclusion This thesis examined the influence of mandate adjustment on the effectiveness of UNPKOs to protect civilians from physical violence in an ongoing civil war. Using the case of UNPKOs in eastern DRC from 2000 – 2014, I tested two competing but not mutually exclusive hypotheses using theory- testing process tracing. The findings suggest that while mandate adjustment does influence the efficacy of UNPKOs to protect civilians from physical violence via organisational change, the presence of a large contingent of UN troops in areas where civilians face threats to their physical integrity does not unilaterally deter rebel forces and armed militias from continuing with hostilities and or target civilians. Nevertheless, the lack of doubly decisive evidence for the mandate adjustment theory leaves us to infer causality from the smoking gun evidence. Put differently, we do not have a categorical answer to the research question. This thesis offers the first insights into how mandate adjustments of an already deployed UNPKO affect the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers in protecting civilians through organisational change. These findings have several implications: First, the result on mandate adjustment highlights the importance of not only equipping UNPKOs with a mandate to protect civilians but also making it the mission's primary goal to help establish coherence from the moment of deployment. Another implication is that mandate adjustment alone is insufficient; it must be supported by the appropriate troop numbers to maximise the organisational benefits following a mandate change. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the mere presence of UN peacekeepers does not automatically prevent rebel forces and armed militias from continuing hostilities or targeting civilians. Therefore, if UN peacekeepers are to effectively protect civilians, policymakers need to consider factors beyond their presence. The findings suggest certain avenues for future research. First, concerning the protection of civilian mandates, future studies could explore quantitative analysis of mandate adjustments to assess how 60 different modifications affect the protection of civilians from physical violence. Second, the absence of conclusive evidence offers an opportunity for further investigation into the relationship between proactive approaches to civilian protection and the reduction of civilian casualties resulting from deliberate targeting. Third, additional research could adopt a broader definition of the protection of civilians from physical violence to examine how it is influenced by mandate adjustments. Lastly, the findings related to the presence argument provide a chance for further testing with other cases of UNPKO to determine if similar results can be obtained. 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Political Analysis, 25(3), 344–362. https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.12 78 Appendix Table 4 List of Troops and Police Contributing Countries to MONUC and MONUSCO Troops Police Bangladesh Bangladesh India Nepal Nepal Kenya Kenya United Republic of Tanzania United Republic of Tanzania Sweden Morocco Morocco Uruguay Niger Pakistani Chad Egypt Bukina Faso Guatemala Tunisia Jordan Djibouti South Africa Mali Indonesia Ghana Malawi Pakistan Turkiye France Romania Indonesia Jordan Cameroon Senegal Russian Federation Togo Gambia Guinea 79