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oai:gupea.ub.gu.se:2077/545612017-12-05T02:36:12Zcom_2077_7453com_2077_8com_2077_10556col_2077_7454col_2077_10557

Bolkvadze, Ketevan 2017-12-04T13:56:49Z 2017-12-04T13:56:49Z 2017-12-04 978-91-984402-3-2 (PDF) 978-91-984402-2-5 (PRINT) 0346-5942 http://hdl.handle.net/2077/54561 Every year the European Union, as well as numerous other international organizations, states, and transnational networks wield ample resources to promote democratic governance in the developing countries. However, the impact of these reform promotion efforts varies widely. Many scholars have blamed structural conditions, or the inadequate rewards offered by the donors, as the reasons behind the partial impact of external actors. However, such approach portrays recipient governments as passive objects of the external influence, and overlooks the fact that domestic actors can, themselves, actively subvert or facilitate the reforms. In this dissertation, Ketevan Bolkvadze addresses this gap, by departing from the literature on hybrid regimes, and by placing incumbents and their incentives structures at the forefront of the analysis. The three different studies in this thesis zero in on the hybrid regimes in Moldova and Georgia, and examine how political fragmentation and incumbent’s timehorizons shaped their response to the EU-promoted reforms. The findings from this dissertation show that the external actors are often caught between a rock and a hard place. When they provide assistance for reforms in dominant-party hybrid regimes, incumbents might use this to bolster their popular support, while, in parallel, side-lining their opponents. Thus, donor assistance might help them perpetuate their political tenure. By contrast, while in fragmented hybrid regimes authoritarian tendencies are not an immediate risk, incumbent politicians often use the existing malfunctioning state institutions – and even donor assistance - for reaping personal monetary benefits. In the first case, donor assistance ends up being used for partisan purposes; in the second case, it risks being used for private ends. Both are troubling outcomes. eng Göteborg Studies in Politics 153 Bolkvadze, K. (2016) Cherry Picking EU Conditionality: Selective Compliance in Georgia’s Hybrid Regime, Europe-Asia Studies, 68:3, 409-440. ::doi::10.1080/09668136.2016.1154138 Bolkvadze, K. (2017) Hitting the Saturation Point: Unpacking the Politics of Bureaucratic Reforms in Hybrid Regimes, Democratization, 24:4, 751-769. ::doi::10.1080/13510347.2016.1247808 Bolkvadze, K. (2017) To Reform, or to Resist? Political Fragmentation and Judicial Corruption in Hybrid Regimes. Unpublished manuscript. hybrid regimes EU conditionality external reform promotion bureaucracy judiciary corruption Governing the Grey Zone: Why Hybrid Regimes in Europe’s Eastern Neighborhood Pursue Partial Governance Reforms Text Doctoral thesis Doctor of Philosophy ketevan.bolkvadze@gu.se kety.b.bolkvadze@gmail.com University of Gothenburg. Faculty of Social Sciences Göteborgs universitet. Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten Department of Political Science ; Statsvetenskapliga institutionen Fredagen den 26 januari 2018, kl. 13.15 i Torgny Segerstedtssalen, Universitetets huvudbyggnad, Vasaparken 1, Göteborg. 2018-01-26 SF open.access